plans: row 195 acceptance script takes Gizmoduck's gate item list; B8 issuer and TLS front end (mos-1011)
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@@ -40,13 +40,21 @@ as given: a fresh Linux host with a named admin path, reachable by the deploying
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5. The admin path and the end state. The host ends with no key the factory uid can read. The design names the
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admin path that remains (for example the hypervisor console, or a key kept off the factory uid) and who
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holds it.
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6. The acceptance checks, as a script Duckworth can read: federation R8's separate-host form (the hub's bus
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socket, data root and config dir don't exist on the factory host, the factory host mounts nothing of the
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hub's, no factory agent holds a login or key for the hub host), plus B7. From the factory uid, `sudo -n`,
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`doas -n`, `su`, polkit, and `ssh -o BatchMode=yes` to the hub host must all fail.
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7. The identity provider path (mos-1008, mos-1006). Either the factory holds no credential that can create
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users, change groups, issue tokens or impersonate in the issuer the hub trusts, or the hub uses an issuer
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or tenant the factory can't administer. The acceptance script or a named manual check shows which holds.
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6. The acceptance script, as code Duckworth can read. It takes Gizmoduck's list of infrastructure gate items
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as its input (mos-1011), not a fixed set of checks. Each item names a path, its closed form and its
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accepted form, and the script reports which form holds for each, or fails. The list covers at least:
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- federation R8's separate-host form: the hub's bus socket, data root and config dir don't exist on the
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factory host, the factory host mounts nothing of the hub's, and no factory agent holds a login or key
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for the hub host
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- B7: from the factory uid, `sudo -n`, `doas -n`, `su`, polkit, and `ssh -o BatchMode=yes` to the hub
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host all fail
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- the hypervisor and backup paths ops-01 measured (mos-1011: one PVE node the factory key has root on,
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PBS on that node with unencrypted backups, a flat /16 LAN), each closed or accepted by Jason
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7. The identity provider and TLS front end (B8, mos-1008, mos-1011). Either the factory holds no credential
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that can create users, change groups, issue tokens or impersonate in the issuer the hub trusts, or the hub
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uses an issuer the factory can't administer. A brand, tenant or app inside the same Authentik does not
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count as separate. The same holds for the TLS front end that serves the hub. The proof is a failed admin
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call from every token the factory's root can read. No credential value is printed in that proof.
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## Boundaries
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@@ -57,6 +65,8 @@ as given: a fresh Linux host with a named admin path, reachable by the deploying
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- No tunnel, Traefik or other exposure outside the internal network. That waits for Jason, after Q175 SSO.
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- No credential value is printed, logged or committed. Keys made for the deploy are removed at the end, and
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the acceptance script proves it.
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- The admin-call proof in point 7 and any call to the issuer or the TLS front end run only in a window Mos
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approves, never as a test or an anonymous probe (Q175).
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- Tests in the repository use scratch roots and stand-ins. The live deploy and the acceptance run on the hub
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host are a window with a backup first (where there is state) and a STATE report after.
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