docs(remediation): promote D-19 to charter; bind residual risk to RM-59 as a tracked edge
Per Mos, with his two additions. Charter gains a fourth first-class principle: when a property cannot exist at the layer that specified it, three honest moves are mandatory — implement what the layer can guarantee; state the boundary in BOTH directions (what it does not defend AND what it does, since either alone misleads); and record the real guarantee as a TRACKED DEPENDENCY, not prose. A written-down gap is acceptable engineering; an implied-fixed gap is the mission's core failure in a new costume. The residual risk is now RM-59 (depends_on RM-12, RM-21, RM-25) — a real backlog task owned by the choke-point executor and spine, which verify from outside the worktree's authority. Mos's point: 'record where the guarantee comes from' only holds if the record is a live dependency someone must close; a documented gap with no owner becomes a permanent gap that reads as intentional. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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@@ -66,6 +66,31 @@ gate/program; the LLM handles only genuine judgment.
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> content as certified is the only unacceptable outcome; an honest "this cannot be verified" is always
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> available and always preferable.
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### First-class principle — when a property cannot exist at the layer it was specified
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> Some required properties are **impossible at the layer that asked for them** — not hard, impossible.
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> A local check cannot defend against an actor who can rewrite the check itself. When that happens,
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> there are exactly three honest moves, and all three are mandatory:
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>
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> 1. **Implement what the layer _can_ guarantee.** Partial protection against the class it was actually
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> born from is worth having.
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> 2. **State the boundary precisely, in BOTH directions.** What it does _not_ defend, **and** beside it
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> what it _does_. A reader who sees only the negative dismisses the check as worthless; one who sees
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> only the positive over-trusts it. **Both together is the honest artifact** — either alone misleads.
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> 3. **Record where the real guarantee will come from — as a TRACKED DEPENDENCY, not prose.** It must
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> name a task that someone must close. _A documented gap with no owner becomes a permanent gap that
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> reads as intentional._
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>
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> **A written-down gap is acceptable engineering. An implied-fixed gap is this mission's core failure in
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> a new costume** — a verification artifact that verifies nothing, with a green to prove it.
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>
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> Promoted to the charter by Mos (2026-07-31) from D-19. Origin: the RM-01 symlink manifest could not be
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> made tamper-evident against a same-UID actor (CWE-345), because the manifest and its marker share one
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> writable tree. The implementing seat **escalated rather than relabelling self-authentication as
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> tamper-resistance** — the corollary above firing on its first real adversarial test, on the cheapest
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> seat in the loop. Residual risk bound to **RM-59** (`depends_on: RM-12, RM-21, RM-25`), where the
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> choke-point executor and spine verify from _outside_ the worktree's authority.
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## Decision record (authoritative, immutable)
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- **15/15 proposals decided: 13 accept, 2 modify (P-AUTHORITY-001, P-INBOX-001), 0 reject.**
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