docs: clarify decision authority and quote full Q207 ruling

BUILD-LOG.md

@@ -5189,3 +5189,5 @@ Before: managed project/thread verbs had no Console conversation area. After: fi
 2026-10-21T20:48:49Z | Huey | Q198 design r5, mos-1206, DECISIONS Q205/Q206, Vikunja 452 | Before: r4 1e8bccff1 left Q4 pending and long outages could exhaust request retry budgets. After: protected mode separate from unchanged D1 human kill authority; mechanical detection, safe-point pause/proof, JEV-first endpoint-before-headless probes at 60-second increments to 600 seconds without attempt limit, upstream reset waits, shared D11 probe accounting, one test session then batches, proposed three-failed-exit escalation, frozen outage clocks/counters without DLQ, advisory online-service routing, Q4 superseded and Q22 pending. Thresholds/deadlines/batches/escalation explicitly labelled Huey readings. Acceptance proposals updated, no implementation. Verification: complete Q205/Q206 read, quotes match ledger, D1/inventory/Q1–Q3 unchanged, 30 pinned citation references resolve, 11-line summary, manual consistency/diff review, whitespace and installed queue guard checked. No builds, suites, real probes, live changes or paid calls.
 
 2026-10-21T21:04:37Z | Huey | Q198 design r6, mos-1208/mos-1210, DECISIONS Q207, scrooge-0003, Vikunja 452 | Before: r5 fd44f7c60 gated probes on JEV and lacked request-local resume failure separation. After: parallel independent probes; central JEV/smaller-model/rules endpoint chain, per-model timeout/calibration, 4 KiB metadata limit and isolated fallback credentials; subscription quota vs metered USD accounting and separately enabled paid-probe budget (proposed $0 defaults). S-F1–S-F7: bounded outage classification, request-local D6/two-resume DLQ rule and batch definition; escalation latch with authorized revision-bound system.recovery.release separate from kill clear; cooperative F5 pause/F6 proof only; proposed configurable 24-hour cumulative pause expiry; full Q205 kill sentence with labelled protected-mode interpretation; r3–r6 history. S5/S6 acceptance proposals updated. Verification: Q205/Q207 quotes match ledger, D1/inventory/Q1–Q3 unchanged, 30 pinned references resolve, summary within 15 lines, manual consistency/delta review, whitespace and installed queue guard checked. No builds, suites, real probes, live changes, credential reads or paid calls.
+
+2026-10-21T21:39:25Z | Huey | Q198 r6.1 touch-up, mos-1222, scrooge-0004 N1–N3, Vikunja 452 | Before: approved r6 2ee68cd69 had unprovable session-call denial wording, implicit queue/late-call behavior and a partial Q207 paragraph. After: rule/S6 tests require session decision calls/output have no routing authority; non-waiting dispatchers use internal rules immediately; timed-out JEV does not occupy fallback decision slot but retains spend reservation; full Q207 paragraph copied exactly from DECISIONS; matching Q22 reading corrected. ENV_ALLOW and all runtime code unchanged. Verification: exact full-quote equality, obsolete wording absent, D1 unchanged, summary within 15 lines, manual N1–N3 delta review, whitespace and installed queue guard checked. No builds, suites, probes, live changes or paid calls. Review/handoff via T3 as Mos authorized.

docs/SESSIONS.md

@@ -1425,3 +1425,4 @@ are never rewritten or removed; corrections are new entries.
 2026-10-21T20:19:53Z | Huey (gpt-6.1-sol) | mos-1203, Q198 design r4, DECISIONS Q204 | Q1–Q3 approved quotes recorded, cap settings interpretation labelled, Q4 pending and P1 unchanged; doc-only checks, no builds/live changes/paid calls
 2026-10-21T20:48:49Z | Huey (gpt-6.1-sol) | mos-1206, Q198 r5 protected mode/outage recovery, Vikunja 452 | Q205/Q206 recorded with labelled readings and probe/resume acceptance proposals; Q4 superseded, Q22 pending; doc checks only, no builds/suites/real probes/live changes/paid calls; Scrooge re-review via Mos
 2026-10-21T21:04:37Z | Huey (gpt-6.1-sol) | mos-1208/mos-1210, Q198 r6, Q207 and scrooge-0003 S-F1–S-F7 | central fallback/parallel probes, request failure and recovery release fixes, quota/probe budgets and credential isolation documented; doc checks only, no builds/suites/probes/live changes/paid calls; Mos routes r6 to Scrooge
+2026-10-21T21:39:25Z | Huey (gpt-6.1-sol) | mos-1222, Q198 r6.1, scrooge-0004 N1–N3 | small doc touch-up verified, no runtime changes/builds/tests/probes/paid calls; Scrooge confirms three items before Sage handoff

docs/plans/2026-10-21_q198-system-manager.md

@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ No live trial, key installation or runtime change is authorized by this design.
 MVP work (Vikunja 414 and 416) keeps first claim on Sage’s gate.
 
 Brief: mos-1183, DECISIONS Q198/Q199, Vikunja **452**. Owner: Huey. Design only.
-Revision **r6**, mos-1208/mos-1210, applies DECISIONS Q207 and scrooge-0003 to
-r5 `fd44f7c60`. Q22 is resolved. New implementation choices are Huey’s readings.
+Revision **r6.1**, mos-1222, applies scrooge-0004 N1–N3 to approved r6 `2ee68cd69`.
+Q22 is resolved. New implementation choices are Huey’s readings.
 All defaults below are proposals, not measured safe operating limits or new authority.
 
 ## 1. Existing pieces and reuse
@@ -397,7 +397,8 @@ reports manager death through an independent health path, not the dead manager i
 allowedActions, state}, signal) → {actionId, confidence?, usage:{cost,currency},
 providerRequestId}`. `allowedActions` contains opaque IDs for already-eligible routes
 or “use rules”. Adapters normalize provider types. **Every routing decision goes through
-this one module. No agent session calls a decision endpoint or picks its own route.**
+this one module. A session’s own decision call carries no routing authority, and no
+session output enters route selection.**
 The module also chooses its own decision endpoint. Provider-neutral requests and results
 keep endpoint wire formats out of sessions and the scheduler. With model assistance
 disabled, the module uses built-in rules without network or key.
@@ -430,6 +431,10 @@ timeout and calibration. No real call or benchmark is authorized. Stand-ins meas
 local behavior, not provider performance. Use at most one in-flight module decision
 per instance, bounded by the caller deadline and these endpoint budgets. A fallback
 never inherits JEV’s confidence threshold without its own calibration.
+A dispatcher that cannot wait takes the module’s rules adapter immediately instead of
+queueing behind a model call. A JEV call still running after its 500 ms timeout does
+not count as the instance’s one in-flight decision while the fallback runs. Its spend
+reservation is kept until settled, and its late answer cannot enter route selection.
 
 Timeout/network failure advances to the next eligible endpoint within the deadline.
 Invalid/stale answers, missing/non-finite/out-of-range or uncalibrated/low confidence
@@ -541,7 +546,7 @@ authorized here. Vikunja 450/451 and MVP 414/416 retain their existing order/aut
 | S3 | Request journal/admission, after S1 and final kill/lifecycle contracts | Migration/rollback compatibility, duplicate-key conflict, crash before/after spawn, two dispatchers, generation fencing, queue limits/expiry, provider cooldown, fairness under sustained traffic, kill-at-launch race, instance isolation. | After MVP preferred. Schema and dispatch integration need a full owned gate. |
 | S4 | Cooperative interrupts and capacity ownership, after S3 and adopted gate lanes | Agent abort proof vs uncertain, test-step cancellation/quarantine, owned build cleanup, PID reuse, remote tool unknown outcome, emergency request during full backlog. No gate grant synthesized. | After MVP. |
 | S5 | Retry/DLQ/replay and permitted reroutes, plus protected-mode journal, mechanical outage detection and automatic resume policy (D13/D15), after S3/S4 | Fake-clock failure spikes/scopes, restart during pause, frozen counters/deadlines, outage never DLQ, isolated request failures still bounded, Retry-After, unknown proxy budget, partial-stream/write no replay, authorized replay lineage, incompatible-route refusal, canary then batches, request-local failures consume D6 budget, one bad request cannot re-enter protected mode, correlated distinct-request re-entry, two separate failed resumes go to D7, batch-failure definition, three-failed-exit latch, authorized revision-bound release via broker/Console without kill clear, later probes do not auto-release, maximum pause age expires without DLQ/capacity release, human kill unchanged. No real probes. | After MVP. |
-| S6 | Decision hook, per-exclusive-key USD ledger and setup, after S5 | Stand-in typed responses, late/invalid/missing/low-confidence answers, unapproved action, snapshot race and redaction canaries. Measure timeout rates and choose the timeout from stand-in results. Verify `sessionEnv` drops `MOSAIC_DECISION_OPENROUTER_KEY`. Test exclusive key binding, reject shared keys/missing provider limit, independent-key budget totals, concurrent reservations, missing/duplicate cost, crash and day rollover. D14 probe adapters: endpoint-before-headless, 60-step-to-600 schedule with no attempt limit, all service schedules parallel without a JEV gate, one success online, reset wait, disabled endpoints, subscription/quota-only success without USD, separate paid-probe caps and deferral, restart and hung-probe cleanup. Prove only the decision module selects endpoints/routes: denied session-local decision calls and route overrides, JEV → allowed smaller model → internal rules, per-model confidence/timeout calibration, 4 KiB metadata-only input at every endpoint and isolated fallback-credential canaries. Network disabled by default. | Fixture implementation may proceed later. No paid trial before explicit approval. |
+| S6 | Decision hook, per-exclusive-key USD ledger and setup, after S5 | Stand-in typed responses, late/invalid/missing/low-confidence answers, unapproved action, snapshot race and redaction canaries. Measure timeout rates and choose the timeout from stand-in results. Verify `sessionEnv` drops `MOSAIC_DECISION_OPENROUTER_KEY`. Test exclusive key binding, reject shared keys/missing provider limit, independent-key budget totals, concurrent reservations, missing/duplicate cost, crash and day rollover. D14 probe adapters: endpoint-before-headless, 60-step-to-600 schedule with no attempt limit, all service schedules parallel without a JEV gate, one success online, reset wait, disabled endpoints, subscription/quota-only success without USD, separate paid-probe caps and deferral, restart and hung-probe cleanup. Prove only the decision module selects endpoints/routes: a session’s own decision call carries no routing authority and no session output enters route selection (test both directly), immediate rules for dispatchers that cannot wait, timed-out JEV not occupying the fallback slot while its spend reservation remains, JEV → allowed smaller model → internal rules, per-model confidence/timeout calibration, 4 KiB metadata-only input at every endpoint and isolated fallback-credential canaries. Network disabled by default. | Fixture implementation may proceed later. No paid trial before explicit approval. |
 
 Each slice gets independent review and tests that kill a mutation of its central
 invariant. Sage chooses package/full-suite gates appropriate to the final diff.
@@ -594,13 +599,13 @@ bounded synthetic pressure. No load experiment on the shared development host.
   Jason’s verbatim requirements. D1’s human kill-switch boundary remains unchanged.
 - **Q22 Resolved by DECISIONS Q207.** Jason, verbatim:
 
-  > We would be better suited to have the requirement for decisions to always flow through the same place on the system and have that module decide the endpoint to use for decisions. If JEV is unavailable it can default to a Haiku, Luna, or some other smaller model to make the decisions from within a minimal harness. Context for the decision-maker would be kept minimal to avoid bloat and unnecessary slowdowns. I'd rather have the fallback occur at the decision module rather than at each agent session.
+  > Q22: That makes sense, somewhat. If the agents are allowed to directly bypass the decision-making module of Mosaic Stack, they will default to bypassing it all the time. Once service is returned, they will not go back to using the system properly until their context is cleared. We would be better suited to have the requirement for decisions to always flow through the same place on the system and have that module decide the endpoint to use for decisions. If JEV is unavailable it can default to a Haiku, Luna, or some other smaller model to make the decisions from within a minimal harness. Context for the decision-maker would be kept minimal to avoid bloat and unnecessary slowdowns. I'd rather have the fallback occur at the decision module rather than at each agent session.
 
   Mos’s recorded reading: service probes proceed independently in parallel and the
   decision module tries JEV, then a configured smaller model, then its built-in rules.
   **Rules last is Mos’s reading**, not Jason’s verbatim endpoint order. Huey’s readings:
   the 10-second fallback timeout candidate, per-model calibration, billing split and
-  isolated fallback credentials in D10–D12. No session-local endpoint or route choice.
+  isolated fallback credentials in D10–D12. Session calls/output carry no routing authority.
 
 ## Verification and handoff