feat(#93): implement agent spawn via federation
Implements FED-010: Agent Spawn via Federation feature that enables spawning and managing Claude agents on remote federated Mosaic Stack instances via COMMAND message type. Features: - Federation agent command types (spawn, status, kill) - FederationAgentService for handling agent operations - Integration with orchestrator's agent spawner/lifecycle services - API endpoints for spawning, querying status, and killing agents - Full command routing through federation COMMAND infrastructure - Comprehensive test coverage (12/12 tests passing) Architecture: - Hub → Spoke: Spawn agents on remote instances - Command flow: FederationController → FederationAgentService → CommandService → Remote Orchestrator - Response handling: Remote orchestrator returns agent status/results - Security: Connection validation, signature verification Files created: - apps/api/src/federation/types/federation-agent.types.ts - apps/api/src/federation/federation-agent.service.ts - apps/api/src/federation/federation-agent.service.spec.ts Files modified: - apps/api/src/federation/command.service.ts (agent command routing) - apps/api/src/federation/federation.controller.ts (agent endpoints) - apps/api/src/federation/federation.module.ts (service registration) - apps/orchestrator/src/api/agents/agents.controller.ts (status endpoint) - apps/orchestrator/src/api/agents/agents.module.ts (lifecycle integration) Testing: - 12/12 tests passing for FederationAgentService - All command service tests passing - TypeScript compilation successful - Linting passed Refs #93 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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# Issue #188: Sanitize Discord error logs to prevent secret exposure
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## Objective
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Implement log sanitization in Discord error logging to prevent exposure of sensitive information including API keys, tokens, credentials, and PII.
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## Security Context
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- **Priority**: P1 SECURITY
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- **Risk**: Credential leakage through logs
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- **Impact**: Could expose authentication tokens, API keys, passwords to unauthorized parties
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## Approach
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1. **Discovery Phase**: Locate all Discord logging points
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2. **Test Phase**: Write tests for log sanitization (TDD)
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3. **Implementation Phase**: Create sanitization utility
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@@ -16,6 +19,7 @@ Implement log sanitization in Discord error logging to prevent exposure of sensi
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5. **Verification Phase**: Ensure all tests pass with ≥85% coverage
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## Progress
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- [x] Create scratchpad
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- [x] Locate Discord error logging code
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- [x] Identify sensitive data patterns to redact
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@@ -30,6 +34,7 @@ Implement log sanitization in Discord error logging to prevent exposure of sensi
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## Discovery
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### Sensitive Data to Redact
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1. **Authentication**: API keys, tokens, bearer tokens
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2. **Headers**: Authorization headers, API key headers
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3. **Credentials**: Passwords, secrets, client secrets
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@@ -38,12 +43,14 @@ Implement log sanitization in Discord error logging to prevent exposure of sensi
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6. **Identifiers**: Workspace IDs (if considered sensitive)
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### Logging Points Found
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- **discord.service.ts:84** - `this.logger.error("Discord client error:", error)`
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- This logs raw error objects which may contain sensitive data
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- Error objects from Discord.js may contain authentication tokens
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- Error stack traces may reveal environment variables or configuration
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### Implementation Plan
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1. Create `apps/api/src/common/utils/log-sanitizer.ts`
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2. Create `apps/api/src/common/utils/log-sanitizer.spec.ts` (TDD - tests first)
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3. Implement sanitization patterns:
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@@ -56,12 +63,15 @@ Implement log sanitization in Discord error logging to prevent exposure of sensi
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5. Export from common/utils/index.ts
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## Testing
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TDD approach:
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1. RED - Write failing tests for sanitization
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2. GREEN - Implement minimal sanitization logic
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3. REFACTOR - Improve code quality
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Test cases:
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- Sanitize string with API key
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- Sanitize string with bearer token
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- Sanitize string with password
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@@ -76,22 +86,27 @@ Test cases:
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## Implementation Summary
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### Files Created
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1. `/home/localadmin/src/mosaic-stack/apps/api/src/common/utils/log-sanitizer.ts` - Core sanitization utility
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2. `/home/localadmin/src/mosaic-stack/apps/api/src/common/utils/log-sanitizer.spec.ts` - Comprehensive test suite (32 tests)
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### Files Modified
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1. `/home/localadmin/src/mosaic-stack/apps/api/src/common/utils/index.ts` - Export sanitization function
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2. `/home/localadmin/src/mosaic-stack/apps/api/src/bridge/discord/discord.service.ts` - Integrate sanitization
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3. `/home/localadmin/src/mosaic-stack/apps/api/src/bridge/discord/discord.service.spec.ts` - Add security tests
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### Test Results
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- **Log Sanitizer Tests**: 32/32 passed (100%)
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- **Discord Service Tests**: 25/25 passed (100%)
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- **Code Coverage**: 97.43% (exceeds 85% requirement)
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### Security Patterns Implemented
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The sanitizer detects and redacts:
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1. API keys (sk_live_*, pk_test_*)
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1. API keys (sk*live*_, pk*test*_)
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2. Bearer tokens
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3. Discord bot tokens (specific format)
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4. JWT tokens
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@@ -103,6 +118,7 @@ The sanitizer detects and redacts:
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10. Generic tokens in text
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### Key Features
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- Deep object traversal (handles nested objects and arrays)
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- Circular reference detection
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- Error object handling (preserves Error structure)
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@@ -113,7 +129,9 @@ The sanitizer detects and redacts:
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## Security Review
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### Threat Model
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**Before**: Discord error logging could expose:
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- Bot authentication tokens
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- API keys in error messages
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- User credentials from failed authentication
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@@ -123,7 +141,9 @@ The sanitizer detects and redacts:
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**After**: All sensitive patterns are automatically redacted before logging.
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### Validation
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Tested scenarios:
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1. ✅ Discord bot token in error message → Redacted
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2. ✅ API keys in error objects → Redacted
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3. ✅ Authorization headers → Redacted
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@@ -131,18 +151,21 @@ Tested scenarios:
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5. ✅ Non-sensitive error data → Preserved
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### Risk Assessment
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- **Pre-mitigation**: P1 - Critical (credential exposure possible)
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- **Post-mitigation**: P4 - Low (mechanical prevention in place)
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## Completion Status
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**Implementation: COMPLETE**
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- All code written and tested (57/57 tests passing)
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- 97.43% code coverage (exceeds 85% requirement)
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- TDD process followed correctly (RED → GREEN → REFACTOR)
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- Security validation complete
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**Commit Status: BLOCKED by pre-existing lint issues**
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- My files pass lint individually
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- Pre-commit hooks enforce package-level linting (per Quality Rails)
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- @mosaic/api package has 602 pre-existing lint errors
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@@ -151,6 +174,7 @@ Tested scenarios:
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**Recommendation:**
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Either:
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1. Fix all @mosaic/api lint issues first (out of scope for this issue)
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2. Temporarily disable strict linting for @mosaic/api during transition
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3. Commit with --no-verify and address lint in separate issue
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@@ -159,6 +183,7 @@ The security fix itself is complete and tested. The log sanitization is function
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and prevents secret exposure in Discord error logging.
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## Notes
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- Focus on Discord error logging as primary use case
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- Make utility reusable for other logging scenarios
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- Consider performance (this will be called frequently)
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