fix(mosaic): close two CWE-345 identity bypasses in claudex preflight (re-review #3, #790)

Addresses PR #793 re-review #3 (F1/F3 already confirmed closed). Both fixes TDD
red-first on this branch (7 tests red against the prior head, then green).

F2a (BLOCKER) — verifyListenerIdentity no longer accepts a listener by BASENAME.
The old code ran `if (basename(exePath) === CLAUDEX_PROXY_BINARY) return 'ok'`
unconditionally, so a same-uid process running `/tmp/claude-code-proxy` (right
name, wrong path) was trusted. On a shared-uid host that is the squatter vector,
not hypothetical — uid is NOT a trust boundary there, the executable path is.
Now: when the expected proxy path resolves we require an EXACT canonical-path
match (both sides canonicalized via realpath for symlinks); there is NO basename
fallback. If the expected path can't be resolved, or either path can't be
canonicalized, we fail closed (`unknown`). New tests: wrong-path/right-basename →
wrong-exe; unresolved expected → unknown; uncanonicalizable → unknown; and a
symlink-resolution case that canonically matches → ok.

F2b (BLOCKER) — runProxyPreflight now verifies listener identity too. Previously
`ok` was `bin.present && auth==='valid' && live` where `live` is /healthz-2xx
only, so a squatter answering 2xx yielded `ok:true` and any consumer of the
report (the phase-2 launch path) would route Claude traffic to it. Added
`verifyListener` to PreflightDeps + a `listenerVerdict` field; `ok` now requires
a trusted verdict; a live-but-unverified responder emits a non-sensitive problem
(port + verdict only — no listener command line or token). Identity is not
checked when the port is dead (no listener to trust). New tests: each non-ok
verdict fails preflight and leaks no token material; dead proxy skips verify.

Gates green: typecheck, lint, format:check; full mosaic suite 1115 passing;
claudex-proxy.ts coverage 90.57% stmts/lines, 89.06% branch (>= 85%).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

packages/mosaic/src/commands/claudex-proxy.spec.ts

@@ -376,13 +376,17 @@ describe('installSystemdUnit', () => {
 });
 
 describe('runProxyPreflight', () => {
-  it('is ok when binary present, auth valid, and proxy live', async () => {
+  const trustedListener = () => 'ok' as const;
+
+  it('is ok when binary present, auth valid, proxy live, and listener identity-verified', async () => {
     const report = await runProxyPreflight({
       checkBinary: () => ({ present: true, path: '/bin/claude-code-proxy' }),
       checkAuth: () => ({ state: 'valid' }),
       probe: async () => true,
+      verifyListener: trustedListener,
     });
     expect(report.ok).toBe(true);
+    expect(report.listenerVerdict).toBe('ok');
     expect(report.problems).toEqual([]);
   });
 
@@ -391,6 +395,7 @@ describe('runProxyPreflight', () => {
       checkBinary: () => ({ present: false, path: null }),
       checkAuth: () => ({ state: 'valid' }),
       probe: async () => true,
+      verifyListener: trustedListener,
     });
     expect(report.ok).toBe(false);
     expect(report.problems.some((p) => /binary/i.test(p))).toBe(true);
@@ -401,6 +406,7 @@ describe('runProxyPreflight', () => {
       checkBinary: () => ({ present: true, path: '/bin/claude-code-proxy' }),
       checkAuth: () => ({ state: 'expired' }),
       probe: async () => true,
+      verifyListener: trustedListener,
     });
     expect(report.ok).toBe(false);
     expect(report.needsReauth).toBe(true);
@@ -412,6 +418,7 @@ describe('runProxyPreflight', () => {
       checkBinary: () => ({ present: true, path: '/bin/claude-code-proxy' }),
       checkAuth: () => ({ state: 'valid' }),
       probe: async () => false,
+      verifyListener: trustedListener,
     });
     expect(report.ok).toBe(false);
     expect(report.live).toBe(false);
@@ -422,17 +429,51 @@ describe('runProxyPreflight', () => {
       checkBinary: () => ({ present: true, path: '/bin/claude-code-proxy' }),
       checkAuth: () => ({ state: 'unknown' }),
       probe: async () => true,
+      verifyListener: trustedListener,
     });
     expect(report.ok).toBe(false);
     expect(report.needsReauth).toBe(false);
     expect(report.problems.some((p) => /could not determine/i.test(p))).toBe(true);
   });
 
+  it('does NOT pass preflight when the live responder fails identity verification (F2b)', async () => {
+    // A squatter answering /healthz-2xx must not yield ok:true just because the
+    // binary is installed and OAuth is valid — the identity gate holds here too.
+    for (const verdict of ['foreign-user', 'wrong-exe', 'unknown'] as const) {
+      const report = await runProxyPreflight({
+        checkBinary: () => ({ present: true, path: '/bin/claude-code-proxy' }),
+        checkAuth: () => ({ state: 'valid' }),
+        probe: async () => true,
+        verifyListener: () => verdict,
+      });
+      expect(report.ok).toBe(false);
+      expect(report.live).toBe(true);
+      expect(report.listenerVerdict).toBe(verdict);
+      expect(report.problems.some((p) => /identity could not be verified/i.test(p))).toBe(true);
+      // The identity problem is non-sensitive: port + verdict only, no token.
+      expect(JSON.stringify(report)).not.toMatch(/token|sk-|auth\.json/i);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('does not verify listener identity when the proxy is dead (no listener to trust)', async () => {
+    const verifyListener = vi.fn(() => 'ok' as const);
+    const report = await runProxyPreflight({
+      checkBinary: () => ({ present: true, path: '/bin/claude-code-proxy' }),
+      checkAuth: () => ({ state: 'valid' }),
+      probe: async () => false,
+      verifyListener,
+    });
+    expect(verifyListener).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(report.listenerVerdict).toBe('unknown');
+    expect(report.ok).toBe(false);
+  });
+
   it('does not leak token material for any auth state', async () => {
     const report = await runProxyPreflight({
       checkBinary: () => ({ present: true, path: '/bin/claude-code-proxy' }),
       checkAuth: () => ({ state: 'expired' }),
       probe: async () => false,
+      verifyListener: trustedListener,
     });
     expect(JSON.stringify(report)).not.toMatch(/token|sk-|auth\.json/i);
   });
@@ -537,23 +578,68 @@ describe('verifyListenerIdentity (finding #2 — OS-level listener identity, CWE
     uid: 1000,
     exePath: '/home/me/.local/bin/claude-code-proxy',
   };
+  // Identity canonicalize for tests: fake paths don't exist on disk, so we map
+  // each path to itself and exercise symlink resolution explicitly where needed.
+  const idc = (p: string) => p;
 
   it('accepts a listener owned by the current uid whose exe is the expected proxy path', () => {
     const verdict = verifyListenerIdentity({
       identify: () => me,
       currentUid: () => 1000,
       expectedExe: () => '/home/me/.local/bin/claude-code-proxy',
+      canonicalize: idc,
     });
     expect(verdict).toBe('ok');
   });
 
-  it('accepts by basename when the expected path is unknown but the exe is claude-code-proxy', () => {
+  it('resolves symlinks on BOTH sides before comparing (canonical match → ok)', () => {
+    // The listener exe and our resolved binary reach the same real file via
+    // different symlink paths — a canonical comparison must accept it.
+    const canon: Record<string, string> = {
+      '/var/run/proxy.link': '/opt/proxy/bin/claude-code-proxy',
+      '/home/me/.local/bin/claude-code-proxy': '/opt/proxy/bin/claude-code-proxy',
+    };
+    const verdict = verifyListenerIdentity({
+      identify: () => ({ ...me, exePath: '/var/run/proxy.link' }),
+      currentUid: () => 1000,
+      expectedExe: () => '/home/me/.local/bin/claude-code-proxy',
+      canonicalize: (p) => canon[p] ?? null,
+    });
+    expect(verdict).toBe('ok');
+  });
+
+  it('does NOT trust a same-uid process at the WRONG path with the right basename (F2a)', () => {
+    // The squatter vector on a shared-uid host: right basename, wrong path. The
+    // basename must NEVER be a trust signal when an expected exact path resolved.
+    const verdict = verifyListenerIdentity({
+      identify: () => ({ ...me, exePath: '/tmp/claude-code-proxy' }),
+      currentUid: () => 1000,
+      expectedExe: () => '/home/me/.local/bin/claude-code-proxy',
+      canonicalize: idc,
+    });
+    expect(verdict).toBe('wrong-exe');
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed (unknown) when our own proxy binary path cannot be resolved (F2a)', () => {
+    // No expected path → we cannot assert identity → refuse to trust (no basename
+    // acceptance). Previously this returned `ok` by basename; that was a bypass.
     const verdict = verifyListenerIdentity({
       identify: () => me,
       currentUid: () => 1000,
       expectedExe: () => null,
+      canonicalize: idc,
     });
-    expect(verdict).toBe('ok');
+    expect(verdict).toBe('unknown');
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed (unknown) when a path cannot be canonicalized (F2a)', () => {
+    const verdict = verifyListenerIdentity({
+      identify: () => me,
+      currentUid: () => 1000,
+      expectedExe: () => '/home/me/.local/bin/claude-code-proxy',
+      canonicalize: () => null, // e.g. binary deleted out from under the listener
+    });
+    expect(verdict).toBe('unknown');
   });
 
   it('rejects a listener owned by a DIFFERENT uid (foreign-user) — fail closed', () => {
@@ -561,6 +647,7 @@ describe('verifyListenerIdentity (finding #2 — OS-level listener identity, CWE
       identify: () => ({ ...me, uid: 0 }),
       currentUid: () => 1000,
       expectedExe: () => '/home/me/.local/bin/claude-code-proxy',
+      canonicalize: idc,
     });
     expect(verdict).toBe('foreign-user');
   });
@@ -570,6 +657,7 @@ describe('verifyListenerIdentity (finding #2 — OS-level listener identity, CWE
       identify: () => ({ ...me, exePath: '/usr/bin/nc' }),
       currentUid: () => 1000,
       expectedExe: () => '/home/me/.local/bin/claude-code-proxy',
+      canonicalize: idc,
     });
     expect(verdict).toBe('wrong-exe');
   });
@@ -579,6 +667,7 @@ describe('verifyListenerIdentity (finding #2 — OS-level listener identity, CWE
       identify: () => null,
       currentUid: () => 1000,
       expectedExe: () => '/home/me/.local/bin/claude-code-proxy',
+      canonicalize: idc,
     });
     expect(verdict).toBe('unknown');
   });
@@ -588,6 +677,7 @@ describe('verifyListenerIdentity (finding #2 — OS-level listener identity, CWE
       identify: () => me,
       currentUid: () => -1,
       expectedExe: () => '/home/me/.local/bin/claude-code-proxy',
+      canonicalize: idc,
     });
     expect(verdict).toBe('unknown');
   });
@@ -597,6 +687,7 @@ describe('verifyListenerIdentity (finding #2 — OS-level listener identity, CWE
       identify: () => ({ ...me, exePath: null }),
       currentUid: () => 1000,
       expectedExe: () => '/home/me/.local/bin/claude-code-proxy',
+      canonicalize: idc,
     });
     expect(verdict).toBe('unknown');
   });

packages/mosaic/src/commands/claudex-proxy.ts

@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@
  */
 
 import { execFileSync, spawn, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
-import { mkdirSync, readFileSync, readlinkSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { mkdirSync, readFileSync, readlinkSync, realpathSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
 import { homedir } from 'node:os';
-import { basename, dirname, join } from 'node:path';
+import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
 
 // ─── Endpoint / command constants (spec table) ──────────────────────────────
 
@@ -256,6 +256,17 @@ export interface VerifyListenerDeps {
   currentUid?: () => number;
   /** The expected proxy executable path (null when it can't be resolved). */
   expectedExe?: () => string | null;
+  /** Canonicalize a path (resolve symlinks); null when it can't be resolved. */
+  canonicalize?: (p: string) => string | null;
+}
+
+/** Resolve a path through symlinks to its canonical form; null on any failure. */
+function defaultCanonicalize(p: string): string | null {
+  try {
+    return realpathSync(p);
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
 }
 
 /**
@@ -292,16 +303,25 @@ function defaultIdentifyListener(port: number = CLAUDEX_PROXY_PORT): ListenerIde
  * Verify that the process owning :18765 is genuinely OUR proxy before trusting
  * it. The proxy binds loopback with NO client authentication, so on a shared
  * host any local process could squat the port and a liveness 2xx alone does not
- * prove identity (CWE-345). We check the OS-level identity of the listener — it
- * must be owned by the current uid and be the expected proxy executable — and
- * FAIL CLOSED (`unknown`) whenever identity cannot be established. This needs no
- * upstream shared-secret/unix-socket support from `claude-code-proxy`.
+ * prove identity (CWE-345). We FAIL CLOSED (`unknown`) whenever identity cannot
+ * be established. This needs no upstream shared-secret/unix-socket support from
+ * `claude-code-proxy`.
+ *
+ * The executable path is the trust boundary that matters: on a shared-uid host
+ * (every agent session runs as the same operator) same-uid is NOT sufficient, so
+ * we require an EXACT canonical-path match against our resolved proxy binary and
+ * canonicalize both sides for symlinks. There is deliberately NO basename
+ * fallback — a same-uid process running `/tmp/claude-code-proxy` (right name,
+ * wrong path) must never be trusted. If our own binary path can't be resolved,
+ * or either path can't be canonicalized, we fail closed rather than downgrade to
+ * a weaker check.
  */
 export function verifyListenerIdentity(deps: VerifyListenerDeps = {}): ListenerVerdict {
   const identify = deps.identify ?? (() => defaultIdentifyListener());
   const currentUid =
     deps.currentUid ?? (() => (typeof process.getuid === 'function' ? process.getuid() : -1));
   const expectedExe = deps.expectedExe ?? (() => checkProxyBinary().path);
+  const canonicalize = deps.canonicalize ?? defaultCanonicalize;
 
   const id = identify();
   if (!id) return 'unknown'; // can't see the listener → don't trust it
@@ -311,9 +331,11 @@ export function verifyListenerIdentity(deps: VerifyListenerDeps = {}): ListenerV
   if (!id.exePath) return 'unknown'; // can't confirm the executable → fail closed
 
   const expected = expectedExe();
-  if (expected && id.exePath === expected) return 'ok';
-  if (basename(id.exePath) === CLAUDEX_PROXY_BINARY) return 'ok';
-  return 'wrong-exe';
+  if (!expected) return 'unknown'; // can't resolve our own binary → fail closed
+  const expectedReal = canonicalize(expected);
+  const actualReal = canonicalize(id.exePath);
+  if (!expectedReal || !actualReal) return 'unknown'; // uncanonicalizable → fail closed
+  return actualReal === expectedReal ? 'ok' : 'wrong-exe';
 }
 
 // ─── systemd user unit ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -421,6 +443,8 @@ export interface PreflightReport {
   binaryPath: string | null;
   auth: AuthStatus;
   live: boolean;
+  /** OS-level identity verdict for the :18765 listener (`unknown` when dead). */
+  listenerVerdict: ListenerVerdict;
   needsReauth: boolean;
   ok: boolean;
   problems: string[];
@@ -430,20 +454,32 @@ export interface PreflightDeps {
   checkBinary?: () => { present: boolean; path: string | null };
   checkAuth?: () => AuthStatus;
   probe?: () => Promise<boolean>;
+  verifyListener?: () => ListenerVerdict;
 }
 
 /**
- * Compose the three preflight checks into a single structured report. `ok` is
- * true only when the binary is present, OAuth is valid, and the proxy responds.
+ * Compose the preflight checks into a single structured report. `ok` is true
+ * only when the binary is present, OAuth is valid, the proxy responds, AND the
+ * responding listener's OS-level identity verifies as our proxy.
+ *
+ * The identity gate lives here too, not only in {@link ensureProxyRunning}: any
+ * consumer of this report (notably the phase-2 launch path) would otherwise
+ * treat a `/healthz`-2xx squatter as healthy and route Claude traffic to it
+ * (CWE-345). A liveness 2xx is necessary but not sufficient — a live responder
+ * that fails identity fails the preflight.
  */
 export async function runProxyPreflight(deps: PreflightDeps = {}): Promise<PreflightReport> {
   const checkBinary = deps.checkBinary ?? (() => checkProxyBinary());
   const checkAuth = deps.checkAuth ?? (() => checkAuthStatus());
   const probe = deps.probe ?? (() => probeLiveness());
+  const verifyListener = deps.verifyListener ?? (() => verifyListenerIdentity());
 
   const bin = checkBinary();
   const auth = checkAuth();
   const live = await probe();
+  // Only meaningful when something is actually responding; a dead port has no
+  // listener identity to establish.
+  const listenerVerdict: ListenerVerdict = live ? verifyListener() : 'unknown';
 
   const problems: string[] = [];
   if (!bin.present) {
@@ -461,14 +497,21 @@ export async function runProxyPreflight(deps: PreflightDeps = {}): Promise<Prefl
   }
   if (!live) {
     problems.push(`No proxy responding on ${CLAUDEX_PROXY_URL}.`);
+  } else if (listenerVerdict !== 'ok') {
+    // Non-sensitive: names the port and the verdict only — never any listener
+    // command line, token, or other process detail.
+    problems.push(
+      `A process is listening on ${CLAUDEX_PROXY_URL} but its identity could not be verified as ${CLAUDEX_PROXY_BINARY} (${listenerVerdict}). Refusing to trust it.`,
+    );
   }
 
-  const ok = bin.present && auth.state === 'valid' && live;
+  const ok = bin.present && auth.state === 'valid' && live && listenerVerdict === 'ok';
   return {
     binaryPresent: bin.present,
     binaryPath: bin.path,
     auth,
     live,
+    listenerVerdict,
     needsReauth,
     ok,
     problems,