# Seat Identity & Credentials Guide

Every agent that touches a Mosaic-managed git host acts as a named seat with its own credential.
This guide is how that works on a host, and what an agent must never do with it.

The mechanism below is the framework's. The specific paths, seats and stores are per-host:
measure yours before trusting any of them.

## The rule

**One seat, one identity, one token file.** A seat never borrows another seat's credential, never
falls back to a shared owner account, and never carries a second copy of its own token. A second
copy is drift, and drift surfaces as the stale copy returning 401 — which reads as a revoked
token and sends whoever debugs it somewhere else entirely.

A credential refusal is correct behavior, not a bug to route around. If git refuses with a
fail-closed diagnostic, the fix is to provision or correct _your_ identity. Escalate; do not
substitute.

## How a credential is resolved

Find the helper the way **git** does, not with `command -v`. Git runs whatever
`credential.helper` names, and on a Mosaic host that is an absolute path — so a PATH lookup
answers a different question and the two disagree the moment the PATH copy is removed. It was
removed on hosts that have completed that migration.

```bash
git config --get-all credential.helper     # every helper, in the order git tries them
```

Git tries **each** configured helper in turn until one supplies a credential. A fail-closed
helper supplies nothing, so a second helper configured behind it silently becomes the one that
answers. When you care which binary serves a credential, read the whole list.
Resolve all three forms git accepts — absolute path, `!command`, and a bare name looked up on
PATH — not just the one your host happens to use.

The helper resolves the identity in this order:

1. `$MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY`
2. `git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity`
3. the username git supplied on stdin

It maps the host to a store prefix — `git.mosaicstack.dev` to `gitea-mosaicstack`,
`git.uscllc.com` to `gitea-usc`. Any other host is declined quietly with rc=0, which is not an
error and raises no escalation.

Then it chooses **one** of two stores, and reads exactly one file:

```
brain_home = ${MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME:-$HOME/.mosaic}

seat     — when $brain_home/fleet/agents/<identity>/ EXISTS
           $brain_home/fleet/agents/<identity>/secrets/<prefix>-<identity>.token
service  — otherwise
           ~/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/<prefix>-<identity>.token
```

**There is no precedence between the two and no fallback from one to the other.** The existence
of the seat directory decides it. A seat that has a directory and an empty slot fails closed; it
does not reach the service store. That is the intended behavior — the alternative is an agent
silently acting as somebody else.

If the file is unreadable the helper **fails closed**: it refuses and writes a durable record to
the escalation spool. It does not fall back to a shared account. The record is what exists — any
alerting built on top of it is a separate, best-effort concern and is not performed by the helper,
so do not wait for a notification that nothing sends. That fallback is what made
`usc/uconnect#3084` unattributable, and it was removed deliberately.

Verify the helper you actually have:

```bash
h=$(git config --get credential.helper)
grep -c 'FAIL CLOSED'  "$h"    # expect >= 1
grep -c 'fleet/agents' "$h"    # expect >= 1; 0 means it predates mosaicstack#1311
```

## Where a seat's token lives

The seat slot is the **only** copy:

```
~/.mosaic/fleet/agents/<seat>/secrets/<prefix>-<seat>.token      real file, mode 600
```

The framework store at `~/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/` holds tokens for **service
identities only** — identities with no seat directory. A seat's token does not belong there.

Before mosaicstack#1311 the deployed helper knew only the service store, and seats were bridged
with a symlink from the store into the slot. **Those bridges must be removed once a seat-aware helper is deployed, and must not be
recreated.** Remove them only after the helper can reach the slot without them; the reverse order
takes every seat offline. A symlink
is not how a system finds a credential; the helper resolving the right store is.

`.principal` and `.scopes` beside the token are grant records, not secrets. They are tracked. The
`.token` never is.

### Provisioning a new seat

1. Create `~/.mosaic/fleet/agents/<seat>/secrets/` mode 700.
2. Write `.principal` (the Gitea login) and `.scopes` (the granted scopes), mode 600.
3. The estate operator mints the token into the seat slot, mode 600. Agents do not mint their
   own, and do not ask another agent to mint one for them.
4. Verify with an authenticated `GET /user` and confirm the returned login is the seat, **not the
   minting account**. Record the date in `ENTITY.md`. Never record the value.

There is no step that links the framework store to the slot. A seat-aware helper reads the slot
directly; a store entry pointing at a slot is the bridge described in **Where a seat's token lives** above,
and it is not part of provisioning.

Until step 3, the seat is unminted and its git writes fail closed. That is the designed state and
is safe to launch in — the seat is told at launch so it does not discover it mid-task.

## Acting as yourself

Name the identity on every invocation:

```bash
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<seat> git push
git -c user.name=<seat> -c user.email=<seat>@mosaicstack.dev commit -m "..."
```

**Never persist `git config mosaic.gitIdentity` inside a `~/src/stack` worktree.** Every worktree
of that clone shares one `.git/config`, so a persisted identity there silently rewrites the
identity of every other seat working in that clone. The per-invocation form has no exception.

## Handling

1. **Never print a token value.** Compare by SHA-256 digest, or write `<REDACTED>`.
2. **Never stage a `.token`, `secrets.json`, or `ENTITY.md`.** Stage explicit paths and **never
   `git add -A`** — `secrets/*.principal` and `secrets/*.scopes` are covered by no ignore rule.
3. **Never place a token in an environment variable** in an interactive session. A `declare -x`
   dump has leaked the whole environment to a terminal before.
4. **No real credential or operator data on a sandbox VM, ever.**
