A copy binding grants the repositories its projects' remotes name when a
credential is issued, and its decision records only project names. repo set
(CLI, route, Settings tab) is now refused with project-repo-bound while a
pending or bound copy binding names the project, before any check, origin
change or write, and again under the lock. The message names the copies and
the next step: revoke the binding, set the repository, raise a new binding
decision. An unbound binding, or none, behaves as before. Bindings are read
from the loader-validated document; binding, launcher and broker code are
unchanged. New refusal-table entry for project-repo-bound.
The check's ssh client accepts any host key, so an answer over ssh shows
only that something at that address speaks git. Security review P2: a
reachable or needs-credential ssh outcome now adds "the ssh host key was
not verified"; https and unreachable outcomes are unchanged.
The needs-credential line no longer promises that a binding will supply
one; it says the check sends none. A recorded check is shown only for
the URL it checked. The Settings section says when the git origin differs
from the recorded repository, and a save repairs it. The URL rule message
names what is refused. Tests cover a document write that fails after
origin is set, the drift line and its repair, and Quick Setup in remote
mode.
Remote mode sets the project checkout's origin and checks it once with
git ls-remote, with no credential, no prompt, a protocol allowlist of
https and ssh and a 15 second limit. The receipt reports reachable,
needs-credential or unreachable with git's error summarized. Nothing is
pushed. URLs are https or ssh only; ext:: and other helpers, file://,
local paths, option-like values and credential-bearing URLs are refused.
`mosaic org project repo set` changes a project's repository later, both
ways between remote and local only, through the same rules and check,
with a revision guard and an org.project.repo.set receipt. The Console's
organization project Settings tab edits it through
/api/orgs/ID/repo/project/PROJECT; Quick Setup accepts ssh and shows the
check.
- The copy launch gate reads the organization registry entry on every
check for a verified copy. A state other than active, or a new
incarnation, refuses credential-revoked; an unreadable registry
refuses credential-unavailable.
- Repository reads need read or write repository scope, like writes
need write scope.
- The admitted organization revision travels from the launcher through
bindLaunch. prepare checks it before and after the live proof, and
admit checks it after the launch authority; a change refuses
organization-changed.
- Tests for the completion authority recheck, the broker session
authority compare and an incarnation change; the copyRefusal comment
now names where restart-required is answered.
Materialize only verified bound copies: a binding approved after boot
answers restart-required. Boot and every launch re-resolve the binding
and prove the slot live against its service; unavailable verification,
a partial binding or a stale file refuses. The A3 revision fence and
the launch authority digest ride through prepare, final admission and
bindLaunch. Pending revocation blocks admission and no fence is
released on an uncertain outcome.
Every copy credential call checks session, incarnation, scopes,
generation and liveness, takes the slot from the session, goes only to
the approved origin with redirects refused, and rechecks the generation
at completion. Prepare and boot proofs run inside a time budget so a
silent service cannot stall the host channel. The launcher maps a
copyLaunch refusal to its own code instead of launch-failed.
Tests: copy-launch unit suite, CLI launch and race cases (prepare and
bind races assert no repo call, empty project manifest included), and a
docker acceptance on gitea 1.27.1.
An owner-issued Gitea token for an agent copy is staged inactive in the
self-only store, proved live against the copy's Gitea (token scopes by
semantic comparison with all and admin refused, the copy's dedicated
per-org/copy/service account, every reachable repository, expiry), then
committed under the writer's generation, revision, decision, copyId,
incarnation and definition-pin recheck. The grant record holds only an
opaque grant id and rotate date. Vikunja refuses
credential-scope-unverified. Copies still cannot launch (CB3).
Security review P2s:
- A binding proposal keeps only its structured request fields. The
free-text reason is never written to the private proposal or covered
by its digest.
- A root copy's receipts are checked at prepare, at check, and again
under the organization lock before the write and before publication.
A copy removed, replaced or unreadable since boot refuses with
instance-fired, copy-stale or root-policy-unreadable.
Build review P2:
- A root copy's admitted projects come from the project unions,
recomputed from the current document and the boot's root agents. A
project that excludes the copy, or whose union refuses, is never in
reach; a request naming it refuses with credential-scope-exceeded.
Build review P3s: tests for proposal-time shadowing, the loader's
copyBindings validation, a pending record that covers every service,
a stricter path check on the refusal table, and refusal codes on every
bare rejects in the binding tests.
CB0: registry incarnation minted at reserve (legacy entries get one at
the first binding proposal, under the registry lock); copyId, source
and definition pin, binding generation; a pure resolver where
effective = role intersect approved and only a bound, matching,
unshadowed record resolves.
CB1: copyBindings in the organization file (ids, scope names, project
ids and integers only). applyCopyBindingDecision is its only writer,
behind a module-private capability every other commit is fenced
against. A binding is an owner-only subtype of the hire decision:
only the chief raises it, no autonomy level, resolver agent, member
right, tester or reader resolves it. Digest, expiry, single
consumption, revision, generation, incarnation and definition pin are
rechecked before any effect; a bind writes pending, an unbind the
unbound tombstone, receipts are paths only. Nothing writes bound, so
nothing launches on a binding yet (CB2/CB3). The org service and the
Console update path keep copyBindings server-held. Eight new refusal
codes with next steps.
authorityBudgetCovered named claude-code to decide whether an account
quota covers every future launch, which fails the row 65 scan. The bus
host now passes each harness module's own countsAccount answer, read
once with its levels in harnessLevels, through autonomyHost to the
broker. Without the lookup no account quota counts (fail closed); the
provider/model branch is unchanged.
The catalogue refusals no longer tell every user to press Disable model
proxy catalogue. The server text names the proxy setup step. The Routing
page adds the Disable step only when cliproxy is listed and every moved
model comes from another listed provider, and sends a tester to the
owner. The switch mismatch message no longer claims a setting changed.
Tests: a fallback thinking-only change saves with no catalogue; a move
between model-proxy models refuses before and after cliproxy is removed.
A fixture-only organization reads a ready catalogue with no model proxy
client: the catalogue asks the proxy only when a module calls it.
A thinking-only change, and a limits patch that keeps harness, model and
entry, no longer asks the catalogue. A change that truly needs it still
refuses, and the WebUI names the next step: keep the model and change
thinking, or press Disable model proxy catalogue. The Routing switch
follows whether cliproxy is listed and removes or adds only cliproxy.
Review "changes 8" fix round for org-redact6.
- launcher: a harness module's throw names its system code or class,
never its message; preflight, loader, bundle, checkout, sandbox and
route text is relayed with host paths replaced (relay()).
- claude-code and pi preflights name MOSAIC_CLAUDE_BIN and the
repository's node_modules, never a path; persona and skill bundle
errors and sandboxProblem name their file or the sandbox by label.
- seat session: thread store, legacy store, overlap, busy lock and
newRun refusals name the place under the data root.
- discord: unknown keys, binding names and turn ids are described when
not plain; approvals, journal and repository read errors name the file
and code; git drops stderr lines that carry a host path and a spawn
failure names its code only.
- seat, control-board: registration fields and seen keys are described
when not plain; invalid seat name and layout state the constraint.
- organization: the registry names the config directory and registry
file by label; --project is quoted only when it is a plain name;
systemConfigProblem moves to its own module.
- scripts/mosaic-config.mjs: the config by where it came from, the data
root and its marker by role, keys and arguments only when plain, and
error codes in place of raw messages. Exit codes unchanged.
- webui sso-config: an unknown console key is named only when plain.
Sentinel tests in each package's path-redaction-labels file fail on
BASE; pins that quoted a path now assert the label and its absence.
redact6. A refusal names the field, the file or the instance. It never quotes a
config value, a host path, or a raw e.message or stderr that carries one.
- organization: checkCredentialRef names the field and each forbidden root by
label; OrgError keeps .path only for a document field ($...); the registry,
fence and lock refusals use the quiet helpers (call and code).
- cli: loadSystem never relays mosaic-config stderr: instance refusals keep
their code and names, everything else reads as a field and its constraint
against a labelled config. Project-key, access warning, halt gate, sessions
file, launch socket, harness relays and the workspace rename name labels.
Launch-log reasons read a Node system error as its call and code.
- scripts/mosaic-config: configuration not found names where the config came from.
- discord, seat, control-board: config, token, context, tool-root, journal,
binding, registration and seen-marks refusals name labels.
Exit codes, refusal codes and check order are unchanged. Each new or changed
test fails on BASE be698e602.
The hire service takes the bus's definition check as scanDefinition and runs
it on the stored proposal entry before preview, check or apply goes further,
and on the approved entry again just before the writers. An approval whose
definition holds a credential the store came to hold after the raise refuses
definition-holds-credential before the decision is consumed; nothing is
written. Without the hook the entry still goes through assertClean whole.
Bus start and credentials.issue also check the boot copy snapshot's
definitions (A4 root agents file definitions, re-applied on every reload),
which no organization file holds.
Review P1: the CLI wrote definitions with a no-op secret check. setDefinition
now refuses definition-secret-check-required when a write that adds or changes
an entry has no assertClean. New bus verbs definition.import|invent|edit|remove
run the writes for the business's human at the cli with the credential
store's assertClean; the tester, agents and readers refuse. The CLI's
definition writes call the bus and map its codes to messages that never
quote the definition.
Roles round 2, slice T1 (roles-and-rails design sections 4, 5 and 13).
- The org file's definitions key: each entry {rev, from?, role, instructions,
personality?} passes checkComposition; a bad entry refuses the whole file,
naming the definition and key, never a value.
- org:<name> instance references resolve to the file's definition; a missing
one refuses definition-missing, naming the instance. Template names are
unchanged.
- Template identity is the name plus a sha256 over the template JSON and its
contract; templateHashes reads the current hash for each template.
- The writer's setDefinition is the only path that changes definitions: it
checks the composition, bumps rev, refuses agent actors, and refuses
definition-in-use for a definition an instance names (A4 adds the change
decision). write() refuses organization-definitions-protected.
- Definition verbs import, edit, invent and remove need org.hire
(definition.*.console in VERB_RIGHTS) and refuse every agent caller.
- The diff read lists the primitives that changed and a line diff of the
instructions. It applies nothing.
- CLI: mosaic org definitions templates|list|show|diff|import|invent|edit|remove.
Sol review (org-redact5, changes 6):
- org-service: Node filesystem errors become "cannot <syscall> <label> (<CODE>)";
code, syscall, deleteStep and deleteReceipt stay. git failures name the verb
and exit code, never git's stderr.
- org-console: consoleStop names "another checkout", not the entry path. Exit 3.
- config-command: the system config is named by where it came from. Exit 3.
- cli org: documents and raw fs errors are named by kind and code. Exit 2.
- instances: --vars file named by flag and kind. Exit 4.
- hosts: a refused command is named by the basename refusedCommand matched.
- role.mjs (T1): the change is back to the readJsonFile label only.
Sentinel tests for each; pins in last-values, rename-b-commands, org-recovery.
PR #1916 rule: a refusal names the field or file, never a config value
or a host path. readJsonFile's three refusals and parseJsonFileText now
name the file by its `what` label only. Callers whose label alone is
ambiguous add a name that already passed a strict pattern (business id,
role name, org id, turn id, project key) or a fixed path under the data
root. Exit codes, refusal codes and check order are unchanged.
organization: util, access, project, config-command, library-seats,
org-service deleteOrg receipt, agent-levels regex; T1 files role.mjs and
organization-config.mjs change only the readJsonFile label.
cli: access lock, accounts owner, host state/lock, notifier journal,
notify-config, run-evidence, dev-fixture, git-socket, org-bus, org-console.
discord: turn record label names the turn id.
Sentinel tests (sk-test-NOT-A-SECRET-1234 as a path component) cover each
changed refusal and fail on BASE; old path pins updated.
assertAccountsOwner refused a symlink or non-directory on the config path,
but checked owner and mode only on the leaf. An ancestor owned by another
user, or writable by others without the sticky bit, let that user rename the
directory away and put their own accounts.json in its place. Since M3 that
file decides root authority on a deployed Console.
One shared helper, config-dir-trust.mjs, now holds A2's rule: every ancestor
belongs to root or this uid and is group or other writable only with the
sticky bit; configDir itself is this uid's and not group or other writable.
The accounts store (load, init, lock, locked write, mosaic accounts) and the
root agent file's writer both call it, each with its own refusal code. A2's
messages are unchanged.
Accounts refusals no longer quote a path: the config directory and accounts
file uid messages name the rule and the uid only (redaction rule, #1916).
A missing config directory now refuses accounts-unsafe instead of a raw
ENOENT.
- A checkout an earlier launch left for a project the instance may no longer
work in is covered by an empty tmpfs inside the sandbox; the host copy stays.
- The launcher rechecks every prepared project against the reloaded document
after preparation, and the bus's final admission takes the instance and
checks the broker's current unions.
- A project define whose vars changed since boot refuses its copy until the
next start.
- Instance-name collisions are recomputed at each reload from the frozen root
claims and the current project defines; every claimant refuses.
Review fix round for slice A3.
- Every project's union is recomputed from the current organization file
at each load. A refused union refuses the project's own copies and every
inherited root or org agent there: no mount at launch (checkout-skipped,
project-refused), no thread and no room, each naming the project and why.
- A project exclude removes that project's mount from the excluded agent;
a narrow reaches the instance's resolved limits, so its real bundle is
narrowed. A narrow in any project narrows the instance for every launch,
since one launch mounts every project it works in.
- Two copies whose instance names collide both refuse, naming each
claimant; the view lists the claimants. An organization instance of the
same name replaces a root or project copy, at boot and after it, and the
copy is gone rather than refused.
- Rooms hold only the thread instances that work in the room's project.
- The grid finds an agent's copy by name and project from the bus view,
never by rebuilding the instance name.
- Real-boot regressions: inherited agents in a refused union, exclude and
narrow in the bundle, an org override after boot, two organizations each
running a copy, a root file change while running, and a grid fed by a
booted bus.
Each root agent an organization does not exclude, and each agent a project
defines, becomes a copy when the organization's bus boots. The root file is
read once, through loadRootAgents, at the cli boot step; the snapshot is fixed
until the next boot. A bound copy joins the organization document's roles and
goes through validateBusinessDocument and checkRoles with the organization's
own credential map. A copy whose role needs a credential service is unbound
and refuses at launch by name and service (credential-unbound); a copy the
organization refuses is copy-refused; every agent in a project whose union
refuses is project-refused, naming the project. A project agent launches
only with its own project's mounts and takes a thread only in its project
(project-agent-elsewhere). Refusal events carry the code alone. The bus's
instances read carries the copies with their running runs, and the Agents
grid shows each copy's real status and reason.
channel-proof re-pins webui bus.mjs for four STATUS entries; no proof or
transport change. packages/business gets the agent-copies.mjs re-export.
The CLI agent verbs validate the instance config through loadSystem before
any read or write, and print a fixed line for errors they do not own. The
root writer refuses a config directory with an ancestor another user can
write without the sticky bit. The project HTTP route checks agent names
with the organization ID_PATTERN and answers 400 naming the key.
The Settings level forms take their own class, so the role-instance
handlers no longer catch them, and keep both drafts in module state with
the revision each began at. The organization writer tests now reach the
file's own uid check and test the assistant protection with an assistant
in the fixture.
Root writer for <configDir>/agents.json (owner only, revision-checked, atomic, A1-validated,
receipts name agents and keys only), the project.agents writer verb on the organization
writer, `mosaic agents root` and `mosaic project agents` verbs, and owner-only Settings >
Agents edit forms on GET/POST hooks gated like /api/agents/levels.
Review finding 1: step 7 compares messaging.receiveFrom with the chief's as
well as sendTo, since the broker checks the recipient's list too.
Review finding 2: checkComposition reads the role and the chief once, as a JSON
copy; a getter, proxy, toJSON, cycle or BigInt that throws refuses with a fixed
message, so the thrown text never reaches the caller.
Roles round 2, slice P1. checkComposition(role, registry, chief, { assertClean })
runs the design's seven steps in order against a registry from buildRegistry
(core vocabulary plus a caller-passed plugin set, empty by default) and returns
the flagged lines: every decision.resolve.* action and everything above the
chief's own resolved role. Refusals name the field and position, quote only
registered names, and never quote instructions or personality text.
COMPOSITION_BOUNDS holds the length bounds the design leaves open. Nothing
calls checkComposition yet; HIRE_ALLOWED and unhireableAction stay until A4.
jason.woltje