merge: absorb main into next — 23-commit divergence (08-05..13 base=main window)

17 content commits + 3 merge bubbles were genuinely missing from next (~8,000 lines: goal controller #1152, framework enforcement #1174/#1195, pr-edit wrapper #1173/#1200, pipefail series #1100/#1105/#1106/#1107, git-tools fixes #1073/#1085/#1086/#1089, #991, #1007, enrollment tolerance #1094). 3 commits were already in next by content (#1060 identical, #1066/#1062 evolved twins — conflicts resolved to next's side). Per-commit classification and evidence: mosaic-brain fleet/lanes/stack-remediation/main-next-divergence.md. Conflict resolutions (6 files) itemized in the PR body.
2026-08-19 16:27:17 -05:00
parent 1bdeed62eb 7102ccb93e
commit b01950e92f
105 changed files with 7967 additions and 208 deletions
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ Pi is the native Mosaic agent runtime. The `mosaic pi` launcher:

 1. Injects the full runtime contract via `--append-system-prompt`
 2. Loads Mosaic skills via `--skill` flags
-3. Loads the Mosaic extension via `--extension` for lifecycle hooks
+3. Loads framework-owned `mosaic-extension.ts` and `goal-extension.ts` from
+   `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/` via ordered `--extension` flags
 4. Detects active missions and injects initial prompts

 ## Capabilities vs Other Runtimes
@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ Pi is the native Mosaic agent runtime. The `mosaic pi` launcher:
 - Native thinking levels replace sequential-thinking MCP
 - Native skill discovery compatible with Mosaic SKILL.md format
 - Native extension system for lifecycle hooks (TypeScript, not bash shims)
+- Bounded persistent `/goal` loop with per-turn, post-compaction, and two-pass evidence checks
 - Native session persistence and resume
 - Model-agnostic (Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, Ollama, custom providers)

@@ -104,7 +104,14 @@ The launcher:
 1. Verifies `~/.config/mosaic` exists
 2. Verifies `SOUL.md` exists (auto-runs `mosaic init` if missing)
 3. Injects `AGENTS.md` into the runtime
-4. Forwards all arguments to the runtime CLI
+4. For Pi, loads the framework-owned core and persistent-goal extensions from
+   `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/`
+5. Forwards all arguments to the runtime CLI
+
+Inside `mosaic pi`, `/goal set <statement>` starts a bounded persistent goal loop. Use `/goal status`,
+`/goal pause`, `/goal resume`, or `/goal cancel` to control it. The extension remains part of Mosaic
+under `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts`; it is not installed in Pi's main extension
+directory.

 You can still launch runtimes directly (`claude`, `codex`, etc.) — thin runtime adapters will tell the agent to read `~/.config/mosaic/AGENTS.md`.

@@ -124,7 +131,7 @@ You can still launch runtimes directly (`claude`, `codex`, etc.) — thin runtim
 │   ├── claude/            ← CLAUDE.md, RUNTIME.md, settings.json, hooks
 │   ├── codex/             ← instructions.md, RUNTIME.md
 │   ├── opencode/          ← AGENTS.md, RUNTIME.md
-│   ├── pi/                ← RUNTIME.md, mosaic-extension.ts
+│   ├── pi/                ← RUNTIME.md, mosaic-extension.ts, goal-extension.ts
 │   └── mcp/               ← MCP server configs
 ├── skills/                ← Universal skills (shipped with the framework package)
 ├── skills-local/          ← Local cross-runtime skills
@@ -136,7 +143,7 @@ You can still launch runtimes directly (`claude`, `codex`, etc.) — thin runtim

 | Launch method       | Injection mechanism                                                                       |
 | ------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| `mosaic pi`         | `--append-system-prompt` with composed runtime contract + skills + extension              |
+| `mosaic pi`         | `--append-system-prompt` with composed runtime contract + skills + Mosaic extensions      |
 | `mosaic claude`     | `--append-system-prompt` with composed runtime contract (`AGENTS.md` + runtime reference) |
 | `mosaic codex`      | Writes composed runtime contract to `~/.codex/instructions.md` before launch              |
 | `mosaic opencode`   | Writes composed runtime contract to `~/.config/opencode/AGENTS.md` before launch          |
@@ -60,6 +60,52 @@ If a repo does not expose these scripts, run equivalent local workflow commands
 - Do not auto-resolve data conflicts in shared state files.
 - Keep commits scoped to a single logical change set.

+## Model Tiering
+
+Model choice is a standard, not a preference. Delegating a mechanical grep to a
+frontier reasoning model wastes budget; sending a security review to a cheap tier
+produces a review that passes and proves nothing. Both are defects.
+
+Tiers are named by **capability class**, so the standard survives a model
+generation. An operator binds each class to a concrete model id.
+
+| Class         | Use for                                                                                   |
+| ------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `search`      | grep/glob, file location, status and health checks, one-line mechanical edits             |
+| `build`       | feature implementation, test writing, bugfixes, routine refactors                         |
+| `judge`       | code review, planning, API/compat-sensitive changes                                       |
+| `adversarial` | security review, ambiguous architecture, anything where a wrong "looks fine" is expensive |
+
+Rules:
+
+1. **Start at the cheapest class that can do the task; escalate on evidence, not
+   on nerves.** Omitting a tier is not neutral — it inherits the caller's model,
+   which is usually the most expensive one.
+2. **Compat-sensitive work escalates one class.** A change that must interoperate
+   with an existing contract is judged, not just built.
+3. **A tier assignment is benchmarked, not asserted.** Move a task class to a
+   cheaper tier only against a blind A/B on real work from this codebase, ranked
+   by someone other than the author. "It seemed fine" is not evidence.
+4. **Reviewer independence beats reviewer size.** An `adversarial` verdict from
+   the model that wrote the code is not a second opinion (see Constitution gate 16).
+
+### Where the binding lives
+
+The class→model map is operator configuration, never framework source: model
+availability, cost, and quotas differ per operator and per host.
+
+Resolution order, first hit wins:
+
+1. the config service (DB-backed, surfaced and editable in the Mosaic webUI)
+2. a local operator file (`STANDARDS.local.md`, or `policy/` where the runtime
+   injects it)
+3. the framework default — the class names above, with no binding
+
+Only layer 1 is auditable across a fleet, so it is the target end state; layers 2
+and 3 exist so a host with no config service still runs. A local override that
+silently disagrees with the config service is drift — the same failure class the
+tool-index gate exists to catch, and it belongs in `mosaic doctor`.
+
 ## Prompting Contract

 All runtime adapters should inject:
@@ -11,22 +11,106 @@ All tool suites are located at `~/.config/mosaic/tools/`.

 Mosaic wrappers at `~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/*.sh` handle platform detection and edge cases. Always use these before raw CLI commands.

+This index is complete and is kept complete mechanically: `tools/quality/scripts/check-tools-index.sh`
+fails CI when a wrapper ships without an entry here, or when an entry here names a wrapper that no
+longer exists. A wrapper missing from this list is, from inside an agent session, indistinguishable
+from a wrapper that was never written — which is how the APPROVE/APPROVED incident below happened.
+
+Every command takes `--help`. All of them accept `--login <account>` to pin the acting identity;
+supply it explicitly on any host where the provider CLI's default account is an admin.
+
+| Issues             |                                   |
+| ------------------ | --------------------------------- |
+| `issue-create.sh`  | Create an issue (Gitea or GitHub) |
+| `issue-view.sh`    | Show one issue                    |
+| `issue-list.sh`    | List issues                       |
+| `issue-edit.sh`    | Edit title/body/labels/milestone  |
+| `issue-comment.sh` | Add a comment                     |
+| `issue-assign.sh`  | Assign or unassign                |
+| `issue-close.sh`   | Close an issue                    |
+| `issue-reopen.sh`  | Reopen a closed issue             |
+
+| Pull requests    |                                                           |
+| ---------------- | --------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `pr-create.sh`   | Open a pull request                                       |
+| `pr-edit.sh`     | Edit PR title, body, base branch, or draft/ready state    |
+| `pr-view.sh`     | Show one PR                                               |
+| `pr-list.sh`     | List PRs                                                  |
+| `pr-diff.sh`     | Fetch a PR's diff                                         |
+| `pr-metadata.sh` | PR metadata as JSON (head SHA, base, state, mergeability) |
+| `pr-review.sh`   | **Place a review verdict — see the dialect note below**   |
+| `pr-ci-wait.sh`  | Block until the PR's CI reaches a terminal state          |
+| `pr-merge.sh`    | Merge a PR                                                |
+| `pr-close.sh`    | Close a PR without merging                                |
+
+| Milestones            |                    |
+| --------------------- | ------------------ |
+| `milestone-create.sh` | Create a milestone |
+| `milestone-list.sh`   | List milestones    |
+| `milestone-close.sh`  | Close a milestone  |
+
+| Gates and guards        |                                                                                                           |
+| ----------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `ci-queue-wait.sh`      | CI queue guard — required before push/merge (see below)                                                   |
+| `push-guard.sh`         | Refuse verifications that pass for the wrong reason (e.g. green against an unpushed tree)                 |
+| `mutate-push-guard.sh`  | Regenerate the guard's mutation-coverage table from measurement, so the table cannot drift from the guard |
+| `verify-clean-clone.sh` | Prove the **committed** artifact runs, from a clean clone — not the working tree                          |
+
+| Context              |                                                                                          |
+| -------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `detect-platform.sh` | Resolve the provider (Gitea vs GitHub) for the current repo; every other wrapper uses it |
+| `lane-brief.sh`      | Live dispatch brief for a repo "lane" (milestone/label) straight from the provider       |
+
+| Workspace            |                                                                          |
+| -------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| `mosaic-worktree.sh` | Create/list/remove git worktrees — **the only supported way**; see below |
+| `wrapper-guard.sh`   | PreToolUse hook that enforces the two rules above; not called by hand    |
+
+**Workspace placement is derived, not chosen.** `mosaic-worktree.sh new <branch>` takes a branch
+name and nothing else. Every path comes out of `git worktree list --porcelain` — main worktree,
+repo name, parent dir, then `<parent>/<repo>-worktrees/<branch-slug>`. There is no placement flag
+because a decision an agent has to make is a decision that drifts: the rule "big work goes on a work
+filesystem" already existed in prose and 255 GB accumulated in `$HOME` across 842 directories
+anyway, under five simultaneous conventions on a single host.
+
 ```bash
-# Issues
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/issue-create.sh
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/issue-close.sh
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/mosaic-worktree.sh new <branch> [--from <base>]
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/mosaic-worktree.sh path <branch>   # derived path, no side effect
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/mosaic-worktree.sh list            # this repo's worktrees + state
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/mosaic-worktree.sh rm <branch>     # removal is part of the task
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/mosaic-worktree.sh gc [--apply]    # reclaim clean + fully-pushed ones
+```

-# PRs
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/pr-create.sh
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/pr-merge.sh
+Worktrees rather than clones, because `git worktree list` makes every checkout enumerable — a bare
+clone dropped somewhere on disk can never be safely reclaimed, so it is never reclaimed. `rm` and
+`gc` decide by **evidence, never by size or age**: a worktree is reclaimable only when
+`git status --porcelain` is empty _and_ `git rev-list --count HEAD --not --remotes` is 0. Anything
+else is preserved and reported. `--force` exists and is yours to type deliberately.

-# Milestones
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/milestone-create.sh
+`wrapper-guard.sh` is registered as a Claude Code `PreToolUse` hook on `Bash` (see
+`runtime/claude/settings.json`). It blocks exactly three things and lets everything else through:
+a `git clone`/`git worktree add` targeting `$HOME`; a raw provider-API **write** to an endpoint that
+already has a wrapper above (reads are untouched — they are how you gather evidence); and the
+literal `"event": "APPROVE"`. For a genuine gap no wrapper can express, prefix
+`MOSAIC_WRAPPER_OVERRIDE=1`. Reaching for the override twice for the same call means the wrapper has
+a missing flag — extend the wrapper.
+
+```bash
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/issue-create.sh --help
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/pr-review.sh --pr 42 --event APPROVED --body "..."

 # CI queue guard (required before push/merge; defaults to the checked-out branch)
 ~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/ci-queue-wait.sh --purpose push|merge
 ```

+**Review dialect — the reason `pr-review.sh` is not optional.** Gitea's approve event is
+`APPROVED`; GitHub's is `APPROVE`. Send GitHub's spelling to a Gitea host and it answers **HTTP
+200**, files the review as PENDING, and then rejects the submit with `422 review stay pending` — the
+verdict looks placed and is not. (`REQUEST_CHANGES` is spelled identically on both, so only the
+approve path carries the trap.) `pr-review.sh` sends the correct token for the detected provider.
+Whatever you use, re-read `GET /pulls/{n}/reviews` and assert the state before reporting a verdict
+placed.
+
 The guard exits nonzero for any provider-asserted non-green, missing, or malformed CI state. If credentials or the provider are unavailable, it emits `CANNOT_ASSERT` and writes a JSONL audit record. Push degrades to exit 0 so recovery work is not bricked; merge holds with retryable exit 75 until the provider recovers, then self-clears without manual reset. Neither outcome is evidence that CI was clear. `pr-merge.sh` automatically inspects the exact PR head repository and full commit SHA rather than its `main` base; this also handles fork PRs without branch-name ambiguity. Pass `--expect-head <approved-full-sha>` to bind a commit-specific review or merge-gate verdict; Gitea uses atomic `head_commit_id` and GitHub uses `--match-head-commit`.

 ### Code Review (Codex)
@@ -64,6 +64,16 @@
            "timeout": 10
          }
        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "matcher": "Bash",
+        "hooks": [
+          {
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/wrapper-guard.sh",
+            "timeout": 10
+          }
+        ]
      }
    ],
    "PostToolUse": [
@@ -51,12 +51,26 @@ Skills are discovered from:

 ### Extensions

-The Mosaic Pi extension (`~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/mosaic-extension.ts`) handles:
+`mosaic pi` loads framework-owned extensions directly from `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/` in this
+order:

- Session start/end lifecycle hooks
- Active mission detection and context injection
- Memory routing to `~/.config/mosaic/memory/`
- MACP queue status reporting
+1. `mosaic-extension.ts` — session lifecycle, mission context, memory routing, lease/mutator gates,
+   and fleet heartbeat reporting.
+2. `goal-extension.ts` — optional persistent `/goal` controller with per-turn and post-compaction
+   checks.
+
+The goal extension is deployed by Mosaic and MUST NOT be copied into `~/.pi/agent/extensions/`.
+Use `/goal set <statement>` (or `/goal <statement>`) to start, then `/goal status`, `/goal pause`,
+`/goal resume`, or `/goal cancel` to control it. An active goal is injected before every model
+request, restored from branch-specific session entries, and considered achieved only after two
+consecutive evidence-bearing reports. Common credential shapes are redacted before controller-owned
+goal-state entries are persisted or
+displayed; Pi's own model/tool-call history is separate. Goals and reports must contain references
+and pass/fail summaries rather than secrets or raw sensitive output.
+
+- `MOSAIC_GOAL_MAX_TURNS` — autonomous turn limit, default `40`, accepted range `1..500`.
+- `MOSAIC_GOAL_MAX_NO_PROGRESS` — identical no-progress report limit, default `6`, accepted range
+  `1..100`.

 ### Sessions

@@ -66,7 +66,10 @@ if command -v tmux >/dev/null 2>&1 && command -v cc >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  trap 'tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" kill-server >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; rm -rf "$TEST_ROOT"' EXIT
  MARKER="$TEST_ROOT/loader-marker"
  LIBRARY="$TEST_ROOT/marker.so"
+  FIXTURE_READY="$TEST_ROOT/loader-ready"
+  FIXTURE_FIFO="$TEST_ROOT/loader-block"
  HOLDER_HOME="$TEST_ROOT/holder-home"
+  mkfifo "$FIXTURE_FIFO"
  mkdir -p "$HOLDER_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/run"
  chmod 700 "$HOLDER_HOME/.config" "$HOLDER_HOME/.config/mosaic" \
    "$HOLDER_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet" "$HOLDER_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/run"
@@ -87,7 +90,17 @@ __attribute__((constructor)) static void mark_loader(void) {
 EOF
  cc -shared -fPIC -o "$LIBRARY" "$TEST_ROOT/marker.c"
  MOSAIC_LOADER_MARKER="$MARKER" LD_PRELOAD="$LIBRARY" \
-    tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" new-session -d -s _holder 'sleep 60'
+    tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" new-session -d -s _holder \
+      "touch '$FIXTURE_READY'; read _ < '$FIXTURE_FIFO'"
+  # tmux starts the pane asynchronously. Wait until its contaminated shell has
+  # loaded the constructor and reached a builtin-only FIFO barrier before
+  # clearing the marker; otherwise that expected constructor can race with the
+  # clean holder assertion below and create a false failure.
+  for _attempt in {1..100}; do
+    [ -e "$FIXTURE_READY" ] && break
+    sleep 0.01
+  done
+  [ -e "$FIXTURE_READY" ] || fail "contaminated fixture pane did not become ready"
  [ -s "$MARKER" ] || fail "contaminated fixture did not execute loader constructor"
  server_pid=$(tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" display-message -p '#{pid}')
  : > "$MARKER"
@@ -112,6 +125,7 @@ EOF
  chmod 700 "$AGENT_HOME/fleet/agents"
  cat > "$AGENT_HOME/fleet/agents/$AGENT_NAME.env.generated" <<EOF
 MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=$AGENT_NAME
+MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=$AGENT_NAME
 MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=code
 MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=pi
 MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=
@@ -152,7 +166,8 @@ EOF
  /usr/bin/env -i HOME="$HOLDER_HOME" PATH=/usr/bin:/bin \
    MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET="$TEST_SOCKET" MOSAIC_TMUX_HOLDER=_holder "$HOLDER_START"
  tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" has-session -t '=_holder:0.0' || fail "fresh holder was not created"
-  if tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" show-environment -g LD_PRELOAD 2>/dev/null | grep -q '^LD_PRELOAD='; then
+  ld_preload_env="$(tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" show-environment -g LD_PRELOAD 2>/dev/null)" || true
+  if grep -q '^LD_PRELOAD=' <<<"$ld_preload_env"; then
    fail "fresh holder retained LD_PRELOAD"
  fi
  /usr/bin/env -i HOME="$HOLDER_HOME" PATH=/usr/bin:/bin MOSAIC_HOME="$AGENT_HOME" \
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ _manifest_glob_to_ere() {
          out="$out.*"
        fi
      else
-        out="$out[^/]*"
+        out="${out}[^/]*"
      fi
    else
      case "$c" in
@@ -87,7 +87,8 @@ _manifest_compile_one() {
  local norm; norm="$(_manifest_norm "$1")"
  [[ -n "$norm" ]] || return 0
  if [[ "$norm" == *"*"* ]]; then
-    local re="^$(_manifest_glob_to_ere "$norm")\$"
+    local re
+    re="^$(_manifest_glob_to_ere "$norm")\$"
    if [[ "$2" == F ]]; then
      _MF_KIND+=(re); _MF_EXACT+=(""); _MF_RE+=("$re")
    else
@@ -183,7 +184,10 @@ _mo_matches() {
  for (( i = 0; i < n; i++ )); do
    if [[ "${_MO_KIND[i]}" == exact ]]; then
      pat="${_MO_EXACT[i]}"
-      [[ "$path" == "$pat" || "$path" == "$pat/"* ]] && return 0
+      # Operator exact entries are file carve-outs, not implicit directory
+      # prefixes. Subtree ownership must be declared explicitly as `dir/**`;
+      # otherwise one bare directory entry can hide all drift beneath it.
+      [[ "$path" == "$pat" ]] && return 0
    else
      re="${_MO_RE[i]}"
      [[ "$path" =~ $re ]] && return 0
@@ -155,6 +155,38 @@ warn_if_symlink_tree_present() {

 echo "[mosaic-doctor] Mosaic home: $MOSAIC_HOME"

+# Compare the framework tools that this CLI/package ships with the deployed
+# ~/.config copy that direct wrappers and systemd units actually execute. Doctor
+# is the right boundary: observational, operator-invoked, and already designed
+# to report drift without mutating live tooling or restarting active seats.
+framework_drift_checker="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/../quality/scripts" && pwd)/framework-drift-check.py"
+if [[ -f "$framework_drift_checker" ]]; then
+  echo "[mosaic-doctor] Checking installed framework-tool drift..."
+  drift_timeout="${MOSAIC_DOCTOR_DRIFT_TIMEOUT_SEC:-15}"
+  if ! [[ "$drift_timeout" =~ ^[1-9][0-9]*$ ]]; then
+    warn "Invalid MOSAIC_DOCTOR_DRIFT_TIMEOUT_SEC='$drift_timeout' (expected positive integer); using 15s"
+    drift_timeout=15
+  fi
+  if command -v timeout >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    set +e
+    timeout -s TERM -k 2 "${drift_timeout}s" \
+      python3 "$framework_drift_checker" --installed-root "$MOSAIC_HOME/tools"
+    drift_rc=$?
+    set -e
+    if [[ "$drift_rc" -eq 0 ]]; then
+      pass "Installed framework tools match shipped source"
+    elif [[ "$drift_rc" -eq 124 || "$drift_rc" -eq 137 || "$drift_rc" -eq 143 ]]; then
+      warn "CANNOT_ASSERT framework drift checker timed out after ${drift_timeout}s; continuing remaining doctor checks"
+    else
+      warn "Installed framework-tool drift detected (checker exit $drift_rc; no files changed)"
+    fi
+  else
+    warn "CANNOT_ASSERT timeout utility unavailable; refusing unbounded framework drift check and continuing remaining doctor checks"
+  fi
+else
+  warn "Framework drift checker is absent from the shipped tools tree"
+fi
+
 # Canonical Mosaic checks
 expect_file "$MOSAIC_HOME/STANDARDS.md"
 expect_file "$MOSAIC_HOME/USER.md"
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ if [[ -n "$GROUP" ]]; then
  group_response=$(curl -sk \
    -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
    "${AUTHENTIK_URL}/api/v3/core/groups/?search=${GROUP}")
-  group_pk=$(echo "$group_response" | jq -r ".results[] | select(.name == \"$GROUP\") | .pk" | head -1)
+  group_pk=$(jq -r "first(.results[] | select(.name == \"$GROUP\") | .pk) // empty" <<<"$group_response")
  if [[ -n "$group_pk" ]]; then
    payload=$(echo "$payload" | jq --arg gk "$group_pk" '. + {groups: [$gk]}')
  else
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ is_sensitive_key() {

 is_generated_key() {
  case "$1" in
-    MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME|MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS|MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME|MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL|MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING|MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY|MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR|MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET) return 0 ;;
+    MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME|MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY|MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS|MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME|MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL|MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING|MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY|MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR|MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET) return 0 ;;
    *) return 1 ;;
  esac
 }
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ validate_generated_value() {
  local value="$2"
  case "$key" in
    MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME) safe_agent_name "$value" || fail_env unsafe-agent-name "$key" "$value" ;;
+    MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY) safe_agent_name "$value" || fail_env unsafe-git-identity "$key" "$value" ;;
    MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS) safe_policy_name "$value" || fail_env unsafe-class "$key" "$value" ;;
    MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME)
      case "$value" in claude|codex|opencode|pi) ;; *) fail_env unsupported-runtime "$key" "$value" ;; esac
@@ -195,7 +196,7 @@ load_environment_file() {

 load_environment_file "$GENERATED_ENV" generated
 for required_key in \
-  MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL \
+  MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL \
  MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET; do
  [ -n "${GENERATED_VALUES[$required_key]+set}" ] || fail_env missing-key "$required_key" ''
 done
@@ -203,12 +204,15 @@ load_environment_file "$LOCAL_ENV" local

 [ "${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME]}" = "$AGENT_NAME" ] || \
  fail_env agent-name-mismatch MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME "${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME]}"
+[ "${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY]}" = "$AGENT_NAME" ] || \
+  fail_env git-identity-mismatch MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY "${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY]}"

 MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET]}
 MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME]}
 MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL]}
 MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING]}
 MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR]}
+MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY]}
 MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS]}
 MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY]}
 MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN=${LOCAL_VALUES[MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN]:-}
@@ -393,6 +397,7 @@ LAUNCH_ENV=(
  "PATH=$PANE_PATH"
  "MOSAIC_HOME=$MOSAIC_HOME"
  "MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=$AGENT_NAME"
+  "MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=$MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY"
  "MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=$MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS"
  "MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=$MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME"
  "MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=$MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL"
@@ -14,6 +14,82 @@ fail() {
  exit 1
 }

+pane_command_clears_environment() {
+  local calls_file="$1"
+  local -a argv=()
+  local index
+  mapfile -d '' -t argv < "$calls_file"
+  for ((index = 0; index + 1 < ${#argv[@]}; index++)); do
+    if [ "${argv[$index]}" = /usr/bin/env ] && [ "${argv[$((index + 1))]}" = -i ]; then
+      return 0
+    fi
+  done
+  return 1
+}
+
+print_pane_argv() {
+  local calls_file="$1"
+  local -a argv=()
+  local bytes index
+  mapfile -d '' -t argv < "$calls_file"
+  bytes=$(wc -c < "$calls_file")
+  printf 'observed pane argv: records=%s bytes=%s\n' "${#argv[@]}" "$bytes" >&2
+  for ((index = 0; index < ${#argv[@]}; index++)); do
+    printf '  [%03d] %q\n' "$index" "${argv[$index]}" >&2
+  done
+}
+
+check_pane_environment_boundary() {
+  local calls_file="$1"
+  if pane_command_clears_environment "$calls_file"; then
+    return 0
+  fi
+  print_pane_argv "$calls_file"
+  return 1
+}
+
+contains_literal() {
+  grep -F -- "$2" <<< "$1" >/dev/null
+}
+
+contains_line() {
+  grep -xF -- "$2" <<< "$1" >/dev/null
+}
+
+# Portability regression: inspect the authoritative NUL-delimited argv instead
+# of piping a newline reconstruction through `grep -q` under pipefail. The old
+# pipeline could report failure after a successful match when an upstream
+# producer received SIGPIPE. A large trailing argument keeps that failure class
+# covered without making stream size part of the semantic contract.
+PORTABILITY_CALLS="$ROOT/portability-calls"
+printf -v PORTABILITY_PADDING '%*s' 32768 ''
+PORTABILITY_PADDING=${PORTABILITY_PADDING// /x}
+printf '%s\0' /usr/bin/env -i "$PORTABILITY_PADDING" > "$PORTABILITY_CALLS"
+pane_command_clears_environment "$PORTABILITY_CALLS" || \
+  fail "valid large pane argv was rejected by the environment-boundary assertion"
+
+assert_pane_boundary_rejected() {
+  local case_name="$1"
+  local expected_records="$2"
+  local diagnostic
+  if diagnostic=$(check_pane_environment_boundary "$PORTABILITY_CALLS" 2>&1); then
+    fail "pane boundary accepted invalid $case_name fixture"
+  fi
+  contains_literal "$diagnostic" "records=$expected_records bytes=" || \
+    fail "pane argv diagnostic omitted counts for $case_name fixture"
+  contains_literal "$diagnostic" '[000]' || \
+    fail "pane argv diagnostic omitted indexed arguments for $case_name fixture"
+}
+
+printf '%s\0' tmux -i > "$PORTABILITY_CALLS"
+assert_pane_boundary_rejected missing-env 2
+printf '%s\0' /usr/bin/env HOME=/untrusted > "$PORTABILITY_CALLS"
+assert_pane_boundary_rejected missing-i 2
+printf '%s\0' /usr/bin/env HOME=/untrusted -i > "$PORTABILITY_CALLS"
+assert_pane_boundary_rejected non-adjacent-i 3
+printf '%s\0' -i /usr/bin/env > "$PORTABILITY_CALLS"
+assert_pane_boundary_rejected reversed-boundary 2
+
 cat > "$FAKE_BIN/tmux" <<'SHIM'
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
 set -euo pipefail
@@ -113,6 +189,7 @@ write_generated() {
  chmod 600 "$home/fleet/run/holder-owner"
  cat > "$home/fleet/agents/$agent.env.generated" <<EOF
 MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=$agent
+MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=$agent
 MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=code
 MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=pi
 MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=openai-codex/gpt-5.6-sol
@@ -144,6 +221,7 @@ run_start() {
  HOME="$home" PATH="$FAKE_BIN:$PATH" MOSAIC_TEST_TMUX_CALLS="$TMUX_CALLS" \
    MOSAIC_TEST_PANE_PID="${MOSAIC_TEST_PANE_PID:-}" \
    MOSAIC_TEST_HELD_SESSIONS="${MOSAIC_TEST_HELD_SESSIONS:-}" \
+    MOSAIC_TEST_FIXED_EPOCH="${MOSAIC_TEST_FIXED_EPOCH:-}" \
    MOSAIC_TEST_HOME="$home" \
    MOSAIC_TEST_FLEET_OWNER=123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000 \
    MOSAIC_HOME="$home" "$START" "$agent"
@@ -159,11 +237,11 @@ write_generated "$HOME_VALID" "$AGENT_VALID"
 # launcher reported as fine.
 MOSAIC_TEST_PANE_PID=$$ run_start "$HOME_VALID" "$AGENT_VALID"
 valid_args=$(tr '\0' '\n' < "$TMUX_CALLS")
-echo "$valid_args" | grep -qF new-session || fail "valid generated projection did not reach tmux"
-echo "$valid_args" | grep -qF 'mosaic' || fail "fixed mosaic launcher command missing"
-echo "$valid_args" | grep -qF 'yolo' || fail "fixed yolo launcher command missing"
-echo "$valid_args" | grep -qF 'pi' || fail "roster runtime missing"
-if echo "$valid_args" | grep -qF 'bash -c'; then
+contains_literal "$valid_args" new-session || fail "valid generated projection did not reach tmux"
+contains_literal "$valid_args" mosaic || fail "fixed mosaic launcher command missing"
+contains_literal "$valid_args" yolo || fail "fixed yolo launcher command missing"
+contains_literal "$valid_args" pi || fail "roster runtime missing"
+if contains_literal "$valid_args" 'bash -c'; then
  fail "launcher constructed a shell command payload"
 fi

@@ -218,8 +296,44 @@ echo "$legacy_args" | grep -qF new-session || fail "legacy single-tree launch re
 # The pane must start through an absolute clean-environment boundary. Its
 # runtime command remains an argv vector, but no holder/session environment
 # control variable can pass through the pane command.
-echo "$valid_args" | grep -qxF '/usr/bin/env' || fail "pane does not use absolute env"
-echo "$valid_args" | grep -qxF -- '-i' || fail "pane environment is not cleared"
+check_pane_environment_boundary "$TMUX_CALLS" || \
+  fail "pane command did not use an adjacent /usr/bin/env -i boundary"
+
+# Git identity is generated authority, not an optional or independently mutable
+# local value. Each invalid form must fail before fake tmux receives a call.
+assert_git_identity_rejected() {
+  local case_name="$1"
+  local expected_code="$2"
+  local home="$ROOT/git-identity-$case_name"
+  local agent="coder-git-identity-$case_name"
+  local generated="$home/fleet/agents/$agent.env.generated"
+  write_generated "$home" "$agent"
+
+  case "$case_name" in
+    missing) grep -v '^MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=' "$generated" > "$generated.next" && mv "$generated.next" "$generated" ;;
+    unsafe) sed -i 's|^MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=.*$|MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=bad/identity|' "$generated" ;;
+    mismatch) sed -i 's|^MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=.*$|MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=other-agent|' "$generated" ;;
+    local-shadow)
+      printf 'MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=%s\n' "$agent" > "$home/fleet/agents/$agent.env.local"
+      chmod 600 "$home/fleet/agents/$agent.env.local"
+      ;;
+    *) fail "unknown Git identity rejection case: $case_name" ;;
+  esac
+  chmod 600 "$generated"
+
+  : > "$TMUX_CALLS"
+  if output=$(run_start "$home" "$agent" 2>&1); then
+    fail "Git identity case $case_name was accepted"
+  fi
+  [ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before Git identity $case_name rejection"
+  contains_literal "$output" "code=$expected_code" || \
+    fail "Git identity $case_name diagnostic omitted code $expected_code"
+}
+
+assert_git_identity_rejected missing missing-key
+assert_git_identity_rejected unsafe unsafe-git-identity
+assert_git_identity_rejected mismatch git-identity-mismatch
+assert_git_identity_rejected local-shadow generated-key-shadow

 # The generated-file parent is a security boundary too: even a private regular
 # file is untrusted if its parent can be replaced or written by another user.
@@ -232,7 +346,7 @@ if output=$(run_start "$HOME_UNSAFE_PARENT" coder-parent 2>&1); then
  fail "generated file under a world-writable parent was accepted"
 fi
 [ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before unsafe parent rejection"
-echo "$output" | grep -qF 'code=unsafe-permissions' || fail "unsafe parent diagnostic missing"
+contains_literal "$output" 'code=unsafe-permissions' || fail "unsafe parent diagnostic missing"

 : > "$TMUX_CALLS"
 HOME_SYMLINK_PARENT="$ROOT/symlink-parent"
@@ -243,7 +357,7 @@ if output=$(run_start "$HOME_SYMLINK_PARENT" coder-symlink-parent 2>&1); then
  fail "generated file under a symlinked parent was accepted"
 fi
 [ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before symlinked parent rejection"
-echo "$output" | grep -qF 'code=unsafe-directory' || fail "symlinked parent diagnostic missing"
+contains_literal "$output" 'code=unsafe-directory' || fail "symlinked parent diagnostic missing"

 # Every managed ancestor is a boundary: MOSAIC_HOME, fleet, and agents. A
 # symlink or group/world-writable ancestor must fail before environment parsing,
@@ -281,8 +395,8 @@ assert_managed_ancestor_rejected() {
  fi
  [ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before $hazard $ancestor rejection"
  [ ! -e "$home/work" ] || fail "workdir was created before $hazard $ancestor rejection"
-  echo "$output" | grep -qF "code=unsafe-" || fail "managed ancestor diagnostic missing"
-  if echo "$output" | grep -qF 'key=MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND'; then
+  contains_literal "$output" 'code=unsafe-' || fail "managed ancestor diagnostic missing"
+  if contains_literal "$output" 'key=MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND'; then
    fail "environment parsing ran before $hazard $ancestor rejection"
  fi
 }
@@ -303,9 +417,9 @@ if output=$(run_start "$HOME_SHADOW" coder1 2>&1); then
  fail "generated-key shadow was accepted"
 fi
 [ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before generated-key shadow rejection"
-echo "$output" | grep -qF 'key=MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME' || fail "shadow diagnostic omitted key"
-echo "$output" | grep -qF 'sha256=' || fail "shadow diagnostic omitted hash"
-if echo "$output" | grep -qF 'codex'; then
+contains_literal "$output" 'key=MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME' || fail "shadow diagnostic omitted key"
+contains_literal "$output" 'sha256=' || fail "shadow diagnostic omitted hash"
+if contains_literal "$output" codex; then
  fail "shadow diagnostic leaked value"
 fi

@@ -321,9 +435,9 @@ if output=$(run_start "$HOME_COMMAND" coder2 2>&1); then
  fail "arbitrary command override was accepted"
 fi
 [ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before command rejection"
-echo "$output" | grep -qF 'key=MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND' || fail "command diagnostic omitted key"
-echo "$output" | grep -qF 'sha256=' || fail "command diagnostic omitted hash"
-if echo "$output" | grep -qF "$COMMAND_VALUE"; then
+contains_literal "$output" 'key=MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND' || fail "command diagnostic omitted key"
+contains_literal "$output" 'sha256=' || fail "command diagnostic omitted hash"
+if contains_literal "$output" "$COMMAND_VALUE"; then
  fail "command diagnostic leaked command value"
 fi

@@ -337,7 +451,7 @@ if output=$(run_start "$HOME_PERMS" coder3 2>&1); then
  fail "world-readable local input was accepted"
 fi
 [ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before permissions rejection"
-echo "$output" | grep -qF 'code=unsafe-permissions' || fail "permission diagnostic missing"
+contains_literal "$output" 'code=unsafe-permissions' || fail "permission diagnostic missing"

 # A unit/holder-like clean bootstrap must yield a pane with trusted HOME and
 # computed PATH only. The pane command itself must not carry loader, shell
@@ -375,25 +489,35 @@ PATH="$PANE_STALE_PATH" \
    "MOSAIC_TEST_PANE_PID=$$" \
    "$START" coder-pane-boundary
 pane_args=$(tr '\0' '\n' < "$TMUX_CALLS")
-echo "$pane_args" | grep -qxF "HOME=$PANE_TRUSTED_HOME" || \
+contains_line "$pane_args" "HOME=$PANE_TRUSTED_HOME" || \
  fail "pane did not restore trusted HOME"
-echo "$pane_args" | grep -qF "HOME=$PANE_STALE_HOME" && \
+contains_literal "$pane_args" "HOME=$PANE_STALE_HOME" && \
  fail "pane inherited stale HOME"
-echo "$pane_args" | grep -qF "$PANE_STALE_PATH" && fail "pane inherited stale PATH"
+contains_literal "$pane_args" "$PANE_STALE_PATH" && fail "pane inherited stale PATH"
 for blocked in LD_PRELOAD= BASH_ENV= MOSAIC_UNTRUSTED_SENTINEL=; do
-  echo "$pane_args" | grep -qF "$blocked" && fail "pane inherited $blocked"
+  contains_literal "$pane_args" "$blocked" && fail "pane inherited $blocked"
 done

-after_pane_env=$(printf '%s\n' "$pane_args" | grep -n -m1 -F '/usr/bin/env' | cut -d: -f1)
-[ -n "$after_pane_env" ] || fail "pane command did not use absolute env"
-printf '%s\n' "$pane_args" | tail -n +"$after_pane_env" | grep -qxF -- '-i' || \
-  fail "pane command did not clear its environment"
+check_pane_environment_boundary "$TMUX_CALLS" || \
+  fail "pane command did not use an adjacent /usr/bin/env -i boundary"
 pane_environment=$(tr '\0' '\n' < "$HOME_PANE_BOUNDARY/fleet/pane-environment")
-echo "$pane_environment" | grep -qxF "HOME=$PANE_TRUSTED_HOME" || \
+# Exercise the repository launcher at $START, not the independently installed
+# host copy. Set-compare every declared generated projection entry with the
+# launched process environment so a newly declared identity cannot be omitted
+# by a hand-maintained per-variable assertion.
+declared_generated_environment=$(sort "$HOME_PANE_BOUNDARY/fleet/agents/coder-pane-boundary.env.generated")
+missing_or_changed_generated_environment=$(comm -23 \
+  <(printf '%s\n' "$declared_generated_environment") \
+  <(printf '%s\n' "$pane_environment" | sort))
+if [ -n "$missing_or_changed_generated_environment" ]; then
+  missing_or_changed_keys=$(printf '%s\n' "$missing_or_changed_generated_environment" | cut -d= -f1 | paste -sd, -)
+  fail "runtime pane omitted or changed generated environment keys: $missing_or_changed_keys"
+fi
+contains_line "$pane_environment" "HOME=$PANE_TRUSTED_HOME" || \
  fail "runtime pane did not receive trusted HOME"
-echo "$pane_environment" | grep -qF "$PANE_STALE_PATH" && fail "runtime pane received stale PATH"
+contains_literal "$pane_environment" "$PANE_STALE_PATH" && fail "runtime pane received stale PATH"
 for blocked in LD_PRELOAD= BASH_ENV= MOSAIC_UNTRUSTED_SENTINEL=; do
-  echo "$pane_environment" | grep -qF "$blocked" && fail "runtime pane received $blocked"
+  contains_literal "$pane_environment" "$blocked" && fail "runtime pane received $blocked"
 done

 write_interaction_generated() {
@@ -405,6 +529,7 @@ write_interaction_generated() {
  chmod 600 "$home/fleet/run/holder-owner"
  cat > "$home/fleet/agents/$agent.env.generated" <<EOF
 MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=$agent
+MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=$agent
 MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=operator-interaction
 MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=pi
 MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=openai/gpt-5.6-sol
@@ -467,8 +592,12 @@ write_generated "$HOME_NATIVE_STALE" "coder-native-stale"
 write_heartbeat_local "$HOME_NATIVE_STALE" "coder-native-stale"
 STALE_HB="$HOME_NATIVE_STALE/run/coder-native-stale.hb"
 printf 'ts=native\npid=1\nstatus=busy\nmodel=stale-model\n' > "$STALE_HB"
-touch -d '10 seconds ago' "$STALE_HB.native"
-MOSAIC_TEST_PANE_PID=$$ run_start "$HOME_NATIVE_STALE" coder-native-stale
+touch -t 200001010000.00 "$STALE_HB.native"
+# Hold the sidecar's observation epoch constant: assertion runtime must not age
+# a fresh-marker mutant into the stale state that this fixture must distinguish.
+STALE_OBSERVATION_EPOCH=$(date +%s)
+MOSAIC_TEST_FIXED_EPOCH="$STALE_OBSERVATION_EPOCH" \
+  MOSAIC_TEST_PANE_PID=$$ run_start "$HOME_NATIVE_STALE" coder-native-stale
 wait_for_sidecar_status "$STALE_HB"

 HOME_NATIVE_ABSENT="$ROOT/native-absent"
@@ -489,22 +618,22 @@ if output=$(run_interaction "$HOME_INTERACTION_MALFORMED" interaction-malformed
  fail "interaction wrapper accepted malformed generated data"
 fi
 [ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before interaction strict-parser rejection"
-echo "$output" | grep -qF 'code=unknown-key' || fail "interaction did not use shared strict parser first"
+contains_literal "$output" 'code=unknown-key' || fail "interaction did not use shared strict parser first"

 # A syntactically valid but policy-incompatible projection reaches the pinned
 # interaction policy check only after strict parsing and never starts tmux.
 : > "$TMUX_CALLS"
 HOME_INTERACTION_POLICY="$ROOT/interaction-policy"
 write_interaction_generated "$HOME_INTERACTION_POLICY" "interaction-policy"
-perl -0pi -e 's/MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=pi/MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=codex/' \
+sed -i 's|^MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=pi$|MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=codex|' \
  "$HOME_INTERACTION_POLICY/fleet/agents/interaction-policy.env.generated"
 if output=$(run_interaction "$HOME_INTERACTION_POLICY" interaction-policy 2>&1); then
  fail "interaction wrapper accepted a policy-incompatible projection"
 fi
 interaction_policy_args=$(tr '\0' '\n' < "$TMUX_CALLS")
-echo "$interaction_policy_args" | grep -qF 'new-session' && \
+contains_literal "$interaction_policy_args" new-session && \
  fail "interaction pinned-policy rejection created a tmux session"
-echo "$output" | grep -qF 'operator interaction service requires runtime pi' || \
+contains_literal "$output" 'operator interaction service requires runtime pi' || \
  fail "interaction pinned-policy check did not follow strict parsing"

 # #1241. The pane runs `mosaic yolo <runtime>` against PANE_PATH. A binary
@@ -586,10 +715,10 @@ HOME="$HOME_STOP" PATH="$FAKE_BIN:$PATH" MOSAIC_TEST_TMUX_CALLS="$TMUX_CALLS" \
  MOSAIC_TEST_FLEET_OWNER=123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000 \
  MOSAIC_HOME="$HOME_STOP" MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=ambient-socket "$START" --stop coder-stop
 stop_args=$(tr '\0' '\n' < "$TMUX_CALLS")
-echo "$stop_args" | grep -qxF 'mosaic-test' || fail "exact stop did not use the validated generated socket"
-echo "$stop_args" | grep -qxF 'kill-session' || fail "exact stop did not request session termination"
-echo "$stop_args" | grep -qxF '=coder-stop' || fail "exact stop did not exact-match the generated agent name"
-if echo "$stop_args" | grep -qF 'ambient-socket'; then
+contains_line "$stop_args" mosaic-test || fail "exact stop did not use the validated generated socket"
+contains_line "$stop_args" kill-session || fail "exact stop did not request session termination"
+contains_line "$stop_args" '=coder-stop' || fail "exact stop did not exact-match the generated agent name"
+if contains_literal "$stop_args" ambient-socket; then
  fail "exact stop trusted an ambient socket"
 fi

@@ -5,7 +5,10 @@

 detect_platform() {
    local remote_url
-    remote_url=$(git remote get-url origin 2>/dev/null)
+    # `|| true` is load-bearing under `set -e`: outside a git repo this returns 128 and
+    # kills the CALLER before the -z check below can run, so the error message that is
+    # already written here was unreachable. Same idiom as get_gitea_repo_args() below.
+    remote_url=$(git remote get-url origin 2>/dev/null) || true

    if [[ -z "$remote_url" ]]; then
        echo "error: not a git repository or no origin remote" >&2
@@ -39,7 +42,10 @@ detect_platform() {

 get_repo_info() {
    local remote_url
-    remote_url=$(git remote get-url origin 2>/dev/null)
+    # `|| true` is load-bearing under `set -e`: outside a git repo this returns 128 and
+    # kills the CALLER before the -z check below can run, so the error message that is
+    # already written here was unreachable. Same idiom as get_gitea_repo_args() below.
+    remote_url=$(git remote get-url origin 2>/dev/null) || true

    if [[ -z "$remote_url" ]]; then
        echo "error: not a git repository or no origin remote" >&2
@@ -240,6 +246,21 @@ PY
    } >&2
 }

+# Explain tea's most misleading failure. `user does not exist [uid: 0, name: ]` reads
+# as a missing account; it almost always means a REVOKED OR STALE TOKEN. `tea login`
+# keeps its OWN COPY of the token, so rotating the credential store does not update it.
+# Diagnostic only -- stderr, no control flow, no exit.
+explain_tea_user_does_not_exist() {
+    cat >&2 <<'MSG'
+NOTE: `user does not exist [uid: 0, name: ]` from tea usually means a REVOKED OR STALE TOKEN,
+      not a missing account. A `tea login` stores its OWN COPY of the token; rotating the
+      credential store does NOT update it.
+      CHECK: the login's cached copy (`tea login list` -- read the FULL table, never `| head`),
+             then re-register that login against the current token.
+      DO NOT probe capability with a mutating request; a POST is the action, not a check.
+MSG
+}
+
 get_gitea_login_for_host() {
    local host="${1:-}"
    local login
@@ -91,13 +91,32 @@ elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
    GITEA_LOGIN_NAME=$(get_gitea_login || true)
    if [[ -n "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME" ]]; then
        if [[ -n "$COMMENT" ]]; then
-            tea issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" "$COMMENT" --repo "$OWNER/$REPO" --login "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME"
+            # `tea issue comment` is NOT a subcommand -- tea 0.11.x lists only
+            # list/create/edit/reopen/close under `tea issue`. Comments are the
+            # TOP-LEVEL `tea comment`, which takes the same --repo/--login flags.
+            # The old call therefore always failed, was unchecked, and the script
+            # closed the issue anyway, losing the record of WHY.
+            #
+            # Use `tea comment` rather than the API helper so the comment and the
+            # close are made by the SAME principal ($GITEA_LOGIN_NAME). Routing the
+            # comment through the token-authenticated helper here would attribute the
+            # comment to the token holder and the close to the tea login -- two
+            # principals for one operation.
+            tea comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" "$COMMENT" --repo "$OWNER/$REPO" --login "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME" || {
+                echo "Error: failed to post comment on #$ISSUE_NUMBER -- NOT closing (fail closed)." >&2
+                exit 1
+            }
        fi
        tea issue close "$ISSUE_NUMBER" --repo "$OWNER/$REPO" --login "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME"
    else
        echo "No tea login configured for $(get_remote_host); using authenticated Gitea API fallback." >&2
        if [[ -n "$COMMENT" ]]; then
-            gitea_issue_comment_api
+            # Fail closed here too: an unchecked comment lets the issue close without its
+            # audit trail, which is the same defect as the tea path above.
+            gitea_issue_comment_api || {
+                echo "Error: failed to post comment on #$ISSUE_NUMBER -- NOT closing (fail closed)." >&2
+                exit 1
+            }
        fi
        gitea_issue_close_api
    fi
@@ -254,15 +254,32 @@ from urllib.parse import urlparse


 def _origin_and_path(url):
-    # Normalize a URL to (scheme, host, effective-port) + comment path. The port
-    # defaults to the scheme's default (80 http / 443 otherwise) so an implicit
-    # port and its explicit default form compare equal.
+    # Normalize a URL to (scheme-class, host, distinguishing-port) + comment path.
+    #
+    # #991: http and https collapse into ONE scheme class ("web"). A Gitea whose
+    # ROOT_URL is configured http:// returns http:// object URLs even when every
+    # client reaches it over https://, so a scheme-strict comparison rejects the
+    # provider's own correct answer about a write that landed — a deterministic
+    # false negative on every comment posted against such a deployment. The
+    # scheme is also not what this check defends: the forgeries it exists to
+    # catch (look-alike host, decoy path prefix, wrong owner/repo/number) all
+    # vary the HOST or the PATH, both of which stay strict below. Any OTHER
+    # scheme (file:, ftp:, javascript:) remains distinguishing and is rejected.
+    #
+    # Port: an implicit port and its own scheme's default compare equal, so
+    # http://h == https://h. An EXPLICIT non-default port still distinguishes,
+    # because a different port is a different service on the same host.
    parsed = urlparse(url or "")
    scheme = (parsed.scheme or "").lower()
    host = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
-    default_port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
-    port = parsed.port if parsed.port is not None else default_port
-    return (scheme, host, port), parsed.path.rstrip("/")
+    if scheme in ("http", "https"):
+        scheme_class = "web"
+        default_port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
+        port = None if parsed.port in (None, default_port) else parsed.port
+    else:
+        scheme_class = scheme
+        port = parsed.port
+    return (scheme_class, host, port), parsed.path.rstrip("/")


 try:
@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
                exit 0
            fi
            echo "Warning: tea issue create failed, trying Gitea API fallback..." >&2
+            { declare -F explain_tea_user_does_not_exist >/dev/null && explain_tea_user_does_not_exist; } || true
        fi
        gitea_issue_create_api
        ;;
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
            exit 0
        fi
        echo "Warning: tea issue view failed, trying Gitea API fallback..." >&2
+        { declare -F explain_tea_user_does_not_exist >/dev/null && explain_tea_user_does_not_exist; } || true
    fi
    gitea_issue_view_api
 else
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# mosaic-worktree.sh — the only supported way to create and dispose of a git
+# worktree on a fleet host.
+#
+# Why this exists as a helper and not as a rule: the rule already existed, in
+# the framework's own words ("Big work → /var/tmp"), and 255 GB accumulated in
+# $HOME across 842 directories anyway. Five placement conventions were live on
+# one fleet host simultaneously. Every one was a decision an agent had to make,
+# and a decision an agent has to make is a decision that drifts.
+#
+# So this script makes NO placement decision available. The caller supplies a
+# branch name. Every path is DERIVED:
+#
+#   main worktree   <- git worktree list --porcelain (never cwd, which may
+#                      itself already be a worktree)
+#   REPO_NAME       <- basename of the main worktree
+#   REPO_PARENT     <- dirname  of the main worktree
+#   WT_ROOT         <- $REPO_PARENT/$REPO_NAME-worktrees
+#   SLUG            <- branch with '/' replaced by '-'
+#   WT_PATH         <- $WT_ROOT/$SLUG
+#
+# The derivation puts the worktree on the same filesystem as the object store
+# it shares, as a sibling of the repo, under one root per repo. Those are the
+# properties that make the checkout cheap and — via `git worktree list` —
+# enumerable, which is the only reason automated cleanup can ever be safe.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   mosaic-worktree.sh new <branch> [--from <base>]   create (branch may exist)
+#   mosaic-worktree.sh path <branch>                  print derived path, no side effect
+#   mosaic-worktree.sh list                           this repo's worktrees + state
+#   mosaic-worktree.sh rm <branch> [--force]          remove; refuses to lose work
+#   mosaic-worktree.sh gc [--apply]                   report/remove clean+pushed worktrees
+#
+# `rm` and `gc` refuse to delete a worktree with uncommitted changes, with
+# commits absent from every remote, or holding ignored files that are not of the
+# well-known regenerable kind (a `.env` is ignored so it is never committed,
+# which is also why nothing else holds a copy). That check is by EVIDENCE, never
+# by size or age. --force overrides it and is yours to type deliberately.
+#
+# Run from anywhere inside the repo, or pass --repo <path>.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+die() { printf 'mosaic-worktree: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+REPO_HINT=""
+ARGS=()
+while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
+  case "$1" in
+    --repo) REPO_HINT="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
+    *) ARGS+=("$1"); shift ;;
+  esac
+done
+set -- "${ARGS[@]+"${ARGS[@]}"}"
+
+CMD="${1:-}"
+[ -n "$CMD" ] || die "no command. Try: new | path | list | rm | gc"
+shift || true
+
+# ---- mechanical derivation -------------------------------------------------
+# The FIRST entry of `git worktree list --porcelain` is always the main
+# worktree, regardless of which worktree we are standing in. Deriving from cwd
+# would nest worktrees inside worktrees.
+resolve_repo() {
+  local start="${REPO_HINT:-$PWD}"
+  git -C "$start" rev-parse --git-dir >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+    || die "not inside a git repository: $start"
+  # Take the first entry WITHOUT closing the pipe early. `awk ... exit` on the
+  # first match closes the read end while git is still writing, git takes SIGPIPE,
+  # and under `set -euo pipefail` the command substitution returns 141 and this
+  # function aborts SILENTLY — no message, no worktree, and `new` exits 141 while
+  # printing nothing at all.
+  #
+  # Whether it happens depends on how much git still had to write when awk left,
+  # so the failure is a function of REPO SIZE: fine on a repo with three
+  # worktrees, reliably broken on one with seventy. That is backwards — the repos
+  # this helper exists to serve are exactly the ones that accumulated worktrees,
+  # and it silently did nothing on those while working everywhere it was tried.
+  # Measured on a repo with 73 worktrees (10 KB of porcelain): rc=141, no output.
+  #
+  # The file's own comment block below already names this class for `head -200`
+  # and removed that cap for the same reason. The `exit` here is the same defect
+  # in the same file, so the rule is now uniform: nothing in this script closes a
+  # git pipe early. Dropping `exit` costs one pass over a few KB.
+  MAIN_WT="$(git -C "$start" worktree list --porcelain | awk '/^worktree /&&!seen{print substr($0,10); seen=1}')"
+  [ -n "$MAIN_WT" ] || die "could not resolve the main worktree"
+  REPO_NAME="$(basename -- "$MAIN_WT")"
+  REPO_PARENT="$(dirname -- "$MAIN_WT")"
+  WT_ROOT="$REPO_PARENT/$REPO_NAME-worktrees"
+}
+
+slugify() { printf '%s' "$1" | tr '/' '-'; }
+
+derive_path() {
+  local branch="$1"
+  [ -n "$branch" ] || die "branch name required"
+  printf '%s/%s' "$WT_ROOT" "$(slugify "$branch")"
+}
+
+# A worktree root under $HOME defeats the entire point: wrong filesystem, and
+# $HOME is for configuration and state, not work products. Refuse rather than
+# silently produce the layout we are trying to eliminate.
+assert_not_home() {
+  local p="$1" home_real repo_real
+  home_real="$(cd "$HOME" && pwd -P)"
+  repo_real="$(cd "$(dirname -- "$p")" 2>/dev/null && pwd -P || dirname -- "$p")"
+  case "$repo_real/" in
+    "$home_real"/*)
+      die "refusing: derived path is under \$HOME ($p).
+The repo itself lives under \$HOME, so its worktrees would too. Move the repo
+to a work filesystem (e.g. /src/$REPO_NAME) and re-run. \$HOME holds
+configuration, credentials, state and caches — not checkouts." ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+# ---- work-loss evidence ----------------------------------------------------
+# Two independent questions, both answered from git, neither from size or age:
+#   dirty    — anything uncommitted in the tree
+#   unpushed — commits reachable from HEAD that no remote ref contains
+#   precious — IGNORED files git will not mention and will not miss
+#
+# The third question is not obvious and was missed on the first pass. An
+# independent reviewer demonstrated it in four commands: a pushed, clean
+# worktree whose .gitignore covers `*.secret`, holding one `local.secret`.
+# `git status --porcelain` is empty, `rev-list --count HEAD --not --remotes` is
+# 0 — the evidence reads SAFE — and `git worktree remove` deletes the file. The
+# same shape covers `.env`, credentials, scratch notes, downloaded fixtures:
+# precisely the files that are ignored BECAUSE they must not be committed, which
+# is also why nothing else is holding a copy.
+#
+# So ignored files count as work unless they are the well-known regenerable
+# kind. Getting that set wrong is asymmetric: an over-broad list preserves a
+# worktree that could have been reclaimed (cheap, visible, fixable by --force),
+# an over-narrow one deletes the only copy of a secret (silent, permanent).
+# The list stays short and conservative for that reason.
+DISPOSABLE_RE='(^|/)(node_modules|\.venv|venv|__pycache__|\.mypy_cache|\.pytest_cache|\.ruff_cache|\.turbo|\.cache|\.parcel-cache|\.gradle|dist|build|out|target|coverage|\.next|\.nuxt|\.svelte-kit)(/|$)|\.(pyc|pyo|o|class)$'
+
+# These three run under `set -euo pipefail` inside command substitution, which
+# makes any nonzero exit ANYWHERE in the pipeline abort the calling function
+# silently. Two ways that bites, one of which shipped:
+#
+#   * `grep -v` exits 1 when it filters everything out. A worktree whose only
+#     ignored entry is `node_modules/` is exactly the SAFE case, and it made
+#     `rm` exit 1 with no message and no removal — found by review.
+#   * `head -200` closes the pipe, SIGPIPEs the producer, and turns a worktree
+#     with 201 dirty files into the same silent abort. Not reported; it is the
+#     same defect one step upstream, so the cap is gone. Counting is cheap;
+#     the cap only ever protected output that is now never printed.
+#
+# Every one of them therefore ends in a total, and every stage that can
+# legitimately exit nonzero says so explicitly.
+wt_dirty() {
+  local out
+  out="$(git -C "$1" status --porcelain 2>/dev/null || true)"
+  if [ -n "$out" ]; then printf '%s\n' "$out" | wc -l; else printf '0'; fi
+}
+
+wt_unpushed() { git -C "$1" rev-list --count HEAD --not --remotes 2>/dev/null || printf '?'; }
+
+# Default --ignored (not =matching) so a 40k-file node_modules collapses to one
+# directory entry instead of being enumerated and then discarded.
+wt_precious() {
+  local ignored
+  ignored="$(git -C "$1" status --porcelain --ignored 2>/dev/null \
+             | awk '/^!! /{print substr($0,4)}' || true)"
+  [ -n "$ignored" ] || { printf '0'; return 0; }
+  printf '%s\n' "$ignored" | grep -Ecv "$DISPOSABLE_RE" || true
+}
+
+wt_state() {
+  local wt="$1" d u p
+  d="$(wt_dirty "$wt")"; u="$(wt_unpushed "$wt")"; p="$(wt_precious "$wt")"
+  if [ "$d" -eq 0 ] && [ "$u" = "0" ] && [ "$p" -eq 0 ]; then
+    printf 'SAFE\tclean; 0 unpushed; no ignored files worth keeping'
+  else
+    printf 'PRESERVE\t%s uncommitted; %s unpushed; %s ignored-but-not-disposable' "$d" "$u" "$p"
+  fi
+}
+
+# ---- commands --------------------------------------------------------------
+cmd_path() { resolve_repo; derive_path "${1:-}"; echo; }
+
+cmd_new() {
+  local branch="${1:-}" base=""
+  shift || true
+  while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
+    case "$1" in --from) base="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;; *) die "unknown flag: $1" ;; esac
+  done
+  [ -n "$branch" ] || die "usage: mosaic-worktree.sh new <branch> [--from <base>]"
+
+  resolve_repo
+  local path; path="$(derive_path "$branch")"
+  assert_not_home "$path"
+
+  if [ -e "$path" ]; then
+    echo "exists: $path"
+    echo "(already checked out — reuse it, or 'rm' it first)"
+    return 0
+  fi
+
+  mkdir -p "$WT_ROOT"
+
+  # Existing branch -> check it out. New branch -> create from base (default:
+  # the remote's default branch if resolvable, else current HEAD).
+  if git -C "$MAIN_WT" show-ref --verify --quiet "refs/heads/$branch" \
+     || git -C "$MAIN_WT" show-ref --verify --quiet "refs/remotes/origin/$branch"; then
+    git -C "$MAIN_WT" worktree add "$path" "$branch"
+  else
+    if [ -z "$base" ]; then
+      base="$(git -C "$MAIN_WT" symbolic-ref --quiet --short refs/remotes/origin/HEAD 2>/dev/null || true)"
+      [ -n "$base" ] || base="HEAD"
+    fi
+    git -C "$MAIN_WT" worktree add -b "$branch" "$path" "$base"
+  fi
+
+  cat <<EOF
+
+worktree: $path
+branch:   $branch
+
+Removal is part of this task, not a later chore. When the work is pushed:
+  mosaic-worktree.sh rm $branch
+EOF
+}
+
+cmd_list() {
+  resolve_repo
+  printf 'repo: %s\nroot: %s\n\n' "$MAIN_WT" "$WT_ROOT"
+  git -C "$MAIN_WT" worktree list --porcelain \
+    | awk '/^worktree /{print substr($0,10)}' \
+    | while read -r wt; do
+        [ "$wt" = "$MAIN_WT" ] && { printf '%-10s %s (main)\n' "-" "$wt"; continue; }
+        printf '%-10s %s\t%s\n' "$(wt_state "$wt" | cut -f1)" "$wt" "$(wt_state "$wt" | cut -f2)"
+      done
+}
+
+cmd_rm() {
+  local branch="${1:-}" force=0
+  shift || true
+  while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
+    case "$1" in --force) force=1; shift ;; *) die "unknown flag: $1" ;; esac
+  done
+  [ -n "$branch" ] || die "usage: mosaic-worktree.sh rm <branch> [--force]"
+
+  resolve_repo
+  local path; path="$(derive_path "$branch")"
+  [ -d "$path" ] || die "no worktree at $path"
+
+  local d u p
+  d="$(wt_dirty "$path")"; u="$(wt_unpushed "$path")"; p="$(wt_precious "$path")"
+  if [ "$force" -eq 0 ] && { [ "$d" -ne 0 ] || [ "$u" != "0" ] || [ "$p" -ne 0 ]; }; then
+    die "refusing to remove $path
+  uncommitted files:            $d
+  unpushed commits:             $u
+  ignored, not disposable:      $p
+Commit and push first — that is the contract. Ignored files are counted because
+git will neither report them nor miss them: a .env or a *.secret is ignored
+precisely so it is never committed, which is also why nothing else holds a copy.
+List them with:  git -C $path status --porcelain --ignored | grep '^!!'
+If this work is genuinely disposable, re-run with --force."
+  fi
+
+  # NB: ${force:+--force} would expand for force=0 too ("0" is non-empty).
+  if [ "$force" -eq 1 ]; then
+    git -C "$MAIN_WT" worktree remove --force "$path"
+  else
+    git -C "$MAIN_WT" worktree remove "$path"
+  fi
+  git -C "$MAIN_WT" worktree prune
+  echo "removed: $path"
+  rmdir "$WT_ROOT" 2>/dev/null || true
+}
+
+cmd_gc() {
+  local apply=0
+  [ "${1:-}" = "--apply" ] && apply=1
+  resolve_repo
+  git -C "$MAIN_WT" worktree prune
+  git -C "$MAIN_WT" worktree list --porcelain \
+    | awk '/^worktree /{print substr($0,10)}' \
+    | while read -r wt; do
+        [ "$wt" = "$MAIN_WT" ] && continue
+        local_state="$(wt_state "$wt")"
+        case "$local_state" in
+          SAFE*)
+            if [ "$apply" -eq 1 ]; then
+              git -C "$MAIN_WT" worktree remove "$wt" && echo "removed: $wt"
+            else
+              echo "reclaimable (clean + fully pushed): $wt"
+            fi ;;
+          *) echo "preserved: $wt  [$(printf '%s' "$local_state" | cut -f2)]" ;;
+        esac
+      done
+  git -C "$MAIN_WT" worktree prune
+  [ "$apply" -eq 1 ] || echo $'\n(report only — re-run with --apply to remove the reclaimable ones)'
+}
+
+case "$CMD" in
+  new)  cmd_new  "$@" ;;
+  path) cmd_path "$@" ;;
+  list) cmd_list "$@" ;;
+  rm)   cmd_rm   "$@" ;;
+  gc)   cmd_gc   "$@" ;;
+  -h|--help|help) sed -n '2,40p' "$0" | sed 's/^# \{0,1\}//' ;;
+  *) die "unknown command: $CMD (new | path | list | rm | gc)" ;;
+esac
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ cp "$TARGET" "$BAK"
 export MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR="$WORK/.work"

 # --- where the prose lives: usage() { ... EOF ---------------------------------
-PROSE_LO="$(grep -n '^usage() {' "$BAK" | head -1 | cut -d: -f1)"
+PROSE_LO="$(grep -n -m1 '^usage() {' "$BAK" | cut -d: -f1)"
 PROSE_HI="$(awk -v lo="$PROSE_LO" 'NR > lo && /^EOF$/ { print NR; exit }' "$BAK")"
 if [[ -z "$PROSE_LO" || -z "$PROSE_HI" ]]; then
    echo "!! cannot locate the usage() heredoc -- the prose guard would be inert; refusing" >&2
@@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
            exit 0
        fi
        echo "Warning: tea pr create failed, trying Gitea API fallback..." >&2
+        { declare -F explain_tea_user_does_not_exist >/dev/null && explain_tea_user_does_not_exist; } || true
        gitea_pr_create_api
        ;;
    *)
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# pr-edit.sh - Edit a pull request on GitHub or Gitea
+# Usage: pr-edit.sh -n <pr_number> [-t <title>] [-b <body>] [-B <base>] [--draft|--ready] [--login <name>] [-r owner/repo] [-H host]
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+# shellcheck source=detect-platform.sh
+source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
+
+PR_NUMBER=""
+TITLE=""
+BODY=""
+BASE_BRANCH=""
+DRAFT_MODE=""
+LOGIN_OVERRIDE=""
+REPO_OVERRIDE=""
+HOST_OVERRIDE=""
+AUTH_CONFIG=""
+
+cleanup() {
+    [[ -z "$AUTH_CONFIG" ]] || rm -f -- "$AUTH_CONFIG"
+}
+terminate() {
+    local signal="$1"
+    trap - "$signal"
+    cleanup
+    kill -s "$signal" "$$"
+}
+trap cleanup EXIT
+trap 'terminate HUP' HUP
+trap 'terminate INT' INT
+trap 'terminate TERM' TERM
+
+usage() {
+    cat <<EOF
+Usage: $(basename "$0") [OPTIONS]
+
+Edit a pull request on the current repository (Gitea or GitHub).
+
+Options:
+    -n, --number NUMBER    Pull request number (required)
+    -t, --title TITLE      New title
+    -b, --body BODY        New body/description
+    -B, --base BRANCH      New base branch
+        --draft            Mark the pull request as draft
+        --ready            Mark the pull request ready for review
+    -l, --login NAME       Gitea login (must authenticate as MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY)
+    -r, --repo OWNER/REPO  Explicit target repository
+    -H, --host HOST        Explicit Gitea host (required with --repo off-host)
+    -h, --help             Show this help message
+EOF
+    exit "${1:-1}"
+}
+
+while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
+    case "$1" in
+        -n|--number) PR_NUMBER="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
+        -t|--title) TITLE="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
+        -b|--body) BODY="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
+        -B|--base) BASE_BRANCH="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
+        --draft)
+            [[ "$DRAFT_MODE" != "ready" ]] || { echo "Error: --draft and --ready are mutually exclusive" >&2; exit 1; }
+            DRAFT_MODE="draft"; shift ;;
+        --ready)
+            [[ "$DRAFT_MODE" != "draft" ]] || { echo "Error: --draft and --ready are mutually exclusive" >&2; exit 1; }
+            DRAFT_MODE="ready"; shift ;;
+        -l|--login) LOGIN_OVERRIDE="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
+        -r|--repo) REPO_OVERRIDE="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
+        -H|--host) HOST_OVERRIDE="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
+        -h|--help) usage 0 ;;
+        *) echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2; usage ;;
+    esac
+done
+
+[[ -n "$PR_NUMBER" ]] || { echo "Error: Pull request number is required (-n)" >&2; exit 1; }
+[[ "$PR_NUMBER" =~ ^[1-9][0-9]*$ ]] || { echo "Error: Pull request number must be a positive integer" >&2; exit 1; }
+if [[ -z "$TITLE" && -z "$BODY" && -z "$BASE_BRANCH" && -z "$DRAFT_MODE" ]]; then
+    echo "Error: At least one edit option is required" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+[[ -z "$REPO_OVERRIDE" || "$REPO_OVERRIDE" =~ ^[^/[:space:]]+/[^/[:space:]]+$ ]] || {
+    echo "Error: --repo must be OWNER/REPO" >&2
+    exit 1
+}
+
+if [[ -n "$HOST_OVERRIDE" || -n "$REPO_OVERRIDE" ]]; then
+    PLATFORM="gitea"
+else
+    PLATFORM=$(detect_platform)
+fi
+
+case "$PLATFORM" in
+    github)
+        [[ -z "$LOGIN_OVERRIDE" ]] || { echo "Error: --login is only valid for Gitea" >&2; exit 1; }
+        if [[ -n "$TITLE" || -n "$BODY" || -n "$BASE_BRANCH" ]]; then
+            CMD=(gh pr edit "$PR_NUMBER")
+            [[ -n "$TITLE" ]] && CMD+=(--title "$TITLE")
+            [[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD+=(--body "$BODY")
+            [[ -n "$BASE_BRANCH" ]] && CMD+=(--base "$BASE_BRANCH")
+            "${CMD[@]}"
+        fi
+        if [[ "$DRAFT_MODE" == "draft" ]]; then
+            gh pr ready "$PR_NUMBER" --undo
+        elif [[ "$DRAFT_MODE" == "ready" ]]; then
+            gh pr ready "$PR_NUMBER"
+        fi
+        ;;
+    gitea)
+        IDENTITY="${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}"
+        [[ -n "$IDENTITY" ]] || {
+            echo "Error: MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY is required for a mutating Gitea operation" >&2
+            exit 1
+        }
+        HOST="${HOST_OVERRIDE:-}"
+        if [[ -z "$HOST" ]]; then
+            HOST=$(get_remote_host) || {
+                echo "Error: Could not resolve Gitea host; pass --host with --repo" >&2
+                exit 1
+            }
+        fi
+        HOST="${HOST#http://}"; HOST="${HOST#https://}"; HOST="${HOST%%/*}"
+        REPO_SLUG="${REPO_OVERRIDE:-}"
+        if [[ -z "$REPO_SLUG" ]]; then
+            REPO_SLUG=$(get_repo_slug) || { echo "Error: Could not resolve Gitea repo slug from remote" >&2; exit 1; }
+        fi
+
+        if [[ -n "$LOGIN_OVERRIDE" ]]; then
+            GITEA_LOGIN_NAME="$LOGIN_OVERRIDE"
+        elif [[ -n "${GITEA_LOGIN:-}" ]]; then
+            GITEA_LOGIN_NAME="$GITEA_LOGIN"
+        else
+            echo "Error: --login (or GITEA_LOGIN) is required; refusing host-first login selection" >&2
+            exit 1
+        fi
+
+        TOKEN=$(get_gitea_token_for_login "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME" "$HOST") || {
+            echo "Error: login '$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME' is not configured for target host '$HOST'" >&2
+            exit 1
+        }
+        AUTH_CONFIG=$(gitea_write_auth_config "$TOKEN") || {
+            echo "Error: could not stage private Gitea authentication" >&2
+            exit 1
+        }
+        unset TOKEN
+
+        API_BASE="https://${HOST}/api/v1"
+        # Resolve identity through the SAME private curl config used for the
+        # mutation. Tea login names are globally scoped and can be duplicated
+        # across hosts; a separate `tea api --login NAME` could validate another
+        # credential than this host-bound token.
+        AUTHENTICATED_USER=$(curl -fsS --config "$AUTH_CONFIG" -H "User-Agent: mosaic-pr-edit" "$API_BASE/user" \
+            | python3 -c 'import json,sys; value=json.load(sys.stdin).get("login"); print(value) if isinstance(value,str) and value else sys.exit(1)') || {
+            echo "Error: could not authenticate the host-bound credential for '$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME'" >&2
+            exit 1
+        }
+        [[ "$AUTHENTICATED_USER" == "$IDENTITY" ]] || {
+            echo "Error: host-bound credential authenticates as '$AUTHENTICATED_USER', not MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY '$IDENTITY'" >&2
+            exit 1
+        }
+
+        REPO_API="$API_BASE/repos/${REPO_SLUG}"
+        curl -fsS --config "$AUTH_CONFIG" -H "User-Agent: mosaic-pr-edit" "$REPO_API" >/dev/null || {
+            echo "Error: target repository preflight failed for https://${HOST}/${REPO_SLUG}" >&2
+            exit 1
+        }
+
+        PAYLOAD=$(TITLE="$TITLE" BODY="$BODY" BASE_BRANCH="$BASE_BRANCH" DRAFT_MODE="$DRAFT_MODE" python3 - <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+payload = {}
+if os.environ["TITLE"]: payload["title"] = os.environ["TITLE"]
+if os.environ["BODY"]: payload["body"] = os.environ["BODY"]
+if os.environ["BASE_BRANCH"]: payload["base"] = os.environ["BASE_BRANCH"]
+if os.environ["DRAFT_MODE"]: payload["draft"] = os.environ["DRAFT_MODE"] == "draft"
+print(json.dumps(payload))
+PY
+)
+        curl -fsS --config "$AUTH_CONFIG" -X PATCH \
+            -H "User-Agent: mosaic-pr-edit" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+            -d "$PAYLOAD" "$REPO_API/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}"
+        echo "Updated Gitea pull request #$PR_NUMBER as '$AUTHENTICATED_USER'" >&2
+        ;;
+    *) echo "Error: Could not detect git platform" >&2; exit 1 ;;
+esac
@@ -243,15 +243,35 @@ from urllib.parse import urlparse


 def _origin_and_path(url):
-    # Normalize a URL to (scheme, host, effective-port) + comment path. The port
-    # defaults to the scheme's default (80 http / 443 otherwise) so an implicit
-    # port and its explicit default form compare equal.
+    # Normalize a URL to (scheme-class, host, distinguishing-port) + comment path.
+    #
+    # #991: http and https collapse into ONE scheme class ("web"). A Gitea whose
+    # ROOT_URL is configured http:// returns http:// object URLs even when every
+    # client reaches it over https://, so a scheme-strict comparison rejects the
+    # provider's own correct answer about a comment that landed — a deterministic
+    # false negative on EVERY review comment posted against such a deployment.
+    # That matters more here than anywhere else: on a host where no seat can
+    # create a review OBJECT, the comment-form review record this path produces
+    # is the only gate-16 evidence available, and this check refuses all of it.
+    # The scheme is also not what the check defends: the forgeries it exists to
+    # catch (look-alike host, decoy path prefix, wrong owner/repo/kind/number)
+    # all vary the HOST or the PATH, both of which stay strict below. Any OTHER
+    # scheme (file:, ftp:, javascript:) remains distinguishing and is rejected.
+    #
+    # Port: an implicit port and its own scheme's default compare equal, so
+    # http://h == https://h. An EXPLICIT non-default port still distinguishes,
+    # because a different port is a different service on the same host.
    parsed = urlparse(url or "")
    scheme = (parsed.scheme or "").lower()
    host = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
-    default_port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
-    port = parsed.port if parsed.port is not None else default_port
-    return (scheme, host, port), parsed.path.rstrip("/")
+    if scheme in ("http", "https"):
+        scheme_class = "web"
+        default_port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
+        port = None if parsed.port in (None, default_port) else parsed.port
+    else:
+        scheme_class = scheme
+        port = parsed.port
+    return (scheme_class, host, port), parsed.path.rstrip("/")


 try:
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# Regression: detect_platform / get_repo_info must FAIL LOUDLY outside a git repo,
+# not kill the caller silently.
+#
+# Both functions already contained the right error path:
+#     if [[ -z "$remote_url" ]]; then echo "error: not a git repository..." >&2; return 1; fi
+# but under `set -e` -- which every wrapper in this directory uses -- the preceding
+# assignment `remote_url=$(git remote get-url origin 2>/dev/null)` returns git's 128
+# outside a repo and terminates the CALLER first. The message was unreachable.
+#
+# Observed cost: pr-review.sh invoked from a non-repo cwd exits 128 with NO stdout and
+# NO stderr, even when -r/--repo and -H/--host are supplied -- the flags documented as
+# "skips git-remote inference". Two reviewer seats hit this and correctly reported
+# `blocked` with no diagnostic to report.
+#
+# The control that matters is the LOUD one: asserting "rc != 0" passes on the broken
+# build too, because 128 is also non-zero. The test must assert the MESSAGE.
+set -uo pipefail
+fail=0
+HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+TMP="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
+
+run_outside() { # $1=function name -> "rc:sawmessage"
+    local fn="$1" out rc
+    out=$( cd "$TMP" && bash -c "set -e; source '$HERE/detect-platform.sh'; $fn" 2>&1 ); rc=$?
+    printf '%s:%s' "$rc" "$(grep -qi 'not a git repository' <<<"$out" && echo yes || echo no)"
+}
+check() { if [ "$2" = "$3" ]; then echo "  PASS  $1 ($2)"; else echo "  FAIL  $1: got $2, want $3"; fail=1; fi; }
+
+# $TMP must not be inside a git repo. Do not SKIP on failure: be-coder-07 showed the
+# original SKIP exited 0, so pointing TMPDIR beneath a git worktree made this test PASS
+# against unchanged main. A skip that exits 0 is indistinguishable from a pass.
+# GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES stops git walking above $TMP, making the condition hold
+# regardless of where TMPDIR lives, rather than merely detecting when it does not.
+# GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES is matched against the PHYSICAL path -- a symlinked TMPDIR
+# (/tmp is commonly one) makes the logical path never match, and the ceiling silently
+# does nothing. Resolve it before exporting.
+TMP="$(cd "$TMP" && pwd -P)"
+export GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES="$TMP"
+if ( cd "$TMP" && git rev-parse --git-dir >/dev/null 2>&1 ); then
+    echo "  FAIL  scratch dir is inside a git repo even with GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES set;"
+    echo "        the outside-a-repo precondition cannot be established -- refusing to report a result"
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+echo "== outside a git repo: rc=1 AND the diagnostic is emitted =="
+check "detect_platform" "$(run_outside detect_platform)" "1:yes"
+check "get_repo_info"   "$(run_outside get_repo_info)"   "1:yes"
+
+echo "== inside a git repo the functions still work =="
+git init -q "$TMP/repo" 2>/dev/null
+git -C "$TMP/repo" remote add origin https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git 2>/dev/null
+out=$( cd "$TMP/repo" && bash -c "set -e; source '$HERE/detect-platform.sh'; detect_platform" 2>&1 ); rc=$?
+if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] && grep -qi 'gitea' <<<"$out"; then echo "  PASS  detect_platform in-repo (rc=0, $out)"
+else echo "  FAIL  detect_platform in-repo: rc=$rc out=$out"; fail=1; fi
+
+[ "$fail" -eq 0 ] && echo "OK  detect-platform fails loudly outside a repo" || echo "FAILED"
+exit "$fail"
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# Regression: the tea-failure diagnostic must be STATUS-NEUTRAL.
+#
+# Found by be-coder-08 reviewing PR #1086. At all three call sites the diagnostic is emitted
+# immediately BEFORE the Gitea API fallback. Written as the last command of an && list:
+#     declare -F explain_... >/dev/null && explain_...
+# under `set -e` a FAILING diagnostic exits and the fallback never runs -- a diagnostic that
+# suppresses the recovery path it exists to explain. It misbehaves ONLY when the helper is
+# PRESENT, so the helper-absent path (pre-#1086 behaviour) keeps working and reads as a
+# passing control.
+#
+# TWO DEFECTS IN THE FIRST VERSION OF THIS TEST, both found by be-coder-08:
+#   1. `out=$( ... ) 2>"$errto"` applies the redirection to the ASSIGNMENT, not to the
+#      command substitution, so the probe's stderr was never actually pointed at /dev/full
+#      and the /dev/full rows proved nothing. Verified: `out=$(echo x >&2) 2>/dev/full`
+#      leaks to the terminal and returns 0; the redirect must be INSIDE the substitution.
+#   2. `eval "$CONSTRUCT"` changes `set -e` semantics for a bare && list, so the probe did
+#      not exercise the construct as the shipped file executes it. It now writes the line
+#      into a real script and runs it -- same parse, same set -e rules, no eval.
+# The construct is still LIFTED FROM THE SHIPPED FILE: retyping the fixed form makes the
+# probe pass on a build whose real call sites still carry the bare && form.
+set -uo pipefail
+fail=0
+GIT_DIR_UNDER_TEST="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+TMP="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
+
+probe() { # $1=present|absent  $2=stderr target  $3=source file  -> "rc:fallback"
+    local helper="$1" errto="$2" src="$3" construct script out rc
+    construct=$(grep -m1 'explain_tea_user_does_not_exist' "$GIT_DIR_UNDER_TEST/$src" | sed 's/^[[:space:]]*//')
+    [ -n "$construct" ] || { printf 'no-construct:no'; return; }
+    script="$TMP/probe.sh"
+    {
+        echo '#!/bin/bash'
+        echo 'set -e'
+        echo 'explain_tea_user_does_not_exist() { echo "diagnostic" >&2; }'
+        [ "$helper" = absent ] && echo 'unset -f explain_tea_user_does_not_exist'
+        echo "$construct"                # the shipped line, parsed by a real shell
+        echo 'echo FALLBACK_REACHED'
+    } > "$script"
+    # redirect INSIDE the substitution so the subshell's stderr really is $errto
+    out=$( bash "$script" 2>"$errto" ); rc=$?
+    printf '%s:%s' "$rc" "$(grep -q FALLBACK_REACHED <<<"$out" && echo yes || echo no)"
+}
+
+check() { if [ "$2" = "$3" ]; then echo "  PASS  $1 ($2)"; else echo "  FAIL  $1: got $2, want $3"; fail=1; fi; }
+
+echo "== diagnostic must not alter exit status or skip the fallback =="
+# /dev/full makes every stderr write fail -- the real-world shape is a closed or full fd.
+for src in pr-create.sh issue-view.sh issue-create.sh; do
+    check "$src stderr OK      / helper present" "$(probe present /dev/null "$src")" "0:yes"
+    check "$src stderr OK      / helper absent " "$(probe absent  /dev/null "$src")" "0:yes"
+    check "$src stderr FAILING / helper present" "$(probe present /dev/full "$src")" "0:yes"
+    check "$src stderr FAILING / helper absent " "$(probe absent  /dev/full "$src")" "0:yes"
+done
+
+echo "== all three call sites use the status-neutral form =="
+for f in pr-create.sh issue-view.sh issue-create.sh; do
+    p="$GIT_DIR_UNDER_TEST/$f"
+    grep -q '{ declare -F explain_tea_user_does_not_exist >/dev/null && explain_tea_user_does_not_exist; } || true' "$p" \
+        && echo "  PASS  $f guarded" || { echo "  FAIL  $f: diagnostic is not status-neutral"; fail=1; }
+done
+
+[ "$fail" -eq 0 ] && echo "OK  diagnostic is status-neutral" || echo "FAILED"
+exit "$fail"
@@ -7,14 +7,40 @@ SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
 WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/gitea-login-resolution}"
 REPO_DIR="$WORK_DIR/repo"
 BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
+HOME_DIR="$WORK_DIR/home"
 LOG_FILE="$WORK_DIR/calls.log"
 CREDENTIALS_FILE="$WORK_DIR/credentials.json"

 rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
-mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR"
+mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR" "$HOME_DIR"

 git -C "$REPO_DIR" init -q
 git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote add origin https://git.uscllc.com/USC/uconnect.git
+# HERMETICITY (#1007) — TWO mechanisms with DIFFERENT jobs; do not conflate them.
+#
+# OPERATIVE: the empty repo-local `mosaic.gitIdentity` below. get_gitea_token()
+# step 0 resolves a per-agent identity from `git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity`,
+# which on a provisioned agent seat is set GLOBALLY and so leaks into this fresh
+# repo. It then reads a REAL per-slot token from $HOME and returns it WITHOUT ever
+# consulting MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE, so the fixture credentials below are silently
+# ignored. This suite is the one where the consequence is not subtle: it FAILS
+# outright on a provisioned seat (rc=1 bare, rc=0 with $HOME sandboxed, one
+# variable changed) and passes everywhere else, including CI, which has no
+# per-agent token to leak.
+#
+# CONTAINMENT: the sandboxed HOME in the four run helpers below. It only has to
+# bound a failure that the pin should already have prevented.
+#
+# NOTE FOR ANYONE AUDITING THIS SUITE: the sandboxed HOME is containment, NOT an
+# assay. Running a suite under a decoy HOME to test for this defect REMOVES the
+# trigger — ~/.gitconfig is where the global identity lives, so step 0 is skipped
+# by construction and every suite reads clean however vulnerable it is. To measure,
+# REPLICATE a seat (a decoy HOME whose .gitconfig sets mosaic.gitIdentity, with no
+# per-slot token) so step 0 reaches its fail-loud branch.
+#
+# Note the env-var route does NOT work: detect-platform.sh reads
+# "${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}", and `:-` treats set-but-empty identically to unset.
+git -C "$REPO_DIR" config mosaic.gitIdentity ""

 cat > "$CREDENTIALS_FILE" <<'JSON'
 {
@@ -86,6 +112,7 @@ run_in_repo() {
    (
        cd "$REPO_DIR"
        PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" \
+        HOME="$HOME_DIR" \
        MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
        MOSAIC_TEST_LOG="$LOG_FILE" \
        "$@"
@@ -283,6 +310,7 @@ run_in_repo2() {
    (
        cd "$REPO_DIR"
        PATH="$BIN_DIR2:$PATH" \
+        HOME="$HOME_DIR" \
        MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
        MOSAIC_TEST_LOG="$LOG_FILE" \
        "$@"
@@ -343,7 +371,7 @@ write_fixture() { printf '%s' "$1" > "$FIXTURE_XDG/tea/config.yml"; }
 token_fallback() {
    (
        cd "$REPO_DIR"
-        XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$FIXTURE_XDG" PYTHONPATH="$NOYAML_DIR" bash -c '
+        HOME="$HOME_DIR" XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$FIXTURE_XDG" PYTHONPATH="$NOYAML_DIR" bash -c '
            source "'"$SCRIPT_DIR"'/detect-platform.sh"
            get_gitea_token_for_login "$1" "$2"
        ' _ "$1" "$2"
@@ -354,7 +382,7 @@ token_fallback() {
 token_pyyaml() {
    (
        cd "$REPO_DIR"
-        XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$FIXTURE_XDG" bash -c '
+        HOME="$HOME_DIR" XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$FIXTURE_XDG" bash -c '
            source "'"$SCRIPT_DIR"'/detect-platform.sh"
            get_gitea_token_for_login "$1" "$2"
        ' _ "$1" "$2"
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
 # Regression harness for #701: -h/--help must exit 0, bad args must still exit nonzero.
 #
-# Covers the 7 wrappers whose usage() previously hard-coded `exit 1`, so every
+# Covers wrappers whose usage() previously hard-coded `exit 1`, so every
 # --help invocation exited nonzero and logged a phantom isError across fleet lanes.
 # Asserts, per wrapper:
 #   1. `--help` exits 0 and prints usage.
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ WRAPPERS=(
    issue-list.sh
    milestone-create.sh
    pr-create.sh
+    pr-edit.sh
    pr-list.sh
    pr-merge.sh
 )
@@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ for wrapper in "${WRAPPERS[@]}"; do
 done

 if [[ "$fail" -eq 0 ]]; then
-    echo "help-exit-code regression passed (7/7 wrappers)"
+    echo "help-exit-code regression passed (8/8 wrappers)"
 fi

 exit "$fail"
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Regression: issue-close.sh must NOT close an issue when the closing comment could not
+# be posted, and comment+close must be made by ONE principal.
+#
+# Guards two defects fixed together (see #1081):
+#   1. `tea issue comment` is not a subcommand -- tea exposes comments as the TOP-LEVEL
+#      `tea comment`. The old call always failed, was unchecked, and the issue closed
+#      anyway, losing the record of WHY it was closed.
+#   2. Routing the comment through the token-authenticated API helper while the close
+#      used --login would attribute one operation to two principals.
+#
+# SAFETY (rev-974, #1085 review 130): this test previously ran under `set -uo pipefail`
+# with unchecked mkdir/redirect/cd, then prepended a possibly-nonexistent $MOCK_BIN to
+# PATH -- while `git remote add origin` names the REAL repository. Forcing setup failure
+# with an unwritable AGENT_WORK_ROOT made it `git init` in its CALLER's directory and
+# invoke the real, provider-mutating issue-close.sh. Setup now fails closed, and both
+# `tea` and `curl` are asserted to resolve INSIDE $MOCK_BIN before any target run.
+set -euo pipefail
+# NOTE: with `set -e`, `grep -q X && fail "..."` is a trap -- the ABSENT case (grep rc=1,
+# which is the PASSING case for a must-not-appear assertion) is the last command of an &&
+# list and silently terminates the script with no message. Every must-not-appear check
+# below is therefore an if-block. This is the same set -e + &&-list defect be-coder-08
+# found in #1086, reintroduced here by adding `set -e` for the sandbox-safety fix.
+
+WORK_ROOT="${AGENT_WORK_ROOT:-${TMPDIR:-/tmp}}"
+SANDBOX="$WORK_ROOT/issue-close-fail-closed-test-$$"
+MOCK_BIN="$SANDBOX/bin"; REPO_DIR="$SANDBOX/repo"; CALLS="$SANDBOX/calls.log"
+cleanup() { rm -rf "$SANDBOX"; }
+trap cleanup EXIT
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+TARGET="$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-close.sh"
+[ -f "$TARGET" ] || { echo "FAIL: issue-close.sh not found beside this test"; exit 1; }
+fail() { echo "FAIL: $*"; exit 1; }
+
+# Every setup step is checked. Under `set -e` these abort; the explicit || fail keeps the
+# reason legible instead of a bare non-zero exit.
+mkdir -p "$MOCK_BIN" "$REPO_DIR" || fail "setup: cannot create sandbox under $WORK_ROOT"
+: > "$CALLS"                     || fail "setup: cannot write calls log at $CALLS"
+cd "$REPO_DIR"                   || fail "setup: cannot cd into $REPO_DIR"
+git init -q                      || fail "setup: git init failed"
+git remote add origin https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git || fail "setup: git remote add failed"
+export PATH="$MOCK_BIN:$PATH" CALLS
+export GITEA_URL="https://git.mosaicstack.dev"
+export GITEA_TOKEN="redacted-test-token"
+
+cat > "$MOCK_BIN/curl" <<'EOF'
+#!/bin/bash
+method=GET; url=""
+while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
+    case "$1" in
+        -X) method="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+        http*|https*) url="$1"; shift ;;
+        *) shift ;;
+    esac
+done
+printf 'curl %s %s\n' "$method" "$url" >> "$CALLS"
+[ "${MOCK_CURL_FAIL:-}" = "1" ] && [ "$method" = "POST" ] && exit 22
+exit 0
+EOF
+chmod +x "$MOCK_BIN/curl"
+
+mk_tea() {  # $1 = exit code for a comment attempt; $2 = login list (empty => no login)
+    local rc="$1" login="${2-}"
+    cat > "$MOCK_BIN/tea" <<EOF
+#!/bin/bash
+printf 'tea %s\n' "\$*" >> "$CALLS"
+if [[ "\$*" == *"login list"* ]]; then
+    printf '%s\n' '${login}'; exit 0
+fi
+# Fail ANY comment attempt -- both the correct top-level \`tea comment\` and the broken
+# \`tea issue comment\` -- so an unfixed script exercises the DEFECT rather than tripping
+# a setup assertion.
+if [[ "\$1" == "comment" || ( "\$1" == "issue" && "\$2" == "comment" ) ]]; then exit $rc; fi
+exit 0
+EOF
+    chmod +x "$MOCK_BIN/tea"
+}
+LOGIN_JSON='[{"name":"git.mosaicstack.dev","url":"https://git.mosaicstack.dev"}]'
+
+# The mocks must be the ones that run. Without this, a failed setup silently falls through
+# to the real tea/curl and the "test" mutates the real provider.
+assert_mocked() {
+    local w
+    for w in tea curl; do
+        p=$(command -v "$w" || true)
+        [ -n "$p" ] || fail "SAFETY: $w does not resolve at all"
+        case "$p" in
+            "$MOCK_BIN"/*) : ;;
+            *) fail "SAFETY: $w resolves to $p, OUTSIDE the sandbox -- refusing to invoke the target" ;;
+        esac
+    done
+}
+
+run_target() {  # never let a target failure abort the test; we assert on rc
+    # Call sites MUST use `rc=0; run_target ... || rc=$?` -- a bare `run_target ...; rc=$?`
+    # lets the non-zero RETURN trip set -e in the CALLER before rc is ever read.
+    set +e; bash "$TARGET" "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1; local rc=$?; set -e; return $rc
+}
+
+# ── tea path ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# 1. NEGATIVE (the regression): comment fails => must NOT close, must exit non-zero
+mk_tea 1 "$LOGIN_JSON"; : > "$CALLS"; assert_mocked
+rc=0; run_target -i 42 -c "closing note" || rc=$?
+grep -qE 'tea (issue )?comment' "$CALLS" || fail "no comment attempt -- setup did not reach the tea branch"
+if grep -q 'tea issue close' "$CALLS"; then fail "ISSUE CLOSED AFTER THE COMMENT FAILED -- the regression"; fi
+[ "$rc" -ne 0 ] || fail "comment failed but issue-close exited 0 -- FAIL-OPEN"
+
+# 2. POSITIVE: comment succeeds => close proceeds, exit 0
+mk_tea 0 "$LOGIN_JSON"; : > "$CALLS"; assert_mocked
+rc=0; run_target -i 42 -c "closing note" || rc=$?
+[ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail "comment succeeded but issue-close exited $rc"
+grep -q 'tea issue close' "$CALLS" || fail "issue not closed even though the comment succeeded"
+
+# 3. must use top-level `tea comment`, never `tea issue comment`
+if grep -q 'tea issue comment' "$CALLS"; then fail "used 'tea issue comment' -- not a valid subcommand"; fi
+
+# 4. ONE PRINCIPAL: comment and close must carry the SAME --login
+c=$(grep -m1 '^tea comment'     "$CALLS" | grep -o -- '--login [^ ]*' | awk '{print $2}')
+k=$(grep -m1 '^tea issue close' "$CALLS" | grep -o -- '--login [^ ]*' | awk '{print $2}')
+[ -n "$c" ] || fail "comment carried no --login"
+[ "$c" = "$k" ] || fail "MIXED PRINCIPALS: comment=$c close=$k"
+
+# ── no-login / API fallback path ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# rev-974: the delta also adds fail-closed behaviour to this branch, and the suite never
+# reached it -- replacing the whole fallback contract with an unconditional close still
+# passed. These assert the POSTCONDITION (which HTTP calls happened, in what order),
+# not merely that a command ran.
+# 5. no login + comment FAILS => POST attempted, NO PATCH, non-zero
+mk_tea 0 ""; : > "$CALLS"; assert_mocked
+rc=0; MOCK_CURL_FAIL=1 run_target -i 42 -c "closing note" || rc=$?
+grep -q 'curl POST' "$CALLS" || fail "API path: no comment POST attempted"
+if grep -q 'curl PATCH' "$CALLS"; then fail "API path: ISSUE CLOSED (PATCH) AFTER THE COMMENT POST FAILED"; fi
+[ "$rc" -ne 0 ] || fail "API path: comment failed but exited 0 -- FAIL-OPEN"
+
+# 6. no login + comment SUCCEEDS => POST strictly BEFORE PATCH, exit 0
+mk_tea 0 ""; : > "$CALLS"; assert_mocked
+rc=0; run_target -i 42 -c "closing note" || rc=$?
+[ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail "API path: comment succeeded but exited $rc"
+order=$(grep -oE 'curl (POST|PATCH)' "$CALLS" | awk '{print $2}' | paste -sd, -)
+[ "$order" = "POST,PATCH" ] || fail "API path: expected POST,PATCH -- got '${order:-<none>}'"
+
+# 7. no login + NO comment => PATCH only, never a POST
+mk_tea 0 ""; : > "$CALLS"; assert_mocked
+rc=0; run_target -i 42 || rc=$?
+[ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail "API path: no-comment close exited $rc"
+if grep -q 'curl POST' "$CALLS"; then fail "API path: posted a comment when none was requested"; fi
+grep -q 'curl PATCH' "$CALLS" || fail "API path: issue not closed when no comment was requested"
+
+echo "issue-close.sh fail-closed + single-principal regression passed"
@@ -61,15 +61,54 @@ STATE_FILE="$WORK_DIR/comments.json"
 # A dedicated scratch dir the wrapper is pointed at via TMPDIR, so the leak
 # check can assert every POST/GET body + metadata temp file is cleaned up.
 TMP_SCRATCH="$WORK_DIR/scratch"
+HOME_DIR="$WORK_DIR/home"

 cleanup() {
    rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
 }
 trap cleanup EXIT

-mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR" "$XDG_DIR" "$TMP_SCRATCH"
+mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR" "$XDG_DIR" "$TMP_SCRATCH" "$HOME_DIR"
 git -C "$REPO_DIR" init -q
 git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote add origin https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git
+# HERMETICITY (#1007) — TWO mechanisms with DIFFERENT jobs; do not conflate them.
+#
+# OPERATIVE: the empty repo-local `mosaic.gitIdentity` below. get_gitea_token()
+# step 0 resolves a per-agent identity from `git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity`,
+# which on a provisioned agent seat is set GLOBALLY and so leaks into this fresh
+# repo. It then reads a REAL per-slot token from $HOME and returns it WITHOUT ever
+# consulting MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE, so the fixture credential below is silently
+# ignored. The stub curl then rejects the unrecognised bearer, and this suite
+# fails at its FIRST case with `Gitea authenticated-identity read failed with
+# HTTP 401`. An empty repo-local value shadows the global one and reads back
+# empty at rc=0. Measured: without this pin the suite is RED on every seat.
+#
+# CONTAINMENT: the sandboxed HOME in run_comment(). It only has to bound a
+# failure that the pin should already have prevented.
+#
+# THIS SUITE WAS THE HARDEST OF THE FIVE TO SEE, and the reason is worth stating
+# because it generalises: run_comment() sends the wrapper's stdout AND stderr to
+# $OUTPUT_FILE, and the EXIT trap above deletes $WORK_DIR. So the 401 — the only
+# thing that says what went wrong — exists only inside a directory that is gone
+# by the time anyone looks. The suite exits 1 with ZERO bytes on stdout and
+# stderr. A suite that discards or deletes its own evidence turns any post-hoc
+# assay into a non-measurement: "nothing found" there means "no surviving
+# trace", never "clean". It was found by intercepting the identity read at its
+# SOURCE (a PATH shim over `git` logging every `mosaic.gitIdentity` read to a
+# file outside $WORK_DIR), which is deletion-proof by construction, rather than
+# by grepping for the symptom.
+#
+# NOTE FOR ANYONE AUDITING THIS SUITE: the sandboxed HOME is containment, NOT an
+# assay. Running a suite under a decoy HOME to test for this defect REMOVES the
+# trigger — ~/.gitconfig is where the global identity lives, so step 0 is skipped
+# by construction and every suite reads clean however vulnerable it is. To
+# measure, REPLICATE a seat (a decoy HOME whose .gitconfig sets
+# mosaic.gitIdentity, with no per-slot token) so step 0 reaches its fail-loud
+# branch — or intercept the read as described above.
+#
+# Note the env-var route does NOT work: detect-platform.sh reads
+# "${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}", and `:-` treats set-but-empty identically to unset.
+git -C "$REPO_DIR" config mosaic.gitIdentity ""

 ISSUE_NUMBER=7
 REPO_SLUG="mosaicstack/stack"
@@ -280,7 +319,10 @@ print("201")
 print(json.dumps(record))
 PY
 )
-    write_response "$(printf '%s' "$result" | head -n1)" "$(printf '%s' "$result" | tail -n +2)"
+    response_status="${result%%$'\n'*}"
+    response_body=""
+    [[ "$result" == *$'\n'* ]] && response_body="${result#*$'\n'}"
+    write_response "$response_status" "$response_body"
 elif [[ "$method" == "GET" && "$path" == "$ISSUE_COMMENT_API_BASE"/issues/comments/* ]]; then
    result=$(ISSUE_COMMENT_GET_ID="${path##*/}" python3 - <<'PY'
 import json
@@ -299,7 +341,10 @@ else:
    print(json.dumps(match))
 PY
 )
-    write_response "$(printf '%s' "$result" | head -n1)" "$(printf '%s' "$result" | tail -n +2)"
+    response_status="${result%%$'\n'*}"
+    response_body=""
+    [[ "$result" == *$'\n'* ]] && response_body="${result#*$'\n'}"
+    write_response "$response_status" "$response_body"
 else
    echo "Unexpected curl request: $method $url" >&2
    exit 97
@@ -366,6 +411,7 @@ run_comment() {
        cd "$REPO_DIR"
        PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" \
        TMPDIR="$TMP_SCRATCH" \
+        HOME="$HOME_DIR" \
        XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$XDG_DIR" \
        MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
        ISSUE_COMMENT_TEA_LOG="$TEA_LOG" \
@@ -7,13 +7,38 @@ SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
 WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/issue-create-interactive-auth}"
 REPO_DIR="$WORK_DIR/repo"
 BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
+HOME_DIR="$WORK_DIR/home"
 LOG_FILE="$WORK_DIR/calls.log"
 CREDENTIALS_FILE="$WORK_DIR/credentials.json"

 rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
-mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR"
+mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR" "$HOME_DIR"
 git -C "$REPO_DIR" init -q
 git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote add origin https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git
+# HERMETICITY (#1007) — TWO mechanisms with DIFFERENT jobs; do not conflate them.
+#
+# OPERATIVE: the empty repo-local `mosaic.gitIdentity` below. get_gitea_token()
+# step 0 resolves a per-agent identity from `git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity`,
+# which on a provisioned agent seat is set GLOBALLY and so leaks into this fresh
+# repo. It then reads a REAL per-slot token from $HOME and returns it WITHOUT ever
+# consulting MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE, so the fixture credential below is silently
+# ignored and the suite runs against a production credential. An empty repo-local
+# value shadows the global one and reads back empty at rc=0. Measured: this suite
+# resolves a per-slot token without it.
+#
+# CONTAINMENT: the sandboxed HOME in run_wrapper(). It only has to bound a failure
+# that the pin should already have prevented.
+#
+# NOTE FOR ANYONE AUDITING THIS SUITE: the sandboxed HOME is containment, NOT an
+# assay. Running a suite under a decoy HOME to test for this defect REMOVES the
+# trigger — ~/.gitconfig is where the global identity lives, so step 0 is skipped
+# by construction and every suite reads clean however vulnerable it is. To measure,
+# REPLICATE a seat (a decoy HOME whose .gitconfig sets mosaic.gitIdentity, with no
+# per-slot token) so step 0 reaches its fail-loud branch.
+#
+# Note the env-var route does NOT work: detect-platform.sh reads
+# "${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}", and `:-` treats set-but-empty identically to unset.
+git -C "$REPO_DIR" config mosaic.gitIdentity ""

 cat > "$CREDENTIALS_FILE" <<'JSON'
 {"gitea":{"mosaicstack":{"url":"https://git.mosaicstack.dev","token":"test-token"}}}
@@ -50,6 +75,7 @@ run_wrapper() {
  (
    cd "$REPO_DIR"
    PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" \
+    HOME="$HOME_DIR" \
    MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
    MOSAIC_TEST_LOG="$LOG_FILE" \
    "$@"
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ section_nums() { # $1 = output  $2 = header-prefix
 }

 fail() { echo "FAIL: $1" >&2; exit 1; }
-contains() { printf '%s\n' "$1" | grep -qx "$2"; }
+contains() { grep -qx "$2" <<<"$1"; }

 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Fixed (current) script behavior
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# test-mosaic-worktree-large-repo.sh — the helper must work on the repos it exists for.
+#
+# resolve_repo() took the first line of `git worktree list --porcelain` with
+# `awk '/^worktree /{print substr($0,10); exit}'`. The `exit` closes the read end
+# of the pipe while git is still writing, git takes SIGPIPE, and under
+# `set -euo pipefail` the command substitution returns 141 — so the assignment
+# fails, `set -e` aborts the function, and the script dies printing NOTHING. No
+# message, no path, no worktree, exit 141.
+#
+# What makes it worth a dedicated test rather than a fixture line is WHEN it
+# fires. If git finishes writing before awk leaves, there is no SIGPIPE and
+# everything works. So the failure is a function of how much porcelain the repo
+# produces: invisible on a three-worktree repo, reliable on a seventy-worktree
+# one. It was measured on a repo with 73 worktrees (10 KB of porcelain) — rc=141,
+# no output — and it had passed every hand-check before that, on small repos.
+#
+# A test that ran `git worktree list` against whatever repo it happens to sit in
+# would inherit that same size dependence and would have PASSED on the tree that
+# was broken. So git is stubbed on PATH and made to emit a large porcelain
+# stream, which turns "depends on the repo you are standing in" into "always".
+#
+# Exit: 0 = the helper resolved the repo · 1 = it did not
+
+set -uo pipefail
+
+HERE="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+TOOL="${1:-$HERE/mosaic-worktree.sh}"
+[ -x "$TOOL" ] || { printf 'test-mosaic-worktree-large-repo: not executable: %s\n' "$TOOL" >&2; exit 2; }
+
+TMP="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
+mkdir -p "$TMP/bin"
+
+# The stub answers exactly the two calls resolve_repo makes, and answers the
+# porcelain one with ~450 KB — comfortably past a 64 KB pipe buffer, so the
+# writer is still writing when a reader that quits early goes away. Anything
+# else exits non-zero rather than pretending to be git.
+cat > "$TMP/bin/git" <<'STUB'
+#!/bin/sh
+while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
+  case "$1" in -C) shift 2 ;; *) break ;; esac
+done
+case "$*" in
+  "rev-parse --git-dir")
+    echo .git; exit 0 ;;
+  "worktree list --porcelain")
+    # The first entry is the main worktree. That single line is all the helper
+    # needs, and it is exactly what it stopped receiving.
+    printf 'worktree /src/fakerepo\nHEAD %040d\nbranch refs/heads/main\n\n' 0
+    awk 'BEGIN{ for (i = 0; i < 4000; i++)
+                  printf "worktree /src/fakerepo-worktrees/w%d\nHEAD %040d\nbranch refs/heads/topic-%d\n\n", i, 0, i }'
+    # NOT `exit 0`. Real git dies of SIGPIPE here and reports 141, and pipefail
+    # in the caller is what turns that into the silent abort. A stub that exits 0
+    # regardless hands the caller a clean status and the probe passes on the
+    # broken tree — which is how this test failed to be a test on its first run.
+    exit $? ;;
+esac
+exit 1
+STUB
+chmod +x "$TMP/bin/git"
+
+fail=0
+check() {
+  local why="$1" want="$2" got="$3"
+  if [ "$want" = "$got" ]; then
+    printf 'ok    %s\n' "$why"
+  else
+    printf 'FAIL  %s\n        want: %s\n        got:  %s\n' "$why" "$want" "$got"
+    fail=1
+  fi
+}
+
+out="$(PATH="$TMP/bin:$PATH" "$TOOL" path feat/workspace-hygiene 2>&1)"
+rc=$?
+
+# Both halves are asserted. rc alone would pass if the helper started printing a
+# usage error, and output alone would miss a non-zero exit — and the defect's
+# signature is precisely a non-zero exit with no output, which only the pair
+# distinguishes from every other way this could go wrong.
+check 'resolving a repo with a large worktree list exits 0' 0 "$rc"
+check 'and derives the path from the main worktree' /src/fakerepo-worktrees/feat-workspace-hygiene "$out"
+
+printf '\n'
+if [ "$fail" -eq 0 ]; then
+  printf 'mosaic-worktree: resolves against a large porcelain stream.\n'
+else
+  cat <<'EOF'
+mosaic-worktree could not resolve the repository.
+
+An empty output with a non-zero exit is the SIGPIPE signature: a reader that
+quits early (`awk ... exit`, `head -n`) kills the producer, and pipefail turns
+that into a silent abort. Nothing in this script may close a git pipe early.
+EOF
+fi
+exit "$fail"
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Regression harness for secret-safe, identity-bound PR editing and explicit targets.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/pr-edit}"
+REPO_DIR="$WORK_DIR/repo"; BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"; HOME_DIR="$WORK_DIR/home"
+XDG_DIR="$WORK_DIR/xdg"; LOG_FILE="$WORK_DIR/calls.log"
+rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"; mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR" "$HOME_DIR" "$XDG_DIR/tea"
+git -C "$REPO_DIR" init -q
+git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote add origin https://git.uscllc.com/other/wrong-checkout.git
+git -C "$REPO_DIR" config mosaic.gitIdentity ""
+
+cat > "$XDG_DIR/tea/config.yml" <<'YAML'
+logins:
+- name: usc-coder3
+  url: https://git.uscllc.com
+  token: fixture-usc-token
+- name: same-host-other
+  url: https://git.uscllc.com
+  token: fixture-other-token
+- name: mosaic-coder3
+  url: https://git.mosaicstack.dev
+  token: fixture-mosaic-token
+YAML
+
+cat > "$BIN_DIR/tea" <<'SH'
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+# Deliberately misleading duplicate-name response: the wrapper must never use
+# tea for identity validation because its name lookup is not host-bound.
+[[ "$*" == "api --login duplicate /user" ]] && { printf '{"login":"coder3"}\n'; exit 0; }
+exit 1
+SH
+cat > "$BIN_DIR/curl" <<'SH'
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+printf 'curl' >> "$MOSAIC_TEST_LOG"; printf ' <%s>' "$@" >> "$MOSAIC_TEST_LOG"; printf '\n' >> "$MOSAIC_TEST_LOG"
+if [[ "${*: -1}" == */user ]]; then
+    printf '{"login":"%s"}\n' "${MOSAIC_STUB_AUTH_USER:-coder3}"
+elif [[ "${*: -1}" == */repos/* && " $* " != *" -X PATCH "* ]]; then
+    [[ "${MOSAIC_STUB_SIGNAL:-}" == "TERM" ]] && { kill -TERM "$PPID"; sleep 1; }
+    [[ "${MOSAIC_STUB_SIGNAL:-}" == "INT" ]] && { kill -INT "$PPID"; sleep 1; }
+    printf '{"name":"repo"}\n'
+else
+    printf '{"number":42,"draft":false}\n'
+fi
+SH
+cat > "$BIN_DIR/gh" <<'SH'
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+printf 'gh' >> "$MOSAIC_TEST_LOG"; printf ' <%s>' "$@" >> "$MOSAIC_TEST_LOG"; printf '\n' >> "$MOSAIC_TEST_LOG"
+SH
+chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/tea" "$BIN_DIR/curl" "$BIN_DIR/gh" "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-edit.sh"
+
+run_wrapper() {
+    (cd "$REPO_DIR"; PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" HOME="$HOME_DIR" XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$XDG_DIR" \
+      MOSAIC_TEST_LOG="$LOG_FILE" "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-edit.sh" "$@")
+}
+assert_no_secret() {
+    ! grep -q 'fixture-.*-token' "$LOG_FILE" || { echo "Credential leaked into curl argv/log" >&2; exit 1; }
+}
+
+# The explicit target differs from CWD origin and must govern BOTH host and slug.
+: > "$LOG_FILE"
+# shellcheck disable=SC2016 # literal backticks prove argument-array body safety.
+MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=coder3 run_wrapper -n 42 --login mosaic-coder3 -r mosaicstack/stack \
+  -H git.mosaicstack.dev --title 'New title' --body 'Body with `literal` bytes' --base develop --draft >/dev/null
+python3 - "$LOG_FILE" <<'PY'
+import json, pathlib, sys
+lines = pathlib.Path(sys.argv[1]).read_text().splitlines()
+assert len(lines) == 3, lines
+assert "https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/user" in lines[0], lines
+assert "https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack" in lines[1], lines
+assert "https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/42" in lines[2], lines
+assert all("--config" in line for line in lines), lines
+assert "Authorization:" not in "\n".join(lines), lines
+payload = lines[2].split(" <-d> <", 1)[1].split("> <https://", 1)[0]
+assert json.loads(payload) == {"title":"New title","body":"Body with `literal` bytes","base":"develop","draft":True}
+PY
+assert_no_secret
+
+# Ready maps to false and still preflights before the write.
+: > "$LOG_FILE"
+MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=coder3 run_wrapper -n 42 --login usc-coder3 -r USC/uconnect -H git.uscllc.com --ready >/dev/null
+grep -q '"draft": false' "$LOG_FILE"; assert_no_secret
+
+# Identity is mandatory; no ambient/first-host login can write.
+: > "$LOG_FILE"
+if run_wrapper -n 42 --login usc-coder3 --draft >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo "Unset identity wrote" >&2; exit 1; fi
+[[ ! -s "$LOG_FILE" ]] || { echo "Unset identity reached curl" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+# Explicit and ambient same-host wrong principals both refuse after identity
+# lookup but before repo preflight/PATCH. The /user read is expected curl #1.
+for mode in explicit ambient; do
+    : > "$LOG_FILE"
+    if [[ "$mode" == explicit ]]; then
+        cmd=(--login same-host-other)
+    else
+        cmd=(); export GITEA_LOGIN=same-host-other
+    fi
+    if MOSAIC_STUB_AUTH_USER=other MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=coder3 run_wrapper -n 42 "${cmd[@]}" -r USC/uconnect -H git.uscllc.com --draft >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        echo "$mode wrong identity wrote" >&2; exit 1
+    fi
+    unset GITEA_LOGIN
+    [[ "$(wc -l < "$LOG_FILE")" -eq 1 ]] || { echo "$mode wrong identity passed identity lookup" >&2; exit 1; }
+    ! grep -q '/repos/' "$LOG_FILE" || { echo "$mode wrong identity reached repo preflight/PATCH" >&2; exit 1; }
+done
+
+# Set identity with no explicit/ambient login refuses rather than selecting first host login.
+: > "$LOG_FILE"
+if MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=coder3 run_wrapper -n 42 -r USC/uconnect -H git.uscllc.com --draft >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "Missing login selected a principal" >&2; exit 1
+fi
+[[ ! -s "$LOG_FILE" ]] || { echo "Missing login reached curl" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+# Split-credential probe for the duplicate-name cross-host seam: tea's
+# name-only /user would report coder3, while the selected host-bound curl token
+# reports other. The wrapper must trust only the latter handle used by PATCH.
+: > "$LOG_FILE"
+if MOSAIC_STUB_AUTH_USER=other MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=coder3 run_wrapper -n 42 --login mosaic-coder3 \
+    -r mosaicstack/stack -H git.mosaicstack.dev --draft >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "Duplicate-name split credential reached PATCH" >&2; exit 1
+fi
+[[ "$(wc -l < "$LOG_FILE")" -eq 1 ]] || { echo "Duplicate-name identity mismatch passed /user" >&2; cat "$LOG_FILE" >&2; exit 1; }
+! grep -q -- '-X> <PATCH' "$LOG_FILE" || { echo "Duplicate-name mismatch mutated" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+# TERM and INT during repo preflight clean up, do not mutate, and return the
+# signal status rather than swallowing termination into success.
+for sig in TERM INT; do
+    : > "$LOG_FILE"
+    set +e
+    MOSAIC_STUB_SIGNAL="$sig" MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=coder3 run_wrapper -n 42 --login usc-coder3 \
+      -r USC/uconnect -H git.uscllc.com --draft >/dev/null 2>&1
+    rc=$?
+    set -e
+    [[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]] || { echo "$sig was swallowed into success" >&2; exit 1; }
+    [[ "$rc" -eq 143 || "$rc" -eq 130 ]] || { echo "$sig returned unexpected status $rc" >&2; exit 1; }
+    ! grep -q -- '-X> <PATCH' "$LOG_FILE" || { echo "$sig continued into PATCH" >&2; exit 1; }
+    assert_no_secret
+done
+
+# Cross-host credential fails before curl; explicit target preflight failure blocks PATCH.
+: > "$LOG_FILE"
+if MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=coder3 run_wrapper -n 42 --login mosaic-coder3 -r USC/uconnect -H git.uscllc.com --draft >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "Cross-host login wrote" >&2; exit 1
+fi
+[[ ! -s "$LOG_FILE" ]] || { echo "Cross-host login reached curl" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+if run_wrapper -n 42 --draft --ready >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo "Accepted conflicting modes" >&2; exit 1; fi
+if run_wrapper -n 42 >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo "Accepted no-op edit" >&2; exit 1; fi
+run_wrapper --help 2>&1 | grep -q '^Usage:'
+
+# GitHub retains provider-native edit/readiness behavior.
+git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote set-url origin https://github.com/acme/widgets.git
+: > "$LOG_FILE"; run_wrapper -n 7 --title 'GitHub title' --draft >/dev/null
+grep -q 'gh <pr> <edit> <7> <--title> <GitHub title>' "$LOG_FILE"
+grep -q 'gh <pr> <ready> <7> <--undo>' "$LOG_FILE"
+echo "PR edit regression harness passed"
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ WORK_ROOT="${AGENT_WORK_ROOT:-${HOME:-/tmp}/mosaic/agent-work}"
 SANDBOX="$WORK_ROOT/pr-merge-empty-uid-test-$$"
 MOCK_BIN="$SANDBOX/bin"
 REPO_DIR="$SANDBOX/repo"
+HOME_DIR="$SANDBOX/home"
 LOG_FILE="$SANDBOX/mock.log"

 cleanup() {
@@ -15,7 +16,7 @@ cleanup() {
 }
 trap cleanup EXIT

-mkdir -p "$MOCK_BIN" "$REPO_DIR"
+mkdir -p "$MOCK_BIN" "$REPO_DIR" "$HOME_DIR"
 : > "$LOG_FILE"

 cat > "$MOCK_BIN/tea" <<'EOF'
@@ -109,7 +110,48 @@ chmod +x "$MOCK_BIN/curl"
 cd "$REPO_DIR"
 git init -q
 git remote add origin https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git
+# HERMETICITY (#1007) — TWO mechanisms with DIFFERENT jobs; do not conflate them.
+#
+# OPERATIVE: the empty repo-local `mosaic.gitIdentity` below. get_gitea_token()
+# step 0 resolves a per-agent identity from `git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity`,
+# which on a provisioned agent seat is set GLOBALLY and so leaks into this fresh
+# repo. Step 0 runs BEFORE the credential loader AND before the GITEA_TOKEN env
+# check, so the `GITEA_TOKEN=redacted-test-token` exported below is silently
+# overridden and a REAL per-slot token from $HOME is what flows through the
+# wrapper. Measured on a provisioned seat before this pin: all 5 mock-curl calls
+# carried the real per-slot token in argv and the fixture token was never used at
+# ALL. Three consequences specific to this suite:
+#   1. pr-merge.sh passes the token as `-H "Authorization: token $token"` and the
+#      mock curl logs full argv, so the real credential is written to $LOG_FILE
+#      on disk — transiently: the suite truncates that file between phases and
+#      the EXIT trap removes $SANDBOX, so it leaves NO post-hoc trace. That is
+#      why this suite was the hardest of the three to detect; observing it needs
+#      an instrument that captures argv while the run is live.
+#   2. Every failure path dumps $OUTPUT/$LOG_FILE to stderr through
+#      `sed 's/redacted-test-token/***REDACTED***/g'` — a redaction pattern that
+#      is the literal fixture string and therefore CANNOT match the token
+#      actually in use.
+#   3. The leak assertion at "Token leaked to pr-merge.sh output" greps for that
+#      same fixture string, so on a provisioned seat it passes vacuously: it is
+#      searching for a value the run never used.
+# An empty repo-local value shadows the global one and reads back empty at rc=0.
+#
+# CONTAINMENT: the sandboxed HOME exported below. It only has to bound a failure
+# that the pin should already have prevented.
+#
+# NOTE FOR ANYONE AUDITING THIS SUITE: the sandboxed HOME is containment, NOT an
+# assay. Running a suite under a decoy HOME to test for this defect REMOVES the
+# trigger — ~/.gitconfig is where the global identity lives, so step 0 is skipped
+# by construction and every suite reads clean however vulnerable it is. To measure,
+# REPLICATE a seat (a decoy HOME whose .gitconfig sets mosaic.gitIdentity, with no
+# per-slot token) so step 0 reaches its fail-loud branch.
+#
+# Note the env-var route does NOT work: detect-platform.sh reads
+# "${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}", and `:-` treats set-but-empty identically to unset.
+git -C "$REPO_DIR" config mosaic.gitIdentity ""

+# $SANDBOX/$HOME_DIR were derived from the real $HOME above, before this export.
+export HOME="$HOME_DIR"
 export PATH="$MOCK_BIN:$PATH"
 export PR_MERGE_TEST_LOG="$LOG_FILE"
 export GITEA_LOGIN="git.mosaicstack.dev"
@@ -8,12 +8,68 @@ WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/pr-metadata-gitea}"
 REPO_DIR="$WORK_DIR/repo"
 FIXTURE_DIR="$WORK_DIR/fixtures"
 STUB_DIR="$WORK_DIR/stubs"
+HOME_DIR="$WORK_DIR/home"
+CREDENTIALS_FILE="$WORK_DIR/credentials.json"

 rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
-mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$FIXTURE_DIR" "$STUB_DIR"
+mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$FIXTURE_DIR" "$STUB_DIR" "$HOME_DIR"

 git -C "$REPO_DIR" init -q
 git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote add origin https://git.uscllc.com/USC/uconnect.git
+# HERMETICITY (#1007) — TWO mechanisms with DIFFERENT jobs; do not conflate them.
+#
+# OPERATIVE: the empty repo-local `mosaic.gitIdentity` below. get_gitea_token()
+# step 0 resolves a per-agent identity from `git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity`,
+# which on a provisioned agent seat is set GLOBALLY and so leaks into this fresh
+# repo. Step 0 runs BEFORE the credential loader AND before the GITEA_TOKEN env
+# check, so the `GITEA_TOKEN="stub-token"` set in the run helpers below is
+# silently overridden and a REAL per-slot token from $HOME is what reaches curl.
+# Measured on a provisioned seat before this pin: both stub-curl calls carried
+# the real token in argv. An empty repo-local value shadows the global one and
+# reads back empty at rc=0.
+#
+# CONTAINMENT: the sandboxed HOME in the three run helpers below. It only has to
+# bound a failure that the pin should already have prevented.
+#
+# NOTE FOR ANYONE AUDITING THIS SUITE: the sandboxed HOME is containment, NOT an
+# assay. Running a suite under a decoy HOME to test for this defect REMOVES the
+# trigger — ~/.gitconfig is where the global identity lives, so step 0 is skipped
+# by construction and every suite reads clean however vulnerable it is. To measure,
+# REPLICATE a seat (a decoy HOME whose .gitconfig sets mosaic.gitIdentity, with no
+# per-slot token) so step 0 reaches its fail-loud branch. See
+# test-gitea-token-identity.sh for the stronger `env -i HOME=…` form used where a
+# suite's whole subject IS identity resolution.
+#
+# Note the env-var route does NOT work: detect-platform.sh reads
+# "${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}", and `:-` treats set-but-empty identically to unset.
+git -C "$REPO_DIR" config mosaic.gitIdentity ""
+
+# The pin above removes step 0, but this suite has a SECOND, independent
+# dependency on operator state, and closing only the first would leave the suite
+# red on any hermetic environment. The `GITEA_TOKEN="stub-token"` /
+# `GITEA_URL="https://git.example.test"` pair the run helpers set is INERT: step 2
+# of get_gitea_token accepts GITEA_TOKEN only when GITEA_URL matches the remote
+# host, and this repo's origin is git.uscllc.com, so that pair can never satisfy
+# it. Before this fixture the only credential that could reach the authenticated
+# curl branch was a REAL one — from step 0 on an agent seat, or from step 1
+# reading the operator's own ~/.config/mosaic/credentials.json. That is why the
+# "curl success path" case passed: not because the stub credential worked, but
+# because a production credential was available.
+#
+# A fixture is used rather than relying on the sandboxed HOME making step 1 find
+# nothing: a test that passes because production configuration is ABSENT fails
+# the moment it is present. Step 1 now resolves deterministically to a value that
+# is a fixture on every machine.
+cat > "$CREDENTIALS_FILE" <<'JSON'
+{
+  "gitea": {
+    "usc": {
+      "url": "https://git.uscllc.com",
+      "token": "stub-token"
+    }
+  }
+}
+JSON

 cat > "$FIXTURE_DIR/gitea-standard.json" <<'JSON'
 {
@@ -131,6 +187,8 @@ run_curl_success_case() {
    set +e
    output=$(cd "$REPO_DIR" && \
        PATH="$STUB_DIR:$PATH" \
+        HOME="$HOME_DIR" \
+        MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
        TMPDIR="$tmpdir" \
        GITEA_TOKEN="stub-token" \
        GITEA_URL="https://git.example.test" \
@@ -170,6 +228,8 @@ run_curl_early_exit_cleanup_case() {
    set +e
    output=$(cd "$REPO_DIR" && \
        PATH="$STUB_DIR:$PATH" \
+        HOME="$HOME_DIR" \
+        MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
        TMPDIR="$tmpdir" \
        GITEA_TOKEN="stub-token" \
        GITEA_URL="https://git.example.test" \
@@ -204,7 +264,8 @@ run_curl_early_exit_cleanup_case() {
 run_case() {
    local fixture="$1" expected_number="$2" expected_head="$3"
    local output
-    output=$(cd "$REPO_DIR" && MOSAIC_GITEA_PR_METADATA_RAW_FILE="$fixture" "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-metadata.sh" -n "$expected_number")
+    output=$(cd "$REPO_DIR" && HOME="$HOME_DIR" MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
+        MOSAIC_GITEA_PR_METADATA_RAW_FILE="$fixture" "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-metadata.sh" -n "$expected_number")
    PR_METADATA_OUTPUT="$output" python3 - "$expected_number" "$expected_head" <<'PY'
 import json
 import os
@@ -225,7 +225,10 @@ write_response() {
 emit() {
    # Split a two-line "status\n<json body>" python result into the response.
    local result="$1"
-    write_response "$(printf '%s' "$result" | head -n1)" "$(printf '%s' "$result" | tail -n +2)"
+    response_status="${result%%$'\n'*}"
+    response_body=""
+    [[ "$result" == *$'\n'* ]] && response_body="${result#*$'\n'}"
+    write_response "$response_status" "$response_body"
 }

 mode="${PR_REVIEW_TEST_MODE:-}"
@@ -436,6 +439,19 @@ elif mode == "comment-url-wrong-repo":
 elif mode == "comment-url-suffix-injection":
    # Prefix-injected: a bare endswith("/<slug>/pulls/123") test would ACCEPT it.
    pr_url = f"{_origin}/deceptive{_slug}/pulls/123"
+elif mode == "comment-url-wrong-port":
+    # #991 bound: an EXPLICIT non-default port is a different service on the same
+    # host. Relaxing http-vs-https must NOT relax this.
+    pr_url = f"{_p.scheme}://{_p.hostname}:8443{_slug}/pulls/123"
+elif mode == "comment-url-non-web-scheme":
+    # #991 bound: ONLY http/https collapse; any other scheme stays distinguishing.
+    pr_url = f"ftp://{_p.netloc}{_slug}/pulls/123"
+elif mode == "comment-url-scheme-downgrade":
+    # #991, and the only URL mode here that must be ACCEPTED. A Gitea whose
+    # ROOT_URL is http:// returns http:// object URLs for a repo reached over
+    # https://. Same host, same path, correct record — a truthful provider
+    # answer about a comment that landed, not a forgery.
+    pr_url = f"http://{_p.netloc}{_slug}/pulls/123"
 elif mode == "comment-mixed-case-slug":
    # #875: EXPECTED_REPO_SLUG is taken verbatim from GITEA_API_BASE and can be
    # mixed-case (e.g. "USC/uconnect"), but Gitea canonicalizes the returned
@@ -890,11 +906,16 @@ fi
 assert_no_temp_leak "review-body-reuse"

 # Cases 12-15 (#865 Blocker 3): a PR comment whose id/author/body are all correct
-# but whose provider-returned pull_request_url is forged must FAIL CLOSED.
-# Verification pins the URL's ORIGIN (scheme+host+effective-port) and FULL path
-# (deployment prefix + exact owner/repo + kind + number); a bare endswith/suffix
-# test would wrongly accept the look-alike-host and prefix-injection variants.
-for bad_mode in comment-url-wrong-host comment-url-wrong-owner comment-url-wrong-repo comment-url-suffix-injection; do
+# but whose provider-returned pull_request_url does not belong to this PR must
+# FAIL CLOSED. Verification pins the URL's ORIGIN (scheme-class + host + explicit
+# non-default port) and FULL path (deployment prefix + exact owner/repo + kind +
+# number); a bare endswith/suffix test would wrongly accept the look-alike-host
+# and prefix-injection variants. comment-url-wrong-port and
+# comment-url-non-web-scheme (#991) bound the scheme relaxation from the other
+# side: collapsing http/https must not also collapse a different port or a
+# different scheme family.
+for bad_mode in comment-url-wrong-host comment-url-wrong-owner comment-url-wrong-repo \
+                comment-url-suffix-injection comment-url-wrong-port comment-url-non-web-scheme; do
    if run_review "$bad_mode" comment durable-body; then
        echo "FAIL: forged comment URL ($bad_mode) was accepted" >&2
        cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
@@ -920,6 +941,19 @@ run_review comment-mixed-case-slug comment durable-body https://git.mosaicstack.
 grep -q 'Added and verified comment on Gitea PR #123' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
 assert_no_temp_leak "comment-mixed-case-slug"

+# Case 15c (#991): the deployment's Gitea ROOT_URL is http:// while every client
+# reaches it over https://, so the provider returns an http:// pull_request_url
+# for a comment that is otherwise entirely correct. Same class as 15b — a
+# legitimate provider response, not a spoof — and a scheme-strict compare
+# rejects it on EVERY comment, deterministically. That is not a cosmetic false
+# negative here: on a host where no seat can create a review OBJECT, this
+# comment-form record is the only gate-16 evidence obtainable, and the wrapper
+# refuses all of it while the comment sits durably on the PR. Host, path, owner,
+# repo, kind and number stay strict; only http-vs-https is relaxed.
+run_review comment-url-scheme-downgrade comment durable-body
+grep -q 'Added and verified comment on Gitea PR #123' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
+assert_no_temp_leak "comment-url-scheme-downgrade"
+
 # Case 16 (#865 ITEM 1, current-head TOCTOU): the PR head advances between the
 # pre-submit head read (which pins the review) and the post-verify re-read. The
 # review is genuinely created and verified as pinned to the OLD head, but the
@@ -222,8 +222,8 @@ grep -q 'Unknown action: bogus-action' "$OUTPUT_FILE"

 # --- Case 2: -h/--help documents both overrides.
 HELP_TEXT="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-review.sh" -h)"
-echo "$HELP_TEXT" | grep -q -- '-r, --repo'
-echo "$HELP_TEXT" | grep -q -- '-H, --host'
+grep -q -- '-r, --repo' <<<"$HELP_TEXT"
+grep -q -- '-H, --host' <<<"$HELP_TEXT"

 # --- Case 3 (comment): a TRUE no-git-origin dir + -r/-H must not silently die
 # and must not fail with "not a git repository or no origin remote" either.
@@ -0,0 +1,703 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# test-wrapper-guard.sh — hermetic behavioural regression for wrapper-guard.sh.
+#
+# Resolves no credentials, touches no network, and creates no repository: the
+# guard reads a hook payload on stdin and answers with an exit code, so the whole
+# contract is testable from fixtures.
+#
+# The fixtures are written to a temp file rather than passed inline, and this is
+# not stylistic. The guard inspects the literal text of the Bash command it is
+# handed. A test that embeds `git clone ... $HOME` inside its own command line
+# trips the guard on the harness instead of on the fixture — which is exactly
+# what happened the first time this was checked by hand. Substring matching over
+# whole command text is the guard's deliberate fail-closed posture; a test that
+# does not account for it silently measures the wrong thing.
+#
+# Exit: 0 = every fixture behaved as specified · 1 = at least one did not
+
+set -uo pipefail
+
+HERE="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+GUARD="${1:-$HERE/wrapper-guard.sh}"
+[ -x "$GUARD" ] || { printf 'test-wrapper-guard: not executable: %s\n' "$GUARD" >&2; exit 2; }
+
+TMP="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
+FIXTURES="$TMP/fixtures.tsv"
+
+# Each line: <expected-exit> TAB <hook payload> TAB <what it proves>
+#            [ TAB <substring the block message must contain> ]
+# 0 = allowed, 2 = blocked. The optional fourth field is how the remediation
+# itself gets checked; without it a block is only asserted to have happened,
+# not to have been useful.
+{
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone https://example.invalid/x ~/wt"}}\tcheckout into $HOME is refused\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add ~/wt topic"}}\tworktree into $HOME is refused\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"g\\"it\\" clone https://example.invalid/x $HOME/wt"}}\ta double quote inside git does not hide a checkout\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"g'"'"'it'"'"' clone https://example.invalid/x $HOME/wt"}}\ta single quote inside git does not hide a checkout\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"g\\\\it clone https://example.invalid/x $HOME/wt"}}\tan unquoted escape inside git does not hide a checkout\n'
+  # Path words use the same quote/escape state machine as names, but preserve
+  # substitutions so HOME remains visible. Quotes do not split the path word.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x \\"$HOME\\"/wt"}}\ta closing quote between HOME and slash does not hide the path\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x ${HOME}/wt"}}\tthe braced HOME spelling is the same home path\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x \\"${HOME}\\"/wt"}}\tbraced HOME may also end a quoted span before the slash\n'
+  # Lexically equivalent absolute paths must be compared after shell-known HOME
+  # expansion and dot-segment normalization, without resolving filesystem links.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x /var/../$HOME/wt"}}\tHOME expansion after parent traversal is normalized before comparison\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add /var/../${HOME}/wt"}}\tworktree placement also normalizes embedded HOME expansion\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --separate-git-dir=/var/../$HOME/gd x /src/wt"}}\tseparate Git state cannot hide behind parent traversal\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME/../outside-home/wt"}}\ta parent segment that leaves HOME is not over-blocked\n'
+  # The target may be HOME itself. End-of-command and whitespace terminate the
+  # token just as a slash does; punctuation that can extend a path does not.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME"}}\tthe unbraced variable may name HOME exactly\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x \\"$HOME\\""}}\tquotes do not change the exact HOME target\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x ${HOME}"}}\tthe braced variable may name HOME exactly\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x ~"}}\ttilde may name HOME exactly\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add $HOME topic"}}\twhitespace terminates an exact HOME target before another argument\n'
+  # Unquoted POSIX metacharacters terminate the target word even without spaces.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME;echo x"}}\tsemicolon terminates an exact HOME target\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x \\"$HOME\\"&& echo x"}}\tand-if terminates a quoted exact HOME target\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x ${HOME}| cat"}}\ta pipe terminates a braced exact HOME target\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x ~&"}}\tbackground operator terminates a tilde HOME target\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME</dev/null"}}\tinput redirection terminates the target word\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME>out"}}\toutput redirection terminates the target word\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"( git clone x $HOME)"}}\ta subshell close terminates the exact HOME target\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME\\necho x"}}\ta literal newline terminates the target word\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME_BACKUP/wt"}}\ta longer HOME-prefixed variable is a different path\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOMEBREW/wt"}}\tHOMEBREW is not HOME either\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME.bak/wt"}}\ta dot continues the path token into a sibling name\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME+bak/wt"}}\tplus is ordinary sibling filename content\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME@bak/wt"}}\tat-sign is ordinary sibling filename content\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME,bak/wt"}}\tcomma is ordinary sibling filename content\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME:bak/wt"}}\tcolon is ordinary sibling filename content\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME=bak/wt"}}\tequals is ordinary sibling filename content\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x ${HOME}+bak/wt"}}\tbraced HOME plus suffix is still a sibling\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x /home/tester+bak/wt"}}\ta literal plus-suffixed home path is a sibling\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x /home/tester@bak/wt"}}\ta literal at-suffixed home path is a sibling\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME+bak/wt;echo x"}}\ta later terminator does not turn a sibling into HOME\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME@bak/wt&& echo x"}}\tand-if after a sibling preserves the allow\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x \\"$HOME;bak/wt\\""}}\ta quoted semicolon is filename content, not a boundary\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME\\\\;bak/wt"}}\tan escaped semicolon is filename content, not a boundary\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME\\u001b/wt"}}\ta raw internal-marker byte is encoded as filename content\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x /home/tester.bak/wt"}}\ta literal sibling path is not beneath HOME\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x /home/testerx/wt"}}\ta longer literal basename is not HOME\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x ~root/wt"}}\tanother account tilde is not this account HOME\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME}/wt"}}\ta closing brace without an opening brace is a literal suffix\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x ${HOME/wt"}}\tan opening brace without a close is not a HOME expansion\n'
+  # Quote removal must not create an expansion the shell never performs.
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x '"'"'$HOME'"'"'/wt"}}\tsingle-quoted HOME is a literal directory name\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x \\\\$HOME/wt"}}\tan escaped dollar makes HOME literal outside quotes\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x \\"\\\\$HOME\\"/wt"}}\tan escaped dollar makes HOME literal inside double quotes\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x \\"~/wt\\""}}\ttilde does not expand inside double quotes\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x '"'"'~/wt'"'"'"}}\ttilde does not expand inside single quotes\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x \\\\~/wt"}}\tan escaped tilde is literal too\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\tcheckout onto a work filesystem is fine\n'
+  # Round ten: placement is decided by the destination and the one clone option
+  # that creates repository state elsewhere, not by every HOME-valued word in
+  # the command. Sources, templates, references, and environment are not targets.
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"NOTE=$HOME git clone https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\tan unrelated assignment carrying HOME is not checkout placement\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --reference=$HOME https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\ta HOME reference is an object source, not checkout placement\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"GIT_DIR=$HOME/x git clone https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\tclone does not place its destination from ambient GIT_DIR\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --template=$HOME/t https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\ta HOME template source is not checkout placement\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --separate-git-dir=$HOME/gd https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\tseparate-git-dir explicitly places repository state under HOME\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --separate-git-dir $HOME/gd https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\tthe space-separated placement option is equivalent\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --reason=$HOME/note /src/wt"}}\ta worktree reason is metadata, not its path\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\ta HOME source with an explicit safe destination is not placement\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --reference $HOME https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\ta space-separated HOME reference remains a source\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --template $HOME/t https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\ta space-separated HOME template remains a source\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone 2>/dev/null https://example.invalid/x $HOME/wt"}}\ta redirection before clone arguments does not become the destination\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --reference $HOME https://example.invalid/x $HOME/wt"}}\ta source option does not hide a later HOME destination\n'
+  # Round eleven: Git accepts boolean options as a rule-generated family,
+  # including --no-* negations. Each command below was checked with Git itself:
+  # `git clone <option> /nonexistent-src /nonexistent-dst` reaches the missing
+  # source instead of reporting an unknown option. The HOME word is the source,
+  # not the explicit /src destination, so Bash expansion is allowed here.
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --bare $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tbare clone keeps its HOME source distinct from the safe destination\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --mirror $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tmirror is an accepted flag and does not consume the HOME source\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --ipv4 $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tipv4 is an accepted flag and does not consume the HOME source\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --ipv6 $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tipv6 is an accepted flag and does not consume the HOME source\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --no-local $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tgenerated no-local remains a flag rather than a placement option\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --no-reject-shallow $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tgenerated no-reject-shallow remains a flag rather than placement\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone -4 $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tthe short IPv4 flag leaves the HOME word in source position\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone -6 $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tthe short IPv6 flag leaves the HOME word in source position\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --no-bare $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tan unusual generated negation is accepted without enumeration\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --no-sparse $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tgenerated no-sparse is accepted without enumeration\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --no-dissociate $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tgenerated no-dissociate is accepted without enumeration\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --no-shallow-submodules $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\ta long generated negation is accepted without enumeration\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --no-quiet $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tgenerated no-quiet is accepted without enumeration\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --no-progress $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tgenerated no-progress is accepted without enumeration\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --no-recurse-submodules $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tgenerated no-recurse-submodules is accepted without enumeration\n'
+  # Git also generates accepted long abbreviations and short-option bundles.
+  # The closed value-taking option grammar must consume their values correctly.
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --templ $HOME/t $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tan accepted template abbreviation consumes metadata rather than the source\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone -qj 1 $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\ta short flag bundle ending in jobs consumes its separate value\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone -qb topic $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\ta short flag bundle ending in branch consumes its separate value\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --separate-git-d=$HOME/gd https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\tan accepted placement-option abbreviation remains blocked in attached form\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --separate-git-d $HOME/gd https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\tan accepted placement-option abbreviation remains blocked in separate form\n'
+  # Worktree boolean options have the same generated-negation grammar. The next
+  # positional is its real path, so safe paths allow and HOME paths still block.
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --no-force /src/wt"}}\tgenerated worktree no-force accepts a safe path\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --no-detach /src/wt"}}\tgenerated worktree no-detach accepts a safe path\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --no-lock /src/wt"}}\tgenerated worktree no-lock accepts a safe path\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --no-guess-remote /src/wt"}}\ta long worktree negation accepts a safe path without enumeration\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add -d /src/wt"}}\tthe documented short detach flag accepts a safe path\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add -q /src/wt"}}\tthe documented short quiet flag accepts a safe path\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --lock --rea $HOME/note /src/wt"}}\tan accepted reason abbreviation consumes metadata rather than the path\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add -fb $HOME/topic /src/wt"}}\ta short branch bundle consumes its HOME-valued branch before the safe path\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add -fb topic $HOME/wt"}}\ta short branch bundle does not hide the later HOME path\n'
+  # Upstream Git defines --orphan as a boolean flag; -b still carries the branch.
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --orphan /src/wt"}}\torphan mode accepts a safe path without consuming it as a value\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --orphan $HOME/wt"}}\torphan mode does not hide its HOME path\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --orphan -b $HOME/topic /src/wt"}}\torphan mode leaves HOME branch metadata to the branch option\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --orphan -b topic $HOME/wt"}}\torphan mode plus a branch option preserves HOME path blocking\n'
+  # The optional second positional is commit-ish metadata, never placement.
+  # HOME expands here, but the explicit worktree path remains safely under /src.
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add /src/wt $HOME/topic"}}\ta HOME-shaped commit-ish is not the worktree path\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --no-force $HOME/wt"}}\ta generated worktree negation does not hide the HOME path\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --no-guess-remote $HOME/wt"}}\ta long worktree negation preserves HOME placement blocking\n'
+  # Explicit placement options and later simple commands remain traps.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --bare $HOME/source /src/wt && git clone x $HOME/wt"}}\ta boolean flag in one command does not hide a later HOME destination\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --no-force /src/wt; git clone x $HOME/wt"}}\ta worktree flag before a boundary does not hide later HOME placement\n'
+  # Routing this arm through the shared name site also repaired an over-block it
+  # had carried from the start: the old whole-command regex found `git` INSIDE a
+  # longer word, so these two were refused at every head before this commit.
+  # Same class as mycurl and curl-wrapper, and refusing them is how a guard gets
+  # routed around instead of repaired.
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"mygit clone https://example.invalid/x $HOME/wt"}}\tmygit is a different program and its checkout is not ours\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gitfoo clone https://example.invalid/x $HOME/wt"}}\tthe name has to end where git ends\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -s -X GET https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1"}}\treads are never blocked\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews"}}\treview write has a wrapper\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/merge"}}\tmerge write has a wrapper\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://api.github.com/repos/a/b/issues"}}\tGitHub host is covered too\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/releases"}}\tan endpoint with no wrapper passes\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d {\\"event\\":\\"APPROVE\\"} https://example.invalid/x"}}\tthe APPROVE token is caught anywhere\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"ls -la /src"}}\tordinary commands are untouched\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"MOSAIC_WRAPPER_OVERRIDE=1 curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls"}}\tbreak-glass works\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{}}\tan empty payload does not block the session\n'
+  # --- bypasses an independent reviewer demonstrated against the first version.
+  # Each of these returned 0 (allowed) and each is a real write. They are pinned
+  # as fixtures rather than fixed-and-forgotten because the class is recurring:
+  # the guard reads text, so every spelling it does not know is a hole.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews"}}\t-d@body with no space is still a body\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl --request=POST -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews"}}\t--request=POST equals-form is still a method\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"p=/api/v1/repo; q=s/a/b/pulls/1/reviews; curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid${p}${q}"}}\ta path split across variables is still that path\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl --data-binary @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\t--data-binary is a body\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -F f=@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues"}}\t-F multipart is a body\n'
+  # Reads must survive every one of those broadenings, or the guard gets disabled.
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -s https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews"}}\tno body and no verb is a read\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"grep -rn /pulls/ src/ | head -20"}}\ta path fragment in a grep is not an API call\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://registry.example.invalid/v2/x/manifests/latest"}}\tan unwrapped API is not this guard'"'"'s business\n'
+  # --- round two of the same review. Splitting the ENDPOINT TOKEN defeats any
+  # amount of fragment matching, because the endpoint does not exist until the
+  # shell expands it. The guard now refuses to clear a write whose URL it cannot
+  # read, rather than pretending it read one.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"a=/api/v1/repos/a/b/iss; b=ues/1/comments; curl -d@body https://git.example.invalid${a}${b}"}}\tan endpoint token split across variables is unreadable, not absent\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"a=/api/v1/repos/a/b/pu; b=lls/1/reviews; curl -d@body https://git.example.invalid${a}${b}"}}\tsame split, review endpoint\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @payload https://hooks.example.invalid/services/${WEBHOOK_ID}"}}\tan opaque URL that is not forge-shaped stays allowed\n'
+  # --- round six changed the contract in this direction, and these fixtures are
+  # where it shows. They used to assert that discussing a call is not making one.
+  # Five rounds proved there is no textual way to tell a quoted example from a
+  # quoted command, so the guard stopped trying: it judges the payload, and a
+  # payload inside quotes is still a payload. Quoting one of these on a Bash
+  # command line is now refused, and the way to write the example is a
+  # file-writing tool. This is the deliberate cost of the mechanism change.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"grep -R \\"curl -d https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues\\" docs/"}}\tquoting a wrapped write is refused even in a grep\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"echo \\"curl -d https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls\\" > note.txt"}}\t...and when written into a file\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"python3 -c '"'"'print(\\"curl -d https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues\\")'"'"'"}}\t...and when printed from another language\n'
+  # The boundary that keeps this from being "block everything": what is refused
+  # is a WRITE to a WRAPPED endpoint. Mentioning either alone still passes, and
+  # these are asserted as hard as the blocks above.
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"grep -R \\"curl -s https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments\\" docs/"}}\tquoting a READ example is untouched\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"echo \\"the wrapped endpoint is https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments\\" >> notes.md"}}\tnaming the endpoint without a body flag is untouched\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"grep -R \\"curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/releases\\" docs/"}}\tquoting a write to an UNWRAPPED endpoint is untouched\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"issue-comment.sh --repo a/b --issue 1 --body @msg.md"}}\tthe wrapper itself carries a body flag and must never trip its own guard\n'
+  # Command position must still catch the real thing behind operators and env.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"cd /tmp && GITEA_TOKEN=$T curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/merge"}}\ta real call behind && and an assignment is still a call\n'
+  # --- the case the AUTHOR hit twice while chasing the above: sending a message
+  # that QUOTED one of these fixtures. Under the old contract that was a defect
+  # to be parsed away; under this one it is the documented cost, and the message
+  # gets composed with a file-writing tool instead.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"send.sh -m \\"repro was: cd /tmp && curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/merge\\""}}\tquoting the repro in a message is refused too\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"cat >> notes.md <<EOF\\nwe ran: curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues\\nEOF"}}\ta heredoc body carrying the payload is refused with it\n'
+  # ...but quotes stop being data the moment something executes them.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"bash -c \\"curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/merge\\""}}\tbash -c makes the quoted text code again\n'
+  # --- round three. Each of these four is a real write that a bare-name match
+  # for the client could not see, because an ordinary word sat in front of it.
+  # They are kept as fixtures after the mechanism change even though the guard no
+  # longer looks for a client at all: they are the evidence for WHY it stopped,
+  # and a future re-narrowing that reintroduced position would fail here first.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"env GITEA_TOKEN=$T curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\tenv VAR=... in front of the client is still the client\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"command curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\tcommand in front of the client is still the client\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"timeout 10 curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\ttimeout N in front of the client is still the client\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"/usr/bin/curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\tan absolute path to the client is still the client\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"echo timeout 10 curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments >> notes.md"}}\tnaming the call after echo carries the payload, so it is refused\n'
+  # A shell standing between quoted data and execution makes that data code,
+  # and the pipe is the form agents actually use. Filing it as data allowed the
+  # call to vanish from the skeleton while still running.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"printf '"'"'%%s\\\\n'"'"' '"'"'curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments'"'"' | sh"}}\tquoted code piped to a shell is code\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"cat <<EOF | sh\\ncurl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments\\nEOF"}}\ta heredoc piped to a shell is code\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"sh -s <<EOF\\ncurl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments\\nEOF"}}\tsh -s reads its script from the heredoc\n'
+  # ...and the questions that used to follow — is the pipe target a shell, does a
+  # shell on one line execute a string on another — no longer have to be answered
+  # at all. Both of these carry the payload, both are refused, and neither
+  # outcome depends on parsing what the pipe or the other line does.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"grep -R \\"curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments\\" docs/ | wc -l"}}\tpiping the payload to wc is refused without asking what wc is\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"docker run --rm alpine sh -c '"'"'echo hi'"'"'\\necho \\"example: curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments\\" >> notes.md"}}\tan unrelated shell on another line no longer changes the answer either way\n'
+  # --- round four. The guard was still reading the command as typed rather than
+  # as the shell will run it: a backslash before a newline is removed before
+  # anything else happens, so the endpoint token can be split across the join.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/iss\\\\\\nues/1/comments"}}\ta line continuation inside the endpoint token is still that endpoint\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pu\\\\\\nlls/1/reviews"}}\tsame join, review endpoint\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"cat >> notes.md <<EOF\\nwe ran: curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/iss\\\\\\nues/1/comments\\nEOF"}}\tthe join still runs first, and the joined payload is refused in a document too\n'
+  # Transparent prefixes take option VALUES, and the value was a word the list
+  # did not know — so the client went missing again behind an ordinary `sudo -u`.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"sudo -u root curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\tan option value after a prefix does not hide the client\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"timeout --signal TERM 10 curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\tan option pair plus a duration does not hide the client\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"xargs echo curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\tthe payload behind xargs echo is refused rather than adjudicated\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"sudo apt-get install curl"}}\tinstalling the client is not calling it\n'
+  # Execution through another command needed its own case under the old design.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"find . -maxdepth 0 -exec curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments ;"}}\tfind -exec runs the client\n'
+  # --- round five, and the finding that ended the parser. Command substitution
+  # inside a double-quoted span EXECUTES, while the skeleton was discarding that
+  # span as inert prose. The unquoted and process-substitution forms already
+  # blocked, which is what made it a classification defect rather than a spelling
+  # one: the same call was refused or allowed depending on a quote character.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"echo \\"$(curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments)\\""}}\tcommand substitution inside double quotes executes\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"echo \\"`curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments`\\""}}\tso does the backtick form\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"msg=\\"$(curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments)\\""}}\tand an assignment RHS is not data either\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"echo $(curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments)"}}\tthe unquoted form, which blocked before and must keep blocking\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"cat <(curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments)"}}\tprocess substitution, same\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"bash --command \\"curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments\\""}}\tthe long-option spelling of bash -c needs no entry in any list now\n'
+  # A client the guard was never taught is the point of dropping client
+  # detection: neither of these names curl at all.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"python3 -c '"'"'import requests; requests.post(\\"https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments\\", json={})'"'"'"}}\ta library call is a write with no flag and no curl\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"wget --post-data=x https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\twget spells its body differently and is still a write\n'
+
+  # Round six scoped the guard on `https?://`, and review found the absence shape
+  # had simply moved to that new boundary: a raw provider CLI carries no scheme,
+  # so the guard never reached the write question. These are the reported repros.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues -f title=x -f body=y"}}\tgh api is a raw write with no URL scheme at all\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X POST repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews -f event=APPROVE"}}\tand it reaches the endpoint the review wrapper owns\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"tea api -X POST repos/a/b/issues/1/comments -f body=x"}}\ttea api, same shape, different CLI\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d x git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues"}}\ta scheme-less host path is still an API write\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api repos/a/b/issues -f title=x"}}\tgh POSTs implicitly when handed a field, exactly as curl does with -d\n'
+  # ...and the boundary that stops a broader scope gate becoming block-everything.
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api repos/a/b/pulls/1"}}\treading through a provider CLI stays untouched\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X POST repos/a/b/releases -f tag_name=v1"}}\tno wrapper owns releases, whoever calls it\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"tea pulls create --title x --repo a/b"}}\tprovider PORCELAIN is out of scope by decision, not by accident\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"rm -f /var/tmp/api/v1-issues-notes.txt"}}\t-f is only a body when it carries key=value\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"grep -f patterns.txt /src/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues.log"}}\tsame, on the flag agents actually collide with\n'
+
+  # Wrong remediation is its own defect: /issues/1/labels used to block with
+  # "use issue-create.sh", which is not the wrapper for that call. Round seven
+  # answered that by letting EVERY path under a numbered issue or PR through,
+  # and review showed the reasoning ("no wrapper owns these") was false in this
+  # tree. These are the reported repros, all rc 0 before round eight, and each
+  # asserts the wrapper the advice must name — not merely that a block happened.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1 -f title=x"}}\tan issue edit is issue-edit.sh, not a wrapper gap\tissue-edit.sh\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X PATCH -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1"}}\tsame call through curl, same wrapper\tissue-edit.sh\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1/labels -f labels[]=bug"}}\tlabels are wrapped, and the advice says by which\tissue-edit.sh\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues/1/assignees -f assignees[]=u"}}\tassignees are issue-assign.sh\tissue-assign.sh\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api repos/a/b/issues/1/assignees -f assignees[]=u"}}\tthe array field spelling is a body with no -X at all\tissue-assign.sh\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X PATCH -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/labels"}}\ta PR is an issue where labels live, so the issue wrapper owns them\tissue-edit.sh\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X PATCH -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1"}}\tPR state is pr-close.sh, and the gap in that arm is stated\tpr-close.sh\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X PATCH -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/milestones/4"}}\ta milestone state change is milestone-close.sh, not the create wrapper\tmilestone-close.sh\n'
+  # SPAN. A wrapper that owns a slice of an endpoint must not be advertised as
+  # owning the endpoint. milestone-close.sh takes only -t <title> and sends
+  # state=closed, so a title/description/due-date edit is a gap and the message
+  # has to say so — round eight named the wrapper and stopped there.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X PATCH -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/milestones/1"}}\ta milestone edit blocks, but the advice states the close-only span\towns the CLOSE only\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1 -f assignee=u"}}\tissue-edit.sh cannot set an assignee, so the message names the one that can\tissue-assign.sh owns the assignee\n'
+  # The residue: still genuinely owned by nothing, and still flowing through.
+  # Requesting a reviewer is not submitting one; pr-review.sh files verdicts and
+  # nothing in the tree adds a requested reviewer.
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X POST repos/a/b/pulls/1/requested_reviewers -f reviewers[]=u"}}\tno wrapper requests a reviewer, so it is not refused with pr-review.sh\n'
+  # SPAN, applied to the guard's OWN fail-closed rule rather than to a wrapper.
+  # The scope gate admits three shapes; the unreadable-endpoint rule asked only
+  # for `https?://`, so a split endpoint in the other two was in scope to block,
+  # produced no readable endpoint, and fell through to allow. Same defect class
+  # as the milestone arm, one layer up. Each shape gets its own fixture, because
+  # a single one would have passed on the arm that already worked.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"p=repos/a/b/iss; q=ues; gh api -X POST ${p}${q} -f title=x"}}\ta split endpoint in a provider-CLI api call is unreadable, not absent\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"p=repos/a/b/issues/1/comm; q=ents; gh api -X POST ${p}${q} -f body=x"}}\tsame, comments\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"p=repos/a/b/pulls/1/rev; q=iews; gh api -X POST ${p}${q} -f event=APPROVED"}}\tsame, and a verdict is the costliest one to lose\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"p=repos/a/b/iss; q=ues; tea api -X POST ${p}${q} -f title=x"}}\tevery CLI the scope gate admits, not just gh\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"p=/api/v1/repos/a/b/iss; q=ues; curl -X POST -d x git.example.invalid${p}${q}"}}\ta schemeless forge host with a split path is unreadable too\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"h=git.example.invalid; q=ues; curl -X POST -d x ${h}/api/v1/repos/a/b/iss${q}"}}\tthe expansion may come first; the token is what matters\n'
+  # And the reason this is not "any variable blocks a write": a payload in a
+  # variable is the SAFE way to pass one and leaves the endpoint fully legible.
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api repos/a/b/git/refs -f sha=$SHA"}}\tan expansion in a body value leaves the endpoint readable\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d \\"$BODY\\" https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/git/refs"}}\tsame for a quoted body on an unwrapped endpoint\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/git/refs"}}\ta read with a split endpoint is still a read\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X PATCH -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/comments/5"}}\tediting a comment has no wrapper; only creating one does\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/stopwatch/start"}}\tno wrapper owns a stopwatch, and none is invented for it\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues/1/times -f time=60"}}\tnor time tracking\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues/1/reactions -f content=+1"}}\tnor reactions\n'
+  # ...and the residue must be decided by the SEGMENT, never by a stray slash.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1 -f body=see-/docs/x"}}\ta slash inside the body is not a subresource\tissue-edit.sh\n'
+  # The arms above the numbered ones must keep blocking, with their own wrappers.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\tthe wrapped subresource must not fall through\tissue-comment.sh\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues"}}\tnor may issue creation\tissue-create.sh\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls"}}\tPR creation is wrapped and must not fall through with them\tpr-create.sh\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews"}}\tand a review still names the review wrapper\tpr-review.sh\n'
+
+  # SPAN a third time, now in the scope gate itself: it asked for `/api/v[0-9]`,
+  # which is Gitea's spelling. GitHub's API carries no version segment at all
+  # (`api.github.com/repos/...`), so the schemeless Gitea write was in scope and
+  # the schemeless GitHub one was not — a gate calibrated to one dialect rather
+  # than to what identifies a provider API. `/repos/` is the marker both share.
+  # These endpoints are READABLE, so each asserts the wrapper it must name; a
+  # rc-only fixture here would pass on the unreadable arm and prove nothing.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d x api.github.com/repos/a/b/issues"}}\ta schemeless GitHub host is a provider API even with no version segment\tissue-create.sh\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d x api.github.com/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\tsame, and the subresource still names its own wrapper\tissue-comment.sh\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"host=api.github.com; curl -X POST -d x ${host}/repos/a/b/issues"}}\tthe host may be a variable; the path is what the guard reads\tissue-create.sh\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d x api.github.com/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews"}}\ta verdict is the costliest call to lose to a spelling\tpr-review.sh\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"p=/repos/a/b/iss; q=ues; curl -X POST -d x api.github.com${p}${q}"}}\tand the split form of it is unreadable, not absent\n'
+  # The end-of-options marker, which is the one option not spelled like one.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"p=repos/a/b/iss; q=ues; gh api -X POST -- ${p}${q} -f title=x"}}\ta bare -- must not walk the endpoint past the scanner\n'
+  # Widening a scope gate may not create a block. Reads and unwrapped endpoints
+  # in the newly admitted shape have to stay allowed, or this is a regression
+  # wearing a fix'"'"'s clothes.
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl api.github.com/repos/a/b/issues"}}\tadmitting a shape to the gate does not make a read a write\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d x api.github.com/repos/a/b/git/refs"}}\tno wrapper owns git refs, on GitHub'"'"'s spelling either\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -- repos/a/b/issues"}}\tthe marker in a read is still a read\n'
+
+  # The APPROVE trap, in the spelling a provider CLI uses, and the value that
+  # must never trip it.
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d {\\"event\\":\\"APPROVED\\"} https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/releases"}}\tAPPROVED is the correct value and is never the trap\n'
+  # Documented over-block, pinned so it is a known boundary and not a surprise.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"python3 -c '"'"'print(\\"https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments .post(\\")'"'"'"}}\tprose carrying .post( near a wrapped URL is refused, by the same payload rule\n'
+
+  # --- round nine, all four from one adversarial pass, and three of them are
+  # the same shape: a test written over the WHOLE command text deciding an
+  # ALLOW. That is the fail-open form this file keeps rediscovering, and it had
+  # reached the break-glass itself.
+  #
+  # BREAK-GLASS. `case "$CMD" in *MOSAIC_WRAPPER_OVERRIDE=1*)` cleared the entire
+  # command if that string appeared anywhere in it — so quoting the override in a
+  # note, or naming a variable after it, disabled the guard for the call sitting
+  # beside it. The override is now read POSITIONALLY: leading `NAME=value`
+  # assignments only, exactly where the shell would honour one.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"echo \\"MOSAIC_WRAPPER_OVERRIDE=1 curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews\\" >> notes.md"}}\tquoting the override in a document does not arm it\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"NOTES=MOSAIC_WRAPPER_OVERRIDE=1 curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews"}}\tan assignment whose VALUE is the override is not the override\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"MOSAIC_WRAPPER_OVERRIDE=10 curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews"}}\t=10 matched the old substring test and is not the value 1\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"GITEA_TOKEN=$T MOSAIC_WRAPPER_OVERRIDE=1 curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews"}}\tthe override still works behind other assignments, as the shell reads it\n'
+  # The cost, pinned rather than discovered later: positional means positional.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"cd /tmp && MOSAIC_WRAPPER_OVERRIDE=1 curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/merge"}}\tan override after && is not in command position and does not arm\n'
+
+  # SUBRESOURCE REFINEMENT, same defect one arm lower. It asked whether a
+  # subresource appears ANYWHERE in the command, so a numbered-object write was
+  # cleared on the strength of text in its own BODY. Inverted: clear only when
+  # EVERY numbered-object occurrence carries a subresource.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1 -f body=cf-/pulls/2/files"}}\ta subresource in the body does not clear a write to the numbered issue\tissue-edit.sh\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1 -f body=cf-/issues/3/reactions"}}\tsame, quoting a subresource of the same object type\tissue-edit.sh\n'
+  # ...and its documented cost, in the safe direction.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues/1/reactions -f content=cf-/issues/2"}}\tan unwrapped subresource write that quotes a bare issue is refused\n'
+
+  # -K/--config. curl reads the method, the body, the headers AND the URL from
+  # that file, so none of them are in the command: every write test above read 0
+  # and the call went through. An unreadable request is not a cleared one.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl --config /tmp/req https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews"}}\tthe request in a config file is unreadable, so it is refused\t--config/-K\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -K /tmp/req https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues"}}\tthe short spelling, same answer\t--config/-K\n'
+  # Cost, stated: this refuses a --config read against a host that has nothing
+  # to do with a forge. The alternative is to require a forge marker in a
+  # command whose URL may itself be in the file, which is the hole again.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl --config /tmp/req https://example.invalid/anything"}}\tan unrelated https URL with --config is refused too, by decision\t--config/-K\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"eslint --config .eslintrc.json src/"}}\t--config on a command that is not curl is nobody'"'"'s business\n'
+
+  # ROUND TEN. The --config check above was first written INSIDE the API-shape
+  # gate, so it was guarded by a condition that the capability it guards against
+  # removes. A config file can carry the URL; delete the URL from the command and
+  # nothing is API-shaped, the branch is never entered, and the guard reports
+  # clean on precisely the call it exists to refuse. It is now asked of any curl.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\ta config file can own the URL, so there is nothing API-shaped left to gate on\t--config/-K\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -K/tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tcurl accepts the value attached to the short flag\t--config/-K\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -sK /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tand inside a bundle, which a space-separated test does not see\t--config/-K\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"tar -K /tmp/archive.tar"}}\t-K on a command that is not curl is not this hook'"'"'s business\n'
+  # curl by any ordinary path spelling. The first version of the config check
+  # matched the bare word only, so these three executed the same wrapped write
+  # while the guard reported clean. Recognizing only the unqualified name is
+  # caller-name parsing, and that is the class this file exists to refuse.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"/usr/bin/curl --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tan absolute path is the same invocation, not a different one\t--config/-K\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"env /usr/bin/curl -K/tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tand it is still curl behind env, with the value attached\t--config/-K\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"./curl --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\ta relative path costs two characters and used to be enough\t--config/-K\n'
+  # The prefix must end at a slash: a basename that merely ENDS in curl is a
+  # different program, and blocking it would be the over-block that gets a guard
+  # routed around rather than fixed.
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"mycurl --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tmycurl is not curl, and over-blocking is its own failure\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"/opt/x/curl-wrapper --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tnor is curl-wrapper, whose name only starts the same way\n'
+
+  # And the same name once it is punctuated. The basename repair above fixed the
+  # UNQUOTED path spelling and nothing else, so two quote characters restored the
+  # bypass it had just closed: the check was still modelling one presentation of
+  # a shell word instead of the word. Every one of these executes the real curl.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"\\"/usr/bin/curl\\" --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tquoting a path does not make it a different program\t--config/-K\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"'"'"'./curl'"'"' --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tnor does quoting a relative one\t--config/-K\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"$(which curl) --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tthe name is in the text even when a substitution supplies the path\t--config/-K\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"`which curl` --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tand in the older spelling of the same substitution\t--config/-K\n'
+
+  # The provider-CLI SCOPE gate had the identical defect, untouched while the
+  # curl arm was repaired twice. It decides whether write detection runs at all,
+  # so failing to admit these is indistinguishable from allowing them — and no
+  # URL marker rescues them, because provider CLI paths carry no leading slash.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"/usr/bin/gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues -f title=x"}}\tan absolute path to a provider CLI is still a provider CLI\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"./gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues -f title=x"}}\tand a relative one still is too\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"/usr/local/bin/tea api -X POST repos/a/b/issues -f title=x"}}\tthe same is true of every CLI the gate names, not just the first\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"mygh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues -f title=x"}}\tmygh is not gh, and the scope gate must not over-admit either\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"/usr/bin/gh api repos/a/b/issues"}}\ta read through an absolute path is still a read\n'
+
+  # Quotes and backslashes INSIDE the word. The previous repair replaced quote
+  # characters with whitespace, which is token separation and not quote removal:
+  # a shell removes a quote without splitting the word around it, so `cu"rl"` is
+  # one word naming curl while whitespace made it two words naming neither.
+  # `"/usr/bin/curl"` passed under that version only because the inserted space
+  # happened to land after a slash, which established nothing.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"cu\\"rl\\" --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\ta quote inside the word does not make it another program\t--config/-K\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"cu'"'"'rl'"'"' --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tand a single quote inside it is the same word again\t--config/-K\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"/usr/bin/cu\\\\rl --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tescaping is ordinary word formation, not a disguise\t--config/-K\n'
+  # A backslash is NOT uniformly removed. It is literal inside single quotes,
+  # and inside double quotes when it precedes anything other than $, `, ",
+  # backslash, or newline. These spell a different program and must stay allowed.
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"'"'"'cu\\\\rl'"'"' --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\ta backslash inside single quotes remains literal\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"\\"cu\\\\rl\\" --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\ta backslash before r inside double quotes remains literal\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"'"'"'g\\\\it'"'"' clone https://example.invalid/x $HOME/wt"}}\ta literal backslash in a single-quoted non-git name is not a checkout\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"\\"g\\\\it\\" clone https://example.invalid/x $HOME/wt"}}\ta literal backslash in a double-quoted non-git name is not a checkout\n'
+  # The other branch of the same rule: OUTSIDE quotes a backslash escapes the
+  # next character, so an escaped quote is a literal quote IN the name and the
+  # program is not curl. Held separately from the cases above because it is a
+  # different arm of the state machine, and an arm without a fixture is a rule
+  # that is not held.
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"cu\\\\\\"rl\\\\\\" --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tan escaped quote is a literal quote in the name\n'
+  # Three quoted segments concatenate into ONE word. This is the shape that
+  # distinguishes quote removal from token separation, so it is worth its own line.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"\\"cu\\"'"'"'r'"'"'\\"l\\" --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tadjacent quoted segments are one word, and that word is curl\t--config/-K\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"g\\"h\\" api -X POST repos/a/b/issues -f title=x"}}\tthe CLI name is a word on the same terms\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"/usr/bin/g\\\\h api -X POST repos/a/b/issues -f title=x"}}\tincluding when it is escaped behind a path\n'
+  # The FLAG is the same recognition problem as the name, and is read the same
+  # way. No review raised this one; the name was simply the easier half to reach.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl --con\\"fig\\" /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tone word spelling --config is still --config\t--config/-K\n'
+
+  # The unreadable-endpoint arm is the THIRD name consumer. It kept a private
+  # bare-name copy of the scope gate's regex, so a caller could be admitted by
+  # the repaired gate and then go unrecognized by the fail-closed refinement —
+  # a gate and its own refinement disagreeing about who the caller is.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"/usr/bin/gh api -X POST repos/a/b/$EP -f title=x"}}\ta path-qualified CLI with an assembled endpoint is still unreadable\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"g\\"h\\" api -X POST repos/a/b/$EP -f title=x"}}\tand so is a quoted one, which is where the two halves disagreed\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"mygh api -X POST repos/a/b/$EP -f title=x"}}\tmygh is still not gh, in the refinement as well as the gate\n'
+
+  # Shapes nobody raised. Written down because reasoning that they were already
+  # covered is precisely what produced two of the rounds above; each one below
+  # was measured, and the three that fail at df83a9ee are here on that evidence.
+  # `\curl` is the ordinary way to bypass a shell alias and is a thing people
+  # actually type, which makes it the least hypothetical entry in the file.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"\\\\curl --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tescaping the leading character to dodge an alias still names curl\t--config/-K\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"cur\\"l\\" --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tthe quote may sit at any offset in the word\t--config/-K\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"g\\"h\\" api -X POST \\"repos/a/b/$EP\\" -f title=x"}}\tboth halves dressed at once, which is where they last disagreed\n'
+
+  # Over-blocking is a real failure and not a safe direction: a guard that
+  # refuses legitimate work gets routed around instead of repaired. These four
+  # pass at both heads, which is what a regression guard is for.
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api \\"repos/a/b/issues\\""}}\ta quoted read is still a read\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl https://example.com/file.txt -o /tmp/f"}}\tan ordinary download is not a provider write\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"echo \\"$EP\\" && gh --version"}}\tno api subcommand, so nothing to refuse\n'
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"echo \\"not a curl call\\""}}\tthe word inside a string, with no flag, is prose\n'
+
+  # Percent-encoded endpoints. Not hypothetical: /issues/1174 and /iss%%75es/1174
+  # both returned HTTP 200 with the same object from the live forge, so the
+  # encoded spelling IS the wrapped endpoint and the literal comparison below it
+  # sees a segment matching nothing. Refused rather than decoded — a decoder has
+  # to be exactly right about depth and normalization, which is the parser
+  # mistake this file declines everywhere else.
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X POST repos/a/b/iss%%75es/1/comments -f body=x"}}\tan encoded path segment reaches the wrapped endpoint\tpercent-escape\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/revi%%65ws"}}\tsame for the review endpoint, which is the one that matters most\tpercent-escape\n'
+  printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X POST repos/a/b/iss%%2575es/1/comments -f body=x"}}\tdouble-encoded too, which is why this refuses instead of decoding\tpercent-escape\n'
+  # Scoped to writes, deliberately. Reads are never blocked by this guard and a
+  # query string carrying %%20 is an ordinary URL, not a hazard.
+  printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -s https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues?q=a%%20b"}}\ta percent-escape in a READ is not this hook'"'"'s business\n'
+} > "$FIXTURES"
+
+fail=0 n=0
+while IFS=$'\t' read -r want payload why remedy; do
+  [ -n "${want:-}" ] || continue
+  n=$((n + 1))
+  out="$(printf '%s' "$payload" | "$GUARD" 2>&1)"
+  got=$?
+  if [ "$got" != "$want" ]; then
+    printf 'FAIL  %s (want exit %s, got %s)\n' "$why" "$want" "$got"
+    fail=1
+    continue
+  fi
+  # A block that names the wrong wrapper is a defect in its own right, and until
+  # now it was invisible here: the harness read the exit code and nothing else,
+  # so /issues/1/labels blocking with "use issue-create.sh" passed every run for
+  # six rounds. Where a fixture states the remediation it expects, assert it.
+  if [ -n "${remedy:-}" ] && ! printf '%s' "$out" | grep -Fq -- "$remedy"; then
+    printf 'FAIL  %s (blocked, but the advice does not name %s)\n' "$why" "$remedy"
+    fail=1
+    continue
+  fi
+  printf 'ok    %s\n' "$why"
+done < "$FIXTURES"
+
+# ---- $HOME resolution ------------------------------------------------------
+# These cannot be fixtures. Every case above varies the COMMAND; this defect
+# varies the ENVIRONMENT, and the loop has no way to express that.
+#
+# The checkout arm built its pattern from "$HOME" without asking whether $HOME
+# was a usable value. Three values it is not: unset (which is a crash under
+# `set -u`, not a decision), empty (the pattern collapses to `/`, so `~|\$HOME|`
+# matches whatever the empty alternative touches), and "/" (every absolute path
+# is under it, so the comparison stops discriminating). An agent seat running
+# with no HOME — a systemd unit without one, a container, `env -i` — got the
+# checkout question answered by accident rather than on the merits.
+#
+# The fix resolves $HOME once, rejects all three, and BLOCKS the checkout it
+# cannot adjudicate. A guard may not clear a question it was unable to ask. The
+# blast radius of that fail-closed arm is asserted below to be one command shape
+# and not the session: with no HOME at all, ordinary commands still pass and the
+# API arms still block.
+home_case() {
+  local why="$1" want="$2" homeval="$3" cmd="$4" needle="${5:-}"
+  local out got
+  n=$((n + 1))
+  local payload
+  payload="$(jq -nc --arg command "$cmd" '{tool_input:{command:$command}}')"
+  if [ "$homeval" = "@unset" ]; then
+    out="$(printf '%s' "$payload" | env -u HOME "$GUARD" 2>&1)"
+  else
+    out="$(printf '%s' "$payload" | env HOME="$homeval" "$GUARD" 2>&1)"
+  fi
+  got=$?
+  if [ "$got" != "$want" ]; then
+    printf 'FAIL  %s (want exit %s, got %s)\n' "$why" "$want" "$got"
+    fail=1
+    return
+  fi
+  if [ -n "$needle" ] && ! printf '%s' "$out" | grep -Fq -- "$needle"; then
+    printf 'FAIL  %s (exit %s, but the message does not say %s)\n' "$why" "$got" "$needle"
+    fail=1
+    return
+  fi
+  printf 'ok    %s\n' "$why"
+}
+
+home_case 'HOME unset: a checkout is refused, not adjudicated' \
+  2 '@unset' 'git clone https://example.invalid/x /src/wt' 'unset or unusable'
+home_case 'HOME empty: same, and it is not the same thing as unset' \
+  2 '' 'git clone https://example.invalid/x /src/wt' 'unset or unusable'
+home_case 'HOME=/ : every path is under it, so it discriminates nothing' \
+  2 '/' 'git clone https://example.invalid/x /src/wt' 'unset or unusable'
+home_case 'a usable HOME still allows a checkout onto a work filesystem' \
+  0 '/home/tester' 'git clone https://example.invalid/x /src/wt'
+home_case 'a usable HOME still catches the literal path' \
+  2 '/home/tester' 'git clone https://example.invalid/x /home/tester/wt' 'checks a repository out under'
+home_case 'a usable HOME catches the exact literal path without a trailing slash' \
+  2 '/home/tester' 'git clone https://example.invalid/x /home/tester' 'checks a repository out under'
+home_case 'quotes around the exact literal HOME path do not change the target' \
+  2 '/home/tester' 'git clone https://example.invalid/x "/home/tester"' 'checks a repository out under'
+home_case 'a quoted literal HOME segment remains contiguous with the suffix' \
+  2 '/home/tester' 'git clone https://example.invalid/x "/home/tester"/wt' 'checks a repository out under'
+home_case 'a repeated leading slash is the same absolute HOME path' \
+  2 '/home/tester' 'git clone https://example.invalid/x //home/tester/wt' 'checks a repository out under'
+home_case 'dot segments cannot disguise the literal HOME path' \
+  2 '/home/tester' 'git worktree add /var/../home/tester/./wt' 'checks a repository out under'
+home_case 'parent traversal into HOME is normalized for separate Git state' \
+  2 '/home/tester' 'git clone --separate-git-dir=/home/other/../tester/gd x /src/wt' 'checks a repository out under'
+home_case 'normalization still permits a literal HOME sibling' \
+  0 '/home/tester' 'git clone x /home/tester/../tester-sibling/wt'
+home_case 'and the unexpanded $HOME spelling, which needs no resolution at all' \
+  2 '/home/tester' 'git worktree add $HOME/wt topic' 'checks a repository out under'
+
+# Resolve the longest existing parent physically before appending a nonexistent
+# destination. Lexical normalization alone cannot see a symlink into HOME, and
+# it applies `..` in the wrong order when the preceding component is a symlink.
+SYMLINK_HOME="$TMP/symlink-home"
+SYMLINK_SAFE="$TMP/symlink-safe"
+mkdir -p "$SYMLINK_HOME/nested" "$SYMLINK_SAFE"
+ln -s "$SYMLINK_HOME" "$TMP/home-link"
+ln -s "$SYMLINK_HOME/nested" "$TMP/home-nested-link"
+ln -s "$SYMLINK_SAFE" "$TMP/safe-link"
+home_case 'a clone path through a symlink into HOME is refused' \
+  2 "$SYMLINK_HOME" "git clone x $TMP/home-link/wt" 'checks a repository out under'
+home_case 'a worktree path through a symlink into HOME is refused' \
+  2 "$SYMLINK_HOME" "git worktree add $TMP/home-link/wt" 'checks a repository out under'
+home_case 'symlink resolution occurs before a following parent segment' \
+  2 "$SYMLINK_HOME" "git clone x $TMP/home-nested-link/../wt" 'checks a repository out under'
+home_case 'a symlink to a physical path outside HOME remains allowed' \
+  0 "$SYMLINK_HOME" "git clone x $TMP/safe-link/wt"
+# The fail-closed arm is scoped to checkouts. If it were not, a seat with no
+# HOME would have every command it runs refused, which is how a guard gets
+# disabled rather than fixed.
+home_case 'HOME unset does not block an ordinary command' \
+  0 '@unset' 'ls -la /src'
+home_case 'HOME unset does not stop the API arms doing their job' \
+  2 '@unset' 'curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews' 'pr-review.sh'
+
+# ---- the guard standing on its own -----------------------------------------
+# Every case above runs the guard from the directory holding its siblings, so
+# `[ -x "$W/pr-review.sh" ]` succeeds and the $HOME fallback beside it never
+# evaluates. That is a property of the HARNESS, not of the guard, and it hid a
+# live fail-open: with the guard copied somewhere alone AND no HOME, the
+# fallback expanded an unset variable under `set -u` and the script died at
+# rc=1 — on EVERY arm, before any adjudication. A PreToolUse hook exiting
+# nonzero-but-not-2 is a non-blocking error, so that seat ran with no guard and
+# nothing reported it.
+#
+# The first remediation moved that expansion four lines earlier and called it
+# closed. It was not closed, because the test could not reach it. So the guard
+# is copied ALONE here — no siblings, no installed mosaic home — which is the
+# deployment this file already claims to support ("still works from a repo
+# checkout with no installed mosaic home").
+LONE="$TMP/lone"; mkdir -p "$LONE"
+cp "$GUARD" "$LONE/wrapper-guard.sh"; chmod +x "$LONE/wrapper-guard.sh"
+
+lone_case() {
+  local why="$1" want="$2" homeval="$3" cmd="$4" needle="${5:-}"
+  local out got
+  n=$((n + 1))
+  if [ "$homeval" = "@unset" ]; then
+    out="$(printf '%s' "{\"tool_input\":{\"command\":\"$cmd\"}}" | env -u HOME "$LONE/wrapper-guard.sh" 2>&1)"
+  else
+    out="$(printf '%s' "{\"tool_input\":{\"command\":\"$cmd\"}}" | env HOME="$homeval" "$LONE/wrapper-guard.sh" 2>&1)"
+  fi
+  got=$?
+  if [ "$got" != "$want" ]; then
+    printf 'FAIL  %s [standalone] (want exit %s, got %s)\n' "$why" "$want" "$got"
+    fail=1
+    return
+  fi
+  if [ -n "$needle" ] && ! printf '%s' "$out" | grep -Fq -- "$needle"; then
+    printf 'FAIL  %s [standalone] (exit %s, but the message does not say %s)\n' "$why" "$got" "$needle"
+    fail=1
+    return
+  fi
+  printf 'ok    %s [standalone]\n' "$why"
+}
+
+lone_case 'no siblings and no HOME: an ordinary command still passes, not rc=1' \
+  0 '@unset' 'ls -la /src'
+lone_case 'no siblings and no HOME: a wrapped write is still refused' \
+  2 '@unset' 'curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews' 'pr-review.sh'
+lone_case 'no siblings and no HOME: a checkout is refused, not adjudicated' \
+  2 '@unset' 'git clone https://example.invalid/x /src/wt' 'unset or unusable'
+# Spelled without quotes on purpose. The payload is interpolated into a JSON
+# string by the helper, so a fixture carrying bare double quotes produces
+# malformed JSON, jq returns empty, and the guard exits 0 on an empty command —
+# a PASS that measures nothing. That is what the first version of this case did.
+lone_case 'no siblings and no HOME: the APPROVE trap still fires' \
+  2 '@unset' 'gh api -X POST repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews -f event=APPROVE'
+lone_case 'no siblings, usable HOME: ordinary commands unaffected' \
+  0 '/home/tester' 'ls -la /src'
+
+printf '\n'
+if [ "$fail" -eq 0 ]; then
+  printf 'wrapper-guard: %d/%d fixtures behaved as specified.\n' "$n" "$n"
+else
+  cat <<'EOF'
+wrapper-guard drifted from its contract.
+
+A guard that blocks too much gets routed around, and a guard that blocks too
+little is decoration. Both directions are failures here, which is why the
+allowed cases are asserted as hard as the blocked ones.
+EOF
+fi
+exit "$fail"
@@ -91,10 +91,12 @@ fi

 if [[ -n "$dirty_files" ]]; then
  echo "  Modified files:"
-  echo "$dirty_files" | head -20 | while IFS= read -r line; do
-    echo "    $line"
+  mapfile -t dirty_lines <<<"$dirty_files"
+  file_count="${#dirty_lines[@]}"
+  display_count=$((file_count < 20 ? file_count : 20))
+  for ((i = 0; i < display_count; i++)); do
+    echo "    ${dirty_lines[$i]}"
  done
-  file_count="$(echo "$dirty_files" | wc -l)"
  if (( file_count > 20 )); then
    echo "    ... and $(( file_count - 20 )) more"
  fi
@@ -64,12 +64,12 @@ if jq -e '.next_task == "T-001"' "$capsule_file" >/dev/null 2>&1; then pass_case
 if grep -Fq 'Target runtime:** codex' <<< "$codex_continue_output"; then pass_case "continue prompt contains target runtime codex"; else fail_case "continue prompt contains target runtime codex"; fi

 codex_run_prompt="$(MOSAIC_COORD_RUNTIME=codex bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/session-run.sh" --project "$tmp_project" --print)"
-if [[ "$(printf '%s\n' "$codex_run_prompt" | head -n1)" == "Now initiating Orchestrator mode..." ]]; then pass_case "codex run prompt first line is mode declaration"; else fail_case "codex run prompt first line is mode declaration"; fi
+if [[ "${codex_run_prompt%%$'\n'*}" == "Now initiating Orchestrator mode..." ]]; then pass_case "codex run prompt first line is mode declaration"; else fail_case "codex run prompt first line is mode declaration"; fi
 if grep -Fq 'Do NOT ask clarifying questions before your first tool actions' <<< "$codex_run_prompt"; then pass_case "codex run prompt includes no-questions hard gate"; else fail_case "codex run prompt includes no-questions hard gate"; fi
 if grep -Fq '"next_task": "T-001"' <<< "$codex_run_prompt"; then pass_case "codex run prompt embeds capsule json"; else fail_case "codex run prompt embeds capsule json"; fi

 claude_run_prompt="$(MOSAIC_COORD_RUNTIME=claude bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/session-run.sh" --project "$tmp_project" --print)"
-if [[ "$(printf '%s\n' "$claude_run_prompt" | head -n1)" == "## Continuation Mission" ]]; then pass_case "claude run prompt remains continuation prompt format"; else fail_case "claude run prompt remains continuation prompt format"; fi
+if [[ "${claude_run_prompt%%$'\n'*}" == "## Continuation Mission" ]]; then pass_case "claude run prompt remains continuation prompt format"; else fail_case "claude run prompt remains continuation prompt format"; fi

 echo ""
 echo "Smoke test summary: pass=$PASS fail=$FAIL"
@@ -96,8 +96,8 @@ L="$WORK/live5.md"; G="$WORK/ledger5.md"; echo "# LEDGER" > "$G"
 make_board "$L" 6 1 400
 before_l=$(cat "$L"); before_g=$(cat "$G")
 out=$(bash "$SUT" --live "$L" --ledger "$G" --cap 2000 --dry-run 2>&1) || note "dry-run exited nonzero: $out"
-echo "$out" | grep -qi "dry run" || note "dry-run did not announce itself"
-echo "$out" | grep -q "would roll" || note "dry-run did not report a plan"
+grep -qi "dry run" <<<"$out" || note "dry-run did not announce itself"
+grep -q "would roll" <<<"$out" || note "dry-run did not report a plan"
 [[ "$(cat "$L")" == "$before_l" ]] || note "dry-run modified LIVE"
 [[ "$(cat "$G")" == "$before_g" ]] || note "dry-run modified LEDGER"

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ present=0

 for entry in "${PRDY_REQUIRED_SECTIONS[@]}"; do
  pattern="${entry#*|}"
-  if echo "$PRD_CONTENT" | grep -qiE "$pattern"; then
+  if grep -qiE "$pattern" <<<"$PRD_CONTENT"; then
    present=$((present + 1))
  fi
 done
@@ -169,13 +169,13 @@ main() {
 # classify_surface PATH → surface name (highest-risk match wins, mirrors TS)
 classify_surface() {
  local p="$1"
-  if printf '%s' "$p" | grep -qiE 'auth|login|session|token|permission|rbac|credential|secret'; then echo auth; return; fi
-  if printf '%s' "$p" | grep -qiE 'migration|prisma|schema|\.sql|entity|repository|seed'; then echo data; return; fi
-  if printf '%s' "$p" | grep -qiE 'docker|\.woodpecker|compose|traefik|deploy|helm|k8s|terraform'; then echo infra; return; fi
-  if printf '%s' "$p" | grep -qiE 'package\.json|tsconfig|turbo\.json|pnpm-|\.config\.|eslint|vite'; then echo build; return; fi
-  if printf '%s' "$p" | grep -qE '\.tsx|\.css|components/|apps/web/'; then echo ui; return; fi
-  if printf '%s' "$p" | grep -qE '\.spec\.|\.test\.|__tests__/'; then echo test; return; fi
-  if printf '%s' "$p" | grep -qE '\.md$|docs/'; then echo docs; return; fi
+  if grep -qiE 'auth|login|session|token|permission|rbac|credential|secret' <<<"$p"; then echo auth; return; fi
+  if grep -qiE 'migration|prisma|schema|\.sql|entity|repository|seed' <<<"$p"; then echo data; return; fi
+  if grep -qiE 'docker|\.woodpecker|compose|traefik|deploy|helm|k8s|terraform' <<<"$p"; then echo infra; return; fi
+  if grep -qiE 'package\.json|tsconfig|turbo\.json|pnpm-|\.config\.|eslint|vite' <<<"$p"; then echo build; return; fi
+  if grep -qE '\.tsx|\.css|components/|apps/web/' <<<"$p"; then echo ui; return; fi
+  if grep -qE '\.spec\.|\.test\.|__tests__/' <<<"$p"; then echo test; return; fi
+  if grep -qE '\.md$|docs/' <<<"$p"; then echo docs; return; fi
  echo none
 }

@@ -13,7 +13,12 @@ JSON_INPUT=$(cat)
 if command -v jq &>/dev/null; then
  FILE_PATH=$(echo "$JSON_INPUT" | jq -r '.tool_input.file_path // .tool_response.filePath // .file_path // empty' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
 else
-  FILE_PATH=$(echo "$JSON_INPUT" | grep -o '"file_path"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"[^"]*"' | sed 's/.*"\([^"]*\)"$/\1/' | head -1)
+  file_path_pattern='"file_path"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"([^"]*)"'
+  if [[ "$JSON_INPUT" =~ $file_path_pattern ]]; then
+    FILE_PATH="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}"
+  else
+    FILE_PATH=""
+  fi
 fi

 # Only check TypeScript files
@@ -53,7 +58,7 @@ OUTPUT=$(npx tsc --noEmit --pretty --maxNodeModuleJsDepth 0 2>&1) || STATUS=$?
 if [ "${STATUS:-0}" -ne 0 ]; then
  # Filter output to only show errors related to the edited file (if possible)
  BASENAME=$(basename "$FILE_PATH")
-  RELEVANT=$(echo "$OUTPUT" | grep -A2 "$BASENAME" 2>/dev/null || echo "$OUTPUT" | head -20)
+  RELEVANT=$(grep -A2 "$BASENAME" <<<"$OUTPUT" 2>/dev/null || sed -n '1,20p' <<<"$OUTPUT")

  echo "TypeScript type errors detected after editing $FILE_PATH:"
  echo "$RELEVANT"
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# check-tools-index.sh — assert every shipped tool is discoverable from the
+# resident documentation an agent actually has in context.
+#
+# WHY THIS GATE EXISTS
+# --------------------
+# The framework ships 26 git wrappers. Before this gate, 20 of them were named
+# in neither `defaults/TOOLS.md` nor `guides/TOOLS-REFERENCE.md`. One of the
+# undocumented ones was `pr-review.sh` — the wrapper that carries the
+# APPROVED/APPROVE provider-dialect split.
+#
+# The observable consequence, on a live fleet host: an agent needing to place a
+# review verdict reached for raw `curl`, sent GitHub's `APPROVE` to a Gitea
+# host, and got HTTP 200 with the review silently filed PENDING — three times,
+# because nothing about the failure pointed at the wrapper that already handled
+# it correctly. The agent was not ignoring Constitution gate 7. It was obeying
+# an index that said the tool did not exist.
+#
+# That is not a discipline problem and no amount of prose fixes it. A wrapper
+# that is not in the resident index is, from inside a session, indistinguishable
+# from a wrapper that was never written. So the invariant is mechanical:
+#
+#     shipping a tool and documenting it are the same commit, or CI fails.
+#
+# WHAT IT CHECKS
+# --------------
+#   forward  every non-excluded tool in an ENFORCED suite is named in at least
+#            one index document (missing tool -> undiscoverable -> FAIL)
+#   reverse  every `<name>.sh` an index document attributes to an enforced
+#            suite exists on disk (stale reference -> agent runs a ghost -> FAIL)
+#
+# Suites outside the enforced set are reported with a coverage percentage but do
+# not fail the build, so the ratchet can be tightened one suite per PR instead of
+# landing as one unreviewable sweep. `--strict` fails on those too.
+#
+# WHY THE ENFORCED LIST LIVES HERE AND NOT IN A MARKER INSIDE THE DOC
+# -------------------------------------------------------------------
+# `TOOLS.md` is operator-owned (see framework-manifest.txt). A marker inside it
+# would let an operator silence this gate by editing their own copy — the gate
+# would then be strongest exactly where it is least needed and absent where it
+# is needed most. The list is framework-owned and changes only through a
+# reviewed PR.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   check-tools-index.sh [--tools-dir DIR] [--doc FILE]... [--strict] [--self-test]
+#
+# Exit: 0 = every enforced suite fully discoverable · 1 = drift · 2 = bad usage
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+# Suites whose coverage is a HARD requirement. Add a suite here only together
+# with the doc changes that make it pass.
+#
+# `git` is first because it is the suite Constitution gates 6-8 make mandatory:
+# an undiscoverable git wrapper converts a hard gate into a coin flip.
+ENFORCED_SUITES=(git)
+
+# Files that are not agent-callable tools and must not be required in an index.
+EXCLUDE_GLOBS=(
+  'test-*'        # hermetic regression scripts, invoked by CI not by agents
+  '_*'            # private helpers (_lib, _scripts internals)
+  '*.bak'         # editor/installer debris
+  '*.pre-*'       # pre-change backups (e.g. ci-queue-wait.sh.pre-404fix-bak)
+  'README.md'
+)
+
+STRICT=0
+SELF_TEST=0
+TOOLS_DIR=""
+DOCS=()
+
+die() { printf 'check-tools-index: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 2; }
+
+while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
+  case "$1" in
+    --tools-dir) TOOLS_DIR="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
+    --doc)       DOCS+=("${2:-}");   shift 2 ;;
+    --strict)    STRICT=1; shift ;;
+    --self-test) SELF_TEST=1; shift ;;
+    -h|--help)   sed -n '2,48p' "$0" | sed 's/^# \{0,1\}//'; exit 0 ;;
+    *)           die "unknown argument: $1" ;;
+  esac
+done
+
+# ---- location resolution ---------------------------------------------------
+# Runs from two places with different layouts, and must not silently check the
+# wrong tree: a CI checkout (repo-relative) and an installed host ($MOSAIC_HOME).
+resolve_locations() {
+  local here framework
+  here="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+  # .../framework/tools/quality/scripts -> .../framework
+  framework="$(cd -- "$here/../../.." && pwd)"
+
+  if [ -z "$TOOLS_DIR" ]; then
+    if [ -d "$framework/tools" ]; then
+      TOOLS_DIR="$framework/tools"
+    else
+      TOOLS_DIR="${MOSAIC_HOME:-$HOME/.config/mosaic}/tools"
+    fi
+  fi
+
+  if [ ${#DOCS[@]} -eq 0 ]; then
+    # The two layouts are mutually exclusive on purpose. Unioning them would let
+    # a well-maintained operator TOOLS.md on the developer's own machine mask a
+    # gap in the shipped defaults — the check would pass locally and the defect
+    # would still install on every other host. Repo layout wins when present.
+    if [ -f "$framework/defaults/TOOLS.md" ]; then
+      DOCS+=("$framework/defaults/TOOLS.md")
+      [ -f "$framework/guides/TOOLS-REFERENCE.md" ] && DOCS+=("$framework/guides/TOOLS-REFERENCE.md")
+    else
+      local mosaic_home="${MOSAIC_HOME:-$HOME/.config/mosaic}"
+      [ -f "$mosaic_home/TOOLS.md" ]                  && DOCS+=("$mosaic_home/TOOLS.md")
+      [ -f "$mosaic_home/guides/TOOLS-REFERENCE.md" ] && DOCS+=("$mosaic_home/guides/TOOLS-REFERENCE.md")
+    fi
+  fi
+
+  [ -d "$TOOLS_DIR" ] || die "tools dir not found: $TOOLS_DIR"
+  [ ${#DOCS[@]} -gt 0 ] || die "no index documents found (pass --doc FILE)"
+}
+
+is_excluded() {
+  local name="$1" glob
+  for glob in "${EXCLUDE_GLOBS[@]}"; do
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2254  # glob is intentionally a pattern
+    case "$name" in $glob) return 0 ;; esac
+  done
+  return 1
+}
+
+# A tool counts as documented when its basename appears anywhere in the corpus.
+# Deliberately permissive about *form* (table cell, code fence, prose) and strict
+# about *presence*: the gate's job is "an agent can find it", not house style.
+documented() { grep -qF -- "$1" "$CORPUS"; }
+
+# ---- the check -------------------------------------------------------------
+run_check() {
+  local rc=0 suite dir tool base enforced
+
+  CORPUS="$(mktemp)"; trap 'rm -f "$CORPUS"' RETURN
+  cat "${DOCS[@]}" > "$CORPUS"
+
+  printf 'tools:  %s\n' "$TOOLS_DIR"
+  for d in "${DOCS[@]}"; do printf 'index:  %s\n' "$d"; done
+  printf '\n'
+
+  for dir in "$TOOLS_DIR"/*/; do
+    [ -d "$dir" ] || continue
+    suite="$(basename -- "$dir")"
+    case " ${ENFORCED_SUITES[*]} " in *" $suite "*) enforced=1 ;; *) enforced=0 ;; esac
+    [ "$STRICT" -eq 1 ] && enforced=1
+    case "$suite" in _*) continue ;; esac
+
+    local total=0 found=0
+    local -a suite_missing=() suite_noexec=()
+    for tool in "$dir"*.sh; do
+      [ -e "$tool" ] || continue
+      base="$(basename -- "$tool")"
+      is_excluded "$base" && continue
+      total=$((total + 1))
+      if documented "$base"; then
+        found=$((found + 1))
+        # Documented AND present is not enough. The index presents these as
+        # commands to run, and every caller — the wrapper guard included —
+        # decides "is this tool here?" with `[ -x ]`. A 0644 wrapper is
+        # documented, present, and dead: it reads as absent to every check that
+        # matters while scoring 100% here. That is a false green, which is worse
+        # than a red, so it fails rather than warns.
+        [ -x "$tool" ] || suite_noexec+=("$base")
+      else
+        suite_missing+=("$base")
+      fi
+    done
+    [ "$total" -eq 0 ] && continue
+
+    local pct=$(( found * 100 / total ))
+    if [ "$enforced" -eq 1 ] && [ ${#suite_noexec[@]} -gt 0 ]; then
+      printf 'FAIL  %-12s %3d%% (%d/%d)  documented but not executable: %s\n' \
+        "$suite" "$pct" "$found" "$total" "${suite_noexec[*]}"
+      rc=1
+    fi
+    if [ "$enforced" -eq 1 ] && [ ${#suite_missing[@]} -gt 0 ]; then
+      printf 'FAIL  %-12s %3d%% (%d/%d)  undocumented: %s\n' \
+        "$suite" "$pct" "$found" "$total" "${suite_missing[*]}"
+      rc=1
+    elif [ "$enforced" -eq 1 ] && [ ${#suite_noexec[@]} -eq 0 ]; then
+      printf 'ok    %-12s %3d%% (%d/%d)  [enforced]\n' "$suite" "$pct" "$found" "$total"
+    else
+      printf 'info  %-12s %3d%% (%d/%d)  not yet enforced\n' "$suite" "$pct" "$found" "$total"
+    fi
+
+    # Reverse: an index that names a tool this suite does not have sends agents
+    # after something that cannot run. Only checked for enforced suites, where
+    # the naming is unambiguous enough to attribute.
+    if [ "$enforced" -eq 1 ]; then
+      local -a stale=()
+      local ref
+      while read -r ref; do
+        [ -n "$ref" ] || continue
+        is_excluded "$ref" && continue
+        [ -e "$dir$ref" ] || stale+=("$ref")
+      done < <(grep -oE "$suite/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]*\.sh" "$CORPUS" \
+                 | sed "s|^$suite/||" | sort -u)
+      if [ ${#stale[@]} -gt 0 ]; then
+        printf 'FAIL  %-12s stale index references (no such file): %s\n' \
+          "$suite" "${stale[*]}"
+        rc=1
+      fi
+    fi
+  done
+
+  printf '\n'
+  if [ "$rc" -ne 0 ]; then
+    cat <<EOF
+Undocumented tools are undiscoverable. An agent cannot obey a hard gate that
+tells it to use a wrapper it has no way to learn exists — it will reach for raw
+curl/gh/tea instead, and the wrapper's provider-dialect handling will be lost.
+
+Fix by naming each tool above in one of the index documents listed at the top,
+in the same commit that ships it.
+EOF
+  else
+    printf 'every enforced suite is fully discoverable.\n'
+  fi
+  return "$rc"
+}
+
+# ---- self-test -------------------------------------------------------------
+# Proves the gate can actually fail. A checker that only ever passes is
+# indistinguishable from one that is not running, which is the failure mode this
+# whole file exists to prevent — so it must demonstrate a red on demand.
+self_test() {
+  local tmp rc
+  tmp="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$tmp"' RETURN
+  mkdir -p "$tmp/tools/git"
+  printf '#!/bin/sh\n' > "$tmp/tools/git/documented-tool.sh"
+  printf '#!/bin/sh\n' > "$tmp/tools/git/test-ignored.sh"
+  chmod +x "$tmp/tools/git/documented-tool.sh" "$tmp/tools/git/test-ignored.sh"
+
+  # run_check reads the TOOLS_DIR / DOCS globals; an array cannot ride in a
+  # command-prefix assignment, so point the globals at the fixture directly.
+  TOOLS_DIR="$tmp/tools"
+  DOCS=("$tmp/doc.md")
+
+  # Case 1: fully documented -> pass.
+  printf 'see tools/git/documented-tool.sh for details\n' > "$tmp/doc.md"
+  if run_check >/dev/null; then
+    printf 'self-test 1/4 ok  (complete index passes)\n'
+  else
+    printf 'self-test 1/4 FAIL (complete index should pass)\n'; return 1
+  fi
+
+  # Case 2: an undocumented tool -> fail.
+  printf '#!/bin/sh\n' > "$tmp/tools/git/undocumented-tool.sh"
+  rc=0; run_check >/dev/null || rc=$?
+  if [ "$rc" -eq 1 ]; then
+    printf 'self-test 2/4 ok  (undocumented tool fails the gate)\n'
+  else
+    printf 'self-test 2/4 FAIL (undocumented tool should fail, got rc=%s)\n' "$rc"; return 1
+  fi
+
+  # Case 3: a stale index reference -> fail.
+  rm "$tmp/tools/git/undocumented-tool.sh"
+  printf 'also tools/git/deleted-tool.sh\n' >> "$tmp/doc.md"
+  rc=0; run_check >/dev/null || rc=$?
+  if [ "$rc" -eq 1 ]; then
+    printf 'self-test 3/4 ok  (stale index reference fails the gate)\n'
+  else
+    printf 'self-test 3/4 FAIL (stale reference should fail, got rc=%s)\n' "$rc"; return 1
+  fi
+
+  # Case 4: documented, present, and NOT executable -> fail. Found by an
+  # independent reviewer: a 0644 wrapper scored 100% here while reading as
+  # absent to every `[ -x ]` in the fleet, including the wrapper guard's.
+  sed -i '/deleted-tool/d' "$tmp/doc.md"
+  printf '#!/bin/sh\n' > "$tmp/tools/git/noexec-tool.sh"
+  chmod 0644 "$tmp/tools/git/noexec-tool.sh"
+  printf 'and tools/git/noexec-tool.sh\n' >> "$tmp/doc.md"
+  rc=0; run_check >/dev/null || rc=$?
+  if [ "$rc" -eq 1 ]; then
+    printf 'self-test 4/4 ok  (documented but non-executable tool fails the gate)\n'
+  else
+    printf 'self-test 4/4 FAIL (non-executable tool should fail, got rc=%s)\n' "$rc"; return 1
+  fi
+
+  printf '\nself-test passed: the gate demonstrably reds on every drift direction.\n'
+}
+
+if [ "$SELF_TEST" -eq 1 ]; then
+  self_test
+else
+  resolve_locations
+  run_check
+fi
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Fail-closed comparison of deployed Mosaic tools to manifest-owned shipped tools."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import stat
+import subprocess
+import sys
+
+
+def digest(path: Path) -> str:
+    value = hashlib.sha256()
+    with path.open("rb") as handle:
+        for chunk in iter(lambda: handle.read(1024 * 1024), b""):
+            value.update(chunk)
+    return value.hexdigest()
+
+
+def default_source_tools() -> Path:
+    return Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+
+
+def normalize_source(path: Path) -> Path:
+    candidate = path.resolve()
+    return candidate / "tools" if (candidate / "tools").is_dir() else candidate
+
+
+def assert_traversable_directory(path: Path) -> None:
+    mode = stat.S_IMODE(path.stat(follow_symlinks=False).st_mode)
+    # At least one principal class must have both read and search. This catches
+    # mode-000 even for privileged reviewers for whom os.access() would lie.
+    if not any(mode & read and mode & execute for read, execute in ((0o400, 0o100), (0o040, 0o010), (0o004, 0o001))):
+        raise PermissionError(f"directory has no readable/searchable mode: {path}")
+
+
+def census(root: Path, *, reject_symlinks: bool) -> dict[str, Path]:
+    result: dict[str, Path] = {}
+
+    def onerror(error: OSError) -> None:
+        raise error
+
+    for current, directories, filenames in os.walk(root, topdown=True, followlinks=False, onerror=onerror):
+        current_path = Path(current)
+        assert_traversable_directory(current_path)
+        for name in directories:
+            entry = current_path / name
+            if entry.is_symlink() and reject_symlinks:
+                # A source symlink makes the shipped census incomplete. Deployed
+                # aliases are assessed later only when they occupy a required
+                # framework path; installed-only aliases remain operator state.
+                raise OSError(f"symlinked directory is not an independent census entry: {entry}")
+        for name in filenames:
+            entry = current_path / name
+            if entry.is_symlink():
+                if reject_symlinks:
+                    raise OSError(f"symlinked file is not an independent census entry: {entry}")
+                result[entry.relative_to(root).as_posix()] = entry
+                continue
+            mode = entry.stat(follow_symlinks=False).st_mode
+            if not stat.S_ISREG(mode):
+                raise OSError(f"non-regular census entry: {entry}")
+            if stat.S_IMODE(mode) & 0o444 == 0:
+                raise PermissionError(f"file has no readable mode: {entry}")
+            result[entry.relative_to(root).as_posix()] = entry
+    return result
+
+
+def classify_with_manifest(source: Path, relatives: list[str]) -> dict[str, str]:
+    framework = source.parent
+    manifest = framework / "framework-manifest.txt"
+    resolver = source / "_lib" / "manifest.sh"
+    if not manifest.is_file() or not os.access(manifest, os.R_OK):
+        raise OSError(f"ownership manifest is missing or unreadable: {manifest}")
+    if not resolver.is_file() or not os.access(resolver, os.R_OK):
+        raise OSError(f"canonical manifest resolver is missing or unreadable: {resolver}")
+    payload = "".join(f"tools/{relative}\n" for relative in relatives)
+    completed = subprocess.run(
+        ["bash", str(resolver), "classify"],
+        input=payload,
+        text=True,
+        capture_output=True,
+        check=False,
+        env={**os.environ, "MANIFEST_FILE": str(manifest)},
+    )
+    if completed.returncode != 0:
+        detail = completed.stderr.strip() or f"resolver rc={completed.returncode}"
+        raise OSError(f"ownership manifest failed canonical resolution: {detail}")
+    classified: dict[str, str] = {}
+    for line in completed.stdout.splitlines():
+        ownership, separator, manifest_path = line.partition("\t")
+        if not separator or not manifest_path.startswith("tools/") or ownership not in {"framework", "operator"}:
+            raise OSError(f"invalid canonical ownership output: {line!r}")
+        relative = manifest_path.removeprefix("tools/")
+        if relative in classified:
+            raise OSError(f"duplicate canonical ownership output: {relative}")
+        classified[relative] = ownership
+    if set(classified) != set(relatives):
+        raise OSError("canonical ownership output did not classify the complete source census")
+    return classified
+
+
+def has_symlinked_component(root: Path, relative: str) -> bool:
+    current = root
+    for component in Path(relative).parts:
+        current = current / component
+        if current.is_symlink():
+            return True
+    return False
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Detect deployed Mosaic framework-tool drift")
+    parser.add_argument("--source-root", type=Path, default=Path(os.environ["MOSAIC_FRAMEWORK_SOURCE_ROOT"]) if os.environ.get("MOSAIC_FRAMEWORK_SOURCE_ROOT") else default_source_tools())
+    parser.add_argument("--installed-root", type=Path, default=Path(os.environ.get("MOSAIC_HOME", Path.home() / ".config/mosaic")) / "tools")
+    parser.add_argument("--verbose", action="store_true")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    source = normalize_source(args.source_root)
+    installed = args.installed_root.resolve()
+    try:
+        if not source.is_dir():
+            raise OSError(f"source tools missing: {source}")
+        if not installed.is_dir():
+            raise OSError(f"installed tools missing: {installed}")
+        if source.samefile(installed):
+            raise OSError("source and installed roots identify the same filesystem object")
+        source_files = census(source, reject_symlinks=True)
+        if not source_files:
+            raise OSError("source tools census is empty")
+        ownership = classify_with_manifest(source, sorted(source_files))
+        required = sorted(relative for relative, owner in ownership.items() if owner == "framework")
+        if not required:
+            raise OSError("ownership manifest classifies zero shipped tools as framework-owned")
+        installed_files = census(installed, reject_symlinks=False)
+    except (OSError, PermissionError) as error:
+        print(f"[framework-drift] CANNOT_ASSERT {error}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+
+    in_sync: list[str] = []
+    stale: list[str] = []
+    not_installed: list[str] = []
+    unsafe_alias: list[str] = []
+    for relative in required:
+        deployed = installed / relative
+        if not deployed.is_file():
+            not_installed.append(relative)
+            continue
+        if has_symlinked_component(installed, relative):
+            unsafe_alias.append(relative)
+            continue
+        try:
+            if source_files[relative].samefile(deployed):
+                unsafe_alias.append(relative)
+            elif digest(source_files[relative]) == digest(deployed):
+                in_sync.append(relative)
+            else:
+                stale.append(relative)
+        except OSError as error:
+            print(f"[framework-drift] CANNOT_ASSERT cannot compare {relative}: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
+            return 2
+
+    source_relative = set(source_files)
+    installed_only = sorted(set(installed_files) - source_relative)
+    if args.verbose:
+        for relative in in_sync:
+            print(f"[framework-drift] IN_SYNC {relative}")
+    for relative in stale:
+        print(f"[framework-drift] STALE {relative}")
+    for relative in not_installed:
+        print(f"[framework-drift] NOT_INSTALLED {relative}")
+    for relative in unsafe_alias:
+        print(f"[framework-drift] UNSAFE_ALIAS {relative}")
+    if args.verbose:
+        for relative in installed_only:
+            print(f"[framework-drift] INSTALLED_ONLY operator-or-unknown {relative}")
+
+    print(
+        "[framework-drift] summary "
+        f"in-sync={len(in_sync)} stale={len(stale)} not-installed={len(not_installed)} "
+        f"unsafe-alias={len(unsafe_alias)} installed-only={len(installed_only)}"
+    )
+    print("[framework-drift] classification canonical framework-manifest ownership; installed-only=operator-or-unknown-preserved")
+    if stale or not_installed or unsafe_alias:
+        print("[framework-drift] FAIL deployed framework tools do not match independent shipped source; schedule a reviewed framework reseed", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+
+CHECKER = Path(__file__).with_name("framework-drift-check.py")
+REAL_RESOLVER = CHECKER.parents[2] / "_lib" / "manifest.sh"
+
+
+class FrameworkDriftCheckTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.temp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        root = Path(self.temp.name)
+        self.framework = root / "framework"
+        self.source = self.framework / "tools"
+        self.installed = root / "home" / "tools"
+        for directory in (self.source / "git", self.source / "_lib", self.installed / "git", self.installed / "_lib"):
+            directory.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        shutil.copy2(REAL_RESOLVER, self.source / "_lib" / "manifest.sh")
+        (self.source / "git" / "guard.sh").write_text("fixed\n")
+        (self.source / "git" / "new-wrapper.sh").write_text("new\n")
+        (self.source / "_lib" / "credentials.json").write_text("source-placeholder\n")
+        self.write_manifest()
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self.temp.cleanup()
+
+    def write_manifest(self, operator_extra: str = "") -> None:
+        (self.framework / "framework-manifest.txt").write_text(
+            "[framework]\ntools/**\n[operator]\ntools/_lib/credentials.json\n" + operator_extra
+        )
+
+    def run_check(self, *extra: str) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+        return subprocess.run(
+            [sys.executable, str(CHECKER), "--source-root", str(self.framework), "--installed-root", str(self.installed), *extra],
+            text=True, capture_output=True, check=False,
+            env={**os.environ, "PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE": "1"},
+        )
+
+    def install_matching(self) -> None:
+        for relative in ("git/guard.sh", "git/new-wrapper.sh", "_lib/manifest.sh"):
+            shutil.copy2(self.source / relative, self.installed / relative)
+        (self.installed / "_lib" / "credentials.json").write_text("different-operator-secret\n")
+
+    def test_fails_loudly_and_classifies_stale_missing_and_installed_only(self) -> None:
+        (self.installed / "git" / "guard.sh").write_text("broken\n")
+        shutil.copy2(self.source / "_lib" / "manifest.sh", self.installed / "_lib" / "manifest.sh")
+        (self.installed / "local-helper.sh").write_text("operator\n")
+        result = self.run_check("--verbose")
+        self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 1)
+        self.assertIn("STALE git/guard.sh", result.stdout)
+        self.assertIn("NOT_INSTALLED git/new-wrapper.sh", result.stdout)
+        self.assertIn("INSTALLED_ONLY operator-or-unknown local-helper.sh", result.stdout)
+        self.assertIn("FAIL deployed framework tools", result.stderr)
+
+    def test_passes_only_when_every_manifest_owned_source_file_matches(self) -> None:
+        self.install_matching()
+        result = self.run_check()
+        self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 0, result.stderr)
+        self.assertIn("stale=0 not-installed=0 unsafe-alias=0", result.stdout)
+
+    def test_exact_operator_directory_does_not_hide_framework_drift_beneath_it(self) -> None:
+        self.install_matching()
+        (self.installed / "git" / "guard.sh").write_text("drift-hidden-by-directory-entry\n")
+        self.write_manifest("tools/git\n")
+
+        result = self.run_check()
+
+        self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 1, result.stdout + result.stderr)
+        self.assertIn("STALE git/guard.sh", result.stdout)
+
+    def test_manifest_is_required_and_policy_changes_take_effect(self) -> None:
+        self.install_matching()
+        (self.installed / "git" / "guard.sh").write_text("operator-divergence\n")
+        self.write_manifest("tools/git/guard.sh\n")
+        self.assertEqual(self.run_check().returncode, 0)
+        (self.framework / "framework-manifest.txt").unlink()
+        result = self.run_check()
+        self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 2)
+        self.assertIn("CANNOT_ASSERT ownership manifest is missing", result.stderr)
+
+    def test_empty_and_unreadable_source_census_cannot_assert(self) -> None:
+        empty_framework = Path(self.temp.name) / "empty-framework"
+        empty_source = empty_framework / "tools"
+        empty_source.mkdir(parents=True)
+        shutil.copy2(self.framework / "framework-manifest.txt", empty_framework / "framework-manifest.txt")
+        # The canonical resolver is supplied outside the empty census solely so
+        # this probe reaches the explicit minimum-population guard.
+        result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(CHECKER), "--source-root", str(empty_framework), "--installed-root", str(self.installed)], text=True, capture_output=True)
+        self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 2)
+        self.assertIn("CANNOT_ASSERT", result.stderr)
+
+        blocked = self.source / "blocked"
+        blocked.mkdir(); (blocked / "hidden.sh").write_text("hidden\n"); blocked.chmod(0)
+        try:
+            result = self.run_check()
+        finally:
+            blocked.chmod(0o700)
+        self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 2)
+        self.assertIn("CANNOT_ASSERT", result.stderr)
+        self.assertTrue("Permission denied" in result.stderr or "no readable/searchable mode" in result.stderr)
+
+    def test_root_and_descendant_aliases_cannot_report_clean(self) -> None:
+        result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(CHECKER), "--source-root", str(self.framework), "--installed-root", str(self.source)], text=True, capture_output=True)
+        self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 2)
+        self.assertIn("same filesystem object", result.stderr)
+
+        shutil.copy2(self.source / "_lib" / "manifest.sh", self.installed / "_lib" / "manifest.sh")
+        shutil.rmtree(self.installed / "git")
+        (self.installed / "git").symlink_to(self.source / "git", target_is_directory=True)
+        result = self.run_check()
+        self.assertNotEqual(result.returncode, 0)
+        self.assertTrue("symlinked directory" in result.stderr or "UNSAFE_ALIAS" in result.stdout)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Doctor must contain a stalled drift checker and continue its remaining audit.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+DOCTOR="$SCRIPT_DIR/../../_scripts/mosaic-doctor"
+WORK="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/framework-drift-doctor}"
+rm -rf "$WORK"
+mkdir -p "$WORK/source/tools/quality/scripts" "$WORK/source/tools/_scripts" "$WORK/home/tools"
+cp "$DOCTOR" "$WORK/source/tools/_scripts/mosaic-doctor"
+cat > "$WORK/source/tools/quality/scripts/framework-drift-check.py" <<'PY'
+import time
+time.sleep(30)
+PY
+
+start=$(date +%s)
+set +e
+output=$(MOSAIC_HOME="$WORK/home" MOSAIC_DOCTOR_DRIFT_TIMEOUT_SEC=1 \
+  bash "$WORK/source/tools/_scripts/mosaic-doctor" --fail-on-warn 2>&1)
+rc=$?
+set -e
+elapsed=$(( $(date +%s) - start ))
+
+[[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]] || { echo "FAIL: checker timeout became doctor success" >&2; exit 1; }
+[[ "$elapsed" -lt 10 ]] || { echo "FAIL: checker hang escaped watchdog (${elapsed}s)" >&2; exit 1; }
+[[ "$output" == *"CANNOT_ASSERT framework drift checker timed out"* ]] || {
+  echo "FAIL: missing timeout CANNOT_ASSERT diagnostic" >&2; printf '%s\n' "$output" >&2; exit 1;
+}
+[[ "$output" == *"[mosaic-doctor] warnings="* ]] || {
+  echo "FAIL: doctor did not continue after checker timeout" >&2; printf '%s\n' "$output" >&2; exit 1;
+}
+
+echo "framework drift doctor watchdog regression passed"
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ chk "F1 fresh: CONSTITUTION/AGENTS/STANDARDS/TOOLS seeded" \
  "[ -f '$T1/CONSTITUTION.md' ] && [ -f '$T1/AGENTS.md' ] && [ -f '$T1/STANDARDS.md' ] && [ -f '$T1/TOOLS.md' ]"
 chk "F1 fresh: AGENTS == shipped default" "cmp -s '$T1/AGENTS.md' '$DEFA/AGENTS.md'"
 chk "F1 fresh: framework-version stamped 3" "[ \"\$(cat '$T1/.framework-version' 2>/dev/null)\" = 3 ]"
+chk "F1 fresh: Pi goal extension deploys under Mosaic runtime" \
+  "cmp -s '$T1/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts' '$FW/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts'"
+chk "F1 fresh: installer creates no nested main Pi config" "[ ! -e '$T1/.pi' ]"

 # F2 — legacy install with a user-edited AGENTS.md (the sanctioned pre-constitution customization)
 T2=$(mktemp -d); mkdir -p "$T2/credentials"
@@ -89,6 +92,8 @@ chk "F6 reseed: per-agent env bytes survive" "cmp -s '$T6/fleet/agents/coder0.en
 chk "F6 reseed: heartbeat bytes survive" "cmp -s '$T6/fleet/run/coder0.hb' '$E6/run.expected'"
 chk "F6 reseed: framework examples are refreshed" "grep -q orchestrator '$T6/fleet/examples/general.yaml'"
 chk "F6 reseed: framework roster schema is refreshed" "cmp -s '$T6/fleet/roster.schema.json' '$FW/fleet/roster.schema.json'"
+chk "F6 reseed: Pi goal extension is refreshed from framework source" \
+  "cmp -s '$T6/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts' '$FW/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts'"

 rm -rf "$T1" "$T2" "$T3" "$T4" "$T5" "$T6" "$E6"
 echo
@@ -176,8 +176,12 @@ run_snap() {

 # Resolve the single pre-update-* snapshot dir under a state dir (newest if many).
 snap_dir() {
-  find "$1/mosaic/backups" -maxdepth 1 -type d -name 'pre-update-*' 2>/dev/null \
-    | LC_ALL=C sort -r | head -1
+  local -a snapshots=()
+  mapfile -t snapshots < <(
+    find "$1/mosaic/backups" -maxdepth 1 -type d -name 'pre-update-*' 2>/dev/null \
+      | LC_ALL=C sort -r
+  )
+  printf '%s\n' "${snapshots[0]:-}"
 }

 echo "── Part 1/2/3: durable snapshot scope, perms, no-leak ──────────────────"
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ chk "[reset-fail] the manual-recovery pointer is emitted (not a silent set -e ex
  "grep -q 'Snapshot restore could not reset' '$OUTG'"
 chk "[reset-fail] the recovery message points at a preserved snapshot dir" \
  "grep -q 'preserved at: .*mosaic-snapshot' '$OUTG'"
-SNAP_E="$(grep -o '/[^ ]*mosaic-snapshot[^ ]*' "$OUTG" | head -1)"
+SNAP_E="$(grep -m1 -o '/[^ ]*mosaic-snapshot[^ ]*' "$OUTG")"
 chk "[reset-fail] the named snapshot directory actually survives for recovery" \
  "[ -n '$SNAP_E' ] && [ -d '$SNAP_E' ]"
 chk "[reset-fail] operator secret value never appears in installer output" \
@@ -353,7 +353,8 @@ chk "[control] without the D2 recovery line the operator gets no snapshot pointe
  "! grep -q 'Snapshot restore could not reset' '$OUTH'"
 [ -n "${SNAP_E:-}" ] && rm -rf "$SNAP_E"
 # Reap any snapshot the reset-fail runs left in /tmp (reset failed → never cleaned).
-grep -o '/[^ ]*mosaic-snapshot[^ ]*' "$OUTH" 2>/dev/null | head -1 | while read -r s; do rm -rf "$s"; done
+orphan_snapshot="$(grep -m1 -o '/[^ ]*mosaic-snapshot[^ ]*' "$OUTH" 2>/dev/null || true)"
+[ -n "$orphan_snapshot" ] && rm -rf "$orphan_snapshot"

 # Cleanup (generated installer controls are also removed by the EXIT trap).
 for d in "$HA" "$REFA" "$HB" "$REFB" "$HC" "$HD" "$HE" "$REFE" "$HF" "$REFF" "$HG" "$HH"; do rm -rf "$d"; done
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ for attempt in $(seq 1 $((RETRIES + 1))); do
  sleep 1.2
  pane=$("${tmux_cmd[@]}" capture-pane -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" -p 2>/dev/null)

-  if printf '%s' "$pane" | grep -qF "$QUEUED_RE"; then
+  if grep -qF "$QUEUED_RE" <<<"$pane"; then
    status="queued"; break
  fi
  # Locate the REPL input box (prompt glyph). If we cannot see it, we have NO
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ for attempt in $(seq 1 $((RETRIES + 1))); do
  fi
  # Input box located AND still carrying our tail => unsubmitted draft. Flush + retry.
  # (Submitted messages scroll up into history; a draft stays on the ❯ line.)
-  if [ -n "$snippet" ] && printf '%s' "$promptline" | grep -qF "$snippet"; then
+  if [ -n "$snippet" ] && grep -qF "$snippet" <<<"$promptline"; then
    status="draft"; continue
  fi
  # Input box located AND clear of our tail => positively submitted. This is the
@@ -34,16 +34,20 @@ tmux new-session -d -s "$DEFAULT_TARGET" -c "$TMPDIR" 'PS1="❯ " exec bash --no

 "$SEND_MESSAGE" -L "$SOCKET" -t "=$TARGET" -m "named socket hello" >/tmp/send-message-named.out
 sleep 0.2
-capture_named | grep -qF "named socket hello" || fail "send-message.sh did not deliver to named socket"
-if capture_default | grep -qF "named socket hello"; then
+named_pane="$(capture_named)" || fail "could not capture named socket pane"
+grep -qF "named socket hello" <<<"$named_pane" || fail "send-message.sh did not deliver to named socket"
+default_pane="$(capture_default)" || fail "could not capture default socket pane"
+if grep -qF "named socket hello" <<<"$default_pane"; then
  fail "send-message.sh leaked named-socket message to default tmux server"
 fi

 "$AGENT_SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -S "tester:source" -s "=$TARGET" -m "agent socket hello" >/tmp/agent-send-named.out
 sleep 0.2
-capture_named | grep -qF "[tester:source ->" || fail "agent-send.sh did not include preamble"
-capture_named | grep -qF "agent socket hello" || fail "agent-send.sh did not deliver to named socket"
-if capture_default | grep -qF "agent socket hello"; then
+named_pane="$(capture_named)" || fail "could not capture named socket pane"
+grep -qF "[tester:source ->" <<<"$named_pane" || fail "agent-send.sh did not include preamble"
+grep -qF "agent socket hello" <<<"$named_pane" || fail "agent-send.sh did not deliver to named socket"
+default_pane="$(capture_default)" || fail "could not capture default socket pane"
+if grep -qF "agent socket hello" <<<"$default_pane"; then
  fail "agent-send.sh leaked named-socket message to default tmux server"
 fi

@@ -65,11 +69,11 @@ done
 sleep 0.2
 for i in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
  pane=$(tmux -L "$SOCKET" capture-pane -t "=conc-$i:0.0" -p)
-  printf '%s' "$pane" | grep -qF "CONCPAYLOAD-${i}-END" \
+  grep -qF "CONCPAYLOAD-${i}-END" <<<"$pane" \
    || fail "concurrent send dropped payload for pane conc-$i"
  for j in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
    [ "$j" = "$i" ] && continue
-    if printf '%s' "$pane" | grep -qF "CONCPAYLOAD-${j}-END"; then
+    if grep -qF "CONCPAYLOAD-${j}-END" <<<"$pane"; then
      fail "concurrent send cross-delivered payload $j to pane conc-$i"
    fi
  done
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ tmux -L "$SOCKET" new-session -d -s repl -c "$TMP" \
  'PS1="❯ " exec bash --noprofile --norc -i'
 sleep 0.3
 out=$("$SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -t "=repl" -m "verdict fixture one delivered ok" 2>"$TMP/e1"); rc=$?
-if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] && printf '%s' "$out" | grep -qF "✓ delivered"; then
+if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] && grep -qF "✓ delivered" <<<"$out"; then
  ok "delivered: ❯-prompt REPL that submits => exit 0 ✓ delivered"
 else
  no "delivered: ❯-prompt REPL that submits => exit 0 ✓ delivered" "rc=$rc out=[$out] err=[$(cat "$TMP/e1")]"
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ _manifest_val() {
  # _manifest_val KEY — echo VALUE for KEY=VALUE in the manifest (blank if none).
  local key="$1"
  [ -f "$MANIFEST" ] || return 0
-  sed -n "s/^${key}=//p" "$MANIFEST" | head -n1 | tr -d '[:space:]'
+  awk -v key="$key" 'index($0, key "=") == 1 { sub(/^[^=]*=/, ""); gsub(/[[:space:]]/, ""); print; exit }' "$MANIFEST"
 }

 # _load_watchlist — validate the watch-list path + JSON + schema_version range.
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ _poll_source() {
    if snap_json="$(jq -ce '.' <<<"$rawmeta" 2>/dev/null)"; then
      snap_sha="$(jq -r 'if (.snapshot_sha|type) == "string" then .snapshot_sha else "" end' <<<"$snap_json")"
      snap_ts="$(jq -r 'if (.snapshot_ts|type) == "number" then (.snapshot_ts|floor|tostring) else "" end' <<<"$snap_json")"
-      if [ -n "$snap_sha" ] && ! printf '%s' "$snap_sha" | grep -Eq '^[0-9a-f]{7,64}$'; then
+      if [ -n "$snap_sha" ] && ! grep -Eq '^[0-9a-f]{7,64}$' <<<"$snap_sha"; then
        echo "detector.sh: source '$kind/$id' snapshot_sha rejected (not a 7-64 char lowercase-hex git sha) — snapshot metadata DROPPED, poll continues (#940)." >&2
        snap_sha=""
        snap_ts=""
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ _poll_source() {
      # A ts must be a sane positive epoch BEFORE any arithmetic touches it: a
      # negative or absurdly large value would make the shell integer comparison
      # below error out and silently KEEP the bad ts — validate first, compare after.
-      if [ -n "$snap_ts" ] && ! printf '%s' "$snap_ts" | grep -Eq '^[0-9]{1,12}$'; then
+      if [ -n "$snap_ts" ] && ! grep -Eq '^[0-9]{1,12}$' <<<"$snap_ts"; then
        echo "detector.sh: source '$kind/$id' snapshot_ts rejected (not a sane positive epoch) — snapshot_ts DROPPED, poll continues (#940)." >&2
        snap_ts=""
      fi
@@ -644,7 +644,8 @@ cmd_render() {
        oseq="$(jq -r '.observed_seq // "?"' <<<"$line")"
        oclass="$(jq -r '.class // "actionable"' <<<"$line")"
        oloc="$(jq -c '.locators // {}' <<<"$line")"
-        olabel="$(_locator_line "$oloc" | head -n1)"
+        olabel="$(_locator_line "$oloc")"
+        olabel="${olabel%%$'\n'*}"
        printf '  * seq %s [%s] %s\n' "$oseq" "$(_scrub_inline "$oclass")" "$olabel"
      done <<<"$pending"
    fi
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ EOF
 _manifest_val() {
  local key="$1"
  [ -f "$MANIFEST" ] || return 0
-  sed -n "s/^${key}=//p" "$MANIFEST" | head -n1 | tr -d '[:space:]'
+  awk -v key="$key" 'index($0, key "=") == 1 { sub(/^[^=]*=/, ""); gsub(/[[:space:]]/, ""); print; exit }' "$MANIFEST"
 }

 # _load_watchlist — validate path + JSON + shape + Gate B schema range (mirrors
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ echo "== Q16 (guard): Q2's ENUM-B fixture must STAY address-free — the reconci
  # Token concatenated so THIS guard's own source lines never contain the
  # literal fixture id and cannot self-match.
  enum_id='ENUM''-B'
-  fixture_line="$(has_match -F "\"id\":\"$enum_id\"" "$self" | has_match -F '"observed_seq":5' | head -n1)"
+  fixture_lines="$(has_match -F "\"id\":\"$enum_id\"" "$self")"; fixture_matches="$(has_match -F '"observed_seq":5' <<<"$fixture_lines")"; fixture_line="${fixture_matches%%$'\n'*}"
  [ -n "$fixture_line" ] || fail_msg "Q16: could not locate Q2's $enum_id fixture line (renamed/renumbered? update this guard)"
  fixture_json="$(printf '%s' "$fixture_line" | sed "s/.*'\({.*}\)'.*/\1/")"
  # Positive controls FIRST (blind-instrument rule): the extraction must yield
@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ echo "== P3: detector orders the cause line BEFORE the delta it explains =="
  printf 'r1 state v2\n' >"$fx/repo_r1"
  "$DET" poll-once >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P3: second poll failed"
  sd="$(state_dir)"
-  pre_seq="$(jq -r 'select(.locators.kind == "preimage") | .observed_seq' "$sd/pending.jsonl" | head -n1)"
-  src_seq="$(jq -r 'select(.locators.kind == "repo") | .observed_seq' "$sd/pending.jsonl" | head -n1)"
+  pre_seq="$(jq -nr 'first(inputs | select(.locators.kind == "preimage") | .observed_seq) // empty' "$sd/pending.jsonl")"
+  src_seq="$(jq -nr 'first(inputs | select(.locators.kind == "repo") | .observed_seq) // empty' "$sd/pending.jsonl")"
  [ -n "$pre_seq" ] || fail_msg "P3: no preimage cause entry enqueued"
  [ -n "$src_seq" ] || fail_msg "P3: no source delta entry enqueued"
  if [ -n "$pre_seq" ] && [ -n "$src_seq" ]; then
@@ -343,8 +343,8 @@ echo "== P11: reconcile surfaces the cause line before its enumerations =="
  printf '# adapter changed while detector down\n' >>"$fx/adapter.sh"
  "$RECON" reconcile >/dev/null 2>&1 # rc 1 expected (unaccounted enumerated)
  sd="$(state_dir)"
-  pre_seq="$(jq -r 'select(.locators.kind == "preimage") | .observed_seq' "$sd/pending.jsonl" | head -n1)"
-  enum_seq="$(jq -r 'select(.locators.reconciled == true) | .observed_seq' "$sd/pending.jsonl" | head -n1)"
+  pre_seq="$(jq -nr 'first(inputs | select(.locators.kind == "preimage") | .observed_seq) // empty' "$sd/pending.jsonl")"
+  enum_seq="$(jq -nr 'first(inputs | select(.locators.reconciled == true) | .observed_seq) // empty' "$sd/pending.jsonl")"
  [ -n "$pre_seq" ] || fail_msg "P11: reconcile must enqueue the preimage cause line"
  [ -n "$enum_seq" ] || fail_msg "P11: reconcile must still enumerate the unaccounted source"
  if [ -n "$pre_seq" ] && [ -n "$enum_seq" ]; then
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ site_line() { # site_line FILE MARKER -> first physical line of that call
  local f="$1" marker="$2" ln
  ln="$(grep -n "# SITE:${marker}\$" "$f" | cut -d: -f1)"
  # continuation marker sits on the tail line; the call starts one line up
-  if ! sed -n "${ln}p" "$f" | grep -Eq 'has_match|count_lines'; then
+  source_line="$(sed -n "${ln}p" "$f")"; if ! grep -Eq 'has_match|count_lines' <<<"$source_line"; then
    ln=$((ln - 1))
  fi
  printf '%s' "$ln"
@@ -167,13 +167,13 @@ rcB=$?
 sort "$LEDGER" >"$TMP/got-c1"
 n_expected="$(grep -c . "$TMP/expected-c1")"
 if [ "$rcA" -eq 0 ] && [ "$rcB" -eq 0 ] &&
-  printf '%s' "$outA" | grep -q 'mini-a: OK' &&
-  printf '%s' "$outB" | grep -q 'mini-b: OK' &&
+  grep -q 'mini-a: OK'  <<<"$outA"&&
+  grep -q 'mini-b: OK'  <<<"$outB"&&
  [ "$n_expected" -gt 1 ] &&
  cmp -s "$TMP/expected-c1" "$TMP/got-c1"; then
  check C1 0 ""
 else
-  check C1 1 "rcA=$rcA rcB=$rcB expected($n_expected)/got diff: $(diff "$TMP/expected-c1" "$TMP/got-c1" 2>&1 | head -n 10 | tr '\n' ' ')"
+  check C1 1 "rcA=$rcA rcB=$rcB expected($n_expected)/got diff: $(diff "$TMP/expected-c1" "$TMP/got-c1" 2>&1 | sed -n '1,10p' | tr '\n' ' ')"
 fi

 # --- C2: early exit -> short ledger, comparison catches it -----------------
@@ -201,12 +201,12 @@ abort_case() { # abort_case NAME MARKER HELPER
    bash "$TMP/mini-a.sh" "$TMP" 2>&1)"
  rc=$?
  if [ "$rc" -ne 0 ] &&
-    ! printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'mini-a: OK' &&
-    ! printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'mini-a: FAILED' &&
-    printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q "WAKE-ASSERT ARMED: forcing real grep error at $site" &&
-    printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q "WAKE-ASSERT ABORT" &&
-    printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q "$site" &&
-    printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q "grep exit 2" &&
+    ! grep -q 'mini-a: OK'  <<<"$out"&&
+    ! grep -q 'mini-a: FAILED'  <<<"$out"&&
+    grep -q "WAKE-ASSERT ARMED: forcing real grep error at $site"  <<<"$out"&&
+    grep -q "WAKE-ASSERT ABORT"  <<<"$out"&&
+    grep -q "$site"  <<<"$out"&&
+    grep -q "grep exit 2"  <<<"$out"&&
    grep -q "^${helper} ${site}\$" "$ledger"; then
    check "$name" 0 ""
  else
@@ -230,8 +230,8 @@ if [ "$got" = "1" ]; then check C8 0 ""; else check C8 1 "env-prefix did not rea
 out="$(WAKE_ASSERT_FORCE_GREP_ERROR_AT="mini-a.sh:9999" bash "$TMP/mini-a.sh" "$TMP" 2>&1)"
 rc=$?
 if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] &&
-  printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'mini-a: OK' &&
-  ! printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'WAKE-ASSERT ARMED'; then
+  grep -q 'mini-a: OK'  <<<"$out"&&
+  ! grep -q 'WAKE-ASSERT ARMED' <<<"$out"; then
  check C9 0 ""
 else
  check C9 1 "rc=$rc out=$(printf '%s' "$out" | tail -n 3 | tr '\n' ' ')"
@@ -248,8 +248,8 @@ chmod +x "$TMP/fake-bash"
 out="$(WAKE_ASSERT_PIN_BASH="$TMP/fake-bash" bash -c '. "$WAKE_COMMON" && wake_assert_init && echo REACHED-PAST-INIT' 2>&1)"
 rc=$?
 if [ "$rc" -ne 0 ] &&
-  ! printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'REACHED-PAST-INIT' &&
-  printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'WAKE-ASSERT INIT ABORT: BASH_LINENO convention violated'; then
+  ! grep -q 'REACHED-PAST-INIT'  <<<"$out"&&
+  grep -q 'WAKE-ASSERT INIT ABORT: BASH_LINENO convention violated' <<<"$out"; then
  check C10 0 ""
 else
  check C10 1 "rc=$rc out=$(printf '%s' "$out" | tail -n 2 | tr '\n' ' ')"
@@ -283,8 +283,8 @@ out="$(WAKE_ASSERT_LEDGER="$LEDGER" bash "$TMP/mini-c.sh" "$TMP" 2>&1)"
 rc=$?
 summary_ln="$(site_line "$TMP/mini-c.sh" c-summary)"
 if [ "$rc" -eq 1 ] &&
-  printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'wake mini-c harness: FAILED (1 assertion(s))' &&
-  ! printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'all invariants passed' &&
+  grep -q 'wake mini-c harness: FAILED (1 assertion(s))'  <<<"$out"&&
+  ! grep -q 'all invariants passed'  <<<"$out"&&
  grep -q "^count_lines mini-c.sh:${summary_ln}\$" "$LEDGER"; then
  check C11 0 ""
 else
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ if cmp -s "$TMP/expected.txt" "$TMP/static.txt"; then
  echo "STATIC-INVENTORY equals expected set ($(grep -c . "$TMP/static.txt") rows from source text)"
 else
  flag "static inventory (source text) differs from expected set (artifact):"
-  diff "$TMP/expected.txt" "$TMP/static.txt" | head -n 20 | sed 's/^/  /'
+  diff "$TMP/expected.txt" "$TMP/static.txt" | sed -n '1,20p' | sed 's/^/  /'
 fi

 # --- 3: green instrumented run ----------------------------------------------
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ LEDGER="$TMP/ledger"
 for s in "${SUITES[@]}"; do
  out="$(WAKE_ASSERT_LEDGER="$LEDGER" bash "$WAKE/$s" 2>&1)"
  rc=$?
-  if printf '%s\n' "$out" | grep -Eq "$(sentinel_for "$s")"; then
+  if grep -Eq "$(sentinel_for "$s")" <<<"$out"; then
    sent="present"
  else
    sent="ABSENT"
@@ -177,14 +177,14 @@ while read -r helper site form; do
  rc=$?
  bad=""
  [ "$rc" -ne 0 ] || bad="$bad exit=0"
-  printf '%s\n' "$out" | grep -q "WAKE-ASSERT ARMED: forcing real grep error at $site" ||
+  grep -q "WAKE-ASSERT ARMED: forcing real grep error at $site"  <<<"$out"||
    bad="$bad no-ARMED-line"
-  printf '%s\n' "$out" | grep -q "WAKE-ASSERT ABORT: ${helper} at ${site}: grep exit" ||
+  grep -q "WAKE-ASSERT ABORT: ${helper} at ${site}: grep exit"  <<<"$out"||
    bad="$bad no-ABORT-line"
  # AND-polarity check (a match is the defect): a grep error (rc>=2) must be
  # its own loud arm — it cannot fall through as "no sentinel = pass".
  rc_sent=0
-  printf '%s\n' "$out" | grep -Eq "$(sentinel_for "$f")" || rc_sent=$?
+  grep -Eq "$(sentinel_for "$f")"  <<<"$out"|| rc_sent=$?
  case "$rc_sent" in
  0) bad="$bad sentinel-emitted" ;;
  1) : ;;