Files
stack/apps/api/src/common/guards/csrf.guard.ts
Jason Woltje 99a4567e32
All checks were successful
ci/woodpecker/push/ci Pipeline was successful
fix(api): skip CSRF for Bearer-authenticated API clients (#622)
Co-authored-by: Jason Woltje <jason@diversecanvas.com>
Co-committed-by: Jason Woltje <jason@diversecanvas.com>
2026-03-01 19:06:14 +00:00

126 lines
3.6 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* CSRF Guard
*
* Implements CSRF protection using double-submit cookie pattern with session binding.
* Validates that:
* 1. CSRF token in cookie matches token in header
* 2. Token HMAC is valid for the current user session
*
* Usage:
* - Apply to controllers handling state-changing operations
* - Use @SkipCsrf() decorator to exempt specific endpoints
* - Safe methods (GET, HEAD, OPTIONS) are automatically exempted
*/
import {
Injectable,
CanActivate,
ExecutionContext,
ForbiddenException,
Logger,
} from "@nestjs/common";
import { Reflector } from "@nestjs/core";
import { Request } from "express";
import { CsrfService } from "../services/csrf.service";
import type { AuthenticatedUser } from "../types/user.types";
export const SKIP_CSRF_KEY = "skipCsrf";
interface RequestWithUser extends Request {
user?: AuthenticatedUser;
}
@Injectable()
export class CsrfGuard implements CanActivate {
private readonly logger = new Logger(CsrfGuard.name);
constructor(
private reflector: Reflector,
private csrfService: CsrfService
) {}
canActivate(context: ExecutionContext): boolean {
// Check if endpoint is marked to skip CSRF
const skipCsrf = this.reflector.getAllAndOverride<boolean>(SKIP_CSRF_KEY, [
context.getHandler(),
context.getClass(),
]);
if (skipCsrf) {
return true;
}
const request = context.switchToHttp().getRequest<RequestWithUser>();
// Exempt safe HTTP methods (GET, HEAD, OPTIONS)
if (["GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"].includes(request.method)) {
return true;
}
const authHeader = request.headers.authorization;
if (typeof authHeader === "string" && authHeader.startsWith("Bearer ")) {
return true;
}
// Get CSRF token from cookie and header
const cookies = request.cookies as Record<string, string> | undefined;
const cookieToken = cookies?.["csrf-token"];
const headerToken = request.headers["x-csrf-token"] as string | undefined;
// Validate tokens exist and match
if (!cookieToken || !headerToken) {
this.logger.warn({
event: "CSRF_TOKEN_MISSING",
method: request.method,
path: request.path,
hasCookie: !!cookieToken,
hasHeader: !!headerToken,
securityEvent: true,
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
});
throw new ForbiddenException("CSRF token missing");
}
if (cookieToken !== headerToken) {
this.logger.warn({
event: "CSRF_TOKEN_MISMATCH",
method: request.method,
path: request.path,
securityEvent: true,
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
});
throw new ForbiddenException("CSRF token mismatch");
}
// Validate session binding via HMAC when user context is available.
// CsrfGuard is a global guard (APP_GUARD) that runs before per-controller
// AuthGuard, so request.user may not be populated yet. In that case, the
// double-submit cookie match above is sufficient CSRF protection.
const userId = request.user?.id;
if (userId) {
if (!this.csrfService.validateToken(cookieToken, userId)) {
this.logger.warn({
event: "CSRF_SESSION_BINDING_INVALID",
method: request.method,
path: request.path,
securityEvent: true,
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
});
throw new ForbiddenException("CSRF token not bound to session");
}
} else {
this.logger.debug({
event: "CSRF_SKIP_SESSION_BINDING",
method: request.method,
path: request.path,
reason: "User context not yet available (global guard runs before AuthGuard)",
});
}
return true;
}
}