honker: row 194 PRD 1.7 draft, REQ-CRED-3 agent host access with sudo through the credential store, Q183 and Q184 sources, who grants left open (sage-1422, mos-1067, Vikunja #424)
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# PRD 1.7 draft: the chief of staff's hire and fire authority, and the coder's push to its fork
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# PRD 1.7 draft: the chief of staff's hire and fire authority, the coder's push to its fork, and agent
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# host access through the credential store
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Draft by Honker for row 194 (#1692), under Mos's ruling mos-1017 (through Sage, sage-1365). Not approved.
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It changes nothing until Jason approves it as a `prd.approve` decision in the Console. Sage opens that
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@@ -10,7 +11,9 @@ Row 194 adds `role.hire` and `role.fire` to the vocabulary, and row 199 adds `gi
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REQ-WAIT-3 all three are hard waits, so today Jason resolves every hire, every fire and every push to a
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remote. This version routes hire and fire for the chief of staff within fixed bounds, so the chief hires
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and fires as needed and the user's per-agent forbid still holds. It routes `git.push.remote` for the coder
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only (Mos, mos-1028 item 3). One `prd.approve` decision covers all three (Vikunja #420).
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only (Mos, mos-1028 item 3). It adds agent host access with sudo through the credential store for
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agents with a grant (Q183, Q184, Vikunja #424, due 2026-10-27). One `prd.approve` decision covers it all
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(Vikunja #420).
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When this version lands, a reviewed commit:
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@@ -24,6 +27,8 @@ When this version lands, a reviewed commit:
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4. states, for a `git.push.remote` with no decision, where the source commit comes from: the latest work
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commit the bus recorded for the coder's task. The check still matches it against the work ref tip and
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the push sends it by oid (row 199, duckworth-0022 N9).
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5. adds the host credential grant check and the stack's ssh and sudo for a granted agent (REQ-CRED-3,
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Vikunja #424).
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Every other check stays as rows 194 and 199 build it. Filling `hireable` stays a separate reviewed role
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file commit in `roles/`.
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@@ -33,12 +38,20 @@ file commit in `roles/`.
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Status line, appended to the current paragraph:
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> Version 1.7 routes the chief of staff's hire and fire actions and the coder's push to its own fork,
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> approved by Jason in decision <prd.approve decision id>.
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> and adds agent host access through the credential store, approved by Jason in decision
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> <prd.approve decision id>.
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Source, a new bullet above "Version 1.6 source":
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> - Version 1.7 source, TARGET.md line 66: "Chief of staff agent has hire/fire authority for agents as
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> needed; unless user forbids per agent"
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> needed; unless user forbids per agent". And Jason through Mos (mos-1067), DECISIONS Q183, in part: "I will
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> still want to allow infra agent(s) on my .53 instance to access other servers, etc. However, not all
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> agents will need to have that access. I envision a credential store within Mosaic Stack that works
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> as some sort of variable for the agent to call. The system will enforce access to the credentials to
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> keep the agents sandboxed with proper security. I need to be able to trust my agents with assisting
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> me. This will require sudo access to several systems. If we can utilize the credential store in
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> Mosaic Stack and allow agents to perform their jobs with NOPASSWD sudo on various machines, I am a
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> happy man." DECISIONS Q184, on whether that is in place by 10-27: "Q5: by 10.27"
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Under "Added in version 1.2", after REQ-COS-2:
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@@ -92,6 +105,16 @@ Under "Landing", after REQ-LAND-1:
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>
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> Every push is logged with the remote, the ref, the commit and, when one was given, the decision.
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Under "Credentials", after REQ-CRED-2:
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> Added in version 1.7:
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>
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> - **REQ-CRED-3.** An agent with a grant can run commands with sudo on another host. The agent asks
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> for the host credential by name. The stack checks that a grant exists for that agent and that host,
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> then does the ssh and the sudo for the agent. The agent never sees the key or any other secret value
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> (REQ-CRED-1, REQ-VAR-2). An agent without a grant for that host is refused. Not every agent gets a
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> grant. Jason grants one through a reviewed role or config change.
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REQ-WAIT-3, appended:
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> `role.hire` and `role.fire` were added as hard waits and route under REQ-COS-3 since version 1.7.
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@@ -125,5 +148,10 @@ REQ-WAIT-3, appended:
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`hireable` list stays a reviewed commit in `roles/`.
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- The credentials bound names no row number, so the text doesn't go stale when row 199 lands. A later
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version lifts it.
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- REQ-CRED-3 states only what Jason said in Q183 and Q184 (sage-1422). Open point: Q183 doesn't say
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who grants host access or how. The text leaves it as Jason through a reviewed role or config change
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and defines no mechanism. The design for #424 settles it, and Duckworth reviews that design because
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it gives agents sudo on hosts (Q184, Mos's reading). Where the build goes, row 199 or a row on top of
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it, is Sage and Megavolt's call.
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- This draft follows the PRD's own style: plain words, no semicolons in new sentences, and the status
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paragraph never edited in place except to append.
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