mosaicstack/stack
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues 81 Pull Requests 1 Actions Packages Projects Releases 15 Wiki Activity

feat(mosaic): WI-2 mutator-class guard for directive-freshness (#837)
Some checks failed
ci/woodpecker/push/ci Pipeline failed
Details
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was successful
Details

Browse Source 
WI-2: mutator-class guard for the compaction directive-freshness mechanism — command-position parser (prefix x var-indirection unified) + primitive-anchored invariant backstop + all-tools-hook fail-close. Parser-complete on principle: realistic evasion matrix RED-regression-covered, residual exotic evasions proven backstop-caught (B-tests), lens-convergence reached.

closes #829
This commit was merged in pull request #837.
This commit is contained in:
jason.woltje
2026-07-18 05:51:58 +00:00
parent 8ec67a1126
commit abd2791f59
27 changed files with 2579 additions and 46 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

7
docs/architecture/lease-broker-security.md
View File

@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@
- Session IDs and cycle tokens use the OS cryptographic RNG. `Math.random` and model output are not token sources.
- Framing and persistence failures fail closed. Sensitive tokens are not logged.
- Built-in `0700`/`0600` filesystem modes provide same-principal hardening only, not socket authenticity against the same UID. WI-1 provides no distinct-principal isolation. That stronger deployment requires an external protected proxy, ACL, or service boundary, and the boundary must preserve authenticated client identity for the broker's `SO_PEERCRED` and ancestry authorization rather than substituting a shared proxy identity.
- WI-2+ security surfaces—receipts, promotion transactions, mutator gates, hooks, payload construction, and recovery—are explicitly out of scope.
- WI-2 whole-class authorization denies every consequential, unknown, and custom tool while UNVERIFIED; it does not inspect shell strings or trust wrapper selection. First-class Claude/Pi, both Claudex dispatch modes, PRDY, QA remediation, coord, orchestrator, and fleet starts converge on broker register-before-exec; Claudex additionally installs the mandatory all-tools hook inside its preserved isolated config and fails closed on unsafe settings.
- The permanent `check-runtime-launches.py` suite/CI guard scans production source for direct literal, absolute-path, process-API, command-array, and dynamic Claude/Pi launches. It has no bypass allowlist: an unrecognized launch form fails CI until routed through the common boundary.
- WI-2 promotion consumes a WI-1 cycle token before VERIFIED becomes visible. Observer revocation, runtime-generation replacement, broker restart, and monotonic TTL expiry remove authority.
- Receipt observation, payload construction, compaction observers, and constrained recovery implementation remain later surfaces. A receipt can become a promotion prerequisite but is never the safety mechanism.
Coordinator security review must rerun the real socket/peercred acceptance suite on an unrestricted Linux runner and obtain the mandated independent Opus-SECREV review before integration.
Coordinator security review must rerun the real socket/peercred and mutator-gate acceptance suites on an unrestricted Linux runner and obtain the mandated independent Opus-SECREV review before integration.