plans: row 195 acceptance script takes Gizmoduck's gate item list; B8 issuer and TLS front end (mos-1011)

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jason.woltje committed 2026-10-20 14:12:19 -05:00
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@@ -40,13 +40,21 @@ as given: a fresh Linux host with a named admin path, reachable by the deploying
5. The admin path and the end state. The host ends with no key the factory uid can read. The design names the
admin path that remains (for example the hypervisor console, or a key kept off the factory uid) and who
holds it.
6. The acceptance checks, as a script Duckworth can read: federation R8's separate-host form (the hub's bus
socket, data root and config dir don't exist on the factory host, the factory host mounts nothing of the
hub's, no factory agent holds a login or key for the hub host), plus B7. From the factory uid, `sudo -n`,
`doas -n`, `su`, polkit, and `ssh -o BatchMode=yes` to the hub host must all fail.
7. The identity provider path (mos-1008, mos-1006). Either the factory holds no credential that can create
users, change groups, issue tokens or impersonate in the issuer the hub trusts, or the hub uses an issuer
or tenant the factory can't administer. The acceptance script or a named manual check shows which holds.
6. The acceptance script, as code Duckworth can read. It takes Gizmoduck's list of infrastructure gate items
as its input (mos-1011), not a fixed set of checks. Each item names a path, its closed form and its
accepted form, and the script reports which form holds for each, or fails. The list covers at least:
- federation R8's separate-host form: the hub's bus socket, data root and config dir don't exist on the
factory host, the factory host mounts nothing of the hub's, and no factory agent holds a login or key
for the hub host
- B7: from the factory uid, `sudo -n`, `doas -n`, `su`, polkit, and `ssh -o BatchMode=yes` to the hub
host all fail
- the hypervisor and backup paths ops-01 measured (mos-1011: one PVE node the factory key has root on,
PBS on that node with unencrypted backups, a flat /16 LAN), each closed or accepted by Jason
7. The identity provider and TLS front end (B8, mos-1008, mos-1011). Either the factory holds no credential
that can create users, change groups, issue tokens or impersonate in the issuer the hub trusts, or the hub
uses an issuer the factory can't administer. A brand, tenant or app inside the same Authentik does not
count as separate. The same holds for the TLS front end that serves the hub. The proof is a failed admin
call from every token the factory's root can read. No credential value is printed in that proof.
## Boundaries
@@ -57,6 +65,8 @@ as given: a fresh Linux host with a named admin path, reachable by the deploying
- No tunnel, Traefik or other exposure outside the internal network. That waits for Jason, after Q175 SSO.
- No credential value is printed, logged or committed. Keys made for the deploy are removed at the end, and
the acceptance script proves it.
- The admin-call proof in point 7 and any call to the issuer or the TLS front end run only in a window Mos
approves, never as a test or an anonymous probe (Q175).
- Tests in the repository use scratch roots and stand-ins. The live deploy and the acceptance run on the hub
host are a window with a backup first (where there is state) and a STATE report after.