docs(remediation): promote the three-mode taxonomy and the integrity-claim corollary to the charter

Per Mos. Two first-class principles alongside observe-the-property:

1. Pre-registration prevents RETROFITTING and nothing else. A pre-registered check set
   can be WRONG (D-8), INCOMPLETE (D-17), or INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT (D-18). It confers
   neither correctness nor coverage nor consistency. All three modes were found on this
   mission's own first delivery, by the machinery applied to its own work. RM-02's four
   clauses are the enforceable form.

2. Never ship an integrity claim dressed as a property. A verification artifact
   writable by the actor whose behaviour it certifies certifies the attack. It must sit
   inside its integrity envelope, publish atomically, and carry a tamper negative
   control observed red. If it cannot be made tamper-evident, say so and reconsider —
   an honest 'this cannot be verified' is always available and always preferable to
   laundering foreign content as certified.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
mos-dt-0
2026-07-31 19:14:06 -05:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 85bdbe3383
commit 3b191b6b34
+38
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@@ -28,6 +28,44 @@ gate/program; the LLM handles only genuine judgment.
> Operationally: after any write, read back the property you required. Applies to gates, wrappers, PR
> flags, commit authorship, file installs, and message delivery alike.
### First-class principle — pre-registration prevents retrofitting, and nothing else
> **A pre-registered check set can fail in three distinct ways:**
>
> | mode | the set is… | found as |
> | --------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | -------- |
> | **WRONG** | a check does not test what it claims | D-8 |
> | **INCOMPLETE** | green while a criterion's requirement is untested | D-17 |
> | **INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT** | two criteria cannot both hold | D-18 |
>
> **Pre-registration protects against exactly one thing: retrofitting a check to fit the implementation
> it is supposed to judge.** It confers neither correctness, nor coverage, nor consistency. "We
> pre-registered the checks" has been treated as though it settled the question — it settles one of
> three.
>
> Promoted to the charter by Mos (2026-07-31). All three modes were found on this mission's own **first
> delivery**, by the machinery applied to its own work — not by inspection, and not by looking for them.
>
> **Enforceable form — RM-02's four clauses.** The registry must establish that: (1) each check is
> **right** — proven red for its own stated reason before its green counts; (2) the set **covers** —
> every criterion bound to a case that actually exercises it; (3) no two criteria **conflict** —
> mutual unsatisfiability is a registry defect discoverable by construction; (4) when a criterion's
> meaning changes, the registry **retains original text, restatement, and reason**, so evolution stays
> auditable. A criterion with no case that can fail for its own reason is unregistered in substance,
> however it reads in the manifest.
### Corollary — never ship an integrity claim dressed as a property
> A verification artifact that can be forged by whoever it is meant to catch verifies nothing. If a
> manifest, marker, ledger, or receipt is writable by the same actor whose behaviour it certifies, it
> **certifies the attack.** Such an artifact must sit inside the integrity envelope it belongs to,
> publish atomically, and carry a **tamper negative-control observed red** — otherwise its integrity is
> a _claim_, not a _property_.
>
> **If it cannot be made tamper-evident, say so and reconsider the approach.** Laundering foreign
> content as certified is the only unacceptable outcome; an honest "this cannot be verified" is always
> available and always preferable.
## Decision record (authoritative, immutable)
- **15/15 proposals decided: 13 accept, 2 modify (P-AUTHORITY-001, P-INBOX-001), 0 reject.**