docs(tess): remediate M5 qualification findings

docs/SITEMAP.md

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# Documentation Sitemap
+
+## Tess interaction agent
+
+### Operator guides
+
+- [User guide](tess/USER-GUIDE.md) — authorized session, attach, send, stop, and handoff workflows.
+- [Admin guide](tess/ADMIN-GUIDE.md) — deployment configuration, policy, and approval controls.
+- [Developer guide](tess/DEVELOPER-GUIDE.md) — provider contracts, scope boundaries, and test workflow.
+- [Plugin guide](tess/PLUGIN-GUIDE.md) — adapter, redaction, and identity-as-data requirements.
+- [Operations guide](tess/OPERATIONS-GUIDE.md) — readiness, recovery, and incident-safe procedures.
+
+### Architecture and security
+
+- [Architecture](tess/ARCHITECTURE.md)
+- [Threat model](tess/THREAT-MODEL.md)
+- [Mos coordination boundary](tess/MOS-COORDINATION.md)
+- [Hermes runtime adapter design](tess/hermes-runtime-adapter-design.md)
+- [Operator plugin sketch](tess/M4-003-OPERATOR-PLUGIN-SKETCH.md)
+
+### API contract
+
+- [Tess OpenAPI contract](openapi-tess.yaml)
+
+### Migration and qualification
+
+- [Migration inventory](tess/M5-MIGRATION-INVENTORY.md)
+- [Cutover procedure](tess/M5-MIGRATION-CUTOVER.md)
+- [Rollback procedure](tess/M5-MIGRATION-ROLLBACK.md)
+- [Retention and deprecation evidence](tess/M5-MIGRATION-RETENTION-DEPRECATION.md)
+- [Verification matrix](tess/VERIFICATION-MATRIX.md)
+- [Documentation checklist](tess/M5-003-DOCUMENTATION-CHECKLIST.md)

docs/scratchpads/tess-m4-001-mos-coordination.md

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Created `docs/tess/MOS-COORDINATION.md`. Mos approved the design and selected th
 ## Progress checkpoint — 2026-07-13
 
 - Implemented `MosCoordinationPort` with handoff/observe/result only, an authority-checking client, and deterministic native adapter in `@mosaicstack/coord`.
-- Implemented the gateway `MosCoordinationService`, deriving requester identity from trusted configuration and actor/tenant/correlation from authenticated context.
+- Implemented the gateway `InteractionCoordinationService`, deriving requester identity from trusted configuration and actor/tenant/correlation from authenticated context.
 - Added contract and gateway boundary tests for configurable identities, native round-trip, unconfigured requester, self-delegation, target drift, and cross-tenant observe/result denial before adapter invocation.
 - Did not modify `apps/gateway/src/commands/command-authorization.service.ts`.
 

docs/tess/M5-MIGRATION-CUTOVER.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ This procedure is evidence-bound. It does not authorize a production cutover unt
 2. Query the normalized runtime capability surface, not a Hermes API directly. Confirm the session capabilities required for the operation are advertised.
 3. Query the transitional matrix through `RuntimeProviderService.transitionalCapabilityMatrix` (`apps/gateway/src/agent/runtime-provider-registry.service.ts`). Kanban, skills, memory, tools, and cron must remain `unsupported`; stop rather than route those operations through Hermes.
 4. Route new memory activity through the Mosaic operator-memory plugin path; there is no landed Hermes memory import.
-5. Use `MosCoordinationService` for orchestration handoff. Tess does not take Mos authority.
+5. Use `InteractionCoordinationService` (`apps/gateway/src/coord/interaction-coordination.service.ts`) for orchestration handoff. The interaction agent does not take configured orchestrator authority.
 6. Record the qualification evidence and only then update an external deployment/channel binding through its separately authorized operational process.
 
 No claim here authorizes bulk transcript copying, data-schema migration, or enabling an unsupported transitional capability.

docs/tess/M5-MIGRATION-INVENTORY.md

@@ -7,5 +7,5 @@ Hermes is a reference adapter, not a Mosaic core dependency. `packages/agent/src
 | sessions, hierarchy, streaming, send/attach/terminate | `HermesRuntimeProvider` plus `hermes-runtime-provider.test.ts`                                                                                                             | adapted                |
 | Kanban, skills, memory, tools, cron                   | normalized matrix in `HermesRuntimeProvider.transitionalCapabilityMatrix`; each is `unsupported` and `assertTransitionalCapability` denies before a transport call         | deferred / fail-closed |
 | operator memory                                       | `packages/memory/src/operator-memory-plugin.ts`, constructed by `apps/gateway/src/memory/memory.module.ts` and session-scoped by `apps/gateway/src/agent/agent.service.ts` | native Mosaic path     |
-| orchestration handoff                                 | `apps/gateway/src/coord/mos-coordination.service.ts` retains authenticated handoff/observe/result ownership checks                                                         | native Mosaic path     |
+| orchestration handoff                                 | `InteractionCoordinationService` in `apps/gateway/src/coord/interaction-coordination.service.ts` retains authenticated handoff/observe/result ownership checks             | native Mosaic path     |
 | transcripts, profiles, preferences                    | no Hermes importer/schema mapping landed                                                                                                                                   | no automatic migration |

docs/tess/M5-MIGRATION-ROLLBACK.md

@@ -6,5 +6,5 @@ Rollback is configuration/binding reversal, not a database rollback: no Hermes s
 2. Keep the gateway registration and core contracts unchanged unless a reviewed code rollback is required; `AgentRuntimeProviderRegistry` registration is explicit and non-replacing (`packages/agent/src/runtime-provider-registry.ts`).
 3. Do not replay an unsupported Kanban, skills, memory, tools, or cron operation. The transitional matrix is intentionally fail-closed.
 4. Preserve Mosaic audit, session, and operator-memory records under their normal scoped retention rules; do not copy them into Hermes as a rollback shortcut.
-5. For an in-flight coordination request, use the owned handoff observation/result flow in `MosCoordinationService`; do not create a second orchestrator path.
+5. For an in-flight coordination request, use the owned handoff observation/result flow in `InteractionCoordinationService` (`apps/gateway/src/coord/interaction-coordination.service.ts`); do not create a second orchestrator path.
 6. Capture the binding reversal, affected scope, correlation IDs, and reason in the approved operational record before retrying a cutover.

docs/tess/MOS-COORDINATION.md

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ and the requester agent from trusted authentication/configuration only.
 
 ## Enforcement point
 
-`apps/gateway` owns a `MosCoordinationService` boundary that compares the
+`apps/gateway` owns an `InteractionCoordinationService` (`apps/gateway/src/coord/interaction-coordination.service.ts`) boundary that compares the
 trusted configured requester/target identities and rejects all of the following
 before calling a transport: unconfigured requester, self-delegation, target
 identity drift, cross-tenant observe/result lookup, and attempts to observe or

docs/tess/THREAT-MODEL.md

@@ -33,14 +33,18 @@ Trust boundaries: Discord→plugin, CLI→gateway, plugin→gateway service iden
 6. Every externally caused operation is replay-safe and correlated.
 7. Provider capability absence is a denial, not an invitation to shell around it.
 
-## Existing Findings That Block Tess
+## Closed Prerequisite Findings
 
-- Command executor lacks server-side enforcement for declared scopes.
-- Session list/reuse/destroy surfaces are not owner-filtered consistently.
-- MCP schemas accept caller-supplied user identity.
-- Discord plugin lacks a complete authenticated service ingress and user/channel allowlists.
-- Chat/tool persistence lacks mandatory redaction.
-- Sessions/pending Discord output are in-memory and not restart-safe.
-- Session GC currently performs globally scoped promotion.
+The original M1 findings below are closed by landed controls and retained for audit traceability.
 
-These are tracked as M1 security prerequisites and must pass independent security review before Tess ingress is enabled.
+| Former finding                              | Closed evidence                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
+| ------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| Command scope/role enforcement              | `apps/gateway/src/commands/command-authorization.service.ts` and its authorization tests enforce the server-side approval boundary.                                                                                |
+| Cross-owner session access                  | Gateway session ownership tests cover server-derived owner and tenant scope.                                                                                                                                       |
+| Caller-controlled MCP identity              | MCP tools derive actor and tenant from authenticated gateway context.                                                                                                                                              |
+| Missing Discord ingress allowlists          | `apps/gateway/src/plugin/plugin.module.ts` requires the guild, channel, and user allowlist environment values; `apps/gateway/src/plugin/discord-ingress.security.spec.ts` exercises denial and configured ingress. |
+| Missing redaction before persistence/egress | Gateway and log redaction coverage verifies sensitive content is classified before durable storage or channel delivery.                                                                                            |
+| In-memory-only restart safety               | `packages/agent/src/durable-session.test.ts` reconstructs durable identity, inbox/outbox, checkpoints, and handoffs after simulated restart.                                                                       |
+| Globally scoped session GC                  | `apps/gateway/src/gc/session-gc.service.spec.ts` verifies session-only collection and the absence of automatic global collection entry points.                                                                     |
+
+These controls remain subject to the runtime's independent review and release qualification gates.

packages/mosaic/src/tui/gateway-api.interaction-errors.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
+import {
+  attachInteractionSession,
+  sendInteractionMessage,
+  stopInteractionSession,
+} from './gateway-api.js';
+
+const gateway = 'https://gateway.example.test';
+const cookie = 'session=test';
+const base = { agentName: 'Nova', correlationId: 'corr-1', sessionId: 'session-1' };
+
+afterEach(() => vi.unstubAllGlobals());
+
+/** The TUI must preserve gateway denial type/status rather than treating it as success. */
+describe('interaction gateway error mapping', (): void => {
+  it.each([
+    {
+      name: 'attach unauthorized',
+      response: { status: 401, message: 'Invalid or expired session' },
+      invoke: (): Promise<unknown> => attachInteractionSession(gateway, cookie, base),
+      expected:
+        'Failed to attach interaction session (401): {"message":"Invalid or expired session"}',
+    },
+    {
+      name: 'send invalid request',
+      response: { status: 400, message: 'Content and idempotency key are required' },
+      invoke: (): Promise<unknown> =>
+        sendInteractionMessage(gateway, cookie, {
+          ...base,
+          content: 'hello',
+          idempotencyKey: 'message-1',
+        }),
+      expected:
+        'Failed to send interaction message (400): {"message":"Content and idempotency key are required"}',
+    },
+    {
+      name: 'stop forbidden',
+      response: { status: 403, message: 'Runtime termination approval denied' },
+      invoke: (): Promise<unknown> =>
+        stopInteractionSession(gateway, cookie, { ...base, approvalRef: 'approval-1' }),
+      expected:
+        'Failed to stop interaction session (403): {"message":"Runtime termination approval denied"}',
+    },
+  ])(
+    '$name preserves the typed gateway denial in the CLI error',
+    async ({ response, invoke, expected }) => {
+      vi.stubGlobal(
+        'fetch',
+        vi.fn(
+          async () =>
+            new Response(JSON.stringify({ message: response.message }), {
+              status: response.status,
+              headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+            }),
+        ),
+      );
+
+      await expect(invoke()).rejects.toThrow(expected);
+    },
+  );
+});