gander: design row 196 human boundary for review

BUILD-LOG.md

@@ -5174,3 +5174,5 @@ Before: managed project/thread verbs had no Console conversation area. After: fi
 2026-10-20 04:44:54 UTC | Row 178 round 2 preparation | Before: Dewey C1 five render guards lacked killing tests. Added independent refusal fixtures, a temporary uid+1 id stub with cleanup, and empty loopback proof case; activation ordering recorded in r2 BUILD. Product unchanged; syntax/text preflight only, no test or mutant execution. Pending row 181 rebase and Sage slot.
 
 2026-10-20 05:10:34 UTC | Row 178 #1676 round 2 verified | Before: C1 render refusals lacked killing tests and row 181 base was pending. Rebased onto 931651f2d, kept all COUNTED/count code and tests, appended T178 tail; added independent owner/collision/absolute/charset/header and empty-loopback proof tests. Four files singly 156/156, all 24 mutants killed, metadata and sandbox fixture probes pass; scratch sweep empty. Packet agents/rocko/work/queue-178/r2/, candidate 9300a670, inventory d0dcde7b (59/59), scan 58 files no findings; in-review revs 2166-2167, expected no-token request failure. No live actions or commits.
+
+2026-10-20 19:09:44 UTC | Gander row 196 #1694 design phase | Before: tester TCP reaches every local uid and human proofs do not bind the socket peer. After: design draft at agents/gander/work/queue-196/DESIGN.md inventories listeners, proposes private tester HTTP and SO_PEERCRED binding, aligns the per-request principal contract with Morgana and Gizmoduck, and lists migration, tests, mutants and same-uid limits. Python versus other credential options and Console provenance require Duckworth ruling. Documentation only. No product code, suite, live probe, secret access or deployment.

agents/gander/work/queue-196/DESIGN.md

@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+# Row 196: the human boundary across uids and humans
+
+Gander, 2026-10-20. Revision 1, proposed for Duckworth's review. Gitea #1694, P19 333.
+Base: `96f243faf`, branch `gander/row196`. Design approval latest-by 2026-10-22, landing
+latest-by 2026-10-24 and before federation R3. This document authorizes no live action.
+
+## 1. Outcome and authority
+
+Other Linux users must not reach the tester's data or writes. A bus human proof must describe
+the process that actually connected. Console user calls must also pass the human walk and
+come directly from this bus tree's Console. Row 193 and federation R3 use that one verifier.
+
+This is not isolation from a hostile process on the instance's own uid. Keeping the human
+terminal CLI means that an unmarked process on that uid still has the owner's authority.
+Process ancestry cannot prove that a process was never an agent. Sections 4 and 8 state this
+limit without treating it as an enforcement guarantee.
+
+Inputs: COMMON at `53bb59462`, the row brief at `96f243faf`, Q175 sections 1, 6 and 8,
+federation r2 at `60b9b112a` section 3.6, Duckworth's B1-B5 at `b402197ff`, row 190's
+DESIGN.md and the row 190b brief. Q175-Q178 and the MVP plan set the order. Row 190b is on
+hold pending the host decision. This row does not assume that a separate uid is already live.
+
+Sage's `sage-1343` accepts the design direction and requires Duckworth to rule on the peer
+credential implementation. `sage-1345` keeps the control board inventory-only. Morgana's
+`morgana-0003` supplies the principal contract in section 4. Sage registers this session.
+
+## 2. Inventory from code, not a live probe
+
+"Same uid" includes untrusted local processes. "Other uid" excludes root, which is outside
+this boundary. SSO below means Q175 is active on that instance, not merely installed.
+
+| Entry | Same uid today | Other uid today | Effect of SSO and this row |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Main Console, default 7332, bare serve default 7330 | Loopback reads. With preview/send, matching Host, header and origin can write as owner | Same TCP reach and header forgery | Q175 SSO verifies login and refuses non-public Host except GET /healthz. This row does not change public ingress |
+| Tester TCP, default installation 7333, optional per instance | Reads and the tester instance, route, name and chat writes | Identical reach, no uid check | Q175 deliberately leaves tester separate. This row replaces TCP with a private filesystem Unix socket |
+| `<dataRoot>/bus/broker.sock` | Connects, then needs cap or proof. Claimed human PID is not the socket peer | Normally refused by bus/ 0700 and socket 0600 | SSO changes nothing. Add peer uid and PID binding, retain file checks |
+| Human wrapper to tree's human-cli.mjs | Owner if CLI path, nonce and ancestry pass. Agent ancestors refuse | Cannot connect to protected socket, and proof uid refuses | Preserve terminal owner path, add peer binding. SSO does not authenticate terminal users |
+| Tester CLI to broker.sock | Tester if its proof passes and bus.tester is exactly true. T3 agents are allowed, managed runs are not | Filesystem modes normally refuse | Same tester policy, plus peer binding. No owner/user upgrade |
+| `<dataRoot>/bus-host/launch.sock` | Requires run cap and launcher checks | bus-host/ 0700, socket 0600 | No human proof endpoint. Unchanged |
+| `<dataRoot>/bus-host/git.sock` | Git capability protocol and broker authorization | bus-host/ 0700, socket 0600 | No human proof endpoint. Unchanged |
+| Discord connector | Outbound Discord gateway/REST, no inbound local listener. Local process could tamper with same-uid files/process | No local port to call. File separation depends on uid and modes | Existing guild, user, channel, bot and webhook checks remain. Discord is not a new bus human transport |
+| Row 190 additions | Separate configs, roots, unit names, wrappers and Console ports, on one uid | Console/tester TCP still reachable | Adds no new class of listener. Row 196 derives its socket per dataRoot. Row 190 alone supplies no hostile-process isolation |
+| Control board, default 7331 | Unauthenticated transcript/board reads, POST /api/reply and /api/seen after request checks | Same loopback reach. A local client can supply matching request headers | Independent development service, outside instance SSO. Inventory only per sage-1345. Its fix needs another row |
+
+Evidence: `packages/webui/src/{cli,serve,bus}.mjs`, `packages/bus/src/{server,runtime,human,
+tester,store}.mjs`, `packages/cli/src/{launcher,git-socket,transport}.mjs`,
+`packages/discord/src/{gateway,authorize}.mjs`, `packages/control-board/src/serve.mjs`.
+Store checks bus/ with `safe(directory,true)`, including owner, symlink and mode checks.
+The dataRoot check itself does not require 0700 today. Do not describe that as a checked mode.
+
+## 3. D1: private tester HTTP socket
+
+Add `serve --tester-socket`, a boolean selecting `<dataRoot>/console/tester.sock`. No arbitrary
+path or new system config field. Create console/ as 0700. Refuse a symlink, wrong owner,
+non-directory or any group/other bits on an existing console/. Refuse a pre-existing socket
+or other entry rather than deleting it blindly. A stale socket needs an operator's diagnosis.
+Refuse a path longer than Linux's 107-byte pathname capacity before binding.
+
+Bind HTTP on the Unix path, set socket mode 0600, then verify type, owner and mode before
+declaring ready. The private parent covers the bind-to-chmod interval. Cleanup only the owned
+device/inode, as broker.sock does. Never open a TCP compatibility bridge or an abstract socket.
+Readiness failure closes the main listener too, rather than leaving a partially started Console.
+
+The tester handler keeps its fixed principal, header/cookie refusals and exact write list.
+Use a fixed logical origin `http://mosaic-tester.invalid` for URL and same-origin checks. It
+does not resolve that name. Clients send that Host and Origin plus the existing Fetch Metadata
+when required. A Host string is not authentication. Unix socket access supplies that boundary.
+The main listener still refuses x-mosaic-tester. No tester /auth route exists.
+
+`bus.tester` remains Jason's switch. Socket reach never enables tester authority by itself.
+Turning it off must refuse every tester bus call. This row adds no user or owner capability
+to the tester. Tester reads retain today's scope, including any local Console reads that are
+not bus calls. This row does not turn bus.tester into a separate HTTP read switch.
+
+### Consumers and migration paths
+
+| Consumer of 7333 | New path |
+|---|---|
+| Agent tester HTTP tools and curl probes in authorized window packets | `curl --unix-socket <dataRoot>/console/tester.sock http://mosaic-tester.invalid/...`, with the fixed Origin for writes. Add one repository helper for bounded tester HTTP requests so callers do not copy path/origin logic |
+| `scripts/mosaic ... --tester` | Already uses TESTER_CLI and broker.sock, not TCP. Keep its verbs, output and switch |
+| Browser tester page in row 176 and later window checks | Ordinary browsers cannot navigate a Unix HTTP socket. Replace automated tester HTTP checks with the socket helper. Browser visual QA uses scratch fixtures only. No local TCP relay is added |
+| `webui-service.sh` render/install and installed unit | Carry --tester-socket for new copies. Refuse a target without support. Units running old copies retain their old flags until a window |
+| `stack-release.sh` activate, plan, rehearsal and rollback | Add --tester-socket. Replace inherited --tester-port N only when explicitly requested. Refuse incompatible inherited flags before stopping units. Plan names the transport and every dropped pair. Rehearsal uses a scratch socket |
+| Gate/window Console checks, including agents' console-check scripts | Extend checks to use scratch Unix HTTP and expect no tester TCP bind. Sage owns live packet updates, including Q175 phase 2's old --tester-port 7333 instructions |
+| `docs/TOOLS.md`, webui/cli/bus READMEs and examples | Document socket invocation, fixed origin, loss of direct browser navigation and per-instance path. Historical window receipts stay unchanged |
+
+Repository search found no non-test hardcoded 7333 caller in tools/ or the harness code. The
+active windows and external seat commands still need Sage's consumer audit before re-pin.
+The build manifest will record the full search, rather than treating this draft as that audit.
+
+## 4. D2: one verified principal per bus request
+
+Internal interface: `verifyPrincipal(request, connection) -> {kind,business,id}` or refusal.
+Kinds are owner, user and tester. The connection metadata is supplied by the trusted server,
+never deserialized from JSON. No role or authority is returned. The broker looks up live policy.
+
+1. Read Linux SO_PEERCRED on the accepted Unix connection before dispatch. Require a valid
+   peer PID and the bus uid. Refuse unavailable credentials, unsupported platform and errors.
+2. Require exactly one cap, human, tester or future user envelope. Human/tester/user proof.pid
+   must equal the kernel peer PID. Verify startTime, nonce and CLI path against that process.
+   Keep the second process read after the walk. Missing, changed or exited processes refuse.
+3. Owner terminal: run the full existing human walk. Map the business to businesses[b].human.
+   No supplied human id, role or uid selects the principal. Keep today's terminal invocation.
+4. Tester: run verifyTester, retaining its deliberate difference from the human walk. An agent
+   seat may be tester. A managed-run marker or registered managed ancestor refuses. Then check
+   bus.tester. The full human walk must never be weakened to admit a session user.
+5. Session user: use the full human walk with the path-bound user-cli entry and its own nonce
+   variable, MOSAIC_BUS_USER_NONCE. Parameterize the nonce reader without admitting a human
+   or tester nonce as a user proof. Require its immediate parent to be the same tree's resolved webui/src/cli.mjs,
+   argv[2] `serve`. Check parent uid, startTime and ppid again before binding. Both child and
+   parent remain alive for the call. A different checkout or wrapper parent refuses.
+6. For user calls, the Console puts its mapped access-file user id in the verified proof's
+   user field, as federation 3.6 specifies. It never takes that id from a form field or verb
+   args. Return kind user, proof.business and proof.user as id only after the provenance
+   checks. R3 then validates that mapping and the live grant. Bad access.json denies users,
+   not the terminal owner. The verifier does not implement access-file policy.
+7. Owner Console calls keep the verified Q175 owner subject path. Under SSO only a subject
+   in console.sso.subjects reaches owner bus calls. They use human-cli and the same peer/walk
+   checks. A terminal owner still needs no SSO token. No anonymous main-listener fallback.
+
+The bus verifies which process supplied the session identity. It relies on that Console's
+Q175 implementation to have verified OIDC. It does not independently verify an ID token in
+this option. A provider/sub field alone, from another process, is not enough.
+
+The Console must spawn user-cli directly with its nonce already in the launch environment.
+It must not use human-cli's existing self-respawn pattern, which makes the CLI's parent a CLI.
+Apply the same initial-nonce spawn to Console human calls for consistent tests. Terminal
+human-cli can retain its self-respawn since no Console-parent condition applies there.
+Never strip agent markers from inherited environments to make a walk pass.
+
+The server binds an internal cap for this request, dispatches, and disconnects in every
+success/error/timeout path, including asynchronous task and web calls. It never returns the
+cap or a reusable principal handle. A proof copied by another process has a different kernel
+peer PID and fails. One verified CLI may make only its one request on its one connection.
+The session may hold s.user for that request. No PID or principal cache survives the connection.
+
+### Fit with rows 193 and R3
+
+Row 196 owns peer metadata, proof/walk verification and the internal principal interface.
+It supplies the Console provenance verifier and tests before R3 adds user-cli and user sessions.
+R3 owns access.json mapping and the bindUser integration, using this interface. It must not
+add a second ancestry implementation. Row 193 adds viewer and share policy to the same live
+grant check. An owner id is the business human. A user id is the access-file id, with stored
+owner string `user:<id>`. Neither row takes role from the proof.
+
+No live grant, unknown subject, duplicate owner/user mapping and invalid access file all
+deny user binding through R3's policy. Per-request authorization, access.reload and the
+30-second recheck remain R3's responsibility. Share visibility uses that check in row 193.
+Binding provenance is not a grant and never widens one. R3's user dispatch must run before
+names falls through to #agent. R3 must not land before this contract and its tests are green.
+Gizmoduck's gizmoduck-0015 and Gander's gander-0007 agree on this split. R3 keeps the reserved
+user-name mutant. Row 196 tests kind separation even if a user id resembles the owner name.
+
+### OIDC alternative
+
+The bus could verify the signed ID token itself and map its issuer/sub. That reduces reliance
+on the Console's subject assertion, but requires JWKS/provider handling, nonce or challenge
+binding, replay handling, login and logout/session lifetimes in the bus. Reusing an ID token
+on every request either creates a replay credential or expires a Console session with the
+token. A bus-issued session needs a separate lifecycle design. It also leaves the terminal
+owner and hostile same-uid limit intact. Recommend the Console provenance contract for this
+slice. Duckworth must rule if B1 instead requires independent bus-side token verification.
+
+## 5. D3: obtaining kernel credentials, decision for Duckworth
+
+All options must bind the accepted connection, not a PID a caller picked. None gets a silent
+fallback to the current proof. Sage requires this comparison before implementation.
+
+| Option | What it proves and costs | Recommendation |
+|---|---|---|
+| O1 Python stdlib helper on inherited accepted socket | Node passes the accepted net.Socket as fd 3 using documented spawn stdio stream passing. Python socket(fileno=3) reads SO_PEERCRED and returns only pid,uid,gid on stdout. No socket reads, no shell, no credential values. Adds Python to bus hosts, copies and relevant containers, and a process per admitted proof connection | Preferred for small audited code, subject to Duckworth's dependency ruling |
+| O2 /proc/net/unix plus inode and /proc/PID/fd scans | The table identifies Unix socket entries, not an authenticated peer PID for each accepted connection. Finding a process holding an inode is racy, may have several holders and can be unreadable. The server endpoint's inode is not the client's inode | Reject as a replacement for SO_PEERCRED. No claimed proof PID may choose the scan target |
+| O3 plain Node fd passing or abstract sockets | A private inherited IPC channel can authenticate a child that this parent spawned. The bus did not spawn the independently started Console or terminal CLI. Moving the bus into the Console's child tree changes lifecycle and ownership. An abstract name supplies no filesystem mode boundary and no peer uid check by itself. Node's public net API supplies no SO_PEERCRED accessor | Reject as a drop-in. A larger bus-spawned transport design could use fd capabilities, but is outside this slice |
+| O4 small compiled helper or Node-API addon | Calls getsockopt directly, with no Python runtime. A helper can use the same inherited fd. Adds compiler/build closure and platform artifacts to stack-copy and containers. An addon also needs a supported way to obtain the accepted socket fd and Node version coverage | Viable alternative if Python is refused. Prefer a small helper over undocumented Node handles |
+
+For O1, invoke a resolved absolute Python interpreter with `-I -S` and an absolute helper path
+inside the same pinned copy. No caller-selected executable or helper. Use a minimal environment.
+Preflight interpreter, helper and SO_PEERCRED support before opening broker.sock. The helper
+lives under packages/bus/src so stack-copy's closure includes it. Copies remain immutable.
+Document Python >=3.10, and add an explicit image build dependency wherever the bus is shipped.
+Do not assume host Python implies image Python. No install through the node_modules symlink.
+
+Pause the connection while reading credentials. For all bus connections limit outstanding helpers
+to 16, timeout to one second, output to one strict JSON record of at most 256 bytes. Refuse
+nonzero exit, extra output, malformed integers, missing fd and timeout. Kill and reap helpers
+on shutdown. Cap-envelope traffic keeps its existing capability authorization after the peer
+uid check. The gate measures the helper cost on managed-run traffic. A latency or capacity
+failure requires a design revision, not skipping the peer check for busy connections.
+
+References: [Node stdio stream passing](https://nodejs.org/api/child_process.html#optionsstdio),
+[Node Unix socket support](https://nodejs.org/api/net.html#ipc-support),
+[Python socket and getsockopt](https://docs.python.org/3/library/socket.html),
+[Linux Unix credentials and permissions](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/unix.7.html),
+[Linux proc network table fields](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/proc_pid_net.5.html).
+These support the APIs. The connection-binding behavior still needs T2 on supported Node versions.
+
+## 6. Migration and rollback
+
+No config schema or store schema changes. Old copies and units keep working until each
+instance re-pins. No new verifier is loaded into a running old broker. Do not pair a new
+Console with an old bus and call it protected. Same-tree paths intentionally refuse mixtures.
+
+The authorized window must pin bus, Console and human wrapper to one candidate. New tools
+offer `activate ID BUSINESS --tester-socket`. Plan must show the old tester-port pair removed
+and the new socket flag added. Without the explicit conversion, a candidate that no longer
+serves tester TCP refuses inherited --tester-port before stopping anything. New serve refuses
+--tester-port with a migration error. It never silently changes that flag's meaning.
+
+Rollback to a copy lacking --tester-socket drops tester enablement and reports it, as today's
+tools drop unsupported flags. It does not turn the socket back into TCP. The old main Console
+and owner CLI can run with their known old limits. A failed activation's recovery may restore
+the old saved unit, including its TCP listener. Report that recovery as restoration of the old
+security state, never as a hardened deployment. After rollback, R3 and second-human access are
+not accepted until prerequisites are restored. Older operator tools cannot manage the new
+flag safely. The window must use the reviewed candidate tool blob for rollback as well.
+
+The Q173 window supplies real uid-denial evidence and the final consumer audit. No second uid,
+live socket, unit, config or secret is touched in this row's tests. Row 190b or a separate host
+still owns cross-instance file isolation. It is not replaced by SSO or this socket change.
+
+## 7. Acceptance tests and mutants
+
+All fixtures use scratch roots and ephemeral sockets, no live 7332/7333, public origin or
+provider. No real second uid. Foreign uid checks use injected metadata and name that limit.
+Use short TMPDIR paths so the longest Unix socket path stays under 108 bytes.
+
+| Test | Required evidence | Mutant killed |
+|---|---|---|
+| T1 private tester | HTTP over scratch socket reads and writes as tester only. parent 0700, socket 0600. No tester TCP listen. Wrong Host/origin and auth cookies refuse | M1 bind loopback TCP as well, M2 remove socket mode check, M3 accept owner cookie |
+| T2 real peer binding | Scratch client process connects, sends its own proof and passes. Second process copies first's live proof and fails because peer PID differs. Repeat on Node 24 and 26. Helper failure cases all refuse | M4 use proof.pid as peer PID, M5 continue after helper error |
+| T3 uid/path refusal | Inject foreign peer uid, wrong file owner/modes, symlink parent, existing socket and long path. Refuse before dispatch, no repaired paths | M6 ignore uid, M7 accept unsafe parent |
+| T4 ancestry | Agent env, binary and registered launch above owner/user refuse. Missing/reused PID, changed parent and cycles refuse. Clean terminal owner works | M8 omit walk, M9 omit identity re-read |
+| T5 Console parent | Direct CLI child from exact tree Console fixture works. Same CLI under shell, other copy, wrapper, agent ancestor or CLI respawn refuses | M10 remove direct-parent check, M11 accept any Console basename |
+| T6 principal shape | No human id or role from request body. Exactly one proof. No returned cap. Disconnect on synchronous and async failure, timeout and close. Tester agent allowed, managed tester refused | M12 accept extra identity, M13 omit disconnect, M14 use tester walk for user |
+| T7 consumer migration | Render/plan/activate/rehearse fixture carries socket flag in unit and pointer. Explicit conversion removes port. Unsupported/inherited mismatch refuses before unit calls. Rollback disables unsupported tester, never opens TCP | M15 keep inherited tester port, M16 restore TCP on downgrade |
+| T8 gates and identity | bus.tester false refuses tester calls. SSO owner/user wiring uses verified session only. User kind never becomes owner from its id. R3 integration maps subject, denies missing/invalid grants and owner overlap, broken access file leaves terminal owner working | M17 bypass tester switch, M18 turn user kind into owner by id |
+| T9 isolation limits | Two scratch instances have different sockets and matching tree paths. Foreign-uid stand-in refuses. Record that no real uid boundary was exercised | M19 choose default instance socket |
+
+Tests for new policy stay in the bus, WebUI and CLI packages. R3 provides the real user/grant
+half of T8 in its candidate, with its own gate. This row tests the shared verifier's user
+provenance without shipping placeholder user access. Mutants run on scratch copies,
+restore the original bytes and verify hashes. Two failures in a gate run stop and are reported.
+Single test files run freely. Ask Sage for the slot before any suite. Final acceptance is
+Duckworth's approved manifest plus Sage's bus, WebUI, CLI and scripts/test-*.sh gate.
+
+## 8. Closure, limits and review decisions
+
+R1. Same uid remains trusted OS authority. A hostile process may detach, clear its markers,
+modify argv, read same-uid pipes or capabilities, edit policy files, or interfere with the
+Console where host policy permits. SO_PEERCRED proves the connecting process identity at
+connection time. It does not prove human intent, protect memory, or track a socket passed to
+another process. Ordinary agent children fail the walk. Hostile detached agents are not
+claimed contained. Separate uids narrow cross-instance reach, not reach within one instance.
+
+R2. The Console provenance option trusts verified code and process metadata, not an independent
+bus-side OIDC exchange. That trade must be approved, not hidden behind the phrase zero trust.
+
+R3. A Unix tester endpoint removes direct browser navigation. No bridge is in this design.
+The 7331 development board remains a separately reported reachability and impersonation risk.
+
+P19 333 can record the following after the implementation gate and authorized re-pin:
+"Tester ingress is private to the instance uid. Bus human proofs are tied to the actual
+Unix peer and retain the human walk. Session-user calls require the same-tree Console as
+direct parent. Q175 phase 2 separately protects main Console ingress with verified OIDC.
+Hostile processes on the instance uid, root, and the independent development control board
+remain outside these guarantees. Cross-instance file isolation requires the uid/host gate."
+
+Do not mark the historical task fully closed on a design or commit. Closure needs live
+Q175 phase 2, this row's re-pin and the recorded residual accepted through Mos. A promise of
+hostile same-uid isolation would require separate OS authority for agents and a new design.
+
+Q1 for Duckworth: choose O1 or O4 for kernel credentials, or require a different transport
+architecture. O2/O3 do not meet the current socket-peer requirement as drop-in replacements.
+Q2 for Duckworth: approve the Console provenance contract and Console's user mapping, or require
+independent bus OIDC verification. No product code begins before the design ruling.