✔ agents: a held role with nothing on the bus is idle; a role session gets the claim rows unchanged (35.010584ms)
✔ agents: working counts what the holder received and has not read; routed alone is not working (32.223637ms)
✔ agents: input needed is the role's open decisions routed to the human, gated first, then oldest (53.019011ms)
✔ agents: working wins over waiting, and Input needed still shows (22.038153ms)
✔ agents: a new holder doesn't inherit what the last one left unread; decisions stay with the role (29.074943ms)
✔ agents: state reads only its own business, even for a run name both use (25.817208ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder released unread is stranded; the next holder gets nothing and cannot read it (32.090219ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder read is not stranded; one the current holder has not read is not listed (32.794704ms)
✔ agents: stranded is oldest first and capped at 50 for a role (178.545853ms)
✔ agents: stranded is per role and per business (56.300418ms)
✔ agents: a message routed to a held role and not yet received is not stranded (24.261058ms)
✔ REQ-DEC an approval outlives its run and a broker restart; a new run of the instance consumes it once (50.955852ms)
✔ REQ-DEC another instance of the same definition cannot consume an approval, and its refusal consumes nothing (25.874125ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread approval is consumed only by a run holding the same thread (34.849326ms)
✔ REQ-DEC a later run of the same instance supersedes an open decision; another instance cannot (29.953287ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread decision is superseded only from the same thread (34.879249ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread instance decision raised before row 121 is not consumed or superseded by any thread run (49.758739ms)
✔ launch identity is stamped, payload identity is refused and stale holder cannot send (35.464368ms)
✔ decision classes route from policy; gated resolution is human-only, choice and target must match (37.810859ms)
✔ claim exclusion, holder release, gated revoke and rerouting to a new holder are atomic (35.483582ms)
✔ launch events require a human CLI capability; generic emit cannot forge authority events (22.695432ms)
✔ within-role decisions close atomically and invalid options or blocking omissions refuse (25.113754ms)
✔ a recommendation that is not exactly one option key refuses invalid-recommendation after the options (37.979999ms)
✔ observer capabilities read human inbox but cannot mutate or forge launch identity (23.951103ms)
✔ task action subjects and linked decision trail are complete and ordered (42.171853ms)
✔ launch binding is durable and reconnecting requires the identical trusted record (25.352305ms)
✔ business isolation includes inherited object names and cross-business message references (35.643223ms)
✔ authority never transfers between action, target, unresolved or replaced role holder; a later run of the instance keeps it (57.902348ms)
✔ task projection uses schema current view, skipping earlier and equal-start polls (26.496357ms)
✔ revocation permanently bars the old run from reclaiming first, including after broker restart (41.249374ms)
✔ empty message references refuse before storage; refusal-evidence failure stays a typed error (25.460879ms)
✔ both arbiters require human resolution when their cross-role route is themselves (39.382704ms)
✔ the shipped coder role raises task.reassign as gated to the human; task.scope.change stays cross-role (30.981467ms)
✔ S1 adapter takes resolved limits and refs, rejects mismatched instance, never mutates input (1.996296ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1, REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff ends a run with a reason and no decision, and the reason is logged (40.047513ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still needs a resolved decision to revoke (42.166457ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: storage accepts a revoke with a reason or a decision and aborts one with neither (29.44802ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff may still cite a decision, and a decision alone is the old path (32.482493ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still ends a run through a resolved decision, which is recorded and has no reason (37.277826ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a reason is required, bounded, and never sent with a decision (49.240422ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the chief of staff cannot end its own run; its end of the assistant gets past the protection (47.650184ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: organization.set from the chief of staff reaches the shared writer, named as the actor (44.178525ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: a refused organization.set logs action.refused and no action.allowed, like a refused limits.set (52.366024ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: organization.set is refused for every caller whose role file lacks organization.change (53.392425ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: the chief of staff is logged as allowed, and organization.set takes only the human's keys (57.887709ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-3, REQ-LIMIT-1: a chief-of-staff change is validated, written and logged like a human's; an invalid one is refused (96.631838ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2, REQ-COS-1: the 3c→3d migration lets the chief of staff end a held role with a reason; neither is still refused (109.249752ms)
✔ comment cursors isolate businesses, move only forward and remain append-only (25.92331ms)
✔ only trusted sync writes validated cursors; events and cursor share rollback (18.567637ms)
✔ explicit 3b copy migration preserves evidence and opens as 3g; normal startup never migrates (93.829523ms)
✔ migration refuses active writers and drifted legacy schemas, with no partial upgrade (135.416364ms)
✔ named migration registry chains 3b through 3g to a fixture-only future version in order (130.037035ms)
✔ migration refuses mismatched source metadata without changing schema or evidence (85.731002ms)
✔ offline command migrates only the supplied fixture root and reports usage errors (234.02633ms)
✔ credentials gives human and reader sessions service, account, role, date and state, and nothing else (26.393405ms)
✔ credentials refuses a role session and any argument (23.655937ms)
✔ credentials reads the status on each request, and a broker without one lists none (30.058253ms)
✔ the broker process answers credentials without a token, path or variable in its output, log or store (138.035689ms)
✔ only validated broker references load; returned data and exceptions cannot expose a known token (4.082547ms)
✔ bad file modes, symlinks, repository/data paths, malformed tokens and missing dates refuse (2.884348ms)
✔ expiry refuses use and env references never become client data (0.95976ms)
✔ S1 parsed service refs work, service mismatch refuses, Gitea rotation due is a warning state (1.635259ms)
✔ opaque tokens shorter than 16 characters refuse before use (0.477752ms)
✔ each C-suite role file carries the same two lists: human, chief-of-staff, pm, cto (2.937843ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (70.882794ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (54.883079ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (49.772721ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (75.149141ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (79.882224ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (66.257114ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (79.188028ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (69.314022ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (60.085737ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (67.960393ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (75.176659ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (56.894261ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (77.477259ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (87.494456ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (68.274231ms)
✔ a human resolve sends the raising role one message from the human, and its request is the answer (51.701859ms)
✔ a cross-role decision resolved by its arbiter comes from that role and run, with no request (32.273961ms)
✔ a human withdraw sends one message with the note (30.915669ms)
✔ a human seen before the close leaves the request on the close's answer, not the seen (36.962771ms)
✔ the raising run's withdraw, a supersede, a within-role raise and seen send nothing (41.196961ms)
✔ refused closes send nothing: invalid-choice, decision-closed, not-resolver (43.960074ms)
✔ a raising role nobody holds at the close gets the message on the next claim (41.733846ms)
✔ a human DECISION send keeps its own instruction as the request, not a close's answer (47.876694ms)
✔ a cross-role raise whose arbiter the raiser does not hear from is refused and stores nothing (47.229529ms)
✔ a gated raise by a role that does not hear from the human is refused and stores nothing (39.276418ms)
✔ a route the raiser hears from is allowed, checked from the route to the raiser (44.746374ms)
✔ a refused supersede withdraws nothing (38.161495ms)
✔ the assistant's within-role and gated raises still work (44.740123ms)
✔ roles lists open decisions routed to a role, and never the human inbox (39.148429ms)
✔ recent lists closed decisions of every route, newest close first, with how each closed (41.755571ms)
✔ recent gives the closing event as closed when the decision was seen first (38.544625ms)
✔ recent stops at RECENT rows (139.36802ms)
✔ every row is what trail already gives the same session for that id (75.664551ms)
✔ a role session can't list decisions, so it can't read another role's open decisions (71.027338ms)
✔ decisions is a read: one business, strict arguments, nothing written (68.707969ms)
✔ endLaunch writes session.ended, releases the run claim and kills its capabilities (28.055846ms)
✔ endLaunch refuses an unknown run, a second end and a rebind of the ended run (18.592483ms)
✔ a restarted broker refuses to rebind an ended run; a refused rebind leaves the run unbound (21.7168ms)
✔ endLaunch leaves a claim another run took alone (24.204124ms)
✔ refuse records action.refused against the caller with the code only (17.653649ms)
✔ launches off refuses role.launch with launch-revoked until launches on (24.977601ms)
✔ broker process: launch ops authorize role.launch, record refusals and end runs (179.146757ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-1: the broker hard waits are exactly the list, and match the business vocabulary (1.68185ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-2: a business granting a hard wait at either class is refused; the actions that left are grantable (22.507109ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: every hard wait goes to the human, cited or not, and the arbiter cannot resolve it (593.083063ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a gated raise citing the current spec goes to the arbiter for its domain; uncited, to the human (302.373074ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: an arbiter-approved cited gated decision authorizes the raiser, and the human cannot resolve it (105.660047ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a cited merge raised by merge-gate goes to the technical arbiter; a merge raised without the grant routes by citation (148.815828ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a stale or unconfirmed citation refuses without a decision; an arbiter raising its own goes to the human (181.951096ms)
✔ Q169: the chief of staff's end of the assistant is not refused role-end-refused; its own run and another ender's are (49.28399ms)
✔ Q169: another role's cited revoke of the assistant, resolved by an arbiter, is refused (87.461373ms)
✔ Q169: a revoke of the assistant citing a decision the human resolved is not refused by the protection (66.660123ms)
✔ Q169: a cited revoke of a role not in END_PROTECTED still goes to the arbiter, and executes (54.837733ms)
✔ Q169: a role granted role.revoke at either class still sends a revoke of the assistant to the human (78.624891ms)
✔ human proof binds CLI entry, process start and nonce; agents and incomplete ancestry refuse (2.227997ms)
✔ process reader gets own kernel identity without exposing environment values (0.464906ms)
✔ EACCES ancestor environments skip only markers; commands and registered launches still refuse (0.662938ms)
✔ real pid 1 remains inspectable when its environment is protected (0.244414ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a merge-gate raise its arbiter resolved lands through the host op: checkLand answers the facts and a ticket, records nothing, and recordLand spends the decision once (49.084488ms)
✔ checkLand refuses on the decision and the review (50.692933ms)
✔ REQ-LAND-1: a gated merge decision refuses not-authorized, cited and approved by the arbiter or uncited and approved by the human (158.77789ms)
✔ REQ-LAND-1: a within-role merge grant refuses not-authorized at the land (45.159642ms)
✔ a cross-role merge that routes to the human, because merge-gate is its own arbiter, lands on the human's CLI answer (51.152212ms)
✔ a merge option with no first line refuses no-subject, as land-work does (41.624386ms)
✔ checkLand refuses with land-work's codes past the authority check, and a decision raised for refactor never lands (108.514227ms)
✔ a ticket outlives the run that asked, and recordLand checks the task again (51.365471ms)
✔ landRefused files the code on the task, tells the role only with notify, and ends the ticket (50.842214ms)
✔ landHeld is true only for an approved, unspent cross-role merge decision this role raised for a task in this thread (49.471268ms)
✔ no run may write the action.allowed for git.merge.protected itself (29.391837ms)
✔ a message to a stopped role sends launch.by one notice, and the result says so (36.540044ms)
✔ a message to a role outside launch.instances says so in its result and in the notice (23.495469ms)
✔ a message to a running role sends no notice and its result is unchanged (19.034621ms)
✔ a re-route at a claim, a release and claim, and a broker restart send no second notice (36.637171ms)
✔ a run launched but not yet claimed counts as no holder (22.017146ms)
✔ no notice for a message to launch.by, from it, from a tester, to the human, or in a thread to a thread instance (51.840984ms)
✔ a business with no launch block tells nobody and says there is no launcher (21.961017ms)
✔ the notice sender stays internal: no role is named _bus and no caller can send as it or to it (67.453892ms)
✔ limits binds actor from human proof and rejects role, reader, tester and forged actor (30.790725ms)
✔ runtime wires verified human settings to the actual shared file writer and actor receipt (92.177402ms)
✔ uncertain organization receipts leave bus startup and reads alone but refuse writes until reconciled (75.176027ms)
✔ within-role sends cite an open gated launch decision without spending it or naming it in grants (48.644064ms)
✔ missing and foreign-business citations refuse and roll back message and grant (33.213606ms)
✔ cross-role sends still need a matching resolved decision and consume it once (43.701933ms)
✔ messages pages all human messages newest first without writes; read state is history (533.92696ms)
✔ messages refuses role callers, invalid paging and cursors outside this human feed (51.937409ms)
✔ views messages passes only its paging arguments through (1.053518ms)
✔ messages isolates businesses even with a valid foreign cursor (36.452196ms)
✔ the assistant sends to the user and to the chief of staff only (64.865759ms)
✔ an assistant send to any other role, or to the tester, is refused and logged (63.083676ms)
✔ only the user and the chief of staff may send to the assistant; the tester is refused by default (61.549713ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2 REQ-THREAD-1 thread.send to an instance that does not hear from the user is refused and stores nothing (44.924719ms)
✔ a sender-side list alone refuses a send to a role that has no list (49.901463ms)
✔ a target-side list alone refuses a send from a role that has no list (55.627455ms)
✔ the sender list is checked before the target list (45.592063ms)
✔ roles without the field behave exactly as before (72.436352ms)
✔ a business with no role definitions at all is unlimited (43.581187ms)
✔ a malformed messaging field refuses at boot (18.452743ms)
✔ the assistant's review.request to a reviewer is refused and logged, even with an approved decision (60.278842ms)
✔ a review.verdict to the assistant from a role outside its receiveFrom is refused and logged (69.371118ms)
✔ review requests and verdicts between roles without the field are unchanged (59.267916ms)
✔ 3f copy migrates to 3g preserving every old column/row, with an empty instance_names and null to_name (155.990014ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: the chief of staff names an instance under its within-role grant, and the write is logged (41.205485ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: the human names an instance through the CLI (28.599151ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a role without the grant, or holding it cross-role, is refused not-authorized (34.192297ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a name is unique in the business and is never an instance key or a role name (59.791568ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a send by name reaches the instance and records both; a send by instance key is unchanged (51.7513ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: an instance key beats a name that equals it, as when a later instance takes the key (30.329ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a role name beats a name that equals it, as when a later definition takes the word (sage-0590) (36.555615ms)
✔ plugins and plugins.set refuse every non-human session and a forged actor, and pass only the patch with the verified actor (38.144415ms)
✔ runtime: the switch changes the organization file, the receipt carries the actor, and a bad shape, an unknown module and a stale revision are refused with nothing written (107.42913ms)
✔ vikunja:19/309 through the broker, a patch switches the kinds it names and keeps the rest; null removes one kind and is trailed (64.772778ms)
✔ broker process binds trusted launches, offers reader capabilities, refuses human mutation, closes cleanly (146.029825ms)
✔ startup token refusal returns safe code without value or partial listening broker (112.562412ms)
✔ loaded fixture token is absent from socket replies and SQLite, including refusal evidence (145.235983ms)
✔ killed broker leaves an explicit stale lock; another process cannot silently reclaim it (259.979119ms)
✔ trusted host registers later launches; socket clients never have a registration verb (159.944561ms)
✔ runtime excludes declared project roots even when host supplies no repoRoots (111.72539ms)
✔ a refused launch binding leaves the broker and existing capabilities alive; bad protocol stops it (123.543571ms)
✔ D1: committed write with a failed receipt refuses outcome-unknown without action.allowed (30.013638ms)
✔ D2: spec.read refuses without content if its role is released during the read (24.695717ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged content without content (21.128282ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged subject without content (22.296484ms)
✔ a human lists, opens and saves; the save is one commit by the business human (187.94724ms)
✔ an agent and a reader refuse every file verb and nothing is written (67.549797ms)
✔ a stale base refuses stale-base and writes nothing (144.584745ms)
✔ paths outside the spec and docs refuse, as do unknown projects, missing files and odd arguments (130.157889ms)
✔ without a project adapter the file verbs refuse project-not-configured (52.789189ms)
✔ on the socket a save may carry 1 MiB of text; every other request keeps the 64 KiB limit (268.376386ms)
✔ a request that names the save verb first and another verb last is refused at 64 KiB (61.315665ms)
✔ two saves racing for one repository make one commit (109.987012ms)
✔ Broker keeps the existing sandbox client import closure: no new imports or lazy project import (2.488218ms)
✔ without a trusted project adapter all three async paths refuse project-not-configured (60.313441ms)
✔ real startBroker injects the project adapter for socket reads and bound-author record writes (113.556746ms)
✔ a reply is listed for human and reader sessions, and its delivery rows are unchanged (53.686123ms)
✔ the reply still reaches the human message.receive (mosaic talk) after the Console showed it (33.532992ms)
✔ a message with no reply gives an empty list (24.436928ms)
✔ replies come oldest first and stop at REPLIES (126.272375ms)
✔ an id that names no message in the business refuses message-not-found, and the refusal is recorded (65.353582ms)
✔ strict arguments; a role session gets human-required (67.041072ms)
✔ views passes replies through as one call with the id (0.471919ms)
✔ requirements returns the committed list to a holding role session, and no one else (39.256121ms)
✔ the PM's prd.approve with no task, when no id fits, reaches the human's Inbox (27.68498ms)
✔ the PM's non-blocking role.revoke with no task reaches the human's Inbox (30.524163ms)
✔ a push is recorded as the action.allowed for git.push.working on the task, and only the host records one (47.144897ms)
✔ review.request names the latest pushed commit and sends the reviewer a REVIEW-REQUEST (37.569839ms)
✔ review.request says which run holds the reviewer role, or null, and a null request waits for a claim (42.802911ms)
✔ review.request refuses a commit that isn't the latest push, a non-reviewer and a role without the action (61.341785ms)
✔ reviewFetch answers only the addressed reviewer, for the request it cites (58.000627ms)
✔ review.verdict answers one request once, to the role that asked (52.524248ms)
✔ task.close on a pushed task needs an approve verdict for the latest push (67.741794ms)
✔ a refusal the host decided is filed on the task it names, and only a task ref counts (45.028771ms)
✔ v3b prototype refusals, views and append-only mutations (154.814618ms)
✔ gated approval authorizes once, survives store reopen, and fresh approval works (45.818525ms)
✔ another run of the same instance consumes an approval once; a failed check leaves it usable (30.615332ms)
✔ two scheduled callers have exactly one grant and one consumed refusal (29.59114ms)
✔ failed commit rolls consumption back; cross-role consumes and within-role stays reusable (61.493676ms)
✔ class drift gated to cross-role refuses before consumption (44.939489ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to gated refuses before consumption (49.272333ms)
✔ class drift gated to within-role refuses before consumption (48.416465ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to within-role refuses before consumption (44.664181ms)
✔ class drift within-role to gated refuses before consumption (36.819491ms)
✔ class drift within-role to cross-role refuses before consumption (37.933524ms)
✔ message.send consumes approval and prevents a later send or authorize (40.530609ms)
✔ role.revoke consumes approval and prevents a later revoke or authorize (52.021955ms)
✔ 3e copy migrates through 3f to 3g preserving every old column/row and adding null spec citations (164.896878ms)
✔ a human spec save sends one notice to each pm and cto, naming the commit, and each commit sends its own (248.367594ms)
✔ no notice for a docs save, an agent record commit, a git commit outside the Console, or a refused save (289.600323ms)
✔ a notice to a role no run holds waits for a claim, and launches nobody and tells nobody (113.316846ms)
✔ a business without a pm or a cto saves the spec and sends nothing (84.622114ms)
✔ a notice that cannot be stored answers outcome-unknown, and the commit stands (87.463992ms)
✔ a BLOCK reaches the chief of staff, the chief relays it to the assistant in the user's thread, and the commit stands (96.229488ms)
✔ with no thread a BLOCK still reaches the chief of staff, and the relay to the assistant is refused (74.143577ms)
✔ within the notice's project the relay lands in the user's most recently opened thread (80.58861ms)
✔ a more recently opened thread in another project does not take the relay (71.02744ms)
✔ a BLOCK is refused from anyone but a pm or cto, to anyone but the chief of staff, and outside a reply to its own notice (78.759542ms)
✔ a role cannot forge a spec notice: its text opens neither a BLOCK nor the assistant's thread (84.706388ms)
✔ the bus receives nothing: a reply to a notice addressed to _bus is refused (75.315138ms)
✔ real socket awaits spec reads, record writes and cited raises; other requests still return normally (185.200205ms)
✔ real socket preserves asynchronous refusal codes and disconnects its transient proof (63.961053ms)
✔ two real socket writes to one repository yield one commit and one project-busy refusal (96.230368ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late reply (88.656392ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late refusal (49.522413ms)
✔ N-a: slow admitted record.write returns its committed result after the idle deadline (219.353517ms)
✔ current citation is recorded; docs commits do not stale it and a new spec never reopens settlement (202.904962ms)
✔ stale, unconfirmed, missing and partial spec citations refuse without inserting a decision (202.027897ms)
✔ uncited raises retain their synchronous path and spec read is available to any held role in its business (80.836964ms)
✔ record writes bind the session author, require authority and refuse spec and impersonation paths (76.878409ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the pm asks the chief of staff for roles and counts; the chief receives a STAFF-REQUEST and answers it (65.361106ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: only the pm can send a staff request; every other session is refused and the chief of staff hears nothing (62.607107ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a pm without message.send is refused like any other gated action (28.145849ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the request goes to the business launcher, and only when that is a chief of staff (85.642594ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the sender is judged by definition: an instance `lead` of the pm definition can ask, an instance `pm` of the coder definition can't (70.611439ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the launcher is judged by definition: an instance `boss` of the chief-of-staff definition receives, a `chief` of the coder definition gives no-chief-of-staff (62.431184ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a refused staff request leaves no staff.request action.allowed event (42.656221ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2: the role definitions' messaging lists hold for a staff request, sender and recipient (86.189904ms)
✔ a staff request names a task, 1 to 10 distinct roles and counts of 1 to 20; nothing else is accepted (65.998581ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a staff request grants nothing: the pm still can't launch and the chief of staff launches as before (36.133736ms)
✔ a business that never switched launches reads allowed with no time and no event (29.212114ms)
✔ launches revoked and then restored read allowed, with the restore time and event id (29.389645ms)
✔ a task closed on the tracker leaves the open list, and total counts the open ones (27.424417ms)
✔ a tombstone is not open (24.805678ms)
✔ the open list stops at the cap and says so; total still counts every open task (34.678913ms)
✔ a role and a reader session read state; arguments, and an unbound cap, refuse (24.101615ms)
✔ a human session reads the same state, with the same cap (32.245424ms)
✔ reading state writes nothing: every table keeps its row count (30.610549ms)
✔ creates private WAL store and excludes a second writer until explicit close (25.731513ms)
✔ rollback is atomic and schema metadata is checked against trusted DDL, not just itself (32.08209ms)
✔ existing empty database and symlink runtime directory refuse, never initialize over damage (32.770528ms)
✔ crash during a transaction recovers no partial event after explicit fixture-only lock removal (95.266599ms)
✔ writer refuses mixed at/read_at forms atomically, even through trusted SQL helpers (23.111066ms)
✔ async transactions refuse before invoking their function (18.186832ms)
✔ the session default fits under the reply cap and pages to the end with next (257.241437ms)
✔ the short form: no description, assignees by role, every listed key (129.342784ms)
✔ each filter, alone and together, and total counts every match (213.888383ms)
✔ task_ref reads one task in full, as the whole board has it (123.551816ms)
✔ no arguments is the read the Console and mosaic make, unchanged (81.272395ms)
✔ an unknown argument or a bad value refuses invalid-request (356.743189ms)
✔ tasks rows carry priority and requirement for every session that reads tasks (77.935985ms)
✔ the read model rebuilds from the ledger: a reopened bus and each trail give the same values (75.017835ms)
✔ an empty business and one with snapshots but no task.created read cleanly (22.08934ms)
✔ recordTask keeps sync reads and a role write apart (36.927025ms)
✔ read_at must be one canonical UTC format, so the projection compares strings safely (17.267195ms)
✔ a bad entry refuses the whole record (18.696554ms)
✔ taskView reads the projection for one business (25.943697ms)
✔ requestTask hands only a holder and a task verb to the handler, and records refusals (43.83521ms)
✔ the server sends task verbs to the adapter with its own timeout; other verbs stay synchronous (288.920042ms)
✔ without an adapter the server refuses every task verb (25.505434ms)
✔ the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one (28.677399ms)
✔ the process loads the S3 adapter from plain-data trackers (194.281382ms)
✔ the tester binds only when the business sets bus.tester to exactly true (137.530715ms)
✔ a business may not name a role tester, so the tester address is never a role (36.434625ms)
✔ every verb outside the tester list refuses tester-refused and is recorded against the tester (80.106263ms)
✔ a tester message is from tester, starts [mos test], and writes no human.input or authority (33.865467ms)
✔ a role answers a tester only in reply to a tester message, and the answer never reaches the human (34.754914ms)
✔ the tester reads the human views a reader reads (43.489704ms)
✔ tester proof binds its own CLI, start time and nonce, refuses a managed run and allows an agent (2.345583ms)
✔ neither CLI's nonce proves the other: each proof is bound to its own CLI and nonce variable (0.51619ms)
✔ testerNonce reads only the tester's variable and gives null on any read error (0.286057ms)
✔ an envelope carries exactly one of cap, human and tester; no tester authenticator refuses (28.270747ms)
✔ tester-cli.mjs binds through the runtime when the switch is on, and refuses off or under a run marker (720.574528ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-ORG-2: the 3d→3e migration adds the thread tables and leaves messages from before threads as written (155.262125ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: a 3d bus with a changed schema is refused and keeps its version and tables (81.745896ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: the offline command prints the kept-message counts before the ready line (139.446095ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: one holder per thread, through the broker and the trigger (63.534313ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: the 3e triggers refuse writes that skip the broker (94.550105ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a message to or from the assistant names its thread, or is refused (54.32056ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: the chief of staff's reply comes back to the thread that sent the work (633.31414ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a reply can't carry one thread instance's thread to another thread instance (19.577357ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-USER-2: one thread's messages never reach another thread's holder (28.01249ms)
✔ REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message to a thread with no holder waits, and the next holder gets it (29.399005ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: threadIdle releases only a thread with nothing waiting, and only for its holder (32.984055ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message delivered to a run that ended unread doesn't hold up the next holder (25.107515ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: an approved role.revoke never reaches a thread run, and the thread stays held (20.320053ms)
✔ REQ-USER-2: the human verbs refuse another owner's thread (25.044356ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: thread.create refuses when the business has no thread instance or more than one (17.018243ms)
✔ REQ-ORG-2: projects and threads are named once, and the repo names a business project (22.714309ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2: thread.messages returns the thread's history in pages and writes nothing (78.274346ms)
✔ socket capability stamps launch identity; shared views use wire, no SQL client (37.573538ms)
✔ two wire claims serialize; a lost reply never automatically retries (31.81103ms)
✔ malformed, oversized and identity-forging envelopes refuse without echoing input (17.245028ms)
✔ client preserves UTF-8 when a response divides a multibyte character (13.266721ms)
✔ committed mutation followed by dropped reply reports unknown and is never retried (22.450317ms)
✔ web.search: a granted role gets labelled results, and the call is trailed with role, run, verb and query (28.598513ms)
✔ web.fetch: a granted role gets the page as labelled text, and the call is trailed with the url (31.328793ms)
✔ a role without the grant is refused, the refusal is logged with the verb, and nothing is fetched (30.096705ms)
✔ a broker with no web service refuses a granted role (16.529529ms)
✔ bad requests are refused: unknown verb, extra or missing argument, not a string, a human or reader session (21.913465ms)
✔ a session that is not the role holder is refused (15.450542ms)
✔ web.mjs's fences hold on the broker side: refusals are normal results with the fixed reason (50.952675ms)
✔ web.search with no search source configured is a refused result, not an error (15.409923ms)
✔ a search source that fails with its own refusal, or that throws, is handled (21.128234ms)
✔ a slow search source ends in a refusal at the deadline (63.605465ms)
✔ a secret in the arguments is refused before anything is trailed or fetched (12.845422ms)
✔ over the socket: the server routes web verbs to the service; other roles are refused; no service is web-not-configured (32.35497ms)
✔ busBusiness: the web grant comes from "web" in the resolved tool limit (0.294907ms)
✔ webServices: the business's search-source plug-in and web.searxng var make web.search work; without either it is refused as not configured (40.849857ms)
✔ an ungranted call is refused at once: no admission, no wait, nothing touched (18.186844ms)
✔ over the socket an ungranted caller is dropped by the server timeout and a granted one gets the longer wait (317.094348ms)
✔ a search that never answers is aborted at the deadline, the module sees the signal, and the call is trailed as refused (timeout) (74.741712ms)
✔ a fetch that stalls is cut off at the deadline: the request is destroyed, not left running (93.681472ms)
✔ one query limit: over SEARCH_MAX_QUERY_CHARS or empty is refused with the same reason before any backend, and the tool schema carries the same number (14.884722ms)
ℹ tests 345
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 345
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 2523.296629
