From 07624140e450f18aa2cf55af98d0db2cdf470bb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: fred Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2026 16:39:15 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] docs: hierarchy schema contract (S2 contract 1, D2) (#1435) --- docs/requirements/hierarchy-schema.md | 380 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 380 insertions(+) create mode 100644 docs/requirements/hierarchy-schema.md diff --git a/docs/requirements/hierarchy-schema.md b/docs/requirements/hierarchy-schema.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5287133d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/requirements/hierarchy-schema.md @@ -0,0 +1,380 @@ +# Hierarchy Schema Contract (D2) + +Status: DRAFT — awaiting ratification (webui-audit S2, contract 1 of 9). +Authority: PRD D2/D9/D13 (Part I §4) and the native-kanban SOT Amendment A1 +(`docs/requirements/native-kanban-sot.md` §8, ratified 2026-08-25). This +document turns the ratified hierarchy into a concrete schema contract: +tables, cardinalities, constraints, and ownership/transfer semantics. It is +the prerequisite for the hierarchy command family and for the RBAC grant +model (contract 2, `docs/requirements/rbac-grant-model.md`). + +Revision 2 (independent review, GPT-5.6 terra): tenancy-FK exemption made +explicit (§1.1); record class extended to include `hierarchy_grants` +(§1.1); provenance corrections on legacy tables and the planning `projects` +table (§1.3, §2 naming note); NOT NULL and `NULLS NOT DISTINCT` grant +uniqueness (§2.6, §3.2); grant FK delete actions split cascade/restrict +(§3.3); transfer transaction includes its audit write (§4.3); ownership +invariant completed via contract 2 with the both-sides rule marked as new +policy (§4.2, §4.4); hierarchy audit brought under REQ-AUD-001-equivalent +guarantees with deletion-safe linkage (§5.2); roll-up never-a-write restored +to full A1 strength (§5.4); §6 rebuilt with bounded observables for every +MUST (allowlist, command surface, audit, corrected cardinality witness). + +Revision 3 (terra re-review residuals): §4.3 transfer write inventory +reconciled with §5.2 — the transaction's writes are the single class-row +mutation plus that mutation's §5.2 audit writes (event + outbox record), +not "exactly two writes"; §6.3 extended with a closed writer-coverage +witness so an unregistered internal writer cannot pass a registered-route +inventory. (Terra's finding-8 residual — a stale contract 2 §7.8 backlink +to contract 1 §6.2 — was already fixed in contract 2 revision 2, which +cites §6.5; measured against `origin/contract/rbac-grants` head +`501112d2`.) + +Revision 4 (terra r3 residual F7): the §6.3(b) writer-coverage assertion +extended to raw SQL — it now also fails on class-table name literals +inside SQL strings or tagged SQL templates outside the allowlist, so a +raw-SQL writer that touches no schema symbol is still caught. + +Revision 5 (terra r4 residual F7): §6.3(b) gains a third prong — any +raw-SQL execution primitive outside the allowlist fails the assertion +regardless of its SQL content, closing the evasion where a +dynamically constructed table name carries neither a schema symbol nor +a class-table literal. The detection claim is now coextensive with +what the three prongs statically see. + +Revision 6 (terra r5 residual F7 + new F8): the "two prongs" wording +corrected to three (F8); §6.3(b) gains the allowlist composition rules +(no generic raw-SQL helper is allowlisted; an allowlisted module may +not export caller-supplied-SQL execution) and fails outright on +runtime code-construction primitives; the detection claim is scoped +honestly to the stated syntactic forms, with evasions beyond static +reach assigned to §5.1 review/audit rather than claimed for CI. + +Revision 7 (terra r6 new F9): the false-positive remedy no longer +contradicts the composition rules — legitimate non-hierarchy raw +execution (e.g. the db package's migration runner) is dispositioned +onto a second closed enumerated list, the infrastructure register, +exempt from prong (iii) only, still bound by prongs (i)/(ii), barred +from the writer allowlist, and importable only by registered modules +or the operational entry points. + +Revision 8 (terra r7 residual F9): the register's import rule made +satisfiable by the live tree — imports are checked re-export-aware +(package barrels followed), and each registered module carries its own +closed importer enumeration, which may name operational entry points +such as the Gateway's startup migration hook; named importers stay +subject to prongs (i)/(ii) and gain no writer standing. + +Revision 9 (terra r8 F10): revision 8 called the Gateway database +module the runner's "one live importer today". That was false — the +measured production importer set has four members. The enumeration +example now lists the complete measured set, and the import analysis +is extended to resolve literal dynamic `import()` routes, which two of +the four members use. + +Scope: the tenancy/authorization structure record class — companies, +estates, platform-projects, workspaces, hierarchy grants, their parentage, +and constraints. Out of scope: the RBAC grant vocabulary and evaluation +semantics (contract 2), roll-up projection semantics (contract 8), kanban +planning entities inside workspaces (SOT §5), migration or retirement of +legacy flat data (future work; see §1.3). + +## 1. Record class and placement + +1. The **tenancy/authorization structure record class** defined by + Amendment A1 §8.1.2 comprises five tables: the four node tables of §2 + AND `hierarchy_grants` (§3) — A1 includes hierarchy-level access grants + in the class. Every rule addressed to "the class" in this contract + (payload prohibition, mutation path, audit) binds all five tables. Class + rows carry parentage, naming, grant, and audit-linkage data only — never + task, plan, or any business/orchestration payload. + References from business/orchestration rows into the class are limited + to exactly one form: the canonical `workspace_id` tenancy column that + REQ-TEN-001 requires on every canonical row, referencing + `workspaces.id`. No business/orchestration row may reference a company, + estate, platform-project, or grant id in any position, and no + business/orchestration row may reference a workspace id in any + non-tenancy position (dependency, claim target, work subject). +2. Hierarchy records are NOT workspace-scoped rows: REQ-TEN-001's + `workspace_id` obligation binds business/orchestration rows and does not + apply to this class (A1 §8.1.2). The `workspaces` table itself is the + anchor the obligation points at. +3. The legacy flat tables (`teams`, and the Brain planning `projects` table + in `packages/db/src/schema.ts`) are not part of this class. What A1 + §8.1.4 pins is narrower: the planning `projects` table and + `platform_projects` stay distinct tables. This contract adds, as new + policy ratified here: neither `teams` nor `projects` is repurposed as a + hierarchy table. Their eventual migration or retirement is future work + that no existing REQ assigns; it is out of scope here. + +## 2. Tables and cardinalities + +Naming: the level above workspaces is `platform_projects`, per A1 §8.1.4. +The existing `projects` table is Brain planning data (so labeled in +`packages/db/src/schema.ts`; it carries no `workspace_id`), and the schema +MUST NOT merge the two. (A rename of either remains an implementation-PR +decision under A1; this contract pins only that they stay distinct tables.) + +1. `companies` — id (uuid pk), name, slug (unique per deployment), + created_at, updated_at. N per deployment (D2). +2. `estates` — id, name, slug, `company_id` NOT NULL → + `companies.id` ON DELETE RESTRICT. Exactly one company per estate; a + company holds any number of estates. +3. `platform_projects` — id, name, slug, `estate_id` NOT NULL → + `estates.id` ON DELETE RESTRICT. Exactly one estate per + platform-project; an estate holds any number of platform-projects. +4. `workspaces` — id, name, slug, `platform_project_id` NOT NULL → + `platform_projects.id` ON DELETE RESTRICT. Exactly one platform-project + per workspace. This table is the referent of every `workspace_id` column + the SOT requires on canonical rows. +5. **Chain resolution is by construction.** Because every parent FK is NOT + NULL and single-valued (one FK column, no parentage edge tables, no + multi-parent forms, no nullable "detached" states), each workspace + resolves to exactly one platform-project → estate → company chain (A1 + §8.3 acceptance 1). One-parent-per-child is the constrained direction; + many children per parent is valid data. +6. **Slug scoping.** All `name` and `slug` columns are NOT NULL. + `estates.slug` is unique within its company, `platform_projects.slug` + within its estate, `workspaces.slug` within its platform-project + (composite unique constraints). Display names are unconstrained beyond + NOT NULL. +7. No hierarchy table carries a `metadata` jsonb column or any + free-form payload field. The columns declared in this section and §3 + are exhaustive: a class table's column set is exactly its declared set + (verified per §6.2) — nothing else (A1 §8.1.2). + +## 3. Grant attachment points + +The grant vocabulary (which roles exist, what each permits, how evaluation +and revocation work) is contract 2. This contract pins only the schema +shape contract 2 attaches to: + +1. `hierarchy_grants` — id, subject (exactly one of `user_id` → `users.id`, + `team_id` → `teams.id`; CHECK-enforced exactly-one-of), target (exactly + one of `company_id`, `estate_id`, `platform_project_id`; + CHECK-enforced exactly-one-of), `role` (text NOT NULL; vocabulary and + its CHECK constraint owned by contract 2 §2), `granted_by` NOT NULL → + `users.id`, created_at. +2. Uniqueness: at most one grant row per (subject, target, role). Because + the subject and target columns are nullable by design, ordinary + PostgreSQL composite uniqueness treats NULLs as distinct and would not + enforce this. The implementation MUST use a single + `UNIQUE NULLS NOT DISTINCT` constraint across (`user_id`, `team_id`, + `company_id`, `estate_id`, `platform_project_id`, `role`) or six + equivalent partial unique indexes (one per subject×target form). The + pinned Drizzle ORM supports `nullsNotDistinct()`. +3. Delete actions are split by column class: + - Target FKs (`company_id`, `estate_id`, `platform_project_id`): + ON DELETE CASCADE — the one permitted cascade in this class. A grant + on a deleted node is meaningless and fail-open if retained. Cascaded + grant deletions are audited per §5.2. + - Principal FKs (`user_id`, `team_id`, `granted_by`): ON DELETE + RESTRICT. The identity contract (§7.3) gates user deletion today and + defines no team-deletion rule; this contract does not invent one. + These FKs stay RESTRICT until an explicit deletion-and-retention + contract ratifies otherwise. +4. Workspace-level access is evaluated, not stored here: a grant at any of + the three levels evaluates down the chain to workspace-scoped + authorization (A1 §8.1.3). No `workspace_id` column exists on + `hierarchy_grants` — workspace membership (REQ-ID-001) remains its own + mechanism inside the SOT schema, and the chain adds where grants can be + declared, never a bypass. + +## 4. Ownership and transfer + +"Assets are transferable subject to the structure" (PRD Part I §4): + +1. A transfer changes exactly one parent FK on exactly one hierarchy row: + workspace → new platform-project, platform-project → new estate, estate + → new company. Nothing else in the class or the SOT changes: business + and orchestration rows inside affected workspaces are untouched, keep + their `workspace_id`, and never cross a workspace boundary (A1 §8.1.3 + "chain maintenance"). +2. Transfer authorization requires authority over BOTH the source and the + destination parent. This both-sides predicate is **new policy + introduced by this contract pair** (D2/A1 do not state it); its + evaluation semantics are contract 2 §5. The structural half — that the + transfer command evaluates it before mutating — binds here. +3. A transfer transaction mutates exactly one class-table row — the + single-row parent-FK update — and contains, beyond that, only the + §5.2 audit writes for that mutation (the audit event and its + hierarchy-outbox record, committing in the same transaction). No other + class, business, or orchestration row changes. There are no multi-row + transfer batches at the schema level; bulk moves are N audited + transfers. +4. Hierarchy records have no `owner_id`. Ownership in the hierarchy IS the + grant structure: a "company owner" is a subject with an `owner` grant + on that company or an ancestor (contract 2 §2), not a column. The + ownership invariant across the contract pair: a node may hold zero + direct owner grants (authority can derive from an ancestor grant); node + creation names the initial `owner` grant in the same audited operation + and the wizard seeds the first company's owner the same way (contract 2 + §4.3); transfer and revocation semantics are contract 2 §§5–6. This + avoids column-encoded authority of the kind the legacy schema carries + (`teams.owner_id` and `teams.manager_id` are required user FKs, and + `team_members.role` is a further authority field — none of them + evaluable under a grant model). + +## 5. Mutation path, audit, and deletion + +1. All hierarchy mutations flow through the same sole-writable-SOT, + fail-closed, audited Gateway command path as everything else (A1 §8.2.3, + REQ-API-001). No direct-DB writers, no raw CRUD endpoints. +2. **Audit parity.** A1 §8.2 leaves every pre-existing REQ binding, so + hierarchy mutations get REQ-AUD-001's guarantees, not a weakened + substitute. Concretely: + - Every create, rename, transfer, grant create/change/revoke, and + delete — including every grant deletion cascaded by a node delete — + emits a semantic audit event carrying actor, verb, target, and (for + transfers) source and destination parents, with the correlation, + causation, idempotency, and per-target ordering guarantees REQ-AUD-001 + defines. + - The state change and its audit event(s) commit in the same + transaction, delivered through a transactional outbox. Hierarchy + events are not workspace-scoped rows and do not ride the workspace + outbox; they get an equivalent hierarchy outbox under the same + append-only, same-transaction rules. + - **Deletion-safe linkage:** audit events reference their target by an + immutable snapshot (id, slug, and parent chain at event time), never + by a foreign key into the class tables, so append-only events survive + the deletion of their target. +3. Deletion is fail-closed bottom-up: a hierarchy record with children + cannot be deleted (RESTRICT FKs, §2). Deleting a workspace is a SOT-side + operation subject to the kanban SOT's own rules and is not granted any + new semantics by this contract. +4. **Roll-up is never a write** (A1 §8.2.2, preserved at full strength). A + roll-up read mutates nothing — not hierarchy state, and not business or + orchestration state: it must not mutate, claim, order, or gate + workspace work. Contract 8 owns projection details but cannot narrow + this rule. This contract additionally guarantees the chain roll-ups + aggregate over is unique and non-null (§2.5). + +## 6. Verification requirements + +Binding on the implementing PRs (extends A1 §8.3): + +1. Schema witnesses (real PostgreSQL, §6.8): chain construction — insert + with a null parent FK refused; insert with one valid parent accepted; + two siblings under one parent accepted (the control proving the + constraint rejects only what §2.5 forbids); catalog assertion that each + child table has exactly one parent-FK column and no parentage edge + table exists. Composite slug uniqueness per parent (duplicate slug + under same parent refused; same slug under different parents accepted). + Grant CHECKs: exactly-one-of subject and exactly-one-of target each + witnessed (zero and two set → refused). Grant uniqueness: a duplicate + (subject, target, role) row refused for each of the six subject×target + forms, proving NULLS-NOT-DISTINCT semantics; NOT NULL on `role`, + `granted_by`, and all `name`/`slug` columns witnessed. +2. Column allowlist: an information_schema assertion that each class + table's column set is exactly the set declared in §2/§3 — the bounded + observable for no-payload (§2.7) and no-`owner_id` (§4.4). +3. Command surface: two witnesses, both required (§5.1). (a) Route + inventory: an assertion over the Gateway's registered hierarchy + routes/commands proving the registered mutation surface is exactly the + declared hierarchy command family — no generic CRUD endpoint. (b) + Writer coverage — the closed allowlist a route inventory cannot + provide: a static CI assertion over the Gateway and package sources + with three prongs, each bound to one explicitly enumerated allowlist + of hierarchy command/repository modules. (i) Symbol prong: write + references to the class-table schema symbols (insert, update, delete) + occur only in allowlisted modules. (ii) Literal prong: a class-table + name appearing inside a SQL string or tagged SQL template outside the + allowlist fails the assertion — this is what catches a raw-SQL writer + that references no schema symbol. (iii) Raw-execution prong: any call + to a raw-SQL execution primitive (the ORM's raw/unsafe constructors, + driver-level query/execute) outside the allowlist fails the + assertion, regardless of what the SQL string contains or how it is + constructed — the call site is statically detectable even when a + dynamically assembled table name is not, so a raw writer with a + runtime-built identifier is caught by its primitive, not its + payload. Two composition rules keep prong (iii) meaningful: the + allowlist names hierarchy command/repository modules only — a + generic raw-SQL helper or database-utility module is never + allowlisted; and an allowlisted module MUST NOT export a function + that executes caller-supplied SQL (such an export is itself a + raw-execution primitive, and the exporting module is treated as + unallowlisted for prong (iii) if it does). Legitimate raw execution + that is not a hierarchy writer — e.g. the migration runner in the + db package — lives on a second, separately enumerated + **infrastructure register**, distinct from the writer allowlist and + equally closed. A registered module is exempt from prong (iii) only: + prongs (i) and (ii) apply to it with no exemption, so it can hold no + class-table schema symbol or class-table SQL literal, and it can + never appear on the writer allowlist. To close the laundering path, + the same assertion checks imports, and the import analysis is + **re-export-aware**: it follows package barrels and re-exports, so a + route hidden behind an index module is still a route — and it + resolves literal dynamic imports the same way: an + `await import('')` is an import edge like any + static import, not an evasion of the analysis (a dynamic import of + the db package whose specifier is not a literal fails the assertion + outright, because it makes the import graph unanalyzable). A + registered module may be imported only by other registered modules + or by importers named on that module's own closed importer + enumeration in the register — operational entry points such as the + migration/bootstrap CLI or the Gateway's startup migration hook. + The enumeration names the complete permitted production consumer + set, and completeness is measured, not asserted: the migration + runner's measured production importer set today has four members — + the Gateway database module (reached through the db package + barrel), the storage package's Postgres adapter, and two mosaic CLI + commands, the fleet-backlog command and the gateway verify command, + both routed through literal dynamic imports of the db package — so + its enumeration names those four. A module that only receives the + runner's functions by parameter injection (the gateway schema-check + module takes them as arguments from the verify command) has no + import edge of its own and is not enumerated. Any import route + outside the enumeration fails the assertion. Being a + named importer confers nothing else: the importer stays fully + subject to prongs (i) and (ii), gains no writer-allowlist standing, + and whether it uses the registered module beyond its operational + purpose is a §5.1 review question, not a static claim. Runtime code-construction + primitives (`eval`, `new Function`) anywhere in the scanned sources + fail the assertion outright, allowlist or not. Schema definitions + and generated migrations are excluded from the literal prong; a + false positive is resolved in the same PR by adding the module to + the one enumerated list its role permits — the writer allowlist for + a hierarchy command/repository module, the infrastructure register + for non-hierarchy raw execution — never by weakening the assertion, + and neither list may take a module the composition rules bar from + it. Both lists are closed, and the assertion's detection + claim is exactly its prongs: it statically surfaces every writer + expressed as a schema-symbol reference, a class-table SQL literal, a + raw-execution call site, or runtime code construction. An evasion + engineered outside those syntactic forms is a §5.1 violation that + review and audit own — the witness does not claim to catch what + static analysis cannot see, and any such evasion found later is + corrected as a conformance defect, not grandfathered. +4. Audit witnesses: for each mutation class (create, rename, transfer, + grant create/change/revoke, delete) — the event exists after commit + with actor/verb/target and same-transaction atomicity; a rolled-back + mutation leaves no event (rollback witness); a node delete's cascaded + grant deletions are each covered by events; events survive deletion of + their target (query the events of a deleted node). +5. Transfer tests: parent-FK update moves the subtree resolution and + modifies zero business/orchestration rows (row-count and content + assertions on workspace contents before/after); transfer without + authority on the source or on the destination side is refused (with + contract 2 §7.8). +6. Deletion tests: delete with children refused at the database level; + delete of a leaf cascades its grants and nothing else; deleting a user + or team that is a grant subject (or `granted_by` referent) is refused + (RESTRICT witnesses for §3.3). +7. Negative tests: no business/orchestration table accepts a company, + estate, platform-project, or grant id in any reference position, and + none accepts a workspace id in any non-tenancy position; the canonical + tenancy FK control — a business row inserted with a valid + `workspace_id` succeeds, with an invalid one is refused; roll-up + endpoints mutate no canonical state anywhere (assert zero writes across + hierarchy AND workspace tables, not hierarchy only); readers see + aggregates only over workspaces they are authorized on, with no + cross-tenant existence oracles (A1 §8.3 acceptance 3). +8. Real-PostgreSQL coverage for every constraint witness (unique/CHECK/ + RESTRICT/NULLS NOT DISTINCT behavior), using the `ci-postgres` service + in the `test` CI step; mocked specs cannot witness database constraints. + +## Ruling request + +Ratify sections 1–6 as written, with one decision embedded: hierarchy +records carry no owner column — ownership is expressed solely through +grants (§4.4) — say "agreed" or name the ownership model you want.