docs: Amendment 1 rev 3 — terra round-2 fixes

- user FKs text not uuid (users.id is BetterAuth text; matches
  hierarchy_grants shape)
- actor receipt split from canonical audit event: receipt carries
  {target id, old, new}; canonical event keeps hierarchy schema §5.2's
  full immutable snapshot; no audit read conferred; §8.6.3 witnesses
  both sides
- kanban SOT Amendment A3 (§10) expressly extends A2's sole-disclosure
  rule by exactly the capability-holder carve-out; ruling request names
  it

docs/requirements/native-kanban-sot.md

@@ -514,3 +514,47 @@ itself permits, so that contract does not stretch A1 by interpretation.
    default-open disclosure.
 5. Every other constraint of A1 — §8.1.2's remaining bullets, §8.2 in full,
    and §8.3's other acceptance criteria — is untouched.
+
+## 10. Amendment A3 — capability-holder existence disclosure
+
+**Status:** amendment to Amendment A2, added by reviewed PR together with
+contract 2 Amendment 1 (`rbac-grant-model.md` §8, this PR), under that
+amendment's ruling request (decision owner Jason). It binds if and only if
+contract 2 Amendment 1 ratifies; until then §9.1.2's sole-disclosure rule
+stands unmodified — which is consistent, because until ratification the
+company-CRUD capability class is empty and the carve-out below has no
+holders. Everything in §§1–9 remains binding verbatim, with exactly the one
+express modification below. The detailed contract text lives in
+`rbac-grant-model.md` §8.1; this amendment changes only what A2 itself
+permits, so that contract does not stretch A2 by interpretation.
+
+### 10.1 What A3 modifies in A2
+
+1. **Capability-holder disclosure (narrows §9.1.2's sole-disclosure rule
+   by one carve-out).** §9.1.2 makes the directory the sole permitted
+   existence disclosure and keeps private companies undisclosed to
+   non-granted subjects everywhere. A3 admits exactly one further
+   disclosure channel: a subject holding the company-CRUD capability
+   (contract 2 §8), when exercising the hierarchy schema §5.5 visibility
+   command, learns the target company's existence and its old/new
+   visibility values through the command's redacted actor receipt —
+   success for an existing target (private or directory alike) versus
+   `not_found` for a nonexistent id — bounded exactly as contract 2 §8.1
+   states: no name, slug, structure, content, grant, or membership
+   information, and no read command of any kind. To every other
+   non-granted subject, private companies remain undisclosed everywhere,
+   including the directory; the directory remains the sole
+   existence-disclosure _listing_.
+
+### 10.2 What A3 explicitly does not change
+
+1. The directory itself is unchanged: read-only, directory-class companies
+   only, existence/name/slug only (§9.1.2's enumeration is narrowed for
+   capability holders' receipts, widened for nothing).
+2. No join-request surface, no curation listing, no read command of any
+   family is authorized (§9.2.2 unchanged; a curation listing is a further
+   amendment per contract 2 §8.1).
+3. The canonical audit event for visibility mutations is untouched — it
+   keeps hierarchy schema §5.2's full immutable target snapshot; the
+   capability confers no audit read (contract 2 §8.5).
+4. Every other constraint of A1 and A2 is untouched.

docs/requirements/rbac-grant-model.md

@@ -30,7 +30,11 @@ anticipate. §8 defines the capability as a platform-scoped, admin-assigned,
 audited delegation of exactly the hierarchy schema §5.5 company visibility
 command — no read command, no other company operation; the mutation's
 inherent existence disclosure is ratified as a bounded carve-out to
-hierarchy schema §6.7/§2.8 (§8.1). The hierarchy role
+hierarchy schema §6.7/§2.8 and to kanban SOT Amendment A2's
+sole-disclosure rule — SOT Amendment A3 (native-kanban-sot.md §10, this
+PR) expressly extends A2 by exactly this carve-out (§8.1). The holder
+sees only a redacted actor receipt; the canonical audit event keeps
+hierarchy schema §5.2's full immutable snapshot. The hierarchy role
 vocabulary (§2), every evaluation rule (§3), and grant management (§4) are
 untouched: the capability is not a `hierarchy_grants.role` value and
 evaluates outside the chain; capability-row deletion joins §6.1's
@@ -292,15 +296,26 @@ further amendment, not an implementation decision.
    (`not_found`), so a holder presenting candidate ids learns existence —
    exactly as a platform admin already does through the same command.
    This amendment ratifies that disclosure as part of the §5.5 curation
-   authority, bounded as follows: the mutation result and its audit event
-   disclose to the holder the target's existence and its old/new
-   visibility values, and **nothing else** — no name, slug, structure,
-   content, grant, or membership information. A successful publish
-   additionally makes the target directory-listed to every authenticated
-   user; that is the command's ratified purpose (hierarchy schema §5.5),
-   not a leak. Hierarchy schema §6.7's existence-oracle rule and §2.8's
-   directory-only disclosure are amended by exactly this carve-out for
-   capability holders and are otherwise untouched. Witnessed in §8.6.3.
+   authority, bounded as follows. The holder-visible surface is the
+   command's **actor receipt** — the mutation result payload, carrying
+   exactly the target id, old visibility, and new visibility, and
+   **nothing else**: no name, slug, structure, content, grant, or
+   membership information. The actor receipt is a redacted projection
+   distinct from the **canonical audit event**, which is unchanged by
+   this amendment: it keeps hierarchy schema §5.2's deletion-safe
+   immutable target snapshot (id, slug, and parent chain at event time)
+   in full. The two never converge on the holder: the capability confers
+   no audit read (§8.5), so the canonical event — and with it the slug
+   and parent chain — is reachable only by subjects independently
+   authorized to read audit data, never through this capability. A
+   successful publish additionally makes the target directory-listed to
+   every authenticated user; that is the command's ratified purpose
+   (hierarchy schema §5.5), not a leak. Hierarchy schema §6.7's
+   existence-oracle rule and §2.8's directory-only disclosure are amended
+   by exactly this carve-out for capability holders, kanban SOT Amendment
+   A3 (native-kanban-sot.md §10, this PR) expressly extends A2's
+   sole-disclosure enumeration by the same carve-out, and all three are
+   otherwise untouched. Witnessed in §8.6.3.
 
 2. **Holding: platform-scoped assignment, user subjects only.** The
    capability is not a hierarchy grant: it attaches to no node, has no
@@ -308,13 +323,19 @@ further amendment, not an implementation decision.
    `platform_capabilities` table whose column set is exactly (nothing
    else, per the contract 1 §2.7 exhaustiveness discipline):
    - `id` — uuid, primary key;
-   - `user_id` — uuid, NOT NULL, FK `users` **ON DELETE RESTRICT**;
+   - `user_id` — text, NOT NULL, FK `users` **ON DELETE RESTRICT**;
    - `capability` — text, NOT NULL, constraint-checked against exactly
      `company_crud`;
-   - `granted_by` — uuid, NOT NULL, FK `users` **ON DELETE RESTRICT**;
+   - `granted_by` — text, NOT NULL, FK `users` **ON DELETE RESTRICT**;
    - `created_at` — timestamptz, NOT NULL;
    - UNIQUE (`user_id`, `capability`).
 
+   The user FKs are **text**, not uuid, because `users.id` is a BetterAuth
+   text key (`packages/db/src/schema.ts`; custody schema records the same)
+   — PostgreSQL cannot reference a text primary key with a uuid column.
+   This matches the shipped `hierarchy_grants` shape exactly: uuid
+   surrogate `id`, text FKs to `users`.
+
    Both user FKs are RESTRICT for the same reason contract 1 §3.3 pins
    RESTRICT on principal FKs: the identity contract (§7.3) gates user
    deletion, and a cascade here could silently destroy a capability
@@ -391,12 +412,19 @@ further amendment, not an implementation decision.
       create behaves exactly as any active user's — always `private`,
       and a creation request carrying a visibility argument is refused
       for holder and baseline alike (contract 3 §5.2).
-   3. Disclosure bound (§8.1 carve-out witnessed): the mutation result
-      for a private-valid target, a directory-valid target, and a
-      nonexistent id is exactly {success, success, `not_found`}; no
-      result or error payload carries name, slug, structure, content,
-      grant, or membership data; the holder's audit-visible surface
-      carries only existence and old/new visibility.
+   3. Disclosure bound (§8.1 carve-out witnessed, receipt and canonical
+      event separately): the mutation result for a private-valid target,
+      a directory-valid target, and a nonexistent id is exactly {success,
+      success, `not_found`}; the actor receipt for a success carries
+      exactly {target id, old visibility, new visibility} and no result
+      or error payload carries name, slug, structure, content, grant, or
+      membership data; the canonical audit event for the same mutation —
+      asserted directly against the hierarchy outbox, not through any
+      holder-facing surface — carries hierarchy schema §5.2's full
+      immutable snapshot (id, slug, parent chain); and the holder's
+      attempt to read audit data is refused (no audit read conferred,
+      §8.5), proving the receipt/event separation reaches the holder as
+      a redaction, not a weakened event.
    4. Assignment path, both polarities: a platform admin assigns and
       revokes through the normal admin command (positive witnesses —
       assign then observe the §8.6.2 allow, revoke then observe deny); a
@@ -437,7 +465,9 @@ interpretive resolution named:
 
 ## Ruling request (Amendment 1)
 
-Ratify §8 and the Amendment 1 header note as written, with one decision
+Ratify §8, the Amendment 1 header note, and kanban SOT Amendment A3
+(native-kanban-sot.md §10 — the express A2 carve-out extension, which
+binds only with this ratification) as written, with one decision
 embedded:
 
 - Decision: the company-CRUD capability is a platform-scoped,