diff --git a/docs/remediation/MISSION.md b/docs/remediation/MISSION.md index f3b434f0..e0258a86 100644 --- a/docs/remediation/MISSION.md +++ b/docs/remediation/MISSION.md @@ -28,6 +28,44 @@ gate/program; the LLM handles only genuine judgment. > Operationally: after any write, read back the property you required. Applies to gates, wrappers, PR > flags, commit authorship, file installs, and message delivery alike. +### First-class principle — pre-registration prevents retrofitting, and nothing else + +> **A pre-registered check set can fail in three distinct ways:** +> +> | mode | the set is… | found as | +> | --------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | -------- | +> | **WRONG** | a check does not test what it claims | D-8 | +> | **INCOMPLETE** | green while a criterion's requirement is untested | D-17 | +> | **INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT** | two criteria cannot both hold | D-18 | +> +> **Pre-registration protects against exactly one thing: retrofitting a check to fit the implementation +> it is supposed to judge.** It confers neither correctness, nor coverage, nor consistency. "We +> pre-registered the checks" has been treated as though it settled the question — it settles one of +> three. +> +> Promoted to the charter by Mos (2026-07-31). All three modes were found on this mission's own **first +> delivery**, by the machinery applied to its own work — not by inspection, and not by looking for them. +> +> **Enforceable form — RM-02's four clauses.** The registry must establish that: (1) each check is +> **right** — proven red for its own stated reason before its green counts; (2) the set **covers** — +> every criterion bound to a case that actually exercises it; (3) no two criteria **conflict** — +> mutual unsatisfiability is a registry defect discoverable by construction; (4) when a criterion's +> meaning changes, the registry **retains original text, restatement, and reason**, so evolution stays +> auditable. A criterion with no case that can fail for its own reason is unregistered in substance, +> however it reads in the manifest. + +### Corollary — never ship an integrity claim dressed as a property + +> A verification artifact that can be forged by whoever it is meant to catch verifies nothing. If a +> manifest, marker, ledger, or receipt is writable by the same actor whose behaviour it certifies, it +> **certifies the attack.** Such an artifact must sit inside the integrity envelope it belongs to, +> publish atomically, and carry a **tamper negative-control observed red** — otherwise its integrity is +> a _claim_, not a _property_. +> +> **If it cannot be made tamper-evident, say so and reconsider the approach.** Laundering foreign +> content as certified is the only unacceptable outcome; an honest "this cannot be verified" is always +> available and always preferable. + ## Decision record (authoritative, immutable) - **15/15 proposals decided: 13 accept, 2 modify (P-AUTHORITY-001, P-INBOX-001), 0 reject.**