fix(#1051): track canonical estate registry
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed

This commit is contained in:
2026-08-05 23:32:23 -05:00
parent a50b5a6b4d
commit e91c8c06a5
6 changed files with 429 additions and 1 deletions
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ No explicit token ceiling was supplied. Working cap: 55K tokens for implementati
- [x] RED acceptance set committed at `cf11c6c86abae073d8b02b4014cd5447ba67f12a`; author and committer read back as `be-coder-07` and branch reachability was independently verified by `tl-mosaic`. - [x] RED acceptance set committed at `cf11c6c86abae073d8b02b4014cd5447ba67f12a`; author and committer read back as `be-coder-07` and branch reachability was independently verified by `tl-mosaic`.
- [x] Moving-contract REDs observed independently for v1.4 mismatch, R8 prerequisite ordering, owner resolver seam/allowlist, tracked skeleton/no-follow behavior, runtime observation/publication, and provider owner resolution. - [x] Moving-contract REDs observed independently for v1.4 mismatch, R8 prerequisite ordering, owner resolver seam/allowlist, tracked skeleton/no-follow behavior, runtime observation/publication, and provider owner resolution.
- [x] Focused implementation includes secure migration, v1.5 write-differential/subject binding, production Git+API refusal parity, provider-backed durable owner resolution that ignores non-admin `active`, required GLPI standing-process policy, P7 provision orchestration, an internal installer command, and installed `mosaic doctor` wiring. Latest focused result: 97/97 (secure config 4, store 45, runtime 19, owner resolver 16, provision 5, provision command 3, installed doctor 5). - [x] Focused implementation includes secure migration, v1.5 write-differential/subject binding, production Git+API refusal parity, provider-backed durable owner resolution that ignores non-admin `active`, required GLPI standing-process policy, P7 provision orchestration, an internal installer command, and installed `mosaic doctor` wiring. Latest focused result: 97/97 (secure config 4, store 45, runtime 19, owner resolver 16, provision 5, provision command 3, installed doctor 5).
- [x] MC-CRED added the required canonical reverse registry seam `ParsedCredentialEstateRegistry.resolveByHost()` at dependency head `6ca8758f`; current local copies are temporary until dependency integration and the 32-line permissive shim has been removed. - [x] MC-CRED added the required canonical reverse registry seam `ParsedCredentialEstateRegistry.resolveByHost()`; the 32-line permissive shim was removed. After exact-head CI proved the cross-PR source dependency was absent, the provider-fetched canonical registry implementation, DTO dependencies, and registry tests were tracked byte-for-byte on this branch so a fresh checkout validates the real seam rather than a stub. A later rebase onto merged MC-CRED should recognize those identical files as upstream.
- [x] Identity gotcha measured: inline `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=be-coder-07` controls credential resolution but does not override `user.name`/`user.email` inherited from the linked worktree common-dir config (`coder-mos1`). The first local P7 RED commit was immediately amended before push with command-scoped `GIT_AUTHOR_*` + `GIT_COMMITTER_*`; resulting author and committer both read back as `be-coder-07`. Every subsequent authoring command must carry both identity sets and be verified. - [x] Identity gotcha measured: inline `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=be-coder-07` controls credential resolution but does not override `user.name`/`user.email` inherited from the linked worktree common-dir config (`coder-mos1`). The first local P7 RED commit was immediately amended before push with command-scoped `GIT_AUTHOR_*` + `GIT_COMMITTER_*`; resulting author and committer both read back as `be-coder-07`. Every subsequent authoring command must carry both identity sets and be verified.
- [x] R6 migration reports filename- or content-secret-shaped files without copying them; arbitrary legacy content requires an approved scanner bound to the exact source snapshot, and production currently retains/reports when no approved scanner is configured. `.gitignore` is canonical allowlisted content only: an existing noncanonical regular file fails closed and is never merged into publication. Symlinked `.gitignore`, layout directories, and nested migration destinations fail closed; a dirty checkout blocks provisioning before skeleton publication. The brain root is principal-owned mode `0700` before clone and after clone, all memory-bearing layout directories are mode `0700` even under umask `0022`, and doctor reports owner-accessible roots as hard unsafe findings. - [x] R6 migration reports filename- or content-secret-shaped files without copying them; arbitrary legacy content requires an approved scanner bound to the exact source snapshot, and production currently retains/reports when no approved scanner is configured. `.gitignore` is canonical allowlisted content only: an existing noncanonical regular file fails closed and is never merged into publication. Symlinked `.gitignore`, layout directories, and nested migration destinations fail closed; a dirty checkout blocks provisioning before skeleton publication. The brain root is principal-owned mode `0700` before clone and after clone, all memory-bearing layout directories are mode `0700` even under umask `0022`, and doctor reports owner-accessible roots as hard unsafe findings.
- [x] Provider owner lookup uses manual redirect handling, a five-second abort signal, strict JSON content type/shape, and an incrementally enforced 256 KiB response ceiling. - [x] Provider owner lookup uses manual redirect handling, a five-second abort signal, strict JSON content type/shape, and an incrementally enforced 256 KiB response ceiling.
@@ -100,6 +100,16 @@ No explicit token ceiling was supplied. Working cap: 55K tokens for implementati
- [ ] HOMELAB CI terminal green at exact head. - [ ] HOMELAB CI terminal green at exact head.
- [ ] Reviewed PR retargeted to `main` after C1 and MC-CRED; `next` remains non-merging integration only. - [ ] Reviewed PR retargeted to `main` after C1 and MC-CRED; `next` remains non-merging integration only.
## Exact-head CI dependency remediation
- Pipeline `#2222` at `a50b5a6b` ran the sole pull-request-eligible workflow (`ci`, 1/3 defined workflows) and failed `typecheck` with two `TS2307` errors before lint, format, or tests could execute.
- History establishes that the imports are intentional: commit `2451c2f` introduced both consumers, while the contemporaneous registry-seam report explicitly called the local 32-line implementation a disposable scaffold and required MC-CRED's canonical parser. This was a deliberate cross-PR dependency, not a wrong import or forgotten shim add.
- RED-first root typecheck reproduced the two missing-module errors. The fix tracks the provider-fetched MC-CRED registry, its two DTO dependencies, its unit test, and the result DTO dependency. Three DTO files remain byte-identical to `fbff4ffa`; author review found that the canonical parser accepted a trailing-slash origin which MB-BRAIN consumers concatenate into double-slash URLs, so the parser and test are intentionally hardened here pending propagation to MC-CRED.
- R7 removed the tracked registry module and root typecheck returned RED with three missing-module errors (the two production consumers plus the registry unit test); restoring the same SHA-256 returned typecheck to 45/45 tasks.
- With the suppressing typecheck failure removed, lint ran 25/25 tasks and formatting passed. Full tests actually ran: 1,607/1,614 passed; the seven failures are the four pre-registered P7 integration tests intentionally held for C1/MC-CRED integration plus the three previously disclosed ambient update-banner CLI smoke failures. No test was weakened. Build ran 25/25 tasks.
- Author review's trailing-slash finding was reproduced RED (`https://git.example.invalid/` accepted), then fixed by requiring the configured source to equal `URL.origin`; the control reran GREEN. Security review reported risk `none` with zero findings; final code re-review remains required after remediation.
- This is a second instance of the `#1068` suppression class: an early integrity failure prevented every downstream stage carrying behavioral evidence from running while the workflow's aggregate failure looked like a completed check. Workflow reordering remains `#1068` scope and is not changed here.
## Completion language ## Completion language
After reviewed merge to `main`, only: **believed-fixed, pending jarvis validation**. Issue #1051 remains open until W-jarvis validates the installed result. After reviewed merge to `main`, only: **believed-fixed, pending jarvis validation**. Issue #1051 remains open until W-jarvis validates the installed result.
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
import type {
ProviderIdentityEvidenceDto,
ReceivePackEvidenceDto,
RepositoryPermission,
RepositoryPermissionEvidenceDto,
} from './credential-result.dto.js';
export interface ResolvedCredential {
readonly identity: string;
readonly estate: string;
readonly host: string;
readonly resolutionId: string;
readonly secret: Uint8Array;
}
export interface CredentialResolver {
resolve(identity: string, estate: string, host: string): Promise<ResolvedCredential | undefined>;
}
export interface GiteaCredentialProvider {
readIdentity(resolved: ResolvedCredential): Promise<ProviderIdentityEvidenceDto>;
readRepositoryPermission(
resolved: ResolvedCredential,
repo: string,
): Promise<RepositoryPermissionEvidenceDto>;
probeReceivePack(
resolved: ResolvedCredential | undefined,
repo: string,
): Promise<ReceivePackEvidenceDto>;
}
export interface CredentialEstateRegistry {
matches(estate: string, host: string): boolean;
}
export interface CredentialValidationDependencies {
readonly resolver: CredentialResolver;
readonly provider: GiteaCredentialProvider;
readonly estateRegistry: CredentialEstateRegistry;
}
export interface GiteaReadValidationRequestDto {
readonly identity: string;
readonly estate: string;
readonly host: string;
readonly repo: string;
readonly requiredPermission?: RepositoryPermission;
}
export interface GiteaWriteValidationRequestDto extends GiteaReadValidationRequestDto {
readonly readOnlyControlIdentity: string;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
export type CredentialOutcome = 'ok' | 'refused' | 'error' | 'indeterminate';
export type CredentialMutationState = 'none' | 'not-started' | 'applied' | 'unknown';
export type RepositoryPermission = 'none' | 'read' | 'write' | 'admin';
export type ReceivePackState = 'advertised' | 'refused';
export interface CredentialReasonDto {
readonly code: string;
readonly message: string;
}
export interface CredentialSubjectDto {
readonly identity: string;
readonly estate: string;
readonly host: string;
readonly repo: string;
}
export interface ProviderIdentityEvidenceDto {
readonly login: string;
readonly endpoint: string;
readonly contentType: string;
}
export interface RepositoryPermissionEvidenceDto {
readonly effective: RepositoryPermission;
readonly endpoint: string;
readonly contentType: string;
}
export interface ReceivePackEvidenceDto {
readonly state: ReceivePackState;
readonly principal: string | null;
readonly resolutionId: string | null;
readonly contentType: string;
}
export interface ReadOnlyControlEvidenceDto {
readonly identity: string;
readonly providerPermission: RepositoryPermission;
readonly receivePack: ReceivePackState;
}
export interface WriteDifferentialEvidenceDto {
readonly state: 'can-write';
readonly credentialBinding: 'same-resolution';
readonly transportPrincipal: string;
readonly authenticatedReceivePack: 'advertised';
readonly readOnlyControl: ReadOnlyControlEvidenceDto;
readonly unauthenticatedReceivePack: 'refused';
readonly artifactCreated: false;
readonly proves: string;
readonly doesNotProve: string;
}
export interface TokenCapabilitiesEvidenceDto {
readonly state: 'measured' | 'not-measured';
readonly scopes: readonly string[];
readonly source: 'provider-token-object' | 'runtime-not-authorized';
}
export interface CredentialValidationEvidenceDto {
readonly providerIdentity: ProviderIdentityEvidenceDto | null;
readonly tokenCapabilities: TokenCapabilitiesEvidenceDto;
readonly repositoryPermission: RepositoryPermissionEvidenceDto | null;
readonly writeDifferential: WriteDifferentialEvidenceDto | null;
}
export interface CredentialAuditResultDto {
readonly journalId: string | null;
readonly state: 'not-started' | 'open' | 'sealed';
}
export interface CredentialValidationResultDto {
readonly schemaVersion: 1;
readonly operation: 'validate' | 'whoami';
readonly outcome: CredentialOutcome;
readonly exitCode: 0 | 10 | 20 | 30;
readonly retryable: boolean;
readonly subject: CredentialSubjectDto;
readonly mutation: CredentialMutationState;
readonly reason: CredentialReasonDto;
readonly evidence: CredentialValidationEvidenceDto;
readonly audit: CredentialAuditResultDto;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
export type CredentialProviderKind = 'gitea';
export interface CredentialHostConfigDto {
readonly host: string;
readonly provider: CredentialProviderKind;
readonly apiBaseUrl: string;
readonly tokenPrefix: string;
}
export interface CredentialEstateConfigDto {
readonly name: string;
readonly readOnlyControlIdentity?: string;
readonly inventoryAuthorityIdentity?: string;
readonly hosts: readonly CredentialHostConfigDto[];
}
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { parseCredentialEstateRegistry } from './estate-registry.js';
const validRegistry = JSON.stringify({
version: 1,
estates: [
{
name: 'homelab',
readOnlyControlIdentity: 'read-control',
hosts: [
{
host: 'git.example.invalid',
provider: 'gitea',
apiBaseUrl: 'https://git.example.invalid',
tokenPrefix: 'gitea-example',
},
],
},
],
});
describe('credential estate registry', (): void => {
it('requires an exact declared estate-host pair', (): void => {
const registry = parseCredentialEstateRegistry(validRegistry);
expect(registry.matches('homelab', 'git.example.invalid')).toBe(true);
expect(registry.matches('usc', 'git.example.invalid')).toBe(false);
expect(registry.matches('homelab', 'other.example.invalid')).toBe(false);
expect(registry.resolveByHost('git.example.invalid')).toMatchObject({
estate: 'homelab',
host: { host: 'git.example.invalid', provider: 'gitea' },
});
expect(registry.resolveByHost('other.example.invalid')).toBeUndefined();
});
it('rejects a provider URL whose host differs from the declared host', (): void => {
const source = validRegistry.replace(
'https://git.example.invalid',
'https://other.example.invalid',
);
expect(() => parseCredentialEstateRegistry(source)).toThrow(/api-host-mismatch/);
});
it('rejects one host assigned to multiple estates', (): void => {
const source = JSON.stringify({
version: 1,
estates: [
{
name: 'homelab',
hosts: [
{
host: 'git.example.invalid',
provider: 'gitea',
apiBaseUrl: 'https://git.example.invalid',
tokenPrefix: 'gitea-example',
},
],
},
{
name: 'other',
hosts: [
{
host: 'git.example.invalid',
provider: 'gitea',
apiBaseUrl: 'https://git.example.invalid',
tokenPrefix: 'gitea-other',
},
],
},
],
});
expect(() => parseCredentialEstateRegistry(source)).toThrow(/duplicate-host/);
});
it('rejects URLs with userinfo, path, query, fragment, trailing slash, or non-HTTPS scheme', (): void => {
for (const apiBaseUrl of [
'http://git.example.invalid',
'https://[email protected]',
'https://git.example.invalid/',
'https://git.example.invalid/api',
'https://git.example.invalid?x=1',
'https://git.example.invalid#x',
]) {
const source = validRegistry.replace('https://git.example.invalid', apiBaseUrl);
expect(() => parseCredentialEstateRegistry(source), apiBaseUrl).toThrow(/invalid-api-url/);
}
});
it('requires a configured read-only control for write validation', (): void => {
const registry = parseCredentialEstateRegistry(validRegistry);
const withoutControl = parseCredentialEstateRegistry(
validRegistry.replace('"readOnlyControlIdentity":"read-control",', ''),
);
expect(registry.readOnlyControl('homelab')).toBe('read-control');
expect(() => withoutControl.readOnlyControl('homelab')).toThrow(/read-only-control-missing/);
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
import { z } from 'zod';
import type { CredentialEstateRegistry } from './credential-provider.dto.js';
import type { CredentialEstateConfigDto, CredentialHostConfigDto } from './estate-registry.dto.js';
const NAME = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$/;
const IDENTITY = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*$/;
const HOST = /^[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9.-]*[a-z0-9])?$/;
const hostSchema = z
.object({
host: z.string().regex(HOST),
provider: z.literal('gitea'),
apiBaseUrl: z.string(),
tokenPrefix: z.string().regex(NAME),
})
.strict();
const estateSchema = z
.object({
name: z.string().regex(NAME),
readOnlyControlIdentity: z.string().regex(IDENTITY).optional(),
inventoryAuthorityIdentity: z.string().regex(IDENTITY).optional(),
hosts: z.array(hostSchema).min(1),
})
.strict();
const registrySchema = z
.object({
version: z.literal(1),
estates: z.array(estateSchema).min(1),
})
.strict();
export class CredentialEstateRegistryError extends Error {
constructor(
public readonly code: string,
message: string,
) {
super(`Credential estate registry rejected: code=${code} ${message}`);
this.name = 'CredentialEstateRegistryError';
}
}
function validateApiUrl(host: CredentialHostConfigDto): void {
let url: URL;
try {
url = new URL(host.apiBaseUrl);
} catch (error: unknown) {
const detail = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
throw new CredentialEstateRegistryError('invalid-api-url', detail);
}
if (
url.protocol !== 'https:' ||
url.username !== '' ||
url.password !== '' ||
url.pathname !== '/' ||
host.apiBaseUrl !== url.origin ||
url.search !== '' ||
url.hash !== ''
) {
throw new CredentialEstateRegistryError(
'invalid-api-url',
'provider API URL must be an HTTPS origin without userinfo, path, query, or fragment',
);
}
if (url.hostname !== host.host) {
throw new CredentialEstateRegistryError(
'api-host-mismatch',
'provider API URL hostname does not equal the declared host',
);
}
}
export class ParsedCredentialEstateRegistry implements CredentialEstateRegistry {
private readonly estates: ReadonlyMap<string, CredentialEstateConfigDto>;
constructor(estates: readonly CredentialEstateConfigDto[]) {
this.estates = new Map(
estates.map(
(estate: CredentialEstateConfigDto): readonly [string, CredentialEstateConfigDto] => [
estate.name,
estate,
],
),
);
}
matches(estate: string, host: string): boolean {
return this.resolve(estate, host) !== undefined;
}
resolve(estate: string, host: string): CredentialHostConfigDto | undefined {
return this.estates
.get(estate)
?.hosts.find((candidate: CredentialHostConfigDto): boolean => candidate.host === host);
}
resolveByHost(
host: string,
): { readonly estate: string; readonly host: CredentialHostConfigDto } | undefined {
for (const [estate, config] of this.estates) {
const match = config.hosts.find(
(candidate: CredentialHostConfigDto): boolean => candidate.host === host,
);
if (match !== undefined) return { estate, host: match };
}
return undefined;
}
inventoryAuthority(estate: string): string {
const identity = this.estates.get(estate)?.inventoryAuthorityIdentity;
if (identity === undefined) {
throw new CredentialEstateRegistryError(
'inventory-authority-missing',
`estate ${estate} has no delegated inventory authority identity`,
);
}
return identity;
}
readOnlyControl(estate: string): string {
const identity = this.estates.get(estate)?.readOnlyControlIdentity;
if (identity === undefined) {
throw new CredentialEstateRegistryError(
'read-only-control-missing',
`estate ${estate} has no provider-confirmed read-only control identity`,
);
}
return identity;
}
}
export function parseCredentialEstateRegistry(source: string): ParsedCredentialEstateRegistry {
let raw: unknown;
try {
raw = JSON.parse(source);
} catch (error: unknown) {
const detail = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
throw new CredentialEstateRegistryError('invalid-json', detail);
}
const parsed = registrySchema.safeParse(raw);
if (!parsed.success) {
throw new CredentialEstateRegistryError(
'invalid-schema',
parsed.error.issues[0]?.message ?? 'invalid',
);
}
const estateNames = new Set<string>();
const hostNames = new Set<string>();
for (const estate of parsed.data.estates) {
if (estateNames.has(estate.name)) {
throw new CredentialEstateRegistryError('duplicate-estate', estate.name);
}
estateNames.add(estate.name);
for (const host of estate.hosts) {
validateApiUrl(host);
if (hostNames.has(host.host)) {
throw new CredentialEstateRegistryError('duplicate-host', host.host);
}
hostNames.add(host.host);
}
}
return new ParsedCredentialEstateRegistry(parsed.data.estates);
}