fix(tess): redact chat persistence and egress (#725)
This commit was merged in pull request #725.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -10,3 +10,8 @@ export {
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type LogQuery,
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} from './agent-logs.js';
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export { registerLogCommand } from './cli.js';
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export {
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redactSensitiveContent,
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type RedactionResult,
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type SensitiveClassification,
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} from './redaction.js';
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25
packages/log/src/redaction.spec.ts
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25
packages/log/src/redaction.spec.ts
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@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
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import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
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import { redactSensitiveContent } from './redaction.js';
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describe('redactSensitiveContent', (): void => {
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it('redacts seeded secret and PII canaries before persistence or egress', (): void => {
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const result = redactSensitiveContent(
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'email canary@example.test token=sk_CANARY12345678 phone +1 555 555 1212',
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);
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expect(result.content).not.toContain('canary@example.test');
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expect(result.content).not.toContain('sk_CANARY12345678');
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expect(result.content).not.toContain('+1 555 555 1212');
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expect(result.classifications).toEqual(['secret', 'pii']);
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});
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it('redacts common provider credential formats', (): void => {
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const result = redactSensitiveContent(
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'Authorization: Bearer canary.bearer.token jwt eyJcanary.eyJpayload.eyJsignature aws AKIACANARY1234567890',
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);
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expect(result.content).not.toContain('canary.bearer.token');
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expect(result.content).not.toContain('eyJcanary.eyJpayload.eyJsignature');
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expect(result.content).not.toContain('AKIACANARY1234567890');
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expect(result.classifications).toEqual(['secret']);
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});
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});
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40
packages/log/src/redaction.ts
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40
packages/log/src/redaction.ts
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@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
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export type SensitiveClassification = 'secret' | 'pii';
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export interface RedactionResult {
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content: string;
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classifications: SensitiveClassification[];
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}
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const SECRET_PATTERNS: RegExp[] = [
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/\b(?:sk|ghp|gitea)_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\b/g,
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/\b(?:api[_-]?key|token|password|secret)\s*[:=]\s*[^\s,;]+/gi,
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/\b(?:authorization\s*:\s*)?bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/-]+=*/gi,
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/\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\b/g,
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/\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}\b/g,
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/-----BEGIN(?: [A-Z]+)* KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END(?: [A-Z]+)* KEY-----/g,
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/https?:\/\/[^\s?#]+[^\s]*[?&](?:token|key|secret|signature|sig)=[^\s&#]+/gi,
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];
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const PII_PATTERNS: RegExp[] = [
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/\b[A-Z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Z0-9.-]+\.[A-Z]{2,}\b/gi,
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/\b\+?\d[\d(). -]{7,}\d\b/g,
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];
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export function redactSensitiveContent(content: string): RedactionResult {
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let redacted = content;
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const classifications: SensitiveClassification[] = [];
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for (const pattern of SECRET_PATTERNS) {
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if (pattern.test(redacted)) {
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classifications.push('secret');
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redacted = redacted.replace(pattern, '[REDACTED_SECRET]');
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}
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pattern.lastIndex = 0;
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}
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for (const pattern of PII_PATTERNS) {
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if (pattern.test(redacted)) {
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classifications.push('pii');
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redacted = redacted.replace(pattern, '[REDACTED_PII]');
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}
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pattern.lastIndex = 0;
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}
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return { content: redacted, classifications: [...new Set(classifications)] };
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}
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