docs(tess): define interaction agent mission

2026-07-12 13:09:18 -05:00
parent a99aded26d
commit 10f757e874
10 changed files with 420 additions and 3 deletions
--- a/docs/tess/ARCHITECTURE.md
+++ b/docs/tess/ARCHITECTURE.md
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+# Tess Architecture
+
+## Purpose
+
+Tess is the Mosaic operator interaction plane. Mos remains the coding/general fleet orchestration authority. Tess receives authorized operator intent, presents fleet/session state, delegates Mos-owned work to Mos, and exposes native Mosaic plus transitional external-agent capabilities through normalized providers.
+
+## Component Boundaries
+
+```text
+Discord plugin ─┐
+                ├─ authenticated ingress envelope ─> Mosaic Gateway
+mosaic tess CLI ┘                                  │
+                                                   ├─ policy/approval/audit
+                                                   ├─ Tess durable session service (Pi GPT-5.6 Sol high)
+                                                   ├─ AgentRuntimeProvider registry
+                                                   │   ├─ native Pi provider
+                                                   │   ├─ fleet/tmux provider
+                                                   │   ├─ Hermes adapter
+                                                   │   └─ Matrix/native transport provider
+                                                   ├─ memory/state/inbox plugins
+                                                   └─ Mos coordination adapter ─> Mos / fleet queue
+```
+
+## Core Contract
+
+`AgentRuntimeProvider` is separate from the existing model-completion `IProviderAdapter`. It normalizes external and native agent runtimes without leaking provider-specific schemas.
+
+Required operations:
+
+- `capabilities()` and `health()`
+- `listSessions(scope)`
+- `getSessionTree(scope)`
+- `streamSession(sessionRef, cursor, scope)`
+- `sendMessage(sessionRef, message, idempotencyKey, scope)`
+- `attach(sessionRef, mode, scope)` / `detach()`
+- `terminate(sessionRef, approvalRef, scope)`
+
+Every call receives an immutable, server-derived actor/tenant/channel scope and correlation ID. Caller-supplied actor IDs are forbidden. Unsupported capabilities fail closed with typed errors.
+
+## Authority Model
+
+| Intent | Owner | Tess behavior |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Conversation, status, retrieval, safe diagnostics | Tess | Execute within policy |
+| Code/project decomposition, worker assignment, reviews, merge orchestration | Mos | Create a correlated handoff and observe result |
+| Destructive, privileged, external/customer-visible action | Human approval + policy | Propose, wait for durable one-time approval, then execute idempotently |
+| Provider-specific unsupported action | None | Fail closed; never emulate silently |
+
+## Session and State Model
+
+A Tess session has stable `sessionId`, `tenantId`, `ownerId`, provider/runtime identity, ingress bindings, cursor, checkpoint, inbox/outbox, and idempotency records. Discord and CLI bind to the same authorized session. Ownership is verified server-side on every list/read/attach/send/terminate operation.
+
+Valkey may hold ephemeral coordination state; PostgreSQL is canonical for durable session bindings, approvals, audit, checkpoints, inbox/outbox, and idempotency. Pi session files are replay sources, not cross-agent truth.
+
+## Transport Strategy
+
+- **Initial:** fleet/tmux provider, including exact target, socket, identity, heartbeat, and safe attach semantics.
+- **Forward:** Matrix/native Mosaic provider using authenticated identity, idempotent transaction IDs, replay cursors, and the same contract suite.
+- Discord/CLI never call tmux or Matrix directly.
+
+## Plugin Families
+
+1. Channel: Discord now; other channels later.
+2. Runtime: Pi, fleet/tmux, Hermes, Matrix/native.
+3. Operator tools: fleet health, Mos handoff, GitOps wrappers, incident-safe diagnostics.
+4. Memory/state: search/recent/capture, durable inbox, checkpoint, handoff, compaction recovery.
+5. Migration: capability inventory, adapters, cutover, rollback, telemetry.
+
+## Deployment
+
+Tess runs as a rostered, systemd-supervised Pi agent using GPT-5.6 Sol and high reasoning. Secrets are supplied through approved runtime secret mechanisms. Startup fails when required model, gateway identity, Discord binding, or durable-state dependencies are missing. Health reports effective model/reasoning/tool policy without credential material.
--- a/docs/tess/MIGRATION-INVENTORY.md
+++ b/docs/tess/MIGRATION-INVENTORY.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Tess Capability Migration Inventory
+
+Status values: `native` · `adapt` · `defer` · `reject`. This is the initial inventory; M5 requires implementation and evidence fields to be completed before cutover.
+
+| Capability | Current source | Target | Initial status | Cutover/rollback intent |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| Interactive agent chat/session streaming | Hermes/Pi/OpenClaw | Mosaic Tess session service | native | Dual-run per channel; revert binding to legacy gateway |
+| Discord dedicated-channel routing | Hermes/Claude/OpenClaw plugins | Mosaic Discord plugin + gateway | native | Per-channel binding switch; legacy bot disabled only after soak |
+| CLI/TUI session interaction and attach | Hermes/Pi/tmux | `mosaic tess` + AgentRuntimeProvider | native | Keep direct tmux attach as break-glass rollback |
+| Session list/tree/send/terminate | Hermes/fleet | AgentRuntimeProvider | native | Capability-negotiated adapter remains during migration |
+| Mos/fleet orchestration handoff | tmux messaging/Mosaic fleet | Mosaic coord/fleet provider | native | tmux handoff remains initial transport |
+| Kanban/projects/tasks | Hermes Kanban | Mosaic queue/coord/project providers | adapt | Read projection first; mutating cutover after parity/audit |
+| Skills catalog/load/manage | Hermes skills/Pi skills | Mosaic skill registry/provider | adapt | Import metadata/provenance; preserve source skill until validated |
+| Tools and MCP | Hermes/OpenClaw/MCP | Mosaic tool registry/MCP | adapt | Default deny; migrate allowlisted tools one capability at a time |
+| Cron/scheduled work | Hermes cron | Mosaic scheduler/queue | adapt | Shadow schedules; prevent duplicate execution; rollback owner field |
+| Memory search/recent/capture | jarvis-brain/OpenViking/OpenBrain/Hermes | Mosaic memory provider | adapt | Flat/project stores remain truth; semantic systems are mirrors |
+| User/profile preferences | Hermes memory/user profile | Mosaic user/memory domain | adapt | Provenance + explicit conflict rules; exportable rollback snapshot |
+| Agent state/inbox/handoff | OpenClaw extensions/session files | Mosaic durable state service | native | Read legacy handoff during coexistence; write Mosaic only after cutover |
+| Runtime contract/bootstrap | Mosaic framework/Hermes/OpenClaw | Mosaic compose/runtime provider | native | Legacy launchers remain until clean-host parity passes |
+| Repository/PR workflow | Mosaic wrappers/Hermes tools | Mosaic operator plugin | native | Wrapper-only; no raw-provider fallback |
+| Incident-safe diagnostics | Hermes skills/tools | Mosaic scoped operator plugin | adapt | Read-only first; privileged recovery requires approval |
+| Broad unrestricted shell from Discord | Hermes/OpenClaw configurations | None | reject | No cutover; replace with allowlisted typed operations |
+| Raw full transcript bulk migration | Hermes/Claude/OpenClaw histories | Indexed summaries/selective import | reject | Keep source archives subject to retention; no automatic copy |
+| Voice/video interaction | Hermes optional tools | Future Mosaic channel plugins | defer | Not required for Tess operational release |
+| Matrix transport | Mosaic connector | AgentRuntimeProvider Matrix implementation | native | Non-default until contract/reliability parity; tmux rollback |
+
+## Cutover Gates
+
+1. Capability contract and security tests pass.
+2. Data mapping/provenance and retention are documented.
+3. Shadow or dual-run shows no unauthorized access, loss, or duplicate effects.
+4. Operator runbook and rollback are exercised.
+5. Channel/provider binding changes are reversible without schema rollback.
+6. Legacy capability is disabled only after a defined soak period and evidence review.
--- a/docs/tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md
+++ b/docs/tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# Mission Manifest — Tess Interaction Agent
+
+## Mission
+
+- **ID:** tess-20260712
+- **Issue:** #706
+- **Branch:** `feat/tess-interaction-agent`
+- **Phase:** Execution
+- **Current Milestone:** TESS-M1 — Runtime contracts and security foundation
+- **Progress:** 0 / 5 delivery milestones complete
+- **Status:** active
+- **Owner:** Mosaic orchestrator; Mos is coordinating fleet authority
+- **Source PRD:** `docs/PRD.md` — `TESS-*` requirements
+- **Scratchpad:** `docs/scratchpads/tess-20260712.md`
+
+## Mission Statement
+
+Ship Tess as Jason's durable Pi-native GPT-5.6 Sol high-reasoning interaction agent for Discord and CLI, with safe visibility/control of Mosaic fleet and transitional Hermes capabilities, while Mos remains the coding/general orchestration authority.
+
+## Invariants
+
+1. Mosaic is the enterprise AI hub; Hermes is a reference migration adapter.
+2. Gateway is the single API surface.
+3. Mos owns coding/general fleet orchestration; Tess owns human interaction, visibility, mediation, and migration access.
+4. Runtime, transport, channel, memory, and external-agent integrations are replaceable adapters.
+5. No source task completes before merged PR, terminal-green CI, independent review, and linked task/issue closure.
+
+## Milestones
+
+| ID | Issue | Name | Status | Exit gate |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| TESS-M1 | #707 | Runtime contracts and security foundation | ready | AgentRuntimeProvider, normalized events/capabilities/errors, RBAC/audit contracts and contract tests merged |
+| TESS-M2 | #708 | Durable Pi Tess service and state | not-started | GPT-5.6 Sol high service starts, resumes, checkpoints, and passes restart/compaction tests |
+| TESS-M3 | #709 | Discord and CLI interaction surfaces | not-started | One durable session works through dedicated Discord binding and `mosaic tess`, including attach and approvals |
+| TESS-M4 | #710 | Fleet, Mos, Hermes, memory, state, and tool plugins | not-started | Fleet/Mos boundary and transitional capability matrix demonstrated end-to-end |
+| TESS-M5 | #711 | Matrix/native migration, recovery, documentation, and qualification | not-started | Transport parity, migration/rollback matrix, security review, docs, greenfield and deployment validation complete |
+
+## Success Criteria
+
+All `AC-TESS-*` criteria in `docs/PRD.md` are mapped to reproducible evidence. The final operational test must prove Discord + CLI session continuity, fleet/Mos coordination, authorized Hermes transition capabilities, denial/audit paths, restart recovery, and rollback.
+
+## Session History
+
+| Session | Date | Runtime | Outcome |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| S1 | 2026-07-12 | Hermes / GPT-5.6 Sol | User commission captured; Mosaic/OpenViking/session/code archaeology completed; issue #706 created; PRD and task control plane initialized. |
--- a/docs/tess/TASKS.md
+++ b/docs/tess/TASKS.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Tasks — Tess Interaction Agent
+
+> Mission: `tess-20260712` · Issue: #706 · PRD requirements: `TESS-*`
+> Orchestrator is sole writer. Workers must not modify this file.
+> `repo` contains one or more comma-separated repository-relative roots; every listed root must exist before dispatch.
+
+| id | status | description | issue | agent | repo | branch | depends_on | estimate | notes |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| TESS-PLAN-001 | done | Finalize PRD, architecture, authority boundary, threat model, migration inventory, and verification matrix | #706 | sonnet | docs, packages/types, apps/gateway | feat/tess-interaction-agent | — | 22K | Independent gate PASS after two remediation rounds; completion effective when planning PR merges |
+| TESS-M1-SEC-001 | not-started | Enforce command scopes/roles and durable exact-action approval for privileged/destructive commands | #707 | codex | apps/gateway | fix/tess-command-authz | TESS-PLAN-001 | 25K | TESS-SEC-002; security TDD |
+| TESS-M1-SEC-002 | not-started | Enforce owner/tenant binding on session list/read/attach/send/terminate across REST and WS | #707 | codex | apps/gateway | fix/tess-session-ownership | TESS-PLAN-001 | 30K | TESS-SEC-003; security TDD |
+| TESS-M1-SEC-003 | not-started | Bind MCP actor/tenant to authenticated context and add per-tool scopes | #707 | codex | apps/gateway | fix/tess-mcp-identity | TESS-PLAN-001 | 22K | TESS-SEC-004; security TDD |
+| TESS-M1-SEC-004 | not-started | Add authenticated Discord service ingress, allowlists, correlation and replay protection | #707 | codex | plugins/discord, apps/gateway | fix/tess-discord-ingress | TESS-PLAN-001 | 28K | TESS-SEC-005; security TDD |
+| TESS-M1-SEC-005 | not-started | Redact/classify secret and PII before persistence/egress; harden provider login flow | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/log | fix/tess-redaction | TESS-PLAN-001 | 28K | TESS-SEC-006; seeded canary tests |
+| TESS-M1-SEC-006 | not-started | Scope session GC/retention or separate authorized global retention job | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/log | fix/tess-session-gc-scope | TESS-PLAN-001 | 18K | TESS-SEC-009; isolation TDD |
+| TESS-M1-001 | not-started | Define AgentRuntimeProvider, capabilities, session tree, normalized stream events/errors, attach semantics | #707 | codex | packages/types, packages/agent | feat/tess-runtime-contract | TESS-PLAN-001 | 25K | TESS-ARP-001, TESS-TRN-001; contract TDD |
+| TESS-M1-002 | not-started | Implement provider registry/service with immutable actor scope, approval, audit and correlation boundaries | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/agent | feat/tess-provider-registry | TESS-M1-001,TESS-M1-SEC-001,TESS-M1-SEC-002,TESS-M1-SEC-003 | 30K | TESS-SEC-001..004,007; security TDD |
+| TESS-M1-003 | not-started | Implement tmux/fleet runtime provider and safe attach/message/terminate capability policy | #707 | codex | packages/mosaic, packages/agent | feat/tess-fleet-provider | TESS-M1-002 | 30K | TESS-FLT-001; exact target/identity tests |
+| TESS-M1-OBS-001 | not-started | Implement correlation propagation, structured runtime/provider/tool audit, health/readiness and safe effective-policy status | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/agent, packages/log | feat/tess-observability | TESS-M1-002 | 24K | TESS-OBS-001; no credential material |
+| TESS-M1-V | not-started | Independent architecture/security review and complete contract/abuse-suite verification | #707 | sonnet | apps/gateway, packages/agent, packages/log, plugins/discord | review/tess-m1 | TESS-M1-SEC-001,TESS-M1-SEC-002,TESS-M1-SEC-003,TESS-M1-SEC-004,TESS-M1-SEC-005,TESS-M1-SEC-006,TESS-M1-003,TESS-M1-OBS-001 | 20K | Gate M2 |
+| TESS-M2-001 | not-started | Add Tess roster/profile/service pinned to GPT-5.6 Sol high with fail-fast config and observable effective policy | #708 | codex | packages/mosaic/framework | feat/tess-pi-service | TESS-M1-V | 22K | TESS-PI-001; explicit AC-TESS-03 test |
+| TESS-M2-002 | not-started | Implement durable session identity, inbox/outbox, approval, checkpoint, handoff, compaction and restart recovery | #708 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/agent, packages/db | feat/tess-durable-state | TESS-M2-001 | 38K | TESS-STA-001, TESS-SEC-007..008; recovery TDD |
+| TESS-M2-V | not-started | Clean-host Pi launch plus model/policy status and restart/compaction/duplicate-side-effect verification | #708 | sonnet | apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration, packages/mosaic/src | review/tess-m2 | TESS-M2-002 | 18K | Gate M3; AC-TESS-03/06 |
+| TESS-M3-001 | not-started | Bind dedicated Tess Discord channel with streaming, threads, attachments, pairing/RBAC and approvals | #709 | codex | plugins/discord, apps/gateway | feat/tess-discord | TESS-M2-V,TESS-M1-SEC-004 | 35K | TESS-DSC-001 |
+| TESS-M3-002 | not-started | Implement `mosaic tess` chat/status/sessions/tree/attach/send/stop/health/recover CLI | #709 | codex | packages/mosaic | feat/tess-cli | TESS-M2-V | 30K | TESS-CLI-001 |
+| TESS-M3-V | not-started | Discord+CLI same-session E2E, denial/approval tests, and operator-flow review | #709 | sonnet | apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration, plugins/discord, packages/mosaic/src | review/tess-m3 | TESS-M3-001,TESS-M3-002 | 20K | Gate M4 |
+| TESS-M4-001 | not-started | Implement Mos coordination handoff/observe/result contract with authority-boundary tests | #710 | codex | packages/coord, apps/gateway | feat/tess-mos-coordination | TESS-M3-V | 25K | TESS-MOS-001 |
+| TESS-M4-002 | not-started | Implement transitional Hermes runtime/capability adapter | #710 | codex | packages/agent, apps/gateway | feat/tess-hermes-adapter | TESS-M3-V | 40K | TESS-HRM-001; no legacy schema in core contracts |
+| TESS-M4-003 | not-started | Implement memory/retrieval, state/inbox, runtime bootstrap, fleet diagnostics and GitOps plugin foundations | #710 | codex | packages/memory, packages/agent, packages/mosaic | feat/tess-operator-plugins | TESS-M3-V | 40K | TESS-MEM-001, TESS-PLG-001 |
+| TESS-M4-V | not-started | Cross-provider capability, privacy, authority and failure-path qualification | #710 | sonnet | apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration, packages/agent | review/tess-m4 | TESS-M4-001,TESS-M4-002,TESS-M4-003 | 22K | Gate M5 |
+| TESS-M5-001 | not-started | Implement Matrix/native runtime provider behind common contracts and parity suite | #711 | codex | packages/mosaic, packages/agent | feat/tess-matrix-provider | TESS-M4-V | 30K | TESS-TRN-001 |
+| TESS-M5-002 | not-started | Complete migration inventory, cutover, rollback, retention and deprecation evidence | #711 | sonnet | docs/tess | feat/tess-migration-docs | TESS-M4-V | 18K | TESS-MIG-001 |
+| TESS-M5-003 | not-started | Complete OpenAPI, user/admin/developer/plugin/operations docs and checklist | #711 | codex | docs | feat/tess-docs | TESS-M5-001,TESS-M5-002 | 22K | Documentation hard gate |
+| TESS-M5-V | not-started | Full baseline, contract, integration, Discord/CLI E2E, security review, recovery drill and rollback qualification | #711 | sonnet | apps/gateway, packages/agent, plugins/discord, packages/mosaic | review/tess-final | TESS-M5-003 | 35K | Maps AC-TESS-01..11 to evidence |
--- a/docs/tess/THREAT-MODEL.md
+++ b/docs/tess/THREAT-MODEL.md
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# Tess Threat Model
+
+## Assets and Trust Boundaries
+
+Assets: operator identity, tenant/project data, agent sessions, fleet control, approvals, credentials, memories, tool outputs, audit evidence, and provider transports.
+
+Trust boundaries: Discord→plugin, CLI→gateway, plugin→gateway service identity, gateway→Pi/provider, Tess→Mos/fleet, Tess→Hermes, MCP→gateway, persistence, and tmux/Matrix transports.
+
+## Threat Matrix
+
+| ID | Severity | Threat | Required control | Required verification |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| TM-01 | critical | Client invokes admin/system command without role | Server-side scope/role enforcement in executor; durable approval for privileged/destructive commands | Authenticated non-admin and forged-scope tests deny and audit |
+| TM-02 | critical | Cross-user/tenant list, attach, send, or terminate by guessed session ID | Owner/tenant binding on every session operation; admin override is explicit and audited | Cross-tenant matrix for REST, WS, CLI, Discord and provider methods |
+| TM-03 | high | MCP caller supplies another `userId` | Remove actor IDs from schemas; derive actor/tenant from authenticated context; per-tool scopes | Forged actor/tool calls deny; no victim data returned |
+| TM-04 | high | Discord ingress impersonates user/channel or bypasses gateway auth | Service-to-service identity, guild/channel/user allowlists, signed/correlated envelope, replay protection | Invalid service identity, unlisted IDs, replayed message IDs all deny |
+| TM-05 | high | Secrets/PII leak in chat, auth links, tool args, logs, memory, or DB | Redact before persistence/egress; DM/out-of-band auth flow; short-lived hashed token state; output classification | Seeded secret/PII canary absent from durable stores/logs/public channel |
+| TM-06 | high | Prompt/tool injection escalates from content to privileged action | Treat messages/files/tool output as untrusted data; structured proposals only; allowlisted tools; approval binds exact action digest | Injection corpus cannot invoke unapproved tools or alter authority |
+| TM-07 | high | Approval forged, replayed, or applied to modified action | One-time approval with actor, tenant, action digest, expiry, correlation and consumption record | Forged/replayed/expired/mutated approvals deny and audit |
+| TM-08 | medium | Restart causes message loss or duplicate side effects | Durable inbox/outbox/checkpoint; idempotency keys; transactional state transitions; bounded replay | Kill/restart at each state transition; exactly-once effect or safe dedupe |
+| TM-09 | medium | Session GC/retention crosses tenant/session scope | Session/user-scoped GC or separately authorized global retention job | GC one session; unrelated logs/memory remain unchanged |
+| TM-10 | high | tmux/Matrix transport target or identity spoofing | Exact target/socket binding, peer identity verification, Matrix whoami, authenticated transport metadata | Wrong socket/peer/room/identity refuses delivery/attach |
+| TM-11 | medium | Hermes adapter exposes unsupported or broader legacy powers | Capability negotiation, default deny, normalized scopes, adapter sandbox/timeouts | Unsupported and over-scoped operations fail closed |
+| TM-12 | medium | Tess competes with Mos or bypasses orchestration gates | Authority policy and correlated Mos handoff; no Tess worker-claim capability by default | Coding/decomposition intent produces handoff, not direct claim |
+
+## Security Invariants
+
+1. Authentication is not authorization; every command/tool/provider operation is authorized server-side.
+2. Actor, tenant, roles, and channel bindings come only from authenticated gateway context.
+3. No client-provided session ID grants ownership or attachment.
+4. No privileged action executes without a matching, unexpired, one-time approval when policy requires it.
+5. Redaction occurs before persistence and before channel egress.
+6. Every externally caused operation is replay-safe and correlated.
+7. Provider capability absence is a denial, not an invitation to shell around it.
+
+## Existing Findings That Block Tess
+
+- Command executor lacks server-side enforcement for declared scopes.
+- Session list/reuse/destroy surfaces are not owner-filtered consistently.
+- MCP schemas accept caller-supplied user identity.
+- Discord plugin lacks a complete authenticated service ingress and user/channel allowlists.
+- Chat/tool persistence lacks mandatory redaction.
+- Sessions/pending Discord output are in-memory and not restart-safe.
+- Session GC currently performs globally scoped promotion.
+
+These are tracked as M1 security prerequisites and must pass independent security review before Tess ingress is enabled.
--- a/docs/tess/VERIFICATION-MATRIX.md
+++ b/docs/tess/VERIFICATION-MATRIX.md
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# Tess Verification Matrix
+
+| Acceptance criterion | Requirements | Planned evidence | Gate |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| AC-TESS-01 | TESS-PI-001, TESS-DSC-001, TESS-CLI-001 | Discord/CLI same-session integration and streaming E2E | M3-V |
+| AC-TESS-02 | TESS-ARP-001, TESS-CLI-001, TESS-FLT-001 | CLI contract tests for status/sessions/tree/attach/send/stop, typed denial/error snapshots | M3-V |
+| AC-TESS-03 | TESS-PI-001, TESS-OBS-001 | Clean service launch; status asserts GPT-5.6 Sol, high reasoning and effective tool policy with secret canaries absent | M2-V, M3-V |
+| AC-TESS-04 | TESS-MOS-001, TESS-FLT-001 | Authority E2E: coding request creates Mos handoff; safe status runs in Tess; no competing worker claim | M4-V |
+| AC-TESS-05 | TESS-HRM-001 | Hermes capability contract suite: sessions/stream/send/tree plus Kanban/skills/memory/tools/cron supported-or-denied matrix | M4-V |
+| AC-TESS-06 | TESS-STA-001, TESS-SEC-008 | Kill/restart/compaction fault injection across inbox/outbox/checkpoint transitions; duplicate side-effect detector | M2-V, M5-V |
+| AC-TESS-07 | TESS-SEC-001..009 | Threat-model abuse suite: authz, tenant isolation, forged identity/approval, injection, redaction, transport identity, GC scope | M1-V, M3-V, M5-V |
+| AC-TESS-08 | TESS-TRN-001 | Common provider contract suite against tmux/fleet and Matrix/native; identity and replay tests | M5-V |
+| AC-TESS-09 | all | `pnpm typecheck`, lint, format, unit/integration/contract/E2E; independent code and security reviews; CI URLs | Every milestone |
+| AC-TESS-10 | TESS-MIG-001 | Completed capability inventory with native/adapted/deferred/rejected state, owner, cutover/rollback evidence | M5-V |
+| AC-TESS-11 | TESS-PLG-001, TESS-OBS-001 | OpenAPI and user/admin/developer/plugin/ops docs, sitemap links, documentation checklist | M5-V |
+
+## Security Abuse Suite Minimum
+
+- Role/scope matrix for every command and provider capability.
+- Cross-tenant and cross-user session ID matrix across REST, WS, Discord, CLI, MCP, and providers.
+- Discord service identity, guild/channel/user allowlist, replay, attachment, and mention/DM policy cases.
+- Prompt/tool injection corpus and structured-proposal enforcement.
+- Approval action-digest mutation, replay, expiry, tenant, and actor mismatch cases.
+- Secret/PII canaries through message, attachment, tool args/output, logs, memory, audit, and error paths.
+- Restart fault injection before/after enqueue, provider send, side effect, response persistence, and acknowledgement.
+- Wrong tmux socket/target and Matrix identity/room/replay cases.
+
+## Evidence Rules
+
+Evidence must include command/test name, terminal result, CI run URL, PR/merge reference, environment, and artifact/log location. A worker self-report is not evidence until independently verified.