# Security Review — Issue #756

**Scope:** final current uncommitted Discord plugin, shared channel contract, gateway ingress, AgentService, and plugin registration delta  
**Snapshot:** `plugins/discord/src/index.ts` SHA-256 `5ee6b6aa4e2ff349f137f76b918d02c1254e12066cb48b136048e57bef36fdb2`  
**Verdict:** **APPROVE**

## Final remediation verification

| Area | Current evidence | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Attachment confidentiality and integrity | Ingress accepts bounded attachment metadata only when URL is HTTPS, query-free, fragment-free, and credential-free. Count, aggregate size, field length, MIME, and finite non-negative size validation apply before dispatch; `sizeBytes` is signed and retained. | Pass |
| Trusted agent selection | Each binding names a required trusted `agentConfigId`; gateway resolves that config server-side and requires its configured name to equal the binding logical-agent ID. Client/provider input cannot select the agent for Discord ingress. | Pass |
| Privileged operation routing | Gateway revalidates the binding and requires the signed conversation identity to match the configured logical agent before approve/stop actions. Paired admin identity and one-time approval checks remain enforced. | Pass |
| Egress containment and delivery | Egress requires an aligned message/route, configured parent or exact observed thread target, and cleans response routes after completion, errors, typed-ingress failure, or bounded-map pressure. | Pass |
| Side-effect limits | Per guild/authorized-parent/user rolling message and thread limits execute before thread creation or dispatch. | Pass |

## Security controls reviewed

- Default-deny guild, parent-channel, user, configured pairing, and role checks precede rate consumption and all side effects.
- Gateway independently enforces Discord service authentication, HMAC integrity, allowlists, binding/role checks, attachment validation, and replay-ID rejection.
- Thread authorization uses only the Discord thread parent; category parents cannot authorize ingress.
- Agent-visible attachment references are explicitly labeled untrusted; binary content is not embedded. Persisted attachment name/URL values are redacted.
- Egress uses deterministic nonces, bounded transient retry, typed terminal errors, and does not send to forged targets.
- No secrets or message content were added to plugin logs.

## Verification evidence

| Command | Result |
|---|---|
| `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/discord-plugin test` | PASS — 44 tests; v8 coverage: 92.18% statements/lines, 86.55% branches, 100% functions |
| `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/discord-plugin typecheck` | PASS |
| `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/types typecheck` | PASS |
| `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway typecheck` | PASS |
| `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway exec vitest run src/plugin/discord-ingress.security.spec.ts src/agent/__tests__/agent-service-ownership.test.ts` | PASS — 29 tests |
| `git diff --check` | PASS |

No unresolved critical, high, medium, or low security findings were identified in the reviewed final delta.
