npm notice run test
npm notice run node --test tests/*.test.mjs
✔ agents: a held role with nothing on the bus is idle; a role session gets the claim rows unchanged (142.309873ms)
✔ agents: working counts what the holder received and has not read; routed alone is not working (231.201892ms)
✔ agents: input needed is the role's open decisions routed to the human, gated first, then oldest (367.803044ms)
✔ agents: working wins over waiting, and Input needed still shows (259.798746ms)
✔ agents: a new holder doesn't inherit what the last one left unread; decisions stay with the role (397.235171ms)
✔ agents: state reads only its own business, even for a run name both use (212.02064ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder released unread is stranded; the next holder gets nothing and cannot read it (230.831747ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder read is not stranded; one the current holder has not read is not listed (216.60349ms)
✔ agents: stranded is oldest first and capped at 50 for a role (963.843246ms)
✔ agents: stranded is per role and per business (374.286349ms)
✔ agents: a message routed to a held role and not yet received is not stranded (154.105087ms)
✔ REQ-DEC an approval outlives its run and a broker restart; a new run of the instance consumes it once (301.650289ms)
✔ REQ-DEC another instance of the same definition cannot consume an approval, and its refusal consumes nothing (202.787714ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread approval is consumed only by a run holding the same thread (312.824123ms)
✔ REQ-DEC a later run of the same instance supersedes an open decision; another instance cannot (432.648317ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread decision is superseded only from the same thread (339.267456ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread instance decision raised before row 121 is not consumed or superseded by any thread run (386.665924ms)
✔ launch identity is stamped, payload identity is refused and stale holder cannot send (168.387278ms)
✔ decision classes route from policy; gated resolution is human-only, choice and target must match (281.576631ms)
✔ claim exclusion, holder release, gated revoke and rerouting to a new holder are atomic (309.051654ms)
✔ launch events require a human CLI capability; generic emit cannot forge authority events (260.623363ms)
✔ within-role decisions close atomically and invalid options or blocking omissions refuse (368.078554ms)
✔ a recommendation that is not exactly one option key refuses invalid-recommendation after the options (281.304982ms)
✔ observer capabilities read human inbox but cannot mutate or forge launch identity (183.937178ms)
✔ task action subjects and linked decision trail are complete and ordered (203.012845ms)
✔ launch binding is durable and reconnecting requires the identical trusted record (117.076817ms)
✔ business isolation includes inherited object names and cross-business message references (265.740593ms)
✔ authority never transfers between action, target, unresolved or replaced role holder; a later run of the instance keeps it (299.378572ms)
✔ task projection uses schema current view, skipping earlier and equal-start polls (157.033714ms)
✔ revocation permanently bars the old run from reclaiming first, including after broker restart (231.052303ms)
✔ empty message references refuse before storage; refusal-evidence failure stays a typed error (161.53335ms)
✔ both arbiters require human resolution when their cross-role route is themselves (263.180123ms)
✔ the shipped coder role raises task.reassign as gated to the human; task.scope.change stays cross-role (237.437295ms)
✔ S1 adapter takes resolved limits and refs, rejects mismatched instance, never mutates input (2.662861ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1, REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff ends a run with a reason and no decision, and the reason is logged (267.786792ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still needs a resolved decision to revoke (360.49961ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: storage accepts a revoke with a reason or a decision and aborts one with neither (326.513773ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff may still cite a decision, and a decision alone is the old path (436.237107ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still ends a run through a resolved decision, which is recorded and has no reason (290.987227ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a reason is required, bounded, and never sent with a decision (311.667144ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the chief of staff cannot end its own run; its end of the assistant gets past the protection (320.097107ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: organization.set from the chief of staff reaches the shared writer, named as the actor (249.134553ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: a refused organization.set logs action.refused and no action.allowed, like a refused limits.set (343.47293ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: organization.set is refused for every caller whose role file lacks organization.change (323.745355ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: the chief of staff is logged as allowed, and organization.set takes only the human's keys (440.91704ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-3, REQ-LIMIT-1: a chief-of-staff change is validated, written and logged like a human's; an invalid one is refused (570.161417ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2, REQ-COS-1: the 3c→3d migration lets the chief of staff end a held role with a reason; neither is still refused (1034.702314ms)
✔ comment cursors isolate businesses, move only forward and remain append-only (130.710467ms)
✔ only trusted sync writes validated cursors; events and cursor share rollback (126.238819ms)
✔ explicit 3b copy migration preserves evidence and opens as 3f; normal startup never migrates (981.018335ms)
✔ migration refuses active writers and drifted legacy schemas, with no partial upgrade (1846.682878ms)
✔ named migration registry chains 3b through 3f to a fixture-only future version in order (914.705075ms)
✔ migration refuses mismatched source metadata without changing schema or evidence (873.90628ms)
✔ offline command migrates only the supplied fixture root and reports usage errors (959.061595ms)
✔ credentials gives human and reader sessions service, account, role, date and state, and nothing else (116.849709ms)
✔ credentials refuses a role session and any argument (183.716297ms)
✔ credentials reads the status on each request, and a broker without one lists none (241.477878ms)
✔ the broker process answers credentials without a token, path or variable in its output, log or store (267.35318ms)
✔ only validated broker references load; returned data and exceptions cannot expose a known token (4.841626ms)
✔ bad file modes, symlinks, repository/data paths, malformed tokens and missing dates refuse (4.375213ms)
✔ expiry refuses use and env references never become client data (1.410739ms)
✔ S1 parsed service refs work, service mismatch refuses, Gitea rotation due is a warning state (1.864275ms)
✔ opaque tokens shorter than 16 characters refuse before use (0.47774ms)
✔ each C-suite role file carries the same two lists: human, chief-of-staff, pm, cto (2.46137ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (516.024271ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (692.495881ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (494.513961ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (501.732584ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (517.19919ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (412.467321ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (537.983819ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (480.40045ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (495.078512ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (530.385133ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (481.380012ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (435.154144ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (445.391814ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (442.247177ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (376.630317ms)
✔ a human resolve sends the raising role one message from the human, and its request is the answer (256.416022ms)
✔ a cross-role decision resolved by its arbiter comes from that role and run, with no request (263.845341ms)
✔ a human withdraw sends one message with the note (319.714821ms)
✔ a human seen before the close leaves the request on the close's answer, not the seen (443.359587ms)
✔ the raising run's withdraw, a supersede, a within-role raise and seen send nothing (368.603134ms)
✔ refused closes send nothing: invalid-choice, decision-closed, not-resolver (307.830785ms)
✔ a raising role nobody holds at the close gets the message on the next claim (307.533623ms)
✔ a human DECISION send keeps its own instruction as the request, not a close's answer (292.212853ms)
✔ a cross-role raise whose arbiter the raiser does not hear from is refused and stores nothing (302.501868ms)
✔ a gated raise by a role that does not hear from the human is refused and stores nothing (317.897026ms)
✔ a route the raiser hears from is allowed, checked from the route to the raiser (495.946425ms)
✔ a refused supersede withdraws nothing (431.790648ms)
✔ the assistant's within-role and gated raises still work (324.778931ms)
✔ roles lists open decisions routed to a role, and never the human inbox (252.393829ms)
✔ recent lists closed decisions of every route, newest close first, with how each closed (313.889133ms)
✔ recent gives the closing event as closed when the decision was seen first (378.582693ms)
✔ recent stops at RECENT rows (1051.827553ms)
✔ every row is what trail already gives the same session for that id (319.899108ms)
✔ a role session can't list decisions, so it can't read another role's open decisions (447.915408ms)
✔ decisions is a read: one business, strict arguments, nothing written (415.51024ms)
✔ endLaunch writes session.ended, releases the run claim and kills its capabilities (157.673954ms)
✔ endLaunch refuses an unknown run, a second end and a rebind of the ended run (150.377271ms)
✔ a restarted broker refuses to rebind an ended run; a refused rebind leaves the run unbound (171.035152ms)
✔ endLaunch leaves a claim another run took alone (201.988658ms)
✔ refuse records action.refused against the caller with the code only (208.690888ms)
✔ launches off refuses role.launch with launch-revoked until launches on (325.591384ms)
✔ broker process: launch ops authorize role.launch, record refusals and end runs (400.14439ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-1: the broker hard waits are exactly the list, and match the business vocabulary (1.383913ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-2: a business granting a hard wait at either class is refused; the actions that left are grantable (116.094019ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: every hard wait goes to the human, cited or not, and the arbiter cannot resolve it (888.603613ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a gated raise citing the current spec goes to the arbiter for its domain; uncited, to the human (633.272316ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: an arbiter-approved cited gated decision authorizes the raiser, and the human cannot resolve it (264.993121ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a cited merge raised by merge-gate goes to the technical arbiter; a merge raised without the grant routes by citation (316.161815ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a stale or unconfirmed citation refuses without a decision; an arbiter raising its own goes to the human (314.106828ms)
✔ Q169: the chief of staff's end of the assistant is not refused role-end-refused; its own run and another ender's are (266.282267ms)
✖ Q169: another role's cited revoke of the assistant, resolved by an arbiter, is refused (229.485912ms)
✔ Q169: a revoke of the assistant citing a decision the human resolved is not refused by the protection (240.76101ms)
✔ Q169: a cited revoke of a role not in END_PROTECTED still goes to the arbiter, and executes (264.547675ms)
✔ Q169: a role granted role.revoke at either class still sends a revoke of the assistant to the human (341.174075ms)
✔ human proof binds CLI entry, process start and nonce; agents and incomplete ancestry refuse (1.601705ms)
✔ process reader gets own kernel identity without exposing environment values (0.464613ms)
✔ EACCES ancestor environments skip only markers; commands and registered launches still refuse (0.660976ms)
✔ real pid 1 remains inspectable when its environment is protected (0.283166ms)
✔ a message to a stopped role sends launch.by one notice, and the result says so (218.531313ms)
✔ a message to a role outside launch.instances says so in its result and in the notice (173.858032ms)
✔ a message to a running role sends no notice and its result is unchanged (147.575196ms)
✔ a re-route at a claim, a release and claim, and a broker restart send no second notice (346.114755ms)
✔ a run launched but not yet claimed counts as no holder (239.599115ms)
✔ no notice for a message to launch.by, from it, from a tester, to the human, or in a thread to a thread instance (359.579029ms)
✔ a business with no launch block tells nobody and says there is no launcher (146.317742ms)
✔ the notice sender stays internal: no role is named _bus and no caller can send as it or to it (365.662836ms)
✔ limits binds actor from human proof and rejects role, reader, tester and forged actor (217.892093ms)
✔ runtime wires verified human settings to the actual shared file writer and actor receipt (313.059179ms)
✔ uncertain organization receipts leave bus startup and reads alone but refuse writes until reconciled (685.224956ms)
✔ within-role sends cite an open gated launch decision without spending it or naming it in grants (221.358863ms)
✔ missing and foreign-business citations refuse and roll back message and grant (214.294871ms)
✔ cross-role sends still need a matching resolved decision and consume it once (385.612912ms)
✔ messages pages all human messages newest first without writes; read state is history (3018.395084ms)
✔ messages refuses role callers, invalid paging and cursors outside this human feed (261.012792ms)
✔ views messages passes only its paging arguments through (0.254699ms)
✔ messages isolates businesses even with a valid foreign cursor (212.26414ms)
✔ the assistant sends to the user and to the chief of staff only (422.215888ms)
✔ an assistant send to any other role, or to the tester, is refused and logged (385.353863ms)
✔ only the user and the chief of staff may send to the assistant; the tester is refused by default (440.796041ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2 REQ-THREAD-1 thread.send to an instance that does not hear from the user is refused and stores nothing (318.289243ms)
✔ a sender-side list alone refuses a send to a role that has no list (335.545256ms)
✔ a target-side list alone refuses a send from a role that has no list (377.557884ms)
✔ the sender list is checked before the target list (363.151065ms)
✔ roles without the field behave exactly as before (448.547393ms)
✔ a business with no role definitions at all is unlimited (423.075891ms)
✔ a malformed messaging field refuses at boot (119.671095ms)
✔ the assistant's review.request to a reviewer is refused and logged, even with an approved decision (381.325815ms)
✔ a review.verdict to the assistant from a role outside its receiveFrom is refused and logged (410.741928ms)
✔ review requests and verdicts between roles without the field are unchanged (366.044928ms)
✔ plugins and plugins.set refuse every non-human session and a forged actor, and pass only the patch with the verified actor (209.124271ms)
✔ runtime: the switch changes the organization file, the receipt carries the actor, and a bad shape, an unknown module and a stale revision are refused with nothing written (517.643083ms)
✔ vikunja:19/309 through the broker, a patch switches the kinds it names and keeps the rest; null removes one kind and is trailed (475.892132ms)
✔ broker process binds trusted launches, offers reader capabilities, refuses human mutation, closes cleanly (218.819659ms)
✔ startup token refusal returns safe code without value or partial listening broker (66.986171ms)
✔ loaded fixture token is absent from socket replies and SQLite, including refusal evidence (220.480367ms)
✔ killed broker leaves an explicit stale lock; another process cannot silently reclaim it (264.099594ms)
✔ trusted host registers later launches; socket clients never have a registration verb (215.306984ms)
✔ runtime excludes declared project roots even when host supplies no repoRoots (67.867886ms)
✔ a refused launch binding leaves the broker and existing capabilities alive; bad protocol stops it (192.541157ms)
✔ D1: committed write with a failed receipt refuses outcome-unknown without action.allowed (173.428009ms)
✔ D2: spec.read refuses without content if its role is released during the read (177.673555ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged content without content (180.81081ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged subject without content (140.357003ms)
✔ Broker keeps the existing sandbox client import closure: no new imports or lazy project import (1.288023ms)
✔ without a trusted project adapter all three async paths refuse project-not-configured (235.988712ms)
✔ real startBroker injects the project adapter for socket reads and bound-author record writes (236.378394ms)
✔ a reply is listed for human and reader sessions, and its delivery rows are unchanged (280.418741ms)
✔ the reply still reaches the human message.receive (mosaic talk) after the Console showed it (204.95764ms)
✔ a message with no reply gives an empty list (184.844268ms)
✔ replies come oldest first and stop at REPLIES (811.37612ms)
✔ an id that names no message in the business refuses message-not-found, and the refusal is recorded (355.279473ms)
✔ strict arguments; a role session gets human-required (383.705107ms)
✔ views passes replies through as one call with the id (0.256315ms)
✔ requirements returns the committed list to a holding role session, and no one else (232.798166ms)
✔ the PM's prd.approve with no task, when no id fits, reaches the human's Inbox (162.494811ms)
✔ the PM's non-blocking role.revoke with no task reaches the human's Inbox (174.61228ms)
✔ a push is recorded as the action.allowed for git.push.working on the task, and only the host records one (248.094559ms)
✔ review.request names the latest pushed commit and sends the reviewer a REVIEW-REQUEST (242.82092ms)
✔ review.request says which run holds the reviewer role, or null, and a null request waits for a claim (310.307381ms)
✔ review.request refuses a commit that isn't the latest push, a non-reviewer and a role without the action (448.980334ms)
✔ reviewFetch answers only the addressed reviewer, for the request it cites (246.57512ms)
✔ review.verdict answers one request once, to the role that asked (357.446501ms)
✔ task.close on a pushed task needs an approve verdict for the latest push (470.767628ms)
✔ a refusal the host decided is filed on the task it names, and only a task ref counts (279.341688ms)
✔ v3b prototype refusals, views and append-only mutations (1594.869488ms)
✔ gated approval authorizes once, survives store reopen, and fresh approval works (283.040113ms)
✔ another run of the same instance consumes an approval once; a failed check leaves it usable (224.657459ms)
✔ two scheduled callers have exactly one grant and one consumed refusal (172.666658ms)
✔ failed commit rolls consumption back; cross-role consumes and within-role stays reusable (396.904502ms)
✔ class drift gated to cross-role refuses before consumption (241.703687ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to gated refuses before consumption (236.475931ms)
✔ class drift gated to within-role refuses before consumption (285.197496ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to within-role refuses before consumption (325.021228ms)
✔ class drift within-role to gated refuses before consumption (231.422614ms)
✔ class drift within-role to cross-role refuses before consumption (250.952844ms)
✔ message.send consumes approval and prevents a later send or authorize (266.66055ms)
✔ role.revoke consumes approval and prevents a later revoke or authorize (284.183249ms)
✔ 3e copy migrates to 3f preserving every old column/row and adding null spec citations (1517.976505ms)
✔ real socket awaits spec reads, record writes and cited raises; other requests still return normally (283.007428ms)
✔ real socket preserves asynchronous refusal codes and disconnects its transient proof (211.603937ms)
✔ two real socket writes to one repository yield one commit and one project-busy refusal (246.520136ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late reply (185.518208ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late refusal (196.536129ms)
✔ N-a: slow admitted record.write returns its committed result after the idle deadline (393.853726ms)
✔ current citation is recorded; docs commits do not stale it and a new spec never reopens settlement (329.634523ms)
✔ stale, unconfirmed, missing and partial spec citations refuse without inserting a decision (355.084027ms)
✔ uncited raises retain their synchronous path and spec read is available to any held role in its business (228.7702ms)
✔ record writes bind the session author, require authority and refuse spec and impersonation paths (292.323439ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the pm asks the chief of staff for roles and counts; the chief receives a STAFF-REQUEST and answers it (302.42164ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: only the pm can send a staff request; every other session is refused and the chief of staff hears nothing (317.676289ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a pm without message.send is refused like any other gated action (185.908016ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the request goes to the business launcher, and only when that is a chief of staff (536.226685ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the sender is judged by definition: an instance `lead` of the pm definition can ask, an instance `pm` of the coder definition can't (421.211175ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the launcher is judged by definition: an instance `boss` of the chief-of-staff definition receives, a `chief` of the coder definition gives no-chief-of-staff (431.296622ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a refused staff request leaves no staff.request action.allowed event (252.770273ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2: the role definitions' messaging lists hold for a staff request, sender and recipient (611.932547ms)
✔ a staff request names a task, 1 to 10 distinct roles and counts of 1 to 20; nothing else is accepted (452.412719ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a staff request grants nothing: the pm still can't launch and the chief of staff launches as before (225.026499ms)
✔ a business that never switched launches reads allowed with no time and no event (150.925805ms)
✔ launches revoked and then restored read allowed, with the restore time and event id (144.239155ms)
✔ a task closed on the tracker leaves the open list, and total counts the open ones (183.717526ms)
✔ a tombstone is not open (177.800365ms)
✔ the open list stops at the cap and says so; total still counts every open task (202.838706ms)
✔ a role and a reader session read state; arguments, and an unbound cap, refuse (151.210144ms)
✔ a human session reads the same state, with the same cap (155.142841ms)
✔ reading state writes nothing: every table keeps its row count (169.588689ms)
✔ creates private WAL store and excludes a second writer until explicit close (132.415244ms)
✔ rollback is atomic and schema metadata is checked against trusted DDL, not just itself (188.599482ms)
✔ existing empty database and symlink runtime directory refuse, never initialize over damage (227.479788ms)
✔ crash during a transaction recovers no partial event after explicit fixture-only lock removal (224.306007ms)
✔ writer refuses mixed at/read_at forms atomically, even through trusted SQL helpers (125.586787ms)
✔ async transactions refuse before invoking their function (115.886513ms)
✔ the session default fits under the reply cap and pages to the end with next (338.514121ms)
✔ the short form: no description, assignees by role, every listed key (289.375787ms)
✔ each filter, alone and together, and total counts every match (348.297857ms)
✔ task_ref reads one task in full, as the whole board has it (307.676935ms)
✔ no arguments is the read the Console and mosaic make, unchanged (276.309848ms)
✔ an unknown argument or a bad value refuses invalid-request (931.051792ms)
✔ tasks rows carry priority and requirement for every session that reads tasks (398.585507ms)
✔ the read model rebuilds from the ledger: a reopened bus and each trail give the same values (363.807012ms)
✔ an empty business and one with snapshots but no task.created read cleanly (134.77228ms)
✔ recordTask keeps sync reads and a role write apart (263.742439ms)
✔ read_at must be one canonical UTC format, so the projection compares strings safely (119.166747ms)
✔ a bad entry refuses the whole record (116.552772ms)
✔ taskView reads the projection for one business (129.320852ms)
✔ requestTask hands only a holder and a task verb to the handler, and records refusals (249.853068ms)
✔ the server sends task verbs to the adapter with its own timeout; other verbs stay synchronous (432.680447ms)
✔ without an adapter the server refuses every task verb (234.850492ms)
✔ the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one (211.533809ms)
✔ the process loads the S3 adapter from plain-data trackers (329.425875ms)
✔ the tester binds only when the business sets bus.tester to exactly true (904.907886ms)
✔ a business may not name a role tester, so the tester address is never a role (267.844483ms)
✔ every verb outside the tester list refuses tester-refused and is recorded against the tester (571.467494ms)
✔ a tester message is from tester, starts [mos test], and writes no human.input or authority (227.510853ms)
✔ a role answers a tester only in reply to a tester message, and the answer never reaches the human (264.789573ms)
✔ the tester reads the human views a reader reads (182.312101ms)
✔ tester proof binds its own CLI, start time and nonce, refuses a managed run and allows an agent (1.091283ms)
✔ neither CLI's nonce proves the other: each proof is bound to its own CLI and nonce variable (0.339985ms)
✔ testerNonce reads only the tester's variable and gives null on any read error (0.196834ms)
✔ an envelope carries exactly one of cap, human and tester; no tester authenticator refuses (118.235665ms)
✔ tester-cli.mjs binds through the runtime when the switch is on, and refuses off or under a run marker (906.907804ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-ORG-2: the 3d→3e migration adds the thread tables and leaves messages from before threads as written (1111.812707ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: a 3d bus with a changed schema is refused and keeps its version and tables (840.29248ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: the offline command prints the kept-message counts before the ready line (846.342797ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: one holder per thread, through the broker and the trigger (364.91389ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: the 3e triggers refuse writes that skip the broker (1201.307549ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a message to or from the assistant names its thread, or is refused (346.287626ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: the chief of staff's reply comes back to the thread that sent the work (3581.476413ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a reply can't carry one thread instance's thread to another thread instance (104.052747ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-USER-2: one thread's messages never reach another thread's holder (153.478556ms)
✔ REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message to a thread with no holder waits, and the next holder gets it (156.706006ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: threadIdle releases only a thread with nothing waiting, and only for its holder (198.6723ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message delivered to a run that ended unread doesn't hold up the next holder (153.217928ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: an approved role.revoke never reaches a thread run, and the thread stays held (144.957507ms)
✔ REQ-USER-2: the human verbs refuse another owner's thread (142.841126ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: thread.create refuses when the business has no thread instance or more than one (106.34141ms)
✔ REQ-ORG-2: projects and threads are named once, and the repo names a business project (717.650965ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2: thread.messages returns the thread's history in pages and writes nothing (513.631219ms)
✔ socket capability stamps launch identity; shared views use wire, no SQL client (175.885318ms)
✔ two wire claims serialize; a lost reply never automatically retries (184.196596ms)
✔ malformed, oversized and identity-forging envelopes refuse without echoing input (115.427156ms)
✔ client preserves UTF-8 when a response divides a multibyte character (11.824489ms)
✔ committed mutation followed by dropped reply reports unknown and is never retried (156.279664ms)
✔ web.search: a granted role gets labelled results, and the call is trailed with role, run, verb and query (145.989984ms)
✔ web.fetch: a granted role gets the page as labelled text, and the call is trailed with the url (172.092623ms)
✔ a role without the grant is refused, the refusal is logged with the verb, and nothing is fetched (212.208249ms)
✔ a broker with no web service refuses a granted role (147.221811ms)
✔ bad requests are refused: unknown verb, extra or missing argument, not a string, a human or reader session (210.059542ms)
✔ a session that is not the role holder is refused (122.600863ms)
✔ web.mjs's fences hold on the broker side: refusals are normal results with the fixed reason (399.420573ms)
✔ web.search with no search source configured is a refused result, not an error (160.227129ms)
✔ a search source that fails with its own refusal, or that throws, is handled (177.042197ms)
✔ a slow search source ends in a refusal at the deadline (189.97177ms)
✔ a secret in the arguments is refused before anything is trailed or fetched (130.606701ms)
✔ over the socket: the server routes web verbs to the service; other roles are refused; no service is web-not-configured (231.343444ms)
✔ busBusiness: the web grant comes from "web" in the resolved tool limit (0.266379ms)
✔ webServices: the business's search-source plug-in and web.searxng var make web.search work; without either it is refused as not configured (212.244347ms)
✔ an ungranted call is refused at once: no admission, no wait, nothing touched (155.516111ms)
✔ over the socket an ungranted caller is dropped by the server timeout and a granted one gets the longer wait (447.626574ms)
✔ a search that never answers is aborted at the deadline, the module sees the signal, and the call is trailed as refused (timeout) (168.079457ms)
✔ a fetch that stalls is cut off at the deadline: the request is destroyed, not left running (190.484769ms)
✔ one query limit: over SEARCH_MAX_QUERY_CHARS or empty is refused with the same reason before any backend, and the tool schema carries the same number (157.092837ms)
ℹ tests 306
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 305
ℹ fail 1
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 12767.820872

✖ failing tests:

test at tests/hard-waits.test.mjs:126:1
✖ Q169: another role's cited revoke of the assistant, resolved by an arbiter, is refused (229.485912ms)
  AssertionError [ERR_ASSERTION]: The input did not match the regular expression /role-end-refused/. Input:
  
  'Error: decision-mismatch'
  
      at TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/tests/hard-waits.test.mjs:138:10)
      at process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:104:5)
      at async Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1409:7)
      at async Test.processPendingSubtests (node:internal/test_runner/test:974:7) {
    generatedMessage: true,
    code: 'ERR_ASSERTION',
    actual: Error: decision-mismatch
        at fail (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:104:9)
        at #checkAuthority (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:682:7)
        at #consumeAuthority (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:688:40)
        at #dispatch (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:1175:33)
        at file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:971:38
        at Store.transaction (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/src/store.mjs:242:22)
        at Broker.request (file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/src/broker.mjs:965:26)
        at file:///home/jwoltje/dewey-scratch/r139/wt/packages/bus/tests/hard-waits.test.mjs:138:29
        at getActual (node:assert:580:5)
        at strict.throws (node:assert:728:24),
    expected: /role-end-refused/,
    operator: 'throws',
    diff: 'simple'
  }
