plans: row 195 brief rewritten as the hub on its own host, host left to Jason (#1693, mos-0998, mos-1005)

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# Brief: Melanie's hub instance under its own Linux user (row 190b)
# Brief: Melanie's hub instance on its own host (row 195, was 190b)
Sage, 2026-10-20, from Darkwing's draft (agents/darkwing/work/queue-190b/BRIEF-DRAFT.md) for Mos's ruling
mos-0986 (2026-10-20T18:53:48Z) on row 190 R1. Mos ruled a separate uid per instance a hard precondition of
federation R8 (mos-0984, mos-0985) and of Case 2 row C2-13. The finding was federation review B5
(duckworth-0001): on one uid any factory agent can read, write and control Melanie's hub directly, and SSO and
RBAC don't stop a local process with filesystem access. On the 10-27 MVP path. Gitea #1693.
Sage, 2026-10-20. Rewritten for Mos's rulings mos-0998 and mos-1005 (Vikunja #418, #419). The first version
put the hub under its own Linux user on dragon-lin. That form can't pass Duckworth's B7 there, because the
factory uid's `sudo -n` succeeds on dragon-lin (Mos's recon, brain-redux
`projects/mosaic-mvp/MELANIE-HOST-RECON.md`). Melanie's own server is ruled out too: it has 1.2 GiB RAM free
with her two Hermes bots running, and co-tenancy would share her user and her passwordless sudo. The hub runs
on a separate host. Which host is Jason's decision (#419): hardware outside the cluster, a cluster VM with
factory PVE root removed, or a cluster VM with that residual accepted. This row is written so the host choice
doesn't change it. Gitea #1693. On the 10-27 MVP path. Federation R8 (Gizmoduck's design r4, 04a6112be) needs
this row or nothing.
Owner Darkwing (Opus 5.5), reviewer Duckworth (author of B5; mos-0981 keeps new work off Filbert and Dewey),
gate owner Sage. Merge-chained on row 190 (Q177): it builds on row 190's candidate and keeps its own review and
gate. Design first. The first deliverable is `agents/darkwing/work/queue-190b/DESIGN.md`.
Owner Darkwing (Opus 5.5), reviewer Duckworth (author of B5 and B7), gate owner Sage. Chained on row 190
(Q177): the hub runs under row 190's config canon. Design first. The first deliverable is
`agents/darkwing/work/queue-190b/DESIGN.md`.
## Goal
Melanie's hub instance runs under its own Linux user. No process of the factory instance can read or write the
hub's config, data root or secrets, or control the hub's units. That covers the bus, role seats and their
sessions, task runs, the Discord connector and the Console.
Melanie's hub instance (Case 2, C2-13) runs on its own host. No factory agent can read or write the hub's
config, data root or secrets, reach its bus socket, or log in to the hub host. Her writing reaches the hub only
through the existing git.mosaicstack.dev remotes, books repo only.
## Provision (blank until Jason answers #419)
Who provisions the host and how is left open. Sizing from Mos (mos-0998): 4 vCPU, 8 GB RAM, 64 GB disk,
internal network only. Each agent process measures 300 to 390 MB RSS on dragon-lin. The design takes the host
as given: a fresh Linux host with a named admin path, reachable by the deploying seat while the row runs.
## The design must state
1. How operators (Mos, Sage, Jason) deploy, re-pin and roll back the hub. Which commands they run, as which
user, and what each one needs.
2. Each root step Jason runs: useradd, the home and its modes, `loginctl enable-linger`, and any sudoers rule,
with the exact command lines.
3. How the hub reaches the Claude proxy and gets its session env without sharing jwoltje's
`claude-session.env`.
4. Whether real isolation needs the factory instance's seats to run apart from the operators' uid. If yes, say
so plainly with its cost. Don't design around it.
It must also cover the copies (shared read-only trees under jwoltje's home, or the hub's own), the human CLI
wrapper and human proof for the hub's Console, and how the stack-release pointer, log and backups work under
the second user.
1. The deploy. Exactly what Darkwing installs on the hub host and how: the stack copy, node, the units, the
config dir and data root under row 190's canon (O1: `~/.config/mosaic-NAME`, and "`~` is the home of the OS
user that runs the instance"). Which commands run as which user on the hub host, and which need its root.
2. Re-pin, rollback and backup on the hub host, and who runs them after the deploy key is gone.
3. How the hub gets model access without a copy of jwoltje's `claude-session.env` or any factory credential.
If that needs the credentials row (T1 item 6), say so and name the interim.
4. The books repo path. Which git.mosaicstack.dev remote, which credential the hub holds for it, and that it
can't read or push any other repository.
5. The admin path and the end state. The host ends with no key the factory uid can read. The design names the
admin path that remains (for example the hypervisor console, or a key kept off the factory uid) and who
holds it.
6. The acceptance checks, as a script Duckworth can read: federation R8's separate-host form (the hub's bus
socket, data root and config dir don't exist on the factory host, the factory host mounts nothing of the
hub's, no factory agent holds a login or key for the hub host), plus B7. From the factory uid, `sudo -n`,
`doas -n`, `su`, polkit, and `ssh -o BatchMode=yes` to the hub host must all fail.
## Boundaries
- Row 190 lands first, as designed: one uid, scratch two-instance tests without root.
- No agent runs a root step. Every one goes to Jason as an exact command list.
- No real hub user, unit or data root is created in this row's tests. Tests use scratch roots and stand-ins as
row 190 does. Anything that needs a second real uid is a Q173 window with a backup first and a STATE report
after.
- No tunnel or Traefik exposure. That waits for Jason, after Q175 SSO.
- Provisioning, hypervisor access and any infra or k3s change are Jason's (Q173 exclusions). Mos takes the
hypervisor residual (factory root on the PVE nodes, Q172) to Jason. It doesn't block this row.
- Melanie's server (`[email protected]`) is reference only, read only, under Jason's authorization in
mos-0995. Nothing on it changes, and her Hermes bots keep running.
- No tunnel, Traefik or other exposure outside the internal network. That waits for Jason, after Q175 SSO.
- No credential value is printed, logged or committed. Keys made for the deploy are removed at the end, and
the acceptance script proves it.
- Tests in the repository use scratch roots and stand-ins. The live deploy and the acceptance run on the hub
host are a window with a backup first (where there is state) and a STATE report after.
## Gate
Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on
Sage's gate. The design's mutants are killed.
Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. Any repository change is green on Sage's gate (cli suite and
every `scripts/test-*.sh`), with the design's mutants killed. The row is done when the acceptance script passes
on the hub host from the factory uid, Duckworth reads its output, and Mos confirms.