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fix(#828): bound persisted broker token state

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Prune consumed and revoked tokens, cap pending token state, reject oversized serialization before replacement, and roll back in-memory mutations when persistence fails.\n\ncloses #828
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ms-lead-reviewer
2026-07-17 21:04:21 -05:00
parent 4e9b4cdf97
commit 0b953faf79
4 changed files with 30 additions and 16 deletions
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docs/architecture/lease-broker-security.md
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@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
- Runtime generations are monotonic per anchor; a bump revokes prior-incarnation tokens before persistence commits.
- Session IDs and cycle tokens use the OS cryptographic RNG. `Math.random` and model output are not token sources.
- Framing and persistence failures fail closed. Sensitive tokens are not logged.
- Same-principal filesystem modes are minimum hardening, not socket authenticity against the same UID. Distinct-principal service isolation is required for that stronger claim.
- Built-in `0700`/`0600` filesystem modes provide same-principal hardening only, not socket authenticity against the same UID. WI-1 provides no distinct-principal isolation. That stronger deployment requires an external protected proxy, ACL, or service boundary, and the boundary must preserve authenticated client identity for the broker's `SO_PEERCRED` and ancestry authorization rather than substituting a shared proxy identity.
- WI-2+ security surfaces—receipts, promotion transactions, mutator gates, hooks, payload construction, and recovery—are explicitly out of scope.
Coordinator security review must rerun the real socket/peercred acceptance suite on an unrestricted Linux runner and obtain the mandated independent Opus-SECREV review before integration.