shared replay mode refused (seed-only rule, contract 3 SS4.3/SS7 item 4); concurrency loser semantics and scope-mismatch collision added to rule 5 and witness 5; query-side correlation envelope specified; no-oracle indistinguishability probe added to witness 9; fence authorization scope pinned; SHARED-CONTRACT SS5.3 citation fixed, fleet-side ASKS reference removed.
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fred
@@ -112,10 +112,10 @@ One command, one query. Module: `apps/gateway/src/enrollment/`
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Request DTO (shared types package, class-validator at the boundary):
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| Field | Type | Rule |
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| ---------------- | ------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| ---------------- | ------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `harness` | string | syntactically invalid (empty/malformed) → `validation_failed`; well-formed but not in the harness registry → `precondition_failed` |
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| `correlationId` | string (uuid) | optional; generated when absent (contract 5 §4.3); carried into audit events and returned in the result |
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| `replayMode` | 'actor-bound' \| 'shared' | optional, default `actor-bound` (contract 3 §4.3) |
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| `replayMode` | 'actor-bound' | optional, default `actor-bound`. `shared` is seed-only (contract 3 §4.3 binds it to the §3.4 canonical seed key set and "no other operation can carry a shared declaration"; §7 item 4 closes it); a `shared` declaration here is refused `validation_failed`, executes nothing, and records no fence row |
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| `name` | string | non-empty, trimmed, ≤ 200 chars |
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| `persona` | string \| null | optional; stored as the agent's system prompt |
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| `model` | string | non-empty (provider-qualified model id) |
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@@ -149,21 +149,35 @@ Rules:
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authorization scope, a digest of the canonicalized request payload
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(the digest input EXCLUDES the credential value — it covers
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provider + credentialMode, never plaintext), the declared replay
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mode (`actor-bound` default / `shared`), and a reference to the
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committed outcome (the agent id). Fence uniqueness is the pair
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(operation identifier, key). **Replay:** a submission whose
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mode (always `actor-bound` for this family — the `shared` refusal
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in the table above means no shared fence row can exist here; the
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column is kept for envelope-shape fidelity and mode-mismatch
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collision checks), and a reference to the committed outcome (the
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agent id). The recorded **authorization scope** for this family is
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pinned to the acting principal's platform-user scope (v1
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authorization is grant-free per rule 4, so the scope is the
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authenticated-user identity domain — recorded so the §4.3
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scope-equality check has a defined value). Fence uniqueness is the
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pair (operation identifier, key). **Replay:** a submission whose
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(operation, key) is recorded is first authorized exactly as a fresh
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submission; then replay-mode, scope, and digest equality are
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checked; then **target-result authorization** — the submitter must
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hold, at replay time, read authority on the referenced agent row
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under §3.2's rule (owner or admin) — in every mode, with
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recorded-actor equality as the additional `actor-bound` condition.
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A passing replay executes nothing, returns the recorded outcome,
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and appends a replay access event (non-mutation audit class:
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accessing principal, current correlation id, fence-row reference).
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Any equality or authorization failure refuses with the single
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bounded `conflict` shape — constant, identifying no record —
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preserving the no-existence-oracle rule.
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checked (a mismatch on any — including scope — is a collision);
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then **target-result authorization** — the submitter must hold, at
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replay time, read authority on the referenced agent row under
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§3.2's rule (owner or admin) — plus recorded-actor equality
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(`actor-bound`). A passing replay executes nothing, returns the
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recorded outcome, and appends a replay access event (non-mutation
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audit class: accessing principal, current correlation id,
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fence-row reference). Any equality or authorization failure refuses
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with the single bounded `conflict` shape — constant, identifying no
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record — preserving the no-existence-oracle rule. **Concurrency
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(contract 3 §4.3's rule, ratified via §7 item 4):** two submissions
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with the same (operation, key) serialize on the fence's unique
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constraint — exactly one executes; the loser waits for the winner's
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transaction, and is then handled as a replay if it committed
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(through the full replay path above) or executes afresh if it
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aborted. A unique-violation race never surfaces as an unhandled
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internal fault.
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6. **Audit + outbox, same transaction.** Insert into `agents` +
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sealed credential write (intake mode) + fence row + semantic audit
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event (`agent.enrolled`: actor, agent id, harness, provider, name,
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@@ -184,6 +198,14 @@ By agent id; actor must be the owner (or admin). Unauthorized and
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missing fold to the same `not_found` wire shape (contract 2
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no-existence-oracle rule, applied family-wide for uniformity).
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The query carries the same non-state envelope as the mutation
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(contract 5 §4.3; contract 3's envelope reconciliation confirms closed
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query responses carry it): typed request DTO with an optional
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`correlationId` (generated when absent) and a typed result —
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`found { agent, correlationId }` | `not_found` (the folded shape,
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also carrying the correlation id). Queries take no idempotency key
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(the fence binds mutations).
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### 3.3 Error enum (closed, §4.2)
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`validation_failed` 400 · `authentication_failed` 401 ·
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@@ -227,8 +249,9 @@ including after the credential write), fence uniqueness on
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(operation, key).
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Sequencing: additive DDL via the same migration path as 0018–0020
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(hierarchy). The KBN-101 §5.3 gate binds KBN-100 kanban DDL, not this
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lane; if the pending ASKS-5 ruling changes migration mechanics
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(hierarchy). The docs/native-kanban-sot/SHARED-CONTRACT.md §5.3 DDL
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gate binds the kanban lane's audit/proposal DDL, not this lane; if a
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pending operator ruling on migration sequencing changes mechanics
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lane-wide, re-check before generating 0021.
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## 5. Witnesses the implementation slice must ship
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@@ -246,10 +269,15 @@ lane-wide, re-check before generating 0021.
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5. Idempotency (contract 3 §4.3 set): actor-bound replay returns the
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recorded outcome and executes nothing (no new agent/audit/outbox
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mutation rows; a replay access event is appended); payload-digest
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mismatch, replay-mode mismatch, and different-actor actor-bound
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replay each refuse with the single bounded `conflict` shape; a
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replay is re-authorized fresh (a submitter whose authorization was
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revoked since the original is refused, not replayed).
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mismatch, replay-mode mismatch, scope mismatch, and different-actor
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actor-bound replay each refuse with the single bounded `conflict`
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shape; a replay is re-authorized fresh (a submitter whose
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authorization was revoked since the original is refused, not
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replayed); a `shared` declaration on `agent.enroll` is refused
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`validation_failed` with nothing executed and no fence row
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recorded (seed-only rule); two concurrent same-(operation, key)
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submissions produce exactly one mutation, the loser resolving
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through the replay path (no unhandled unique-violation fault).
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6. Same-tx atomicity fault injection (agent / credential write / fence
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/ audit / outbox), including a failure injected after the intake
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credential write commits its statement — everything rolls back, no
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@@ -260,8 +288,11 @@ lane-wide, re-check before generating 0021.
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8. `is_system` injection attempt is rejected by DTO validation.
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9. Correlation-id witness (contract 5 §6.3): a correlation id submitted
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on `agent.enroll` appears in its audit event(s) and in the result;
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the §6.3 static companions (no `any`-typed boundary pass-through;
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single audit emitter) apply.
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the same holds for `agent.enrollment.get`'s result; the §6.3 static
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companions (no `any`-typed boundary pass-through; single audit
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emitter) apply. §6.3's no-existence-oracle probe: an unauthorized
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`agent.enrollment.get` of an existing agent and a get of a
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nonexistent id return indistinguishable results.
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10. CLI-parity witness (contract 5 §6.4): a CLI smoke invocation of
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`agent.enroll` and `agent.enrollment.get` against the Gateway
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succeeds with the same typed results the web client receives. The
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