plans: row 195 brief rewritten as the hub on its own host, host left to Jason (#1693, mos-0998, mos-1005)
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# Brief: Melanie's hub instance under its own Linux user (row 190b)
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# Brief: Melanie's hub instance on its own host (row 195, was 190b)
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Sage, 2026-10-20, from Darkwing's draft (agents/darkwing/work/queue-190b/BRIEF-DRAFT.md) for Mos's ruling
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mos-0986 (2026-10-20T18:53:48Z) on row 190 R1. Mos ruled a separate uid per instance a hard precondition of
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federation R8 (mos-0984, mos-0985) and of Case 2 row C2-13. The finding was federation review B5
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(duckworth-0001): on one uid any factory agent can read, write and control Melanie's hub directly, and SSO and
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RBAC don't stop a local process with filesystem access. On the 10-27 MVP path. Gitea #1693.
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Sage, 2026-10-20. Rewritten for Mos's rulings mos-0998 and mos-1005 (Vikunja #418, #419). The first version
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put the hub under its own Linux user on dragon-lin. That form can't pass Duckworth's B7 there, because the
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factory uid's `sudo -n` succeeds on dragon-lin (Mos's recon, brain-redux
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`projects/mosaic-mvp/MELANIE-HOST-RECON.md`). Melanie's own server is ruled out too: it has 1.2 GiB RAM free
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with her two Hermes bots running, and co-tenancy would share her user and her passwordless sudo. The hub runs
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on a separate host. Which host is Jason's decision (#419): hardware outside the cluster, a cluster VM with
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factory PVE root removed, or a cluster VM with that residual accepted. This row is written so the host choice
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doesn't change it. Gitea #1693. On the 10-27 MVP path. Federation R8 (Gizmoduck's design r4, 04a6112be) needs
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this row or nothing.
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Owner Darkwing (Opus 5.5), reviewer Duckworth (author of B5; mos-0981 keeps new work off Filbert and Dewey),
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gate owner Sage. Merge-chained on row 190 (Q177): it builds on row 190's candidate and keeps its own review and
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gate. Design first. The first deliverable is `agents/darkwing/work/queue-190b/DESIGN.md`.
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Owner Darkwing (Opus 5.5), reviewer Duckworth (author of B5 and B7), gate owner Sage. Chained on row 190
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(Q177): the hub runs under row 190's config canon. Design first. The first deliverable is
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`agents/darkwing/work/queue-190b/DESIGN.md`.
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## Goal
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Melanie's hub instance runs under its own Linux user. No process of the factory instance can read or write the
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hub's config, data root or secrets, or control the hub's units. That covers the bus, role seats and their
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sessions, task runs, the Discord connector and the Console.
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Melanie's hub instance (Case 2, C2-13) runs on its own host. No factory agent can read or write the hub's
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config, data root or secrets, reach its bus socket, or log in to the hub host. Her writing reaches the hub only
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through the existing git.mosaicstack.dev remotes, books repo only.
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## Provision (blank until Jason answers #419)
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Who provisions the host and how is left open. Sizing from Mos (mos-0998): 4 vCPU, 8 GB RAM, 64 GB disk,
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internal network only. Each agent process measures 300 to 390 MB RSS on dragon-lin. The design takes the host
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as given: a fresh Linux host with a named admin path, reachable by the deploying seat while the row runs.
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## The design must state
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1. How operators (Mos, Sage, Jason) deploy, re-pin and roll back the hub. Which commands they run, as which
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user, and what each one needs.
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2. Each root step Jason runs: useradd, the home and its modes, `loginctl enable-linger`, and any sudoers rule,
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with the exact command lines.
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3. How the hub reaches the Claude proxy and gets its session env without sharing jwoltje's
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`claude-session.env`.
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4. Whether real isolation needs the factory instance's seats to run apart from the operators' uid. If yes, say
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so plainly with its cost. Don't design around it.
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It must also cover the copies (shared read-only trees under jwoltje's home, or the hub's own), the human CLI
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wrapper and human proof for the hub's Console, and how the stack-release pointer, log and backups work under
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the second user.
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1. The deploy. Exactly what Darkwing installs on the hub host and how: the stack copy, node, the units, the
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config dir and data root under row 190's canon (O1: `~/.config/mosaic-NAME`, and "`~` is the home of the OS
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user that runs the instance"). Which commands run as which user on the hub host, and which need its root.
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2. Re-pin, rollback and backup on the hub host, and who runs them after the deploy key is gone.
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3. How the hub gets model access without a copy of jwoltje's `claude-session.env` or any factory credential.
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If that needs the credentials row (T1 item 6), say so and name the interim.
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4. The books repo path. Which git.mosaicstack.dev remote, which credential the hub holds for it, and that it
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can't read or push any other repository.
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5. The admin path and the end state. The host ends with no key the factory uid can read. The design names the
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admin path that remains (for example the hypervisor console, or a key kept off the factory uid) and who
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holds it.
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6. The acceptance checks, as a script Duckworth can read: federation R8's separate-host form (the hub's bus
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socket, data root and config dir don't exist on the factory host, the factory host mounts nothing of the
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hub's, no factory agent holds a login or key for the hub host), plus B7. From the factory uid, `sudo -n`,
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`doas -n`, `su`, polkit, and `ssh -o BatchMode=yes` to the hub host must all fail.
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## Boundaries
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- Row 190 lands first, as designed: one uid, scratch two-instance tests without root.
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- No agent runs a root step. Every one goes to Jason as an exact command list.
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- No real hub user, unit or data root is created in this row's tests. Tests use scratch roots and stand-ins as
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row 190 does. Anything that needs a second real uid is a Q173 window with a backup first and a STATE report
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after.
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- No tunnel or Traefik exposure. That waits for Jason, after Q175 SSO.
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- Provisioning, hypervisor access and any infra or k3s change are Jason's (Q173 exclusions). Mos takes the
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hypervisor residual (factory root on the PVE nodes, Q172) to Jason. It doesn't block this row.
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- Melanie's server (`[email protected]`) is reference only, read only, under Jason's authorization in
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mos-0995. Nothing on it changes, and her Hermes bots keep running.
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- No tunnel, Traefik or other exposure outside the internal network. That waits for Jason, after Q175 SSO.
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- No credential value is printed, logged or committed. Keys made for the deploy are removed at the end, and
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the acceptance script proves it.
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- Tests in the repository use scratch roots and stand-ins. The live deploy and the acceptance run on the hub
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host are a window with a backup first (where there is state) and a STATE report after.
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## Gate
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Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. The cli suite and every `scripts/test-*.sh` are green on
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Sage's gate. The design's mutants are killed.
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Duckworth approves DESIGN.md, then the manifest. Any repository change is green on Sage's gate (cli suite and
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every `scripts/test-*.sh`), with the design's mutants killed. The row is done when the acceptance script passes
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on the hub host from the factory uid, Duckworth reads its output, and Mos confirms.
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