credentials: a credential store per agent, its own git identity, pushes to a remote (row 199, #1697)
Squash of Megavolt's 627979a17..86963d281 on origin/megavolt/row199-on-190 (base00d4cc1f6, row 190's landing), the 37 manifest paths, build.patch 05383075, manifest 35f900fd (Duckworth approve round 1, comment 29779, rev 2540). Mutant batches 1 and 2 in agents/megavolt/work/queue-199/BUILD.md: batch 2 26 of 28 killed, M17 and M27 equivalent. docs/TOOLS.md is a 3-way merge with row 200 (9e1085816): row 199's hunk applies unchanged (patch-id d88379111e2e) and no test reads the file. Gate on9e1085816plus the patch: 15 package suites 2735 pass 0 fail, 10 scripts/test-*.sh suites 429 pass 0 fail (plus 156 node tests in the queue suite). Refactor moved to76134dfdesince, a brief touching no manifest path. No live change: the stack runs from copy4429a104funtil the 10-24 re-pin window.
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# Row 199 (#1697): per-agent credential store, each agent's own git identity, publish to its fork
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Builder: Megavolt. Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md`. Design: `DESIGN.md` r6 at
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4d3007ec9, approved by Duckworth in duckworth-0027 (REVIEW-r6.md at 640011518). Authority model ruled
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by Mos in mos-1027. Branch: megavolt/row199. Reviewer: Duckworth.
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Status: candidate on megavolt/row199-on-190, rebased on origin/refactor 00d4cc1f6 (sage-1555). The
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full gate and the section 11 mutants ran in Sage's slot; results under "Runs".
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## Commits so far
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- 286bf598c business: agent identity, the publish grant, the project upstream with the D9c parse, store
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credential references; git.push.remote as a hard wait.
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- a2c387dba bus: broker publish authority (checkPublish, recordPublish, publishRefused, pushCommit on
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the raise); the D9c parse moves to `business/src/vocabulary.mjs`; pm.md and chief-of-staff.md list
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git.push.remote among the hard waits.
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- 609dc9364 bus: the per-agent credential store in `credentials.mjs`.
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- 504336797 bus: runtime wiring, the store root and the four publish entries in the op table.
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- a18fc6cf8 tasks: request calls use `useFor` keyed from the session; the start probe keeps `use`. The
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D5 test in `credential-store.test.mjs` pins the `use(` call sites to `credentials.mjs` (useFor's own
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call) and `tasks/src/adapter.mjs` (the host's @sync and start probe).
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- aa740cc71 bus: the lifecycle verbs `credentials.issue`, `credentials.revoke` and `credentials.delete`
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in `credential-verbs.mjs`, the broker branch, the runtime wiring; `organizationWriter` gets a
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`detail` on `write` and a receipt-only `record`.
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- 0cdace415 cli: `mosaic credentials status|issue|rotate|revoke|delete`, the scripts/mosaic route, docs.
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## Deviations from DESIGN.md r6
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1. **Identity is optional on an agent.** D8 reads as identity on every agent. Today's business files
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carry none, so identity stays optional and `publish` requires it (N10's load refusal). An agent
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without identity commits as E7 (T6).
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2. **Revoke of a `{file}` or `{env}` reference.** Section 6 describes revoke for store references.
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For a reference outside the store, revoke forgets the token in memory and never unlinks the file;
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the lifecycle verb then turns the business file's reference into `store`, so a restart finds
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nothing. The test: `credential-store.test.mjs`, "revoke of a {file} reference".
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3. **Issue order.** Issue writes the token file (tmp, fsync, rename, dir fsync), then runs the
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caller's commit (the business file's reference becomes `store`), then sets memory. A failed commit
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leaves the file on disk and the token out of memory, so the agent stays `not-issued` until the
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issue is run again. The test: "a failed commit leaves the token on disk but not in memory".
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4. **The D9c parse lives in `business/src/vocabulary.mjs`, not `business.mjs`.** The broker reads
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`forkProblem` and `forkUrl`, and `project-runtime.test.mjs` pins the broker's import closure to
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files that import nothing. `business.mjs` wraps `parseGiteaUrl` with the loader's refusal
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messages. The pin test names the two new imports.
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5. **`withGitea` takes the publish ticket, not a cap (D9b).** The key is the session checkPublish
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checked with `#agent` (a run holding its claim; never a tester, reader or human), read through
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`broker.publishSession(ticket)`. The token is usable only between checkPublish and recordPublish
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or publishRefused. Its refusals are filed once, by publishRefused on the task's trail, and not
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also by `refusing()`. The test: `publish.test.mjs`, "runtime: withGitea keys from the open ticket
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only".
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6. **Role contracts.** `workflow-roles.test.mjs` requires the hard waits listed in `roles/pm.md` and
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`roles/chief-of-staff.md` to equal GATED_ONLY. Adding git.push.remote to the vocabulary made it
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fail, so both lists now name git.push.remote. Prose only; no hash pin reads either file. Duckworth
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should review this hunk because `roles/` is reviewed authority.
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7. **Delete takes a reason.** Section 6 lists `delete AGENT` with no reason. The broker requires
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`reason` on delete as on revoke, so every receipt that ends a credential says why.
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8. **Rotate is `credentials.issue`.** There are three bus verbs, not four. An issue over an entry the
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bus holds is recorded as `rotate` in the receipt and the answer. The CLI's `rotate` reads the
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status first and refuses before reading stdin when nothing is issued.
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9. **Issue covers entries the bus loaded.** The business file must already name the kind for the
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agent, and the bus must have loaded that reference at start; otherwise `credential-unknown`. An
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agent added after the bus started needs the restart row 165 already asks for. Row 194's human
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`create` is where a new agent's `store` references come from.
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10. **No Console page yet.** Section 6 puts the verbs in the Console's agent page too. This branch has
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the bus verbs and the CLI. The Console page is a separate piece (packages/webui, its `BUS_VERBS`
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and `STATUS` pins); I raise the split with Sage before the manifest. Ruled in sage-1421: the
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Console page is out of row 199 and becomes a follow-up row with Webby as reviewer. The manifest
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holds bus, business, tasks, cli and seat.
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11. **The push runs in the bus child, and the git socket polls for it (D9b).** The git socket runs in
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the host process. The broker, the runtime and the token are in the bus child that
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`packages/cli/src/host.mjs` forks, and host ops cross that IPC one at a time with a 10 s answer
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limit. ls-remote and the push can run longer than that, so `withGitea(ticket, fn)` can't wrap a
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host-side git. The split: the socket runs D9 steps 3 and 4 (tip and identity under the lock,
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`working.publish`), then op `publishPush`, which starts `publishRemote` in the bus child under
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`withGitea` and answers `{state: 'running'}`. The socket polls op `publishResult` every 200 ms
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until it reads `pushed` or `refused`. Fork, user, source and destination come from the ticket
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(`broker.publishTarget`), never from the host's message. `recordPublish` also refuses `ref-moved`
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when the pushed ref isn't the ticket's destination. A second `publishPush` on a running ticket
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refuses `publish-busy`. The token reaches git on fd 3 only (`runGit` option `pass`), read once
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by a one-shot credential helper that answers `get` for https on the fork's exact host and port.
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On close, a running publish's git isn't awaited; git's own time limit ends it, and the ticket
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goes with the process. The 10 s IPC limit stays as it is (sage-1440). The poll has a bound
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(sage-1440): `publishDeadlineMs`, by default four times git's limit and grace (publishRemote runs
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at most four git commands) plus 30 s. Past it the socket refuses `publish-timeout`, filed once by
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publishRefused, and logs that the bus process's push may still reach the fork. A failure that is not a refusal is filed as `git-failed` and logged on
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the bus's stderr by error name and code only. Tests: `seat/tests/publish.test.mjs` (11),
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`bus/tests/publish.test.mjs` (the process ops), `cli/tests/publish-socket.test.mjs` (7, end to
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end through the socket, the in-process runtime, the store and a TLS fake Gitea; one is the
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publish-timeout outcome).
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12. **No harness tool for publish.** `packages/harness/src/git-tools.mjs` has push, fetch and land
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clients. A runner tool that calls the socket's `publish` op is in packages/harness, outside the
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manifest scope sage-1421 set. Today a publish needs a socket client; the tool is a follow-up.
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13. **The bind rule's `git.push.remote` clause has no test of its own.** D11 adds it and the
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launcher has it. A role can publish only a push its own role made (`work-not-yours`), and
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`recordPush` needs `git.push.working`, which already binds the socket. No role reaches the
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clause alone, so dropping it changes no outcome today. It matters once a role can publish work
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it didn't push. Ruled in sage-1440: keep it; its mutant goes in the section 11 list as
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equivalent, with this reasoning, and Duckworth judges it.
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14. **A push between checkPublish and the git push refuses; it never lands a different commit.**
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T3 says such a push "doesn't change the commit that lands". Under the hard wait it refuses:
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`working.publish` checks the work ref's tip against the ticket's source under the lock
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(`ref-moved`, `seat/tests/publish.test.mjs`), and `recordPublish` checks `pushCommit` again
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(`decision-mismatch`, `bus/tests/publish.test.mjs` "r4 B4"). The fork gets only the ticket's
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oid either way. N9's routing-commit test still applies. Ruled in sage-1440: T3's wording in
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DESIGN.md now reads "refuses with `ref-moved` or `decision-mismatch`", and an end-to-end test
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asserts each code mid-flight in `cli/tests/publish-socket.test.mjs`: a push after checkPublish
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refuses `ref-moved` with no request to the fork; a push recorded while the bus process pushes
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refuses `decision-mismatch`, filed once, and the fork holds only the ticket's oid.
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15. **Fix: rotate on a due gitea key (gizmoduck-0050, sage-1494).** The CLI's `ISSUED` set
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(`packages/cli/src/credentials.mjs`) listed valid, expiring and expired, but the bus's `status()`
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gives a gitea key past its rotate-by date `rotation-due`. So `credentials rotate` refused the one
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case it exists for. `ISSUED` now names every state status() gives a held token. The test:
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`cli/tests/credentials.test.mjs`, "rotate goes ahead on each held state". Its mutant (the old set)
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fails that test and goes in the section 11 list.
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16. **The bus process refuses a boot config carrying `publishTls` (M26, sage-1563).** process.mjs
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used to drop `publishTls` from the boot config before `startBroker`, and no test could see the
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drop. The host's boot config (`packages/cli/src/config.mjs`) never carries it; it is the tests'
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scratch CA for an in-process runtime only. A boot that carries it now refuses
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`invalid-host-request` and the process exits 2, rather than trusting it or dropping it quietly.
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The test: `bus/tests/publish.test.mjs`, "the bus process answers the publish ops from their own
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lines". Every test file that reads process.mjs ran singly, green (see "Runs").
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17. **M17 is equivalent: `#authorityFor`'s pushCommit comparison is also made by `#publishFacts`.**
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A git.push.remote raise with no recorded push refuses `no-push` (`broker.mjs` raise,
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`pushCommit = ... ?? fail('no-push')`), so every publish decision carries a pushCommit.
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`#publishFacts` takes `source = result.pushCommit` and refuses `decision-mismatch` when it isn't
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`#latestPush(task_ref).commit`, the same two values `#authorityFor` compares. The check stays as
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defense in depth, for a decision whose context lacks pushCommit, which no code path writes today.
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Duckworth judges it, as with M27.
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## N9, for the routing commit (sage-1388)
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Today git.push.remote is a hard wait, so every publish carries a decision, and the decision's
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`pushCommit` fixes the commit. If a later commit routes git.push.remote within role, a publish has
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no decision and no `pushCommit`. `#publishFacts` then takes the commit from `#latestPush`, and the
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git socket's tip check under the lock is the only thing that holds it. That commit needs a test
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that a push between checkPublish and the git push doesn't change what lands.
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## R1, the backup set
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Checked at 504336797. Row 185's `backup_store` (`scripts/stack-release.sh:372-392`) copies only
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`<dataRoot>/bus/bus.sqlite`, plus its sums, modes, listing and stamps, into
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`<dataRoot>/backups/stack/<activation>/`. Nothing under `<configDir>` is copied, so
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`<configDir>/secrets/agents` isn't in the backup set. `rehearse` copies the live business file
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through `R_BUSINESS_JS` (`:1268-1288`). Its `swap` replaces every credential reference, a `store`
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one included, with a placeholder file in the rehearsal's own dir. The guard then refuses
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`credential-ref-live` unless every reference is such a placeholder (`:1329-1337`), so a rehearsal
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never reads a store token. A backup tool outside this repository that copies `<configDir>` would
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copy tokens. That is R1's open half, and it is Jason's to check on each VM.
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## T1 limit
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A wrong owner on a store dir or file can't be set up without root, so T1 covers modes, symlinks and
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dirs. The owner check (`st.uid !== process.getuid()`) is in `privateDir` and `#read`, and is untested.
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## Runs
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Single files, each green on its commit: bus broker, decision-close, decision-route, decisions,
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hard-waits, land, project-runtime, launch-notice, review, publish, credential-store, credentials,
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credential-status, limits, tester, plugins-verb, routes-verb, limits-runtime, instances-verb, web,
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usage-runtime, limit-checks, daily-quota-runtime, chief-of-staff, tasks, tester-writes; every
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business test file. Since: credential-verbs (2/2), credential-store (11/11, with D5), each tasks file,
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tester, credential-status, plugins-verb, routes-verb, instances-verb; business launch-settings,
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plugin-settings, instance-settings, token-limit-settings; cli credentials (3/3), cli, app,
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tester-reads, tester, other-tree, transport, instances, limits, verbs. Hash pins: none on a changed
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file (`thread-migration.test.mjs:46` pins DDL only).
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Publish, single files, each green before its commit: seat
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checkout (77), working (26), publish (11), landing (8); bus process (8), land (17), publish (12),
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credential-verbs (2); cli publish-socket (4), git-socket (24), launcher (29); harness tools (22).
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Hash pins: none on a changed file.
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sage-1440 changes (the poll bound, the mid-flight tests), single files, green before the commit: cli
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publish-socket (7), git-socket (24), launcher (29). Hash pins: none on a changed file.
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The rotation-due fix, single files: cli credentials (4), green; the old-set mutant fails it 3/1.
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Hash pins: none on a changed file.
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Slip, 2026-10-20 about 19:51Z: I ran `node --test packages/tasks/tests/*.test.mjs` in one command,
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which is a package suite, without asking Sage for the slot. It passed, 97 pass and 0 fail, in under a
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minute. Reported to Sage in megavolt-0017.
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Rebase (sage-1555): the 21 commits from megavolt/row199 sit on origin/refactor 00d4cc1f6 as the new
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branch megavolt/row199-on-190 (no force-push). `git range-diff` shows all 21 patches as `=`; the
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merge of 12c85ada1 flattened with an empty remerge-diff.
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Full gate, Sage's slot, on c6868ba41 (base 00d4cc1f6), logs started 2026-10-20T22:55:44Z: bus 476
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pass 0 fail; business 191/0; tasks 97/0; cli 522/0 (472 s); seat 163/0; scripts/test-queue.sh
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156/0; test-auth, test-conductor, test-config, test-discord, test-extension-package,
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test-foundation, test-land-work, test-release and test-task each exit 0. The test-task compose run
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left the network megavolt-row199_default with 0 containers; I removed it.
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Section 11 mutants, batch 1, on c6868ba41, 2026-10-20T23:09:03Z to 23:09:56Z, restores verified and
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packages/ clean: 22 of 28 killed; M27 survived, expected equivalent (deviation 13). Five expected
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kills survived, each a test gap: M05 (the token in the push URL), M06 (revoke unlinks before it drops
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memory), M12 (http.followRedirects=false dropped), M17 (#authorityFor's pushCommit check dropped)
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and M26 (publishTls reaches startBroker). Launchpad's stack-release single file ran alongside from
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23:09:28Z, so batch 2 reruns all 28 (sage-1563).
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Fixes, each checked by its mutant alone: 5fa7b2553 seat publish, a test reads git's argv through a
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PATH shim and finds no token and no userinfo (M05 killed); the 302 test's target shares the CA git
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trusts, so only http.followRedirects=false keeps git off it (M12 killed). 116eeec48 bus,
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credential-store: revoke's unlink fails (dir 0500) and the token is already out of memory (M06
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killed); process.mjs refuses publishTls, deviation 16 (M26 killed, its anchor is now the refusal
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line). M17 is equivalent, deviation 17. Single files after the fixes, each green: seat publish (12),
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bus credential-store (12), bus publish (12), bus process (8), and every other file that reads
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process.mjs: bus credential-status (4), limit-checks (16), land (17), tasks (9), end-launch (7); cli
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trackers-boot (1), thread-launch (11), publish-socket (7). Hash pins: none on a changed file.
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Section 11 mutants, batch 2, all 28, on 7c3cdd940 in Sage's slot (sage-1565), 2026-10-20T23:17:59Z to
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23:18:48Z, restores verified and packages/ clean: 26 killed; M17 and M27 survived, both expected
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equivalent (deviations 17 and 13). Each of the five batch 1 survivors but M17 now fails its test. Then
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pkg-bus 477 pass 0 fail, pkg-seat 164/0, pkg-cli 522/0 (461 s), ending 23:26:40Z. No other seat's run
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was active: the busy check said CLEAR before the batch started. Logs:
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/mnt/storage/scratch/megavolt-r199/batch2-20261020T231650Z/.
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@@ -0,0 +1,416 @@
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# Row 199 design: a credential store per agent, own git identity, pushes to a remote
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Megavolt, 2026-10-20. Gitea #1697, MVP T1 item 6. Brief: `docs/plans/2026-10-20_agent-credentials.md`.
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Reviewer Duckworth. Mos rules on the authority model (section 9) before any code. Base: refactor at 992650232.
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No credential value was read to write this. Evidence is code and docs only.
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r2 answers duckworth-0013 (review at 6ab9cd927 on duckworth/reviews): B1 in D3a, T1 and T5, B2 in D9 step 5
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and T3, N1 in section 6 and Q-M3, N2 in section 6, N3 in D9 step 3, N4 in D9a and T3, N5 in E5 and D9b.
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r3 records Mos's rulings (mos-1027) in section 9. The Q-M2 hard wait changes D9 step 1, D9b and T3. Q-M1
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drops O2 (D10, A3, R2).
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r4 answers duckworth-0017 (REVIEW-r3.md at 4065ed59f): B3 in T3 and D9 step 5, B4 in D9 steps 1, 3 and 5, N6
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and N7 in D9a, N8 in D9 step 1.
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r5 takes webby-0011 N1 (row 194 review, through honker-0009): the host checks at each push that the
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remote's owner is the agent's own Gitea user. r4 named one `remote` per project, which can't be a fork per
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agent (O1) once two agents publish the same project. So `projects.<p>.remote` now names the upstream
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repository, and the host builds each agent's fork URL from it (D9 step 2, D10, T3). It also fixes a conflict
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found while building: D8 made `identity` required for every agent whose definition declares `gitea`, while D9
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step 2 says today's files load unchanged. Coder declares `gitea`, so r5 makes `identity` optional and
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`publish` require it (D8).
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r6 answers duckworth-0026 (REVIEW-r5.md at 3cb6888e1), with Mos's acceptance (mos-1043). B5: the derived URL
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has one name, `fork`, and D9a's `ls-remote`, step 5's push, the helper's host match, `checkPublish`'s result
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and step 6's event all use it (D9, D9a, D9b, T3). B6: the URL parse is written down (D9c) and tested (T3).
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N10 in D8 and T3. N11 in D9a and A3. N9 is carried to BUILD.md for the routing commit.
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## 0. Terms
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- **Stack instance**: one Mosaic Stack deployment (row 190). It has one OS user, one config dir
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`~/.config/mosaic-NAME` (here `<configDir>`), one data root and one bus. Case 1 and Case 2 are two stack
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instances on two VMs (DECISIONS Q180).
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- **Agent**: a role instance in a business file (`roles.<agent>`). Today's code calls it "instance". This
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design says agent.
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- **Kind**: a credential type: `gitea`, `vikunja`, `model`.
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- **Host**: the bus process and its git socket, running as the stack instance's OS user, outside any sandbox.
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## 1. What exists (measured at 992650232)
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| Code | Fact | Where |
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|---|---|---|
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| E1 | The business file references credentials per agent: `roles.<agent>.credentials.<kind> = {file or env, rotateBy or expires}`. The kinds an agent may hold are the ones its role definition lists | `business/src/business.mjs:89-111`, `credentials.mjs:18-38`, `role.mjs:105-118` |
|
||||
| E2 | The bus reads each token once at start (O_NOFOLLOW, own uid, 0600, at most 16 KiB, outside the repos and data root) into a private map keyed `<business>/<agent>:<kind>` | `bus/src/credentials.mjs:18-89`, `bus/src/runtime.mjs:78-89` |
|
||||
| E3 | Only Vikunja uses a token: `credentials.use("<business>/<agent>", "vikunja", ...)`. Gitea tokens are loaded and never used. `assertClean` refuses any event that contains a token | `tasks/src/adapter.mjs:70`, `runtime.mjs:134`, `broker.mjs:560` |
|
||||
| E4 | Agents run in bwrap as the bus's own uid. `~/.config`, `~/.mosaic` and `~/.ssh` are not bound. The git socket is bound only for `git.push.working`, `review.verdict` or a landing | `seat/src/sandbox.mjs:21-30, 104-124`, `cli/src/launcher.mjs:401` |
|
||||
| E5 | A session proves who it is with a 64-hex cap the broker mints and maps to a frozen session record. The git socket resolves the cap to (business, role) before anything else | `broker.mjs:280, 379-383`, `packages/cli/src/git-socket.mjs:398-407` |
|
||||
| E6 | The model credential is one env file per host (`EnvironmentFile=-%h/.config/mosaic-dev/secrets/claude-session.env`). `ENV_ALLOW` passes it into every sandbox, so every agent holds the same model token | `cli/systemd/mosaic-bus.service.in:24`, `seat/src/session.mjs:83-94` |
|
||||
| E7 | Commits in a session's clone use `<agent>@<business>.mosaic.invalid`. Landed squashes use "Mosaic bus host" | `sandbox.mjs:151-157`, `working.mjs:280-281` |
|
||||
| E8 | No code pushes to a remote. The git socket pushes bundles into a local bare working repo with no remote and no credential | `working.mjs:1-14, 198-238` |
|
||||
| E9 | Adding or changing an agent refuses a definition that declares credentials (`organization-credentials-out-of-scope`). Binding them is a hand edit. Row 194's design keeps that refusal for create and hire "until the credentials row" | `business/src/instance-settings.mjs:20-29`, row 194 DESIGN.md D1 |
|
||||
| E10 | The development repository's helper pushes as one identity from one JSON file | `scripts/git-credential-mosaic.mjs` |
|
||||
|
||||
So per-agent references and a host-only reader already exist for two kinds. What's missing: a fixed place for
|
||||
the files, an agent identity, any remote push, lifecycle verbs, and a model credential that agents don't
|
||||
share.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. The store (brief item 1)
|
||||
|
||||
D1. **Layout.** Each stack instance keeps its agents' secrets under its own config dir:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
<configDir>/secrets/agents/ 0700, owner = the stack instance's OS user
|
||||
<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/ 0700
|
||||
<configDir>/secrets/agents/<business>/<agent>/<kind> 0600, the token only, one line
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
This is row 190's secrets root (`<configDir>/secrets/...`, as Q175's slot uses). The token file keeps E2's
|
||||
format, so the bus reader doesn't change. Nothing in a token file is a name, an email or a URL. Those are not
|
||||
secret and go in the business file (D6), where review sees them.
|
||||
|
||||
D2. **The business file reference.** A new reference form, `{"store": true, "rotateBy" | "expires": DATE}`,
|
||||
means "the file at the layout path for this business, agent and kind". The path is derived, never written,
|
||||
so an agent's entry can't name another agent's file. The old `{file}` and `{env}` forms stay valid for
|
||||
migration (section 7). A `{file}` reference that points inside `<configDir>/secrets/agents/` but not at its
|
||||
own agent's path refuses `credential-not-yours` when the business file loads.
|
||||
|
||||
D3. **Read path.** Unchanged in shape: the bus reads every entry once at start (E2) and on a store change
|
||||
(section 6), and holds the values in memory. No sandbox binds `<configDir>` (E4 already holds). No token goes
|
||||
into a sandbox for `gitea` or `vikunja`. The agent asks the bus to act, and the bus uses the token.
|
||||
|
||||
D3a. **A `store` reference with no file.** ENOENT on a `store` path loads as an absent entry. `status` shows
|
||||
`not-issued`, and `useFor` refuses `credential-unavailable`. The bus still starts. This is the state after a
|
||||
create without `issue` (D13) and after `revoke` (section 6). Every other defect still refuses start: wrong
|
||||
owner or mode on the file or a dir, a symlink, a non-regular file, bad format, a missing or wrong-mode
|
||||
`secrets/agents/` dir. `{file}` and `{env}` keep E2's behavior, where a missing file refuses start.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. The "RLS equivalent" (brief item 1)
|
||||
|
||||
Three layers. Each one is enforced by code or the OS, not by prose.
|
||||
|
||||
D4. **OS, between stack instances.** Files are 0600 and dirs 0700, owned by the stack instance's own OS user.
|
||||
Case 1's user can't read Case 2's store (Q180: each instance under its own user without sudo). The bus refuses
|
||||
to start when any file or dir under `secrets/agents/` has the wrong owner or mode (`credential-file`, as E2
|
||||
does for files today, extended to the dirs).
|
||||
|
||||
D5. **Bus, between agents of one stack instance.** The principal for every credential use comes only from the
|
||||
verified cap (E5). The agent-facing API is `credentials.useFor(session, kind, op)`: `session` is the broker's
|
||||
frozen record, and the key is built from `session.business` and `session.role`. It has no agent argument, so
|
||||
there is nothing in a request to point at another agent. The existing `use(name, kind, op)` stays for the
|
||||
host's own `@sync` entry and is not reachable from a request. The tasks adapter's per-role calls (`ctx.as`,
|
||||
`verbs.mjs:126`) move to `useFor`. Any request field that names an agent other than the caller (`as`,
|
||||
`agent`, `instance`, `role` on a credential path) is refused `credential-not-yours` and recorded through
|
||||
`broker.refuse()` as `action.refused`, with the caller's cap and the task ref. A build test greps every
|
||||
`credentials.use(` call site and fails on a new one outside the allowlist.
|
||||
|
||||
D6. **What stays open.** A process of the same OS user outside the sandbox can read every agent's file. That
|
||||
is the same limit as the human proof (P19 333). Q180's per-user VMs move the boundary to "one stack instance
|
||||
per OS user". Agents of one instance are kept apart by the sandbox and D5, not by the OS.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Kinds (brief item 2)
|
||||
|
||||
| Kind | 10-27 | Use |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `gitea` | yes | Git push to a granted remote (section 5). Gitea API verbs (issues, pull requests) wait. The factory's review flow runs in the working repo today, and no 10-27 case needs an agent to open a pull request |
|
||||
| `vikunja` | yes, exists | Moves to `store` references and `useFor`. No behavior change |
|
||||
| `model` | per stack instance only | See D7 |
|
||||
|
||||
D7. **Model provider.** A model token has to sit inside the sandbox today, because the harness calls the
|
||||
provider itself (E6). Per-agent model tokens need a proxy that holds the real token and gives each run its own
|
||||
short-lived one, which is the CLIProxyAPI line in TARGET.md. That waits for its own row. For 10-27 the model
|
||||
credential is per stack instance: row 190's `<configDir>/secrets/claude-session.env`, owned by that
|
||||
instance's OS user. It is never a copy of jwoltje's file. Jason signs in on each VM user himself (A6). Whether
|
||||
Case 1 and Case 2 run on Jason's existing subscription or need a new account is Jason's call (Q-J1). This row
|
||||
doesn't pick. A pi model credential also waits for P19 #383.
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Git identity and push (brief item 3)
|
||||
|
||||
D8. **Identity.** A new business-file key, `roles.<agent>.identity = {name, email, gitea: {url, user}}`. It is
|
||||
optional, because today's business files with a `gitea` agent (coder) must load unchanged. `publish` (D9
|
||||
step 2) requires it, and requires that the definition declare `gitea`. A business file with a `publish`
|
||||
grant on an agent that lacks either refuses at load, and the error names `roles.<agent>.publish` and says
|
||||
"needs identity and a gitea definition" (N10). Load is the only place this is checked: a business file that
|
||||
fails it never reaches the bus. The sandbox sets `GIT_AUTHOR_*` and `GIT_COMMITTER_*` from
|
||||
it in place of E7's invalid domain. The email is the one Jason gives the agent's Gitea user, so Gitea links the
|
||||
commits to that user. Agents without `gitea` keep E7.
|
||||
|
||||
D9. **Push to a remote: a new git socket op, `publish`.** No new socket, no bundle, and no token in the sandbox.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
publish {"cap", "op": "publish", "task_ref", "project", "branch", "decision"}
|
||||
-> {"ok": true, "result": {"fork", "ref", "commit", "previous"}} or a refusal
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The host checks, in order, and each refusal goes through `broker.refuse()`:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Identity from the cap (E5), then the broker's `#checkAuthority(s, "git.push.remote", {decision, target:
|
||||
task_ref})`, as `checkLand` does for a merge (`broker.mjs:907-913`). `git.push.remote` is a new action in
|
||||
ACTIONS and is not in ROUTED (REQ-WAIT-3, `packages/business/src/vocabulary.mjs:52-58`,
|
||||
`broker.mjs:42-69`), so it is a hard wait and classifies `gated` for every role. Every publish therefore
|
||||
needs a decision the human resolved for this task ref. A decision is spent once (`decision-consumed`).
|
||||
|
||||
**The decision binds one commit.** `#authorityFor` binds action, role, thread and target only
|
||||
(`broker.mjs:769-798`), so the commit needs its own carrier. The raise records it the same way it records
|
||||
`holderRun` for `role.revoke` (`broker.mjs:1733`). When the action is `git.push.remote`, the
|
||||
`decision.raise` event body gets `pushCommit`. That is the commit of `#latestPush(business, target)` at
|
||||
raise time, read by the broker and never taken from the agent. A raise with no recorded push for the task
|
||||
refuses `no-push`. The decision's question shown to the human ends with that commit. `#authorityFor` then
|
||||
refuses `decision-mismatch` when `context.pushCommit` differs from the commit of `#latestPush` now, which
|
||||
is the same check `holderRun` gets at `broker.mjs:796`. So the sequence approve at A, push B, publish B
|
||||
refuses.
|
||||
No role definition grants the action yet. When Jason's PRD version routes it (Sage, Vikunja #420), a
|
||||
reviewed commit adds it to both ROUTED lists and to coder's `withinRole`. From then on a coder publishes
|
||||
without a decision, and `decision` is optional for a within-role class only.
|
||||
2. The project is in the agent's grant, `roles.<agent>.publish: [project]`, and the business file names the
|
||||
project's upstream repository, `projects.<project>.remote: "https://HOST/OWNER/REPO"`
|
||||
(`remote-not-granted`). Both URLs pass D9c's parse at load. The upstream's host and port equal
|
||||
`identity.gitea.url`'s (`remote-host-mismatch`). The host never contacts that URL. It builds the agent's
|
||||
fork, `fork = https://HOST[:PORT]/<gitea.user>/REPO`, from the upstream's origin and repository name and
|
||||
the agent's own `gitea.user`. `fork` is the only URL the rest of `publish` uses: D9a's `ls-remote`, step
|
||||
5's push, the helper's host match, `checkPublish`'s result and step 6's event. So the owner of the
|
||||
repository that receives a push is the agent's own Gitea user on every push, by construction, and the
|
||||
agent can't name it (webby-0011 N1). D9c is what makes "by construction" hold. Gitea's refusal of a
|
||||
push to a repository the user doesn't own or collaborate on is the second layer. An upstream whose owner
|
||||
equals the agent's `gitea.user`, compared without case, refuses `remote-not-fork`, at load and at push. `remote` is a new key
|
||||
beside `root` and `repo` (`business.mjs:186`), and `identity` and `publish` are new keys on a role entry
|
||||
(`business.mjs:89`). All three are optional, so today's business files load unchanged.
|
||||
3. The source is one commit, `C = context.pushCommit`. It is checked three ways, so all three are equal:
|
||||
the decision's commit, the commit of `#latestPush`, and the work ref's tip in the working repo,
|
||||
`work/vikunja-<project>-<task>` (`working.mjs:110-114`). The tip is read under the repository's lock, and
|
||||
if they differ the push refuses `ref-moved`. The work ref is per task, not per agent. Two checks make it the
|
||||
caller's: `#latestPush` was recorded by the caller's role (`work-not-yours`), and step 4. The destination is always `refs/heads/<gitea.user>/<branch>`, built by the host.
|
||||
`validBranch(branch)` holds (`invalid-request`). The agent never names the destination ref.
|
||||
4. Every commit in `main..<work ref>` has author and committer email equal to `identity.email`
|
||||
(`identity-mismatch`).
|
||||
5. The push runs through `credentials.useFor(session, "gitea", ...)`: `git push <fork> <C>:<dst>`, by oid,
|
||||
with no `+` and no `--force`. It never pushes by ref name, so a push to the working repo after
|
||||
`checkPublish` can't change what goes out (`non-fast-forward` from git stays a refusal). Git runs with E8's SAFE flags
|
||||
(`working.mjs:92-98`), which set `protocol.allow=never`. `publish` adds exactly two flags,
|
||||
`protocol.https.allow=always` and `http.followRedirects=false`, plus `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0` and no global
|
||||
or system config. The token reaches git through a one-shot credential helper that reads it from an
|
||||
inherited pipe, never through argv, env, the URL or a file. Seat `gitEnv` (`checkout.mjs:79-89`) takes only
|
||||
PATH from the host and sets the rest itself, so no proxy or `GIT_SSL_*` variable reaches git. `publish` takes a `tls` parameter that
|
||||
defaults to `[]`, the same way `push` takes `fsck = FSCK` (`working.mjs:100`). Tests pass
|
||||
`["-c", "http.sslCAInfo=<scratch CA>"]`. The host never sets it, and nothing in config or env reaches it. The helper answers `get` only when `protocol`
|
||||
is `https` and `host`, port included, equals `fork`'s. It writes nothing for any other `get` and for
|
||||
`store` and `erase`. `assertClean` checks git's output, so a fork that echoes the token gets
|
||||
`credential-leak`.
|
||||
6. The bus records `action.allowed` for `git.push.remote` with fork, ref and commit.
|
||||
|
||||
D9a. **The agent's fork must share root's history.** A push sends every object the fork lacks. The working
|
||||
repo's `main` is the project root's history (`working.mjs`, seed), so a fork that doesn't share it would
|
||||
receive all of root, landing squashes included. The check runs on `fork`, never on the upstream: a related
|
||||
upstream says nothing about what the agent's `<user>/REPO` holds.
|
||||
`publish` runs `seed` first (`working.mjs:164-176`), under the repository's lock as `push` does, so `main`
|
||||
catches up with root before the check below. That means a fork also receives any landed root commits that
|
||||
upstream doesn't have yet, because they sit under the agent's work. That is expected: the agent's branch is
|
||||
built on them.
|
||||
Before the push, the host runs `git ls-remote --symref <fork> HEAD` (same flags and helper). It refuses
|
||||
`remote-unrelated` when the fork is empty or when that tip isn't a commit the working repo already has and an
|
||||
ancestor of `main`. When `ls-remote` exits non-zero, for a fork that doesn't exist, a refused token or a
|
||||
network failure, `publish` refuses `fork-unavailable` and the push doesn't run (N11). Git's stderr isn't
|
||||
parsed to tell those apart and isn't returned, since it can carry the URL. Only `ls-remote` crosses the
|
||||
network for this, so nothing is fetched from the fork. If the fork has moved past root, the refusal stands
|
||||
until root catches up. That is a human pull into root, not an agent's.
|
||||
|
||||
D9c. **The URL parse (B6).** `projects.<p>.remote` and `identity.gitea.url` are parsed with `new URL()` at load,
|
||||
and the business file refuses to load unless all of these hold:
|
||||
|
||||
- The scheme is `https:`. There is no username, password, query or fragment.
|
||||
- The string equals its own normalized form: for the upstream, `url.origin + url.pathname`; for
|
||||
`gitea.url`, `url.origin + "/"` or `url.origin`. So a dot segment (`/<user>/../OWNER/REPO`), a
|
||||
percent-encoded dot, an upper-case host, an explicit `:443`, a backslash, userinfo, a query and a fragment
|
||||
each refuse, because `new URL()` would change them (checked with node: each differs from its normalized
|
||||
form). A trailing slash survives normalization and is refused by the two-segment rule below. The checks below run on that path, so the owner that is checked is
|
||||
the owner that is used.
|
||||
- The upstream's path is exactly `/OWNER/REPO`: two non-empty segments, no more and no fewer. One trailing `.git` on
|
||||
REPO is allowed and stripped. `fork` is built from the stripped REPO.
|
||||
- `OWNER`, `REPO` and `gitea.user` each match Gitea's name rule, `^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,100}$` and not `.` or
|
||||
`..`. REPO after stripping must still match.
|
||||
- `gitea.url`'s path is `/`. A Gitea served under a sub-path isn't supported by this row and refuses at load.
|
||||
- Host and port are compared after `new URL()` normalized them, and an omitted port counts as 443 on both
|
||||
sides.
|
||||
- Gitea compares user and repository names without case (`lower_name`), so `remote-not-fork` compares the
|
||||
upstream's OWNER with `gitea.user` without case. An upstream owned by `Coder` and a `gitea.user` of `coder`
|
||||
would otherwise build a "fork" that is the upstream itself.
|
||||
|
||||
D9b. **How `publish` reaches the broker and the store.** The git socket runs in the bus process
|
||||
(`cli.mjs:504-506`) and reaches the broker only through the host's op table (`bus/src/runtime.mjs:222-246`).
|
||||
`publish` adds three entries there, each wrapped in `refusing()`:
|
||||
|
||||
- `checkPublish(cap, args)`: steps 1 to 3, including the decision check. It returns `{ticket, fork, user,
|
||||
email, source}` and no token. The ticket holds the session and the decision until `recordPublish`, the
|
||||
same way `checkLand` holds a landing.
|
||||
- `withGitea(cap, fn)`: `credentials.useFor(broker.session(cap), "gitea", fn)`. `fn` gets the token and runs
|
||||
step 5. The token never leaves that call.
|
||||
- `recordPublish(ticket, result)`: step 6, and it spends the decision.
|
||||
|
||||
The op table gets no entry that returns a token.
|
||||
|
||||
D10. **Which refs.** Our side: only `refs/heads/<gitea.user>/*`, set by the host (D9 step 3). The default
|
||||
branch and other agents' prefixes can't be named. Gitea side, two options (Q-M1):
|
||||
|
||||
- **O1. A fork per agent. Ruled by Mos (mos-1027).** The agent's Gitea user has read on the upstream repo and owns a fork
|
||||
named like it. The host derives the fork's URL from the upstream and the agent's user (D9 step 2).
|
||||
Its token can write only repos the user owns or collaborates on, so Gitea itself stops any push to upstream
|
||||
or to another agent's fork. No branch rules are needed per agent, so none can drift. The cost: work reaches
|
||||
upstream as a pull request from the fork, opened by a human or a later API verb.
|
||||
- **O2. One shared repo. Not chosen.** The agent is a Write collaborator. Upstream's default and release branches get
|
||||
branch protection with no agent on the push list, plus a rule `<user>/*` per agent. Gitea doesn't stop agent
|
||||
A from creating an unprotected name outside `A/*` unless a catch-all rule outranks the per-agent ones. That
|
||||
depends on Gitea's rule priority, which I haven't verified on our version (probe P1). Every hire adds a rule.
|
||||
|
||||
Token scopes for either: `write:repository` and `read:user`, nothing else, per vocabulary.mjs rules (no
|
||||
`all`, no admin).
|
||||
|
||||
D11. **The host git socket.** `publish` is added to the socket. `push`, `fetch` and `land` don't change. The
|
||||
socket's bind rule (E4) adds `git.push.remote`. The working repo stays credential-free and remote-free. The
|
||||
`fork` URL is passed per call and never written into its config. A landing still squashes into the project
|
||||
root as "Mosaic bus host". Landings don't push anywhere.
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Lifecycle (brief item 4)
|
||||
|
||||
All verbs are on the bus, in the CLI (`mosaic credentials ...`) and in the Console's agent page. Every verb is
|
||||
human-only. Under Q173 the tester may run `status` and `revoke` on the dev stack instance. `issue` and
|
||||
`rotate` stay with Jason, because the tester is an agent and the token would pass through its session
|
||||
(duckworth N1). Each one appends to the organization
|
||||
writer's `changes.jsonl` (actor, agent, kind, verb, date; never a value). No schema migration, no new event
|
||||
kind. A refusal uses `action.refused`.
|
||||
|
||||
| Verb | What it does |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `issue AGENT KIND --rotate-by DATE` (gitea) or `--expires DATE` (vikunja) | Reads the token on stdin (never argv), checks E2's format, writes `<kind>.tmp` 0600, fsyncs, renames over `<kind>`, and sets the business file reference to `{"store": true, date}`. The bus reloads that one entry, with no restart |
|
||||
| `rotate` | Same as `issue` over an existing entry. The old value is gone from disk and memory when the call returns. Jason then deletes the old token in Gitea (A5) |
|
||||
| `revoke AGENT [KIND] --reason` | Drops the entry from the bus's memory first, then unlinks the file. A use in flight finishes. Every later use refuses `credential-unavailable` |
|
||||
| `delete AGENT` | `revoke` for every kind, then removes the agent's dir. Refused while the agent has a running claim |
|
||||
| `status [AGENT]` | Kind, date and state per entry (E3's `status()`), no values |
|
||||
|
||||
D12. **"Stops working at once."** On our side this holds without a timing window. A fired agent never holds a
|
||||
`gitea` or `vikunja` token (D3), so revoking means the bus no longer has it. On the Gitea and Vikunja side the
|
||||
token still exists until Jason deletes it (A5). The status line for a revoked entry says so until Jason
|
||||
confirms. The model token is the exception: it sits in the running sandbox (D7), so a fired agent's runs must
|
||||
end. Row 194's fire ends them.
|
||||
|
||||
D13. **What row 194 calls.**
|
||||
|
||||
- `credentials.issue` is never called by the chief. Row 194's hire stays uncredentialed (its D1).
|
||||
- A human `create` of a credentialed definition: row 194 lifts E9's refusal for the human path only. The agent
|
||||
is created with `store` references and no files. `launch` refuses `credential-unavailable` until Jason runs
|
||||
`issue`.
|
||||
- `fire` and `delete`: row 194 calls `credentials.revoke(business, agent, {reason, actor})` before it changes
|
||||
the business file. A failed revoke stops the fire (`credential-revoke-failed`), so an agent can't be fired
|
||||
with its credentials still live on our side.
|
||||
- `regenerate`: no credential change.
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Who does what (brief item 5)
|
||||
|
||||
Agents never mint accounts or tokens. Jason's steps, per agent that needs `gitea`:
|
||||
|
||||
- A1. Create the Gitea user: Site Administration, User Accounts, Create User Account. The name is the agent's
|
||||
`gitea.user`. The email is the agent's `identity.email`.
|
||||
- A2. Create its token: sign in as that user, Settings, Applications, Generate New Token, scopes
|
||||
`write:repository` and `read:user`, nothing else.
|
||||
- A3. Create the fork of each granted repo as that user (O1). Gitea's push-to-create
|
||||
(`ENABLE_PUSH_CREATE_USER`, `ENABLE_PUSH_CREATE_ORG`) stays off, so a push to a missing `<user>/REPO`
|
||||
fails rather than creating a plain repository (N11). `publish` refuses `fork-unavailable` before that.
|
||||
- A4. On the stack instance's VM, as its OS user: `mosaic credentials issue AGENT gitea --rotate-by DATE`, with
|
||||
the token pasted into stdin.
|
||||
- A5. On fire or rotate: delete the token in Gitea (Settings, Applications), or disable the user.
|
||||
- A6. Model: sign in to the provider on each VM user to write `<configDir>/secrets/claude-session.env`.
|
||||
|
||||
Vikunja bot accounts and tokens are already Jason's (tracker bots). Only A4 changes for them.
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Migration (brief item 6)
|
||||
|
||||
- M1. Existing `{file}` and `{env}` references keep working. A business moves one agent at a time with
|
||||
`issue`, which rewrites that agent's reference to `store`.
|
||||
- M2. Nothing here touches the dev repository's helper, its `.git/config`, `~/.mosaic` or `~/.mosaic-dev`.
|
||||
Dev seats (jarvis, seat tokens) keep pushing as today. The mos-0981 rule ends only when Mos says so.
|
||||
- M3. The live dev stack instance needs no change at re-pin: no reference uses `store` until someone issues
|
||||
one.
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. Questions
|
||||
|
||||
Mos ruled on the authority model in mos-1027 (2026-10-20T19:27Z):
|
||||
|
||||
- Q-M1. O1, one fork per agent.
|
||||
- Q-M2. `git.push.remote` and its bounds in D9 to D11 are approved. It lands as a hard wait: out of ROUTED,
|
||||
and no role grants it within-role (D9 step 1). Sage puts its routing in the PRD version draft going to
|
||||
Jason with `role.hire` and `role.fire` (Vikunja #420). After his approval, a reviewed commit routes it and
|
||||
grants it to coder.
|
||||
- Q-M3. Issue, rotate and delete are human-only, and the chief gets none of them. Under Q173 the dev
|
||||
instance's tester gets `status` and `revoke` only.
|
||||
- Q-M4. The model credential stays per stack instance for 10-27. Per-agent model tokens wait for a proxy
|
||||
row.
|
||||
|
||||
Open for Jason. Mos takes these to him one at a time:
|
||||
|
||||
- Q-J1. The model account for Case 1 and Case 2: existing subscription or a new account.
|
||||
- Q-J2. Gitea users and tokens for the agents that need them (A1 to A3).
|
||||
|
||||
## 10. What this closes (brief item 7)
|
||||
|
||||
- G11: closes the store (D1 to D6) and lifecycle (section 6) for `gitea` and `vikunja`. Still open: per-agent
|
||||
model credentials (D7), and the same-uid limit inside one stack instance (D6).
|
||||
- G13: closes "own credentials for git" (D8 to D10). Still open: Gitea API verbs (section 4).
|
||||
- C2.5 (git remote): Case 2's books repo can use `publish` once its project names a remote.
|
||||
|
||||
## 11. Tests and mutants
|
||||
|
||||
All tests use scratch roots, fake tokens and a fake Gitea: `git http-backend` behind a node http server on
|
||||
127.0.0.1 that checks basic auth against a fake token and records each ref update. No request leaves the host.
|
||||
|
||||
- T1. Layout: wrong mode or owner on a dir or file refuses start. A `{file}` reference into another agent's
|
||||
path refuses `credential-not-yours`. A bus restart after a create without `issue` starts, and the agent's
|
||||
status is `not-issued`. A missing `{file}` still refuses start.
|
||||
- T2. `useFor` keys from the cap only. A request naming another agent is refused and leaves one
|
||||
`action.refused`.
|
||||
- T3. The fake Gitea serves https on 127.0.0.1 with a cert from a scratch CA made by the test. It reaches git
|
||||
only through the `tls` parameter (D9 step 5). Each refusal test that should reach the network asserts that
|
||||
the first port received the request, so no test passes because git refused http first. `publish`: the
|
||||
happy path lands `refs/heads/<user>/<branch>` on the agent's fork in the fake, which shares root's history, at
|
||||
exactly the decision's commit. Refusals for each step in D9, one test each, including `work-not-yours`. Until routing, a publish with
|
||||
no decision refuses, one with a decision for another task or commit refuses, and a second publish on a
|
||||
spent decision refuses `decision-consumed`. Approve while the latest push is A, push B, publish: refuses
|
||||
`decision-mismatch`, and the fork receives nothing. A push to the working repo between `checkPublish` and
|
||||
the git push refuses with `ref-moved` or `decision-mismatch` (sage-1440, BUILD.md deviation 14). A raise with no recorded push refuses `no-push`. A test pins that `git.push.remote` is in neither ROUTED list
|
||||
and that no `roles/*.json` grants it. A force-push attempt is
|
||||
refused by git's non-fast-forward. A fake fork that answers 302 to a second 127.0.0.1 port: the push
|
||||
fails, and the second port receives no request with an Authorization header. A remote on the right host
|
||||
and a different port is refused at step 2. Two agents granted one project each land on their own fork:
|
||||
agent A's push reaches `/<A's user>/REPO` only and B's reaches `/<B's user>/REPO` only, and the fake's
|
||||
upstream repository receives nothing. An upstream owned by the agent's own user refuses `remote-not-fork`,
|
||||
and so does one whose owner differs from `gitea.user` only in case. With an upstream that shares root's
|
||||
history, a first publish to an empty fork and to an unrelated fork each refuse `remote-unrelated`, and
|
||||
neither fork nor upstream receives objects. A fork that doesn't exist refuses `fork-unavailable`, and the
|
||||
fake records no push. `ls-remote` and the push each reach the fork's path only (the fake records every
|
||||
path). Load refusals (D9c), one test each: a dot segment, an extra path segment, a missing segment,
|
||||
a trailing slash, userinfo, a query, a fragment, an explicit `:443`, a name outside Gitea's rule, and a `gitea.url` with a
|
||||
sub-path. A `.git` suffix loads and builds the fork without it. A `publish` grant on an agent without
|
||||
`identity`, and on one whose definition lacks `gitea`, each refuse at load with the N10 message.
|
||||
- T4. Token handoff: the token never appears in argv, env, the fork URL, the working repo config,
|
||||
`changes.jsonl`, events or logs (scan every file under the scratch roots).
|
||||
- T5. Lifecycle: issue, rotate, revoke and delete, each live with no restart. After revoke, `publish` and the
|
||||
Vikunja path refuse `credential-unavailable`, and so they do after a bus restart that follows the revoke.
|
||||
The tester can run `status` and `revoke`, and `issue` and `rotate` refuse it.
|
||||
- T6. Default: an agent without `identity` commits as E7. Existing `{file}` references load unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
Mutants to kill: drop the cap-derived key in `useFor`, let the request name the destination ref, add `+` to
|
||||
the refspec, skip the identity check, put the token in the URL, revoke file before memory, skip the dir mode
|
||||
check, allow a `{file}` reference into another agent's dir, make ENOENT on a `store` path fatal again, make
|
||||
ENOENT on a `{file}` path silent, a helper that answers any host, drop `http.followRedirects=false`, drop the
|
||||
`work-not-yours` check, drop the `remote-unrelated` check, add `git.push.remote` to ROUTED, skip the spent
|
||||
check on the decision, drop the `pushCommit` comparison in `#authorityFor`, push by ref name in place of the
|
||||
oid, push to the upstream URL in place of the derived fork, run `ls-remote` against the upstream in place of
|
||||
the fork, take the fork's owner from anywhere but the agent's `gitea.user`, compare the owner with case, run the
|
||||
D9c checks on the raw path in place of the normalized one, read a failed `ls-remote` as empty, skip the tip
|
||||
check under the lock, and pass a CA flag in production.
|
||||
|
||||
## 12. Risks
|
||||
|
||||
- R1. Backups: if a backup tool copies `<configDir>`, it copies tokens. The build checks row 185's backup set
|
||||
and says what it includes.
|
||||
- R2. Withdrawn. O1 was ruled, so probe P1 isn't needed.
|
||||
- R3. Outbound HTTPS from the bus host to Gitea is new network reach for the host process. On the VMs this is
|
||||
Jason's network to confirm.
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user