diff --git a/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/manifest.txt b/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/manifest.txt
index 84efaf64..d0342b1b 100644
--- a/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/manifest.txt
+++ b/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/manifest.txt
@@ -390,15 +390,33 @@
 #              (acceptance a). A git-repo-in-operator-dir design was REJECTED:
 #              its who/why claim is false under shared-author fleets, and
 #              .gitignore is pattern-based where acceptance (b) demands
-#              fail-closed. (2) CREDENTIAL HARD GATE (acceptance b): byte
-#              capture is REFUSED — never redacted — for (i) credential-store
-#              PATHS (mosaic-home credentials.json, tools/_lib/credentials.json,
-#              credentials/**, any basename credentials.json), (ii)
-#              secret-SHAPED content (digest.sh's six scrub shapes reused as a
-#              content-deny grep), (iii) files over WAKE_PREIMAGE_MAX_BYTES
-#              (default 1 MiB). A refused file still gets its hash/size/mtime
-#              row (captured:false + refused reason) so change TIME survives
-#              even when content must not. (3) FIRST-CLASS CAUSE LINE
+#              fail-closed. (2) CREDENTIAL HARD GATE (acceptance b), FOUR
+#              LAYERS (#964 re-verdict: B2 cases C+D): (i) POLARITY — extras
+#              (WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA) are RECORD-ONLY by default (ledger row +
+#              cause line, NO bytes); byte capture for an extra requires the
+#              path listed in WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE (colon-separated opt-in);
+#              only the core set (adapter, watch-list) is capture-eligible by
+#              default — a shape list can only refuse the secrets someone
+#              already enumerated, so safety may not rest on one (#964-D).
+#              (ii) PATH DENY evaluated on BOTH the raw and realpath-resolved
+#              candidate forms against BOTH unresolved and resolved
+#              mosaic-home anchors (credentials.json,
+#              tools/_lib/credentials.json, credentials/**, any basename
+#              credentials.json) — a deny list written in unresolved paths
+#              cannot match a path resolved before it arrived (#964-C), and a
+#              symlinked opt-in entry cannot smuggle a denied target (deny
+#              runs FIRST, independent of what the opt-in matched). (iii)
+#              CONTENT DENY on the opt-in path only, defense-in-depth NOT the
+#              safety mechanism: digest.sh's six scrub shapes + a
+#              named-assignment probe (key/token/secret/passw/hmac/credential/
+#              bearer = unbroken value >=16 chars); probe ERROR fails TOWARD
+#              refusal (an error exit is not a negative result); false
+#              positives are acceptable — a false match only withholds byte
+#              capture, never tracking. (iv) size cap WAKE_PREIMAGE_MAX_BYTES
+#              (default 1 MiB). Deny ALWAYS wins over the opt-in. A refused
+#              file still gets its hash/size/mtime row (captured:false +
+#              refused reason) so change TIME survives even when content must
+#              not. (3) FIRST-CLASS CAUSE LINE
 #              (acceptance c): on a change (or deletion — ABSENT is a state,
 #              not an error), one class=actionable entry is enqueued via the
 #              store allocator with locators {kind:preimage, path (§2.1 hard
@@ -414,13 +432,20 @@
 #              object/ledger write, or failed enqueue is a loud non-zero —
 #              never read as "no change"; in both integrations the pass exits
 #              non-zero but source observation still proceeds (no starvation).
-#              First-seen is a SILENT baseline (detector first-poll idiom).
+#              An ABSENT/EMPTY ledger with objects/ NON-empty is a loud
+#              non-zero REFUSAL to re-baseline (#964-B11: objects with no
+#              ledger cannot be a first install — history was deleted; the
+#              first-install path must not silently absorb it). First-seen on
+#              a genuinely clean state dir is a SILENT baseline (detector
+#              first-poll idiom).
 #              The installer is UNCHANGED — Gate A auto-enumerates the new
 #              file from the filesystem; the recording site is the runtime
 #              tick, which is where the env-derived preimage set exists.
 #              store.sh/digest.sh/beacon.sh UNCHANGED; watch-list schema
 #              UNTOUCHED ([1,1]). Changed: preimage.sh (new), detector.sh,
-#              reconcile.sh (+ test-wake-preimage.sh P1-P12).
+#              reconcile.sh (+ test-wake-preimage.sh P1-P17; P13-P17 are the
+#              #964 re-verdict regression needles: symlinked store, live
+#              secret value, polarity, ledger deletion, allowlist-symlink).
 component=wake
 version=0.7.0
 
diff --git a/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/preimage.sh b/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/preimage.sh
index 68771cd8..40f09eae 100755
--- a/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/preimage.sh
+++ b/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/preimage.sh
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@
 #       * the resolved file behind WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD (first word),
 #       * the WAKE_WATCH_LIST file,
 #       * operator-declared extras via WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA (colon-separated —
-#         e.g. detector.env, sink/feed scripts).
+#         e.g. sink/feed scripts). Extras are RECORD-ONLY by default (see the
+#         credential hard gate below); never list key-material files.
 #   - Records each file's (sha256, size, mtime, ts) as an APPEND-ONLY ledger
 #     row in <state>/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl and stores the full bytes
 #     CONTENT-ADDRESSED at <state>/preimage/objects/<sha256> — so a change is
@@ -29,28 +30,48 @@
 #     not just N re-baselined sources. Acceptance (c).
 #
 # CREDENTIAL HARD GATE — acceptance (b): the mechanism must be UNABLE to
-# capture credential material even by operator error. Enforced two ways, both
+# capture credential material even by operator error. Layered, every layer
 # fail-closed toward NOT capturing bytes (the hash/size/mtime row is still
 # written — change-time attribution survives, content capture does not;
 # a sha256 discloses nothing about the bytes):
-#   1. PATH deny: the mosaic credential store locations
+#   1. POLARITY (#964 review, case D): byte capture is DENY-BY-DEFAULT for
+#      operator extras. WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA paths are RECORD-ONLY (rows +
+#      first-class change entries, no bytes) unless explicitly listed in
+#      WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE — a shape list can only refuse the secrets
+#      someone already enumerated, so arbitrary operator-pointed files must
+#      not default to capture. The CORE set (the resolved adapter file, the
+#      watch-list) is capture-eligible: it IS the preimage definition this
+#      tool exists to snapshot, and the deny layers below still apply to it.
+#   2. PATH deny: the mosaic credential store locations
 #      (<mosaic-home>/credentials.json, <mosaic-home>/tools/_lib/
 #      credentials.json, anything under <mosaic-home>/credentials/, and any
-#      file literally named credentials.json) are refused by resolved realpath
-#      before a single byte is read into the object store.
-#   2. CONTENT deny: a candidate whose bytes match the well-known secret-token
+#      file literally named credentials.json) are refused. Evaluated on BOTH
+#      the operator-supplied form AND the symlink-resolved form, against BOTH
+#      the unresolved and resolved forms of the mosaic-home anchor — a deny
+#      list written only in unresolved paths cannot match a path that was
+#      resolved before it arrived (#964 review, case C).
+#   3. CONTENT deny: a candidate whose bytes match the well-known secret-token
 #      shapes (same conservative set digest.sh redacts: PAT/Slack/AKIA/JWT/PEM)
-#      is refused — refusal, not redaction: a redacted preimage would be a
-#      false witness, and secret bytes must never land in the object store.
+#      OR a named-assignment secret shape (key/token/secret/passw/hmac/
+#      credential/bearer = long unbroken value — catches prefix-less
+#      high-entropy keys, e.g. an HMAC key in an env file) is refused —
+#      refusal, not redaction: a redacted preimage would be a false witness,
+#      and secret bytes must never land in the object store. Deliberately
+#      conservative toward REFUSAL: a false match only withholds byte capture,
+#      never tracking.
 #   Plus a size cap (WAKE_PREIMAGE_MAX_BYTES, default 1 MiB) so a stray extra
 #   pointing at a large binary cannot turn provenance into data hoovering.
+#   Deny ALWAYS wins over the WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE opt-in.
 #
 # FAIL-LOUD DISCIPLINE (the D2/#955 class, both layers): an infrastructure
 # failure of THIS tool (unresolvable adapter, unreadable/corrupt ledger,
 # failed durable write, failed enqueue) exits NON-ZERO and is never read as
 # "no change". A corrupt ledger REFUSES to compare (and to re-baseline):
 # silently restarting history would erase the very attribution this exists
-# to provide.
+# to provide. Likewise (#964 review, B11) an ABSENT/EMPTY ledger while
+# objects/ still holds prior captures is DELETED HISTORY, not a first
+# install — it refuses loudly instead of re-baselining, because a silent
+# restart would absorb the next real change as first-seen.
 #
 # Operator-agnostic (framework firewall): all state via XDG/env; the deny
 # list names only framework-defined credential locations, no operator hosts/
@@ -95,7 +116,8 @@ Usage: preimage.sh <command>
 
 Commands:
   check [--enqueue]   Compare every preimage-set file against the ledger head.
-                      A changed file gets a new ledger row + captured bytes;
+                      A changed file gets a new ledger row (+ captured bytes
+                      when capture-eligible and not denied — see Environment);
                       with --enqueue each change (not first-seen) also enqueues
                       ONE first-class class=actionable store entry (hard
                       locator: path). First-seen files baseline SILENTLY (row,
@@ -111,9 +133,19 @@ Environment:
   WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD  Adapter command; its resolved file joins the set.
   WAKE_WATCH_LIST           Watch-list path; joins the set when set.
   WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA       Colon-separated additional operator preimage files
-                            (e.g. detector.env, sink scripts). A listed path
-                            that does not exist is tracked as ABSENT (deletion
-                            of a preimage file is a change, not an error).
+                            (e.g. sink/feed scripts). Extras are RECORD-ONLY
+                            by default: changes get a hash/size/mtime row and
+                            a first-class change entry, but their BYTES are
+                            never captured unless the path is also listed in
+                            WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE. A listed path that does not
+                            exist is tracked as ABSENT (deletion of a preimage
+                            file is a change, not an error).
+  WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE     Colon-separated allowlist of extras whose bytes
+                            MAY be captured. The credential deny rules ALWAYS
+                            win over this list. NEVER list files that can hold
+                            key material (env files with keys/HMACs, credential
+                            stores): the deny gate is a backstop, not a
+                            license.
   WAKE_PREIMAGE_MAX_BYTES   Byte-capture cap (default 1048576). Larger files:
                             hash/size/mtime recorded, bytes refused.
   WAKE_STATE_HOME/WAKE_AGENT  store namespace (see store.sh).
@@ -122,10 +154,21 @@ EOF
 
 # --- preimage-set derivation (generic; no operator paths baked in) ----------
 
+# _realpath_or_self PATH — resolved form when resolvable, the input otherwise.
+_realpath_or_self() {
+  local p="$1"
+  if command -v realpath >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    realpath -- "$p" 2>/dev/null || printf '%s' "$p"
+  else
+    printf '%s' "$p"
+  fi
+}
+
 # _resolve_cmd_file CMD — resolve the FIRST WORD of an adapter command string
-# to a real file. Non-zero (loud) if it cannot be resolved: an adapter the
-# detector will invoke but provenance cannot see is an infrastructure failure,
-# not a smaller set.
+# to a real file; prints `raw<TAB>resolved`. Non-zero (loud) if it cannot be
+# resolved: an adapter the detector will invoke but provenance cannot see is
+# an infrastructure failure, not a smaller set. BOTH forms are kept: the deny
+# gate must see the pre-resolution form too (#964 review, case C).
 _resolve_cmd_file() {
   local cmd="$1" word path
   # shellcheck disable=SC2086
@@ -139,23 +182,22 @@ _resolve_cmd_file() {
     [ -f "$path" ] || return 1
   fi
   # realpath so the ledger keys on the actual file, not a symlink alias.
-  if command -v realpath >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    realpath -- "$path" 2>/dev/null || printf '%s' "$path"
-  else
-    printf '%s' "$path"
-  fi
+  printf '%s\t%s' "$path" "$(_realpath_or_self "$path")"
 }
 
-# _preimage_set — print the derived set, one path per line. Paths from
-# WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA are printed EVEN IF ABSENT (deletion is a tracked
-# state); the adapter and watch-list must resolve (loud failure otherwise —
-# see _resolve_cmd_file rationale).
+# _preimage_set — print the derived set, one member per line as
+# `origin<TAB>raw<TAB>resolved` (origin: core|extra). BOTH path forms travel
+# with every member so the deny gate and the capture allowlist are evaluated
+# on the SAME candidate in BOTH its forms — resolving before denying is the
+# #964 case-C ordering defect. Paths from WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA are printed
+# EVEN IF ABSENT (deletion is a tracked state); the adapter and watch-list
+# must resolve (loud failure otherwise — see _resolve_cmd_file rationale).
 _preimage_set() {
   local failed=0
   if [ -n "${WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD:-}" ]; then
     local af
     if af="$(_resolve_cmd_file "$WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD")"; then
-      printf '%s\n' "$af"
+      printf 'core\t%s\n' "$af"
     else
       echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD ('$WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD') does not resolve to a file; the preimage definition cannot be observed (NOT treated as 'no change')." >&2
       failed=1
@@ -163,12 +205,7 @@ _preimage_set() {
   fi
   if [ -n "${WAKE_WATCH_LIST:-}" ]; then
     if [ -f "$WAKE_WATCH_LIST" ]; then
-      if command -v realpath >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        realpath -- "$WAKE_WATCH_LIST" 2>/dev/null || printf '%s' "$WAKE_WATCH_LIST"
-      else
-        printf '%s' "$WAKE_WATCH_LIST"
-      fi
-      printf '\n'
+      printf 'core\t%s\t%s\n' "$WAKE_WATCH_LIST" "$(_realpath_or_self "$WAKE_WATCH_LIST")"
     else
       echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — WAKE_WATCH_LIST ('$WAKE_WATCH_LIST') is not a file; the preimage definition cannot be observed." >&2
       failed=1
@@ -180,11 +217,10 @@ _preimage_set() {
       [ -n "$p" ] || continue
       # Extras are tracked even when absent (ABSENT is a state). Resolve the
       # realpath only when the file exists; otherwise track the literal path.
-      if [ -e "$p" ] && command -v realpath >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        realpath -- "$p" 2>/dev/null || printf '%s' "$p"
-        printf '\n'
+      if [ -e "$p" ]; then
+        printf 'extra\t%s\t%s\n' "$p" "$(_realpath_or_self "$p")"
       else
-        printf '%s\n' "$p"
+        printf 'extra\t%s\t%s\n' "$p" "$p"
       fi
     done
   fi
@@ -193,28 +229,59 @@ _preimage_set() {
 
 # --- credential hard gate (acceptance (b)) ----------------------------------
 
-# _deny_path PATH — 0 (deny) iff PATH is a known credential-store location.
-# Framework-defined locations only (firewall): the mosaic credential store,
-# the tools/_lib credential file the framework-manifest itself carves out of
-# tools/**, the credentials/ operator subtree, and any file literally named
-# credentials.json.
+# _deny_path RAW RESOLVED — 0 (deny) iff EITHER form of the candidate names a
+# known credential-store location. Framework-defined locations only
+# (firewall): the mosaic credential store, the tools/_lib credential file the
+# framework-manifest itself carves out of tools/**, the credentials/ operator
+# subtree, and any file literally named credentials.json.
+#
+# Evaluated on BOTH the operator-supplied (raw) form and the symlink-resolved
+# form, against BOTH the unresolved and resolved forms of the mosaic-home
+# anchor: a deny list written only in unresolved paths cannot match a path
+# that was resolved before it arrived (#964 review, case C — a symlink whose
+# target was renamed slipped every path rule because the candidate had
+# already been realpath'd but the anchors never were).
 _deny_path() {
-  local p="$1" home="${MOSAIC_HOME:-$HOME/.config/mosaic}"
-  case "$p" in
-  "$home/credentials.json") return 0 ;;
-  "$home/tools/_lib/credentials.json") return 0 ;;
-  "$home/credentials/"*) return 0 ;;
-  esac
-  case "$(basename -- "$p")" in
-  credentials.json) return 0 ;;
-  esac
+  local raw="$1" resolved="$2"
+  local home="${MOSAIC_HOME:-$HOME/.config/mosaic}" rhome p a
+  rhome="$(_realpath_or_self "$home")"
+  for p in "$raw" "$resolved"; do
+    [ -n "$p" ] || continue
+    for a in "$home" "$rhome"; do
+      case "$p" in
+      "$a/credentials.json") return 0 ;;
+      "$a/tools/_lib/credentials.json") return 0 ;;
+      "$a/credentials/"*) return 0 ;;
+      esac
+    done
+    case "$(basename -- "$p")" in
+    credentials.json) return 0 ;;
+    esac
+  done
   return 1
 }
 
-# _deny_content FILE — 0 (deny) iff FILE's bytes match a well-known secret-
-# token shape. Same conservative shape set digest.sh redacts (PAT / Slack /
-# AKIA / JWT / PEM) — conservative on purpose: a 40-hex git sha never matches.
+# _deny_content FILE — 0 (deny) iff FILE's bytes look secret-shaped.
+# Two probes: (a) the well-known vendor-token shapes digest.sh redacts
+# (PAT / Slack / AKIA / JWT / PEM — conservative: a 40-hex git sha never
+# matches); (b) a named-assignment shape (key/token/secret/passw/hmac/
+# credential/bearer = long unbroken value) that catches prefix-less
+# high-entropy keys, e.g. an HMAC key in an env file (#964 review, case D).
+#
+# (b) is defense-in-depth for the OPT-IN path only, NOT the thing that keeps
+# case D safe — polarity does that (extras are record-only unless allowlisted;
+# a shape list can only refuse the secrets someone already enumerated). It is
+# deliberately conservative toward REFUSAL: a false match (a checksum in a
+# config, a path that happens to be long and unbroken) only withholds byte
+# capture — the hash/size/mtime row and change entry still land. A variable
+# REFERENCE (token="$GITEA_TOKEN") never matches: `$` is not in the value
+# class — only literal secret values do.
+#
+# FAILS TOWARD REFUSAL: if a probe itself errors (unreadable file, grep
+# failure — rc >= 2), the answer is DENY, not capture. An error exit is not a
+# negative result.
 _deny_content() {
+  local rc
   LC_ALL=C grep -Eq \
     -e 'gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}' \
     -e 'github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{16,}' \
@@ -223,6 +290,44 @@ _deny_content() {
     -e 'eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}' \
     -e '-----BEGIN[A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----' \
     -- "$1" 2>/dev/null
+  rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -eq 1 ] || return 0
+  LC_ALL=C grep -Eiq \
+    -e "[A-Za-z0-9_]*(key|token|secret|passw|hmac|credential|bearer)[A-Za-z0-9_]*[[:space:]]*[=:][[:space:]]*[\"']?[A-Za-z0-9+/=_-]{16,}" \
+    -- "$1" 2>/dev/null
+  rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -eq 1 ] || return 0
+  return 1
+}
+
+# _capture_allowed ORIGIN RAW RESOLVED — 0 iff byte capture may even be
+# ATTEMPTED for this member (the deny gate still runs after, and wins).
+# POLARITY (#964 review, case D): core members (the adapter file, the
+# watch-list) are capture-eligible — they ARE the preimage definition this
+# tool exists to snapshot (acceptance (a)). Extras are RECORD-ONLY unless
+# listed in WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE.
+#
+# The allowlist is matched with the SAME both-forms discipline as the deny
+# list (entry raw/resolved vs candidate raw/resolved): two lists keyed on
+# different strings would let a symlink alias slip between them. "Deny wins
+# over opt-in" is a precedence rule, not a guarantee both lists see the same
+# path — the guarantee comes from _check_one running _deny_path on both forms
+# FIRST, independent of anything matched here.
+_capture_allowed() {
+  local origin="$1" raw="$2" resolved="$3"
+  [ "$origin" = "core" ] && return 0
+  [ -n "${WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE:-}" ] || return 1
+  local IFS=':' e er
+  for e in $WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE; do
+    [ -n "$e" ] || continue
+    er="$e"
+    [ -e "$e" ] && er="$(_realpath_or_self "$e")"
+    if [ "$e" = "$raw" ] || [ "$e" = "$resolved" ] ||
+      [ "$er" = "$raw" ] || [ "$er" = "$resolved" ]; then
+      return 0
+    fi
+  done
+  return 1
 }
 
 # --- ledger primitives ------------------------------------------------------
@@ -253,11 +358,12 @@ _ledger_append() {
 
 # --- the check itself -------------------------------------------------------
 
-# _check_one PATH ENQUEUE — compare PATH to its ledger head; on change record
-# (+bytes unless denied) and optionally enqueue. Prints nothing on no-change.
-# Returns: 0 ok (changed or not), 1 infrastructure failure.
+# _check_one ORIGIN RAW PATH ENQUEUE — compare PATH (the resolved form; the
+# ledger keys on it) to its ledger head; on change record (+bytes only if
+# capture-eligible and not denied) and optionally enqueue. Prints nothing on
+# no-change. Returns: 0 ok (changed or not), 1 infrastructure failure.
 _check_one() {
-  local path="$1" enqueue="$2"
+  local origin="$1" raw="$2" path="$3" enqueue="$4"
   local cur_sha size mtime denied="" refused=""
 
   if [ -f "$path" ]; then
@@ -271,12 +377,18 @@ _check_one() {
     mtime="$(stat -c %Y -- "$path" 2>/dev/null || stat -f %m -- "$path" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)"
     local cap="${WAKE_PREIMAGE_MAX_BYTES:-1048576}"
     case "$cap" in '' | *[!0-9]*) cap=1048576 ;; esac
-    # Deny order matters: path first (a known credential store is refused
-    # without a content probe — the hash read above is deliberate: a sha256
-    # discloses nothing about the bytes), size cap second (never content-grep
-    # an oversized file), content shape last.
-    if _deny_path "$path"; then
+    # Gate order matters: path deny FIRST, on BOTH forms, INDEPENDENT of the
+    # capture allowlist — so an allowlisted symlink whose target is denied
+    # refuses no matter what string the allowlist matched (a known credential
+    # store is refused without a content probe; the hash read above is
+    # deliberate: a sha256 discloses nothing about the bytes). Then polarity
+    # (record-only extras never reach the content probe — case D must be safe
+    # WITHOUT the shape list), then size cap (never content-grep an oversized
+    # file), content shape last.
+    if _deny_path "$raw" "$path"; then
       denied="credential-store path (deny list)"
+    elif ! _capture_allowed "$origin" "$raw" "$path"; then
+      denied="extra is record-only by default (byte capture requires WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE; deny rules still win)"
     elif [ "$size" -gt "$cap" ]; then
       denied="exceeds WAKE_PREIMAGE_MAX_BYTES ($size > $cap)"
     elif _deny_content "$path"; then
@@ -303,7 +415,7 @@ _check_one() {
     if [ -n "$denied" ]; then
       captured=false
       refused="$denied"
-      echo "preimage.sh: REFUSED byte capture for $path ($denied) — hash/size/mtime recorded, content NOT stored (acceptance (b), #958)." >&2
+      echo "preimage.sh: byte capture WITHHELD for $path ($denied) — hash/size/mtime recorded, content NOT stored (#958)." >&2
     else
       mkdir -p "$OBJECTS" || return 1
       if [ ! -f "$OBJECTS/$cur_sha" ]; then
@@ -397,10 +509,21 @@ cmd_check() {
     echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — cannot acquire preimage lock" >&2
     exit 1
   fi
-  local failed=0 p
-  while IFS= read -r p; do
-    [ -n "$p" ] || continue
-    _check_one "$p" "$enqueue" || failed=1
+  # #964 review (B11): an ABSENT/EMPTY ledger while objects/ still holds
+  # prior captures is DELETED HISTORY, not a first install — the asymmetry is
+  # locally detectable and is the whole detection. Re-baselining here would
+  # silently absorb the next real change as first-seen (the exact erasure
+  # this tool exists to prevent). ABSENT is not CORRUPT: it must not take the
+  # first-install path either.
+  if [ ! -s "$LEDGER" ] && [ -d "$OBJECTS" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A -- "$OBJECTS" 2>/dev/null)" ]; then
+    echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — preimage ledger $LEDGER is ABSENT/EMPTY but $OBJECTS still holds prior objects: history was deleted; REFUSING to re-baseline over it (a silent restart would absorb the next real change as first-seen). Restore the ledger, or move objects/ aside explicitly after investigation." >&2
+    _wake_lock_release
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  local failed=0 origin raw resolved
+  while IFS=$'\t' read -r origin raw resolved; do
+    [ -n "$resolved" ] || continue
+    _check_one "$origin" "$raw" "$resolved" "$enqueue" || failed=1
   done <<EOF
 $set_list
 EOF
@@ -419,7 +542,9 @@ cmd_status() {
 }
 
 cmd_set() {
-  _preimage_set || exit 1
+  local s
+  s="$(_preimage_set)" || exit 1
+  [ -n "$s" ] && printf '%s\n' "$s" | cut -f3
 }
 
 main() {
diff --git a/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/test-wake-preimage.sh b/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/test-wake-preimage.sh
index 63c2bb80..f9058e60 100755
--- a/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/test-wake-preimage.sh
+++ b/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/test-wake-preimage.sh
@@ -23,6 +23,24 @@
 #   P12 detector: preimage infra failure is LOUD (pass exits non-zero) but does
 #       NOT starve source observation
 #
+# Regression needles from the #964 NOT-CLEAR review (decoy method: plant the
+# bytes, grep the WHOLE state dir — the decoy does not know what the code
+# believes):
+#   P13 case C: symlinked/renamed credential store (mosaic-home itself behind
+#       a symlink; a renamed target outside every path rule) — refused on BOTH
+#       path forms / by content, bytes grep-absent          (acceptance b)
+#   P14 case D: prefix-less high-entropy key (detector.env class) — safe
+#       WITHOUT opt-in by POLARITY alone (must hold with the shape list
+#       deleted), and refused WITH opt-in by the named-assignment shape
+#   P15 polarity: extras are RECORD-ONLY by default (change row + enqueue, no
+#       bytes); byte capture requires explicit WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE opt-in
+#   P16 case B11: ledger deleted while objects/ survives — LOUD refusal to
+#       re-baseline; the v2->v3 change is NOT absorbed as first-seen
+#   P17 allowlist symmetry: an allowlisted symlink whose TARGET is denied
+#       refuses (deny runs first, on both forms — precedence is not path
+#       agreement); a symlink to an ALLOWED target still captures (the fix
+#       must not close case C by breaking every symlinked path)
+#
 # Uses FAKE/STUB sources only (no live network). Isolated per test.
 # shellcheck disable=SC2030,SC2031
 set -uo pipefail
@@ -102,29 +120,31 @@ echo "== P1: first-seen -> SILENT baseline (rows, no enqueue) =="
   [ "$(depth)" = "0" ] || fail_msg "P1: first-seen must NOT enqueue (depth=$(depth))"
 ) && ok
 
-echo "== P2: change -> prior bytes + first-class hard-locator enqueue =="
+echo "== P2: adapter change -> prior bytes + first-class hard-locator enqueue =="
 (
   WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p2)"
   export WAKE_STATE_HOME
   unset WAKE_AGENT
   fx="$TMP_ROOT/p2fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
   make_stub "$fx"; make_wl "$fx/wl.json"
-  printf 'adapter preimage v1\n' >"$fx/extra.sh"
-  export WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD="$fx/adapter.sh" WAKE_WATCH_LIST="$fx/wl.json" WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA="$fx/extra.sh"
+  # Acceptance (a) names the OPERATOR ADAPTER — a core member. Core members
+  # capture by default (they ARE the preimage definition); extras do not (P15).
+  export WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD="$fx/adapter.sh" WAKE_WATCH_LIST="$fx/wl.json"
+  unset WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE MOSAIC_HOME
   "$PRE" check --enqueue >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P2: baseline failed"
-  old_sha="$(sha256sum "$fx/extra.sh" | awk '{print $1}')"
-  printf 'adapter preimage v2 CHANGED\n' >"$fx/extra.sh"
-  new_sha="$(sha256sum "$fx/extra.sh" | awk '{print $1}')"
+  cp "$fx/adapter.sh" "$fx/adapter.v1"
+  old_sha="$(sha256sum "$fx/adapter.sh" | awk '{print $1}')"
+  printf '# adapter v2 CHANGED\n' >>"$fx/adapter.sh"
+  new_sha="$(sha256sum "$fx/adapter.sh" | awk '{print $1}')"
   out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
   [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail_msg "P2: change check must exit 0 (rc=$rc) [$out]"
   sd="$(state_dir)"
-  row="$(jq -c --arg p "$(realpath "$fx/extra.sh")" 'select(.path == $p)' "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl" | tail -n1)"
+  row="$(jq -c --arg p "$(realpath "$fx/adapter.sh")" 'select(.path == $p)' "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl" | tail -n1)"
   [ "$(jq -r '.prev // ""' <<<"$row")" = "$old_sha" ] || fail_msg "P2: new row must carry prev=<old sha> [$row]"
   [ "$(jq -r '.sha256' <<<"$row")" = "$new_sha" ] || fail_msg "P2: new row sha mismatch [$row]"
   # Acceptance (a): the PRIOR BYTES are retrievable from durable state alone.
-  [ -f "$sd/preimage/objects/$old_sha" ] || fail_msg "P2: prior bytes object missing"
-  [ "$(cat "$sd/preimage/objects/$old_sha")" = "adapter preimage v1" ] || fail_msg "P2: prior bytes not byte-exact"
-  [ -f "$sd/preimage/objects/$new_sha" ] || fail_msg "P2: current bytes object missing"
+  cmp -s "$sd/preimage/objects/$old_sha" "$fx/adapter.v1" || fail_msg "P2: prior bytes missing or not byte-exact"
+  cmp -s "$sd/preimage/objects/$new_sha" "$fx/adapter.sh" || fail_msg "P2: current bytes object missing or mismatched"
   # Acceptance (c): ONE first-class actionable with a §2.1 hard locator (path).
   [ "$(depth)" = "1" ] || fail_msg "P2: exactly one enqueue expected (depth=$(depth))"
   ent="$(tail -n1 "$sd/pending.jsonl")"
@@ -171,8 +191,11 @@ echo "== P4: credential-store PATH refused — bytes never captured (acceptance
   mkdir -p "$MOSAIC_HOME"
   secret='cred-value-P4-do-not-capture'
   printf '{"svc":{"token":"%s"}}\n' "$secret" >"$MOSAIC_HOME/credentials.json"
-  # Operator error: the credential store listed as a preimage extra.
+  # Operator error: the credential store listed as a preimage extra — AND
+  # explicitly opted in to capture. Deny must win over the opt-in (#964: a
+  # path both denied and allowlisted must refuse).
   export WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA="$MOSAIC_HOME/credentials.json"
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE="$MOSAIC_HOME/credentials.json"
   unset WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD WAKE_WATCH_LIST
   out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
   [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail_msg "P4: refusal is not an infra failure (rc=$rc) [$out]"
@@ -194,7 +217,8 @@ echo "== P5: secret-SHAPED content refused (refusal, not redaction) =="
   fx="$TMP_ROOT/p5fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
   tok='ghp_abcdefghijklmnop0123456789ABCDEF'
   printf 'export MY_TOKEN=%s\n' "$tok" >"$fx/leaky.env"
-  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA="$fx/leaky.env"
+  # Opted in, so the CONTENT gate (not record-only polarity) is what refuses.
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA="$fx/leaky.env" WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE="$fx/leaky.env"
   unset WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD WAKE_WATCH_LIST MOSAIC_HOME
   out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
   [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail_msg "P5: refusal is not an infra failure (rc=$rc) [$out]"
@@ -281,7 +305,9 @@ echo "== P10: oversized file -> bytes refused, hash still recorded =="
   unset WAKE_AGENT
   fx="$TMP_ROOT/p10fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
   head -c 200 /dev/zero | tr '\0' 'A' >"$fx/big.bin"
+  # Opted in, so the SIZE gate (not record-only polarity) is what refuses.
   export WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA="$fx/big.bin" WAKE_PREIMAGE_MAX_BYTES=64
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE="$fx/big.bin"
   unset WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD WAKE_WATCH_LIST MOSAIC_HOME
   out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
   [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail_msg "P10: size refusal is not an infra failure (rc=$rc) [$out]"
@@ -341,6 +367,166 @@ echo "== P12: detector — preimage infra failure is LOUD but does not starve ob
   [ "$n" -ge 1 ] || fail_msg "P12: source observation must still proceed (no watch hash baselined)"
 ) && ok
 
+echo "== P13: symlinked/renamed credential store refused on BOTH path forms (#964 C) =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p13)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p13fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  # The mosaic home is ITSELF behind a symlink: a deny list written in
+  # unresolved paths cannot match a candidate that was realpath'd before the
+  # deny saw it — unless the anchors are resolved too.
+  mkdir -p "$fx/real-store/credentials"
+  ln -s "$fx/real-store" "$fx/mh"
+  export MOSAIC_HOME="$fx/mh"
+  s1='decoy-P13a-renamed-target-under-store'
+  printf 'x_token=%s\n' "$s1" >"$fx/mh/credentials/brain-creds.json"
+  # And a renamed target OUTSIDE every known store location, reached via a
+  # benign-looking symlink: no path rule can name it — the content gate must
+  # hold on the resolved file.
+  s2='0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdefP13b'
+  printf 'service_hmac_key=%s\n' "$s2" >"$fx/renamed-anywhere.cfg"
+  ln -s "$fx/renamed-anywhere.cfg" "$fx/link-b.env"
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA="$fx/mh/credentials/brain-creds.json:$fx/link-b.env"
+  # Explicit opt-in for BOTH: deny must win over the allowlist.
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE="$fx/mh/credentials/brain-creds.json:$fx/link-b.env"
+  unset WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD WAKE_WATCH_LIST
+  out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail_msg "P13: refusal is not an infra failure (rc=$rc) [$out]"
+  sd="$(state_dir)"
+  n="$(jq -r 'select(.captured == false) | .path' "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl" | wc -l | tr -d '[:space:]')"
+  [ "$n" = "2" ] || fail_msg "P13: both decoys must record captured=false (got $n)"
+  # THE invariant (decoy method): the planted bytes exist NOWHERE in state.
+  if grep -rq "$s1" "$sd" 2>/dev/null; then
+    fail_msg "P13: renamed-target store bytes leaked into the wake state dir"
+  fi
+  if grep -rq "$s2" "$sd" 2>/dev/null; then
+    fail_msg "P13: prefix-less key bytes leaked into the wake state dir"
+  fi
+) && ok
+
+echo "== P14: detector.env-class key — safe WITHOUT opt-in by polarity, refused WITH opt-in by shape (#964 D) =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p14)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p14fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  hm='9f8e7d6c5b4a39281706f5e4d3c2b1a09f8e7d6c'
+  printf 'WAKE_HMAC_KEY=%s\n' "$hm" >"$fx/detector.env"
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA="$fx/detector.env"
+  unset WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD WAKE_WATCH_LIST MOSAIC_HOME WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE
+  # (a) NO opt-in: polarity alone keeps the bytes out. This leg must hold even
+  # with the content shape list deleted — the shape is defense-in-depth for
+  # the opt-in path, never the thing that makes case D read safe.
+  out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail_msg "P14a: record-only tracking must succeed (rc=$rc) [$out]"
+  sd="$(state_dir)"
+  row="$(tail -n1 "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl")"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.captured' <<<"$row")" = "false" ] || fail_msg "P14a: extra must be record-only without opt-in [$row]"
+  if grep -rq "$hm" "$sd" 2>/dev/null; then
+    fail_msg "P14a: key bytes leaked without any opt-in"
+  fi
+  # (b) The operator opts the env file in (the exact error the old usage text
+  # invited): the named-assignment shape must still refuse the bytes.
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE="$fx/detector.env"
+  printf 'WAKE_HMAC_KEY=%s\nrotated=1\n' "$hm" >"$fx/detector.env"
+  out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail_msg "P14b: refusal is not an infra failure (rc=$rc) [$out]"
+  row="$(tail -n1 "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl")"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.captured' <<<"$row")" = "false" ] || fail_msg "P14b: opted-in key material must still refuse [$row]"
+  jq -r '.refused // ""' <<<"$row" | grep -qi 'secret' || fail_msg "P14b: refusal must name secret-shaped content [$row]"
+  if grep -rq "$hm" "$sd" 2>/dev/null; then
+    fail_msg "P14b: key bytes leaked despite refusal"
+  fi
+) && ok
+
+echo "== P15: extras are RECORD-ONLY by default; capture requires explicit opt-in =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p15)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p15fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  printf 'plain v1\n' >"$fx/notes.cfg"
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA="$fx/notes.cfg"
+  unset WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD WAKE_WATCH_LIST MOSAIC_HOME WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE
+  "$PRE" check --enqueue >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P15: baseline failed"
+  printf 'plain v2\n' >"$fx/notes.cfg"
+  sha2="$(sha256sum "$fx/notes.cfg" | awk '{print $1}')"
+  "$PRE" check --enqueue >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P15: change check failed"
+  sd="$(state_dir)"
+  row="$(tail -n1 "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl")"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.captured' <<<"$row")" = "false" ] || fail_msg "P15: default must be record-only [$row]"
+  [ ! -f "$sd/preimage/objects/$sha2" ] || fail_msg "P15: bytes captured without opt-in"
+  [ "$(depth)" = "1" ] || fail_msg "P15: record-only must still track the change (depth=$(depth))"
+  # Opt in -> the next change captures.
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE="$fx/notes.cfg"
+  printf 'plain v3\n' >"$fx/notes.cfg"
+  sha3="$(sha256sum "$fx/notes.cfg" | awk '{print $1}')"
+  "$PRE" check --enqueue >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P15: opted-in change check failed"
+  row="$(tail -n1 "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl")"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.captured' <<<"$row")" = "true" ] || fail_msg "P15: opt-in must capture [$row]"
+  cmp -s "$sd/preimage/objects/$sha3" "$fx/notes.cfg" || fail_msg "P15: opted-in bytes missing or mismatched"
+) && ok
+
+echo "== P16: deleted ledger over surviving objects/ — REFUSE to re-baseline (#964 B11) =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p16)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p16fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  make_stub "$fx"
+  export WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD="$fx/adapter.sh"
+  unset WAKE_WATCH_LIST WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE MOSAIC_HOME
+  "$PRE" check >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P16: v1 baseline failed"
+  printf '# v2\n' >>"$fx/adapter.sh"
+  "$PRE" check >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P16: v2 change failed"
+  sd="$(state_dir)"
+  nobj="$(ls "$sd/preimage/objects" | wc -l | tr -d '[:space:]')"
+  # Delete the ledger; objects/ survives. ABSENT is not CORRUPT — and it is
+  # not a first install either: that asymmetry is locally detectable.
+  rm -f "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl"
+  printf '# v3\n' >>"$fx/adapter.sh"
+  out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -ne 0 ] || fail_msg "P16: absent ledger over prior objects must FAIL LOUD (rc=0) [$out]"
+  echo "$out" | grep -qi 'REFUSING to re-baseline' || fail_msg "P16: the failure must name the refusal [$out]"
+  [ ! -e "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl" ] || fail_msg "P16: the ledger must NOT be silently recreated over deleted history"
+  [ "$(ls "$sd/preimage/objects" | wc -l | tr -d '[:space:]')" = "$nobj" ] || fail_msg "P16: prior objects must remain untouched"
+  [ "$(depth)" = "0" ] || fail_msg "P16: the v2->v3 change must NOT be absorbed or enqueued from an unverifiable baseline (depth=$(depth))"
+) && ok
+
+echo "== P17: allowlist symmetry — symlink to a DENIED target refuses; symlink to an allowed target captures =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p17)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p17fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  export MOSAIC_HOME="$fx/mh"
+  mkdir -p "$MOSAIC_HOME"
+  s='decoy-P17-cred-behind-benign-alias'
+  printf '{"svc":{"token":"%s"}}\n' "$s" >"$MOSAIC_HOME/credentials.json"
+  # A benign-looking alias whose TARGET is denied: the allowlist matches the
+  # alias string, but deny runs FIRST and on BOTH forms — "deny wins over
+  # opt-in" is a precedence rule, path agreement is what makes it hold.
+  ln -s "$MOSAIC_HOME/credentials.json" "$fx/settings.json"
+  # And a symlink to an ALLOWED target: the fix must not close case C by
+  # breaking every symlinked path outright.
+  printf 'benign payload v1\n' >"$fx/target.cfg"
+  ln -s "$fx/target.cfg" "$fx/alias.cfg"
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA="$fx/settings.json:$fx/alias.cfg"
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE="$fx/settings.json:$fx/alias.cfg"
+  unset WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD WAKE_WATCH_LIST
+  out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail_msg "P17: check must exit 0 (rc=$rc) [$out]"
+  sd="$(state_dir)"
+  crow="$(jq -c --arg p "$(realpath "$fx/settings.json")" 'select(.path == $p)' "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl" | tail -n1)"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.captured' <<<"$crow")" = "false" ] || fail_msg "P17: allowlisted symlink to a denied target must refuse [$crow]"
+  if grep -rq "$s" "$sd" 2>/dev/null; then
+    fail_msg "P17: credential bytes leaked via an allowlisted alias"
+  fi
+  brow="$(jq -c --arg p "$(realpath "$fx/alias.cfg")" 'select(.path == $p)' "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl" | tail -n1)"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.captured' <<<"$brow")" = "true" ] || fail_msg "P17: symlink to an allowed target must still capture [$brow]"
+) && ok
+
 echo
 total=$((pass + $(wc -l <"$FAILFILE")))
 echo "== test-wake-preimage: $pass/$total passed =="