npm notice run test
npm notice run node --test tests/*.test.mjs
✔ agents: a held role with nothing on the bus is idle; a role session gets the claim rows unchanged (208.277453ms)
✔ agents: working counts what the holder received and has not read; routed alone is not working (276.041528ms)
✔ agents: input needed is the role's open decisions routed to the human, gated first, then oldest (410.424969ms)
✔ agents: working wins over waiting, and Input needed still shows (258.712221ms)
✔ agents: a new holder doesn't inherit what the last one left unread; decisions stay with the role (270.012787ms)
✔ agents: state reads only its own business, even for a run name both use (290.987456ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder released unread is stranded; the next holder gets nothing and cannot read it (330.27816ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder read is not stranded; one the current holder has not read is not listed (292.950608ms)
✔ agents: stranded is oldest first and capped at 50 for a role (1075.866297ms)
✔ agents: stranded is per role and per business (413.961354ms)
✔ agents: a message routed to a held role and not yet received is not stranded (223.500568ms)
✔ REQ-DEC an approval outlives its run and a broker restart; a new run of the instance consumes it once (383.275857ms)
✔ REQ-DEC another instance of the same definition cannot consume an approval, and its refusal consumes nothing (245.276508ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread approval is consumed only by a run holding the same thread (361.676779ms)
✔ REQ-DEC a later run of the same instance supersedes an open decision; another instance cannot (344.032352ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread decision is superseded only from the same thread (401.910413ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread instance decision raised before row 121 is not consumed or superseded by any thread run (528.952875ms)
✔ launch identity is stamped, payload identity is refused and stale holder cannot send (235.905474ms)
✔ decision classes route from policy; gated resolution is human-only, choice and target must match (352.94321ms)
✔ claim exclusion, holder release, gated revoke and rerouting to a new holder are atomic (361.403791ms)
✔ launch events require a human CLI capability; generic emit cannot forge authority events (276.869686ms)
✔ within-role decisions close atomically and invalid options or blocking omissions refuse (264.456803ms)
✔ a recommendation that is not exactly one option key refuses invalid-recommendation after the options (419.563048ms)
✔ observer capabilities read human inbox but cannot mutate or forge launch identity (237.142667ms)
✔ task action subjects and linked decision trail are complete and ordered (264.620776ms)
✔ launch binding is durable and reconnecting requires the identical trusted record (201.488089ms)
✔ business isolation includes inherited object names and cross-business message references (211.7141ms)
✔ authority never transfers between action, target, unresolved or replaced role holder; a later run of the instance keeps it (302.212703ms)
✔ task projection uses schema current view, skipping earlier and equal-start polls (247.931731ms)
✔ revocation permanently bars the old run from reclaiming first, including after broker restart (293.508535ms)
✔ empty message references refuse before storage; refusal-evidence failure stays a typed error (168.649852ms)
✔ both arbiters require human resolution when their cross-role route is themselves (363.052343ms)
✔ the shipped coder role raises task.reassign as gated to the human; task.scope.change stays cross-role (193.288859ms)
✔ S1 adapter takes resolved limits and refs, rejects mismatched instance, never mutates input (3.273893ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1, REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff ends a run with a reason and no decision, and the reason is logged (328.227898ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still needs a resolved decision to revoke (448.249381ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: storage accepts a revoke with a reason or a decision and aborts one with neither (348.07844ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff may still cite a decision, and a decision alone is the old path (344.09815ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still ends a run through a resolved decision, which is recorded and has no reason (400.365925ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a reason is required, bounded, and never sent with a decision (418.491194ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the chief of staff cannot end its own run; its end of the assistant gets past the protection (363.857695ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: organization.set from the chief of staff reaches the shared writer, named as the actor (247.029503ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: a refused organization.set logs action.refused and no action.allowed, like a refused limits.set (422.861924ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: organization.set is refused for every caller whose role file lacks organization.change (389.447697ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: the chief of staff is logged as allowed, and organization.set takes only the human's keys (495.460221ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-3, REQ-LIMIT-1: a chief-of-staff change is validated, written and logged like a human's; an invalid one is refused (655.179487ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2, REQ-COS-1: the 3c→3d migration lets the chief of staff end a held role with a reason; neither is still refused (1242.556027ms)
✔ comment cursors isolate businesses, move only forward and remain append-only (192.916096ms)
✔ only trusted sync writes validated cursors; events and cursor share rollback (188.060795ms)
✔ explicit 3b copy migration preserves evidence and opens as 3f; normal startup never migrates (1182.68694ms)
✔ migration refuses active writers and drifted legacy schemas, with no partial upgrade (2064.23543ms)
✔ named migration registry chains 3b through 3f to a fixture-only future version in order (1049.547344ms)
✔ migration refuses mismatched source metadata without changing schema or evidence (969.198033ms)
✔ offline command migrates only the supplied fixture root and reports usage errors (1247.718607ms)
✔ credentials gives human and reader sessions service, account, role, date and state, and nothing else (150.376098ms)
✔ credentials refuses a role session and any argument (236.614126ms)
✔ credentials reads the status on each request, and a broker without one lists none (261.313814ms)
✔ the broker process answers credentials without a token, path or variable in its output, log or store (298.988107ms)
✔ only validated broker references load; returned data and exceptions cannot expose a known token (6.333326ms)
✔ bad file modes, symlinks, repository/data paths, malformed tokens and missing dates refuse (3.478106ms)
✔ expiry refuses use and env references never become client data (0.913367ms)
✔ S1 parsed service refs work, service mismatch refuses, Gitea rotation due is a warning state (4.182647ms)
✔ opaque tokens shorter than 16 characters refuse before use (0.46132ms)
✔ each C-suite role file carries the same two lists: human, chief-of-staff, pm, cto (1.974968ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (643.493812ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (657.951875ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (634.839908ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (679.653964ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (482.957499ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (537.747135ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (612.896568ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (573.844065ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (489.184026ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (670.547333ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (686.939941ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (551.829752ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (591.648013ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (610.020191ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (612.06306ms)
✔ a human resolve sends the raising role one message from the human, and its request is the answer (301.74803ms)
✔ a cross-role decision resolved by its arbiter comes from that role and run, with no request (338.06041ms)
✔ a human withdraw sends one message with the note (300.288431ms)
✔ a human seen before the close leaves the request on the close's answer, not the seen (404.88797ms)
✔ the raising run's withdraw, a supersede, a within-role raise and seen send nothing (405.91572ms)
✔ refused closes send nothing: invalid-choice, decision-closed, not-resolver (445.290674ms)
✔ a raising role nobody holds at the close gets the message on the next claim (399.169579ms)
✔ a human DECISION send keeps its own instruction as the request, not a close's answer (263.357263ms)
✔ a cross-role raise whose arbiter the raiser does not hear from is refused and stores nothing (389.870027ms)
✔ a gated raise by a role that does not hear from the human is refused and stores nothing (387.706376ms)
✔ a route the raiser hears from is allowed, checked from the route to the raiser (476.8234ms)
✔ a refused supersede withdraws nothing (426.206642ms)
✔ the assistant's within-role and gated raises still work (448.56594ms)
✔ roles lists open decisions routed to a role, and never the human inbox (300.349445ms)
✔ recent lists closed decisions of every route, newest close first, with how each closed (392.107293ms)
✔ recent gives the closing event as closed when the decision was seen first (421.856936ms)
✔ recent stops at RECENT rows (1176.685992ms)
✔ every row is what trail already gives the same session for that id (372.163259ms)
✔ a role session can't list decisions, so it can't read another role's open decisions (419.264304ms)
✔ decisions is a read: one business, strict arguments, nothing written (525.049539ms)
✔ endLaunch writes session.ended, releases the run claim and kills its capabilities (192.378683ms)
✔ endLaunch refuses an unknown run, a second end and a rebind of the ended run (180.676116ms)
✔ a restarted broker refuses to rebind an ended run; a refused rebind leaves the run unbound (189.726501ms)
✔ endLaunch leaves a claim another run took alone (240.246529ms)
✔ refuse records action.refused against the caller with the code only (210.343038ms)
✔ launches off refuses role.launch with launch-revoked until launches on (258.161931ms)
✔ broker process: launch ops authorize role.launch, record refusals and end runs (467.015424ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-1: the broker hard waits are exactly the list, and match the business vocabulary (1.932827ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-2: a business granting a hard wait at either class is refused; the actions that left are grantable (151.718929ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: every hard wait goes to the human, cited or not, and the arbiter cannot resolve it (978.979482ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a gated raise citing the current spec goes to the arbiter for its domain; uncited, to the human (606.711157ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: an arbiter-approved cited gated decision authorizes the raiser, and the human cannot resolve it (360.111405ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a cited merge raised by merge-gate goes to the technical arbiter; a merge raised without the grant routes by citation (414.786356ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a stale or unconfirmed citation refuses without a decision; an arbiter raising its own goes to the human (295.337028ms)
✔ Q169: the chief of staff's end of the assistant is not refused role-end-refused; its own run and another ender's are (249.769342ms)
✔ Q169: another role's cited revoke of the assistant, resolved by an arbiter, is refused (336.548721ms)
✔ Q169: a revoke of the assistant citing a decision the human resolved is not refused by the protection (272.363728ms)
✔ Q169: a cited revoke of a role not in END_PROTECTED still goes to the arbiter, and executes (300.409772ms)
✔ Q169: a role granted role.revoke at either class still sends a revoke of the assistant to the human (337.450352ms)
✔ human proof binds CLI entry, process start and nonce; agents and incomplete ancestry refuse (1.555359ms)
✔ process reader gets own kernel identity without exposing environment values (0.492618ms)
✔ EACCES ancestor environments skip only markers; commands and registered launches still refuse (0.674902ms)
✔ real pid 1 remains inspectable when its environment is protected (0.25377ms)
✔ a message to a stopped role sends launch.by one notice, and the result says so (279.786499ms)
✔ a message to a role outside launch.instances says so in its result and in the notice (222.041451ms)
✔ a message to a running role sends no notice and its result is unchanged (205.998789ms)
✔ a re-route at a claim, a release and claim, and a broker restart send no second notice (352.011006ms)
✔ a run launched but not yet claimed counts as no holder (158.169755ms)
✔ no notice for a message to launch.by, from it, from a tester, to the human, or in a thread to a thread instance (408.15513ms)
✔ a business with no launch block tells nobody and says there is no launcher (205.306829ms)
✔ the notice sender stays internal: no role is named _bus and no caller can send as it or to it (479.134986ms)
✔ limits binds actor from human proof and rejects role, reader, tester and forged actor (281.662527ms)
✔ runtime wires verified human settings to the actual shared file writer and actor receipt (394.192168ms)
✔ uncertain organization receipts leave bus startup and reads alone but refuse writes until reconciled (577.809154ms)
✔ within-role sends cite an open gated launch decision without spending it or naming it in grants (255.178095ms)
✔ missing and foreign-business citations refuse and roll back message and grant (245.281351ms)
✔ cross-role sends still need a matching resolved decision and consume it once (351.361382ms)
✔ messages pages all human messages newest first without writes; read state is history (3383.912828ms)
✔ messages refuses role callers, invalid paging and cursors outside this human feed (376.413511ms)
✔ views messages passes only its paging arguments through (0.273173ms)
✔ messages isolates businesses even with a valid foreign cursor (195.353096ms)
✔ the assistant sends to the user and to the chief of staff only (480.57285ms)
✔ an assistant send to any other role, or to the tester, is refused and logged (513.755152ms)
✔ only the user and the chief of staff may send to the assistant; the tester is refused by default (465.231701ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2 REQ-THREAD-1 thread.send to an instance that does not hear from the user is refused and stores nothing (358.389192ms)
✔ a sender-side list alone refuses a send to a role that has no list (415.7882ms)
✔ a target-side list alone refuses a send from a role that has no list (452.167806ms)
✔ the sender list is checked before the target list (369.755894ms)
✔ roles without the field behave exactly as before (544.00174ms)
✔ a business with no role definitions at all is unlimited (415.468733ms)
✔ a malformed messaging field refuses at boot (184.792926ms)
✔ the assistant's review.request to a reviewer is refused and logged, even with an approved decision (544.87816ms)
✔ a review.verdict to the assistant from a role outside its receiveFrom is refused and logged (572.256898ms)
✔ review requests and verdicts between roles without the field are unchanged (471.923589ms)
✔ plugins and plugins.set refuse every non-human session and a forged actor, and pass only the patch with the verified actor (315.517757ms)
✔ runtime: the switch changes the organization file, the receipt carries the actor, and a bad shape, an unknown module and a stale revision are refused with nothing written (688.497728ms)
✔ vikunja:19/309 through the broker, a patch switches the kinds it names and keeps the rest; null removes one kind and is trailed (516.940685ms)
✔ broker process binds trusted launches, offers reader capabilities, refuses human mutation, closes cleanly (273.055109ms)
✔ startup token refusal returns safe code without value or partial listening broker (65.904629ms)
✔ loaded fixture token is absent from socket replies and SQLite, including refusal evidence (269.093003ms)
✔ killed broker leaves an explicit stale lock; another process cannot silently reclaim it (289.095099ms)
✔ trusted host registers later launches; socket clients never have a registration verb (212.12483ms)
✔ runtime excludes declared project roots even when host supplies no repoRoots (72.346112ms)
✔ a refused launch binding leaves the broker and existing capabilities alive; bad protocol stops it (255.78486ms)
✔ D1: committed write with a failed receipt refuses outcome-unknown without action.allowed (198.068074ms)
✔ D2: spec.read refuses without content if its role is released during the read (244.501651ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged content without content (146.990246ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged subject without content (152.22161ms)
✔ Broker keeps the existing sandbox client import closure: no new imports or lazy project import (1.212696ms)
✔ without a trusted project adapter all three async paths refuse project-not-configured (272.806957ms)
✔ real startBroker injects the project adapter for socket reads and bound-author record writes (221.205724ms)
✔ a reply is listed for human and reader sessions, and its delivery rows are unchanged (304.867447ms)
✔ the reply still reaches the human message.receive (mosaic talk) after the Console showed it (208.933737ms)
✔ a message with no reply gives an empty list (187.924897ms)
✔ replies come oldest first and stop at REPLIES (1009.999642ms)
✔ an id that names no message in the business refuses message-not-found, and the refusal is recorded (357.532858ms)
✔ strict arguments; a role session gets human-required (492.444402ms)
✔ views passes replies through as one call with the id (0.227261ms)
✔ requirements returns the committed list to a holding role session, and no one else (228.118592ms)
✔ the PM's prd.approve with no task, when no id fits, reaches the human's Inbox (242.057621ms)
✔ the PM's non-blocking role.revoke with no task reaches the human's Inbox (170.200685ms)
✔ a push is recorded as the action.allowed for git.push.working on the task, and only the host records one (261.085783ms)
✔ review.request names the latest pushed commit and sends the reviewer a REVIEW-REQUEST (309.501394ms)
✔ review.request says which run holds the reviewer role, or null, and a null request waits for a claim (354.626656ms)
✔ review.request refuses a commit that isn't the latest push, a non-reviewer and a role without the action (501.547236ms)
✔ reviewFetch answers only the addressed reviewer, for the request it cites (293.920624ms)
✔ review.verdict answers one request once, to the role that asked (394.013504ms)
✔ task.close on a pushed task needs an approve verdict for the latest push (492.698639ms)
✔ a refusal the host decided is filed on the task it names, and only a task ref counts (393.277205ms)
✔ v3b prototype refusals, views and append-only mutations (1883.216913ms)
✔ gated approval authorizes once, survives store reopen, and fresh approval works (348.984265ms)
✔ another run of the same instance consumes an approval once; a failed check leaves it usable (215.90766ms)
✔ two scheduled callers have exactly one grant and one consumed refusal (229.633633ms)
✔ failed commit rolls consumption back; cross-role consumes and within-role stays reusable (438.196434ms)
✔ class drift gated to cross-role refuses before consumption (265.148418ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to gated refuses before consumption (351.251777ms)
✔ class drift gated to within-role refuses before consumption (269.258816ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to within-role refuses before consumption (339.972392ms)
✔ class drift within-role to gated refuses before consumption (341.704331ms)
✔ class drift within-role to cross-role refuses before consumption (290.828793ms)
✔ message.send consumes approval and prevents a later send or authorize (367.823562ms)
✔ role.revoke consumes approval and prevents a later revoke or authorize (378.237021ms)
✔ 3e copy migrates to 3f preserving every old column/row and adding null spec citations (1726.085428ms)
✔ real socket awaits spec reads, record writes and cited raises; other requests still return normally (362.013893ms)
✔ real socket preserves asynchronous refusal codes and disconnects its transient proof (264.275409ms)
✔ two real socket writes to one repository yield one commit and one project-busy refusal (262.637892ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late reply (221.09243ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late refusal (235.771097ms)
✔ N-a: slow admitted record.write returns its committed result after the idle deadline (403.99316ms)
✔ current citation is recorded; docs commits do not stale it and a new spec never reopens settlement (366.519816ms)
✔ stale, unconfirmed, missing and partial spec citations refuse without inserting a decision (346.347447ms)
✔ uncited raises retain their synchronous path and spec read is available to any held role in its business (282.282986ms)
✔ record writes bind the session author, require authority and refuse spec and impersonation paths (318.596255ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the pm asks the chief of staff for roles and counts; the chief receives a STAFF-REQUEST and answers it (291.764143ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: only the pm can send a staff request; every other session is refused and the chief of staff hears nothing (431.729214ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a pm without message.send is refused like any other gated action (195.263026ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the request goes to the business launcher, and only when that is a chief of staff (587.000551ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the sender is judged by definition: an instance `lead` of the pm definition can ask, an instance `pm` of the coder definition can't (611.309765ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the launcher is judged by definition: an instance `boss` of the chief-of-staff definition receives, a `chief` of the coder definition gives no-chief-of-staff (578.561091ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a refused staff request leaves no staff.request action.allowed event (353.123791ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2: the role definitions' messaging lists hold for a staff request, sender and recipient (824.556535ms)
✔ a staff request names a task, 1 to 10 distinct roles and counts of 1 to 20; nothing else is accepted (609.087066ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a staff request grants nothing: the pm still can't launch and the chief of staff launches as before (390.936989ms)
✔ a business that never switched launches reads allowed with no time and no event (145.896372ms)
✔ launches revoked and then restored read allowed, with the restore time and event id (233.412751ms)
✔ a task closed on the tracker leaves the open list, and total counts the open ones (166.493715ms)
✔ a tombstone is not open (183.585477ms)
✔ the open list stops at the cap and says so; total still counts every open task (192.362799ms)
✔ a role and a reader session read state; arguments, and an unbound cap, refuse (192.821448ms)
✔ a human session reads the same state, with the same cap (234.687853ms)
✔ reading state writes nothing: every table keeps its row count (206.751325ms)
✔ creates private WAL store and excludes a second writer until explicit close (145.245876ms)
✔ rollback is atomic and schema metadata is checked against trusted DDL, not just itself (259.111817ms)
✔ existing empty database and symlink runtime directory refuse, never initialize over damage (206.772537ms)
✔ crash during a transaction recovers no partial event after explicit fixture-only lock removal (234.497319ms)
✔ writer refuses mixed at/read_at forms atomically, even through trusted SQL helpers (123.253897ms)
✔ async transactions refuse before invoking their function (168.831852ms)
✔ the session default fits under the reply cap and pages to the end with next (361.511742ms)
✔ the short form: no description, assignees by role, every listed key (309.047319ms)
✔ each filter, alone and together, and total counts every match (534.990012ms)
✔ task_ref reads one task in full, as the whole board has it (441.344639ms)
✔ no arguments is the read the Console and mosaic make, unchanged (348.747908ms)
✔ an unknown argument or a bad value refuses invalid-request (1228.251686ms)
✔ tasks rows carry priority and requirement for every session that reads tasks (379.443105ms)
✔ the read model rebuilds from the ledger: a reopened bus and each trail give the same values (515.064722ms)
✔ an empty business and one with snapshots but no task.created read cleanly (192.557694ms)
✔ recordTask keeps sync reads and a role write apart (239.439668ms)
✔ read_at must be one canonical UTC format, so the projection compares strings safely (141.623551ms)
✔ a bad entry refuses the whole record (198.7251ms)
✔ taskView reads the projection for one business (188.665067ms)
✔ requestTask hands only a holder and a task verb to the handler, and records refusals (330.630107ms)
✔ the server sends task verbs to the adapter with its own timeout; other verbs stay synchronous (504.024232ms)
✔ without an adapter the server refuses every task verb (335.216711ms)
✔ the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one (258.801953ms)
✔ the process loads the S3 adapter from plain-data trackers (423.905898ms)
✔ the tester binds only when the business sets bus.tester to exactly true (1126.173752ms)
✔ a business may not name a role tester, so the tester address is never a role (402.448937ms)
✔ every verb outside the tester list refuses tester-refused and is recorded against the tester (766.80692ms)
✔ a tester message is from tester, starts [mos test], and writes no human.input or authority (316.80843ms)
✔ a role answers a tester only in reply to a tester message, and the answer never reaches the human (368.653606ms)
✔ the tester reads the human views a reader reads (203.151164ms)
✔ tester proof binds its own CLI, start time and nonce, refuses a managed run and allows an agent (1.100255ms)
✔ neither CLI's nonce proves the other: each proof is bound to its own CLI and nonce variable (0.3608ms)
✔ testerNonce reads only the tester's variable and gives null on any read error (0.201182ms)
✔ an envelope carries exactly one of cap, human and tester; no tester authenticator refuses (170.298868ms)
✔ tester-cli.mjs binds through the runtime when the switch is on, and refuses off or under a run marker (1129.559082ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-ORG-2: the 3d→3e migration adds the thread tables and leaves messages from before threads as written (1489.501788ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: a 3d bus with a changed schema is refused and keeps its version and tables (1096.590659ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: the offline command prints the kept-message counts before the ready line (1242.723873ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: one holder per thread, through the broker and the trigger (495.369428ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: the 3e triggers refuse writes that skip the broker (1615.942696ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a message to or from the assistant names its thread, or is refused (440.202174ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: the chief of staff's reply comes back to the thread that sent the work (4253.376085ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a reply can't carry one thread instance's thread to another thread instance (98.788144ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-USER-2: one thread's messages never reach another thread's holder (212.049876ms)
✔ REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message to a thread with no holder waits, and the next holder gets it (164.654034ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: threadIdle releases only a thread with nothing waiting, and only for its holder (205.439924ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message delivered to a run that ended unread doesn't hold up the next holder (153.381612ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: an approved role.revoke never reaches a thread run, and the thread stays held (143.833145ms)
✔ REQ-USER-2: the human verbs refuse another owner's thread (150.045689ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: thread.create refuses when the business has no thread instance or more than one (109.368987ms)
✔ REQ-ORG-2: projects and threads are named once, and the repo names a business project (154.518788ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2: thread.messages returns the thread's history in pages and writes nothing (570.209051ms)
✔ socket capability stamps launch identity; shared views use wire, no SQL client (232.011762ms)
✔ two wire claims serialize; a lost reply never automatically retries (273.275037ms)
✔ malformed, oversized and identity-forging envelopes refuse without echoing input (184.610611ms)
✔ client preserves UTF-8 when a response divides a multibyte character (11.953627ms)
✔ committed mutation followed by dropped reply reports unknown and is never retried (228.613414ms)
✔ web.search: a granted role gets labelled results, and the call is trailed with role, run, verb and query (248.466368ms)
✔ web.fetch: a granted role gets the page as labelled text, and the call is trailed with the url (225.416806ms)
✔ a role without the grant is refused, the refusal is logged with the verb, and nothing is fetched (276.710024ms)
✔ a broker with no web service refuses a granted role (209.686464ms)
✔ bad requests are refused: unknown verb, extra or missing argument, not a string, a human or reader session (226.101126ms)
✔ a session that is not the role holder is refused (216.037372ms)
✔ web.mjs's fences hold on the broker side: refusals are normal results with the fixed reason (528.692136ms)
✔ web.search with no search source configured is a refused result, not an error (163.840367ms)
✔ a search source that fails with its own refusal, or that throws, is handled (247.678066ms)
✔ a slow search source ends in a refusal at the deadline (325.657345ms)
✔ a secret in the arguments is refused before anything is trailed or fetched (198.677551ms)
✔ over the socket: the server routes web verbs to the service; other roles are refused; no service is web-not-configured (260.076665ms)
✔ busBusiness: the web grant comes from "web" in the resolved tool limit (0.281227ms)
✔ webServices: the business's search-source plug-in and web.searxng var make web.search work; without either it is refused as not configured (335.979195ms)
✔ an ungranted call is refused at once: no admission, no wait, nothing touched (216.435498ms)
✔ over the socket an ungranted caller is dropped by the server timeout and a granted one gets the longer wait (453.228061ms)
✔ a search that never answers is aborted at the deadline, the module sees the signal, and the call is trailed as refused (timeout) (188.128262ms)
✔ a fetch that stalls is cut off at the deadline: the request is destroyed, not left running (204.078134ms)
✔ one query limit: over SEARCH_MAX_QUERY_CHARS or empty is refused with the same reason before any backend, and the tool schema carries the same number (173.100798ms)
ℹ tests 306
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 306
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 14243.481023
