docs(bootstrap): add python-is-python3 host prereq (#561)

.prettierignore

@@ -5,5 +5,3 @@ pnpm-lock.yaml
 **/drizzle
 **/.next
 .claude/
-docs/tess/TASKS.md
-docs/scratchpads/

apps/gateway/src/commands/command-executor.service.ts

@@ -83,15 +83,16 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
             success: true,
             message: 'Retry last message requested.',
           };
-        case 'gc':
+        case 'gc': {
-          // Global retention requires a separate, authorized and audited job.
+          // Admin-only: system-wide GC sweep across all sessions
-          // Session cleanup is performed only through the session lifecycle.
+          const result = await this.sessionGC.sweepOrphans();
           return {
             command: 'gc',
-            success: false,
+            success: true,
-            message: 'Global GC is disabled pending an authorized retention job.',
+            message: `GC sweep complete: ${result.orphanedSessions} orphaned sessions cleaned in ${result.duration}ms.`,
             conversationId,
           };
+        }
         case 'agent':
           return await this.handleAgent(args ?? null, conversationId, userId);
         case 'provider':

apps/gateway/src/commands/commands.integration.spec.ts

@@ -176,12 +176,14 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
     expect(result.command).toBe('nonexistent');
   });
 
-  it('/gc refuses an unaudited global sweep', async () => {
+  // /gc handler calls SessionGCService.sweepOrphans (admin-only, no userId arg)
+  it('/gc calls SessionGCService.sweepOrphans without arguments', async () => {
     const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'gc', conversationId };
     const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
-    expect(mockSessionGC.sweepOrphans).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(mockSessionGC.sweepOrphans).toHaveBeenCalledWith();
-    expect(result.success).toBe(false);
+    expect(result.success).toBe(true);
-    expect(result.message).toContain('disabled pending an authorized retention job');
+    expect(result.message).toContain('GC sweep complete');
+    expect(result.message).toContain('3 orphaned sessions');
   });
 
   // /system with args calls SystemOverrideService.set

apps/gateway/src/gc/session-gc.service.spec.ts

@@ -12,12 +12,7 @@ type MockRedis = {
 describe('SessionGCService', () => {
   let service: SessionGCService;
   let mockRedis: MockRedis;
-  let mockLogService: {
+  let mockLogService: { logs: { promoteToWarm: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn> } };
-    logs: {
-      promoteSessionToWarm: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
-      promoteToWarm: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
-    };
-  };
 
   /**
    * Helper: build a scan mock that returns all provided keys in a single
@@ -35,7 +30,6 @@ describe('SessionGCService', () => {
 
     mockLogService = {
       logs: {
-        promoteSessionToWarm: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(0),
         promoteToWarm: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(0),
       },
     };
@@ -70,18 +64,49 @@ describe('SessionGCService', () => {
     expect(result.sessionId).toBe('test-session-id');
   });
 
-  it('collect() demotes logs only for the requested session', async () => {
+  it('fullCollect() deletes all session keys', async () => {
-    await service.collect('owned-session');
+    mockRedis.scan = makeScanMock(['mosaic:session:abc:system', 'mosaic:session:xyz:foo']);
-
+    const result = await service.fullCollect();
-    expect(mockLogService.logs.promoteSessionToWarm).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+    expect(mockRedis.del).toHaveBeenCalled();
-      'owned-session',
+    expect(result.valkeyKeys).toBe(2);
-      expect.any(Date),
-    );
-    expect(mockLogService.logs.promoteToWarm).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
   });
 
-  it('does not expose automatic global GC entry points', () => {
+  it('fullCollect() with no keys returns 0 valkeyKeys', async () => {
-    expect('fullCollect' in service).toBe(false);
+    mockRedis.scan = makeScanMock([]);
-    expect('sweepOrphans' in service).toBe(false);
+    const result = await service.fullCollect();
+    expect(result.valkeyKeys).toBe(0);
+    expect(mockRedis.del).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('fullCollect() returns duration', async () => {
+    const result = await service.fullCollect();
+    expect(result.duration).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
+  });
+
+  it('sweepOrphans() extracts unique session IDs and collects them', async () => {
+    // First scan call returns the global session list; subsequent calls return
+    // per-session keys during collect().
+    mockRedis.scan = vi
+      .fn()
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce([
+        '0',
+        ['mosaic:session:abc:system', 'mosaic:session:abc:messages', 'mosaic:session:xyz:system'],
+      ])
+      // collect('abc') scan
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(['0', ['mosaic:session:abc:system', 'mosaic:session:abc:messages']])
+      // collect('xyz') scan
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(['0', ['mosaic:session:xyz:system']]);
+    mockRedis.del.mockResolvedValue(1);
+
+    const result = await service.sweepOrphans();
+    expect(result.orphanedSessions).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
+    expect(result.duration).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
+  });
+
+  it('sweepOrphans() returns empty when no session keys', async () => {
+    mockRedis.scan = makeScanMock([]);
+    const result = await service.sweepOrphans();
+    expect(result.orphanedSessions).toBe(0);
+    expect(result.totalCleaned).toHaveLength(0);
   });
 });

apps/gateway/src/gc/session-gc.service.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { Inject, Injectable, Logger, type OnModuleInit } from '@nestjs/common';
 import type { QueueHandle } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
 import type { LogService } from '@mosaicstack/log';
 import { LOG_SERVICE } from '../log/log.tokens.js';
@@ -13,13 +13,49 @@ export interface GCResult {
   };
 }
 
+export interface GCSweepResult {
+  orphanedSessions: number;
+  totalCleaned: GCResult[];
+  duration: number;
+}
+
+export interface FullGCResult {
+  valkeyKeys: number;
+  logsDemoted: number;
+  jobsPurged: number;
+  tempFilesRemoved: number;
+  duration: number;
+}
+
 @Injectable()
-export class SessionGCService {
+export class SessionGCService implements OnModuleInit {
+  private readonly logger = new Logger(SessionGCService.name);
+
   constructor(
     @Inject(REDIS) private readonly redis: QueueHandle['redis'],
     @Inject(LOG_SERVICE) private readonly logService: LogService,
   ) {}
 
+  onModuleInit(): void {
+    // Fire-and-forget: run full GC asynchronously so it does not block the
+    // NestJS bootstrap chain.  Cold-start GC typically takes 100–500 ms
+    // depending on Valkey key count; deferring it removes that latency from
+    // the TTFB of the first HTTP request.
+    this.fullCollect()
+      .then((result) => {
+        this.logger.log(
+          `Full GC complete: ${result.valkeyKeys} Valkey keys, ` +
+            `${result.logsDemoted} logs demoted, ` +
+            `${result.jobsPurged} jobs purged, ` +
+            `${result.tempFilesRemoved} temp dirs removed ` +
+            `(${result.duration}ms)`,
+        );
+      })
+      .catch((err: unknown) => {
+        this.logger.error('Cold-start GC failed', err instanceof Error ? err.stack : String(err));
+      });
+  }
+
   /**
    * Scan Valkey for all keys matching a pattern using SCAN (non-blocking).
    * KEYS is avoided because it blocks the Valkey event loop for the full scan
@@ -50,13 +86,79 @@ export class SessionGCService {
       result.cleaned.valkeyKeys = valkeyKeys.length;
     }
 
-    // 2. PG: demote hot-tier agent logs for this session only.
+    // 2. PG: demote hot-tier agent_logs for this session to warm
-    const cutoff = new Date();
+    const cutoff = new Date(); // demote all hot logs for this session
-    const logsDemoted = await this.logService.logs.promoteSessionToWarm(sessionId, cutoff);
+    const logsDemoted = await this.logService.logs.promoteToWarm(cutoff);
     if (logsDemoted > 0) {
       result.cleaned.logsDemoted = logsDemoted;
     }
 
     return result;
   }
+
+  /**
+   * Sweep GC — find orphaned artifacts from dead sessions.
+   * System-wide operation: only call from admin-authorized paths or internal
+   * scheduled jobs.  Individual session cleanup is handled by collect().
+   */
+  async sweepOrphans(): Promise<GCSweepResult> {
+    const start = Date.now();
+    const cleaned: GCResult[] = [];
+
+    // 1. Find all session-scoped Valkey keys (non-blocking SCAN)
+    const allSessionKeys = await this.scanKeys('mosaic:session:*');
+
+    // Extract unique session IDs from keys
+    const sessionIds = new Set<string>();
+    for (const key of allSessionKeys) {
+      const match = key.match(/^mosaic:session:([^:]+):/);
+      if (match) sessionIds.add(match[1]!);
+    }
+
+    // 2. For each session ID, collect stale keys
+    for (const sessionId of sessionIds) {
+      const gcResult = await this.collect(sessionId);
+      if (Object.keys(gcResult.cleaned).length > 0) {
+        cleaned.push(gcResult);
+      }
+    }
+
+    return {
+      orphanedSessions: cleaned.length,
+      totalCleaned: cleaned,
+      duration: Date.now() - start,
+    };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Full GC — aggressive collection for cold start.
+   * Assumes no sessions survived the restart.
+   */
+  async fullCollect(): Promise<FullGCResult> {
+    const start = Date.now();
+
+    // 1. Valkey: delete ALL session-scoped keys (non-blocking SCAN)
+    const sessionKeys = await this.scanKeys('mosaic:session:*');
+    if (sessionKeys.length > 0) {
+      await this.redis.del(...sessionKeys);
+    }
+
+    // 2. NOTE: channel keys are NOT collected on cold start
+    //    (discord/telegram plugins may reconnect and resume)
+
+    // 3. PG: demote stale hot-tier logs older than 24h to warm
+    const hotCutoff = new Date(Date.now() - 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
+    const logsDemoted = await this.logService.logs.promoteToWarm(hotCutoff);
+
+    // 4. No summarization job purge API available yet
+    const jobsPurged = 0;
+
+    return {
+      valkeyKeys: sessionKeys.length,
+      logsDemoted,
+      jobsPurged,
+      tempFilesRemoved: 0,
+      duration: Date.now() - start,
+    };
+  }
 }

apps/gateway/src/log/cron.service.ts

@@ -6,10 +6,11 @@ import {
   type OnModuleDestroy,
 } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { SummarizationService } from './summarization.service.js';
+import { SessionGCService } from '../gc/session-gc.service.js';
 import {
   QueueService,
-  QUEUE_GC,
   QUEUE_SUMMARIZATION,
+  QUEUE_GC,
   QUEUE_TIER_MANAGEMENT,
 } from '../queue/queue.service.js';
 import type { Worker } from 'bullmq';
@@ -22,12 +23,14 @@ export class CronService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
 
   constructor(
     @Inject(SummarizationService) private readonly summarization: SummarizationService,
+    @Inject(SessionGCService) private readonly sessionGC: SessionGCService,
     @Inject(QueueService) private readonly queueService: QueueService,
   ) {}
 
   async onModuleInit(): Promise<void> {
     const summarizationSchedule = process.env['SUMMARIZATION_CRON'] ?? '0 */6 * * *'; // every 6 hours
     const tierManagementSchedule = process.env['TIER_MANAGEMENT_CRON'] ?? '0 3 * * *'; // daily at 3am
+    const gcSchedule = process.env['SESSION_GC_CRON'] ?? '0 4 * * *'; // daily at 4am
 
     // M6-003: Summarization repeatable job
     await this.queueService.addRepeatableJob(
@@ -53,12 +56,15 @@ export class CronService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
     });
     this.registeredWorkers.push(tierWorker);
 
-    // Retire any repeatable global GC schedule created by older deployments.
+    // M6-004: GC repeatable job
-    // Session cleanup is now triggered only by an authorized session lifecycle operation.
+    await this.queueService.addRepeatableJob(QUEUE_GC, 'session-gc', {}, gcSchedule);
-    await this.queueService.removeRepeatableJobs(QUEUE_GC, 'session-gc');
+    const gcWorker = this.queueService.registerWorker(QUEUE_GC, async () => {
+      await this.sessionGC.sweepOrphans();
+    });
+    this.registeredWorkers.push(gcWorker);
 
     this.logger.log(
-      `BullMQ jobs scheduled: summarization="${summarizationSchedule}", tier="${tierManagementSchedule}"`,
+      `BullMQ jobs scheduled: summarization="${summarizationSchedule}", tier="${tierManagementSchedule}", gc="${gcSchedule}"`,
     );
   }
 

apps/gateway/src/queue/queue.service.ts

@@ -162,23 +162,6 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
     );
   }
 
-  /**
-   * Remove every existing repeatable schedule for a job name. This supports
-   * safe retirement of previously registered system-wide jobs.
-   */
-  async removeRepeatableJobs(queueName: string, jobName: string): Promise<number> {
-    const queue = this.getQueue(queueName);
-    const jobs = await queue.getRepeatableJobs();
-    const matchingJobs = jobs.filter((job) => job.name === jobName);
-    await Promise.all(matchingJobs.map((job) => queue.removeRepeatableByKey(job.key)));
-    if (matchingJobs.length > 0) {
-      this.logger.log(
-        `Removed ${matchingJobs.length} repeatable "${jobName}" job(s) from "${queueName}"`,
-      );
-    }
-    return matchingJobs.length;
-  }
-
   /**
    * Register a Worker for the given queue name with error handling and
    * exponential backoff.

docs/MISSION-MANIFEST.md

@@ -67,11 +67,10 @@ The MVP is complete when ALL declared workstreams are complete AND every cross-c
 
 ## Workstreams
 
-| #   | ID   | Name                                        | Status            | Manifest                                                                | Notes                                               |
+| #   | ID  | Name                                        | Status            | Manifest                                                                | Notes                                               |
-| --- | ---- | ------------------------------------------- | ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- |
+| --- | --- | ------------------------------------------- | ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- |
-| W1  | FED  | Federation v1                               | planning-complete | [docs/federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md](./federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md) | 7 milestones, ~175K tokens, issues #460–#466 filed  |
+| W1  | FED | Federation v1                               | planning-complete | [docs/federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md](./federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md) | 7 milestones, ~175K tokens, issues #460–#466 filed  |
-| W2  | TESS | Tess interaction agent                      | planning-complete | [docs/tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md](./tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md)             | 5 milestones; issue #706; M1 issue #707 ready       |
+| W2+ | TBD | (additional workstreams declared as scoped) | —                 | —                                                                       | Scope creep is expected and explicitly accommodated |
-| W3+ | TBD  | (additional workstreams declared as scoped) | —                 | —                                                                       | Scope creep is expected and explicitly accommodated |
 
 ### Likely Additional Workstreams (Not Yet Declared)
 

docs/PRD.md

@@ -79,102 +79,6 @@ Jarvis (v0.2.0) is a self-hosted AI assistant with a Python FastAPI backend and
 
 ---
 
-## Tess Interaction Agent Workstream (TESS)
-
-### Problem and Objective
-
-Jason needs one durable, operator-facing Mosaic agent outside Hermes that is reachable through a dedicated Discord channel and CLI, can attach to and operate the Mosaic fleet and transitional Hermes agents, and preserves context across restarts and compaction. Mos remains the coding/general fleet orchestrator; Tess is the complementary human interaction, visibility, control, and migration agent.
-
-The objective is to ship **Tess** (from _tessera_, a piece of a mosaic) as a Pi-native, GPT-5.6 Sol agent with high reasoning. Tess must use Mosaic-owned contracts and plugins so Hermes can be replaced incrementally rather than becoming a permanent architectural dependency.
-
-### Scope
-
-#### In Scope
-
-1. `TESS-ARP-001`: A runtime-neutral `AgentRuntimeProvider` contract supporting `listSessions`, `streamSession`, `sendMessage`, `terminate`, `getSessionTree`, `attach`, health, capability discovery, and normalized events/errors.
-2. `TESS-PI-001`: A long-running Pi-native Tess agent profile/service pinned to GPT-5.6 Sol with high reasoning, explicit tool policy, lifecycle hooks, durable checkpoints, and restart recovery.
-3. `TESS-DSC-001`: Dedicated Discord channel binding to Tess through the Mosaic gateway, with allowlists/RBAC, thread/reply policy, streaming, attachments, approvals, and correlation IDs.
-4. `TESS-CLI-001`: `mosaic tess` CLI commands for chat, status, session listing, attach/detach, send/steer/stop, provider health, and recovery.
-5. `TESS-FLT-001`: Fleet plugin capabilities for roster/status/heartbeat inspection, message delivery, session hierarchy, safe attach, and controlled restart/recovery.
-6. `TESS-MOS-001`: Explicit Mos coordination boundary and tools: hand off orchestration requests, observe mission/task state, receive results, and never silently compete for orchestration authority.
-7. `TESS-HRM-001`: Transitional Hermes adapter for profiles/agents, sessions, streaming/messages, Kanban, skills, memory, tools, cron, and health, using capability negotiation and fail-closed unsupported operations.
-8. `TESS-MEM-001`: Unified memory/retrieval plugin with scoped search/recent/capture/stats, startup context injection, provenance, redaction, namespace isolation, and flat-file/project truth precedence.
-9. `TESS-STA-001`: Durable agent state, inbox, handoff, compaction-recovery, and resume reconstruction.
-10. `TESS-PLG-001`: Plugin/tool catalog covering runtime bootstrap, repository/PR workflow, fleet diagnostics, incident-safe read operations, Discord interaction, and extensible MCP/skill discovery.
-11. `TESS-TRN-001`: Replaceable transport providers: tmux/fleet now, Matrix/native Mosaic transport later, with no Discord/CLI business logic coupled to transport details.
-12. `TESS-SEC-001`: RBAC, per-operation authorization, explicit approval for destructive/privileged/customer-visible actions, audit events, secret/PII redaction, tenant isolation, and bounded command execution.
-13. `TESS-SEC-002`: Command execution SHALL enforce declared scope/role server-side; admin/system and destructive operations SHALL require policy-bound durable approval.
-14. `TESS-SEC-003`: Every session list/read/attach/send/terminate operation SHALL enforce server-derived owner and tenant scope; guessed or client-supplied IDs SHALL grant no authority.
-15. `TESS-SEC-004`: MCP tools SHALL derive actor/tenant from authenticated context and SHALL NOT accept caller-controlled identity fields.
-16. `TESS-SEC-005`: Discord plugin ingress SHALL authenticate service identity, enforce guild/channel/user allowlists, propagate correlation/message IDs, and reject replay.
-17. `TESS-SEC-006`: Secret/PII classification and redaction SHALL occur before persistence and before channel egress, including tool metadata and authentication flows.
-18. `TESS-SEC-007`: Approvals SHALL be one-time, expiring, actor/tenant-bound, and cryptographically bound to the exact structured action digest.
-19. `TESS-SEC-008`: Ingress, provider sends, tool side effects, and responses SHALL use durable inbox/outbox/checkpoints and idempotency records for restart-safe replay.
-20. `TESS-SEC-009`: Garbage collection and retention SHALL be session/tenant scoped unless executed as a separately authorized and audited system-wide job.
-21. `TESS-OBS-001`: Structured logs, traces, health/readiness, provider latency/errors, session lifecycle, tool audit, and actionable recovery diagnostics.
-22. `TESS-MIG-001`: Capability inventory and staged Hermes-to-Mosaic migration matrix with coexistence, cutover, rollback, and deprecation gates.
-
-#### Out of Scope
-
-1. Replacing Mos as coding/general fleet orchestrator.
-2. Making Hermes the Mosaic core or coupling Mosaic domain logic to Hermes schemas.
-3. Migrating every historical chat verbatim; only policy-compliant indexed summaries and user-selected sessions are migrated.
-4. Unrestricted shell execution from Discord.
-5. Full web UI parity in the first Tess operational milestone; gateway contracts must remain web-consumable.
-6. Replacing tmux before Matrix/native transport reaches operational parity.
-
-### Stakeholder and User Requirements
-
-- Jason must be able to converse with the same Tess session from Discord and CLI.
-- Jason must be able to see what is running, stale, blocked, or unhealthy without attaching manually to every session.
-- Jason must be able to attach to Tess and authorized fleet sessions through supported CLI controls.
-- Tess must collaborate with Mos and the fleet while preserving a single clear orchestration authority.
-- The system must migrate useful Hermes/OpenClaw capabilities intentionally, with evidence, instead of copying implementations wholesale.
-
-### Non-Functional Requirements
-
-1. **Security:** default-deny provider/tool capabilities, least privilege, no secrets in logs/prompts/commits, Discord user/channel authorization, and auditable approvals.
-2. **Reliability:** durable inbox/checkpoints; idempotent message handling; reconnect with bounded backoff; no message loss or duplicate execution across gateway restart.
-3. **Performance:** first acknowledgement within 2 seconds when connected; streamed agent output begins within 5 seconds excluding model/provider delay; status reads return within 2 seconds under nominal local conditions.
-4. **Observability:** every ingress message and resulting provider/tool operation carries a correlation ID across Discord, gateway, Tess, provider, and audit events.
-5. **Maintainability:** channel, runtime, transport, memory, and external-agent integrations remain adapter-based with contract tests.
-6. **Privacy:** only scoped context enters external runtimes; persisted messages/memories follow retention and redaction policy.
-7. **Portability:** Tess runs through Pi/Mosaic contracts and does not require Hermes to start or serve native Mosaic operations.
-
-### Acceptance Criteria
-
-1. `AC-TESS-01`: A dedicated Discord channel and `mosaic tess chat` connect to one durable Tess session and stream responses bidirectionally.
-2. `AC-TESS-02`: `mosaic tess status|sessions|tree|attach|send|stop` operate against authorized provider capabilities with stable typed outputs and actionable errors.
-3. `AC-TESS-03`: Tess runs GPT-5.6 Sol at high reasoning and its effective runtime/model/tool policy is visible through status without exposing credentials.
-4. `AC-TESS-04`: Tess can inspect and message the Mosaic fleet, hand orchestration work to Mos, and demonstrate that Tess does not independently claim Mos-owned orchestration work.
-5. `AC-TESS-05`: Hermes adapter demonstrates session listing, streaming/message delivery, hierarchy mapping, and at least one approved capability in each of Kanban, skills, memory, tools, and cron—or reports unsupported capabilities fail-closed.
-6. `AC-TESS-06`: Restart/compaction test preserves session identity, pending inbox, last durable checkpoint, and a resumable handoff without duplicate side effects.
-7. `AC-TESS-07`: Unauthorized Discord users/channels, cross-tenant access, unsafe tool calls, forged approvals, and sensitive-output cases are denied and audited.
-8. `AC-TESS-08`: tmux/fleet and Matrix/native transport implementations pass the same provider contract suite; Matrix may remain non-default until readiness gates pass.
-9. `AC-TESS-09`: Baseline quality gates, unit/integration/contract tests, Discord+CLI E2E, restart/recovery tests, independent code review, and security review are green.
-10. `AC-TESS-10`: Migration matrix documents every audited Hermes/OpenClaw capability as native, adapted, deferred, or rejected, with cutover and rollback evidence.
-11. `AC-TESS-11`: User, admin, developer, API/OpenAPI, operations/recovery, and plugin-authoring documentation is current and linked from the sitemap.
-
-### Constraints, Dependencies, Risks, and Assumptions
-
-- Dependency: Mosaic gateway remains the single API surface; Pi is the native runtime; Valkey/PostgreSQL provide canonical durable state where required.
-- Dependency: Discord bot credentials and dedicated channel ID are deployment secrets provisioned outside source control.
-- Risk: Tess could drift into a second orchestrator. Mitigation: explicit role policy, Mos handoff contract, authority checks, and E2E boundary tests.
-- Risk: broad Hermes compatibility can freeze legacy semantics into Mosaic. Mitigation: Mosaic-owned normalized contracts and capability negotiation.
-- Risk: Discord creates a privileged remote-control surface. Mitigation: pairing/allowlists, RBAC, approvals, rate limits, audit, and safe tool classes.
-- Risk: transcript ingestion can violate privacy or overload memory. Mitigation: scoped opt-in import, redacted summaries, provenance, retention, and deduplication.
-- Risk: current root filesystem has limited headroom. Mitigation: isolated worktrees, no duplicated dependency installation unless required, and cleanup only after active-lane verification.
-- `ASSUMPTION:` The public name is **Tess**, because the user requested a name and the tessera/Mosaic relationship is distinctive; config must permit later display-name changes without renaming APIs or storage keys.
-- `ASSUMPTION:` The dedicated Discord channel ID and final guild policy will be supplied/provisioned during deployment, so implementation uses explicit configuration and fail-fast startup validation.
-- `ASSUMPTION:` tmux/fleet is the production transport for the first operational milestone; Matrix/native transport is implemented behind the same contract and promoted only after parity/reliability verification.
-- `ASSUMPTION:` Project/task truth remains in canonical Mosaic/project stores; semantic memory systems are retrieval/mirror layers, not hidden authorities.
-
-### Testing and Delivery Intent
-
-Delivery uses five gated milestones: runtime contracts/security; Pi service/state; Discord/CLI; fleet/Hermes/plugin suite; migration/Matrix/recovery/qualification. Every source-code task requires tests, independent review, a PR to `main`, terminal-green CI, and issue/task closure. Production activation additionally requires a clean-host Pi launch, dedicated Discord channel smoke test, CLI attach test, restart/recovery drill, and rollback procedure.
-
----
-
 ## Architecture
 
 ### High-Level System Diagram

docs/TASKS.md

@@ -14,10 +14,9 @@
 
 ## Workstream Rollup
 
-| id  | status            | workstream             | progress         | tasks file                                        | notes                                                           |
+| id  | status            | workstream          | progress         | tasks file                                        | notes                                                           |
-| --- | ----------------- | ---------------------- | ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| --- | ----------------- | ------------------- | ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| W1  | planning-complete | Federation v1 (FED)    | 0 / 7 milestones | [docs/federation/TASKS.md](./federation/TASKS.md) | M1 task breakdown populated; M2–M7 deferred to mission planning |
+| W1  | planning-complete | Federation v1 (FED) | 0 / 7 milestones | [docs/federation/TASKS.md](./federation/TASKS.md) | M1 task breakdown populated; M2–M7 deferred to mission planning |
-| W2  | planning-complete | Tess interaction agent | 0 / 5 milestones | [docs/tess/TASKS.md](./tess/TASKS.md)             | Issue #706; independent planning gate PASS; M1 issue #707 ready |
 
 ## Cross-Cutting Tracking
 

docs/guides/admin-guide.md

@@ -301,10 +301,6 @@ Each OIDC provider requires its client ID, client secret, and issuer URL togethe
 | `TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN`   | Telegram bot token (enables Telegram plugin)                               |
 | `TELEGRAM_GATEWAY_URL` | Gateway URL for Telegram plugin to call                                    |
 
-### Session retention and garbage collection
-
-Session cleanup is scoped to one session identifier and only removes that session's Valkey keys and demotes that session's hot logs. Gateway startup and scheduled jobs do not perform global session cleanup; startup removes legacy repeatable `session-gc` schedules created by older deployments. The `/gc` command is intentionally disabled until a distinct global-retention job supplies explicit authorization and audit evidence. This prevents one tenant or session's cleanup from changing another's retained data.
-
 ### Observability
 
 | Variable                      | Default                 | Description                      |

docs/scratchpads/703-wrapper-interactive-auth.md

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-# #703 Git Wrapper Interactive and Auth Resilience
-
-## Objective
-
-Restore the deployed Git wrapper contract: issue-create supports interactive invocation and Gitea mutation behavior tolerates a stale Tea authenticated user by validating current identity and using the existing host-scoped API fallback.
-
-## Scope
-
-- `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/issue-create.sh`
-- `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/detect-platform.sh`
-- Git wrapper regression harnesses
-- This scratchpad
-
-## Requirements / acceptance evidence
-
-1. `issue-create -i` and `--interactive` prompt for missing issue fields without exposing credentials.
-2. Explicit command-line fields retain precedence and do not trigger prompt input.
-3. Gitea wrapper resolves the current user dynamically from the target host and does not rely on the saved Tea user identity.
-4. A Tea `GetUserByName` failure falls back to authenticated API creation.
-5. Existing body-safety, login-resolution, issue-create, and pr-create paths remain green.
-6. Source framework is re-seeded to deployed `~/.config/mosaic`, then deployed wrappers are verified end to end.
-
-## Plan
-
-1. Add failing shell regression harness for interactive input and stale Tea user fallback.
-2. Implement minimal helper and parser changes.
-3. Run wrapper harnesses, syntax checks, and repository baseline checks.
-4. Re-seed deployed framework and run live wrapper verification.
-5. Commit, queue guard, push, open PR, and stop for independent review.
-
-## Progress
-
-- Issue #703 filed before code; issue comment records #536 root cause and stale-login trigger.
-- Deployed wrapper `issue-create.sh -i` reproduced: `Unknown option: -i` (exit 1).
-- Live Tea mutation did not reproduce `GetUserByName` on this host because the current mosaicstack Tea login is valid. The test harness models the reported stale authenticated-user condition.
-- Implemented `-i` / `--interactive` prompt collection and a dynamic Tea `/user` validation. A stale Tea identity now selects the existing host-scoped Gitea API fallback before mutation for both issue and PR creation.
-- Re-seeded the framework with `MOSAIC_INSTALL_MODE=keep MOSAIC_SYNC_ONLY=1 bash packages/mosaic/framework/install.sh`. Installed and source wrapper SHA-256 values matched.
-- Live deployed verification: interactive issue-create opened then closed #704; installed dynamic identity resolved `jason.woltje`.
-
-## Verification
-
-- PASS: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-create-interactive-auth.sh`
-- PASS: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-create-body-safety.sh`
-- PASS: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-gitea-login-resolution.sh`
-- PASS: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-metadata-gitea.sh`
-- PASS: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-merge-gitea-empty-uid.sh`
-- PASS: `bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-lane-brief-pr-linkage.sh`
-- PASS: `bash -n packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/*.sh`
-- PASS: Prettier check for this scratchpad

docs/scratchpads/tess-20260712.md

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-# Scratchpad — Tess Interaction Agent
-
-## 2026-07-12 — Mission intake
-
-**Objective:** Build a Pi-native GPT-5.6 Sol high-reasoning Mosaic interaction agent, named Tess, as Jason's primary Discord/CLI access point for Mosaic fleet and transitional Hermes capabilities. Tess complements Mos and must not become a competing orchestrator.
-
-**Issue:** #706
-
-**Budget:** No explicit cap provided. Original working estimate was 290K implementation/review tokens. That estimate is superseded after six security prerequisite tasks were added; revised arithmetic total is pending because the calculation tool was blocked by runtime consent. Run at most two workers; prefer one implementation lane plus one independent review/discovery lane. Re-estimate after planning approval and each milestone.
-
-**Evidence gathered:**
-- Mosaic already provides Pi lifecycle hooks, fleet/tmux sessions, Matrix connector/controller pieces, typed chat events, Discord/Telegram channel plugins, and command/plugin registries.
-- Current `IProviderAdapter` is an LLM model/completion abstraction, not an external agent/session provider.
-- Required new seam is `AgentRuntimeProvider`: sessions, stream, message, terminate, hierarchy, attach, health, capabilities.
-- Recurring cross-runtime needs: unified memory/retrieval, Discord routing/approvals, agent state/inbox/compaction recovery, runtime bootstrap, fleet/incident controls, and GitOps workflow.
-- Project truth must remain in canonical project/Mosaic stores; semantic memory is retrieval/mirror.
-
-**Decisions:**
-1. Name: Tess (tessera). Stable machine key `tess`; display name configurable.
-2. Mos owns orchestration; Tess delegates Mos-owned work through an explicit coordination contract.
-3. Gateway owns ingress/auth/routing; Discord and CLI remain thin clients.
-4. tmux/fleet ships first behind an adapter; Matrix/native Mosaic is the forward transport.
-5. Hermes integration is transitional and capability-negotiated; unsupported operations fail closed.
-6. No unrestricted Discord shell. Privileged/destructive/customer-visible actions require authorization and approval.
-
-**Plan:**
-1. Land requirements/architecture/task graph.
-2. Deliver runtime contracts and security model.
-3. Deliver durable Pi service/state.
-4. Deliver Discord and CLI.
-5. Deliver fleet/Mos/Hermes/memory/tool plugins.
-6. Deliver Matrix/native transport, migration matrix, recovery, docs, and qualification.
-
-**Progress:** Issue #706 created. PRD/manifest/tasks initialized on clean branch `feat/tess-interaction-agent` from `origin/main`.
-
-**Risks:** 14 GB root filesystem headroom; active fleet lanes; broad migration scope; Discord privilege boundary; possible duplicate orchestration authority.
-
-## 2026-07-12 — Independent planning and threat review
-
-**Verdict received:** BLOCK TESS-PLAN-001. Coding remains stopped.
-
-**Blocking findings:** formal threat model absent; verification matrix absent; migration inventory implied but absent; non-existent task paths; AC-TESS-03 lacked a crisp test. Security review also identified command scope bypass, cross-tenant session attachment, MCP actor impersonation, unsafe Discord service ingress, pre-persistence/egress secret leakage, non-durable replay, and globally scoped GC.
-
-**Remediation applied:**
-- Added `docs/tess/ARCHITECTURE.md`.
-- Added `docs/tess/THREAT-MODEL.md` with TM-01..12.
-- Added `docs/tess/VERIFICATION-MATRIX.md` mapping AC-TESS-01..11.
-- Added `docs/tess/MIGRATION-INVENTORY.md`.
-- Added hard requirements TESS-SEC-002..009.
-- Added six prerequisite security tasks before provider/ingress implementation.
-- Corrected task paths to existing package surfaces.
-- Added explicit GPT-5.6 Sol/high/tool-policy status verification for AC-TESS-03.
-
-**Re-review 1:** BLOCK only on composite `repo` values that looked like nonexistent paths. Remediated by declaring comma-separated roots and validating every root.
-
-**Final focused review:** PASS. Deterministic audit validated all task repository roots with zero missing paths; no planning placeholders remained; security prerequisites still gate Tess exposure; observability traceability is explicit.
-
-**Current gate:** planning PR must merge to `main` with terminal-green CI before any source-code worker starts.

docs/scratchpads/tess-m1-sec-006-session-gc-scope.md

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Scratchpad — TESS-M1-SEC-006 Session GC scope
-
-- **Task / issue:** TESS-M1-SEC-006 / #707
-- **Branch:** `fix/tess-session-gc-scope` from `origin/main` at `59e49cfd`
-- **Objective:** Make session cleanup session-scoped and prevent automatic global retention/GC without an authorized, auditable operation.
-- **Scope:** `apps/gateway`, `packages/log`, admin/developer operations documentation.
-- **Budget:** Task estimate 18K; no explicit hard cap supplied.
-- **Assumption:** No authorized global retention service exists today. Existing full/sweep GC must therefore be disabled from startup and cron paths, while single-session cleanup remains available.
-
-## Plan
-
-1. Add failing isolation tests proving single-session cleanup only demotes its own logs and automatic startup/scheduled GC cannot globally delete session data.
-2. Add session-scoped log repository retention and make `collect(sessionId)` use it.
-3. Remove automatic full/sweep GC invocation; preserve any future global operation behind an explicit authorization/audit seam.
-4. Document the operational boundary, run gates, review, and commit without push.
-
-## Verification evidence
-
-- Isolation TDD: `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test -- session-gc.service.spec.ts commands.integration.spec.ts command-executor-p8012.spec.ts` — 61 passed.
-- `pnpm typecheck` — passed.
-- `pnpm lint` — passed.
-- `pnpm format:check` remains red only on the known pre-existing Tess documentation debt; changed files are Prettier-clean.

docs/tess/ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-# Tess Architecture
-
-## Purpose
-
-Tess is the Mosaic operator interaction plane. Mos remains the coding/general fleet orchestration authority. Tess receives authorized operator intent, presents fleet/session state, delegates Mos-owned work to Mos, and exposes native Mosaic plus transitional external-agent capabilities through normalized providers.
-
-## Component Boundaries
-
-```text
-Discord plugin ─┐
-                ├─ authenticated ingress envelope ─> Mosaic Gateway
-mosaic tess CLI ┘                                  │
-                                                   ├─ policy/approval/audit
-                                                   ├─ Tess durable session service (Pi GPT-5.6 Sol high)
-                                                   ├─ AgentRuntimeProvider registry
-                                                   │   ├─ native Pi provider
-                                                   │   ├─ fleet/tmux provider
-                                                   │   ├─ Hermes adapter
-                                                   │   └─ Matrix/native transport provider
-                                                   ├─ memory/state/inbox plugins
-                                                   └─ Mos coordination adapter ─> Mos / fleet queue
-```
-
-## Core Contract
-
-`AgentRuntimeProvider` is separate from the existing model-completion `IProviderAdapter`. It normalizes external and native agent runtimes without leaking provider-specific schemas.
-
-Required operations:
-
-- `capabilities()` and `health()`
-- `listSessions(scope)`
-- `getSessionTree(scope)`
-- `streamSession(sessionRef, cursor, scope)`
-- `sendMessage(sessionRef, message, idempotencyKey, scope)`
-- `attach(sessionRef, mode, scope)` / `detach()`
-- `terminate(sessionRef, approvalRef, scope)`
-
-Every call receives an immutable, server-derived actor/tenant/channel scope and correlation ID. Caller-supplied actor IDs are forbidden. Unsupported capabilities fail closed with typed errors.
-
-## Authority Model
-
-| Intent                                                                      | Owner                   | Tess behavior                                                          |
-| --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| Conversation, status, retrieval, safe diagnostics                           | Tess                    | Execute within policy                                                  |
-| Code/project decomposition, worker assignment, reviews, merge orchestration | Mos                     | Create a correlated handoff and observe result                         |
-| Destructive, privileged, external/customer-visible action                   | Human approval + policy | Propose, wait for durable one-time approval, then execute idempotently |
-| Provider-specific unsupported action                                        | None                    | Fail closed; never emulate silently                                    |
-
-## Session and State Model
-
-A Tess session has stable `sessionId`, `tenantId`, `ownerId`, provider/runtime identity, ingress bindings, cursor, checkpoint, inbox/outbox, and idempotency records. Discord and CLI bind to the same authorized session. Ownership is verified server-side on every list/read/attach/send/terminate operation.
-
-Valkey may hold ephemeral coordination state; PostgreSQL is canonical for durable session bindings, approvals, audit, checkpoints, inbox/outbox, and idempotency. Pi session files are replay sources, not cross-agent truth.
-
-## Transport Strategy
-
-- **Initial:** fleet/tmux provider, including exact target, socket, identity, heartbeat, and safe attach semantics.
-- **Forward:** Matrix/native Mosaic provider using authenticated identity, idempotent transaction IDs, replay cursors, and the same contract suite.
-- Discord/CLI never call tmux or Matrix directly.
-
-## Plugin Families
-
-1. Channel: Discord now; other channels later.
-2. Runtime: Pi, fleet/tmux, Hermes, Matrix/native.
-3. Operator tools: fleet health, Mos handoff, GitOps wrappers, incident-safe diagnostics.
-4. Memory/state: search/recent/capture, durable inbox, checkpoint, handoff, compaction recovery.
-5. Migration: capability inventory, adapters, cutover, rollback, telemetry.
-
-## Deployment
-
-Tess runs as a rostered, systemd-supervised Pi agent using GPT-5.6 Sol and high reasoning. Secrets are supplied through approved runtime secret mechanisms. Startup fails when required model, gateway identity, Discord binding, or durable-state dependencies are missing. Health reports effective model/reasoning/tool policy without credential material.

docs/tess/MIGRATION-INVENTORY.md

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Tess Capability Migration Inventory
-
-Status values: `native` · `adapt` · `defer` · `reject`. This is the initial inventory; M5 requires implementation and evidence fields to be completed before cutover.
-
-| Capability                               | Current source                           | Target                                     | Initial status | Cutover/rollback intent                                                 |
-| ---------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------ | -------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| Interactive agent chat/session streaming | Hermes/Pi/OpenClaw                       | Mosaic Tess session service                | native         | Dual-run per channel; revert binding to legacy gateway                  |
-| Discord dedicated-channel routing        | Hermes/Claude/OpenClaw plugins           | Mosaic Discord plugin + gateway            | native         | Per-channel binding switch; legacy bot disabled only after soak         |
-| CLI/TUI session interaction and attach   | Hermes/Pi/tmux                           | `mosaic tess` + AgentRuntimeProvider       | native         | Keep direct tmux attach as break-glass rollback                         |
-| Session list/tree/send/terminate         | Hermes/fleet                             | AgentRuntimeProvider                       | native         | Capability-negotiated adapter remains during migration                  |
-| Mos/fleet orchestration handoff          | tmux messaging/Mosaic fleet              | Mosaic coord/fleet provider                | native         | tmux handoff remains initial transport                                  |
-| Kanban/projects/tasks                    | Hermes Kanban                            | Mosaic queue/coord/project providers       | adapt          | Read projection first; mutating cutover after parity/audit              |
-| Skills catalog/load/manage               | Hermes skills/Pi skills                  | Mosaic skill registry/provider             | adapt          | Import metadata/provenance; preserve source skill until validated       |
-| Tools and MCP                            | Hermes/OpenClaw/MCP                      | Mosaic tool registry/MCP                   | adapt          | Default deny; migrate allowlisted tools one capability at a time        |
-| Cron/scheduled work                      | Hermes cron                              | Mosaic scheduler/queue                     | adapt          | Shadow schedules; prevent duplicate execution; rollback owner field     |
-| Memory search/recent/capture             | jarvis-brain/OpenViking/OpenBrain/Hermes | Mosaic memory provider                     | adapt          | Flat/project stores remain truth; semantic systems are mirrors          |
-| User/profile preferences                 | Hermes memory/user profile               | Mosaic user/memory domain                  | adapt          | Provenance + explicit conflict rules; exportable rollback snapshot      |
-| Agent state/inbox/handoff                | OpenClaw extensions/session files        | Mosaic durable state service               | native         | Read legacy handoff during coexistence; write Mosaic only after cutover |
-| Runtime contract/bootstrap               | Mosaic framework/Hermes/OpenClaw         | Mosaic compose/runtime provider            | native         | Legacy launchers remain until clean-host parity passes                  |
-| Repository/PR workflow                   | Mosaic wrappers/Hermes tools             | Mosaic operator plugin                     | native         | Wrapper-only; no raw-provider fallback                                  |
-| Incident-safe diagnostics                | Hermes skills/tools                      | Mosaic scoped operator plugin              | adapt          | Read-only first; privileged recovery requires approval                  |
-| Broad unrestricted shell from Discord    | Hermes/OpenClaw configurations           | None                                       | reject         | No cutover; replace with allowlisted typed operations                   |
-| Raw full transcript bulk migration       | Hermes/Claude/OpenClaw histories         | Indexed summaries/selective import         | reject         | Keep source archives subject to retention; no automatic copy            |
-| Voice/video interaction                  | Hermes optional tools                    | Future Mosaic channel plugins              | defer          | Not required for Tess operational release                               |
-| Matrix transport                         | Mosaic connector                         | AgentRuntimeProvider Matrix implementation | native         | Non-default until contract/reliability parity; tmux rollback            |
-
-## Cutover Gates
-
-1. Capability contract and security tests pass.
-2. Data mapping/provenance and retention are documented.
-3. Shadow or dual-run shows no unauthorized access, loss, or duplicate effects.
-4. Operator runbook and rollback are exercised.
-5. Channel/provider binding changes are reversible without schema rollback.
-6. Legacy capability is disabled only after a defined soak period and evidence review.

docs/tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-# Mission Manifest — Tess Interaction Agent
-
-## Mission
-
-- **ID:** tess-20260712
-- **Issue:** #706
-- **Branch:** `feat/tess-interaction-agent`
-- **Phase:** Execution
-- **Current Milestone:** TESS-M1 — Runtime contracts and security foundation
-- **Progress:** 0 / 5 delivery milestones complete
-- **Status:** active
-- **Owner:** Mosaic orchestrator; Mos is coordinating fleet authority
-- **Source PRD:** `docs/PRD.md` — `TESS-*` requirements
-- **Scratchpad:** `docs/scratchpads/tess-20260712.md`
-
-## Mission Statement
-
-Ship Tess as Jason's durable Pi-native GPT-5.6 Sol high-reasoning interaction agent for Discord and CLI, with safe visibility/control of Mosaic fleet and transitional Hermes capabilities, while Mos remains the coding/general orchestration authority.
-
-## Invariants
-
-1. Mosaic is the enterprise AI hub; Hermes is a reference migration adapter.
-2. Gateway is the single API surface.
-3. Mos owns coding/general fleet orchestration; Tess owns human interaction, visibility, mediation, and migration access.
-4. Runtime, transport, channel, memory, and external-agent integrations are replaceable adapters.
-5. No source task completes before merged PR, terminal-green CI, independent review, and linked task/issue closure.
-
-## Milestones
-
-| ID      | Issue | Name                                                                | Status      | Exit gate                                                                                                         |
-| ------- | ----- | ------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| TESS-M1 | #707  | Runtime contracts and security foundation                           | ready       | AgentRuntimeProvider, normalized events/capabilities/errors, RBAC/audit contracts and contract tests merged       |
-| TESS-M2 | #708  | Durable Pi Tess service and state                                   | not-started | GPT-5.6 Sol high service starts, resumes, checkpoints, and passes restart/compaction tests                        |
-| TESS-M3 | #709  | Discord and CLI interaction surfaces                                | not-started | One durable session works through dedicated Discord binding and `mosaic tess`, including attach and approvals     |
-| TESS-M4 | #710  | Fleet, Mos, Hermes, memory, state, and tool plugins                 | not-started | Fleet/Mos boundary and transitional capability matrix demonstrated end-to-end                                     |
-| TESS-M5 | #711  | Matrix/native migration, recovery, documentation, and qualification | not-started | Transport parity, migration/rollback matrix, security review, docs, greenfield and deployment validation complete |
-
-## Success Criteria
-
-All `AC-TESS-*` criteria in `docs/PRD.md` are mapped to reproducible evidence. The final operational test must prove Discord + CLI session continuity, fleet/Mos coordination, authorized Hermes transition capabilities, denial/audit paths, restart recovery, and rollback.
-
-## Session History
-
-| Session | Date       | Runtime              | Outcome                                                                                                                                     |
-| ------- | ---------- | -------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| S1      | 2026-07-12 | Hermes / GPT-5.6 Sol | User commission captured; Mosaic/OpenViking/session/code archaeology completed; issue #706 created; PRD and task control plane initialized. |

docs/tess/TASKS.md

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Tasks — Tess Interaction Agent
-
-> Mission: `tess-20260712` · Issue: #706 · PRD requirements: `TESS-*`
-> Orchestrator is sole writer. Workers must not modify this file.
-> `repo` contains one or more comma-separated repository-relative roots; every listed root must exist before dispatch.
-
-| id | status | description | issue | agent | repo | branch | depends_on | estimate | notes |
-| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| TESS-PLAN-001 | done | Finalize PRD, architecture, authority boundary, threat model, migration inventory, and verification matrix | #706 | sonnet | docs, packages/types, apps/gateway | feat/tess-interaction-agent | — | 22K | Independent gate PASS after two remediation rounds; completion effective when planning PR merges |
-| TESS-M1-SEC-001 | not-started | Enforce command scopes/roles and durable exact-action approval for privileged/destructive commands | #707 | codex | apps/gateway | fix/tess-command-authz | TESS-PLAN-001 | 25K | TESS-SEC-002; security TDD |
-| TESS-M1-SEC-002 | not-started | Enforce owner/tenant binding on session list/read/attach/send/terminate across REST and WS | #707 | codex | apps/gateway | fix/tess-session-ownership | TESS-PLAN-001 | 30K | TESS-SEC-003; security TDD |
-| TESS-M1-SEC-003 | not-started | Bind MCP actor/tenant to authenticated context and add per-tool scopes | #707 | codex | apps/gateway | fix/tess-mcp-identity | TESS-PLAN-001 | 22K | TESS-SEC-004; security TDD |
-| TESS-M1-SEC-004 | not-started | Add authenticated Discord service ingress, allowlists, correlation and replay protection | #707 | codex | plugins/discord, apps/gateway | fix/tess-discord-ingress | TESS-PLAN-001 | 28K | TESS-SEC-005; security TDD |
-| TESS-M1-SEC-005 | not-started | Redact/classify secret and PII before persistence/egress; harden provider login flow | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/log | fix/tess-redaction | TESS-PLAN-001 | 28K | TESS-SEC-006; seeded canary tests |
-| TESS-M1-SEC-006 | not-started | Scope session GC/retention or separate authorized global retention job | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/log | fix/tess-session-gc-scope | TESS-PLAN-001 | 18K | TESS-SEC-009; isolation TDD |
-| TESS-M1-001 | not-started | Define AgentRuntimeProvider, capabilities, session tree, normalized stream events/errors, attach semantics | #707 | codex | packages/types, packages/agent | feat/tess-runtime-contract | TESS-PLAN-001 | 25K | TESS-ARP-001, TESS-TRN-001; contract TDD |
-| TESS-M1-002 | not-started | Implement provider registry/service with immutable actor scope, approval, audit and correlation boundaries | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/agent | feat/tess-provider-registry | TESS-M1-001,TESS-M1-SEC-001,TESS-M1-SEC-002,TESS-M1-SEC-003 | 30K | TESS-SEC-001..004,007; security TDD |
-| TESS-M1-003 | not-started | Implement tmux/fleet runtime provider and safe attach/message/terminate capability policy | #707 | codex | packages/mosaic, packages/agent | feat/tess-fleet-provider | TESS-M1-002 | 30K | TESS-FLT-001; exact target/identity tests |
-| TESS-M1-OBS-001 | not-started | Implement correlation propagation, structured runtime/provider/tool audit, health/readiness and safe effective-policy status | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/agent, packages/log | feat/tess-observability | TESS-M1-002 | 24K | TESS-OBS-001; no credential material |
-| TESS-M1-V | not-started | Independent architecture/security review and complete contract/abuse-suite verification | #707 | sonnet | apps/gateway, packages/agent, packages/log, plugins/discord | review/tess-m1 | TESS-M1-SEC-001,TESS-M1-SEC-002,TESS-M1-SEC-003,TESS-M1-SEC-004,TESS-M1-SEC-005,TESS-M1-SEC-006,TESS-M1-003,TESS-M1-OBS-001 | 20K | Gate M2 |
-| TESS-M2-001 | not-started | Add Tess roster/profile/service pinned to GPT-5.6 Sol high with fail-fast config and observable effective policy | #708 | codex | packages/mosaic/framework | feat/tess-pi-service | TESS-M1-V | 22K | TESS-PI-001; explicit AC-TESS-03 test |
-| TESS-M2-002 | not-started | Implement durable session identity, inbox/outbox, approval, checkpoint, handoff, compaction and restart recovery | #708 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/agent, packages/db | feat/tess-durable-state | TESS-M2-001 | 38K | TESS-STA-001, TESS-SEC-007..008; recovery TDD |
-| TESS-M2-V | not-started | Clean-host Pi launch plus model/policy status and restart/compaction/duplicate-side-effect verification | #708 | sonnet | apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration, packages/mosaic/src | review/tess-m2 | TESS-M2-002 | 18K | Gate M3; AC-TESS-03/06 |
-| TESS-M3-001 | not-started | Bind dedicated Tess Discord channel with streaming, threads, attachments, pairing/RBAC and approvals | #709 | codex | plugins/discord, apps/gateway | feat/tess-discord | TESS-M2-V,TESS-M1-SEC-004 | 35K | TESS-DSC-001 |
-| TESS-M3-002 | not-started | Implement `mosaic tess` chat/status/sessions/tree/attach/send/stop/health/recover CLI | #709 | codex | packages/mosaic | feat/tess-cli | TESS-M2-V | 30K | TESS-CLI-001 |
-| TESS-M3-V | not-started | Discord+CLI same-session E2E, denial/approval tests, and operator-flow review | #709 | sonnet | apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration, plugins/discord, packages/mosaic/src | review/tess-m3 | TESS-M3-001,TESS-M3-002 | 20K | Gate M4 |
-| TESS-M4-001 | not-started | Implement Mos coordination handoff/observe/result contract with authority-boundary tests | #710 | codex | packages/coord, apps/gateway | feat/tess-mos-coordination | TESS-M3-V | 25K | TESS-MOS-001 |
-| TESS-M4-002 | not-started | Implement transitional Hermes runtime/capability adapter | #710 | codex | packages/agent, apps/gateway | feat/tess-hermes-adapter | TESS-M3-V | 40K | TESS-HRM-001; no legacy schema in core contracts |
-| TESS-M4-003 | not-started | Implement memory/retrieval, state/inbox, runtime bootstrap, fleet diagnostics and GitOps plugin foundations | #710 | codex | packages/memory, packages/agent, packages/mosaic | feat/tess-operator-plugins | TESS-M3-V | 40K | TESS-MEM-001, TESS-PLG-001 |
-| TESS-M4-V | not-started | Cross-provider capability, privacy, authority and failure-path qualification | #710 | sonnet | apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration, packages/agent | review/tess-m4 | TESS-M4-001,TESS-M4-002,TESS-M4-003 | 22K | Gate M5 |
-| TESS-M5-001 | not-started | Implement Matrix/native runtime provider behind common contracts and parity suite | #711 | codex | packages/mosaic, packages/agent | feat/tess-matrix-provider | TESS-M4-V | 30K | TESS-TRN-001 |
-| TESS-M5-002 | not-started | Complete migration inventory, cutover, rollback, retention and deprecation evidence | #711 | sonnet | docs/tess | feat/tess-migration-docs | TESS-M4-V | 18K | TESS-MIG-001 |
-| TESS-M5-003 | not-started | Complete OpenAPI, user/admin/developer/plugin/operations docs and checklist | #711 | codex | docs | feat/tess-docs | TESS-M5-001,TESS-M5-002 | 22K | Documentation hard gate |
-| TESS-M5-V | not-started | Full baseline, contract, integration, Discord/CLI E2E, security review, recovery drill and rollback qualification | #711 | sonnet | apps/gateway, packages/agent, plugins/discord, packages/mosaic | review/tess-final | TESS-M5-003 | 35K | Maps AC-TESS-01..11 to evidence |

docs/tess/THREAT-MODEL.md

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-# Tess Threat Model
-
-## Assets and Trust Boundaries
-
-Assets: operator identity, tenant/project data, agent sessions, fleet control, approvals, credentials, memories, tool outputs, audit evidence, and provider transports.
-
-Trust boundaries: Discord→plugin, CLI→gateway, plugin→gateway service identity, gateway→Pi/provider, Tess→Mos/fleet, Tess→Hermes, MCP→gateway, persistence, and tmux/Matrix transports.
-
-## Threat Matrix
-
-| ID    | Severity | Threat                                                                   | Required control                                                                                                                     | Required verification                                                     |
-| ----- | -------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| TM-01 | critical | Client invokes admin/system command without role                         | Server-side scope/role enforcement in executor; durable approval for privileged/destructive commands                                 | Authenticated non-admin and forged-scope tests deny and audit             |
-| TM-02 | critical | Cross-user/tenant list, attach, send, or terminate by guessed session ID | Owner/tenant binding on every session operation; admin override is explicit and audited                                              | Cross-tenant matrix for REST, WS, CLI, Discord and provider methods       |
-| TM-03 | high     | MCP caller supplies another `userId`                                     | Remove actor IDs from schemas; derive actor/tenant from authenticated context; per-tool scopes                                       | Forged actor/tool calls deny; no victim data returned                     |
-| TM-04 | high     | Discord ingress impersonates user/channel or bypasses gateway auth       | Service-to-service identity, guild/channel/user allowlists, signed/correlated envelope, replay protection                            | Invalid service identity, unlisted IDs, replayed message IDs all deny     |
-| TM-05 | high     | Secrets/PII leak in chat, auth links, tool args, logs, memory, or DB     | Redact before persistence/egress; DM/out-of-band auth flow; short-lived hashed token state; output classification                    | Seeded secret/PII canary absent from durable stores/logs/public channel   |
-| TM-06 | high     | Prompt/tool injection escalates from content to privileged action        | Treat messages/files/tool output as untrusted data; structured proposals only; allowlisted tools; approval binds exact action digest | Injection corpus cannot invoke unapproved tools or alter authority        |
-| TM-07 | high     | Approval forged, replayed, or applied to modified action                 | One-time approval with actor, tenant, action digest, expiry, correlation and consumption record                                      | Forged/replayed/expired/mutated approvals deny and audit                  |
-| TM-08 | medium   | Restart causes message loss or duplicate side effects                    | Durable inbox/outbox/checkpoint; idempotency keys; transactional state transitions; bounded replay                                   | Kill/restart at each state transition; exactly-once effect or safe dedupe |
-| TM-09 | medium   | Session GC/retention crosses tenant/session scope                        | Session/user-scoped GC or separately authorized global retention job                                                                 | GC one session; unrelated logs/memory remain unchanged                    |
-| TM-10 | high     | tmux/Matrix transport target or identity spoofing                        | Exact target/socket binding, peer identity verification, Matrix whoami, authenticated transport metadata                             | Wrong socket/peer/room/identity refuses delivery/attach                   |
-| TM-11 | medium   | Hermes adapter exposes unsupported or broader legacy powers              | Capability negotiation, default deny, normalized scopes, adapter sandbox/timeouts                                                    | Unsupported and over-scoped operations fail closed                        |
-| TM-12 | medium   | Tess competes with Mos or bypasses orchestration gates                   | Authority policy and correlated Mos handoff; no Tess worker-claim capability by default                                              | Coding/decomposition intent produces handoff, not direct claim            |
-
-## Security Invariants
-
-1. Authentication is not authorization; every command/tool/provider operation is authorized server-side.
-2. Actor, tenant, roles, and channel bindings come only from authenticated gateway context.
-3. No client-provided session ID grants ownership or attachment.
-4. No privileged action executes without a matching, unexpired, one-time approval when policy requires it.
-5. Redaction occurs before persistence and before channel egress.
-6. Every externally caused operation is replay-safe and correlated.
-7. Provider capability absence is a denial, not an invitation to shell around it.
-
-## Existing Findings That Block Tess
-
-- Command executor lacks server-side enforcement for declared scopes.
-- Session list/reuse/destroy surfaces are not owner-filtered consistently.
-- MCP schemas accept caller-supplied user identity.
-- Discord plugin lacks a complete authenticated service ingress and user/channel allowlists.
-- Chat/tool persistence lacks mandatory redaction.
-- Sessions/pending Discord output are in-memory and not restart-safe.
-- Session GC currently performs globally scoped promotion.
-
-These are tracked as M1 security prerequisites and must pass independent security review before Tess ingress is enabled.

docs/tess/VERIFICATION-MATRIX.md

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-# Tess Verification Matrix
-
-| Acceptance criterion | Requirements                             | Planned evidence                                                                                                                | Gate             |
-| -------------------- | ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------- |
-| AC-TESS-01           | TESS-PI-001, TESS-DSC-001, TESS-CLI-001  | Discord/CLI same-session integration and streaming E2E                                                                          | M3-V             |
-| AC-TESS-02           | TESS-ARP-001, TESS-CLI-001, TESS-FLT-001 | CLI contract tests for status/sessions/tree/attach/send/stop, typed denial/error snapshots                                      | M3-V             |
-| AC-TESS-03           | TESS-PI-001, TESS-OBS-001                | Clean service launch; status asserts GPT-5.6 Sol, high reasoning and effective tool policy with secret canaries absent          | M2-V, M3-V       |
-| AC-TESS-04           | TESS-MOS-001, TESS-FLT-001               | Authority E2E: coding request creates Mos handoff; safe status runs in Tess; no competing worker claim                          | M4-V             |
-| AC-TESS-05           | TESS-HRM-001                             | Hermes capability contract suite: sessions/stream/send/tree plus Kanban/skills/memory/tools/cron supported-or-denied matrix     | M4-V             |
-| AC-TESS-06           | TESS-STA-001, TESS-SEC-008               | Kill/restart/compaction fault injection across inbox/outbox/checkpoint transitions; duplicate side-effect detector              | M2-V, M5-V       |
-| AC-TESS-07           | TESS-SEC-001..009                        | Threat-model abuse suite: authz, tenant isolation, forged identity/approval, injection, redaction, transport identity, GC scope | M1-V, M3-V, M5-V |
-| AC-TESS-08           | TESS-TRN-001                             | Common provider contract suite against tmux/fleet and Matrix/native; identity and replay tests                                  | M5-V             |
-| AC-TESS-09           | all                                      | `pnpm typecheck`, lint, format, unit/integration/contract/E2E; independent code and security reviews; CI URLs                   | Every milestone  |
-| AC-TESS-10           | TESS-MIG-001                             | Completed capability inventory with native/adapted/deferred/rejected state, owner, cutover/rollback evidence                    | M5-V             |
-| AC-TESS-11           | TESS-PLG-001, TESS-OBS-001               | OpenAPI and user/admin/developer/plugin/ops docs, sitemap links, documentation checklist                                        | M5-V             |
-
-## Security Abuse Suite Minimum
-
-- Role/scope matrix for every command and provider capability.
-- Cross-tenant and cross-user session ID matrix across REST, WS, Discord, CLI, MCP, and providers.
-- Discord service identity, guild/channel/user allowlist, replay, attachment, and mention/DM policy cases.
-- Prompt/tool injection corpus and structured-proposal enforcement.
-- Approval action-digest mutation, replay, expiry, tenant, and actor mismatch cases.
-- Secret/PII canaries through message, attachment, tool args/output, logs, memory, audit, and error paths.
-- Restart fault injection before/after enqueue, provider send, side effect, response persistence, and acknowledgement.
-- Wrong tmux socket/target and Matrix identity/room/replay cases.
-
-## Evidence Rules
-
-Evidence must include command/test name, terminal result, CI run URL, PR/merge reference, environment, and artifact/log location. A worker self-report is not evidence until independently verified.

packages/log/src/agent-logs.ts

@@ -58,28 +58,9 @@ export function createAgentLogsRepo(db: Db) {
       return rows[0];
     },
 
-    /**
-     * Transition hot logs for one session to warm tier. Session retention is
-     * default-deny: no other session's logs can be changed by this operation.
-     */
-    async promoteSessionToWarm(sessionId: string, olderThan: Date): Promise<number> {
-      const result = await db
-        .update(agentLogs)
-        .set({ tier: 'warm', summarizedAt: new Date() })
-        .where(
-          and(
-            eq(agentLogs.sessionId, sessionId),
-            eq(agentLogs.tier, 'hot'),
-            lt(agentLogs.createdAt, olderThan),
-          ),
-        )
-        .returning();
-      return result.length;
-    },
-
     /**
      * Transition hot logs older than the cutoff to warm tier.
-     * Reserved for a separately authorized global retention job.
+     * Returns the number of logs transitioned.
      */
     async promoteToWarm(olderThan: Date): Promise<number> {
       const result = await db

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/_lib/credentials.sh

@@ -15,23 +15,13 @@
 #
 # After loading, service-specific env vars are exported.
 # Run `load_credentials --help` for details.
-#
-# Resolution order (first match wins):
-#   1. $MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE (explicit override — never second-guessed)
-#   2. $HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json
-#   3. /etc/mosaic/credentials.json (host-level fallback)
-# The /etc fallback exists for HOME-redirected profile environments, where
-# $HOME points at a per-profile directory that has no credentials file.
-# Operators symlink /etc/mosaic/credentials.json to the host's canonical
-# file once, instead of exporting MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE per invocation.
 
 if [[ -z "${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:-}" ]]; then
-  for _cand in "$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json" "/etc/mosaic/credentials.json"; do
+  for _cand in "$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json"; do
     if [[ -f "$_cand" ]]; then MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$_cand"; break; fi
   done
   : "${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:=$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json}"
 fi
-export MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE
 
 _mosaic_require_jq() {
   if ! command -v jq &>/dev/null; then

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/detect-platform.sh

@@ -86,16 +86,7 @@ gitea_url_matches_host() {
 
 get_gitea_service_for_host() {
     local host="$1"
-    local cred_file="${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:-}"
+    local cred_file="${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:-$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json}"
-    if [[ -z "$cred_file" ]]; then
-        # Same resolution chain as _lib/credentials.sh: profile HOME, then
-        # host-level /etc only if it exists; neither existing keeps the
-        # $HOME default (matches the lib's final := fallback).
-        cred_file="$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json"
-        if [[ ! -f "$cred_file" && -f /etc/mosaic/credentials.json ]]; then
-            cred_file="/etc/mosaic/credentials.json"
-        fi
-    fi
 
     case "$host" in
         git.mosaicstack.dev)
@@ -240,33 +231,6 @@ get_gitea_login_for_host() {
     return 1
 }
 
-# Validate the current authenticated Gitea user for a resolved Tea login.
-# Tea stores a user name with each login which can become stale after user rename,
-# token rotation, or server migration. Querying /user derives the identity from the
-# active credential instead of trusting that saved name. Callers fall back to the
-# host-scoped API path when this validation fails.
-get_gitea_authenticated_user() {
-    local login_name="$1" response
-
-    command -v tea >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 1
-    response=$(tea api --login "$login_name" /user 2>/dev/null) || return 1
-    TEA_AUTHENTICATED_USER_JSON="$response" python3 - <<'PY'
-import json
-import os
-
-try:
-    user = json.loads(os.environ["TEA_AUTHENTICATED_USER_JSON"])
-except (KeyError, json.JSONDecodeError):
-    raise SystemExit(1)
-
-login = user.get("login") if isinstance(user, dict) else None
-if isinstance(login, str) and login:
-    print(login)
-    raise SystemExit(0)
-raise SystemExit(1)
-PY
-}
-
 get_default_tea_login() {
     local logins_json
 

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/issue-assign.sh

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -i 42 -l "in-progress" -m "0.2.0"
     $(basename "$0") -i 42 -a @me
 EOF
-    exit "${1:-1}"
+    exit 1
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             shift
             ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage 0
+            usage
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/issue-create.sh

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ TITLE=""
 BODY=""
 LABELS=""
 MILESTONE=""
-INTERACTIVE=false
 
 # get_remote_host and get_gitea_token are provided by detect-platform.sh
 
@@ -67,15 +66,13 @@ Options:
     -b, --body BODY         Issue body/description
     -l, --labels LABELS     Comma-separated labels (e.g., "bug,feature")
     -m, --milestone NAME    Milestone name to assign
-    -i, --interactive       Prompt for missing issue fields
     -h, --help              Show this help message
 
 Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -t "Fix login bug" -l "bug,priority-high"
     $(basename "$0") -t "Add dark mode" -b "Implement theme switching" -m "0.2.0"
-    $(basename "$0") -i
 EOF
-    exit "${1:-1}"
+    exit 1
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -97,12 +94,8 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             MILESTONE="$2"
             shift 2
             ;;
-        -i|--interactive)
-            INTERACTIVE=true
-            shift
-            ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage 0
+            usage
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
@@ -111,13 +104,6 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
     esac
 done
 
-if [[ "$INTERACTIVE" == true ]]; then
-    [[ -n "$TITLE" ]] || read -r -p "Issue title: " TITLE
-    [[ -n "$BODY" ]] || read -r -p "Issue body (optional): " BODY || true
-    [[ -n "$LABELS" ]] || read -r -p "Labels, comma-separated (optional): " LABELS || true
-    [[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]] || read -r -p "Milestone (optional): " MILESTONE || true
-fi
-
 if [[ -z "$TITLE" ]]; then
     echo "Error: Title is required (-t)" >&2
     usage
@@ -141,11 +127,6 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
                 gitea_issue_create_api
                 exit $?
             }
-            if ! get_gitea_authenticated_user "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME" >/dev/null; then
-                echo "Warning: Tea authenticated-user validation failed (possible stale user/login); trying Gitea API fallback..." >&2
-                gitea_issue_create_api
-                exit $?
-            fi
             REPO_ARGS=(--repo "$REPO_SLUG" --login "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME")
             CMD=(tea issue create "${REPO_ARGS[@]}" --title "$TITLE")
             [[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD+=(--description "$BODY")

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/issue-list.sh

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -m "0.2.0"               # Issues in milestone 0.2.0
     $(basename "$0") --repo ddk/ai-bma         # List issues from anywhere
 EOF
-    exit "${1:-1}"
+    exit 1
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             shift 2
             ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage 0
+            usage
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/milestone-create.sh

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -t "0.0.1" -d "Pre-MVP Foundation Sprint"
     $(basename "$0") -t "0.1.0" -d "MVP Release" --due "2025-03-01"
 EOF
-    exit "${1:-1}"
+    exit 1
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             shift
             ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage 0
+            usage
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-create.sh

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -i 42 -b "Implements the feature described in #42"
     $(basename "$0") -t "WIP: New feature" --draft
 EOF
-    exit "${1:-1}"
+    exit 1
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             shift
             ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage 0
+            usage
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
@@ -183,11 +183,6 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
             gitea_pr_create_api
             exit $?
         }
-        if ! get_gitea_authenticated_user "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME" >/dev/null; then
-            echo "Warning: Tea authenticated-user validation failed (possible stale user/login); trying Gitea API fallback..." >&2
-            gitea_pr_create_api
-            exit $?
-        fi
         REPO_ARGS=(--repo "$REPO_SLUG" --login "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME")
         CMD=(tea pr create "${REPO_ARGS[@]}" --title "$TITLE")
         [[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD+=(--description "$BODY")

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-list.sh

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -s merged -a username    # Merged PRs by user
     $(basename "$0") --repo ddk/ai-bma         # List PRs from anywhere
 EOF
-    exit "${1:-1}"
+    exit 1
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             shift 2
             ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage 0
+            usage
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-merge.sh

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -n 42 -d                 # Squash merge and delete branch
     $(basename "$0") -n 42 --skip-queue-guard # Skip queue guard wait
 EOF
-    exit "${1:-1}"
+    exit 1
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             shift
             ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage 0
+            usage
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-gitea-login-resolution.sh

@@ -45,11 +45,6 @@ JSON
     exit 0
 fi
 
-if [[ "${1:-}" == "api" ]]; then
-    printf '%s\n' '{"login":"ci-bot"}'
-    exit 0
-fi
-
 printf 'tea %s\n' "$*" >> "$MOSAIC_TEST_LOG"
 if [[ "${MOSAIC_TEA_FAIL_PR_CREATE:-}" == "1" && "$*" == pr\ create* ]]; then
     echo 'GetUserByName: simulated stale login failure' >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-help-exit-code.sh

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Regression harness for #701: -h/--help must exit 0, bad args must still exit nonzero.
-#
-# Covers the 7 wrappers whose usage() previously hard-coded `exit 1`, so every
-# --help invocation exited nonzero and logged a phantom isError across fleet lanes.
-# Asserts, per wrapper:
-#   1. `--help` exits 0 and prints usage.
-#   2. `-h` exits 0 and prints usage.
-#   3. A genuine unknown flag still exits nonzero (usage() default path untouched).
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-
-WRAPPERS=(
-    issue-assign.sh
-    issue-create.sh
-    issue-list.sh
-    milestone-create.sh
-    pr-create.sh
-    pr-list.sh
-    pr-merge.sh
-)
-
-fail=0
-
-for wrapper in "${WRAPPERS[@]}"; do
-    path="$SCRIPT_DIR/$wrapper"
-
-    if ! output=$(bash "$path" --help 2>&1); then
-        echo "FAIL: $wrapper --help exited nonzero" >&2
-        fail=1
-    elif [[ "$output" != Usage:* ]]; then
-        echo "FAIL: $wrapper --help did not print usage" >&2
-        fail=1
-    fi
-
-    if ! bash "$path" -h >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        echo "FAIL: $wrapper -h exited nonzero" >&2
-        fail=1
-    fi
-
-    if bash "$path" --this-is-not-a-real-flag >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        echo "FAIL: $wrapper accepted an unknown flag (should have exited nonzero)" >&2
-        fail=1
-    fi
-done
-
-if [[ "$fail" -eq 0 ]]; then
-    echo "help-exit-code regression passed (7/7 wrappers)"
-fi
-
-exit "$fail"

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-create-body-safety.sh

@@ -55,11 +55,6 @@ JSON
     exit 0
 fi
 
-if [[ "${1:-}" == "api" ]]; then
-    printf '%s\n' '{"login":"ci-bot"}'
-    exit 0
-fi
-
 if [[ "${1:-}" == "issue" && "${2:-}" == "create" ]]; then
     desc=""
     while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-create-interactive-auth.sh

@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Regression harness for #703: interactive issue creation and stale Tea-user fallback.
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/issue-create-interactive-auth}"
-REPO_DIR="$WORK_DIR/repo"
-BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
-LOG_FILE="$WORK_DIR/calls.log"
-CREDENTIALS_FILE="$WORK_DIR/credentials.json"
-
-rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
-mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR"
-git -C "$REPO_DIR" init -q
-git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote add origin https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git
-
-cat > "$CREDENTIALS_FILE" <<'JSON'
-{"gitea":{"mosaicstack":{"url":"https://git.mosaicstack.dev","token":"test-token"}}}
-JSON
-
-cat > "$BIN_DIR/tea" <<'SH'
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-set -euo pipefail
-if [[ "$*" == "login list --output json" ]]; then
-  printf '%s\n' '[{"name":"mosaicstack","url":"https://git.mosaicstack.dev"}]'
-  exit 0
-fi
-if [[ "${1:-}" == "api" ]]; then
-  if [[ "${MOSAIC_TEA_STALE_USER:-0}" == "1" ]]; then
-    echo 'GetUserByName: stale configured user' >&2
-    exit 1
-  fi
-  printf '%s\n' '{"login":"current-user"}'
-  exit 0
-fi
-printf 'tea %s\n' "$*" >> "$MOSAIC_TEST_LOG"
-exit 0
-SH
-
-cat > "$BIN_DIR/curl" <<'SH'
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-set -euo pipefail
-printf 'curl %s\n' "$*" >> "$MOSAIC_TEST_LOG"
-printf '%s\n' '{"number":703}'
-SH
-chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/tea" "$BIN_DIR/curl"
-
-run_wrapper() {
-  (
-    cd "$REPO_DIR"
-    PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" \
-    MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
-    MOSAIC_TEST_LOG="$LOG_FILE" \
-    "$@"
-  )
-}
-
-: > "$LOG_FILE"
-printf 'Interactive title\nInteractive body\nlabel-a,label-b\nM1\n' | run_wrapper "$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-create.sh" -i >/dev/null
-
-grep -q -- 'tea issue create --repo mosaicstack/stack --login mosaicstack --title Interactive title --description Interactive body --labels label-a,label-b --milestone M1' "$LOG_FILE"
-
-# Explicit values take precedence in interactive mode: no title input is
-# supplied, but the wrapper still creates the issue with the explicit title.
-: > "$LOG_FILE"
-printf '\n\n\n' | run_wrapper "$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-create.sh" -i -t 'Explicit title' >/dev/null
-grep -q -- 'tea issue create --repo mosaicstack/stack --login mosaicstack --title Explicit title' "$LOG_FILE"
-
-: > "$LOG_FILE"
-run_wrapper env MOSAIC_TEA_STALE_USER=1 "$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-create.sh" -t 'Fallback title' -b 'Fallback body' >/dev/null 2>"$WORK_DIR/issue-stderr"
-grep -q -- 'curl .*https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/issues' "$LOG_FILE"
-grep -q -- 'Tea authenticated-user validation failed' "$WORK_DIR/issue-stderr"
-if grep -q -- 'tea issue create' "$LOG_FILE"; then
-  echo 'FAIL: issue-create invoked Tea mutation after stale-user validation failed' >&2
-  exit 1
-fi
-
-: > "$LOG_FILE"
-run_wrapper env MOSAIC_TEA_STALE_USER=1 "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-create.sh" -t 'PR fallback' -H feature/wrapfix >/dev/null 2>"$WORK_DIR/pr-stderr"
-grep -q -- 'curl .*https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls' "$LOG_FILE"
-grep -q -- 'Tea authenticated-user validation failed' "$WORK_DIR/pr-stderr"
-if grep -q -- 'tea pr create' "$LOG_FILE"; then
-  echo 'FAIL: pr-create invoked Tea mutation after stale-user validation failed' >&2
-  exit 1
-fi
-
-echo 'issue-create interactive/auth regression harness passed'

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/README.md

@@ -87,10 +87,6 @@ message crosses the wire as base64 (`-b`) to avoid all shell-quoting hazards.
 
 - `agent-send.sh` — inter-agent wrapper (preamble + local/remote dispatch).
 - `send-message.sh` — low-level reliable single-pane submitter (`-b` base64 input).
-- `auto-submit-drafts.sh` — watchdog that flushes stable unsubmitted prompt
-  drafts on a coordinator pane (default target `mos-claude`); run it as a
-  long-lived process alongside the coordinator session.
-- `agent-send.test.sh` — regression + grammar lock for `agent-send.sh`.
 - `test-send-message-socket.sh` — smoke test for named-socket isolation.
 
 ## Distribution

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/auto-submit-drafts.sh

@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# auto-submit-drafts.sh — watchdog for Claude Code panes that receive channel
-# messages but leave them as unsubmitted prompt drafts. Intended for Mos only.
-set -uo pipefail
-
-TARGET="${1:-mos-claude}"
-INTERVAL="${INTERVAL:-2}"
-STABLE_SECONDS="${STABLE_SECONDS:-4}"
-LOG_PREFIX="[auto-submit-drafts:$TARGET]"
-
-last_prompt=""
-first_seen=0
-
-prompt_text() {
-  tmux capture-pane -t "$TARGET" -p 2>/dev/null | python3 -c '
-import sys, re
-lines = sys.stdin.read().splitlines()
-idx = None
-for i in range(len(lines)-1, -1, -1):
-    if "❯" in lines[i]:
-        idx = i
-        break
-if idx is None:
-    raise SystemExit
-parts = []
-after = lines[idx].split("❯", 1)[1]
-parts.append(after)
-for line in lines[idx+1:]:
-    # Stop at Claude Code separator/border lines.
-    if "─" in line or "╰" in line or "╭" in line:
-        break
-    s = line.replace("\u00a0", " ")
-    s = re.sub(r"[\x00-\x1f\x7f]", "", s).strip()
-    if s:
-        parts.append(s)
-text = " ".join(parts).replace("\u00a0", " ")
-text = re.sub(r"[\x00-\x1f\x7f]", "", text).strip()
-print(text)
-'
-}
-
-while true; do
-  if ! tmux has-session -t "$TARGET" 2>/dev/null; then
-    echo "$LOG_PREFIX target missing; waiting" >&2
-    sleep "$INTERVAL"
-    last_prompt=""
-    first_seen=0
-    continue
-  fi
-
-  current="$(prompt_text || true)"
-  now="$(date +%s)"
-
-  if [[ -z "$current" ]]; then
-    last_prompt=""
-    first_seen=0
-    sleep "$INTERVAL"
-    continue
-  fi
-
-  if [[ "$current" != "$last_prompt" ]]; then
-    last_prompt="$current"
-    first_seen="$now"
-    sleep "$INTERVAL"
-    continue
-  fi
-
-  age=$(( now - first_seen ))
-  if (( age >= STABLE_SECONDS )); then
-    echo "$LOG_PREFIX submitting stable draft after ${age}s: ${current:0:120}" >&2
-    tmux send-keys -t "$TARGET" C-j
-    sleep 0.8
-    tmux send-keys -t "$TARGET" C-m
-    sleep 2
-    last_prompt=""
-    first_seen=0
-  else
-    sleep "$INTERVAL"
-  fi
-done

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/send-message.sh

@@ -77,20 +77,10 @@ snippet=$(printf '%s' "$MSG" | tr '\n' ' ' | tr -s ' ' | sed 's/[^[:print:]]//g'
 
 # 1) Paste the body as a bracketed paste so multi-line content does not submit
 #    line-by-line. load-buffer/paste-buffer is far safer than `send-keys -l`.
-# Buffer name MUST be unique per invocation: concurrent senders on the shared
+printf '%s' "$MSG" | "${tmux_cmd[@]}" load-buffer -b __mosaic_send -
-# tmux server race a fixed name (load overwrites load, -d deletes underneath),
-# cross-delivering or dropping messages — bit the fleet on the 2026-07-09
-# simultaneous restart (briefs swapped between sessions).
-BUF="__mosaic_send_$$_$(date +%s%N)"
-printf '%s' "$MSG" | "${tmux_cmd[@]}" load-buffer -b "$BUF" -
 # -p = bracketed paste when the client supports it; fall back if not.
-"${tmux_cmd[@]}" paste-buffer -d -p -b "$BUF" -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" 2>/dev/null \
+"${tmux_cmd[@]}" paste-buffer -d -p -b __mosaic_send -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" 2>/dev/null \
-  || "${tmux_cmd[@]}" paste-buffer -d -b "$BUF" -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" \
+  || "${tmux_cmd[@]}" paste-buffer -d -b __mosaic_send -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET"
-  || "${tmux_cmd[@]}" delete-buffer -b "$BUF" 2>/dev/null
-# ^ -d deletes the buffer only on a SUCCESSFUL paste; if both attempts fail
-#   (e.g. the target vanished since the liveness check), delete explicitly —
-#   named buffers are exempt from tmux's buffer-limit eviction, so orphans
-#   would otherwise accumulate forever.
 sleep 0.5
 
 # 2) Submit, then verify; flush with another Enter if it is still a draft.

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-socket.sh

@@ -47,32 +47,4 @@ if capture_default | grep -qF "agent socket hello"; then
   fail "agent-send.sh leaked named-socket message to default tmux server"
 fi
 
-# Concurrency: parallel senders on one server must not cross-deliver or drop.
-# Locks the unique-per-invocation paste buffer (a fixed buffer name raced:
-# load overwrote load, -d deleted underneath — messages swapped between panes).
-CONC_N=5
-for i in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
-  tmux -L "$SOCKET" new-session -d -s "conc-$i" -c "$TMPDIR" 'bash --noprofile --norc -i'
-done
-pids=()
-for i in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
-  "$SEND_MESSAGE" -L "$SOCKET" -t "=conc-$i" -m "CONCPAYLOAD-${i}-END" >/dev/null &
-  pids+=($!)
-done
-for pid in "${pids[@]}"; do
-  wait "$pid" || fail "concurrent send-message.sh invocation exited non-zero"
-done
-sleep 0.2
-for i in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
-  pane=$(tmux -L "$SOCKET" capture-pane -t "=conc-$i:0.0" -p)
-  printf '%s' "$pane" | grep -qF "CONCPAYLOAD-${i}-END" \
-    || fail "concurrent send dropped payload for pane conc-$i"
-  for j in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
-    [ "$j" = "$i" ] && continue
-    if printf '%s' "$pane" | grep -qF "CONCPAYLOAD-${j}-END"; then
-      fail "concurrent send cross-delivered payload $j to pane conc-$i"
-    fi
-  done
-done
-
 echo "ok - named tmux socket send tools"