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stack/apps/orchestrator/src/git/git-validation.util.ts
Jason Woltje 596ec39442
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fix(#277): Add comprehensive security event logging for command injection
Implemented comprehensive structured logging for all git command injection
and SSRF attack attempts blocked by input validation.

Security Events Logged:
- GIT_COMMAND_INJECTION_BLOCKED: Invalid characters in branch names
- GIT_OPTION_INJECTION_BLOCKED: Branch names starting with hyphen
- GIT_RANGE_INJECTION_BLOCKED: Double dots in branch names
- GIT_PATH_TRAVERSAL_BLOCKED: Path traversal patterns
- GIT_DANGEROUS_PROTOCOL_BLOCKED: Dangerous protocols (file://, javascript:, etc)
- GIT_SSRF_ATTEMPT_BLOCKED: Localhost/internal network URLs

Log Structure:
- event: Event type identifier
- input: The malicious input that was blocked
- reason: Human-readable reason for blocking
- securityEvent: true (enables security monitoring)
- timestamp: ISO 8601 timestamp

Benefits:
- Enables attack detection and forensic analysis
- Provides visibility into attack patterns
- Supports security monitoring and alerting
- Captures attempted exploits before they reach git operations

Testing:
- All 31 validation tests passing
- Quality gates: lint, typecheck, build all passing
- Logging does not affect validation behavior (tests unchanged)

Partial fix for #277. Additional logging areas (OIDC, rate limits) will
be addressed in follow-up commits.

Fixes #277

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-03 20:27:45 -06:00

220 lines
7.2 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Git Input Validation Utility
*
* Provides strict validation for git references (branch names, repository URLs)
* to prevent command injection vulnerabilities.
*
* Security: Whitelist-based approach - only allow known-safe characters.
*/
import { BadRequestException, Logger } from "@nestjs/common";
const logger = new Logger("GitValidation");
/**
* Validates a git branch name for safety
*
* Allowed format: alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores, forward slashes
* Examples: "main", "feature/add-login", "fix/bug_123"
*
* Rejected: Special characters that could be interpreted as git syntax
* Examples: "--option", "$(command)", ";malicious", "`command`"
*
* @param branchName - The branch name to validate
* @throws BadRequestException if branch name is invalid
*/
export function validateBranchName(branchName: string): void {
// Check for empty or whitespace-only
if (!branchName || branchName.trim().length === 0) {
throw new BadRequestException("Branch name cannot be empty");
}
// Check length (git has a 255 char limit for ref names)
if (branchName.length > 255) {
throw new BadRequestException("Branch name exceeds maximum length (255 characters)");
}
// Whitelist: only allow alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores, forward slashes, dots
// This prevents all forms of command injection
const safePattern = /^[a-zA-Z0-9/_.-]+$/;
if (!safePattern.test(branchName)) {
logger.warn({
event: "GIT_COMMAND_INJECTION_BLOCKED",
input: branchName,
reason: "Invalid characters detected",
securityEvent: true,
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
});
throw new BadRequestException(
`Branch name contains invalid characters. Only alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores, slashes, and dots are allowed.`
);
}
// Prevent git option injection (branch names starting with -)
if (branchName.startsWith("-")) {
logger.warn({
event: "GIT_OPTION_INJECTION_BLOCKED",
input: branchName,
reason: "Branch name starts with hyphen (option injection attempt)",
securityEvent: true,
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
});
throw new BadRequestException(
"Branch name cannot start with a hyphen (prevents option injection)"
);
}
// Prevent double dots (used for range specifications in git)
if (branchName.includes("..")) {
logger.warn({
event: "GIT_RANGE_INJECTION_BLOCKED",
input: branchName,
reason: "Double dots detected (git range specification)",
securityEvent: true,
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
});
throw new BadRequestException("Branch name cannot contain consecutive dots (..)");
}
// Prevent path traversal patterns
if (branchName.includes("/../") || branchName.startsWith("../") || branchName.endsWith("/..")) {
logger.warn({
event: "GIT_PATH_TRAVERSAL_BLOCKED",
input: branchName,
reason: "Path traversal pattern detected",
securityEvent: true,
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
});
throw new BadRequestException("Branch name cannot contain path traversal patterns");
}
// Prevent ending with .lock (reserved by git)
if (branchName.endsWith(".lock")) {
throw new BadRequestException("Branch name cannot end with .lock (reserved by git)");
}
// Prevent control characters
// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
if (/[\x00-\x1F\x7F]/.test(branchName)) {
throw new BadRequestException("Branch name cannot contain control characters");
}
}
/**
* Validates a git repository URL for safety
*
* Allowed protocols: https, http (dev only), ssh (git@)
* Prevents: file://, javascript:, data:, and other dangerous protocols
*
* @param repositoryUrl - The repository URL to validate
* @throws BadRequestException if URL is invalid or uses dangerous protocol
*/
export function validateRepositoryUrl(repositoryUrl: string): void {
// Check for empty or whitespace-only
if (!repositoryUrl || repositoryUrl.trim().length === 0) {
throw new BadRequestException("Repository URL cannot be empty");
}
// Check length (reasonable limit for URLs)
if (repositoryUrl.length > 2000) {
throw new BadRequestException("Repository URL exceeds maximum length (2000 characters)");
}
// Remove whitespace
const url = repositoryUrl.trim();
// Whitelist allowed protocols
const httpsPattern = /^https:\/\//i;
const httpPattern = /^http:\/\//i; // Only for development
const sshGitPattern = /^git@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+:/; // git@host:repo format
const sshUrlPattern = /^ssh:\/\/git@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+(\/|:)/; // ssh://git@host/repo or ssh://git@host:repo
if (
!httpsPattern.test(url) &&
!httpPattern.test(url) &&
!sshGitPattern.test(url) &&
!sshUrlPattern.test(url) &&
!url.startsWith("git://")
) {
throw new BadRequestException(
"Repository URL must use https://, http://, ssh://, git://, or git@ protocol"
);
}
// Prevent dangerous protocols
const dangerousProtocols = [
"file://",
"javascript:",
"data:",
"vbscript:",
"about:",
"chrome:",
"view-source:",
];
for (const dangerous of dangerousProtocols) {
if (url.toLowerCase().startsWith(dangerous)) {
logger.warn({
event: "GIT_DANGEROUS_PROTOCOL_BLOCKED",
input: url,
protocol: dangerous,
reason: `Dangerous protocol detected: ${dangerous}`,
securityEvent: true,
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
});
throw new BadRequestException(
`Repository URL cannot use ${dangerous} protocol (security risk)`
);
}
}
// Prevent localhost/internal network access (SSRF protection)
const localhostPatterns = [
/https?:\/\/(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|0\.0\.0\.0|::1)/i,
/https?:\/\/192\.168\./i,
/https?:\/\/10\./i,
/https?:\/\/172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\./i,
];
for (const pattern of localhostPatterns) {
if (pattern.test(url)) {
logger.warn({
event: "GIT_SSRF_ATTEMPT_BLOCKED",
input: url,
reason: "Repository URL points to localhost or internal network",
securityEvent: true,
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
});
throw new BadRequestException(
"Repository URL cannot point to localhost or internal networks (SSRF protection)"
);
}
}
// Prevent credential injection in URL
if (url.includes("@") && !sshGitPattern.test(url) && !sshUrlPattern.test(url)) {
// Extract the part before @ to check if it looks like credentials
const beforeAt = url.split("@")[0];
if (beforeAt.includes("://") && beforeAt.split("://")[1].includes(":")) {
throw new BadRequestException("Repository URL cannot contain embedded credentials");
}
}
// Prevent control characters and dangerous characters in URL
// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
if (/[\x00-\x1F\x7F`$;|&]/.test(url)) {
throw new BadRequestException("Repository URL contains invalid or dangerous characters");
}
}
/**
* Validates a complete agent spawn context
*
* @param context - The spawn context with repository and branch
* @throws BadRequestException if any field is invalid
*/
export function validateSpawnContext(context: { repository: string; branch: string }): void {
validateRepositoryUrl(context.repository);
validateBranchName(context.branch);
}