npm notice run test
npm notice run node --test tests/*.test.mjs
✔ agents: a held role with nothing on the bus is idle; a role session gets the claim rows unchanged (155.063053ms)
✔ agents: working counts what the holder received and has not read; routed alone is not working (241.161916ms)
✔ agents: input needed is the role's open decisions routed to the human, gated first, then oldest (386.125503ms)
✔ agents: working wins over waiting, and Input needed still shows (163.903846ms)
✔ agents: a new holder doesn't inherit what the last one left unread; decisions stay with the role (182.024141ms)
✔ agents: state reads only its own business, even for a run name both use (182.053417ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder released unread is stranded; the next holder gets nothing and cannot read it (218.271027ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder read is not stranded; one the current holder has not read is not listed (206.387417ms)
✔ agents: stranded is oldest first and capped at 50 for a role (840.00376ms)
✔ agents: stranded is per role and per business (335.111849ms)
✔ agents: a message routed to a held role and not yet received is not stranded (126.222066ms)
✔ REQ-DEC an approval outlives its run and a broker restart; a new run of the instance consumes it once (317.681569ms)
✔ REQ-DEC another instance of the same definition cannot consume an approval, and its refusal consumes nothing (254.037449ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread approval is consumed only by a run holding the same thread (267.828221ms)
✔ REQ-DEC a later run of the same instance supersedes an open decision; another instance cannot (227.11609ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread decision is superseded only from the same thread (238.307829ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread instance decision raised before row 121 is not consumed or superseded by any thread run (374.288404ms)
✔ launch identity is stamped, payload identity is refused and stale holder cannot send (186.153833ms)
✔ decision classes route from policy; gated resolution is human-only, choice and target must match (339.67942ms)
✔ claim exclusion, holder release, gated revoke and rerouting to a new holder are atomic (284.749245ms)
✔ launch events require a human CLI capability; generic emit cannot forge authority events (172.349092ms)
✔ within-role decisions close atomically and invalid options or blocking omissions refuse (173.305516ms)
✔ a recommendation that is not exactly one option key refuses invalid-recommendation after the options (262.351953ms)
✔ observer capabilities read human inbox but cannot mutate or forge launch identity (182.98293ms)
✔ task action subjects and linked decision trail are complete and ordered (195.436311ms)
✔ launch binding is durable and reconnecting requires the identical trusted record (115.49538ms)
✔ business isolation includes inherited object names and cross-business message references (188.893912ms)
✔ authority never transfers between action, target, unresolved or replaced role holder; a later run of the instance keeps it (272.741063ms)
✔ task projection uses schema current view, skipping earlier and equal-start polls (141.665115ms)
✔ revocation permanently bars the old run from reclaiming first, including after broker restart (212.78449ms)
✔ empty message references refuse before storage; refusal-evidence failure stays a typed error (148.38983ms)
✔ both arbiters require human resolution when their cross-role route is themselves (242.280803ms)
✔ the shipped coder role raises task.reassign as gated to the human; task.scope.change stays cross-role (177.665931ms)
✔ S1 adapter takes resolved limits and refs, rejects mismatched instance, never mutates input (2.254263ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1, REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff ends a run with a reason and no decision, and the reason is logged (282.150019ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still needs a resolved decision to revoke (382.262373ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: storage accepts a revoke with a reason or a decision and aborts one with neither (231.012782ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff may still cite a decision, and a decision alone is the old path (230.335107ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still ends a run through a resolved decision, which is recorded and has no reason (258.59892ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a reason is required, bounded, and never sent with a decision (292.476378ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the chief of staff cannot end its own run; its end of the assistant gets past the protection (277.485257ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: organization.set from the chief of staff reaches the shared writer, named as the actor (225.173554ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: a refused organization.set logs action.refused and no action.allowed, like a refused limits.set (282.571549ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: organization.set is refused for every caller whose role file lacks organization.change (302.437385ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: the chief of staff is logged as allowed, and organization.set takes only the human's keys (369.686947ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-3, REQ-LIMIT-1: a chief-of-staff change is validated, written and logged like a human's; an invalid one is refused (484.819769ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2, REQ-COS-1: the 3c→3d migration lets the chief of staff end a held role with a reason; neither is still refused (866.926907ms)
✔ comment cursors isolate businesses, move only forward and remain append-only (142.510365ms)
✔ only trusted sync writes validated cursors; events and cursor share rollback (145.188906ms)
✔ explicit 3b copy migration preserves evidence and opens as 3f; normal startup never migrates (952.118513ms)
✔ migration refuses active writers and drifted legacy schemas, with no partial upgrade (1479.319731ms)
✔ named migration registry chains 3b through 3f to a fixture-only future version in order (778.825666ms)
✔ migration refuses mismatched source metadata without changing schema or evidence (727.87393ms)
✔ offline command migrates only the supplied fixture root and reports usage errors (884.222469ms)
✔ credentials gives human and reader sessions service, account, role, date and state, and nothing else (109.903193ms)
✔ credentials refuses a role session and any argument (215.063763ms)
✔ credentials reads the status on each request, and a broker without one lists none (283.443085ms)
✔ the broker process answers credentials without a token, path or variable in its output, log or store (220.634815ms)
✔ only validated broker references load; returned data and exceptions cannot expose a known token (4.135556ms)
✔ bad file modes, symlinks, repository/data paths, malformed tokens and missing dates refuse (2.592616ms)
✔ expiry refuses use and env references never become client data (0.84642ms)
✔ S1 parsed service refs work, service mismatch refuses, Gitea rotation due is a warning state (1.7251ms)
✔ opaque tokens shorter than 16 characters refuse before use (0.408721ms)
✔ each C-suite role file carries the same two lists: human, chief-of-staff, pm, cto (1.757083ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (576.327926ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (439.738931ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (394.312982ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (480.85762ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (423.354874ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (367.382568ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (460.916944ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (420.169636ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (384.305028ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (472.737934ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (456.090922ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (398.974323ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (447.662673ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (658.881965ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (445.546194ms)
✔ a human resolve sends the raising role one message from the human, and its request is the answer (260.961261ms)
✔ a cross-role decision resolved by its arbiter comes from that role and run, with no request (301.931392ms)
✔ a human withdraw sends one message with the note (249.901581ms)
✔ a human seen before the close leaves the request on the close's answer, not the seen (266.533682ms)
✔ the raising run's withdraw, a supersede, a within-role raise and seen send nothing (277.258648ms)
✔ refused closes send nothing: invalid-choice, decision-closed, not-resolver (301.193179ms)
✔ a raising role nobody holds at the close gets the message on the next claim (260.5422ms)
✔ a human DECISION send keeps its own instruction as the request, not a close's answer (230.781981ms)
✔ a cross-role raise whose arbiter the raiser does not hear from is refused and stores nothing (338.272398ms)
✔ a gated raise by a role that does not hear from the human is refused and stores nothing (347.229538ms)
✔ a route the raiser hears from is allowed, checked from the route to the raiser (330.730868ms)
✔ a refused supersede withdraws nothing (276.242067ms)
✔ the assistant's within-role and gated raises still work (315.017397ms)
✔ roles lists open decisions routed to a role, and never the human inbox (231.544874ms)
✔ recent lists closed decisions of every route, newest close first, with how each closed (380.725493ms)
✔ recent gives the closing event as closed when the decision was seen first (290.178456ms)
✔ recent stops at RECENT rows (805.878584ms)
✔ every row is what trail already gives the same session for that id (274.984506ms)
✔ a role session can't list decisions, so it can't read another role's open decisions (379.824921ms)
✔ decisions is a read: one business, strict arguments, nothing written (365.917385ms)
✔ endLaunch writes session.ended, releases the run claim and kills its capabilities (148.364242ms)
✔ endLaunch refuses an unknown run, a second end and a rebind of the ended run (165.008836ms)
✔ a restarted broker refuses to rebind an ended run; a refused rebind leaves the run unbound (210.854714ms)
✔ endLaunch leaves a claim another run took alone (171.322773ms)
✔ refuse records action.refused against the caller with the code only (125.264633ms)
✔ launches off refuses role.launch with launch-revoked until launches on (178.884004ms)
✔ broker process: launch ops authorize role.launch, record refusals and end runs (290.943232ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-1: the broker hard waits are exactly the list, and match the business vocabulary (1.297941ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-2: a business granting a hard wait at either class is refused; the actions that left are grantable (118.573806ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: every hard wait goes to the human, cited or not, and the arbiter cannot resolve it (813.597368ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a gated raise citing the current spec goes to the arbiter for its domain; uncited, to the human (470.360961ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: an arbiter-approved cited gated decision authorizes the raiser, and the human cannot resolve it (235.93233ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a cited merge raised by merge-gate goes to the technical arbiter; a merge raised without the grant routes by citation (300.233053ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a stale or unconfirmed citation refuses without a decision; an arbiter raising its own goes to the human (269.678465ms)
✔ Q169: the chief of staff's end of the assistant is not refused role-end-refused; its own run and another ender's are (224.702003ms)
✖ Q169: another role's cited revoke of the assistant, resolved by an arbiter, is refused (181.453798ms)
✖ Q169: a revoke of the assistant citing a decision the human resolved is not refused by the protection (200.735158ms)
✔ Q169: a cited revoke of a role not in END_PROTECTED still goes to the arbiter, and executes (228.410963ms)
✖ Q169: a role granted role.revoke at either class still sends a revoke of the assistant to the human (219.247219ms)
✔ human proof binds CLI entry, process start and nonce; agents and incomplete ancestry refuse (1.456517ms)
✔ process reader gets own kernel identity without exposing environment values (0.422936ms)
✔ EACCES ancestor environments skip only markers; commands and registered launches still refuse (0.597234ms)
✔ real pid 1 remains inspectable when its environment is protected (0.243308ms)
✔ a message to a stopped role sends launch.by one notice, and the result says so (239.495944ms)
✔ a message to a role outside launch.instances says so in its result and in the notice (230.025402ms)
✔ a message to a running role sends no notice and its result is unchanged (152.390967ms)
✔ a re-route at a claim, a release and claim, and a broker restart send no second notice (235.28249ms)
✔ a run launched but not yet claimed counts as no holder (131.160579ms)
✔ no notice for a message to launch.by, from it, from a tester, to the human, or in a thread to a thread instance (256.494853ms)
✔ a business with no launch block tells nobody and says there is no launcher (127.328381ms)
✔ the notice sender stays internal: no role is named _bus and no caller can send as it or to it (351.437225ms)
✔ limits binds actor from human proof and rejects role, reader, tester and forged actor (253.925887ms)
✔ runtime wires verified human settings to the actual shared file writer and actor receipt (341.81361ms)
✔ uncertain organization receipts leave bus startup and reads alone but refuse writes until reconciled (407.738334ms)
✔ within-role sends cite an open gated launch decision without spending it or naming it in grants (261.457856ms)
✔ missing and foreign-business citations refuse and roll back message and grant (194.42556ms)
✔ cross-role sends still need a matching resolved decision and consume it once (239.587992ms)
✔ messages pages all human messages newest first without writes; read state is history (2502.977465ms)
✔ messages refuses role callers, invalid paging and cursors outside this human feed (255.490303ms)
✔ views messages passes only its paging arguments through (0.282315ms)
✔ messages isolates businesses even with a valid foreign cursor (165.047918ms)
✔ the assistant sends to the user and to the chief of staff only (295.350649ms)
✔ an assistant send to any other role, or to the tester, is refused and logged (380.520656ms)
✔ only the user and the chief of staff may send to the assistant; the tester is refused by default (351.440636ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2 REQ-THREAD-1 thread.send to an instance that does not hear from the user is refused and stores nothing (280.083873ms)
✔ a sender-side list alone refuses a send to a role that has no list (306.050185ms)
✔ a target-side list alone refuses a send from a role that has no list (330.810486ms)
✔ the sender list is checked before the target list (300.112592ms)
✔ roles without the field behave exactly as before (393.979552ms)
✔ a business with no role definitions at all is unlimited (324.861592ms)
✔ a malformed messaging field refuses at boot (122.169231ms)
✔ the assistant's review.request to a reviewer is refused and logged, even with an approved decision (346.470675ms)
✔ a review.verdict to the assistant from a role outside its receiveFrom is refused and logged (386.825012ms)
✔ review requests and verdicts between roles without the field are unchanged (332.424448ms)
✔ plugins and plugins.set refuse every non-human session and a forged actor, and pass only the patch with the verified actor (186.447239ms)
✔ runtime: the switch changes the organization file, the receipt carries the actor, and a bad shape, an unknown module and a stale revision are refused with nothing written (513.96096ms)
✔ vikunja:19/309 through the broker, a patch switches the kinds it names and keeps the rest; null removes one kind and is trailed (386.911504ms)
✔ broker process binds trusted launches, offers reader capabilities, refuses human mutation, closes cleanly (220.314318ms)
✔ startup token refusal returns safe code without value or partial listening broker (77.8626ms)
✔ loaded fixture token is absent from socket replies and SQLite, including refusal evidence (223.046802ms)
✔ killed broker leaves an explicit stale lock; another process cannot silently reclaim it (248.098695ms)
✔ trusted host registers later launches; socket clients never have a registration verb (206.555652ms)
✔ runtime excludes declared project roots even when host supplies no repoRoots (66.843146ms)
✔ a refused launch binding leaves the broker and existing capabilities alive; bad protocol stops it (196.003471ms)
✔ D1: committed write with a failed receipt refuses outcome-unknown without action.allowed (152.547841ms)
✔ D2: spec.read refuses without content if its role is released during the read (154.108826ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged content without content (133.864355ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged subject without content (135.145943ms)
✔ Broker keeps the existing sandbox client import closure: no new imports or lazy project import (1.384394ms)
✔ without a trusted project adapter all three async paths refuse project-not-configured (215.982928ms)
✔ real startBroker injects the project adapter for socket reads and bound-author record writes (213.514857ms)
✔ a reply is listed for human and reader sessions, and its delivery rows are unchanged (225.99218ms)
✔ the reply still reaches the human message.receive (mosaic talk) after the Console showed it (196.046207ms)
✔ a message with no reply gives an empty list (141.106508ms)
✔ replies come oldest first and stop at REPLIES (728.533198ms)
✔ an id that names no message in the business refuses message-not-found, and the refusal is recorded (295.400401ms)
✔ strict arguments; a role session gets human-required (347.706823ms)
✔ views passes replies through as one call with the id (0.229409ms)
✔ requirements returns the committed list to a holding role session, and no one else (195.081806ms)
✔ the PM's prd.approve with no task, when no id fits, reaches the human's Inbox (147.349301ms)
✔ the PM's non-blocking role.revoke with no task reaches the human's Inbox (163.969755ms)
✔ a push is recorded as the action.allowed for git.push.working on the task, and only the host records one (218.818513ms)
✔ review.request names the latest pushed commit and sends the reviewer a REVIEW-REQUEST (235.940172ms)
✔ review.request says which run holds the reviewer role, or null, and a null request waits for a claim (276.96395ms)
✔ review.request refuses a commit that isn't the latest push, a non-reviewer and a role without the action (361.351025ms)
✔ reviewFetch answers only the addressed reviewer, for the request it cites (218.65701ms)
✔ review.verdict answers one request once, to the role that asked (284.837687ms)
✔ task.close on a pushed task needs an approve verdict for the latest push (375.745654ms)
✔ a refusal the host decided is filed on the task it names, and only a task ref counts (250.675974ms)
✔ v3b prototype refusals, views and append-only mutations (1394.731586ms)
✔ gated approval authorizes once, survives store reopen, and fresh approval works (246.674731ms)
✔ another run of the same instance consumes an approval once; a failed check leaves it usable (202.879138ms)
✔ two scheduled callers have exactly one grant and one consumed refusal (166.04663ms)
✔ failed commit rolls consumption back; cross-role consumes and within-role stays reusable (311.871319ms)
✔ class drift gated to cross-role refuses before consumption (226.657384ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to gated refuses before consumption (221.940266ms)
✔ class drift gated to within-role refuses before consumption (230.179506ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to within-role refuses before consumption (244.516533ms)
✔ class drift within-role to gated refuses before consumption (206.775752ms)
✔ class drift within-role to cross-role refuses before consumption (210.559431ms)
✔ message.send consumes approval and prevents a later send or authorize (238.62197ms)
✔ role.revoke consumes approval and prevents a later revoke or authorize (256.062602ms)
✔ 3e copy migrates to 3f preserving every old column/row and adding null spec citations (1294.490012ms)
✔ real socket awaits spec reads, record writes and cited raises; other requests still return normally (260.704892ms)
✔ real socket preserves asynchronous refusal codes and disconnects its transient proof (186.883385ms)
✔ two real socket writes to one repository yield one commit and one project-busy refusal (226.828515ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late reply (170.44533ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late refusal (170.088105ms)
✔ N-a: slow admitted record.write returns its committed result after the idle deadline (379.407083ms)
✔ current citation is recorded; docs commits do not stale it and a new spec never reopens settlement (307.625298ms)
✔ stale, unconfirmed, missing and partial spec citations refuse without inserting a decision (299.169781ms)
✔ uncited raises retain their synchronous path and spec read is available to any held role in its business (219.412657ms)
✔ record writes bind the session author, require authority and refuse spec and impersonation paths (257.293598ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the pm asks the chief of staff for roles and counts; the chief receives a STAFF-REQUEST and answers it (242.539804ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: only the pm can send a staff request; every other session is refused and the chief of staff hears nothing (283.57821ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a pm without message.send is refused like any other gated action (159.30295ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the request goes to the business launcher, and only when that is a chief of staff (421.93901ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the sender is judged by definition: an instance `lead` of the pm definition can ask, an instance `pm` of the coder definition can't (415.483366ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the launcher is judged by definition: an instance `boss` of the chief-of-staff definition receives, a `chief` of the coder definition gives no-chief-of-staff (376.532059ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a refused staff request leaves no staff.request action.allowed event (231.377236ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2: the role definitions' messaging lists hold for a staff request, sender and recipient (592.912315ms)
✔ a staff request names a task, 1 to 10 distinct roles and counts of 1 to 20; nothing else is accepted (705.09351ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a staff request grants nothing: the pm still can't launch and the chief of staff launches as before (250.652775ms)
✔ a business that never switched launches reads allowed with no time and no event (118.671102ms)
✔ launches revoked and then restored read allowed, with the restore time and event id (129.586926ms)
✔ a task closed on the tracker leaves the open list, and total counts the open ones (151.374669ms)
✔ a tombstone is not open (141.533645ms)
✔ the open list stops at the cap and says so; total still counts every open task (138.427777ms)
✔ a role and a reader session read state; arguments, and an unbound cap, refuse (140.479561ms)
✔ a human session reads the same state, with the same cap (141.670688ms)
✔ reading state writes nothing: every table keeps its row count (152.345683ms)
✔ creates private WAL store and excludes a second writer until explicit close (120.240417ms)
✔ rollback is atomic and schema metadata is checked against trusted DDL, not just itself (140.417371ms)
✔ existing empty database and symlink runtime directory refuse, never initialize over damage (178.464987ms)
✔ crash during a transaction recovers no partial event after explicit fixture-only lock removal (174.262498ms)
✔ writer refuses mixed at/read_at forms atomically, even through trusted SQL helpers (107.541772ms)
✔ async transactions refuse before invoking their function (99.656962ms)
✔ the session default fits under the reply cap and pages to the end with next (303.167438ms)
✔ the short form: no description, assignees by role, every listed key (247.107472ms)
✔ each filter, alone and together, and total counts every match (338.558475ms)
✔ task_ref reads one task in full, as the whole board has it (288.415386ms)
✔ no arguments is the read the Console and mosaic make, unchanged (253.606623ms)
✔ an unknown argument or a bad value refuses invalid-request (1202.679797ms)
✔ tasks rows carry priority and requirement for every session that reads tasks (291.966392ms)
✔ the read model rebuilds from the ledger: a reopened bus and each trail give the same values (341.364543ms)
✔ an empty business and one with snapshots but no task.created read cleanly (108.710075ms)
✔ recordTask keeps sync reads and a role write apart (165.155423ms)
✔ read_at must be one canonical UTC format, so the projection compares strings safely (121.621083ms)
✔ a bad entry refuses the whole record (106.511495ms)
✔ taskView reads the projection for one business (134.902484ms)
✔ requestTask hands only a holder and a task verb to the handler, and records refusals (252.616928ms)
✔ the server sends task verbs to the adapter with its own timeout; other verbs stay synchronous (414.818522ms)
✔ without an adapter the server refuses every task verb (216.666762ms)
✔ the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one (211.106308ms)
✔ the process loads the S3 adapter from plain-data trackers (371.551757ms)
✔ the tester binds only when the business sets bus.tester to exactly true (801.74922ms)
✔ a business may not name a role tester, so the tester address is never a role (238.873967ms)
✔ every verb outside the tester list refuses tester-refused and is recorded against the tester (553.600587ms)
✔ a tester message is from tester, starts [mos test], and writes no human.input or authority (209.690599ms)
✔ a role answers a tester only in reply to a tester message, and the answer never reaches the human (232.973455ms)
✔ the tester reads the human views a reader reads (437.467494ms)
✔ tester proof binds its own CLI, start time and nonce, refuses a managed run and allows an agent (1.471376ms)
✔ neither CLI's nonce proves the other: each proof is bound to its own CLI and nonce variable (0.427071ms)
✔ testerNonce reads only the tester's variable and gives null on any read error (0.269203ms)
✔ an envelope carries exactly one of cap, human and tester; no tester authenticator refuses (156.746246ms)
✔ tester-cli.mjs binds through the runtime when the switch is on, and refuses off or under a run marker (1003.445536ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-ORG-2: the 3d→3e migration adds the thread tables and leaves messages from before threads as written (972.326919ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: a 3d bus with a changed schema is refused and keeps its version and tables (792.457401ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: the offline command prints the kept-message counts before the ready line (1123.063281ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: one holder per thread, through the broker and the trigger (319.379545ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: the 3e triggers refuse writes that skip the broker (1136.072091ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a message to or from the assistant names its thread, or is refused (315.813803ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: the chief of staff's reply comes back to the thread that sent the work (4016.142566ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a reply can't carry one thread instance's thread to another thread instance (105.418404ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-USER-2: one thread's messages never reach another thread's holder (155.767903ms)
✔ REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message to a thread with no holder waits, and the next holder gets it (170.031384ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: threadIdle releases only a thread with nothing waiting, and only for its holder (182.966719ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message delivered to a run that ended unread doesn't hold up the next holder (166.515417ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: an approved role.revoke never reaches a thread run, and the thread stays held (137.219197ms)
✔ REQ-USER-2: the human verbs refuse another owner's thread (160.232131ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: thread.create refuses when the business has no thread instance or more than one (114.174233ms)
✔ REQ-ORG-2: projects and threads are named once, and the repo names a business project (150.810125ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2: thread.messages returns the thread's history in pages and writes nothing (499.410487ms)
✔ socket capability stamps launch identity; shared views use wire, no SQL client (148.196072ms)
✔ two wire claims serialize; a lost reply never automatically retries (176.44724ms)
✔ malformed, oversized and identity-forging envelopes refuse without echoing input (120.205787ms)
✔ client preserves UTF-8 when a response divides a multibyte character (11.674113ms)
✔ committed mutation followed by dropped reply reports unknown and is never retried (137.251559ms)
✔ web.search: a granted role gets labelled results, and the call is trailed with role, run, verb and query (168.161312ms)
✔ web.fetch: a granted role gets the page as labelled text, and the call is trailed with the url (164.223423ms)
✔ a role without the grant is refused, the refusal is logged with the verb, and nothing is fetched (193.49248ms)
✔ a broker with no web service refuses a granted role (136.594302ms)
✔ bad requests are refused: unknown verb, extra or missing argument, not a string, a human or reader session (206.224707ms)
✔ a session that is not the role holder is refused (115.376197ms)
✔ web.mjs's fences hold on the broker side: refusals are normal results with the fixed reason (369.21533ms)
✔ web.search with no search source configured is a refused result, not an error (131.535458ms)
✔ a search source that fails with its own refusal, or that throws, is handled (466.863549ms)
✔ a slow search source ends in a refusal at the deadline (201.995415ms)
✔ a secret in the arguments is refused before anything is trailed or fetched (134.524125ms)
✔ over the socket: the server routes web verbs to the service; other roles are refused; no service is web-not-configured (435.001125ms)
✔ busBusiness: the web grant comes from "web" in the resolved tool limit (0.293252ms)
✔ webServices: the business's search-source plug-in and web.searxng var make web.search work; without either it is refused as not configured (191.0647ms)
✔ an ungranted call is refused at once: no admission, no wait, nothing touched (163.429343ms)
✔ over the socket an ungranted caller is dropped by the server timeout and a granted one gets the longer wait (466.704151ms)
✔ a search that never answers is aborted at the deadline, the module sees the signal, and the call is trailed as refused (timeout) (217.083088ms)
✔ a fetch that stalls is cut off at the deadline: the request is destroyed, not left running (197.483571ms)
✔ one query limit: over SEARCH_MAX_QUERY_CHARS or empty is refused with the same reason before any backend, and the tool schema carries the same number (157.682941ms)
ℹ tests 306
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 303
ℹ fail 3
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 11948.297073

✖ failing tests:

test at tests/hard-waits.test.mjs:126:1
✖ Q169: another role's cited revoke of the assistant, resolved by an arbiter, is refused (181.453798ms)
  AssertionError [ERR_ASSERTION]: Expected values to be strictly deep-equal:
  + actual - expected
  
    {
      class: 'gated',
  +   route_to: 'reviewer'
  -   route_to: 'human'
    }
  
      at TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/tests/hard-waits.test.mjs:129:10)
      at async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
      at async Test.processPendingSubtests (node:internal/test_runner/test:974:7) {
    generatedMessage: true,
    code: 'ERR_ASSERTION',
    actual: { class: 'gated', route_to: 'reviewer' },
    expected: { class: 'gated', route_to: 'human' },
    operator: 'deepStrictEqual',
    diff: 'simple'
  }

test at tests/hard-waits.test.mjs:141:1
✖ Q169: a revoke of the assistant citing a decision the human resolved is not refused by the protection (200.735158ms)
  AssertionError [ERR_ASSERTION]: Missing expected exception.
      at TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/tests/hard-waits.test.mjs:144:10)
      at process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:104:5)
      at async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
      at async Test.processPendingSubtests (node:internal/test_runner/test:974:7) {
    generatedMessage: false,
    code: 'ERR_ASSERTION',
    actual: undefined,
    expected: /human-required/,
    operator: 'throws',
    diff: 'simple'
  }

test at tests/hard-waits.test.mjs:160:1
✖ Q169: a role granted role.revoke at either class still sends a revoke of the assistant to the human (219.247219ms)
  AssertionError [ERR_ASSERTION]: Expected values to be strictly deep-equal:
  + actual - expected
  
    {
  +   class: 'cross-role',
  +   route_to: 'reviewer'
  -   class: 'gated',
  -   route_to: 'human'
    }
  
      at TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/tests/hard-waits.test.mjs:165:10)
      at process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:104:5)
      at async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
      at async Test.processPendingSubtests (node:internal/test_runner/test:974:7) {
    generatedMessage: true,
    code: 'ERR_ASSERTION',
    actual: { class: 'cross-role', route_to: 'reviewer' },
    expected: { class: 'gated', route_to: 'human' },
    operator: 'deepStrictEqual',
    diff: 'simple'
  }
