Review round (P2): a credential issued between the launcher's definition scan and
spawn could make text already in the definition a held value; a same-date rotate
leaves the organization file's revision unchanged, so the revision fence missed it.
The bus's final request.admission for an instance, the last bus op before spawn,
now runs the held-secret check on the org: definition the instance names, on the
bus loop that issue runs on, and refuses definition-holds-credential.
Self-found: check() takes the scanned entry from the same read as resolveInstance,
before any await can let another check replace the shared organization.
T1 follow-up. A definition's text becomes an agent's contract, but a load ran the
held-secret check with an empty store. Bus start now checks every definitions entry
(the boot copy's org: entries and the file's own) with the live store, and the
launch check asks the bus the same question for the org: definition it just read,
before a contract exists. A hit refuses as definition-holds-credential, a new code
in the refusal table; the refusal names the definition and key, never the text or
the credential. bus start records the refusal in the boot status.
Review P1: the CLI wrote definitions with a no-op secret check. setDefinition
now refuses definition-secret-check-required when a write that adds or changes
an entry has no assertClean. New bus verbs definition.import|invent|edit|remove
run the writes for the business's human at the cli with the credential
store's assertClean; the tester, agents and readers refuse. The CLI's
definition writes call the bus and map its codes to messages that never
quote the definition.
Roles round 2, slice T1 (roles-and-rails design sections 4, 5 and 13).
- The org file's definitions key: each entry {rev, from?, role, instructions,
personality?} passes checkComposition; a bad entry refuses the whole file,
naming the definition and key, never a value.
- org:<name> instance references resolve to the file's definition; a missing
one refuses definition-missing, naming the instance. Template names are
unchanged.
- Template identity is the name plus a sha256 over the template JSON and its
contract; templateHashes reads the current hash for each template.
- The writer's setDefinition is the only path that changes definitions: it
checks the composition, bumps rev, refuses agent actors, and refuses
definition-in-use for a definition an instance names (A4 adds the change
decision). write() refuses organization-definitions-protected.
- Definition verbs import, edit, invent and remove need org.hire
(definition.*.console in VERB_RIGHTS) and refuse every agent caller.
- The diff read lists the primitives that changed and a line diff of the
instructions. It applies nothing.
- CLI: mosaic org definitions templates|list|show|diff|import|invent|edit|remove.
The review round changed the config-command relay and the org document
refusal to name the file by label. cli/tests/json-redaction.test.mjs still
required the host path in those two CLI refusals. They now require the
label and the path's absence. The direct scripts/mosaic-config.mjs checks
and the loadSystem check (PL1, deferred) still require the path.
Sol review (org-redact5, changes 6):
- org-service: Node filesystem errors become "cannot <syscall> <label> (<CODE>)";
code, syscall, deleteStep and deleteReceipt stay. git failures name the verb
and exit code, never git's stderr.
- org-console: consoleStop names "another checkout", not the entry path. Exit 3.
- config-command: the system config is named by where it came from. Exit 3.
- cli org: documents and raw fs errors are named by kind and code. Exit 2.
- instances: --vars file named by flag and kind. Exit 4.
- hosts: a refused command is named by the basename refusedCommand matched.
- role.mjs (T1): the change is back to the readJsonFile label only.
Sentinel tests for each; pins in last-values, rename-b-commands, org-recovery.
PR #1916 rule: a refusal names the field or file, never a config value
or a host path. readJsonFile's three refusals and parseJsonFileText now
name the file by its `what` label only. Callers whose label alone is
ambiguous add a name that already passed a strict pattern (business id,
role name, org id, turn id, project key) or a fixed path under the data
root. Exit codes, refusal codes and check order are unchanged.
organization: util, access, project, config-command, library-seats,
org-service deleteOrg receipt, agent-levels regex; T1 files role.mjs and
organization-config.mjs change only the readJsonFile label.
cli: access lock, accounts owner, host state/lock, notifier journal,
notify-config, run-evidence, dev-fixture, git-socket, org-bus, org-console.
discord: turn record label names the turn id.
Sentinel tests (sk-test-NOT-A-SECRET-1234 as a path component) cover each
changed refusal and fail on BASE; old path pins updated.
The row299 root-side pair (mos-1409) spans supervisor start-up and
clean_session, which scans every /proc entry on the host. With about
1,850 processes that adds 0.6 to 1.6 s, so the unchanged inner probe read
2.5 to 3.9 s and failed the [1.25, 2.75) band, while the 1 s inner-timer
mutant read 2.06 to 2.38 s and passed. Widening the bound alone would
have kept that mutant alive.
A second observer pair, also confined to the private test copy, brackets
only the inner timer: begin just before the supervisor starts its sleep,
end at the start of finish(). It writes only for the SO_PEERCRED peer and
at most one pair. The unchanged band now applies to that interval
(2.01 s on base, 1.00 s and 3.00 s for the 1 s and 3 s mutants, so both
fail). The root pair remains required and must contain the timer pair;
probe-inner-timeout already places it before the outer bound.
test-case2.sh failed 8 of 21 steps on base from S3b on. Bisect names
f23a998ee (#797, "close project archive admission races") as the first
bad commit: it made every launch call request.admission and updated each
in-process launcher fixture except scripts/case2/launch.mjs. The fixture
host refused the op with invalid-host-request, so no launch started; the
S6/S7 "unauthenticated" and S8/S10 reds followed from the missing launch
capability, not from a separate session change.
The fixture now spreads requestHostOps from packages/cli/tests, the shared
map every other fixture uses, so it tracks the production protocol.
mosaic accounts init refuses accounts-unsafe since #1919 when a folder above the
config directory is writable by another user. Step 3 now gives the read-only check.
assertAccountsOwner refused a symlink or non-directory on the config path,
but checked owner and mode only on the leaf. An ancestor owned by another
user, or writable by others without the sticky bit, let that user rename the
directory away and put their own accounts.json in its place. Since M3 that
file decides root authority on a deployed Console.
One shared helper, config-dir-trust.mjs, now holds A2's rule: every ancestor
belongs to root or this uid and is group or other writable only with the
sticky bit; configDir itself is this uid's and not group or other writable.
The accounts store (load, init, lock, locked write, mosaic accounts) and the
root agent file's writer both call it, each with its own refusal code. A2's
messages are unchanged.
Accounts refusals no longer quote a path: the config directory and accounts
file uid messages name the rule and the uid only (redaction rule, #1916).
A missing config directory now refuses accounts-unsafe instead of a raw
ENOENT.
The rehearsal provider matches routes on the parsed pathname, so a
query string no longer turns authorize or token into a 404. Authorize
and token answer 403 to any method before the GET check, and only
discovery and the JWKS answer 405 to another method. R20 now sends a
POST to token and a GET to authorize with a query, and expects 403 for
both.
The upstream A2 agent-levels write test stubbed an owner session
without rootOwner. M3 sets the hook's owner flag from rootOwner, as
sso.mjs grants it, so the stub now carries rootOwner: true, as
system-types-http does. No check changes.
An installed unit must equal the render but for the copy id, so a
re-pin that adds --sso refused render-refused. case2-unit gains --check
(every render check, nothing written) and --check-new (a first install's
checks). stack-upgrade runs both checks before anything stops, and
--next-args reads root's <instance>.args.next: equal before -- but for
--copy, different after it. After the stage it moves the installed unit
files into a new <instance>.replaced.XXXXXX directory and renders a
first install. A failure moves them back unchanged and restarts the old
copy, and confirm swaps the args file. The run sheet gives the commands,
the rollback past the migration included.
A stamped rehearsal now starts an isolated provider on 127.0.0.1 port 0
with a certificate and keys made for the run. It serves discovery and a
JWKS for the live provider ids and answers 403 to authorize and token.
Only the scratch Console trusts its certificate. The gate requires each
provider ready (sso-ready); provider-discovery requires discovery and
JWKS fetches and no code or token request. The provider stops with the
run, and by itself once the run's shell is gone.
The system-path test helper asserts the log's from copy again. The
pinned-copy sign-in requests are bounded, and cleanup waits for each
Console to exit.
stack-release refuses a user-unit activate, rollback or pm-on when the
instance shows any accounts sign (stamped target, accounts.json,
console.sso, .deployed), before anything stops. Root renders the system
units with case2-unit.sh, and the op runs with --units external.
case2-unit renders a stamped copy's units only with --sso, console.sso,
an accounts.json that loads and a valid .deployed, and names each
missing step in run-sheet order before any write. Per Jason's ruling of
2026-11-10, a stamped library unit takes --sso and refuses proxy-preview
admission and its proof. The unstamped and dev paths are unchanged.
rehearse runs a stamped copy against rehearsal.invalid with scratch
slot placeholders, a copy of the live accounts.json and the copy's own
.deployed. It refuses sso-not-prepared and accounts-not-initialized
before any rehearsal directory exists, and sso-isolated before the host
starts.
The tests that turned SSO on through the user unit now pin the refusal
and reach the same end state through the system path. The copy tests
start the Console on real scratch prerequisites and pin each refusal.
The run sheet, TOOLS.md and the accounts design record the ruling and
the migration order.
- A checkout an earlier launch left for a project the instance may no longer
work in is covered by an empty tmpfs inside the sandbox; the host copy stays.
- The launcher rechecks every prepared project against the reloaded document
after preparation, and the bus's final admission takes the instance and
checks the broker's current unions.
- A project define whose vars changed since boot refuses its copy until the
next start.
- Instance-name collisions are recomputed at each reload from the frozen root
claims and the current project defines; every claimant refuses.
Review fix round for slice A3.
- Every project's union is recomputed from the current organization file
at each load. A refused union refuses the project's own copies and every
inherited root or org agent there: no mount at launch (checkout-skipped,
project-refused), no thread and no room, each naming the project and why.
- A project exclude removes that project's mount from the excluded agent;
a narrow reaches the instance's resolved limits, so its real bundle is
narrowed. A narrow in any project narrows the instance for every launch,
since one launch mounts every project it works in.
- Two copies whose instance names collide both refuse, naming each
claimant; the view lists the claimants. An organization instance of the
same name replaces a root or project copy, at boot and after it, and the
copy is gone rather than refused.
- Rooms hold only the thread instances that work in the room's project.
- The grid finds an agent's copy by name and project from the bus view,
never by rebuilding the instance name.
- Real-boot regressions: inherited agents in a refused union, exclude and
narrow in the bundle, an org override after boot, two organizations each
running a copy, a root file change while running, and a grid fed by a
booted bus.
Each root agent an organization does not exclude, and each agent a project
defines, becomes a copy when the organization's bus boots. The root file is
read once, through loadRootAgents, at the cli boot step; the snapshot is fixed
until the next boot. A bound copy joins the organization document's roles and
goes through validateBusinessDocument and checkRoles with the organization's
own credential map. A copy whose role needs a credential service is unbound
and refuses at launch by name and service (credential-unbound); a copy the
organization refuses is copy-refused; every agent in a project whose union
refuses is project-refused, naming the project. A project agent launches
only with its own project's mounts and takes a thread only in its project
(project-agent-elsewhere). Refusal events carry the code alone. The bus's
instances read carries the copies with their running runs, and the Agents
grid shows each copy's real status and reason.
channel-proof re-pins webui bus.mjs for four STATUS entries; no proof or
transport change. packages/business gets the agent-copies.mjs re-export.
The CLI agent verbs validate the instance config through loadSystem before
any read or write, and print a fixed line for errors they do not own. The
root writer refuses a config directory with an ancestor another user can
write without the sticky bit. The project HTTP route checks agent names
with the organization ID_PATTERN and answers 400 naming the key.
The Settings level forms take their own class, so the role-instance
handlers no longer catch them, and keep both drafts in module state with
the revision each began at. The organization writer tests now reach the
file's own uid check and test the assistant protection with an assistant
in the fixture.
Root writer for <configDir>/agents.json (owner only, revision-checked, atomic, A1-validated,
receipts name agents and keys only), the project.agents writer verb on the organization
writer, `mosaic agents root` and `mosaic project agents` verbs, and owner-only Settings >
Agents edit forms on GET/POST hooks gated like /api/agents/levels.
jason.woltje