gander: revise row 196 design after Duckworth review

BUILD-LOG.md

@@ -5176,3 +5176,5 @@ Before: managed project/thread verbs had no Console conversation area. After: fi
 2026-10-20 05:10:34 UTC | Row 178 #1676 round 2 verified | Before: C1 render refusals lacked killing tests and row 181 base was pending. Rebased onto 931651f2d, kept all COUNTED/count code and tests, appended T178 tail; added independent owner/collision/absolute/charset/header and empty-loopback proof tests. Four files singly 156/156, all 24 mutants killed, metadata and sandbox fixture probes pass; scratch sweep empty. Packet agents/rocko/work/queue-178/r2/, candidate 9300a670, inventory d0dcde7b (59/59), scan 58 files no findings; in-review revs 2166-2167, expected no-token request failure. No live actions or commits.
 
 2026-10-20 19:09:44 UTC | Gander row 196 #1694 design phase | Before: tester TCP reaches every local uid and human proofs do not bind the socket peer. After: design draft at agents/gander/work/queue-196/DESIGN.md inventories listeners, proposes private tester HTTP and SO_PEERCRED binding, aligns the per-request principal contract with Morgana and Gizmoduck, and lists migration, tests, mutants and same-uid limits. Python versus other credential options and Console provenance require Duckworth ruling. Documentation only. No product code, suite, live probe, secret access or deployment.
+
+2026-10-20 19:16:20 UTC | Gander row 196 #1694 design r2 | Before: Duckworth r1 requested concurrent helper-fd evidence (B1) and selected O1 with interpreter, proof-only and image conditions. After: design adds eight concurrent genuine proof processes plus a racing copier, M20 swapped socket and post-helper socket survival, root-owned system ELF pinning and activation evidence, safe gid validation, cap traffic without helpers, and unchanged P19 R2 text. Mos accepted socket-only tester access (mos-1015 via sage-1363); any authenticated browser relay is a separate row. Documentation coverage checks passed. No product code, suites or live action.

agents/gander/work/queue-196/DESIGN.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Row 196: the human boundary across uids and humans
 
-Gander, 2026-10-20. Revision 1, proposed for Duckworth's review. Gitea #1694, P19 333.
+Gander, 2026-10-20. Revision 2, addressing Duckworth's r1 review. Gitea #1694, P19 333.
 Base: `96f243faf`, branch `gander/row196`. Design approval latest-by 2026-10-22, landing
 latest-by 2026-10-24 and before federation R3. This document authorizes no live action.
 
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ hold pending the host decision. This row does not assume that a separate uid is
 Sage's `sage-1343` accepts the design direction and requires Duckworth to rule on the peer
 credential implementation. `sage-1345` keeps the control board inventory-only. Morgana's
 `morgana-0003` supplies the principal contract in section 4. Sage registers this session.
+Mos accepted removal of direct tester browser access in mos-1015, relayed by sage-1363.
+Agents test through the private socket. Any later browser view is an authenticated relay
+behind SSO, designed and reviewed in its own row. This row adds no relay.
 
 ## 2. Inventory from code, not a live probe
 
@@ -94,8 +97,10 @@ Internal interface: `verifyPrincipal(request, connection) -> {kind,business,id}`
 Kinds are owner, user and tester. The connection metadata is supplied by the trusted server,
 never deserialized from JSON. No role or authority is returned. The broker looks up live policy.
 
-1. Read Linux SO_PEERCRED on the accepted Unix connection before dispatch. Require a valid
-   peer PID and the bus uid. Refuse unavailable credentials, unsupported platform and errors.
+1. Read and validate the bounded envelope first. For human, tester and user proofs, read Linux
+   SO_PEERCRED on that accepted Unix connection before dispatch. Require a valid peer PID
+   and the bus uid. Refuse unavailable credentials, unsupported platform and errors. Cap
+   traffic keeps its capability protocol behind the validated 0700 directory and 0600 socket.
 2. Require exactly one cap, human, tester or future user envelope. Human/tester/user proof.pid
    must equal the kernel peer PID. Verify startTime, nonce and CLI path against that process.
    Keep the second process read after the walk. Missing, changed or exited processes refuse.
@@ -110,7 +115,9 @@ never deserialized from JSON. No role or authority is returned. The broker looks
    argv[2] `serve`. Check parent uid, startTime and ppid again before binding. Both child and
    parent remain alive for the call. A different checkout or wrapper parent refuses.
 6. For user calls, the Console puts its mapped access-file user id in the verified proof's
-   user field, as federation 3.6 specifies. It never takes that id from a form field or verb
+   user field, as federation 3.6 specifies. The id comes only from claims Q175 verified for
+   this request's live session, never from an identity cached past that session. It never
+   takes that id from a form field or verb
    args. Return kind user, proof.business and proof.user as id only after the provenance
    checks. R3 then validates that mapping and the live grant. Bad access.json denies users,
    not the terminal owner. The verifier does not implement access-file policy.
@@ -159,33 +166,50 @@ binding, replay handling, login and logout/session lifetimes in the bus. Reusing
 on every request either creates a replay credential or expires a Console session with the
 token. A bus-issued session needs a separate lifecycle design. It also leaves the terminal
 owner and hostile same-uid limit intact. Recommend the Console provenance contract for this
-slice. Duckworth must rule if B1 instead requires independent bus-side token verification.
+slice. Duckworth approved this option in duckworth-0006, with the live-session condition above
+and the requirement to carry section 8 R2 into P19 333 word for word.
 
-## 5. D3: obtaining kernel credentials, decision for Duckworth
+## 5. D3: obtaining kernel credentials, O1 approved with conditions
 
 All options must bind the accepted connection, not a PID a caller picked. None gets a silent
-fallback to the current proof. Sage requires this comparison before implementation.
+fallback to the current proof. Sage required this comparison. Duckworth selected O1 in
+duckworth-0006, with the interpreter, proof-only and image conditions below. O4 remains the
+fallback if Python is unavailable, and needs a revised build manifest before use.
 
 | Option | What it proves and costs | Recommendation |
 |---|---|---|
-| O1 Python stdlib helper on inherited accepted socket | Node passes the accepted net.Socket as fd 3 using documented spawn stdio stream passing. Python socket(fileno=3) reads SO_PEERCRED and returns only pid,uid,gid on stdout. No socket reads, no shell, no credential values. Adds Python to bus hosts, copies and relevant containers, and a process per admitted proof connection | Preferred for small audited code, subject to Duckworth's dependency ruling |
+| O1 Python stdlib helper on inherited accepted socket | Node passes the accepted net.Socket as fd 3 using documented spawn stdio stream passing. Python socket(fileno=3) reads SO_PEERCRED and returns only pid,uid,gid on stdout. No socket reads, no shell, no credential values. Adds Python to bus hosts and any future bus image, with a process per admitted proof connection. Copies carry the helper and depend on the system interpreter | Selected by Duckworth, with conditions below |
 | O2 /proc/net/unix plus inode and /proc/PID/fd scans | The table identifies Unix socket entries, not an authenticated peer PID for each accepted connection. Finding a process holding an inode is racy, may have several holders and can be unreadable. The server endpoint's inode is not the client's inode | Reject as a replacement for SO_PEERCRED. No claimed proof PID may choose the scan target |
 | O3 plain Node fd passing or abstract sockets | A private inherited IPC channel can authenticate a child that this parent spawned. The bus did not spawn the independently started Console or terminal CLI. Moving the bus into the Console's child tree changes lifecycle and ownership. An abstract name supplies no filesystem mode boundary and no peer uid check by itself. Node's public net API supplies no SO_PEERCRED accessor | Reject as a drop-in. A larger bus-spawned transport design could use fd capabilities, but is outside this slice |
 | O4 small compiled helper or Node-API addon | Calls getsockopt directly, with no Python runtime. A helper can use the same inherited fd. Adds compiler/build closure and platform artifacts to stack-copy and containers. An addon also needs a supported way to obtain the accepted socket fd and Node version coverage | Viable alternative if Python is refused. Prefer a small helper over undocumented Node handles |
 
-For O1, invoke a resolved absolute Python interpreter with `-I -S` and an absolute helper path
-inside the same pinned copy. No caller-selected executable or helper. Use a minimal environment.
-Preflight interpreter, helper and SO_PEERCRED support before opening broker.sock. The helper
-lives under packages/bus/src so stack-copy's closure includes it. Copies remain immutable.
-Document Python >=3.10, and add an explicit image build dependency wherever the bus is shipped.
-Do not assume host Python implies image Python. No install through the node_modules symlink.
+For O1, pin the system interpreter `/usr/bin/python3`, resolving its system symlink to an
+absolute ELF binary. Require root ownership and no group/other write on that executable and
+its path components. Refuse scripts, PATH shims and any resolved path under an OS account's
+home, including /home and /root. A pyenv shim can choose an interpreter before -I -S applies.
+No PATH lookup, caller-selected interpreter or helper. Invoke the resolved binary with
+`-I -S`, a minimal environment and the absolute helper path in the same pinned copy.
 
-Pause the connection while reading credentials. For all bus connections limit outstanding helpers
+Activation preflight records the interpreter's resolved path, version and file identity/hash
+in its gate evidence. The bus validates and pins the resolved executable at startup before
+opening broker.sock. The gate must report the same interpreter used by that bus. Missing,
+unsafe or changed resolution refuses the new activation, never falling back to PATH. No
+secret values are recorded. Test system-owned interpreter checks through injected metadata.
+
+Preflight helper and SO_PEERCRED support too. The helper lives under packages/bus/src so
+stack-copy's closure includes it. Copies remain immutable. Document Python >=3.10 on bus
+hosts. Today's Containerfile builds the worker image and runs run-agent.sh, not the bus.
+It needs no Python change for this row. A future bus-host image must explicitly include
+the pinned system Python or use reviewed O4. No install through the node_modules symlink.
+
+Pause each proof connection while reading credentials. Limit outstanding helpers
 to 16, timeout to one second, output to one strict JSON record of at most 256 bytes. Refuse
-nonzero exit, extra output, malformed integers, missing fd and timeout. Kill and reap helpers
-on shutdown. Cap-envelope traffic keeps its existing capability authorization after the peer
-uid check. The gate measures the helper cost on managed-run traffic. A latency or capacity
-failure requires a design revision, not skipping the peer check for busy connections.
+nonzero exit, extra output, malformed integers, missing fd and timeout. Validate pid, uid and
+gid as safe integers, pid >=2 and uid/gid >=0. Only pid and uid select the principal. gid is
+validated but grants no authority. Kill and reap helpers on shutdown. Cap envelopes never
+spawn this helper. Reading the proof envelope first is sound because SO_PEERCRED describes
+the peer at connect time. Keep the accepted Socket object owned by its connection closure,
+not a shared current-fd variable. Only the helper's duplicate fd is closed when it exits.
 
 References: [Node stdio stream passing](https://nodejs.org/api/child_process.html#optionsstdio),
 [Node Unix socket support](https://nodejs.org/api/net.html#ipc-support),
@@ -202,7 +226,10 @@ Console with an old bus and call it protected. Same-tree paths intentionally ref
 
 The authorized window must pin bus, Console and human wrapper to one candidate. New tools
 offer `activate ID BUSINESS --tester-socket`. Plan must show the old tester-port pair removed
-and the new socket flag added. Without the explicit conversion, a candidate that no longer
+and the new socket flag added, and tell Jason that direct tester browser navigation is lost.
+Mos accepted that change in mos-1015 (sage-1363). Agents test through the socket. A later
+authenticated browser relay behind SSO belongs to its own row. Without the explicit
+conversion, a candidate that no longer
 serves tester TCP refuses inherited --tester-port before stopping anything. New serve refuses
 --tester-port with a migration error. It never silently changes that flag's meaning.
 
@@ -227,14 +254,15 @@ Use short TMPDIR paths so the longest Unix socket path stays under 108 bytes.
 | Test | Required evidence | Mutant killed |
 |---|---|---|
 | T1 private tester | HTTP over scratch socket reads and writes as tester only. parent 0700, socket 0600. No tester TCP listen. Wrong Host/origin and auth cookies refuse | M1 bind loopback TCP as well, M2 remove socket mode check, M3 accept owner cookie |
-| T2 real peer binding | Scratch client process connects, sends its own proof and passes. Second process copies first's live proof and fails because peer PID differs. Repeat on Node 24 and 26. Helper failure cases all refuse | M4 use proof.pid as peer PID, M5 continue after helper error |
-| T3 uid/path refusal | Inject foreign peer uid, wrong file owner/modes, symlink parent, existing socket and long path. Refuse before dispatch, no repaired paths | M6 ignore uid, M7 accept unsafe parent |
+| T2 real peer binding | At least 8 concurrent proof connections from distinct scratch client processes, each with its own live proof, plus a copier racing one live CLI. Barrier the helpers so connections overlap. Each genuine call must bind its own peer PID and pass, the copier must refuse. Repeat on Node 24 and 26. A lower-level helper fixture exchanges bytes both ways on the accepted socket after the helper exits, and each real bus call receives its response after helper exit. Helper failure cases all refuse | M4 use proof.pid as peer PID, M5 continue after helper error, M20 give the helper another pending connection's socket |
+| T3 uid/path refusal | Inject foreign peer uid, wrong file owner/modes, symlink parent, existing socket and long path. Inject interpreter script, user-owned ELF, home path, writable ancestor and missing executable. Refuse before dispatch, no repaired paths. Unsafe pid/uid/gid and extra helper output refuse | M6 ignore uid, M7 accept unsafe parent |
 | T4 ancestry | Agent env, binary and registered launch above owner/user refuse. Missing/reused PID, changed parent and cycles refuse. Clean terminal owner works | M8 omit walk, M9 omit identity re-read |
 | T5 Console parent | Direct CLI child from exact tree Console fixture works. Same CLI under shell, other copy, wrapper, agent ancestor or CLI respawn refuses | M10 remove direct-parent check, M11 accept any Console basename |
 | T6 principal shape | No human id or role from request body. Exactly one proof. No returned cap. Disconnect on synchronous and async failure, timeout and close. Tester agent allowed, managed tester refused | M12 accept extra identity, M13 omit disconnect, M14 use tester walk for user |
 | T7 consumer migration | Render/plan/activate/rehearse fixture carries socket flag in unit and pointer. Explicit conversion removes port. Unsupported/inherited mismatch refuses before unit calls. Rollback disables unsupported tester, never opens TCP | M15 keep inherited tester port, M16 restore TCP on downgrade |
-| T8 gates and identity | bus.tester false refuses tester calls. SSO owner/user wiring uses verified session only. User kind never becomes owner from its id. R3 integration maps subject, denies missing/invalid grants and owner overlap, broken access file leaves terminal owner working | M17 bypass tester switch, M18 turn user kind into owner by id |
+| T8 gates and identity | bus.tester false refuses tester calls. SSO owner/user wiring uses only claims verified for that request's live session. Expired/logged-out or replaced session cannot reuse an earlier mapped id. User kind never becomes owner from its id. R3 integration maps subject, denies missing/invalid grants and owner overlap, broken access file leaves terminal owner working | M17 bypass tester switch, M18 turn user kind into owner by id |
 | T9 isolation limits | Two scratch instances have different sockets and matching tree paths. Foreign-uid stand-in refuses. Record that no real uid boundary was exercised | M19 choose default instance socket |
+| T10 interpreter and cap path | Activation evidence records the same pinned root-owned system ELF that the bus uses. Scripts, home paths and unsafe owners/modes refuse. Cap calls complete without invoking the helper, proven with a helper spy that fails if called | M21 bypass interpreter safety, M22 invoke helper for cap traffic |
 
 Tests for new policy stay in the bus, WebUI and CLI packages. R3 provides the real user/grant
 half of T8 in its candidate, with its own gate. This row tests the shared verifier's user
@@ -265,11 +293,17 @@ direct parent. Q175 phase 2 separately protects main Console ingress with verifi
 Hostile processes on the instance uid, root, and the independent development control board
 remain outside these guarantees. Cross-instance file isolation requires the uid/host gate."
 
+Duckworth requires that P19 333 also carry R2 word for word:
+"The Console provenance option trusts verified code and process metadata, not an independent
+bus-side OIDC exchange. That trade must be approved, not hidden behind the phrase zero trust."
+
 Do not mark the historical task fully closed on a design or commit. Closure needs live
 Q175 phase 2, this row's re-pin and the recorded residual accepted through Mos. A promise of
 hostile same-uid isolation would require separate OS authority for agents and a new design.
 
-Q1 for Duckworth: choose O1 or O4 for kernel credentials, or require a different transport
-architecture. O2/O3 do not meet the current socket-peer requirement as drop-in replacements.
-Q2 for Duckworth: approve the Console provenance contract and Console's user mapping, or require
-independent bus OIDC verification. No product code begins before the design ruling.
+Review receipt: duckworth-0006, notes at `86be181a2:agents/duckworth/work/row196/REVIEW.md`.
+Q1 selects O1 with the conditions incorporated in section 5. Q2 approves Console provenance
+with the live-session and unchanged P19 R2 conditions. B1 adds concurrent T2, M20 and socket
+survival checks. N2's detached-Console limit remains in R1. N3's gid validation and N4's
+operator window warning are included. Mos's tester-access ruling is recorded above. No
+product code begins before design approval.