From 825e56d4545a78f9e2fbda08c9c4504fb0026572 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: code-infra-01 Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2026 23:20:24 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?fix(#1367):=20close=20both=20secret=20channels?= =?UTF-8?q?=20=E2=80=94=20trap-swept=20staging=20and=20file-to-file=20asse?= =?UTF-8?q?mbly=20(review=20263)?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Blocker 2 (secret at rest on error paths): all staging now lives in ONE per-run mktemp -d removed by an EXIT/INT/TERM trap; a curl dying rc=7 mid-run (the reviewer's transport-failure case) leaves nothing behind. M10 pins it against a dying mock in an isolated TMPDIR; trap-removed mutant killed. Blocker 1 (bash -x trace channel, upheld above landed parity because this is the admin-token minter): secrets are assembled FILE-TO-FILE — stage_auth/stage_user take token/password FILE PATHS and build the curl configs with jq --rawfile; the password is generated straight into its staging file; bodies are composed by jq from the template + password file. No secret is ever expanded into a shell word a trace would print. M11 runs a real bash -x and asserts the admin-token value, the minted token value, and any password-shaped 32-char expansion are all absent; expansion mutant killed (measured: the mutant's trace shows '+ PW_VALUE=<32 chars>', the fixed script's trace shows paths only). Header comment corrected to state what is actually true, including the explicit note that detect-platform's gitea_write_auth_config still leaks under -x — that parity gap is now tracked as #1369, opened per review 263 and fred's ruling; issue-comment/pr-review/pr-edit left untouched in this PR. --- .../tools/fleet/mint-seat-credential.sh | 103 +++++++++++------- .../tools/fleet/test-mint-seat-credential.sh | 88 ++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) diff --git a/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/mint-seat-credential.sh b/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/mint-seat-credential.sh index 4bf38e08..1e4a7fc9 100755 --- a/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/mint-seat-credential.sh +++ b/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/mint-seat-credential.sh @@ -33,34 +33,59 @@ # The .scopes file is written from the mint RESPONSE rather than from what was # requested, so the record is what was granted rather than what was asked for. # -# SECRETS NEVER TOUCH ARGV (#1343 class, rev-security-01 review 259): the admin -# token, the generated password, and the minted seat token all pass through -# 0600 curl --config / --data files — the landed in-tree standard -# (gitea_write_auth_config in detect-platform.sh). argv is world-readable via -# /proc//cmdline for the life of each request, and a bash -x trace would -# print every secret otherwise. The staging files are unlinked after each use. +# SECRETS NEVER TOUCH ARGV (#1343 class, rev-security-01 review 259), and the +# staging area is a single trap-swept directory (review 263 blocker 2): the +# admin token, the generated password, and the minted seat token all pass +# through 0600 files under a per-run staging dir removed by an EXIT/INT/TERM +# trap, so a transport failure mid-run cannot leave secrets at rest in /tmp. +# +# TRACE CHANNEL, stated plainly (review 263 blocker 1): this script is held to +# a higher bar than ordinary wrappers because it mints admin-grade +# credentials and a durable password. Secrets here are assembled FILE-TO-FILE +# — source token file, password generated straight into its staging file, +# bodies composed with jq from those files — so no secret is ever expanded +# into a shell word a trace would print. A plain `bash -x` of this script +# shows staging PATHS only. (The landed gitea_write_auth_config in +# detect-platform.sh still expands tokens into shell words and DOES leak +# under -x; that fleet-wide parity gap is tracked in its own issue — see the +# framework-hardening issue referenced from this PR.) set -Eeuo pipefail -# Stage secrets into 0600 files; nothing secret reaches argv or a trace. -# write_auth_config -> curl --config carrying the Authorization header -# (same shape as gitea_write_auth_config in -# detect-platform.sh, local so this script stays -# standalone under tools/fleet). -# write_user_config -> curl --config with `user =` (covers -u). -# write_body -> 0600 file for --data @file. -write_auth_config() { - local f; f=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-mint-auth.XXXXXX") || return 1 - printf 'header = "Authorization: token %s"\n' "$1" >"$f" || { rm -f "$f"; return 1; } +STAGE_DIR="" +cleanup_stage() { + [ -n "$STAGE_DIR" ] && rm -rf -- "$STAGE_DIR" + STAGE_DIR="" +} +trap cleanup_stage EXIT INT TERM + +# All staging lives in one per-run dir, swept by the trap above. Files are +# created 0600 and secrets are moved between them only by tool reads +# (jq/cat), never through shell-word expansion. +new_stage() { STAGE_DIR="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-mint.XXXXXX")"; chmod 700 "$STAGE_DIR"; } + +# stage_auth — curl --config carrying the Authorization header, +# reading the token from the file with jq so it never +# becomes a shell word. +# stage_user — curl --config with `user =`; the password is +# read from its file by jq. is not a secret. +# stage_body — body file; jq injects the password +# file's value into the template. The mint body has +# no secret and is written directly. +stage_auth() { + local f="$STAGE_DIR/auth.cfg" + jq -rn --rawfile t "$1" '"header = \"Authorization: token " + $t + "\""' >"$f" || return 1 chmod 600 "$f"; printf '%s' "$f" } -write_user_config() { - local f; f=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-mint-user.XXXXXX") || return 1 - printf 'user = "%s:%s"\n' "$1" "$2" >"$f" || { rm -f "$f"; return 1; } +stage_user() { + local f="$STAGE_DIR/user.cfg" + jq -rn --rawfile p "$2" --arg u "$1" '"user = \"" + $u + ":" + $p + "\""' >"$f" || return 1 chmod 600 "$f"; printf '%s' "$f" } -write_body() { - local f; f=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-mint-body.XXXXXX") || return 1 - printf '%s' "$1" >"$f" || { rm -f "$f"; return 1; } +stage_body() { + # $1 is a JSON template string (no secrets); $2 is the password file. jq + # parses the template and injects the password read straight from the file. + local f="$STAGE_DIR/body.json" + jq -c --rawfile p "$2" '.password = $p' <<<"$1" >"$f" || return 1 chmod 600 "$f"; printf '%s' "$f" } @@ -114,34 +139,37 @@ for KEY in $INSTANCES; do [[ -n "$BASE" ]] || { echo " $KEY: no URL known for this instance (set $ov), skipped" >&2; rc=1; continue; } ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE="$BRAIN/fleet/agents/$ADMIN/secrets/gitea-$KEY-$ADMIN.token" [[ -r "$ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE" ]] || { echo " $KEY: no admin token for seat '$ADMIN' ($ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE), skipped" >&2; rc=1; continue; } - T="$(cat "$ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE")" - AUTH_CFG="$(write_auth_config "$T")" - PW="$(openssl rand -base64 33 | tr -d '\n/+=' | head -c 32)" - USER_CFG="$(write_user_config "$SEAT" "$PW")" + # Per-instance staging dir: everything under it dies with the trap, so a + # transport failure (review 263 blocker 2) cannot leave secrets at rest. + new_stage + AUTH_CFG="$(stage_auth "$ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE")" + # The password is generated STRAIGHT INTO its staging file; the variable + # below is its path, never the value (review 263 blocker 1). + openssl rand -base64 33 | tr -d '\n/+=' | head -c 32 >"$STAGE_DIR/pw" + chmod 600 "$STAGE_DIR/pw" + USER_CFG="$(stage_user "$SEAT" "$STAGE_DIR/pw")" if curl -sf -o /dev/null --config "$AUTH_CFG" "$BASE/api/v1/users/$SEAT"; then - BODY="$(write_body "{\"login_name\":\"$SEAT\",\"source_id\":0,\"password\":\"$PW\",\"must_change_password\":false}")" + BODY="$(stage_body '{"login_name":"'"$SEAT"'","source_id":0,"password":"","must_change_password":false}' "$STAGE_DIR/pw")" curl -s -o /dev/null -X PATCH -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ --config "$AUTH_CFG" --data "@$BODY" \ "$BASE/api/v1/admin/users/$SEAT" - rm -f "$BODY"; BODY="" act="reset-pw" else - BODY="$(write_body "{\"username\":\"$SEAT\",\"email\":\"$SEAT@$EMAIL_DOMAIN\",\"password\":\"$PW\",\"must_change_password\":false,\"full_name\":\"Mosaic fleet seat $SEAT\"}")" + BODY="$(stage_body '{"username":"'"$SEAT"'","email":"'"$SEAT@$EMAIL_DOMAIN"'","password":"","must_change_password":false,"full_name":"Mosaic fleet seat '"$SEAT"'"}' "$STAGE_DIR/pw")" curl -s -o /dev/null -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ --config "$AUTH_CFG" --data "@$BODY" \ "$BASE/api/v1/admin/users" - rm -f "$BODY"; BODY="" act="create" fi - tmp="$(mktemp)"; chmod 600 "$tmp" - MINT_BODY="$(write_body "{\"name\":\"mosaic-seat\",\"scopes\":$SCOPES}")" + tmp="$STAGE_DIR/mint-response.json" + printf '{"name":"mosaic-seat","scopes":%s}' "$SCOPES" >"$STAGE_DIR/mint-body.json"; chmod 600 "$STAGE_DIR/mint-body.json" + MINT_BODY="$STAGE_DIR/mint-body.json" code="$(curl -s -o "$tmp" -w '%{http_code}' -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ --config "$USER_CFG" --data "@$MINT_BODY" "$BASE/api/v1/users/$SEAT/tokens")" - rm -f "$MINT_BODY"; MINT_BODY="" if [[ "$code" != "201" ]]; then - echo " $KEY: mint FAILED http=$code ($act)" >&2; rm -f "$tmp"; rc=1; PW=""; rm -f "$AUTH_CFG" "$USER_CFG"; continue + echo " $KEY: mint FAILED http=$code ($act)" >&2; rm -f "$tmp"; rc=1; cleanup_stage; continue fi python3 - "$tmp" "$D" "$KEY" "$SEAT" <<'PY' @@ -155,12 +183,13 @@ p=pathlib.Path(d) for suf in ("token","scopes","principal"): (p/f"gitea-{key}-{seat}.{suf}").chmod(0o600) PY - rm -f "$tmp"; PW=""; rm -f "$AUTH_CFG" "$USER_CFG" + rm -f "$tmp"; cleanup_stage - VERIFY_CFG="$(write_auth_config "$(cat "$D/gitea-$KEY-$SEAT.token")")" + new_stage # fresh staging for the verify read + VERIFY_CFG="$(stage_auth "$D/gitea-$KEY-$SEAT.token")" login="$(curl -s --config "$VERIFY_CFG" "$BASE/api/v1/user" \ | python3 -c 'import json,sys;print(json.load(sys.stdin).get("login","ERR"))' 2>/dev/null || echo ERR)" - rm -f "$VERIFY_CFG" + cleanup_stage if [[ "$login" == "$SEAT" ]]; then echo " $KEY: $act, minted, GET /user -> $login" else diff --git a/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/test-mint-seat-credential.sh b/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/test-mint-seat-credential.sh index 97fffce0..7cba5b3a 100755 --- a/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/test-mint-seat-credential.sh +++ b/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/test-mint-seat-credential.sh @@ -22,6 +22,11 @@ # variable, matching seat-logins.sh (SF3). # M9 MOSAIC_SEAT_EMAIL_DOMAIN is required: unset is a usage error (rc=3), # nothing written (framework-PR firewall answer). +# M10 no secret at rest after ANY exit, including transport failure mid-run +# (review 263 blocker 2): the staging dir is swept by the trap, so a curl +# that dies rc=7 on the admin POST leaves nothing behind. +# M11 a real `bash -x` trace of the whole run contains no secret VALUE — +# staging appears only as paths (review 263 blocker 1). set -euo pipefail WORK_ROOT="${AGENT_WORK_ROOT:-${TMPDIR:-/tmp}}" @@ -43,7 +48,7 @@ chmod 600 "$BRAIN/fleet/agents/admin-seat/secrets/gitea-alpha-admin-seat.token" # A PATH with only the mock bin plus the system tools the script needs, and no tea. SYS_BIN="$SANDBOX/sys"; mkdir -p "$SYS_BIN" -for t in bash sed cat mktemp openssl tr head python3 sort printf chmod mkdir rm dirname grep stat; do +for t in bash sed cat mktemp openssl tr head python3 sort printf chmod mkdir rm dirname grep stat jq find wc; do p="$(command -v "$t" 2>/dev/null || true)"; [ -n "$p" ] && ln -s "$p" "$SYS_BIN/$t" done export PATH="$MOCK_BIN:$SYS_BIN" CALLS @@ -158,4 +163,85 @@ grep -q "no admin token for seat 'other-admin'" "$SANDBOX/err" || fail "M2: miss [ ! -s "$CALLS" ] || fail "M2: API was called without an admin token: $(cat "$CALLS")" [ ! -e "$BRAIN/fleet/agents/newseat/secrets/gitea-alpha-newseat.token" ] || fail "M2: token written without an admin token" +# M10: transport failure mid-run leaves NO secret at rest (review 263 blocker 2). +# A second mock that dies rc=7 on the admin POST; the trap must sweep the staging dir. +rm -rf "$BRAIN/fleet/agents/newseat" +M10_TMP="$SANDBOX/m10-tmp"; mkdir -p "$M10_TMP" +cat > "$MOCK_BIN/curl" <<'EOF' +#!/bin/bash +while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do + case "$1" in + http*) echo "$1" >> "${FAIL_URLS:?}"; exit 7 ;; + *) shift ;; + esac +done +exit 7 +EOF +chmod +x "$MOCK_BIN/curl" +export FAIL_URLS="$SANDBOX/failed-urls.txt"; : > "$FAIL_URLS" +BEFORE=$(find "$M10_TMP" -maxdepth 1 -name 'mosaic-mint.*' 2>/dev/null | wc -l) +rc=$(TMPDIR="$M10_TMP" MOSAIC_ADMIN_SEAT=admin-seat MOSAIC_GITEA_INSTANCES=alpha run newseat) +[ "$rc" != 0 ] || fail "M10: transport failure reported rc=0" +AFTER=$(find "$M10_TMP" -maxdepth 1 -name 'mosaic-mint.*' 2>/dev/null | wc -l) +[ "$AFTER" -le "$BEFORE" ] || fail "M10: staging left at rest after failure: $AFTER dir(s) under $M10_TMP" +[ -s "$FAIL_URLS" ] || fail "M10: mock never called" + +# Restore the well-behaved mock for M11. +cat > "$MOCK_BIN/curl" <<'EOF' +#!/bin/bash +method=GET; url=""; out=""; wcode=0; auth=""; body="" +while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do + case "$1" in + -X) method="$2"; shift 2 ;; + -o) out="$2"; shift 2 ;; + -w) wcode=1; shift 2 ;; + --config) + if grep -q 'Authorization: token' "$2" 2>/dev/null; then auth="${auth}token,"; fi + if grep -q '^user = ' "$2" 2>/dev/null; then auth="${auth}user,"; fi + shift 2 ;; + --data) + case "$2" in + @*) body="@file" ;; + *) body="inline" ;; + esac + shift 2 ;; + -H|-u) shift 2 ;; + http*) url="$1"; shift ;; + *) shift ;; + esac +done +printf '%s %s auth=%s body=%s\n' "$method" "$url" "${auth:-NONE}" "$body" >> "$CALLS" +emit() { if [ -n "$out" ]; then printf '%s' "$1" > "$out"; else printf '%s' "$1"; fi; } +case "$method $url" in + "GET "*/api/v1/users/newseat) exit 22 ;; + "POST "*/api/v1/admin/users) emit '{}'; exit 0 ;; + "POST "*/api/v1/users/newseat/tokens) emit '{"id":9,"name":"mosaic-seat","sha1":"minted-token-7f3a","scopes":["read:user","write:repository"]}' + [ "$wcode" = 1 ] && printf '201'; exit 0 ;; + "GET "*/api/v1/user) emit '{"login":"newseat"}'; exit 0 ;; + *) emit '{}'; exit 0 ;; +esac +EOF +chmod +x "$MOCK_BIN/curl" +unset FAIL_URLS + +# M11: a real bash -x trace of a full mint contains no secret VALUE (review 263 +# blocker 1). Secrets are generated straight into staging files and moved only +# by jq reads, so only staging PATHS may appear. The mock above has no secrets, +# so this measures the SCRIPT's word handling: the admin token sentinel and the +# mint response token must not appear in the xtrace of a successful run. +rm -rf "$BRAIN/fleet/agents/newseat" +: > "$CALLS" +TRACE="$SANDBOX/trace.log" +MOSAIC_ADMIN_SEAT=admin-seat MOSAIC_GITEA_INSTANCES=alpha bash -x "$TARGET" newseat >"$SANDBOX/out11" 2>"$TRACE" || fail "M11: traced run failed" +if grep -qF "$ADMIN_TOKEN_VALUE" "$TRACE"; then fail "M11: admin token value appears in xtrace"; fi +if grep -qF 'minted-token-7f3a' "$TRACE"; then fail "M11: minted token value appears in xtrace"; fi +# Any password-shaped expansion: the password is 32 base64ish chars. A trace +# that expands it into a word (assignment or argument) prints exactly that +# shape; the clean script's trace contains no 32-char base64ish run at all +# (paths and URLs are the only long strings). +if grep -qE "[[:space:]=\"'][A-Za-z0-9]{32}([[:space:]\"']|$)" "$TRACE"; then + LEAK=$(grep -oE "[[:space:]=\"'][A-Za-z0-9]{32}" "$TRACE" | head -1) + fail "M11: password-like value expansion in xtrace: $LEAK" +fi + echo "mint-seat-credential regression harness passed"