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Co-authored-by: Jason Woltje <jason@diversecanvas.com> Co-committed-by: Jason Woltje <jason@diversecanvas.com>
121 lines
3.5 KiB
TypeScript
121 lines
3.5 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* CSRF Guard
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*
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* Implements CSRF protection using double-submit cookie pattern with session binding.
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* Validates that:
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* 1. CSRF token in cookie matches token in header
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* 2. Token HMAC is valid for the current user session
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*
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* Usage:
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* - Apply to controllers handling state-changing operations
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* - Use @SkipCsrf() decorator to exempt specific endpoints
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* - Safe methods (GET, HEAD, OPTIONS) are automatically exempted
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*/
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import {
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Injectable,
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CanActivate,
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ExecutionContext,
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ForbiddenException,
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Logger,
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} from "@nestjs/common";
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import { Reflector } from "@nestjs/core";
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import { Request } from "express";
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import { CsrfService } from "../services/csrf.service";
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import type { AuthenticatedUser } from "../types/user.types";
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export const SKIP_CSRF_KEY = "skipCsrf";
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interface RequestWithUser extends Request {
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user?: AuthenticatedUser;
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}
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@Injectable()
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export class CsrfGuard implements CanActivate {
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private readonly logger = new Logger(CsrfGuard.name);
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constructor(
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private reflector: Reflector,
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private csrfService: CsrfService
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) {}
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canActivate(context: ExecutionContext): boolean {
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// Check if endpoint is marked to skip CSRF
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const skipCsrf = this.reflector.getAllAndOverride<boolean>(SKIP_CSRF_KEY, [
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context.getHandler(),
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context.getClass(),
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]);
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if (skipCsrf) {
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return true;
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}
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const request = context.switchToHttp().getRequest<RequestWithUser>();
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// Exempt safe HTTP methods (GET, HEAD, OPTIONS)
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if (["GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"].includes(request.method)) {
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return true;
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}
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// Get CSRF token from cookie and header
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const cookies = request.cookies as Record<string, string> | undefined;
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const cookieToken = cookies?.["csrf-token"];
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const headerToken = request.headers["x-csrf-token"] as string | undefined;
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// Validate tokens exist and match
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if (!cookieToken || !headerToken) {
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this.logger.warn({
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event: "CSRF_TOKEN_MISSING",
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method: request.method,
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path: request.path,
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hasCookie: !!cookieToken,
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hasHeader: !!headerToken,
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securityEvent: true,
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timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
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});
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throw new ForbiddenException("CSRF token missing");
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}
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if (cookieToken !== headerToken) {
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this.logger.warn({
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event: "CSRF_TOKEN_MISMATCH",
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method: request.method,
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path: request.path,
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securityEvent: true,
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timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
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});
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throw new ForbiddenException("CSRF token mismatch");
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}
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// Validate session binding via HMAC when user context is available.
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// CsrfGuard is a global guard (APP_GUARD) that runs before per-controller
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// AuthGuard, so request.user may not be populated yet. In that case, the
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// double-submit cookie match above is sufficient CSRF protection.
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const userId = request.user?.id;
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if (userId) {
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if (!this.csrfService.validateToken(cookieToken, userId)) {
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this.logger.warn({
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event: "CSRF_SESSION_BINDING_INVALID",
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method: request.method,
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path: request.path,
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securityEvent: true,
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timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
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});
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throw new ForbiddenException("CSRF token not bound to session");
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}
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} else {
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this.logger.debug({
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event: "CSRF_SKIP_SESSION_BINDING",
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method: request.method,
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path: request.path,
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reason: "User context not yet available (global guard runs before AuthGuard)",
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});
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}
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return true;
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}
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}
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