npm notice run test
npm notice run node --test tests/*.test.mjs
✔ agents: a held role with nothing on the bus is idle; a role session gets the claim rows unchanged (207.045576ms)
✔ agents: working counts what the holder received and has not read; routed alone is not working (240.730618ms)
✔ agents: input needed is the role's open decisions routed to the human, gated first, then oldest (400.426309ms)
✔ agents: working wins over waiting, and Input needed still shows (241.186783ms)
✔ agents: a new holder doesn't inherit what the last one left unread; decisions stay with the role (227.640425ms)
✔ agents: state reads only its own business, even for a run name both use (217.459729ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder released unread is stranded; the next holder gets nothing and cannot read it (339.147567ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder read is not stranded; one the current holder has not read is not listed (234.443411ms)
✔ agents: stranded is oldest first and capped at 50 for a role (1160.988975ms)
✔ agents: stranded is per role and per business (444.425324ms)
✔ agents: a message routed to a held role and not yet received is not stranded (204.048929ms)
✔ REQ-DEC an approval outlives its run and a broker restart; a new run of the instance consumes it once (400.817556ms)
✔ REQ-DEC another instance of the same definition cannot consume an approval, and its refusal consumes nothing (252.91469ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread approval is consumed only by a run holding the same thread (356.823746ms)
✔ REQ-DEC a later run of the same instance supersedes an open decision; another instance cannot (261.714086ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread decision is superseded only from the same thread (301.070873ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread instance decision raised before row 121 is not consumed or superseded by any thread run (494.982357ms)
✔ launch identity is stamped, payload identity is refused and stale holder cannot send (227.476714ms)
✔ decision classes route from policy; gated resolution is human-only, choice and target must match (331.496759ms)
✔ claim exclusion, holder release, gated revoke and rerouting to a new holder are atomic (317.475304ms)
✔ launch events require a human CLI capability; generic emit cannot forge authority events (252.855236ms)
✔ within-role decisions close atomically and invalid options or blocking omissions refuse (186.308451ms)
✔ a recommendation that is not exactly one option key refuses invalid-recommendation after the options (396.530822ms)
✔ observer capabilities read human inbox but cannot mutate or forge launch identity (209.610641ms)
✔ task action subjects and linked decision trail are complete and ordered (212.960747ms)
✔ launch binding is durable and reconnecting requires the identical trusted record (138.621254ms)
✔ business isolation includes inherited object names and cross-business message references (212.659127ms)
✔ authority never transfers between action, target, unresolved or replaced role holder; a later run of the instance keeps it (473.802074ms)
✔ task projection uses schema current view, skipping earlier and equal-start polls (200.683688ms)
✔ revocation permanently bars the old run from reclaiming first, including after broker restart (290.652462ms)
✔ empty message references refuse before storage; refusal-evidence failure stays a typed error (181.833296ms)
✔ both arbiters require human resolution when their cross-role route is themselves (360.118604ms)
✔ the shipped coder role raises task.reassign as gated to the human; task.scope.change stays cross-role (225.364973ms)
✔ S1 adapter takes resolved limits and refs, rejects mismatched instance, never mutates input (2.029828ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1, REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff ends a run with a reason and no decision, and the reason is logged (351.786782ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still needs a resolved decision to revoke (408.372062ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: storage accepts a revoke with a reason or a decision and aborts one with neither (325.461509ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff may still cite a decision, and a decision alone is the old path (261.273231ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still ends a run through a resolved decision, which is recorded and has no reason (391.30168ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a reason is required, bounded, and never sent with a decision (326.909409ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the chief of staff cannot end its own run; its end of the assistant gets past the protection (299.613149ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: organization.set from the chief of staff reaches the shared writer, named as the actor (294.947088ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: a refused organization.set logs action.refused and no action.allowed, like a refused limits.set (507.98134ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: organization.set is refused for every caller whose role file lacks organization.change (393.185243ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: the chief of staff is logged as allowed, and organization.set takes only the human's keys (537.288404ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-3, REQ-LIMIT-1: a chief-of-staff change is validated, written and logged like a human's; an invalid one is refused (686.321836ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2, REQ-COS-1: the 3c→3d migration lets the chief of staff end a held role with a reason; neither is still refused (1360.340377ms)
✔ comment cursors isolate businesses, move only forward and remain append-only (190.539112ms)
✔ only trusted sync writes validated cursors; events and cursor share rollback (163.646697ms)
✔ explicit 3b copy migration preserves evidence and opens as 3f; normal startup never migrates (1125.781028ms)
✔ migration refuses active writers and drifted legacy schemas, with no partial upgrade (2001.428264ms)
✔ named migration registry chains 3b through 3f to a fixture-only future version in order (1087.48955ms)
✔ migration refuses mismatched source metadata without changing schema or evidence (1122.506421ms)
✔ offline command migrates only the supplied fixture root and reports usage errors (1179.1195ms)
✔ credentials gives human and reader sessions service, account, role, date and state, and nothing else (157.842189ms)
✔ credentials refuses a role session and any argument (198.543334ms)
✔ credentials reads the status on each request, and a broker without one lists none (266.291789ms)
✔ the broker process answers credentials without a token, path or variable in its output, log or store (233.135179ms)
✔ only validated broker references load; returned data and exceptions cannot expose a known token (3.379668ms)
✔ bad file modes, symlinks, repository/data paths, malformed tokens and missing dates refuse (1.984961ms)
✔ expiry refuses use and env references never become client data (0.628421ms)
✔ S1 parsed service refs work, service mismatch refuses, Gitea rotation due is a warning state (1.700217ms)
✔ opaque tokens shorter than 16 characters refuse before use (0.450596ms)
✔ each C-suite role file carries the same two lists: human, chief-of-staff, pm, cto (1.563657ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (635.067474ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (571.117528ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (548.887439ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (532.651948ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (661.101475ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (496.084534ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (646.570057ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (572.868141ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (606.54118ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (685.520341ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (569.851264ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (435.295121ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (500.592822ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (450.150636ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (367.830553ms)
✔ a human resolve sends the raising role one message from the human, and its request is the answer (320.875593ms)
✔ a cross-role decision resolved by its arbiter comes from that role and run, with no request (310.500453ms)
✔ a human withdraw sends one message with the note (324.916561ms)
✔ a human seen before the close leaves the request on the close's answer, not the seen (318.320735ms)
✔ the raising run's withdraw, a supersede, a within-role raise and seen send nothing (406.530029ms)
✔ refused closes send nothing: invalid-choice, decision-closed, not-resolver (339.605242ms)
✔ a raising role nobody holds at the close gets the message on the next claim (311.599134ms)
✔ a human DECISION send keeps its own instruction as the request, not a close's answer (304.854037ms)
✔ a cross-role raise whose arbiter the raiser does not hear from is refused and stores nothing (402.535541ms)
✔ a gated raise by a role that does not hear from the human is refused and stores nothing (373.325698ms)
✔ a route the raiser hears from is allowed, checked from the route to the raiser (423.433208ms)
✔ a refused supersede withdraws nothing (340.082598ms)
✔ the assistant's within-role and gated raises still work (438.814506ms)
✔ roles lists open decisions routed to a role, and never the human inbox (329.815276ms)
✔ recent lists closed decisions of every route, newest close first, with how each closed (349.403564ms)
✔ recent gives the closing event as closed when the decision was seen first (393.6446ms)
✔ recent stops at RECENT rows (999.382826ms)
✔ every row is what trail already gives the same session for that id (319.022347ms)
✔ a role session can't list decisions, so it can't read another role's open decisions (620.404494ms)
✔ decisions is a read: one business, strict arguments, nothing written (479.927691ms)
✔ endLaunch writes session.ended, releases the run claim and kills its capabilities (210.229485ms)
✔ endLaunch refuses an unknown run, a second end and a rebind of the ended run (158.828482ms)
✔ a restarted broker refuses to rebind an ended run; a refused rebind leaves the run unbound (205.471246ms)
✔ endLaunch leaves a claim another run took alone (221.047633ms)
✔ refuse records action.refused against the caller with the code only (215.973884ms)
✔ launches off refuses role.launch with launch-revoked until launches on (210.477091ms)
✔ broker process: launch ops authorize role.launch, record refusals and end runs (418.973783ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-1: the broker hard waits are exactly the list, and match the business vocabulary (1.261835ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-2: a business granting a hard wait at either class is refused; the actions that left are grantable (178.006801ms)
✖ REQ-DEC-2: every hard wait goes to the human, cited or not, and the arbiter cannot resolve it (263.442703ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a gated raise citing the current spec goes to the arbiter for its domain; uncited, to the human (545.20383ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: an arbiter-approved cited gated decision authorizes the raiser, and the human cannot resolve it (283.185111ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a cited merge raised by merge-gate goes to the technical arbiter; a merge raised without the grant routes by citation (414.840923ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a stale or unconfirmed citation refuses without a decision; an arbiter raising its own goes to the human (290.166818ms)
✔ Q169: the chief of staff's end of the assistant is not refused role-end-refused; its own run and another ender's are (276.660988ms)
✖ Q169: another role's cited revoke of the assistant, resolved by an arbiter, is refused (192.873554ms)
✖ Q169: a revoke of the assistant citing a decision the human resolved is not refused by the protection (258.475823ms)
✔ Q169: a cited revoke of a role not in END_PROTECTED still goes to the arbiter, and executes (384.554335ms)
✖ Q169: a role granted role.revoke at either class still sends a revoke of the assistant to the human (296.16808ms)
✔ human proof binds CLI entry, process start and nonce; agents and incomplete ancestry refuse (1.331486ms)
✔ process reader gets own kernel identity without exposing environment values (0.41676ms)
✔ EACCES ancestor environments skip only markers; commands and registered launches still refuse (0.528474ms)
✔ real pid 1 remains inspectable when its environment is protected (0.225566ms)
✔ a message to a stopped role sends launch.by one notice, and the result says so (296.051901ms)
✔ a message to a role outside launch.instances says so in its result and in the notice (208.176123ms)
✔ a message to a running role sends no notice and its result is unchanged (155.191391ms)
✔ a re-route at a claim, a release and claim, and a broker restart send no second notice (337.597194ms)
✔ a run launched but not yet claimed counts as no holder (140.127411ms)
✔ no notice for a message to launch.by, from it, from a tester, to the human, or in a thread to a thread instance (308.673504ms)
✔ a business with no launch block tells nobody and says there is no launcher (225.165733ms)
✔ the notice sender stays internal: no role is named _bus and no caller can send as it or to it (402.877986ms)
✔ limits binds actor from human proof and rejects role, reader, tester and forged actor (308.306468ms)
✔ runtime wires verified human settings to the actual shared file writer and actor receipt (339.112302ms)
✔ uncertain organization receipts leave bus startup and reads alone but refuse writes until reconciled (497.887477ms)
✔ within-role sends cite an open gated launch decision without spending it or naming it in grants (265.010064ms)
✔ missing and foreign-business citations refuse and roll back message and grant (278.272304ms)
✔ cross-role sends still need a matching resolved decision and consume it once (262.376033ms)
✔ messages pages all human messages newest first without writes; read state is history (3329.052496ms)
✔ messages refuses role callers, invalid paging and cursors outside this human feed (347.644247ms)
✔ views messages passes only its paging arguments through (0.279254ms)
✔ messages isolates businesses even with a valid foreign cursor (239.800494ms)
✔ the assistant sends to the user and to the chief of staff only (443.645663ms)
✔ an assistant send to any other role, or to the tester, is refused and logged (411.797456ms)
✔ only the user and the chief of staff may send to the assistant; the tester is refused by default (408.68946ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2 REQ-THREAD-1 thread.send to an instance that does not hear from the user is refused and stores nothing (511.78699ms)
✔ a sender-side list alone refuses a send to a role that has no list (418.215222ms)
✔ a target-side list alone refuses a send from a role that has no list (495.486368ms)
✔ the sender list is checked before the target list (366.343571ms)
✔ roles without the field behave exactly as before (573.116118ms)
✔ a business with no role definitions at all is unlimited (548.468314ms)
✔ a malformed messaging field refuses at boot (144.278541ms)
✔ the assistant's review.request to a reviewer is refused and logged, even with an approved decision (536.179968ms)
✔ a review.verdict to the assistant from a role outside its receiveFrom is refused and logged (468.12324ms)
✔ review requests and verdicts between roles without the field are unchanged (364.159869ms)
✔ plugins and plugins.set refuse every non-human session and a forged actor, and pass only the patch with the verified actor (213.018608ms)
✔ runtime: the switch changes the organization file, the receipt carries the actor, and a bad shape, an unknown module and a stale revision are refused with nothing written (651.574035ms)
✔ vikunja:19/309 through the broker, a patch switches the kinds it names and keeps the rest; null removes one kind and is trailed (466.516339ms)
✔ broker process binds trusted launches, offers reader capabilities, refuses human mutation, closes cleanly (219.661513ms)
✔ startup token refusal returns safe code without value or partial listening broker (66.243192ms)
✔ loaded fixture token is absent from socket replies and SQLite, including refusal evidence (230.51212ms)
✔ killed broker leaves an explicit stale lock; another process cannot silently reclaim it (247.045555ms)
✔ trusted host registers later launches; socket clients never have a registration verb (278.257435ms)
✔ runtime excludes declared project roots even when host supplies no repoRoots (64.483107ms)
✔ a refused launch binding leaves the broker and existing capabilities alive; bad protocol stops it (264.588454ms)
✔ D1: committed write with a failed receipt refuses outcome-unknown without action.allowed (181.810841ms)
✔ D2: spec.read refuses without content if its role is released during the read (173.763999ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged content without content (159.768582ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged subject without content (301.299358ms)
✔ Broker keeps the existing sandbox client import closure: no new imports or lazy project import (1.255795ms)
✔ without a trusted project adapter all three async paths refuse project-not-configured (234.04527ms)
✔ real startBroker injects the project adapter for socket reads and bound-author record writes (224.621171ms)
✔ a reply is listed for human and reader sessions, and its delivery rows are unchanged (247.288411ms)
✔ the reply still reaches the human message.receive (mosaic talk) after the Console showed it (250.412597ms)
✔ a message with no reply gives an empty list (315.000599ms)
✔ replies come oldest first and stop at REPLIES (1016.568152ms)
✔ an id that names no message in the business refuses message-not-found, and the refusal is recorded (349.864971ms)
✔ strict arguments; a role session gets human-required (507.859858ms)
✔ views passes replies through as one call with the id (0.242664ms)
✔ requirements returns the committed list to a holding role session, and no one else (397.470438ms)
✔ the PM's prd.approve with no task, when no id fits, reaches the human's Inbox (194.352227ms)
✔ the PM's non-blocking role.revoke with no task reaches the human's Inbox (224.41021ms)
✔ a push is recorded as the action.allowed for git.push.working on the task, and only the host records one (421.254809ms)
✔ review.request names the latest pushed commit and sends the reviewer a REVIEW-REQUEST (289.856036ms)
✔ review.request says which run holds the reviewer role, or null, and a null request waits for a claim (412.094484ms)
✔ review.request refuses a commit that isn't the latest push, a non-reviewer and a role without the action (464.423566ms)
✔ reviewFetch answers only the addressed reviewer, for the request it cites (349.195038ms)
✔ review.verdict answers one request once, to the role that asked (445.385593ms)
✔ task.close on a pushed task needs an approve verdict for the latest push (526.363102ms)
✔ a refusal the host decided is filed on the task it names, and only a task ref counts (403.655774ms)
✔ v3b prototype refusals, views and append-only mutations (2025.616638ms)
✔ gated approval authorizes once, survives store reopen, and fresh approval works (349.661865ms)
✔ another run of the same instance consumes an approval once; a failed check leaves it usable (258.563455ms)
✔ two scheduled callers have exactly one grant and one consumed refusal (255.360944ms)
✔ failed commit rolls consumption back; cross-role consumes and within-role stays reusable (389.762074ms)
✔ class drift gated to cross-role refuses before consumption (263.836532ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to gated refuses before consumption (356.624434ms)
✔ class drift gated to within-role refuses before consumption (367.311167ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to within-role refuses before consumption (380.225974ms)
✔ class drift within-role to gated refuses before consumption (334.50848ms)
✔ class drift within-role to cross-role refuses before consumption (301.497996ms)
✔ message.send consumes approval and prevents a later send or authorize (289.099547ms)
✔ role.revoke consumes approval and prevents a later revoke or authorize (289.306581ms)
✔ 3e copy migrates to 3f preserving every old column/row and adding null spec citations (1780.691754ms)
✔ real socket awaits spec reads, record writes and cited raises; other requests still return normally (352.14265ms)
✔ real socket preserves asynchronous refusal codes and disconnects its transient proof (232.673616ms)
✔ two real socket writes to one repository yield one commit and one project-busy refusal (253.520418ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late reply (237.213828ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late refusal (217.052799ms)
✔ N-a: slow admitted record.write returns its committed result after the idle deadline (436.882636ms)
✖ current citation is recorded; docs commits do not stale it and a new spec never reopens settlement (321.389474ms)
✔ stale, unconfirmed, missing and partial spec citations refuse without inserting a decision (372.416051ms)
✔ uncited raises retain their synchronous path and spec read is available to any held role in its business (243.914158ms)
✔ record writes bind the session author, require authority and refuse spec and impersonation paths (383.343444ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the pm asks the chief of staff for roles and counts; the chief receives a STAFF-REQUEST and answers it (368.887325ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: only the pm can send a staff request; every other session is refused and the chief of staff hears nothing (362.933366ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a pm without message.send is refused like any other gated action (177.758426ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the request goes to the business launcher, and only when that is a chief of staff (647.859234ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the sender is judged by definition: an instance `lead` of the pm definition can ask, an instance `pm` of the coder definition can't (537.288283ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the launcher is judged by definition: an instance `boss` of the chief-of-staff definition receives, a `chief` of the coder definition gives no-chief-of-staff (594.041065ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a refused staff request leaves no staff.request action.allowed event (292.446429ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2: the role definitions' messaging lists hold for a staff request, sender and recipient (667.554132ms)
✔ a staff request names a task, 1 to 10 distinct roles and counts of 1 to 20; nothing else is accepted (464.7086ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a staff request grants nothing: the pm still can't launch and the chief of staff launches as before (241.68112ms)
✔ a business that never switched launches reads allowed with no time and no event (153.125155ms)
✔ launches revoked and then restored read allowed, with the restore time and event id (176.013629ms)
✔ a task closed on the tracker leaves the open list, and total counts the open ones (179.77928ms)
✔ a tombstone is not open (229.713252ms)
✔ the open list stops at the cap and says so; total still counts every open task (182.432589ms)
✔ a role and a reader session read state; arguments, and an unbound cap, refuse (242.703994ms)
✔ a human session reads the same state, with the same cap (256.244377ms)
✔ reading state writes nothing: every table keeps its row count (178.756336ms)
✔ creates private WAL store and excludes a second writer until explicit close (143.477187ms)
✔ rollback is atomic and schema metadata is checked against trusted DDL, not just itself (258.573876ms)
✔ existing empty database and symlink runtime directory refuse, never initialize over damage (231.834738ms)
✔ crash during a transaction recovers no partial event after explicit fixture-only lock removal (288.285703ms)
✔ writer refuses mixed at/read_at forms atomically, even through trusted SQL helpers (207.736974ms)
✔ async transactions refuse before invoking their function (111.731127ms)
✔ the session default fits under the reply cap and pages to the end with next (491.117221ms)
✔ the short form: no description, assignees by role, every listed key (330.19306ms)
✔ each filter, alone and together, and total counts every match (498.028131ms)
✔ task_ref reads one task in full, as the whole board has it (380.21512ms)
✔ no arguments is the read the Console and mosaic make, unchanged (277.583684ms)
✔ an unknown argument or a bad value refuses invalid-request (1074.438213ms)
✔ tasks rows carry priority and requirement for every session that reads tasks (526.625893ms)
✔ the read model rebuilds from the ledger: a reopened bus and each trail give the same values (471.998528ms)
✔ an empty business and one with snapshots but no task.created read cleanly (163.215908ms)
✔ recordTask keeps sync reads and a role write apart (293.63358ms)
✔ read_at must be one canonical UTC format, so the projection compares strings safely (206.434274ms)
✔ a bad entry refuses the whole record (135.463527ms)
✔ taskView reads the projection for one business (138.928333ms)
✔ requestTask hands only a holder and a task verb to the handler, and records refusals (423.371193ms)
✔ the server sends task verbs to the adapter with its own timeout; other verbs stay synchronous (453.500886ms)
✔ without an adapter the server refuses every task verb (243.915917ms)
✔ the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one (243.228487ms)
✔ the process loads the S3 adapter from plain-data trackers (374.782334ms)
✔ the tester binds only when the business sets bus.tester to exactly true (1224.497663ms)
✔ a business may not name a role tester, so the tester address is never a role (313.523652ms)
✔ every verb outside the tester list refuses tester-refused and is recorded against the tester (616.382488ms)
✔ a tester message is from tester, starts [mos test], and writes no human.input or authority (243.239663ms)
✔ a role answers a tester only in reply to a tester message, and the answer never reaches the human (279.433626ms)
✔ the tester reads the human views a reader reads (187.979755ms)
✔ tester proof binds its own CLI, start time and nonce, refuses a managed run and allows an agent (1.221122ms)
✔ neither CLI's nonce proves the other: each proof is bound to its own CLI and nonce variable (0.346209ms)
✔ testerNonce reads only the tester's variable and gives null on any read error (0.2688ms)
✔ an envelope carries exactly one of cap, human and tester; no tester authenticator refuses (106.602819ms)
✔ tester-cli.mjs binds through the runtime when the switch is on, and refuses off or under a run marker (905.337721ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-ORG-2: the 3d→3e migration adds the thread tables and leaves messages from before threads as written (1445.039198ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: a 3d bus with a changed schema is refused and keeps its version and tables (894.699658ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: the offline command prints the kept-message counts before the ready line (861.661835ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: one holder per thread, through the broker and the trigger (408.407803ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: the 3e triggers refuse writes that skip the broker (1464.806819ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a message to or from the assistant names its thread, or is refused (368.924366ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: the chief of staff's reply comes back to the thread that sent the work (3519.48498ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a reply can't carry one thread instance's thread to another thread instance (103.080666ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-USER-2: one thread's messages never reach another thread's holder (159.525411ms)
✔ REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message to a thread with no holder waits, and the next holder gets it (151.320171ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: threadIdle releases only a thread with nothing waiting, and only for its holder (176.345598ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message delivered to a run that ended unread doesn't hold up the next holder (154.795097ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: an approved role.revoke never reaches a thread run, and the thread stays held (153.028598ms)
✔ REQ-USER-2: the human verbs refuse another owner's thread (150.623104ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: thread.create refuses when the business has no thread instance or more than one (113.436568ms)
✔ REQ-ORG-2: projects and threads are named once, and the repo names a business project (149.259666ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2: thread.messages returns the thread's history in pages and writes nothing (476.796882ms)
✔ socket capability stamps launch identity; shared views use wire, no SQL client (264.280236ms)
✔ two wire claims serialize; a lost reply never automatically retries (251.788081ms)
✔ malformed, oversized and identity-forging envelopes refuse without echoing input (138.603902ms)
✔ client preserves UTF-8 when a response divides a multibyte character (11.873074ms)
✔ committed mutation followed by dropped reply reports unknown and is never retried (177.495406ms)
✔ web.search: a granted role gets labelled results, and the call is trailed with role, run, verb and query (261.491453ms)
✔ web.fetch: a granted role gets the page as labelled text, and the call is trailed with the url (227.668823ms)
✔ a role without the grant is refused, the refusal is logged with the verb, and nothing is fetched (260.721527ms)
✔ a broker with no web service refuses a granted role (154.365746ms)
✔ bad requests are refused: unknown verb, extra or missing argument, not a string, a human or reader session (226.79117ms)
✔ a session that is not the role holder is refused (134.972672ms)
✔ web.mjs's fences hold on the broker side: refusals are normal results with the fixed reason (427.046192ms)
✔ web.search with no search source configured is a refused result, not an error (154.16875ms)
✔ a search source that fails with its own refusal, or that throws, is handled (197.614408ms)
✔ a slow search source ends in a refusal at the deadline (194.401441ms)
✔ a secret in the arguments is refused before anything is trailed or fetched (131.48511ms)
✔ over the socket: the server routes web verbs to the service; other roles are refused; no service is web-not-configured (233.003066ms)
✔ busBusiness: the web grant comes from "web" in the resolved tool limit (0.257227ms)
✔ webServices: the business's search-source plug-in and web.searxng var make web.search work; without either it is refused as not configured (208.520521ms)
✔ an ungranted call is refused at once: no admission, no wait, nothing touched (171.788083ms)
✔ over the socket an ungranted caller is dropped by the server timeout and a granted one gets the longer wait (458.283677ms)
✔ a search that never answers is aborted at the deadline, the module sees the signal, and the call is trailed as refused (timeout) (176.63443ms)
✔ a fetch that stalls is cut off at the deadline: the request is destroyed, not left running (185.719793ms)
✔ one query limit: over SEARCH_MAX_QUERY_CHARS or empty is refused with the same reason before any backend, and the tool schema carries the same number (155.707523ms)
ℹ tests 306
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 301
ℹ fail 5
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 12897.612493

✖ failing tests:

test at tests/hard-waits.test.mjs:38:1
✖ REQ-DEC-2: every hard wait goes to the human, cited or not, and the arbiter cannot resolve it (263.442703ms)
  AssertionError [ERR_ASSERTION]: spend {"project":"stack","spec_path":"spec/north-star.md","spec_commit":"94ad77f623676dff49a4274d13b388b71807c333"}
  + actual - expected
  
    {
      class: 'gated',
  +   route_to: 'reviewer'
  -   route_to: 'human'
    }
  
      at TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/tests/hard-waits.test.mjs:43:14)
      at async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
      at async Test.processPendingSubtests (node:internal/test_runner/test:974:7) {
    generatedMessage: false,
    code: 'ERR_ASSERTION',
    actual: { class: 'gated', route_to: 'reviewer' },
    expected: { class: 'gated', route_to: 'human' },
    operator: 'deepStrictEqual',
    diff: 'simple'
  }

test at tests/hard-waits.test.mjs:126:1
✖ Q169: another role's cited revoke of the assistant, resolved by an arbiter, is refused (192.873554ms)
  AssertionError [ERR_ASSERTION]: Expected values to be strictly deep-equal:
  + actual - expected
  
    {
      class: 'gated',
  +   route_to: 'reviewer'
  -   route_to: 'human'
    }
  
      at TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/tests/hard-waits.test.mjs:129:10)
      at async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
      at async Test.processPendingSubtests (node:internal/test_runner/test:974:7) {
    generatedMessage: true,
    code: 'ERR_ASSERTION',
    actual: { class: 'gated', route_to: 'reviewer' },
    expected: { class: 'gated', route_to: 'human' },
    operator: 'deepStrictEqual',
    diff: 'simple'
  }

test at tests/hard-waits.test.mjs:141:1
✖ Q169: a revoke of the assistant citing a decision the human resolved is not refused by the protection (258.475823ms)
  AssertionError [ERR_ASSERTION]: Missing expected exception.
      at TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/tests/hard-waits.test.mjs:144:10)
      at async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
      at async Test.processPendingSubtests (node:internal/test_runner/test:974:7) {
    generatedMessage: false,
    code: 'ERR_ASSERTION',
    actual: undefined,
    expected: /human-required/,
    operator: 'throws',
    diff: 'simple'
  }

test at tests/hard-waits.test.mjs:160:1
✖ Q169: a role granted role.revoke at either class still sends a revoke of the assistant to the human (296.16808ms)
  AssertionError [ERR_ASSERTION]: Expected values to be strictly deep-equal:
  + actual - expected
  
    {
      class: 'gated',
  +   route_to: 'reviewer'
  -   route_to: 'human'
    }
  
      at TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/tests/hard-waits.test.mjs:165:10)
      at async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
      at async Test.processPendingSubtests (node:internal/test_runner/test:974:7) {
    generatedMessage: true,
    code: 'ERR_ASSERTION',
    actual: { class: 'gated', route_to: 'reviewer' },
    expected: { class: 'gated', route_to: 'human' },
    operator: 'deepStrictEqual',
    diff: 'simple'
  }

test at tests/spec.test.mjs:9:1
✖ current citation is recorded; docs commits do not stale it and a new spec never reopens settlement (321.389474ms)
  Error: agent-required
      at fail (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:104:9)
      at #agent (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:297:18)
      at #dispatch (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:1320:22)
      at file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:972:38
      at Store.transaction (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/src/store.mjs:242:22)
      at Broker.request (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:966:26)
      at Object.call (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/tests/spec-fixtures.mjs:33:49)
      at TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/tests/spec.test.mjs:14:5)
      at process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:104:5)
      at async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7) {
    code: 'agent-required'
  }
