feat(#462): add federation list verb (#682)
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This commit was merged in pull request #682.
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2026-06-25 02:15:17 +00:00
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# FED-M3-05 — Federation List Verb Scratchpad
## Objective
Implement `POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource`.
## Scope
- Wire `FederationAuthGuard``FederationScopeService` → read-only list query layer.
- Apply `max_rows_per_query` row cap and return pagination metadata when truncated.
- Tag returned rows with `_source: "local"`.
- Keep audit writes deferred to M4.
- No request/response body persistence.
## Base / branch
- Branch: `feat/federation-m3-verb-list`
- Base: `main` after M3-04 scope service merged via PR #672 (`c739256a`).
## Implementation notes
- Added `ListController` under `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/`.
- Added `FederationListQueryService` as the read-only query layer and native RBAC evaluator.
- Query resources supported in M3 list path:
- `tasks`: project/mission scoped tasks visible through personal/team project access.
- `notes`: non-empty `mission_tasks.notes` rows visible through personal/team mission access.
- `memory`: user-owned `insights` and `preferences` rows.
- `credentials` / `api_keys`: denied by native RBAC in M3 even if present in scope; sensitive-resource implementation is not part of FED-M3-05.
- Cursor pagination uses an opaque base64url keyset cursor over `(createdAt, id)`; DB reads fetch at most `limit + 1` rows per resource query.
- Reviewer isolation fix: `mission_tasks.notes` rows are always constrained by `missionTasks.userId = subjectUserId` and accessible mission IDs; team scope narrows missions but never widens to other users' mission task notes.
- Follow-up review fix: memory listing now uses deterministic table-block pagination (`insights` first, then `preferences`) with cursor source metadata, so one table's cursor is never applied to the other.
- Follow-up hardening: missing auth-guard context returns a structured federation `unauthorized` envelope; unsupported resources and non-encodable truncated cursors throw instead of silently crashing/truncating.
## Tests
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test -- list.controller.spec.ts list-query.service.spec.ts` — PASS (16 tests, including PGlite regression coverage for team-scoped notes isolation, unauthorized mission notes exclusion, `includePersonal: false`, deterministic memory pagination, missing context envelope, unsupported resource, and cursor encode failure).
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway typecheck` — PASS.
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway lint` — PASS.
- `pnpm format:check` — PASS.
- `pnpm typecheck` — PASS (41/41 turbo tasks).
- `pnpm lint` — PASS (23/23 turbo tasks).
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test` — FAIL in pre-existing/live-DB integration suite: `apps/gateway/src/__tests__/cross-user-isolation.test.ts` cleanup cannot connect to local PostgreSQL on `localhost:5433`. New list tests pass; failure is outside FED-M3-05.
## Review evidence
- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-code-review.sh --uncommitted` — PASS after follow-up remediation; approve, no findings.
- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-security-review.sh --uncommitted` — PASS after follow-up remediation; risk level none, no findings.
- Security-review note: read-path audit logging remains intentionally deferred to M4 per orchestrator clarification and FED-M3-05 scope.
## Risks / follow-up
- Read-path audit logging remains intentionally deferred to M4.