✔ launch identity is stamped, payload identity is refused and stale holder cannot send (145.699342ms)
✔ decision classes route from policy; gated resolution is human-only, choice and target must match (246.753955ms)
✔ claim exclusion, holder release, gated revoke and rerouting to a new holder are atomic (242.099071ms)
✔ launch events require a human CLI capability; generic emit cannot forge authority events (154.800709ms)
✔ within-role decisions close atomically and invalid options or blocking omissions refuse (152.866183ms)
✔ observer capabilities read human inbox but cannot mutate or forge launch identity (143.13816ms)
✔ task action subjects and linked decision trail are complete and ordered (272.254567ms)
✔ launch binding is durable and reconnecting requires the identical trusted record (111.423704ms)
✔ business isolation includes inherited object names and cross-business message references (219.984118ms)
✔ authority never transfers between action, run, target, unresolved or replaced role holder (435.026479ms)
✔ task projection uses schema current view, skipping earlier and equal-start polls (125.65938ms)
✔ revocation permanently bars the old run from reclaiming first, including after broker restart (204.075537ms)
✔ empty message references refuse before storage; refusal-evidence failure stays a typed error (113.966122ms)
✔ both arbiters require human resolution when their cross-role route is themselves (183.453882ms)
✔ S1 adapter takes resolved limits and refs, rejects mismatched instance, never mutates input (2.308315ms)
✔ only validated broker references load; returned data and exceptions cannot expose a known token (5.770669ms)
✔ bad file modes, symlinks, repository/data paths, malformed tokens and missing dates refuse (2.834462ms)
✔ expiry refuses use and env references never become client data (0.858583ms)
✔ S1 parsed service refs work, service mismatch refuses, Gitea rotation due is a warning state (1.94638ms)
✔ opaque tokens shorter than 16 characters refuse before use (0.59084ms)
✔ endLaunch writes session.ended, releases the run claim and kills its capabilities (116.677841ms)
✔ endLaunch refuses an unknown run, a second end and a rebind of the ended run (131.158771ms)
✔ a restarted broker refuses to rebind an ended run; a refused rebind leaves the run unbound (147.524656ms)
✔ endLaunch leaves a claim another run took alone (161.634957ms)
✔ refuse records action.refused against the caller with the code only (125.876016ms)
✖ launches off refuses role.launch with launch-revoked until launches on (142.300893ms)
✔ broker process: launch ops authorize role.launch, record refusals and end runs (218.862179ms)
✔ human proof binds CLI entry, process start and nonce; agents and incomplete ancestry refuse (4.607107ms)
✔ process reader gets own kernel identity without exposing environment values (0.740531ms)
✔ EACCES ancestor environments skip only markers; commands and registered launches still refuse (1.032764ms)
✔ real pid 1 remains inspectable when its environment is protected (0.405112ms)
✔ within-role sends cite an open gated launch decision without spending it or naming it in grants (184.174358ms)
✔ missing and foreign-business citations refuse and roll back message and grant (169.894038ms)
✔ cross-role sends still need a matching resolved decision and consume it once (226.260541ms)
✔ broker process binds trusted launches, offers reader capabilities, refuses human mutation, closes cleanly (169.671805ms)
✔ startup token refusal returns safe code without value or partial listening broker (37.78021ms)
✔ loaded fixture token is absent from socket replies and SQLite, including refusal evidence (175.279268ms)
✔ killed broker leaves an explicit stale lock; another process cannot silently reclaim it (167.28754ms)
✔ trusted host registers later launches; socket clients never have a registration verb (167.034327ms)
✔ runtime excludes declared project roots even when host supplies no repoRoots (36.525098ms)
✔ a refused launch binding leaves the broker and existing capabilities alive; bad protocol stops it (154.714552ms)
✔ v3b prototype refusals, views and append-only mutations (950.500775ms)
✔ gated approval authorizes once, survives store reopen, and fresh approval works (234.901997ms)
✔ another run cannot consume an approval; a failed check leaves it usable (202.680739ms)
✔ two scheduled callers have exactly one grant and one consumed refusal (159.001809ms)
✔ failed commit rolls consumption back; cross-role consumes and within-role stays reusable (284.633069ms)
✔ class drift gated to cross-role refuses before consumption (169.400824ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to gated refuses before consumption (304.313418ms)
✔ class drift gated to within-role refuses before consumption (205.104985ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to within-role refuses before consumption (247.99929ms)
✔ class drift within-role to gated refuses before consumption (366.042302ms)
✔ class drift within-role to cross-role refuses before consumption (170.491063ms)
✔ message.send consumes approval and prevents a later send or authorize (192.831049ms)
✔ role.revoke consumes approval and prevents a later revoke or authorize (206.596535ms)
✔ creates private WAL store and excludes a second writer until explicit close (113.23738ms)
✔ rollback is atomic and schema metadata is checked against trusted DDL, not just itself (162.625023ms)
✔ existing empty database and symlink runtime directory refuse, never initialize over damage (167.236319ms)
✔ crash during a transaction recovers no partial event after explicit fixture-only lock removal (170.327072ms)
✔ writer refuses mixed at/read_at forms atomically, even through trusted SQL helpers (93.442914ms)
✔ async transactions refuse before invoking their function (80.944013ms)
✔ recordTask keeps sync reads and a role write apart (160.829393ms)
✔ read_at must be one canonical UTC format, so the projection compares strings safely (107.353806ms)
✔ a bad entry refuses the whole record (101.799967ms)
✔ taskView reads the projection for one business (116.999697ms)
✔ requestTask hands only a holder and a task verb to the handler, and records refusals (233.715142ms)
✔ the server sends task verbs to the adapter with its own timeout; other verbs stay synchronous (395.045161ms)
✔ without an adapter the server refuses every task verb (314.479348ms)
✔ the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one (253.582773ms)
✔ the process loads the S3 adapter from plain-data trackers (438.173741ms)
✔ socket capability stamps launch identity; shared views use wire, no SQL client (128.222648ms)
✔ two wire claims serialize; a lost reply never automatically retries (174.922863ms)
✔ malformed, oversized and identity-forging envelopes refuse without echoing input (100.447962ms)
✔ client preserves UTF-8 when a response divides a multibyte character (11.6814ms)
✔ committed mutation followed by dropped reply reports unknown and is never retried (126.768521ms)
ℹ tests 74
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 73
ℹ fail 1
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 2840.450299

✖ failing tests:

test at packages/bus/tests/end-launch.test.mjs:121:1
✖ launches off refuses role.launch with launch-revoked until launches on (142.300893ms)
  AssertionError [ERR_ASSERTION]: Missing expected exception.
      at TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///home/jwoltje/darkwing-scratch/r41c/wt/packages/bus/tests/end-launch.test.mjs:128:10)
      at Test.runInAsyncScope (node:async_hooks:226:14)
      at Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1402:25)
      at Test.processPendingSubtests (node:internal/test_runner/test:974:18)
      at Test.postRun (node:internal/test_runner/test:1542:19)
      at Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1467:12)
      at async Test.processPendingSubtests (node:internal/test_runner/test:974:7) {
    generatedMessage: false,
    code: 'ERR_ASSERTION',
    actual: undefined,
    expected: { code: 'launch-revoked' },
    operator: 'throws',
    diff: 'simple'
  }
