refactor(framework): thin-core prompt diet — cut injected contract ~53% (#529)

Fresh `mosaic gateway install` (npm) left the gateway DB schema empty —
sign-in 500'd with `relation "users" does not exist`, and every entry
point (auth, bootstrap setup) failed because they all query the users
table first. Five stacked bugs on the local (PGlite) tier:

1. `packages/db/package.json` `files: ["dist"]` excluded the `drizzle/`
   SQL migrations from the published tarball.
2. `runMigrations()` only supports postgres-js — unusable for embedded
   PGlite.
3. `apps/gateway/src/database/database.module.ts` never invoked
   migrations at startup.
4. `createPgliteDb` didn't load pgvector, so migration 0001's
   `CREATE EXTENSION vector` failed.
5. Drizzle's PG migrator wraps every migration in one outer
   transaction, which trips Postgres' `check_safe_enum_use` on
   migration 0009 (`ALTER TYPE ADD VALUE 'pending'` → `SET DEFAULT
   'pending'` in the same tx).

Changes:
- Ship `drizzle/` in the published tarball.
- `createPgliteDb` loads `@electric-sql/pglite/vector`.
- New `runPgliteMigrations(handle)` walks the Drizzle journal and
  runs each statement-breakpoint chunk through PGlite's `client.exec()`
  (autocommit per statement). Records into `drizzle.__drizzle_migrations`
  for interop with the postgres-js path. Per-statement try/catch
  surfaces which statement of which migration failed.
- `DatabaseModule` runs migrations in `OnModuleInit` before
  `app.listen()`. Local tier: explicit `runPgliteMigrations` then
  `storageAdapter.migrate()`. Postgres tier: just `storageAdapter.migrate()`,
  which already calls `runMigrations(url)` internally — no double-call.
- Removed `packages/storage/src/test-utils/pglite-with-vector.ts`. The
  "intentionally not exported" rationale is moot now that migration
  0001 forces pgvector load anyway. The integration test uses
  `createPgliteDb` + `runPgliteMigrations` from `@mosaicstack/db`.

Tests: BetterAuth tables exist after migrate; idempotent (re-runs 0009);
partial-failure surfaces statement-level context and leaves no ledger row.

QA on a fresh PGlite install:
- `Applying PGlite schema migrations...` then `Initializing storage
  adapter (pglite)...` in startup log.
- `GET /api/bootstrap/status` → `{"needsSetup":true}` HTTP 200 (was 500).
- `POST /api/bootstrap/setup` reaches Zod validator (was 500).

Scope: this PR fixes the local (PGlite) tier. Postgres-tier first
install still has the outer-transaction problem and a journal ordering
bug (0009's `when` < 0008's). Documented inline as TODO and in the
scratchpad — needs a separate change with real-Postgres validation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.woodpecker/ci.yml

@@ -46,18 +46,28 @@ steps:
   test:
     image: *node_image
     environment:
-      DATABASE_URL: postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@postgres:5432/mosaic
+      # Avoid the namespace-level Woodpecker DB service named "postgres".
+      # The Kubernetes backend exposes service containers by step name.
+      DATABASE_URL: postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@ci-postgres:5432/mosaic
     commands:
       - *enable_pnpm
       # Install postgresql-client for pg_isready
       - apk add --no-cache postgresql-client
-      # Wait up to 30s for postgres to be ready
+      # Wait up to 60s for CI postgres to be ready; fail fast if it never comes up.
       - |
-        for i in $(seq 1 30); do
-          pg_isready -h postgres -p 5432 -U mosaic && break
-          echo "Waiting for postgres ($i/30)..."
+        ready=0
+        for i in $(seq 1 60); do
+          if pg_isready -h ci-postgres -p 5432 -U mosaic; then
+            ready=1
+            break
+          fi
+          echo "Waiting for ci-postgres ($i/60)..."
           sleep 1
         done
+        if [ "$ready" -ne 1 ]; then
+          echo "ci-postgres did not become ready" >&2
+          exit 1
+        fi
       # Run migrations (DATABASE_URL is set in environment above)
       - pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db run db:migrate
       # Run all tests
@@ -66,7 +76,7 @@ steps:
       - typecheck
 
 services:
-  postgres:
+  ci-postgres:
     image: pgvector/pgvector:pg17
     environment:
       POSTGRES_USER: mosaic

.woodpecker/publish.yml

@@ -114,6 +114,31 @@ steps:
     depends_on:
       - build
 
+  build-appservice:
+    image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:debug
+    environment:
+      REGISTRY_USER:
+        from_secret: gitea_username
+      REGISTRY_PASS:
+        from_secret: gitea_password
+      CI_COMMIT_BRANCH: ${CI_COMMIT_BRANCH}
+      CI_COMMIT_TAG: ${CI_COMMIT_TAG}
+      CI_COMMIT_SHA: ${CI_COMMIT_SHA}
+    commands:
+      - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
+      - echo "{\"auths\":{\"git.mosaicstack.dev\":{\"username\":\"$REGISTRY_USER\",\"password\":\"$REGISTRY_PASS\"}}}" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
+      - |
+        DESTINATIONS="--destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/appservice:sha-${CI_COMMIT_SHA:0:7}"
+        if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "main" ]; then
+          DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/appservice:latest"
+        fi
+        if [ -n "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
+          DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/appservice:$CI_COMMIT_TAG"
+        fi
+        /kaniko/executor --context . --dockerfile docker/appservice.Dockerfile $DESTINATIONS
+    depends_on:
+      - build
+
   build-web:
     image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:debug
     environment:

README.md

@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ mosaic yolo pi               # Pi in yolo mode
 
 The launcher verifies your config, checks for `SOUL.md`, injects your `AGENTS.md` standards into the runtime, and forwards all arguments.
 
+Pi launches default to a token-lean skill posture: `mosaic pi` passes `--no-skills` so Pi does not preload every global skill description into the system prompt. Use `MOSAIC_PI_SKILL_MODE=all mosaic pi` for the legacy all-skills catalog, or `MOSAIC_PI_SKILL_MODE=discover mosaic pi` to let Pi use its native settings/project skill discovery.
+
 ### TUI & Gateway
 
 ```bash

apps/appservice/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+  "name": "@mosaicstack/mosaic-as",
+  "version": "0.0.1",
+  "type": "module",
+  "private": true,
+  "repository": {
+    "type": "git",
+    "url": "https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git",
+    "directory": "apps/appservice"
+  },
+  "main": "dist/main.js",
+  "bin": {
+    "mosaic-as": "dist/main.js",
+    "mosaic-as-registration": "dist/registration-main.js"
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "build": "tsc",
+    "lint": "eslint src",
+    "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
+    "test": "vitest run --passWithNoTests",
+    "dev": "tsx watch src/main.ts"
+  },
+  "dependencies": {
+    "@mosaicstack/appservice": "workspace:*"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "@types/node": "^22.0.0",
+    "tsx": "^4.19.0",
+    "typescript": "^5.8.0",
+    "vitest": "^2.0.0"
+  },
+  "files": [
+    "dist"
+  ]
+}

apps/appservice/src/__tests__/server.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
+
+import { AppserviceDaemon } from '../server.js';
+import type { DaemonConfig, DaemonRequest } from '../server.js';
+
+const cfg: DaemonConfig = {
+  homeserverUrl: 'https://hs.example',
+  domain: 'hs.example',
+  asToken: 'as-secret',
+  hsToken: 'hs-secret',
+  bridgeTokens: ['bridge-secret'],
+};
+
+const jsonResponse = (status: number, body: unknown): Response =>
+  new Response(JSON.stringify(body), { status, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } });
+
+const request = (overrides: Partial<DaemonRequest>): DaemonRequest => ({
+  method: 'GET',
+  path: '/',
+  searchParams: new URLSearchParams(),
+  body: undefined,
+  ...overrides,
+});
+
+const makeDaemon = () => {
+  const fetchMock = vi.fn(async (_input: URL | string) => jsonResponse(200, { event_id: '$sent' }));
+  const daemon = new AppserviceDaemon(cfg, fetchMock as unknown as typeof fetch, () => {});
+  return { daemon, fetchMock };
+};
+
+describe('AppserviceDaemon routing', () => {
+  it('serves health unauthenticated', async () => {
+    const { daemon } = makeDaemon();
+    expect((await daemon.handle(request({ path: '/health' }))).status).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  it('404s unknown paths', async () => {
+    const { daemon } = makeDaemon();
+    expect((await daemon.handle(request({ path: '/nope' }))).status).toBe(404);
+  });
+
+  it('transactions require the hs_token', async () => {
+    const { daemon } = makeDaemon();
+    const bad = await daemon.handle(
+      request({
+        method: 'PUT',
+        path: '/_matrix/app/v1/transactions/t1',
+        authorizationHeader: 'Bearer wrong',
+        body: { events: [] },
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(bad.status).toBe(403);
+    const ok = await daemon.handle(
+      request({
+        method: 'PUT',
+        path: '/_matrix/app/v1/transactions/t1',
+        authorizationHeader: 'Bearer hs-secret',
+        body: { events: [{ type: 'm.room.message', event_id: '$e' }] },
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(ok.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  it('bridge requires a bridge token (hs/as tokens do not work)', async () => {
+    const { daemon } = makeDaemon();
+    for (const token of [undefined, 'Bearer hs-secret', 'Bearer as-secret', 'Bearer nope']) {
+      const res = await daemon.handle(
+        request({
+          method: 'POST',
+          path: '/bridge/v1/messages',
+          authorizationHeader: token,
+          body: {},
+        }),
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('bridge message sends as the agent and returns the event id', async () => {
+    const { daemon, fetchMock } = makeDaemon();
+    const res = await daemon.handle(
+      request({
+        method: 'POST',
+        path: '/bridge/v1/messages',
+        authorizationHeader: 'Bearer bridge-secret',
+        body: { room_id: '!r:hs.example', agent: 'pi0-web1', body: 'hi', thread_root: '$req' },
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body.event_id).toBe('$sent');
+    const sendCall = fetchMock.mock.calls
+      .map((c) => new URL(String(c[0])))
+      .find((u) => u.pathname.includes('/send/m.room.message/'));
+    expect(sendCall).toBeDefined();
+    expect(sendCall!.searchParams.get('user_id')).toBe('@agent-pi0-web1:hs.example');
+  });
+
+  it('bridge rejects invalid payloads with 400', async () => {
+    const { daemon } = makeDaemon();
+    const res = await daemon.handle(
+      request({
+        method: 'POST',
+        path: '/bridge/v1/messages',
+        authorizationHeader: 'Bearer bridge-secret',
+        body: { room_id: 'bad', agent: 'pi0', body: 'x' },
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  it('bridge typing endpoint works', async () => {
+    const { daemon, fetchMock } = makeDaemon();
+    const res = await daemon.handle(
+      request({
+        method: 'POST',
+        path: '/bridge/v1/typing',
+        authorizationHeader: 'Bearer bridge-secret',
+        body: { room_id: '!r:hs.example', agent: 'pi0-web1', typing: true },
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const typingCall = fetchMock.mock.calls
+      .map((c) => new URL(String(c[0])))
+      .find((u) => u.pathname.includes('/typing/'));
+    expect(typingCall).toBeDefined();
+  });
+
+  it('authenticated unknown bridge sub-paths return 405, never fall through', async () => {
+    const { daemon } = makeDaemon();
+    const res = await daemon.handle(
+      request({
+        method: 'GET',
+        path: '/bridge/v1/unknown',
+        authorizationHeader: 'Bearer bridge-secret',
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(405);
+  });
+
+  it('empty bridge token list denies everything', async () => {
+    const daemon = new AppserviceDaemon({ ...cfg, bridgeTokens: [] }, undefined, () => {});
+    const res = await daemon.handle(
+      request({
+        method: 'POST',
+        path: '/bridge/v1/typing',
+        authorizationHeader: 'Bearer bridge-secret',
+        body: {},
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+});

apps/appservice/src/config.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+import type { DaemonConfig } from './server.js';
+
+const required = (name: string): string => {
+  const value = process.env[name];
+  if (!value) throw new Error(`missing required env var ${name}`);
+  return value;
+};
+
+export function configFromEnv(): DaemonConfig & { port: number } {
+  return {
+    homeserverUrl: required('MOSAIC_AS_HOMESERVER_URL'),
+    domain: required('MOSAIC_AS_DOMAIN'),
+    asToken: required('MOSAIC_AS_TOKEN'),
+    hsToken: required('MOSAIC_HS_TOKEN'),
+    userPrefix: process.env.MOSAIC_AS_USER_PREFIX ?? 'agent-',
+    senderLocalpart: process.env.MOSAIC_AS_SENDER_LOCALPART ?? 'mosaic-as',
+    bridgeTokens: (process.env.MOSAIC_AS_BRIDGE_TOKENS ?? '')
+      .split(',')
+      .map((t) => t.trim())
+      .filter(Boolean),
+    port: Number(process.env.MOSAIC_AS_PORT ?? 8008),
+  };
+}

apps/appservice/src/main.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+import http from 'node:http';
+
+import { configFromEnv } from './config.js';
+import { AppserviceDaemon } from './server.js';
+
+const cfg = configFromEnv();
+const daemon = new AppserviceDaemon(cfg);
+
+const MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;
+
+const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
+  const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
+  let received = 0;
+  let rejected = false;
+  req.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {
+    received += chunk.length;
+    if (received > MAX_BODY_BYTES) {
+      rejected = true;
+      res.writeHead(413, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+      res.end(JSON.stringify({ errcode: 'M_TOO_LARGE', error: 'request body too large' }));
+      req.destroy();
+      return;
+    }
+    chunks.push(chunk);
+  });
+  req.on('end', () => {
+    if (rejected) return;
+    void (async () => {
+      const url = new URL(req.url ?? '/', 'http://localhost');
+      let body: unknown;
+      try {
+        const raw = Buffer.concat(chunks).toString();
+        body = raw ? JSON.parse(raw) : undefined;
+      } catch {
+        res.writeHead(400, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+        res.end(JSON.stringify({ errcode: 'M_NOT_JSON', error: 'invalid json' }));
+        return;
+      }
+      const result = await daemon.handle({
+        method: req.method ?? 'GET',
+        path: url.pathname,
+        searchParams: url.searchParams,
+        authorizationHeader: req.headers.authorization,
+        body,
+      });
+      res.writeHead(result.status, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+      res.end(JSON.stringify(result.body));
+    })().catch((error: unknown) => {
+      console.error('request failed:', error);
+      if (res.headersSent) {
+        res.destroy();
+        return;
+      }
+      res.writeHead(500, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+      res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: 'internal error' }));
+    });
+  });
+});
+
+server.listen(cfg.port, () => {
+  console.log(
+    `mosaic-as listening on :${cfg.port} (homeserver ${cfg.homeserverUrl}, domain ${cfg.domain})`,
+  );
+  if (cfg.bridgeTokens.length === 0) {
+    console.warn('WARNING: MOSAIC_AS_BRIDGE_TOKENS is empty — bridge API will deny all requests');
+  }
+});

apps/appservice/src/registration-main.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+import { buildRegistration, registrationToYaml } from '@mosaicstack/appservice';
+
+import { configFromEnv } from './config.js';
+
+// Prints the Synapse registration YAML (mosaic-as.yaml) for the current env.
+// Usage: MOSAIC_AS_URL=http://mosaic-as:8008 mosaic-as-registration > mosaic-as.yaml
+const cfg = configFromEnv();
+const url = process.env.MOSAIC_AS_URL;
+if (!url) throw new Error('missing required env var MOSAIC_AS_URL');
+process.stdout.write(registrationToYaml(buildRegistration(cfg, { url })));

apps/appservice/src/server.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+import { createHmac, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
+
+import {
+  AppserviceIntent,
+  TransactionHandler,
+  validateBridgeMessage,
+  validateBridgeTyping,
+} from '@mosaicstack/appservice';
+import type { AppserviceConfig, MatrixEvent } from '@mosaicstack/appservice';
+
+export interface DaemonConfig extends AppserviceConfig {
+  /** Bearer tokens accepted on /bridge/v1/* (one per agent-comms host daemon). */
+  bridgeTokens: string[];
+}
+
+export interface DaemonRequest {
+  method: string;
+  /** URL path without query string. */
+  path: string;
+  searchParams: URLSearchParams;
+  authorizationHeader?: string;
+  body: unknown;
+}
+
+export interface DaemonResponse {
+  status: number;
+  body: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+
+// Compare equal-length HMAC digests so neither content nor LENGTH of the
+// stored secret is observable through timing.
+const HMAC_KEY = randomBytes(32);
+const digest = (value: string): Buffer => createHmac('sha256', HMAC_KEY).update(value).digest();
+
+const safeEqual = (a: string, b: string): boolean => timingSafeEqual(digest(a), digest(b));
+
+const TXN_PATH = /^\/_matrix\/app\/v1\/transactions\/([^/]+)$/;
+
+/**
+ * HTTP-framework-agnostic request router for the mosaic-as daemon: the
+ * Application Service transactions endpoint (Synapse-facing) plus the
+ * internal bridge API v1 (agent-comms daemon-facing). main.ts binds this to
+ * node:http; tests drive it directly.
+ */
+export class AppserviceDaemon {
+  readonly intent: AppserviceIntent;
+  private readonly transactions: TransactionHandler;
+
+  constructor(
+    private readonly cfg: DaemonConfig,
+    fetchImpl?: typeof fetch,
+    private readonly log: (line: string) => void = (line) => console.log(line),
+  ) {
+    this.intent = new AppserviceIntent(cfg, fetchImpl);
+    this.transactions = new TransactionHandler({
+      hsToken: cfg.hsToken,
+      onEvent: (event) => this.onEvent(event),
+      onError: (error, txnId) => this.log(`txn ${txnId} handler error: ${String(error)}`),
+    });
+  }
+
+  /** v1: the daemon only observes; room logic lives in the agent-comms daemons. */
+  private onEvent(event: MatrixEvent): void {
+    if (event.type === 'm.room.message') {
+      this.log(
+        `event ${event.event_id ?? '?'} in ${event.room_id ?? '?'} from ${event.sender ?? '?'}`,
+      );
+    }
+  }
+
+  private bridgeAuthorized(authorizationHeader: string | undefined): boolean {
+    if (!authorizationHeader?.startsWith('Bearer ')) return false;
+    const presented = authorizationHeader.slice('Bearer '.length);
+    return this.cfg.bridgeTokens.some((token) => safeEqual(presented, token));
+  }
+
+  async handle(req: DaemonRequest): Promise<DaemonResponse> {
+    if (req.method === 'GET' && req.path === '/health') {
+      return { status: 200, body: { ok: true } };
+    }
+
+    const txnMatch = req.method === 'PUT' ? TXN_PATH.exec(req.path) : null;
+    if (txnMatch?.[1] !== undefined) {
+      return this.transactions.handle(txnMatch[1], req.body, {
+        authorizationHeader: req.authorizationHeader,
+        accessTokenParam: req.searchParams.get('access_token') ?? undefined,
+      });
+    }
+
+    if (req.path.startsWith('/bridge/v1/')) {
+      if (!this.bridgeAuthorized(req.authorizationHeader)) {
+        return { status: 403, body: { errcode: 'M_FORBIDDEN', error: 'bad bridge token' } };
+      }
+      try {
+        if (req.method === 'POST' && req.path === '/bridge/v1/messages') {
+          validateBridgeMessage(req.body);
+          const eventId = await this.intent.sendAsAgent({
+            roomId: req.body.room_id,
+            agent: req.body.agent,
+            body: req.body.body,
+            threadRoot: req.body.thread_root,
+            msgtype: req.body.msgtype,
+            extraContent: req.body.extra_content,
+          });
+          return { status: 200, body: { event_id: eventId ?? null } };
+        }
+        if (req.method === 'POST' && req.path === '/bridge/v1/typing') {
+          validateBridgeTyping(req.body);
+          await this.intent.setTyping(req.body.room_id, req.body.agent, req.body.typing);
+          return { status: 200, body: {} };
+        }
+      } catch (error) {
+        const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
+        this.log(`bridge error ${req.method} ${req.path}: ${message}`);
+        return { status: 400, body: { error: message } };
+      }
+      // Explicit: never fall out of the authenticated bridge block, so future
+      // sub-paths cannot accidentally route around the auth guard above.
+      return { status: 405, body: { error: 'unsupported bridge method/path' } };
+    }
+
+    return { status: 404, body: { error: 'not found' } };
+  }
+}

apps/appservice/tsconfig.json

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "extends": "../../tsconfig.base.json",
+  "compilerOptions": {
+    "outDir": "dist",
+    "rootDir": "src"
+  },
+  "include": ["src/**/*"],
+  "exclude": ["node_modules", "dist"]
+}

apps/gateway/package.json

@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
     "@opentelemetry/sdk-metrics": "^2.6.0",
     "@opentelemetry/sdk-node": "^0.213.0",
     "@opentelemetry/semantic-conventions": "^1.40.0",
+    "@peculiar/x509": "^2.0.0",
     "@sinclair/typebox": "^0.34.48",
     "better-auth": "^1.5.5",
     "bullmq": "^5.71.0",
@@ -64,6 +65,7 @@
     "dotenv": "^17.3.1",
     "fastify": "^5.0.0",
     "ioredis": "^5.10.0",
+    "jose": "^6.2.2",
     "node-cron": "^4.2.1",
     "openai": "^6.32.0",
     "postgres": "^3.4.8",
@@ -71,6 +73,7 @@
     "rxjs": "^7.8.0",
     "socket.io": "^4.8.0",
     "uuid": "^11.0.0",
+    "undici": "^7.24.6",
     "zod": "^4.3.6"
   },
   "devDependencies": {

apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration/federation-m2-e2e.integration.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+/**
+ * Federation M2 E2E test — peer-add enrollment flow (FED-M2-10).
+ *
+ * Covers MILESTONES.md acceptance test #6:
+ *   "`peer add <url>` on Server A yields an `active` peer record with a valid cert + key"
+ *
+ * This test simulates two gateways using a single bootstrapped NestJS app:
+ *   - "Server A": the admin API that generates a keypair and stores the cert
+ *   - "Server B": the enrollment endpoint that signs the CSR
+ *   Both share the same DB + Step-CA in the test environment.
+ *
+ * Prerequisites:
+ *   docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml --profile federated up -d
+ *
+ * Run:
+ *   FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1 STEP_CA_AVAILABLE=1 \
+ *   STEP_CA_URL=https://localhost:9000 \
+ *   STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON="$(docker exec $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca) cat /home/step/secrets/mosaic-fed.json)" \
+ *   STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH=/tmp/step-ca-root.crt \
+ *   pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test \
+ *     src/__tests__/integration/federation-m2-e2e.integration.test.ts
+ *
+ * Obtaining Step-CA credentials:
+ *   # Extract provisioner key from running container:
+ *   #   docker exec $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca) cat /home/step/secrets/mosaic-fed.json
+ *   # Copy root cert from container:
+ *   #   docker cp $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca):/home/step/certs/root_ca.crt /tmp/step-ca-root.crt
+ *   # Then: export STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH=/tmp/step-ca-root.crt
+ *
+ * Skipped unless both FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1 and STEP_CA_AVAILABLE=1 are set.
+ */
+
+import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
+import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
+import { ValidationPipe } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { FastifyAdapter, type NestFastifyApplication } from '@nestjs/platform-fastify';
+import supertest from 'supertest';
+import {
+  createDb,
+  type Db,
+  type DbHandle,
+  federationPeers,
+  federationGrants,
+  federationEnrollmentTokens,
+  inArray,
+  eq,
+} from '@mosaicstack/db';
+import * as schema from '@mosaicstack/db';
+import { DB } from '../../database/database.module.js';
+import { AdminGuard } from '../../admin/admin.guard.js';
+import { FederationModule } from '../../federation/federation.module.js';
+import { GrantsService } from '../../federation/grants.service.js';
+import { EnrollmentService } from '../../federation/enrollment.service.js';
+
+const run = process.env['FEDERATED_INTEGRATION'] === '1';
+const stepCaRun =
+  run &&
+  process.env['STEP_CA_AVAILABLE'] === '1' &&
+  !!process.env['STEP_CA_URL'] &&
+  !!process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON'] &&
+  !!process.env['STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH'];
+
+const PG_URL = 'postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic';
+
+const RUN_ID = crypto.randomUUID();
+
+describe.skipIf(!stepCaRun)('federation M2 E2E — peer add enrollment flow', () => {
+  let handle: DbHandle;
+  let db: Db;
+  let app: NestFastifyApplication;
+  let agent: ReturnType<typeof supertest>;
+  let grantsService: GrantsService;
+  let enrollmentService: EnrollmentService;
+
+  const createdTokenGrantIds: string[] = [];
+  const createdGrantIds: string[] = [];
+  const createdPeerIds: string[] = [];
+  const createdUserIds: string[] = [];
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] ??= 'test-e2e-sealing-key';
+
+    handle = createDb(PG_URL);
+    db = handle.db;
+
+    const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
+      imports: [FederationModule],
+      providers: [{ provide: DB, useValue: db }],
+    })
+      .overrideGuard(AdminGuard)
+      .useValue({ canActivate: () => true })
+      .compile();
+
+    app = moduleRef.createNestApplication<NestFastifyApplication>(new FastifyAdapter());
+    app.useGlobalPipes(new ValidationPipe({ whitelist: true, transform: true }));
+    await app.init();
+    await app.getHttpAdapter().getInstance().ready();
+
+    agent = supertest(app.getHttpServer());
+
+    grantsService = moduleRef.get(GrantsService);
+    enrollmentService = moduleRef.get(EnrollmentService);
+  }, 30_000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (db && createdTokenGrantIds.length > 0) {
+      await db
+        .delete(federationEnrollmentTokens)
+        .where(inArray(federationEnrollmentTokens.grantId, createdTokenGrantIds))
+        .catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-e2e cleanup]', e));
+    }
+    if (db && createdGrantIds.length > 0) {
+      await db
+        .delete(federationGrants)
+        .where(inArray(federationGrants.id, createdGrantIds))
+        .catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-e2e cleanup]', e));
+    }
+    if (db && createdPeerIds.length > 0) {
+      await db
+        .delete(federationPeers)
+        .where(inArray(federationPeers.id, createdPeerIds))
+        .catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-e2e cleanup]', e));
+    }
+    if (db && createdUserIds.length > 0) {
+      await db
+        .delete(schema.users)
+        .where(inArray(schema.users.id, createdUserIds))
+        .catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-e2e cleanup]', e));
+    }
+    if (app)
+      await app.close().catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-e2e cleanup]', e));
+    if (handle)
+      await handle.close().catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-e2e cleanup]', e));
+  });
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // #6 — peer add: keypair → enrollment → cert storage → active peer record
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  it('#6 — peer add flow: keypair → enrollment → cert storage → active peer record', async () => {
+    // Create a subject user to satisfy FK on federation_grants.subject_user_id
+    const userId = crypto.randomUUID();
+    await db
+      .insert(schema.users)
+      .values({
+        id: userId,
+        name: `e2e-user-${RUN_ID}`,
+        email: `e2e-${RUN_ID}@federation-test.invalid`,
+        emailVerified: false,
+      })
+      .onConflictDoNothing();
+    createdUserIds.push(userId);
+
+    // ── Step A: "Server B" setup ─────────────────────────────────────────
+    // Server B admin creates a grant and generates an enrollment token to
+    // share out-of-band with Server A's operator.
+
+    // Insert a placeholder peer on "Server B" to satisfy the grant FK
+    const serverBPeerId = crypto.randomUUID();
+    await db
+      .insert(federationPeers)
+      .values({
+        id: serverBPeerId,
+        commonName: `server-b-peer-${RUN_ID}`,
+        displayName: 'Server B Placeholder',
+        certPem: '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMOCK\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n',
+        certSerial: `serial-b-${serverBPeerId}`,
+        certNotAfter: new Date(Date.now() + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000),
+        state: 'pending',
+      })
+      .onConflictDoNothing();
+    createdPeerIds.push(serverBPeerId);
+
+    const grant = await grantsService.createGrant({
+      subjectUserId: userId,
+      scope: { resources: ['tasks'], excluded_resources: [], max_rows_per_query: 100 },
+      peerId: serverBPeerId,
+    });
+    createdGrantIds.push(grant.id);
+    createdTokenGrantIds.push(grant.id);
+
+    const { token } = await enrollmentService.createToken({
+      grantId: grant.id,
+      peerId: serverBPeerId,
+      ttlSeconds: 900,
+    });
+
+    // ── Step B: "Server A" generates keypair ─────────────────────────────
+    const keypairRes = await agent
+      .post('/api/admin/federation/peers/keypair')
+      .send({
+        commonName: `e2e-peer-${RUN_ID.slice(0, 8)}`,
+        displayName: 'E2E Test Peer',
+        endpointUrl: 'https://test.invalid',
+      })
+      .set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
+
+    expect(keypairRes.status).toBe(201);
+    const { peerId, csrPem } = keypairRes.body as { peerId: string; csrPem: string };
+    expect(typeof peerId).toBe('string');
+    expect(csrPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----');
+    createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
+
+    // ── Step C: Enrollment (simulates Server A sending CSR to Server B) ──
+    const enrollRes = await agent
+      .post(`/api/federation/enrollment/${token}`)
+      .send({ csrPem })
+      .set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
+
+    expect(enrollRes.status).toBe(200);
+    const { certPem, certChainPem } = enrollRes.body as {
+      certPem: string;
+      certChainPem: string;
+    };
+    expect(certPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----');
+    expect(certChainPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----');
+
+    // ── Step D: "Server A" stores the cert ───────────────────────────────
+    const storeRes = await agent
+      .patch(`/api/admin/federation/peers/${peerId}/cert`)
+      .send({ certPem })
+      .set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
+
+    expect(storeRes.status).toBe(200);
+
+    // ── Step E: Verify peer record in DB ─────────────────────────────────
+    const [peer] = await db
+      .select()
+      .from(federationPeers)
+      .where(eq(federationPeers.id, peerId))
+      .limit(1);
+
+    expect(peer).toBeDefined();
+    expect(peer?.state).toBe('active');
+    expect(peer?.certPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----');
+    expect(typeof peer?.certSerial).toBe('string');
+    expect((peer?.certSerial ?? '').length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    // clientKeyPem is a sealed ciphertext — must not be a raw PEM
+    expect(peer?.clientKeyPem?.startsWith('-----BEGIN')).toBe(false);
+    // certNotAfter must be in the future
+    expect(peer?.certNotAfter?.getTime()).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now());
+  }, 60_000);
+});

apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration/federation-m2.integration.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,483 @@
+/**
+ * Federation M2 integration tests (FED-M2-09).
+ *
+ * Covers MILESTONES.md acceptance tests #1, #2, #3, #5, #7, #8.
+ *
+ * Prerequisites:
+ *   docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml --profile federated up -d
+ *
+ * Run DB-only tests (no Step-CA):
+ *   FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1 BETTER_AUTH_SECRET=test-secret pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test \
+ *     src/__tests__/integration/federation-m2.integration.test.ts
+ *
+ * Run all tests including Step-CA-dependent ones:
+ *   FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1 STEP_CA_AVAILABLE=1 \
+ *   STEP_CA_URL=https://localhost:9000 \
+ *   STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON="$(docker exec $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca) cat /home/step/secrets/mosaic-fed.json)" \
+ *   STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH=/tmp/step-ca-root.crt \
+ *   pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test \
+ *     src/__tests__/integration/federation-m2.integration.test.ts
+ *
+ * Obtaining Step-CA credentials:
+ *   # Extract provisioner key from running container:
+ *   #   docker exec $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca) cat /home/step/secrets/mosaic-fed.json
+ *   # Copy root cert from container:
+ *   #   docker cp $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca):/home/step/certs/root_ca.crt /tmp/step-ca-root.crt
+ *   # Then: export STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH=/tmp/step-ca-root.crt
+ */
+
+import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
+import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
+import { GoneException } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator, X509Certificate as PeculiarX509 } from '@peculiar/x509';
+import {
+  createDb,
+  type Db,
+  type DbHandle,
+  federationPeers,
+  federationGrants,
+  federationEnrollmentTokens,
+  inArray,
+  eq,
+} from '@mosaicstack/db';
+import * as schema from '@mosaicstack/db';
+import { seal } from '@mosaicstack/auth';
+import { DB } from '../../database/database.module.js';
+import { GrantsService } from '../../federation/grants.service.js';
+import { EnrollmentService } from '../../federation/enrollment.service.js';
+import { CaService } from '../../federation/ca.service.js';
+import { FederationScopeError } from '../../federation/scope-schema.js';
+
+const run = process.env['FEDERATED_INTEGRATION'] === '1';
+const stepCaRun = run && process.env['STEP_CA_AVAILABLE'] === '1';
+
+const PG_URL = 'postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Helpers for test data isolation
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/** Unique run prefix to identify rows created by this test run. */
+const RUN_ID = crypto.randomUUID();
+
+/** Insert a minimal user row to satisfy the FK on federation_grants.subject_user_id. */
+async function insertTestUser(db: Db, id: string): Promise<void> {
+  await db
+    .insert(schema.users)
+    .values({
+      id,
+      name: `test-user-${id}`,
+      email: `test-${id}@federation-test.invalid`,
+      emailVerified: false,
+    })
+    .onConflictDoNothing();
+}
+
+/** Insert a minimal peer row to satisfy the FK on federation_grants.peer_id. */
+async function insertTestPeer(db: Db, id: string, suffix: string = ''): Promise<void> {
+  await db
+    .insert(federationPeers)
+    .values({
+      id,
+      commonName: `test-peer-${RUN_ID}-${suffix}`,
+      displayName: `Test Peer ${suffix}`,
+      certPem: '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMOCK\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n',
+      certSerial: `test-serial-${id}`,
+      certNotAfter: new Date(Date.now() + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000),
+      state: 'pending',
+    })
+    .onConflictDoNothing();
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// DB-only test module (CaService mocked so env vars not required)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+function buildDbModule(db: Db) {
+  return Test.createTestingModule({
+    providers: [
+      { provide: DB, useValue: db },
+      GrantsService,
+      {
+        provide: CaService,
+        useValue: {
+          issueCert: async () => {
+            throw new Error('CaService.issueCert should not be called in DB-only tests');
+          },
+        },
+      },
+      EnrollmentService,
+    ],
+  }).compile();
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Test suite — DB-only (no Step-CA)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+describe.skipIf(!run)('federation M2 — DB-only tests', () => {
+  let handle: DbHandle;
+  let db: Db;
+  let grantsService: GrantsService;
+
+  /** IDs created during this run — cleaned up in afterAll. */
+  const createdGrantIds: string[] = [];
+  const createdPeerIds: string[] = [];
+  const createdUserIds: string[] = [];
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] ??= 'test-integration-sealing-key-not-for-prod';
+
+    handle = createDb(PG_URL);
+    db = handle.db;
+
+    const moduleRef = await buildDbModule(db);
+    grantsService = moduleRef.get(GrantsService);
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    // Clean up in FK-safe order: tokens → grants → peers → users
+    if (db && createdGrantIds.length > 0) {
+      await db
+        .delete(federationEnrollmentTokens)
+        .where(inArray(federationEnrollmentTokens.grantId, createdGrantIds))
+        .catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
+      await db
+        .delete(federationGrants)
+        .where(inArray(federationGrants.id, createdGrantIds))
+        .catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
+    }
+    if (db && createdPeerIds.length > 0) {
+      await db
+        .delete(federationPeers)
+        .where(inArray(federationPeers.id, createdPeerIds))
+        .catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
+    }
+    if (db && createdUserIds.length > 0) {
+      await db
+        .delete(schema.users)
+        .where(inArray(schema.users.id, createdUserIds))
+        .catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
+    }
+    if (handle)
+      await handle.close().catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
+  });
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // #1 — grant create writes a pending row
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  it('#1 — createGrant writes a pending row to DB', async () => {
+    const userId = crypto.randomUUID();
+    const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
+    const validScope = {
+      resources: ['tasks'],
+      excluded_resources: [],
+      max_rows_per_query: 100,
+    };
+
+    await insertTestUser(db, userId);
+    await insertTestPeer(db, peerId, 'test1');
+    createdUserIds.push(userId);
+    createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
+
+    const grant = await grantsService.createGrant({
+      subjectUserId: userId,
+      scope: validScope,
+      peerId,
+    });
+
+    createdGrantIds.push(grant.id);
+
+    // Verify the row exists in DB with correct shape
+    const [row] = await db
+      .select()
+      .from(federationGrants)
+      .where(eq(federationGrants.id, grant.id))
+      .limit(1);
+
+    expect(row).toBeDefined();
+    expect(row?.status).toBe('pending');
+    expect(row?.peerId).toBe(peerId);
+    expect(row?.subjectUserId).toBe(userId);
+    const storedScope = row?.scope as Record<string, unknown>;
+    expect(storedScope['resources']).toEqual(['tasks']);
+    expect(storedScope['max_rows_per_query']).toBe(100);
+  }, 15_000);
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // #7 — scope with unknown resource type rejected
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  it('#7 — createGrant rejects scope with unknown resource type', async () => {
+    const userId = crypto.randomUUID();
+    const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
+    const invalidScope = {
+      resources: ['totally_unknown_resource'],
+      excluded_resources: [],
+      max_rows_per_query: 100,
+    };
+
+    await insertTestUser(db, userId);
+    await insertTestPeer(db, peerId, 'test7');
+    createdUserIds.push(userId);
+    createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
+
+    await expect(
+      grantsService.createGrant({
+        subjectUserId: userId,
+        scope: invalidScope,
+        peerId,
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toThrow(FederationScopeError);
+  }, 15_000);
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // #8 — listGrants returns accurate status for grants in various states
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  it('#8 — listGrants returns accurate status for grants in various states', async () => {
+    const userId = crypto.randomUUID();
+    const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
+    const validScope = {
+      resources: ['notes'],
+      excluded_resources: [],
+      max_rows_per_query: 50,
+    };
+
+    await insertTestUser(db, userId);
+    await insertTestPeer(db, peerId, 'test8');
+    createdUserIds.push(userId);
+    createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
+
+    // Create two pending grants via GrantsService
+    const grantA = await grantsService.createGrant({
+      subjectUserId: userId,
+      scope: validScope,
+      peerId,
+    });
+    const grantB = await grantsService.createGrant({
+      subjectUserId: userId,
+      scope: { resources: ['tasks'], excluded_resources: [], max_rows_per_query: 50 },
+      peerId,
+    });
+    createdGrantIds.push(grantA.id, grantB.id);
+
+    // Insert a third grant directly in 'revoked' state to test status variety
+    const [grantC] = await db
+      .insert(federationGrants)
+      .values({
+        id: crypto.randomUUID(),
+        subjectUserId: userId,
+        peerId,
+        scope: validScope,
+        status: 'revoked',
+        revokedAt: new Date(),
+      })
+      .returning();
+    createdGrantIds.push(grantC!.id);
+
+    // List all grants for this peer
+    const allForPeer = await grantsService.listGrants({ peerId });
+
+    const ourGrantIds = new Set([grantA.id, grantB.id, grantC!.id]);
+    const ourGrants = allForPeer.filter((g) => ourGrantIds.has(g.id));
+    expect(ourGrants).toHaveLength(3);
+
+    const pendingGrants = ourGrants.filter((g) => g.status === 'pending');
+    const revokedGrants = ourGrants.filter((g) => g.status === 'revoked');
+    expect(pendingGrants).toHaveLength(2);
+    expect(revokedGrants).toHaveLength(1);
+
+    // Status-filtered query
+    const pendingOnly = await grantsService.listGrants({ peerId, status: 'pending' });
+    const ourPending = pendingOnly.filter((g) => ourGrantIds.has(g.id));
+    expect(ourPending.every((g) => g.status === 'pending')).toBe(true);
+
+    // Verify peer list from DB also shows the peer rows with correct state
+    const peers = await db.select().from(federationPeers).where(eq(federationPeers.id, peerId));
+    expect(peers).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(peers[0]?.state).toBe('pending');
+  }, 15_000);
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // #5 — client_key_pem encrypted at rest
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  it('#5 — clientKeyPem stored in DB is a sealed ciphertext (not a valid PEM)', async () => {
+    const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
+    const rawPem = '-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nMOCK\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n';
+    const sealed = seal(rawPem);
+
+    await db.insert(federationPeers).values({
+      id: peerId,
+      commonName: `test-peer-${RUN_ID}-sealed`,
+      displayName: 'Sealed Key Test Peer',
+      certPem: '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMOCK\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n',
+      certSerial: `test-serial-sealed-${peerId}`,
+      certNotAfter: new Date(Date.now() + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000),
+      state: 'pending',
+      clientKeyPem: sealed,
+    });
+    createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
+
+    const [row] = await db
+      .select()
+      .from(federationPeers)
+      .where(eq(federationPeers.id, peerId))
+      .limit(1);
+
+    expect(row).toBeDefined();
+    // The stored value must NOT be a valid PEM — it's a sealed ciphertext blob
+    expect(row?.clientKeyPem).toBeDefined();
+    expect(row?.clientKeyPem?.startsWith('-----BEGIN')).toBe(false);
+    // The sealed value should be non-trivial (at least 20 chars)
+    expect((row?.clientKeyPem ?? '').length).toBeGreaterThan(20);
+  }, 15_000);
+});
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Test suite — Step-CA gated
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+describe.skipIf(!stepCaRun)('federation M2 — Step-CA tests', () => {
+  let handle: DbHandle;
+  let db: Db;
+  let grantsService: GrantsService;
+  let enrollmentService: EnrollmentService;
+
+  const createdGrantIds: string[] = [];
+  const createdPeerIds: string[] = [];
+  const createdUserIds: string[] = [];
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    handle = createDb(PG_URL);
+    db = handle.db;
+
+    // Use real CaService — env vars (STEP_CA_URL, STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON,
+    // STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH) must be set when STEP_CA_AVAILABLE=1
+    const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
+      providers: [{ provide: DB, useValue: db }, CaService, GrantsService, EnrollmentService],
+    }).compile();
+
+    grantsService = moduleRef.get(GrantsService);
+    enrollmentService = moduleRef.get(EnrollmentService);
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (db && createdGrantIds.length > 0) {
+      await db
+        .delete(federationEnrollmentTokens)
+        .where(inArray(federationEnrollmentTokens.grantId, createdGrantIds))
+        .catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
+      await db
+        .delete(federationGrants)
+        .where(inArray(federationGrants.id, createdGrantIds))
+        .catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
+    }
+    if (db && createdPeerIds.length > 0) {
+      await db
+        .delete(federationPeers)
+        .where(inArray(federationPeers.id, createdPeerIds))
+        .catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
+    }
+    if (db && createdUserIds.length > 0) {
+      await db
+        .delete(schema.users)
+        .where(inArray(schema.users.id, createdUserIds))
+        .catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
+    }
+    if (handle)
+      await handle.close().catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
+  });
+
+  /** Generate a P-256 key pair and PKCS#10 CSR, returning the CSR as PEM. */
+  async function generateCsrPem(cn: string): Promise<string> {
+    const alg = { name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256', hash: 'SHA-256' };
+    const keyPair = await crypto.subtle.generateKey(alg, true, ['sign', 'verify']);
+    const csr = await Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator.create({
+      name: `CN=${cn}`,
+      keys: keyPair,
+      signingAlgorithm: alg,
+    });
+    return csr.toString('pem');
+  }
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // #2 — enrollment signs CSR and returns cert
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  it('#2 — redeem returns a certPem containing a valid PEM certificate', async () => {
+    const userId = crypto.randomUUID();
+    const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
+    const validScope = {
+      resources: ['tasks'],
+      excluded_resources: [],
+      max_rows_per_query: 100,
+    };
+
+    await insertTestUser(db, userId);
+    await insertTestPeer(db, peerId, 'ca-test2');
+    createdUserIds.push(userId);
+    createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
+
+    const grant = await grantsService.createGrant({
+      subjectUserId: userId,
+      scope: validScope,
+      peerId,
+    });
+    createdGrantIds.push(grant.id);
+
+    const { token } = await enrollmentService.createToken({
+      grantId: grant.id,
+      peerId,
+      ttlSeconds: 900,
+    });
+
+    const csrPem = await generateCsrPem(`gateway-test-${RUN_ID.slice(0, 8)}`);
+    const result = await enrollmentService.redeem(token, csrPem);
+
+    expect(result.certPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----');
+    expect(result.certChainPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----');
+
+    // Verify the issued cert parses cleanly
+    const cert = new PeculiarX509(result.certPem);
+    expect(cert.serialNumber).toBeTruthy();
+  }, 30_000);
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // #3 — token single-use; second attempt returns GoneException
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  it('#3 — second redeem of the same token throws GoneException', async () => {
+    const userId = crypto.randomUUID();
+    const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
+    const validScope = {
+      resources: ['notes'],
+      excluded_resources: [],
+      max_rows_per_query: 50,
+    };
+
+    await insertTestUser(db, userId);
+    await insertTestPeer(db, peerId, 'ca-test3');
+    createdUserIds.push(userId);
+    createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
+
+    const grant = await grantsService.createGrant({
+      subjectUserId: userId,
+      scope: validScope,
+      peerId,
+    });
+    createdGrantIds.push(grant.id);
+
+    const { token } = await enrollmentService.createToken({
+      grantId: grant.id,
+      peerId,
+      ttlSeconds: 900,
+    });
+
+    const csrPem = await generateCsrPem(`gateway-test-replay-${RUN_ID.slice(0, 8)}`);
+
+    // First redeem must succeed
+    const result = await enrollmentService.redeem(token, csrPem);
+    expect(result.certPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----');
+
+    // Second redeem with the same token must be rejected
+    await expect(enrollmentService.redeem(token, csrPem)).rejects.toThrow(GoneException);
+  }, 30_000);
+});

apps/gateway/src/agent/provider-credentials.service.ts

@@ -1,62 +1,10 @@
 import { Inject, Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
-import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
+import { seal, unseal } from '@mosaicstack/auth';
 import type { Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
 import { providerCredentials, eq, and } from '@mosaicstack/db';
 import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
 import type { ProviderCredentialSummaryDto } from './provider-credentials.dto.js';
 
-const ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-gcm';
-const IV_LENGTH = 12; // 96-bit IV for GCM
-const TAG_LENGTH = 16; // 128-bit auth tag
-
-/**
- * Derive a 32-byte AES-256 key from BETTER_AUTH_SECRET using SHA-256.
- * The secret is assumed to be set in the environment.
- */
-function deriveEncryptionKey(): Buffer {
-  const secret = process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
-  if (!secret) {
-    throw new Error('BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is not set — cannot derive encryption key');
-  }
-  return createHash('sha256').update(secret).digest();
-}
-
-/**
- * Encrypt a plain-text value using AES-256-GCM.
- * Output format: base64(iv + authTag + ciphertext)
- */
-function encrypt(plaintext: string): string {
-  const key = deriveEncryptionKey();
-  const iv = randomBytes(IV_LENGTH);
-  const cipher = createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv);
-
-  const encrypted = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, 'utf8'), cipher.final()]);
-  const authTag = cipher.getAuthTag();
-
-  // Combine iv (12) + authTag (16) + ciphertext and base64-encode
-  const combined = Buffer.concat([iv, authTag, encrypted]);
-  return combined.toString('base64');
-}
-
-/**
- * Decrypt a value encrypted by `encrypt()`.
- * Throws on authentication failure (tampered data).
- */
-function decrypt(encoded: string): string {
-  const key = deriveEncryptionKey();
-  const combined = Buffer.from(encoded, 'base64');
-
-  const iv = combined.subarray(0, IV_LENGTH);
-  const authTag = combined.subarray(IV_LENGTH, IV_LENGTH + TAG_LENGTH);
-  const ciphertext = combined.subarray(IV_LENGTH + TAG_LENGTH);
-
-  const decipher = createDecipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv);
-  decipher.setAuthTag(authTag);
-
-  const decrypted = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ciphertext), decipher.final()]);
-  return decrypted.toString('utf8');
-}
-
 @Injectable()
 export class ProviderCredentialsService {
   private readonly logger = new Logger(ProviderCredentialsService.name);
@@ -74,7 +22,7 @@ export class ProviderCredentialsService {
     value: string,
     metadata?: Record<string, unknown>,
   ): Promise<void> {
-    const encryptedValue = encrypt(value);
+    const encryptedValue = seal(value);
 
     await this.db
       .insert(providerCredentials)
@@ -122,7 +70,7 @@ export class ProviderCredentialsService {
     }
 
     try {
-      return decrypt(row.encryptedValue);
+      return unseal(row.encryptedValue);
     } catch (err) {
       this.logger.error(
         `Failed to decrypt credential for user=${userId} provider=${provider}`,

apps/gateway/src/database/database.module.ts

@@ -1,8 +1,21 @@
 import { mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
 import { homedir } from 'node:os';
 import { join } from 'node:path';
-import { Global, Inject, Module, type OnApplicationShutdown } from '@nestjs/common';
-import { createDb, createPgliteDb, type Db, type DbHandle } from '@mosaicstack/db';
+import {
+  Global,
+  Inject,
+  Logger,
+  Module,
+  type OnApplicationShutdown,
+  type OnModuleInit,
+} from '@nestjs/common';
+import {
+  createDb,
+  createPgliteDb,
+  runPgliteMigrations,
+  type Db,
+  type DbHandle,
+} from '@mosaicstack/db';
 import { createStorageAdapter, type StorageAdapter } from '@mosaicstack/storage';
 import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
 import { MOSAIC_CONFIG } from '../config/config.module.js';
@@ -39,12 +52,37 @@ export const STORAGE_ADAPTER = 'STORAGE_ADAPTER';
   ],
   exports: [DB, STORAGE_ADAPTER],
 })
-export class DatabaseModule implements OnApplicationShutdown {
+export class DatabaseModule implements OnApplicationShutdown, OnModuleInit {
+  private readonly logger = new Logger(DatabaseModule.name);
+
   constructor(
     @Inject(DB_HANDLE) private readonly handle: DbHandle,
     @Inject(STORAGE_ADAPTER) private readonly storageAdapter: StorageAdapter,
+    @Inject(MOSAIC_CONFIG) private readonly config: MosaicConfig,
   ) {}
 
+  // Migrations must complete before any module that injects DB starts serving
+  // requests. NestJS awaits onModuleInit before app.listen(), and modules that
+  // inject DB are initialized after this one — so all DB-dependent code sees a
+  // populated schema before the first HTTP request lands.
+  //
+  // Local (PGlite) tier: we run gateway-DB migrations explicitly here. The
+  // storage adapter writes to a separate PGlite directory and only manages its
+  // own KV tables, so we still call its migrate() afterwards.
+  //
+  // Postgres tier: PostgresAdapter.migrate() already calls runMigrations() on
+  // the same DATABASE_URL, so a single call covers both the gateway DB and
+  // the storage tables. We deliberately do NOT call runMigrations() here to
+  // avoid opening a second short-lived connection and doubling startup cost.
+  async onModuleInit(): Promise<void> {
+    if (this.config.tier === 'local') {
+      this.logger.log('Applying PGlite schema migrations...');
+      await runPgliteMigrations(this.handle);
+    }
+    this.logger.log(`Initializing storage adapter (${this.storageAdapter.name})...`);
+    await this.storageAdapter.migrate();
+  }
+
   async onApplicationShutdown(): Promise<void> {
     await Promise.all([this.handle.close(), this.storageAdapter.close()]);
   }

apps/gateway/src/federation/__tests__/enrollment.service.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
+/**
+ * Unit tests for EnrollmentService — federation enrollment token flow (FED-M2-07).
+ *
+ * Coverage:
+ *  createToken:
+ *   - inserts token row with correct grantId, peerId, and future expiresAt
+ *   - returns { token, expiresAt } with a 64-char hex token
+ *   - clamps ttlSeconds to 900
+ *
+ *  redeem — error paths:
+ *   - NotFoundException when token row not found
+ *   - GoneException when token already used (usedAt set)
+ *   - GoneException when token expired (expiresAt < now)
+ *   - GoneException when grant status is not pending
+ *
+ *  redeem — success path:
+ *   - atomically claims token BEFORE cert issuance (claim → issueCert → tx)
+ *   - calls CaService.issueCert with correct args
+ *   - activates grant + updates peer + writes audit log inside a transaction
+ *   - returns { certPem, certChainPem }
+ *
+ *  redeem — replay protection:
+ *   - GoneException when claim UPDATE returns empty array (concurrent request won)
+ */
+
+import 'reflect-metadata';
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, beforeAll } from 'vitest';
+import { GoneException, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
+import type { Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
+import { EnrollmentService } from '../enrollment.service.js';
+import { makeSelfSignedCert } from './helpers/test-cert.js';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Test constants
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const GRANT_ID = 'g1111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111';
+const PEER_ID = 'p2222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222';
+const USER_ID = 'u3333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333';
+const TOKEN = 'a'.repeat(64); // 64-char hex
+
+// Real self-signed EC P-256 cert — populated once in beforeAll.
+// Required because EnrollmentService.extractCertNotAfter calls new X509Certificate(certPem)
+// with strict parsing (PR #501 HIGH-2: no silent fallback).
+let REAL_CERT_PEM: string;
+
+const MOCK_CHAIN_PEM = () => REAL_CERT_PEM + REAL_CERT_PEM;
+const MOCK_SERIAL = 'ABCD1234';
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  REAL_CERT_PEM = await makeSelfSignedCert();
+});
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Factory helpers
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+function makeTokenRow(overrides: Partial<Record<string, unknown>> = {}) {
+  return {
+    token: TOKEN,
+    grantId: GRANT_ID,
+    peerId: PEER_ID,
+    expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 60_000), // 1 min from now
+    usedAt: null,
+    createdAt: new Date(),
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+}
+
+function makeGrant(overrides: Partial<Record<string, unknown>> = {}) {
+  return {
+    id: GRANT_ID,
+    peerId: PEER_ID,
+    subjectUserId: USER_ID,
+    scope: { resources: ['tasks'], excluded_resources: [], max_rows_per_query: 100 },
+    status: 'pending',
+    expiresAt: null,
+    createdAt: new Date(),
+    revokedAt: null,
+    revokedReason: null,
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Mock DB builder
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+function makeDb({
+  tokenRows = [makeTokenRow()],
+  // claimedRows is returned by the .returning() on the token-claim UPDATE.
+  // Empty array = concurrent request won the race (GoneException).
+  claimedRows = [{ token: TOKEN }],
+}: {
+  tokenRows?: unknown[];
+  claimedRows?: unknown[];
+} = {}) {
+  // insert().values() — for createToken (outer db, not tx)
+  const insertValues = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+  const insertMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ values: insertValues });
+
+  // select().from().where().limit() — for fetching the token row
+  const limitSelect = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(tokenRows);
+  const whereSelect = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ limit: limitSelect });
+  const fromSelect = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ where: whereSelect });
+  const selectMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ from: fromSelect });
+
+  // update().set().where().returning() — for the atomic token claim (outer db)
+  const returningMock = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(claimedRows);
+  const whereClaimUpdate = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ returning: returningMock });
+  const setClaimMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ where: whereClaimUpdate });
+  const claimUpdateMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ set: setClaimMock });
+
+  // transaction(cb) — cb receives txMock; txMock has update + insert
+  //
+  // The tx mock must support two tx.update() call patterns (CRIT-2, PR #501):
+  //   1. Grant activation:  .update().set().where().returning() → resolves to [{ id }]
+  //   2. Peer update:       .update().set().where()             → resolves to undefined
+  //
+  // We achieve this by making txWhereUpdate return an object with BOTH a thenable
+  // interface (so `await tx.update().set().where()` works) AND a .returning() method.
+  const txGrantActivatedRow = { id: GRANT_ID };
+  const txReturningMock = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([txGrantActivatedRow]);
+  const txWhereUpdate = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({
+    // .returning() for grant activation (first tx.update call)
+    returning: txReturningMock,
+    // thenables so `await tx.update().set().where()` also works for peer update
+    then: (resolve: (v: undefined) => void) => resolve(undefined),
+    catch: () => undefined,
+    finally: () => undefined,
+  });
+  const txSetMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ where: txWhereUpdate });
+  const txUpdateMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ set: txSetMock });
+  const txInsertValues = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+  const txInsertMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ values: txInsertValues });
+  const txMock = { update: txUpdateMock, insert: txInsertMock };
+  const transactionMock = vi
+    .fn()
+    .mockImplementation(async (cb: (tx: typeof txMock) => Promise<void>) => cb(txMock));
+
+  return {
+    insert: insertMock,
+    select: selectMock,
+    update: claimUpdateMock,
+    transaction: transactionMock,
+    _mocks: {
+      insertValues,
+      insertMock,
+      limitSelect,
+      whereSelect,
+      fromSelect,
+      selectMock,
+      returningMock,
+      whereClaimUpdate,
+      setClaimMock,
+      claimUpdateMock,
+      txInsertValues,
+      txInsertMock,
+      txWhereUpdate,
+      txReturningMock,
+      txSetMock,
+      txUpdateMock,
+      txMock,
+      transactionMock,
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Mock CaService
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+function makeCaService() {
+  return {
+    // REAL_CERT_PEM is populated by beforeAll — safe to reference via closure here
+    // because makeCaService() is only called after the suite's beforeAll runs.
+    issueCert: vi.fn().mockImplementation(async () => ({
+      certPem: REAL_CERT_PEM,
+      certChainPem: MOCK_CHAIN_PEM(),
+      serialNumber: MOCK_SERIAL,
+    })),
+  };
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Mock GrantsService
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+function makeGrantsService(grantOverrides: Partial<Record<string, unknown>> = {}) {
+  return {
+    getGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(makeGrant(grantOverrides)),
+    activateGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(makeGrant({ status: 'active' })),
+  };
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Helper: build service under test
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+function buildService({
+  db = makeDb(),
+  caService = makeCaService(),
+  grantsService = makeGrantsService(),
+}: {
+  db?: ReturnType<typeof makeDb>;
+  caService?: ReturnType<typeof makeCaService>;
+  grantsService?: ReturnType<typeof makeGrantsService>;
+} = {}) {
+  return new EnrollmentService(db as unknown as Db, caService as never, grantsService as never);
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Tests: createToken
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+describe('EnrollmentService.createToken', () => {
+  it('inserts a token row and returns { token, expiresAt }', async () => {
+    const db = makeDb();
+    const service = buildService({ db });
+
+    const result = await service.createToken({
+      grantId: GRANT_ID,
+      peerId: PEER_ID,
+      ttlSeconds: 900,
+    });
+
+    expect(result.token).toHaveLength(64); // 32 bytes hex
+    expect(result.expiresAt).toBeDefined();
+    expect(new Date(result.expiresAt).getTime()).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now());
+    expect(db._mocks.insertValues).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ grantId: GRANT_ID, peerId: PEER_ID }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('clamps ttlSeconds to 900', async () => {
+    const db = makeDb();
+    const service = buildService({ db });
+
+    const before = Date.now();
+    const result = await service.createToken({
+      grantId: GRANT_ID,
+      peerId: PEER_ID,
+      ttlSeconds: 9999,
+    });
+    const after = Date.now();
+
+    const expiresMs = new Date(result.expiresAt).getTime();
+    // Should be at most 900s from now
+    expect(expiresMs - before).toBeLessThanOrEqual(900_000 + 100);
+    expect(expiresMs - after).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
+  });
+});
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Tests: redeem — error paths
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+describe('EnrollmentService.redeem — error paths', () => {
+  it('throws NotFoundException when token row not found', async () => {
+    const db = makeDb({ tokenRows: [] });
+    const service = buildService({ db });
+
+    await expect(service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotFoundException);
+  });
+
+  it('throws GoneException when usedAt is set (already redeemed)', async () => {
+    const db = makeDb({ tokenRows: [makeTokenRow({ usedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 1000) })] });
+    const service = buildService({ db });
+
+    await expect(service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(GoneException);
+  });
+
+  it('throws GoneException when token has expired', async () => {
+    const db = makeDb({ tokenRows: [makeTokenRow({ expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() - 1000) })] });
+    const service = buildService({ db });
+
+    await expect(service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(GoneException);
+  });
+
+  it('throws GoneException when grant status is not pending', async () => {
+    const db = makeDb();
+    const grantsService = makeGrantsService({ status: 'active' });
+    const service = buildService({ db, grantsService });
+
+    await expect(service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(GoneException);
+  });
+
+  it('throws GoneException when token claim UPDATE returns empty array (concurrent replay)', async () => {
+    const db = makeDb({ claimedRows: [] });
+    const caService = makeCaService();
+    const grantsService = makeGrantsService();
+    const service = buildService({ db, caService, grantsService });
+
+    await expect(service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(GoneException);
+  });
+
+  it('does NOT call issueCert when token claim fails (no double minting)', async () => {
+    const db = makeDb({ claimedRows: [] });
+    const caService = makeCaService();
+    const service = buildService({ db, caService });
+
+    await expect(service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(GoneException);
+    expect(caService.issueCert).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+});
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Tests: redeem — success path
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+describe('EnrollmentService.redeem — success path', () => {
+  let db: ReturnType<typeof makeDb>;
+  let caService: ReturnType<typeof makeCaService>;
+  let grantsService: ReturnType<typeof makeGrantsService>;
+  let service: EnrollmentService;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    db = makeDb();
+    caService = makeCaService();
+    grantsService = makeGrantsService();
+    service = buildService({ db, caService, grantsService });
+  });
+
+  it('claims token BEFORE calling issueCert (prevents double minting)', async () => {
+    const callOrder: string[] = [];
+    db._mocks.returningMock.mockImplementation(async () => {
+      callOrder.push('claim');
+      return [{ token: TOKEN }];
+    });
+    caService.issueCert.mockImplementation(async () => {
+      callOrder.push('issueCert');
+      return { certPem: REAL_CERT_PEM, certChainPem: MOCK_CHAIN_PEM(), serialNumber: MOCK_SERIAL };
+    });
+
+    await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
+
+    expect(callOrder).toEqual(['claim', 'issueCert']);
+  });
+
+  it('calls CaService.issueCert with grantId, subjectUserId, csrPem, ttlSeconds=300', async () => {
+    await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
+
+    expect(caService.issueCert).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        grantId: GRANT_ID,
+        subjectUserId: USER_ID,
+        csrPem: '---CSR---',
+        ttlSeconds: 300,
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('runs activate grant + peer update + audit inside a transaction', async () => {
+    await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
+
+    expect(db._mocks.transactionMock).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
+    // tx.update called twice: activate grant + update peer
+    expect(db._mocks.txUpdateMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+    // tx.insert called once: audit log
+    expect(db._mocks.txInsertMock).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
+  });
+
+  it('activates grant (sets status=active) inside the transaction', async () => {
+    await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
+
+    expect(db._mocks.txSetMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ status: 'active' }));
+  });
+
+  it('updates the federationPeers row with certPem, certSerial, state=active inside the transaction', async () => {
+    await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
+
+    expect(db._mocks.txSetMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        certPem: REAL_CERT_PEM,
+        certSerial: MOCK_SERIAL,
+        state: 'active',
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('inserts an audit log row inside the transaction', async () => {
+    await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
+
+    expect(db._mocks.txInsertValues).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        peerId: PEER_ID,
+        grantId: GRANT_ID,
+        verb: 'enrollment',
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('returns { certPem, certChainPem } from CaService', async () => {
+    const result = await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
+
+    expect(result).toEqual({
+      certPem: REAL_CERT_PEM,
+      certChainPem: MOCK_CHAIN_PEM(),
+    });
+  });
+});

apps/gateway/src/federation/__tests__/federation.controller.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+/**
+ * Unit tests for FederationController (FED-M2-08).
+ *
+ * Coverage:
+ *  - listGrants: delegates to GrantsService with query params
+ *  - createGrant: delegates to GrantsService, validates body
+ *  - generateToken: returns enrollmentUrl containing the token
+ *  - listPeers: returns DB rows
+ */
+
+import 'reflect-metadata';
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
+import { NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
+import type { Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
+import { FederationController } from '../federation.controller.js';
+import type { GrantsService } from '../grants.service.js';
+import type { EnrollmentService } from '../enrollment.service.js';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Constants
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const GRANT_ID = 'g1111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111';
+const PEER_ID = 'p2222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222';
+const USER_ID = 'u3333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333';
+
+const MOCK_GRANT = {
+  id: GRANT_ID,
+  peerId: PEER_ID,
+  subjectUserId: USER_ID,
+  scope: { resources: ['tasks'], operations: ['list'] },
+  status: 'pending' as const,
+  expiresAt: null,
+  createdAt: new Date('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
+  revokedAt: null,
+  revokedReason: null,
+};
+
+const MOCK_PEER = {
+  id: PEER_ID,
+  commonName: 'test-peer',
+  displayName: 'Test Peer',
+  certPem: '',
+  certSerial: 'pending',
+  certNotAfter: new Date(0),
+  clientKeyPem: null,
+  state: 'pending' as const,
+  endpointUrl: null,
+  createdAt: new Date('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
+  updatedAt: new Date('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
+};
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// DB mock builder
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+function makeDbMock(rows: unknown[] = []) {
+  const orderBy = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(rows);
+  const where = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ orderBy });
+  const from = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ where, orderBy });
+  const select = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ from });
+
+  return {
+    select,
+    from,
+    where,
+    orderBy,
+    insert: vi.fn(),
+    update: vi.fn(),
+    delete: vi.fn(),
+  } as unknown as Db;
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Tests
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+describe('FederationController', () => {
+  let db: Db;
+  let grantsService: GrantsService;
+  let enrollmentService: EnrollmentService;
+  let controller: FederationController;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    db = makeDbMock([MOCK_PEER]);
+
+    grantsService = {
+      createGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(MOCK_GRANT),
+      getGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(MOCK_GRANT),
+      listGrants: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([MOCK_GRANT]),
+      revokeGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ ...MOCK_GRANT, status: 'revoked' }),
+      activateGrant: vi.fn(),
+      expireGrant: vi.fn(),
+    } as unknown as GrantsService;
+
+    enrollmentService = {
+      createToken: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
+        token: 'abc123def456abc123def456abc123def456abc123def456abc123def456ab12',
+        expiresAt: '2026-01-01T00:15:00.000Z',
+      }),
+      redeem: vi.fn(),
+    } as unknown as EnrollmentService;
+
+    controller = new FederationController(db, grantsService, enrollmentService);
+  });
+
+  // ─── Grant management ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  describe('listGrants', () => {
+    it('delegates to GrantsService with provided query params', async () => {
+      const query = { peerId: PEER_ID, status: 'pending' as const };
+      const result = await controller.listGrants(query);
+
+      expect(grantsService.listGrants).toHaveBeenCalledWith(query);
+      expect(result).toEqual([MOCK_GRANT]);
+    });
+
+    it('delegates to GrantsService with empty filters', async () => {
+      const result = await controller.listGrants({});
+
+      expect(grantsService.listGrants).toHaveBeenCalledWith({});
+      expect(result).toEqual([MOCK_GRANT]);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('createGrant', () => {
+    it('delegates to GrantsService and returns created grant', async () => {
+      const body = {
+        peerId: PEER_ID,
+        subjectUserId: USER_ID,
+        scope: { resources: ['tasks'], operations: ['list'] },
+      };
+
+      const result = await controller.createGrant(body);
+
+      expect(grantsService.createGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith(body);
+      expect(result).toEqual(MOCK_GRANT);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('getGrant', () => {
+    it('delegates to GrantsService with provided ID', async () => {
+      const result = await controller.getGrant(GRANT_ID);
+
+      expect(grantsService.getGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith(GRANT_ID);
+      expect(result).toEqual(MOCK_GRANT);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('revokeGrant', () => {
+    it('delegates to GrantsService with id and reason', async () => {
+      const result = await controller.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID, { reason: 'test reason' });
+
+      expect(grantsService.revokeGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith(GRANT_ID, 'test reason');
+      expect(result).toMatchObject({ status: 'revoked' });
+    });
+
+    it('delegates without reason when omitted', async () => {
+      await controller.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID, {});
+
+      expect(grantsService.revokeGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith(GRANT_ID, undefined);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('generateToken', () => {
+    it('returns enrollmentUrl containing the token', async () => {
+      const token = 'abc123def456abc123def456abc123def456abc123def456abc123def456ab12';
+      vi.mocked(enrollmentService.createToken).mockResolvedValueOnce({
+        token,
+        expiresAt: '2026-01-01T00:15:00.000Z',
+      });
+
+      const result = await controller.generateToken(GRANT_ID, { ttlSeconds: 900 });
+
+      expect(result.token).toBe(token);
+      expect(result.enrollmentUrl).toContain(token);
+      expect(result.enrollmentUrl).toContain('/api/federation/enrollment/');
+    });
+
+    it('creates token via EnrollmentService with correct grantId and peerId', async () => {
+      await controller.generateToken(GRANT_ID, { ttlSeconds: 300 });
+
+      expect(enrollmentService.createToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+        grantId: GRANT_ID,
+        peerId: PEER_ID,
+        ttlSeconds: 300,
+      });
+    });
+
+    it('throws NotFoundException when grant does not exist', async () => {
+      vi.mocked(grantsService.getGrant).mockRejectedValueOnce(
+        new NotFoundException(`Grant ${GRANT_ID} not found`),
+      );
+
+      await expect(controller.generateToken(GRANT_ID, { ttlSeconds: 900 })).rejects.toThrow(
+        NotFoundException,
+      );
+    });
+  });
+
+  // ─── Peer management ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  describe('listPeers', () => {
+    it('returns DB rows ordered by commonName', async () => {
+      const result = await controller.listPeers();
+
+      expect(db.select).toHaveBeenCalled();
+      // The DB mock resolves with [MOCK_PEER]
+      expect(result).toEqual([MOCK_PEER]);
+    });
+  });
+});

apps/gateway/src/federation/__tests__/grants.service.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+/**
+ * Unit tests for GrantsService — federation grants CRUD + status transitions (FED-M2-06).
+ *
+ * Coverage:
+ *  - createGrant: validates scope via parseFederationScope
+ *  - createGrant: inserts with status 'pending'
+ *  - getGrant: returns grant when found
+ *  - getGrant: throws NotFoundException when not found
+ *  - listGrants: no filters returns all grants
+ *  - listGrants: filters by peerId
+ *  - listGrants: filters by subjectUserId
+ *  - listGrants: filters by status
+ *  - listGrants: multiple filters combined
+ *  - activateGrant: pending → active works
+ *  - activateGrant: non-pending throws ConflictException
+ *  - revokeGrant: active → revoked works, sets revokedAt
+ *  - revokeGrant: non-active throws ConflictException
+ *  - expireGrant: active → expired works
+ *  - expireGrant: non-active throws ConflictException
+ */
+
+import 'reflect-metadata';
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
+import { ConflictException, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
+import type { Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
+import { GrantsService } from '../grants.service.js';
+import { FederationScopeError } from '../scope-schema.js';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Minimal valid federation scope for testing
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+const VALID_SCOPE = {
+  resources: ['tasks'] as const,
+  excluded_resources: [],
+  max_rows_per_query: 100,
+};
+
+const PEER_ID = 'a1111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111';
+const USER_ID = 'u2222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222';
+const GRANT_ID = 'g3333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Build a mock DB that mimics chained Drizzle query builder calls
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+function makeMockGrant(overrides: Partial<Record<string, unknown>> = {}) {
+  return {
+    id: GRANT_ID,
+    peerId: PEER_ID,
+    subjectUserId: USER_ID,
+    scope: VALID_SCOPE,
+    status: 'pending',
+    expiresAt: null,
+    createdAt: new Date('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
+    revokedAt: null,
+    revokedReason: null,
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+}
+
+function makeDb(
+  overrides: {
+    insertReturning?: unknown[];
+    selectRows?: unknown[];
+    updateReturning?: unknown[];
+  } = {},
+) {
+  const insertReturning = overrides.insertReturning ?? [makeMockGrant()];
+  const selectRows = overrides.selectRows ?? [makeMockGrant()];
+  const updateReturning = overrides.updateReturning ?? [makeMockGrant({ status: 'active' })];
+
+  // Drizzle returns a chainable builder; we need to mock the full chain.
+  const returningInsert = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(insertReturning);
+  const valuesInsert = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ returning: returningInsert });
+  const insertMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ values: valuesInsert });
+
+  // select().from().where().limit()
+  const limitSelect = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(selectRows);
+  const whereSelect = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ limit: limitSelect });
+  // from returns something that is both thenable (for full-table select) and has .where()
+  const fromSelect = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({
+    where: whereSelect,
+    limit: limitSelect,
+    // Make it thenable for listGrants with no filters (await db.select().from(federationGrants))
+    then: (resolve: (v: unknown) => unknown) => resolve(selectRows),
+  });
+  const selectMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ from: fromSelect });
+
+  const returningUpdate = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(updateReturning);
+  const whereUpdate = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ returning: returningUpdate });
+  const setMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ where: whereUpdate });
+  const updateMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ set: setMock });
+
+  return {
+    insert: insertMock,
+    select: selectMock,
+    update: updateMock,
+    // Expose internals for assertions
+    _mocks: {
+      insertReturning,
+      valuesInsert,
+      insertMock,
+      limitSelect,
+      whereSelect,
+      fromSelect,
+      selectMock,
+      returningUpdate,
+      whereUpdate,
+      setMock,
+      updateMock,
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Tests
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+describe('GrantsService', () => {
+  let db: ReturnType<typeof makeDb>;
+  let service: GrantsService;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    db = makeDb();
+    service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
+  });
+
+  // ─── createGrant ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  describe('createGrant', () => {
+    it('calls parseFederationScope — rejects an invalid scope', async () => {
+      const invalidScope = { resources: [], max_rows_per_query: 0 };
+      await expect(
+        service.createGrant({ peerId: PEER_ID, subjectUserId: USER_ID, scope: invalidScope }),
+      ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(FederationScopeError);
+    });
+
+    it('inserts a grant with status pending and returns it', async () => {
+      const result = await service.createGrant({
+        peerId: PEER_ID,
+        subjectUserId: USER_ID,
+        scope: VALID_SCOPE,
+      });
+
+      expect(db._mocks.valuesInsert).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+        expect.objectContaining({ status: 'pending', peerId: PEER_ID, subjectUserId: USER_ID }),
+      );
+      expect(result.status).toBe('pending');
+    });
+
+    it('passes expiresAt as a Date when provided', async () => {
+      await service.createGrant({
+        peerId: PEER_ID,
+        subjectUserId: USER_ID,
+        scope: VALID_SCOPE,
+        expiresAt: '2027-01-01T00:00:00Z',
+      });
+
+      expect(db._mocks.valuesInsert).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+        expect.objectContaining({ expiresAt: expect.any(Date) }),
+      );
+    });
+
+    it('sets expiresAt to null when not provided', async () => {
+      await service.createGrant({ peerId: PEER_ID, subjectUserId: USER_ID, scope: VALID_SCOPE });
+
+      expect(db._mocks.valuesInsert).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+        expect.objectContaining({ expiresAt: null }),
+      );
+    });
+  });
+
+  // ─── getGrant ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  describe('getGrant', () => {
+    it('returns the grant when found', async () => {
+      const result = await service.getGrant(GRANT_ID);
+      expect(result.id).toBe(GRANT_ID);
+    });
+
+    it('throws NotFoundException when no rows returned', async () => {
+      db = makeDb({ selectRows: [] });
+      service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
+      await expect(service.getGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotFoundException);
+    });
+  });
+
+  // ─── listGrants ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  describe('listGrants', () => {
+    it('queries without where clause when no filters provided', async () => {
+      const result = await service.listGrants({});
+      expect(Array.isArray(result)).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('applies peerId filter', async () => {
+      await service.listGrants({ peerId: PEER_ID });
+      expect(db._mocks.whereSelect).toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it('applies subjectUserId filter', async () => {
+      await service.listGrants({ subjectUserId: USER_ID });
+      expect(db._mocks.whereSelect).toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it('applies status filter', async () => {
+      await service.listGrants({ status: 'active' });
+      expect(db._mocks.whereSelect).toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it('applies multiple filters combined', async () => {
+      await service.listGrants({ peerId: PEER_ID, status: 'pending' });
+      expect(db._mocks.whereSelect).toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+  });
+
+  // ─── activateGrant ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  describe('activateGrant', () => {
+    it('transitions pending → active and returns updated grant', async () => {
+      db = makeDb({
+        selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'pending' })],
+        updateReturning: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'active' })],
+      });
+      service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
+
+      const result = await service.activateGrant(GRANT_ID);
+
+      expect(db._mocks.setMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ status: 'active' });
+      expect(result.status).toBe('active');
+    });
+
+    it('throws ConflictException when grant is already active', async () => {
+      db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'active' })] });
+      service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
+
+      await expect(service.activateGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
+    });
+
+    it('throws ConflictException when grant is revoked', async () => {
+      db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'revoked' })] });
+      service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
+
+      await expect(service.activateGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
+    });
+
+    it('throws ConflictException when grant is expired', async () => {
+      db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'expired' })] });
+      service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
+
+      await expect(service.activateGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
+    });
+  });
+
+  // ─── revokeGrant ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  describe('revokeGrant', () => {
+    it('transitions active → revoked and sets revokedAt', async () => {
+      const revokedAt = new Date();
+      db = makeDb({
+        selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'active' })],
+        updateReturning: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'revoked', revokedAt })],
+      });
+      service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
+
+      const result = await service.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID, 'test reason');
+
+      expect(db._mocks.setMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+        expect.objectContaining({
+          status: 'revoked',
+          revokedAt: expect.any(Date),
+          revokedReason: 'test reason',
+        }),
+      );
+      expect(result.status).toBe('revoked');
+    });
+
+    it('sets revokedReason to null when not provided', async () => {
+      db = makeDb({
+        selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'active' })],
+        updateReturning: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'revoked', revokedAt: new Date() })],
+      });
+      service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
+
+      await service.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID);
+
+      expect(db._mocks.setMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+        expect.objectContaining({ revokedReason: null }),
+      );
+    });
+
+    it('throws ConflictException when grant is pending', async () => {
+      db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'pending' })] });
+      service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
+
+      await expect(service.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
+    });
+
+    it('throws ConflictException when grant is already revoked', async () => {
+      db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'revoked' })] });
+      service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
+
+      await expect(service.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
+    });
+
+    it('throws ConflictException when grant is expired', async () => {
+      db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'expired' })] });
+      service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
+
+      await expect(service.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
+    });
+  });
+
+  // ─── expireGrant ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  describe('expireGrant', () => {
+    it('transitions active → expired and returns updated grant', async () => {
+      db = makeDb({
+        selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'active' })],
+        updateReturning: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'expired' })],
+      });
+      service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
+
+      const result = await service.expireGrant(GRANT_ID);
+
+      expect(db._mocks.setMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ status: 'expired' });
+      expect(result.status).toBe('expired');
+    });
+
+    it('throws ConflictException when grant is pending', async () => {
+      db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'pending' })] });
+      service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
+
+      await expect(service.expireGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
+    });
+
+    it('throws ConflictException when grant is already expired', async () => {
+      db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'expired' })] });
+      service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
+
+      await expect(service.expireGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
+    });
+
+    it('throws ConflictException when grant is revoked', async () => {
+      db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'revoked' })] });
+      service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
+
+      await expect(service.expireGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
+    });
+  });
+});

apps/gateway/src/federation/__tests__/helpers/test-cert.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+/**
+ * Test helpers for generating real X.509 PEM certificates in unit tests.
+ *
+ * PR #501 (FED-M2-11) introduced strict `new X509Certificate(certPem)` parsing
+ * in both EnrollmentService.extractCertNotAfter and CaService.issueCert — dummy
+ * cert strings now throw `error:0680007B:asn1 encoding routines::header too long`.
+ *
+ * These helpers produce minimal but cryptographically valid self-signed EC P-256
+ * certificates via @peculiar/x509 + Node.js webcrypto, suitable for test mocks.
+ *
+ * Two variants:
+ *  - makeSelfSignedCert()          Plain cert — satisfies node:crypto X509Certificate parse.
+ *  - makeMosaicIssuedCert(opts)    Cert with custom Mosaic OID extensions — satisfies the
+ *                                  CRIT-1 OID presence + value checks in CaService.issueCert.
+ */
+
+import { webcrypto } from 'node:crypto';
+import {
+  X509CertificateGenerator,
+  Extension,
+  KeyUsagesExtension,
+  KeyUsageFlags,
+  BasicConstraintsExtension,
+  cryptoProvider,
+} from '@peculiar/x509';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Internal helpers
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Encode a string as an ASN.1 UTF8String TLV:
+ *   0x0C (tag) + 1-byte length (for strings ≤ 127 bytes) + UTF-8 bytes.
+ *
+ * CaService.issueCert reads the extension value as:
+ *   decoder.decode(grantIdExt.value.slice(2))
+ * i.e. it skips the tag + length byte and decodes the remainder as UTF-8.
+ * So we must produce exactly this encoding as the OCTET STRING content.
+ */
+function encodeUtf8String(value: string): Uint8Array {
+  const utf8 = new TextEncoder().encode(value);
+  if (utf8.length > 127) {
+    throw new Error('encodeUtf8String: value too long for single-byte length encoding');
+  }
+  const buf = new Uint8Array(2 + utf8.length);
+  buf[0] = 0x0c; // ASN.1 UTF8String tag
+  buf[1] = utf8.length;
+  buf.set(utf8, 2);
+  return buf;
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Mosaic OID constants (must match production CaService)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const OID_MOSAIC_GRANT_ID = '1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1';
+const OID_MOSAIC_SUBJECT_USER_ID = '1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Public API
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Generate a minimal self-signed EC P-256 certificate valid for 1 day.
+ * CN=harness-test, no custom extensions.
+ *
+ * Suitable for:
+ *  - EnrollmentService.extractCertNotAfter (just needs parseable PEM)
+ *  - Any mock that returns certPem / certChainPem without OID checks
+ */
+export async function makeSelfSignedCert(): Promise<string> {
+  // Ensure @peculiar/x509 uses Node.js webcrypto (available as globalThis.crypto in Node 19+,
+  // but we set it explicitly here to be safe on all Node 18+ versions).
+  cryptoProvider.set(webcrypto as unknown as Parameters<typeof cryptoProvider.set>[0]);
+
+  const alg = { name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256', hash: 'SHA-256' } as const;
+  const keys = await webcrypto.subtle.generateKey(alg, false, ['sign', 'verify']);
+
+  const now = new Date();
+  const tomorrow = new Date(now.getTime() + 86_400_000);
+
+  const cert = await X509CertificateGenerator.createSelfSigned({
+    serialNumber: '01',
+    name: 'CN=harness-test',
+    notBefore: now,
+    notAfter: tomorrow,
+    signingAlgorithm: alg,
+    keys,
+    extensions: [
+      new BasicConstraintsExtension(false),
+      new KeyUsagesExtension(KeyUsageFlags.digitalSignature),
+    ],
+  });
+
+  return cert.toString('pem');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a self-signed EC P-256 certificate that contains the two custom
+ * Mosaic OID extensions required by CaService.issueCert's CRIT-1 check:
+ *   OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1  → mosaic_grant_id   (value = grantId)
+ *   OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2  → mosaic_subject_user_id (value = subjectUserId)
+ *
+ * The extension value encoding matches the production parser's `.slice(2)` assumption:
+ * each extension value is an OCTET STRING wrapping an ASN.1 UTF8String TLV.
+ */
+export async function makeMosaicIssuedCert(opts: {
+  grantId: string;
+  subjectUserId: string;
+}): Promise<string> {
+  // Ensure @peculiar/x509 uses Node.js webcrypto.
+  cryptoProvider.set(webcrypto as unknown as Parameters<typeof cryptoProvider.set>[0]);
+
+  const alg = { name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256', hash: 'SHA-256' } as const;
+  const keys = await webcrypto.subtle.generateKey(alg, false, ['sign', 'verify']);
+
+  const now = new Date();
+  const tomorrow = new Date(now.getTime() + 86_400_000);
+
+  const cert = await X509CertificateGenerator.createSelfSigned({
+    serialNumber: '01',
+    name: 'CN=mosaic-issued-test',
+    notBefore: now,
+    notAfter: tomorrow,
+    signingAlgorithm: alg,
+    keys,
+    extensions: [
+      new BasicConstraintsExtension(false),
+      new KeyUsagesExtension(KeyUsageFlags.digitalSignature),
+      // mosaic_grant_id — OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1
+      new Extension(OID_MOSAIC_GRANT_ID, false, encodeUtf8String(opts.grantId)),
+      // mosaic_subject_user_id — OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2
+      new Extension(OID_MOSAIC_SUBJECT_USER_ID, false, encodeUtf8String(opts.subjectUserId)),
+    ],
+  });
+
+  return cert.toString('pem');
+}

apps/gateway/src/federation/__tests__/peer-key.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
+import { sealClientKey, unsealClientKey } from '../peer-key.util.js';
+
+const TEST_SECRET = 'test-secret-for-peer-key-unit-tests-only';
+
+const TEST_PEM = `-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQC7o4qne60TB3wo
+pCOW8QqstpxEBpnFo37JxLYEJbpE3gUlJajsHv9UWRQ7m5B7n+MBXwTCQqMEY8Wl
+kHv9tGgz1YGwzBjNKxPJXE6pPTXQ1Oa0VB9l3qHdqF5HtZoJzE0c6dO8HJ5YUVL
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----`;
+
+let savedSecret: string | undefined;
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  savedSecret = process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
+  process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] = TEST_SECRET;
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  if (savedSecret === undefined) {
+    delete process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
+  } else {
+    process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] = savedSecret;
+  }
+});
+
+describe('peer-key seal/unseal', () => {
+  it('round-trip: unsealClientKey(sealClientKey(pem)) returns original pem', () => {
+    const sealed = sealClientKey(TEST_PEM);
+    const roundTripped = unsealClientKey(sealed);
+    expect(roundTripped).toBe(TEST_PEM);
+  });
+
+  it('non-determinism: sealClientKey produces different ciphertext each call', () => {
+    const sealed1 = sealClientKey(TEST_PEM);
+    const sealed2 = sealClientKey(TEST_PEM);
+    expect(sealed1).not.toBe(sealed2);
+  });
+
+  it('at-rest: sealed output does not contain plaintext PEM content', () => {
+    const sealed = sealClientKey(TEST_PEM);
+    expect(sealed).not.toContain('PRIVATE KEY');
+    expect(sealed).not.toContain(
+      'MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQC7o4qne60TB3wo',
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('tamper: flipping a byte in the sealed payload causes unseal to throw', () => {
+    const sealed = sealClientKey(TEST_PEM);
+    const buf = Buffer.from(sealed, 'base64');
+    // Flip a byte in the middle of the buffer (past IV and authTag)
+    const midpoint = Math.floor(buf.length / 2);
+    buf[midpoint] = buf[midpoint]! ^ 0xff;
+    const tampered = buf.toString('base64');
+    expect(() => unsealClientKey(tampered)).toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it('missing secret: unsealClientKey throws when BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is unset', () => {
+    const sealed = sealClientKey(TEST_PEM);
+    delete process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
+    expect(() => unsealClientKey(sealed)).toThrow('BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is not set');
+  });
+});

apps/gateway/src/federation/ca.dto.ts

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  * IssuedCertDto        — output from CaService.issueCert()
  */
 
-import { IsInt, IsNotEmpty, IsString, IsUUID, Max, Min } from 'class-validator';
+import { IsInt, IsNotEmpty, IsOptional, IsString, IsUUID, Max, Min } from 'class-validator';
 
 export class IssueCertRequestDto {
   /**
@@ -32,13 +32,14 @@ export class IssueCertRequestDto {
 
   /**
    * Requested certificate validity in seconds.
-   * Capped at the step-ca provisioner policy ceiling.
-   * Defaults to 86 400 s (24 h) when omitted by callers.
+   * Hard cap: 900 s (15 minutes). Default: 300 s (5 minutes).
+   * The service will always clamp to 900 s regardless of this value.
    */
+  @IsOptional()
   @IsInt()
   @Min(60)
-  @Max(365 * 24 * 3600)
-  ttlSeconds!: number;
+  @Max(15 * 60)
+  ttlSeconds: number = 300;
 }
 
 export class IssuedCertDto {

apps/gateway/src/federation/ca.service.spec.ts

@@ -7,15 +7,23 @@
  *  - certChainPem from ca field: uses crt+ca when certChain absent but ca present
  *  - HTTP 401: throws CaServiceError with cause + remediation
  *  - HTTP non-401 error: throws CaServiceError
- *  - Malformed CSR: throws before HTTP call
+ *  - Malformed CSR: throws before HTTP call (INVALID_CSR)
  *  - Non-JSON response: throws CaServiceError
  *  - HTTPS connection error: throws CaServiceError
  *  - JWT custom claims: mosaic_grant_id and mosaic_subject_user_id present in OTT payload
+ *    verified with jose.jwtVerify (real signature check)
  *  - CaServiceError: has cause + remediation properties
  *  - Missing crt in response: throws CaServiceError
+ *  - Real CSR validation: valid P-256 CSR passes; malformed CSR fails with INVALID_CSR
+ *  - provisionerPassword never appears in CaServiceError messages
+ *  - HTTPS-only enforcement: http:// URL throws in constructor
  */
 
-import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, type Mock } from 'vitest';
+import 'reflect-metadata';
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, beforeAll, type Mock } from 'vitest';
+import { jwtVerify, exportJWK, generateKeyPair } from 'jose';
+import { Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator } from '@peculiar/x509';
+import { makeMosaicIssuedCert } from './__tests__/helpers/test-cert.js';
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Mock node:https BEFORE importing CaService so the mock is in place when
@@ -46,36 +54,87 @@ vi.mock('node:fs', () => {
 // Helpers
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-// Minimal self-signed certificate PEM produced by openssl for testing.
-// Serial 01, RSA 512 bit (invalid for production, fine for unit tests).
+// Real self-signed EC P-256 certificate generated with openssl for testing.
+// openssl req -x509 -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:P-256 -nodes -keyout /dev/null \
+//   -out /dev/stdout -subj "/CN=test" -days 1
 const FAKE_CERT_PEM = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA0000000000000000AAAA
------END CERTIFICATE-----\n`;
+MIIBdDCCARmgAwIBAgIUM+iUJSayN+PwXkyVN6qwSY7sr6gwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw
+DzENMAsGA1UEAwwEdGVzdDAeFw0yNjA0MjIwMzE5MTlaFw0yNjA0MjMwMzE5MTla
+MA8xDTALBgNVBAMMBHRlc3QwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR21kHL
+n1GmFQ4TEBw3EA53pD+2McIBf5WcoHE+x0eMz5DpRKJe0ksHwOVN5Yev5d57kb+4
+MvG1LhbHCB/uQo8So1MwUTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUPq0pdIGiQ7pLBRXICS8GTliCrLsw
+HwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUPq0pdIGiQ7pLBRXICS8GTliCrLswDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB
+/zAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNJADBGAiEAypJqyC6S77aQ3eEXokM6sgAsD7Oa3tJbCbVm
+zG3uJb0CIQC1w+GE+Ad0OTR5Quja46R1RjOo8ydpzZ7Fh4rouAiwEw==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+`;
 
-const FAKE_CSR_PEM = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
-MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA0000000000000000AAAA
------END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\n`;
-
-const FAKE_CA_PEM = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-CAROOT000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000AAAA
------END CERTIFICATE-----\n`;
+// Use a second copy of the same cert for the CA field in tests.
+const FAKE_CA_PEM = FAKE_CERT_PEM;
 
 const GRANT_ID = 'a0eebc99-9c0b-4ef8-bb6d-6bb9bd380a11';
-const SUBJECT_USER_ID = 'b1ffcd00-0d1c-5fg9-cc7e-7cc0ce491b22';
+const SUBJECT_USER_ID = 'b1ffcd00-0d1c-5f09-cc7e-7cc0ce491b22';
+
+// Real self-signed cert containing both Mosaic OID extensions — populated in beforeAll.
+// Required because CaService.issueCert performs CRIT-1 OID presence/value checks on the
+// response cert (PR #501 — strict parsing, no silent fallback).
+let realIssuedCertPem: string;
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Generate a real EC P-256 key pair and CSR for integration-style tests
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// We generate this once at module level so it's available to all tests.
+// The key pair and CSR PEM are populated asynchronously in the test that needs them.
+
+let realCsrPem: string;
+
+async function generateRealCsr(): Promise<string> {
+  const { privateKey, publicKey } = await generateKeyPair('ES256');
+  // Export public key JWK for potential verification (not used here but confirms key is exportable)
+  await exportJWK(publicKey);
+
+  // Use @peculiar/x509 to build a proper CSR
+  const csr = await Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator.create({
+    name: 'CN=test.federation.local',
+    signingAlgorithm: { name: 'ECDSA', hash: 'SHA-256' },
+    keys: { privateKey, publicKey },
+  });
+
+  return csr.toString('pem');
+}
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Setup env before importing service
+// We use an EC P-256 key pair here so the JWK-based signing works.
+// The key pair is generated once and stored in module-level vars.
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-const JWK_KEY = JSON.stringify({
-  kty: 'oct',
-  kid: 'test-kid',
-  k: 'dGVzdC1zZWNyZXQ=', // base64url("test-secret")
-});
+// Real EC P-256 test JWK (test-only, never used in production).
+// Generated with node webcrypto for use in unit tests.
+const TEST_EC_PRIVATE_JWK = {
+  key_ops: ['sign'],
+  ext: true,
+  kty: 'EC',
+  x: 'Xq2RjZctcPcUMU14qfjs3MtZTmFk8z1lFGQyypgXZOU',
+  y: 't8w9Cbt4RVmR47Wnb_i5cLwefEnMcvwse049zu9Rl_E',
+  crv: 'P-256',
+  d: 'TM6N79w1HE-PiML5Td4mbXfJaLHEaZrVyVrrwlJv7q8',
+  kid: 'test-ec-kid',
+};
+
+const TEST_EC_PUBLIC_JWK = {
+  key_ops: ['verify'],
+  ext: true,
+  kty: 'EC',
+  x: 'Xq2RjZctcPcUMU14qfjs3MtZTmFk8z1lFGQyypgXZOU',
+  y: 't8w9Cbt4RVmR47Wnb_i5cLwefEnMcvwse049zu9Rl_E',
+  crv: 'P-256',
+  kid: 'test-ec-kid',
+};
 
 process.env['STEP_CA_URL'] = 'https://step-ca:9000';
-process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD'] = 'test-password';
-process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON'] = JWK_KEY;
+process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON'] = JSON.stringify(TEST_EC_PRIVATE_JWK);
 process.env['STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH'] = '/fake/root.pem';
 
 // Import AFTER env is set and mocks are registered
@@ -92,6 +151,7 @@ function makeHttpsMock(statusCode: number, body: unknown, errorMsg?: string): vo
     write: vi.fn(),
     end: vi.fn(),
     on: vi.fn(),
+    setTimeout: vi.fn(),
   };
 
   (httpsModule.request as unknown as Mock).mockImplementation(
@@ -140,35 +200,80 @@ function makeHttpsMock(statusCode: number, body: unknown, errorMsg?: string): vo
 describe('CaService', () => {
   let service: CaService;
 
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    // Generate a cert with the two Mosaic OIDs so that CaService.issueCert's
+    // CRIT-1 OID checks pass when mock step-ca returns it as `crt`.
+    realIssuedCertPem = await makeMosaicIssuedCert({
+      grantId: GRANT_ID,
+      subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+    });
+  });
+
   beforeEach(() => {
     vi.clearAllMocks();
     service = new CaService();
   });
 
   function makeReq(overrides: Partial<IssueCertRequestDto> = {}): IssueCertRequestDto {
+    // Use a real CSR if available; fall back to a minimal placeholder
+    const defaultCsr = realCsrPem ?? makeFakeCsr();
     return {
-      csrPem: FAKE_CSR_PEM,
+      csrPem: defaultCsr,
       grantId: GRANT_ID,
       subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-      ttlSeconds: 86400,
+      ttlSeconds: 300,
       ...overrides,
     };
   }
 
+  function makeFakeCsr(): string {
+    // A structurally valid-looking CSR header/footer (body will fail crypto verify)
+    return `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\nMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA0000000000000000AAAA\n-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\n`;
+  }
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // Real CSR generation — runs once and populates realCsrPem
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+  it('generates a real P-256 CSR that passes validateCsr', async () => {
+    realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
+    expect(realCsrPem).toMatch(/BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST/);
+
+    // Now test that the service's validateCsr accepts it.
+    // We call it indirectly via issueCert with a successful mock.
+    makeHttpsMock(200, { crt: realIssuedCertPem, certChain: [realIssuedCertPem, FAKE_CA_PEM] });
+    const result = await service.issueCert(makeReq({ csrPem: realCsrPem }));
+    expect(result.certPem).toBe(realIssuedCertPem);
+  });
+
+  it('throws INVALID_CSR for a malformed PEM-shaped CSR', async () => {
+    const malformedCsr =
+      '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\nTm90QVJlYWxDU1I=\n-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\n';
+
+    await expect(service.issueCert(makeReq({ csrPem: malformedCsr }))).rejects.toSatisfy(
+      (err: unknown) => {
+        if (!(err instanceof CaServiceError)) return false;
+        expect(err.code).toBe('INVALID_CSR');
+        return true;
+      },
+    );
+  });
+
   // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
   // Happy path
   // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
   it('returns IssuedCertDto on success (certChain present)', async () => {
+    if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
     makeHttpsMock(200, {
-      crt: FAKE_CERT_PEM,
-      certChain: [FAKE_CERT_PEM, FAKE_CA_PEM],
+      crt: realIssuedCertPem,
+      certChain: [realIssuedCertPem, FAKE_CA_PEM],
     });
 
     const result = await service.issueCert(makeReq());
 
-    expect(result.certPem).toBe(FAKE_CERT_PEM);
-    expect(result.certChainPem).toContain(FAKE_CERT_PEM);
+    expect(result.certPem).toBe(realIssuedCertPem);
+    expect(result.certChainPem).toContain(realIssuedCertPem);
     expect(result.certChainPem).toContain(FAKE_CA_PEM);
     expect(typeof result.serialNumber).toBe('string');
   });
@@ -178,15 +283,16 @@ describe('CaService', () => {
   // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
   it('builds certChainPem from crt+ca when certChain is absent', async () => {
+    if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
     makeHttpsMock(200, {
-      crt: FAKE_CERT_PEM,
+      crt: realIssuedCertPem,
       ca: FAKE_CA_PEM,
     });
 
     const result = await service.issueCert(makeReq());
 
-    expect(result.certPem).toBe(FAKE_CERT_PEM);
-    expect(result.certChainPem).toContain(FAKE_CERT_PEM);
+    expect(result.certPem).toBe(realIssuedCertPem);
+    expect(result.certChainPem).toContain(realIssuedCertPem);
     expect(result.certChainPem).toContain(FAKE_CA_PEM);
   });
 
@@ -195,12 +301,13 @@ describe('CaService', () => {
   // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
   it('falls back to certPem alone when certChain and ca are absent', async () => {
-    makeHttpsMock(200, { crt: FAKE_CERT_PEM });
+    if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
+    makeHttpsMock(200, { crt: realIssuedCertPem });
 
     const result = await service.issueCert(makeReq());
 
-    expect(result.certPem).toBe(FAKE_CERT_PEM);
-    expect(result.certChainPem).toBe(FAKE_CERT_PEM);
+    expect(result.certPem).toBe(realIssuedCertPem);
+    expect(result.certChainPem).toBe(realIssuedCertPem);
   });
 
   // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -208,6 +315,7 @@ describe('CaService', () => {
   // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
   it('throws CaServiceError on HTTP 401', async () => {
+    if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
     makeHttpsMock(401, { message: 'Unauthorized' });
 
     await expect(service.issueCert(makeReq())).rejects.toSatisfy((err: unknown) => {
@@ -223,6 +331,7 @@ describe('CaService', () => {
   // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
   it('throws CaServiceError on HTTP 422', async () => {
+    if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
     makeHttpsMock(422, { message: 'Unprocessable Entity' });
 
     await expect(service.issueCert(makeReq())).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(CaServiceError);
@@ -247,6 +356,7 @@ describe('CaService', () => {
   // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
   it('throws CaServiceError when step-ca returns non-JSON', async () => {
+    if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
     makeHttpsMock(200, 'this is not json');
 
     await expect(service.issueCert(makeReq())).rejects.toSatisfy((err: unknown) => {
@@ -261,6 +371,7 @@ describe('CaService', () => {
   // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
   it('throws CaServiceError on HTTPS connection error', async () => {
+    if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
     makeHttpsMock(0, undefined, 'connect ECONNREFUSED 127.0.0.1:9000');
 
     await expect(service.issueCert(makeReq())).rejects.toSatisfy((err: unknown) => {
@@ -273,18 +384,21 @@ describe('CaService', () => {
 
   // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
   // JWT custom claims: mosaic_grant_id and mosaic_subject_user_id
+  // Verified with jose.jwtVerify for real signature verification (M6)
   // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-  it('includes mosaic_grant_id and mosaic_subject_user_id in the OTT payload', async () => {
+  it('OTT contains mosaic_grant_id, mosaic_subject_user_id, and jti; signature verifies with jose', async () => {
+    if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
+
     let capturedBody: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
 
-    // Override the mock to capture the request body
     const mockReq = {
       write: vi.fn((data: string) => {
         capturedBody = JSON.parse(data) as Record<string, unknown>;
       }),
       end: vi.fn(),
       on: vi.fn(),
+      setTimeout: vi.fn(),
     };
 
     (httpsModule.request as unknown as Mock).mockImplementation(
@@ -299,7 +413,7 @@ describe('CaService', () => {
           statusCode: 200,
           on: (event: string, cb: (chunk?: Buffer) => void) => {
             if (event === 'data') {
-              cb(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ crt: FAKE_CERT_PEM })));
+              cb(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ crt: realIssuedCertPem })));
             }
             if (event === 'end') {
               cb();
@@ -311,21 +425,35 @@ describe('CaService', () => {
       },
     );
 
-    await service.issueCert(makeReq());
+    await service.issueCert(makeReq({ csrPem: realCsrPem }));
 
     expect(capturedBody).toBeDefined();
     const ott = capturedBody!['ott'] as string;
     expect(typeof ott).toBe('string');
 
-    // Decode JWT payload (second segment)
+    // Verify JWT structure
     const parts = ott.split('.');
     expect(parts).toHaveLength(3);
 
+    // Decode payload without signature check first
     const payloadJson = Buffer.from(parts[1]!, 'base64url').toString('utf8');
     const payload = JSON.parse(payloadJson) as Record<string, unknown>;
 
     expect(payload['mosaic_grant_id']).toBe(GRANT_ID);
     expect(payload['mosaic_subject_user_id']).toBe(SUBJECT_USER_ID);
+    expect(typeof payload['jti']).toBe('string'); // M2: jti present
+    expect(payload['jti']).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f-]{36}$/); // UUID format
+
+    // M3: top-level sha should NOT be present; step.sha should be present
+    expect(payload['sha']).toBeUndefined();
+    const step = payload['step'] as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
+    expect(step?.['sha']).toBeDefined();
+
+    // M6: Verify signature with jose.jwtVerify using the public key
+    const { importJWK: importJose } = await import('jose');
+    const publicKey = await importJose(TEST_EC_PUBLIC_JWK, 'ES256');
+    const verified = await jwtVerify(ott, publicKey);
+    expect(verified.payload['mosaic_grant_id']).toBe(GRANT_ID);
   });
 
   // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -349,6 +477,7 @@ describe('CaService', () => {
   // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
   it('throws CaServiceError when response is missing the crt field', async () => {
+    if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
     makeHttpsMock(200, { ca: FAKE_CA_PEM });
 
     await expect(service.issueCert(makeReq())).rejects.toSatisfy((err: unknown) => {
@@ -357,4 +486,107 @@ describe('CaService', () => {
       return true;
     });
   });
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // M6: provisionerPassword must never appear in CaServiceError messages
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+  it('provisionerPassword does not appear in any CaServiceError message', async () => {
+    // Temporarily set a recognizable password to test against
+    const originalPassword = process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD'];
+    process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD'] = 'super-secret-password-12345';
+
+    // Generate a bad CSR to trigger an error path
+    const caughtErrors: CaServiceError[] = [];
+    try {
+      await service.issueCert(makeReq({ csrPem: 'not-a-csr' }));
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (err instanceof CaServiceError) {
+        caughtErrors.push(err);
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Also try HTTP 401 path
+    if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
+    makeHttpsMock(401, { message: 'Unauthorized' });
+    try {
+      await service.issueCert(makeReq({ csrPem: realCsrPem }));
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (err instanceof CaServiceError) {
+        caughtErrors.push(err);
+      }
+    }
+
+    for (const err of caughtErrors) {
+      expect(err.message).not.toContain('super-secret-password-12345');
+      if (err.remediation) {
+        expect(err.remediation).not.toContain('super-secret-password-12345');
+      }
+    }
+
+    process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD'] = originalPassword;
+  });
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // M7: HTTPS-only enforcement in constructor
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+  it('throws in constructor if STEP_CA_URL uses http://', () => {
+    const originalUrl = process.env['STEP_CA_URL'];
+    process.env['STEP_CA_URL'] = 'http://step-ca:9000';
+
+    expect(() => new CaService()).toThrow(CaServiceError);
+
+    process.env['STEP_CA_URL'] = originalUrl;
+  });
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // TTL clamp: ttlSeconds is clamped to 900 s (15 min) maximum
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+  it('clamps ttlSeconds to 900 s regardless of input', async () => {
+    if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
+
+    let capturedBody: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
+
+    const mockReq = {
+      write: vi.fn((data: string) => {
+        capturedBody = JSON.parse(data) as Record<string, unknown>;
+      }),
+      end: vi.fn(),
+      on: vi.fn(),
+      setTimeout: vi.fn(),
+    };
+
+    (httpsModule.request as unknown as Mock).mockImplementation(
+      (
+        _options: unknown,
+        callback: (res: {
+          statusCode: number;
+          on: (event: string, cb: (chunk?: Buffer) => void) => void;
+        }) => void,
+      ) => {
+        const mockRes = {
+          statusCode: 200,
+          on: (event: string, cb: (chunk?: Buffer) => void) => {
+            if (event === 'data') {
+              cb(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ crt: realIssuedCertPem })));
+            }
+            if (event === 'end') {
+              cb();
+            }
+          },
+        };
+        setImmediate(() => callback(mockRes));
+        return mockReq;
+      },
+    );
+
+    // Request 86400 s — should be clamped to 900
+    await service.issueCert(makeReq({ ttlSeconds: 86400 }));
+
+    expect(capturedBody).toBeDefined();
+    const validity = capturedBody!['validity'] as Record<string, unknown>;
+    expect(validity['duration']).toBe('900s');
+  });
 });

apps/gateway/src/federation/ca.service.ts

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
  * CaService — Step-CA client for federation grant certificate issuance.
  *
  * Responsibilities:
- *  1. Build a JWK-provisioner One-Time Token (OTT) signed with HS256
- *     carrying Mosaic-specific claims (`mosaic_grant_id`,
- *     `mosaic_subject_user_id`, `step.sha`) per the step-ca JWK provisioner
- *     protocol.
+ *  1. Build a JWK-provisioner One-Time Token (OTT) signed with the provisioner
+ *     private key (ES256/ES384/RS256 per JWK kty/crv) carrying Mosaic-specific
+ *     claims (`mosaic_grant_id`, `mosaic_subject_user_id`, `step.sha`) per the
+ *     step-ca JWK provisioner protocol.
  *  2. POST the CSR + OTT to the step-ca `/1.0/sign` endpoint over HTTPS,
  *     pinning the trust to the CA root cert supplied via env.
  *  3. Return an IssuedCertDto containing the leaf cert, full chain, and
@@ -13,10 +13,12 @@
  *
  * Environment variables (all required at runtime — validated in constructor):
  *   STEP_CA_URL                   https://step-ca:9000
- *   STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD  JWK provisioner password (raw string)
- *   STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON  JWK provisioner public+private key (JSON)
+ *   STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON  JWK provisioner private key (JSON)
  *   STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH        Absolute path to the CA root PEM
  *
+ * Optional (only used for JWK PBES2 decrypt at startup if key is encrypted):
+ *   STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD  JWK provisioner password (raw string)
+ *
  * Custom OID registry (PRD §6, docs/federation/SETUP.md):
  *   1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1  — mosaic_grant_id
  *   1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2  — mosaic_subject_user_id
@@ -32,6 +34,8 @@ import { Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
 import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
 import * as fs from 'node:fs';
 import * as https from 'node:https';
+import { SignJWT, importJWK } from 'jose';
+import { Pkcs10CertificateRequest, X509Certificate } from '@peculiar/x509';
 import type { IssueCertRequestDto } from './ca.dto.js';
 import { IssuedCertDto } from './ca.dto.js';
 
@@ -42,12 +46,14 @@ import { IssuedCertDto } from './ca.dto.js';
 export class CaServiceError extends Error {
   readonly cause: unknown;
   readonly remediation: string;
+  readonly code?: string;
 
-  constructor(message: string, remediation: string, cause?: unknown) {
+  constructor(message: string, remediation: string, cause?: unknown, code?: string) {
     super(message);
     this.name = 'CaServiceError';
     this.cause = cause;
     this.remediation = remediation;
+    this.code = code;
   }
 }
 
@@ -80,12 +86,24 @@ interface JwkKey {
 // Helpers
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
+/** UUID regex for validation */
+const UUID_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;
+
 /**
- * Base64url-encode a Buffer or string (no padding).
+ * Derive the JWT algorithm string from a JWK's kty/crv fields.
+ * EC P-256 → ES256, EC P-384 → ES384, RSA → RS256.
  */
-function b64url(input: Buffer | string): string {
-  const buf = typeof input === 'string' ? Buffer.from(input, 'utf8') : input;
-  return buf.toString('base64url');
+function algFromJwk(jwk: JwkKey): string {
+  if (jwk.alg) return jwk.alg;
+  if (jwk.kty === 'EC') {
+    if (jwk.crv === 'P-384') return 'ES384';
+    return 'ES256'; // default for P-256 and Ed25519-style EC keys
+  }
+  if (jwk.kty === 'RSA') return 'RS256';
+  throw new CaServiceError(
+    `Unsupported JWK kty: ${jwk.kty}`,
+    'STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON must be an EC (P-256/P-384) or RSA JWK private key.',
+  );
 }
 
 /**
@@ -120,91 +138,6 @@ function csrFingerprint(csrPem: string): string {
   return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(derBuf).digest('hex');
 }
 
-/**
- * Derive a signing key from the JWK provisioner password using PBKDF2
- * then sign with HMAC-SHA256 to produce an HS256 JWT.
- *
- * step-ca JWK provisioner tokens:
- *   - alg: HS256
- *   - header.kid: provisioner key ID
- *   - The key is the raw password bytes (step-ca uses the password directly
- *     as the HMAC key when the JWK provisioner type is "JWK" with symmetric
- *     key, or the password-derived key when encrypting the JWK).
- *
- * Per step-ca source (jose/jwk.go), for a JWK provisioner the OTT is a
- * JWT signed with the provisioner's decrypted private key.  For HS256 the
- * key material is the `k` field of the JWK (symmetric secret), which itself
- * was encrypted with the provisioner password.  Since we already have the
- * raw provisioner password we use it directly as the HMAC key — this mirrors
- * what `step ca token` does for symmetric JWK provisioners.
- */
-function buildOtt(params: {
-  caUrl: string;
-  provisionerPassword: string;
-  provisionerKeyJson: string;
-  csrPem: string;
-  grantId: string;
-  subjectUserId: string;
-  ttlSeconds: number;
-}): string {
-  const {
-    caUrl,
-    provisionerPassword,
-    provisionerKeyJson,
-    csrPem,
-    grantId,
-    subjectUserId,
-    ttlSeconds,
-  } = params;
-
-  let jwk: JwkKey;
-  try {
-    jwk = JSON.parse(provisionerKeyJson) as JwkKey;
-  } catch (err) {
-    throw new CaServiceError(
-      'STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON is not valid JSON',
-      'Set STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON to the JSON-serialised JWK object for the mosaic-fed provisioner.',
-      err,
-    );
-  }
-
-  const sha = csrFingerprint(csrPem);
-  const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
-  const kid = jwk.kid ?? 'mosaic-fed';
-
-  const header = {
-    alg: 'HS256',
-    typ: 'JWT',
-    kid,
-  };
-
-  const payload = {
-    iss: kid,
-    sub: `${caUrl}/1.0/sign`,
-    aud: [`${caUrl}/1.0/sign`],
-    iat: now,
-    nbf: now - 30, // 30 s clock-skew tolerance
-    exp: now + Math.min(ttlSeconds, 3600), // OTT validity ≤ 1 h
-    sha,
-    // Mosaic custom claims consumed by federation.tpl
-    mosaic_grant_id: grantId,
-    mosaic_subject_user_id: subjectUserId,
-    // step.sha is the canonical field name used in the template
-    step: { sha },
-  };
-
-  const headerB64 = b64url(JSON.stringify(header));
-  const payloadB64 = b64url(JSON.stringify(payload));
-  const signingInput = `${headerB64}.${payloadB64}`;
-
-  // Use the provisioner password as the raw HMAC-SHA256 key.
-  const hmac = crypto.createHmac('sha256', Buffer.from(provisionerPassword, 'utf8'));
-  hmac.update(signingInput);
-  const signature = hmac.digest();
-
-  return `${signingInput}.${b64url(signature)}`;
-}
-
 /**
  * Send a JSON POST to the step-ca sign endpoint.
  * Returns the parsed response body or throws CaServiceError.
@@ -224,6 +157,7 @@ function httpsPost(url: string, body: unknown, agent: https.Agent): Promise<Step
         'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(bodyStr),
       },
       agent,
+      timeout: 5000,
     };
 
     const req = https.request(options, (res) => {
@@ -236,7 +170,7 @@ function httpsPost(url: string, body: unknown, agent: https.Agent): Promise<Step
           reject(
             new CaServiceError(
               `step-ca returned HTTP 401 — invalid or expired OTT`,
-              'Check STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD and STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON. Ensure the mosaic-fed provisioner is configured in the CA.',
+              'Check STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON. Ensure the mosaic-fed provisioner is configured in the CA.',
             ),
           );
           return;
@@ -270,6 +204,10 @@ function httpsPost(url: string, body: unknown, agent: https.Agent): Promise<Step
       });
     });
 
+    req.setTimeout(5000, () => {
+      req.destroy(new Error('Request timed out after 5000ms'));
+    });
+
     req.on('error', (err: Error) => {
       reject(
         new CaServiceError(
@@ -287,15 +225,21 @@ function httpsPost(url: string, body: unknown, agent: https.Agent): Promise<Step
 
 /**
  * Extract a decimal serial number from a PEM certificate.
- * Returns the hex serial if conversion is not possible.
+ * Throws CaServiceError on failure — never silently returns 'unknown'.
  */
 function extractSerial(certPem: string): string {
+  let cert: crypto.X509Certificate;
   try {
-    const cert = new crypto.X509Certificate(certPem);
-    return cert.serialNumber;
-  } catch {
-    return 'unknown';
+    cert = new crypto.X509Certificate(certPem);
+  } catch (err) {
+    throw new CaServiceError(
+      'Failed to parse the issued certificate PEM',
+      'The certificate returned by step-ca could not be parsed. Check that step-ca is returning a valid PEM certificate.',
+      err,
+      'CERT_PARSE',
+    );
   }
+  return cert.serialNumber;
 }
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -307,14 +251,15 @@ export class CaService {
   private readonly logger = new Logger(CaService.name);
 
   private readonly caUrl: string;
-  private readonly provisionerPassword: string;
-  private readonly provisionerKeyJson: string;
   private readonly rootCertPath: string;
   private readonly httpsAgent: https.Agent;
+  private readonly jwk: JwkKey;
+  private cachedPrivateKey: crypto.KeyObject | null = null;
+  private readonly jwtAlg: string;
+  private readonly kid: string;
 
   constructor() {
     const caUrl = process.env['STEP_CA_URL'];
-    const provisionerPassword = process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD'];
     const provisionerKeyJson = process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON'];
     const rootCertPath = process.env['STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH'];
 
@@ -324,12 +269,25 @@ export class CaService {
         'Set STEP_CA_URL to the base URL of the step-ca instance, e.g. https://step-ca:9000',
       );
     }
-    if (!provisionerPassword) {
+
+    // Enforce HTTPS-only URL
+    let parsedUrl: URL;
+    try {
+      parsedUrl = new URL(caUrl);
+    } catch (err) {
       throw new CaServiceError(
-        'STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD is not set',
-        'Set STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD to the JWK provisioner password for the mosaic-fed provisioner.',
+        `STEP_CA_URL is not a valid URL: ${caUrl}`,
+        'Set STEP_CA_URL to a valid HTTPS URL, e.g. https://step-ca:9000',
+        err,
       );
     }
+    if (parsedUrl.protocol !== 'https:') {
+      throw new CaServiceError(
+        `STEP_CA_URL must use HTTPS — got: ${parsedUrl.protocol}`,
+        'Set STEP_CA_URL to an https:// URL. Unencrypted connections to the CA are not permitted.',
+      );
+    }
+
     if (!provisionerKeyJson) {
       throw new CaServiceError(
         'STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON is not set',
@@ -343,9 +301,32 @@ export class CaService {
       );
     }
 
+    // Parse JWK once — do NOT store the raw JSON string as a class field
+    let jwk: JwkKey;
+    try {
+      jwk = JSON.parse(provisionerKeyJson) as JwkKey;
+    } catch (err) {
+      throw new CaServiceError(
+        'STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON is not valid JSON',
+        'Set STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON to the JSON-serialised JWK object for the mosaic-fed provisioner.',
+        err,
+      );
+    }
+
+    // Derive algorithm from JWK metadata
+    const jwtAlg = algFromJwk(jwk);
+    const kid = jwk.kid ?? 'mosaic-fed';
+
+    // Import the JWK into a native KeyObject — fail loudly if it cannot be loaded.
+    // We do this synchronously here by calling the async importJWK via a blocking workaround.
+    // Actually importJWK is async, so we store it for use during token building.
+    // We keep the raw jwk object for later async import inside buildOtt.
+    // NOTE: We do NOT store provisionerKeyJson string as a class field.
+    this.jwk = jwk;
+    this.jwtAlg = jwtAlg;
+    this.kid = kid;
+
     this.caUrl = caUrl;
-    this.provisionerPassword = provisionerPassword;
-    this.provisionerKeyJson = provisionerKeyJson;
     this.rootCertPath = rootCertPath;
 
     // Read the root cert and pin it for all HTTPS connections.
@@ -368,6 +349,225 @@ export class CaService {
     this.logger.log(`CaService initialised — CA URL: ${this.caUrl}`);
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Lazily import the private key from JWK on first use.
+   * The key is cached in cachedPrivateKey after first import.
+   */
+  private async getPrivateKey(): Promise<crypto.KeyObject> {
+    if (this.cachedPrivateKey !== null) return this.cachedPrivateKey;
+    try {
+      const key = await importJWK(this.jwk, this.jwtAlg);
+      // importJWK returns KeyLike (crypto.KeyObject | Uint8Array) — in Node.js it's KeyObject
+      this.cachedPrivateKey = key as unknown as crypto.KeyObject;
+      return this.cachedPrivateKey;
+    } catch (err) {
+      throw new CaServiceError(
+        'Failed to import STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON as a cryptographic key',
+        'Ensure STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON contains a valid JWK private key (EC P-256/P-384 or RSA).',
+        err,
+      );
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Build the JWK-provisioner OTT signed with the provisioner private key.
+   * Algorithm is derived from the JWK kty/crv fields.
+   */
+  private async buildOtt(params: {
+    csrPem: string;
+    grantId: string;
+    subjectUserId: string;
+    ttlSeconds: number;
+    csrCn: string;
+  }): Promise<string> {
+    const { csrPem, grantId, subjectUserId, ttlSeconds, csrCn } = params;
+
+    // Validate UUID shape for grant id and subject user id
+    if (!UUID_RE.test(grantId)) {
+      throw new CaServiceError(
+        `grantId is not a valid UUID: ${grantId}`,
+        'Provide a valid UUID (RFC 4122) for grantId.',
+        undefined,
+        'INVALID_GRANT_ID',
+      );
+    }
+    if (!UUID_RE.test(subjectUserId)) {
+      throw new CaServiceError(
+        `subjectUserId is not a valid UUID: ${subjectUserId}`,
+        'Provide a valid UUID (RFC 4122) for subjectUserId.',
+        undefined,
+        'INVALID_GRANT_ID',
+      );
+    }
+
+    const sha = csrFingerprint(csrPem);
+    const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+    const privateKey = await this.getPrivateKey();
+
+    const ott = await new SignJWT({
+      iss: this.kid,
+      sub: csrCn, // M1: set sub to identity from CSR CN
+      aud: [`${this.caUrl}/1.0/sign`],
+      iat: now,
+      nbf: now - 30, // 30 s clock-skew tolerance
+      exp: now + Math.min(ttlSeconds, 3600), // OTT validity ≤ 1 h
+      jti: crypto.randomUUID(), // M2: unique token ID
+      // step.sha is the canonical field name used in the template — M3: keep only step.sha
+      step: { sha },
+      // Mosaic custom claims consumed by federation.tpl
+      mosaic_grant_id: grantId,
+      mosaic_subject_user_id: subjectUserId,
+    })
+      .setProtectedHeader({ alg: this.jwtAlg, typ: 'JWT', kid: this.kid })
+      .sign(privateKey);
+
+    return ott;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Validate a PEM-encoded CSR using @peculiar/x509.
+   * Verifies the self-signature, key type/size, and signature algorithm.
+   * Optionally verifies that the CSR's SANs match the expected set.
+   *
+   * Throws CaServiceError with code 'INVALID_CSR' on failure.
+   */
+  private async validateCsr(pem: string, expectedSans?: string[]): Promise<string> {
+    let csr: Pkcs10CertificateRequest;
+    try {
+      csr = new Pkcs10CertificateRequest(pem);
+    } catch (err) {
+      throw new CaServiceError(
+        'Failed to parse CSR PEM as a valid PKCS#10 certificate request',
+        'Provide a valid PEM-encoded PKCS#10 CSR.',
+        err,
+        'INVALID_CSR',
+      );
+    }
+
+    // Verify self-signature
+    let valid: boolean;
+    try {
+      valid = await csr.verify();
+    } catch (err) {
+      throw new CaServiceError(
+        'CSR signature verification threw an error',
+        'The CSR self-signature could not be verified. Ensure the CSR is properly formed.',
+        err,
+        'INVALID_CSR',
+      );
+    }
+    if (!valid) {
+      throw new CaServiceError(
+        'CSR self-signature is invalid',
+        'The CSR must be self-signed with the corresponding private key.',
+        undefined,
+        'INVALID_CSR',
+      );
+    }
+
+    // Validate signature algorithm — reject MD5 and SHA-1
+    // signatureAlgorithm is HashedAlgorithm which extends Algorithm.
+    // Cast through unknown to access .name and .hash.name without DOM lib globals.
+    const sigAlgAny = csr.signatureAlgorithm as unknown as {
+      name?: string;
+      hash?: { name?: string };
+    };
+    const sigAlgName = (sigAlgAny.name ?? '').toLowerCase();
+    const hashName = (sigAlgAny.hash?.name ?? '').toLowerCase();
+    if (
+      sigAlgName.includes('md5') ||
+      sigAlgName.includes('sha1') ||
+      hashName === 'sha-1' ||
+      hashName === 'sha1'
+    ) {
+      throw new CaServiceError(
+        `CSR uses a forbidden signature algorithm: ${sigAlgAny.name ?? 'unknown'}`,
+        'Use SHA-256 or stronger. MD5 and SHA-1 are not permitted.',
+        undefined,
+        'INVALID_CSR',
+      );
+    }
+
+    // Validate public key algorithm and strength via the algorithm descriptor on the key.
+    // csr.publicKey.algorithm is type Algorithm (WebCrypto) — use name-based checks.
+    // We cast to an extended interface to access curve/modulus info without DOM globals.
+    const pubKeyAlgo = csr.publicKey.algorithm as {
+      name: string;
+      namedCurve?: string;
+      modulusLength?: number;
+    };
+    const keyAlgoName = pubKeyAlgo.name;
+
+    if (keyAlgoName === 'RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5' || keyAlgoName === 'RSA-PSS') {
+      const modulusLength = pubKeyAlgo.modulusLength ?? 0;
+      if (modulusLength < 2048) {
+        throw new CaServiceError(
+          `CSR RSA key is too short: ${modulusLength} bits (minimum 2048)`,
+          'Use an RSA key of at least 2048 bits.',
+          undefined,
+          'INVALID_CSR',
+        );
+      }
+    } else if (keyAlgoName === 'ECDSA') {
+      const namedCurve = pubKeyAlgo.namedCurve ?? '';
+      const allowedCurves = new Set(['P-256', 'P-384']);
+      if (!allowedCurves.has(namedCurve)) {
+        throw new CaServiceError(
+          `CSR EC key uses disallowed curve: ${namedCurve}`,
+          'Use EC P-256 or P-384. Other curves are not permitted.',
+          undefined,
+          'INVALID_CSR',
+        );
+      }
+    } else if (keyAlgoName === 'Ed25519') {
+      // Ed25519 is explicitly allowed
+    } else {
+      throw new CaServiceError(
+        `CSR uses unsupported key algorithm: ${keyAlgoName}`,
+        'Use EC (P-256/P-384), Ed25519, or RSA (≥2048 bit) keys.',
+        undefined,
+        'INVALID_CSR',
+      );
+    }
+
+    // Extract SANs if expectedSans provided
+    if (expectedSans && expectedSans.length > 0) {
+      // Get SANs from CSR extensions
+      const sanExtension = csr.extensions?.find(
+        (ext) => ext.type === '2.5.29.17', // Subject Alternative Name OID
+      );
+      const csrSans: string[] = [];
+      if (sanExtension) {
+        // Parse the raw SAN extension — store as stringified for comparison
+        // @peculiar/x509 exposes SANs through the parsed extension
+        const sanExt = sanExtension as { names?: Array<{ type: string; value: string }> };
+        if (sanExt.names) {
+          for (const name of sanExt.names) {
+            csrSans.push(name.value);
+          }
+        }
+      }
+
+      const csrSanSet = new Set(csrSans);
+      const expectedSanSet = new Set(expectedSans);
+      const missing = expectedSans.filter((s) => !csrSanSet.has(s));
+      const extra = csrSans.filter((s) => !expectedSanSet.has(s));
+
+      if (missing.length > 0 || extra.length > 0) {
+        throw new CaServiceError(
+          `CSR SANs do not match expected set. Missing: [${missing.join(', ')}], Extra: [${extra.join(', ')}]`,
+          'The CSR must include exactly the SANs specified in the issuance request.',
+          undefined,
+          'INVALID_CSR',
+        );
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Return the CN from the CSR subject for use as JWT sub
+    const cn = csr.subjectName.getField('CN')?.[0] ?? '';
+    return cn;
+  }
+
   /**
    * Submit a CSR to step-ca and return the issued certificate.
    *
@@ -375,26 +575,22 @@ export class CaService {
    * Never silently swallows errors — fail-loud is a hard contract per M2-02 review.
    */
   async issueCert(req: IssueCertRequestDto): Promise<IssuedCertDto> {
+    // Clamp TTL to 15-minute maximum (H2)
+    const ttl = Math.min(req.ttlSeconds ?? 300, 900);
+
     this.logger.debug(
-      `issueCert — grantId=${req.grantId} subjectUserId=${req.subjectUserId} ttl=${req.ttlSeconds}s`,
+      `issueCert — grantId=${req.grantId} subjectUserId=${req.subjectUserId} ttl=${ttl}s`,
     );
 
-    // Validate CSR before making network calls
-    if (!req.csrPem || !req.csrPem.includes('CERTIFICATE REQUEST')) {
-      throw new CaServiceError(
-        'csrPem does not appear to be a valid PKCS#10 PEM',
-        'Provide a PEM-encoded CSR starting with -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----.',
-      );
-    }
+    // Validate CSR — real cryptographic validation (H3)
+    const csrCn = await this.validateCsr(req.csrPem);
 
-    const ott = buildOtt({
-      caUrl: this.caUrl,
-      provisionerPassword: this.provisionerPassword,
-      provisionerKeyJson: this.provisionerKeyJson,
+    const ott = await this.buildOtt({
       csrPem: req.csrPem,
       grantId: req.grantId,
       subjectUserId: req.subjectUserId,
-      ttlSeconds: req.ttlSeconds,
+      ttlSeconds: ttl,
+      csrCn,
     });
 
     const signUrl = `${this.caUrl}/1.0/sign`;
@@ -402,7 +598,7 @@ export class CaService {
       csr: req.csrPem,
       ott,
       validity: {
-        duration: `${req.ttlSeconds}s`,
+        duration: `${ttl}s`,
       },
     };
 
@@ -428,6 +624,51 @@ export class CaService {
 
     const serialNumber = extractSerial(response.crt);
 
+    // CRIT-1: Verify the issued certificate contains both Mosaic OID extensions
+    // with the correct values. Step-CA's federation.tpl encodes each as an ASN.1
+    // UTF8String TLV: tag 0x0C + 1-byte length + UUID bytes. We skip 2 bytes
+    // (tag + length) to extract the raw UUID string.
+    const issuedCert = new X509Certificate(response.crt);
+    const decoder = new TextDecoder();
+
+    const grantIdExt = issuedCert.getExtension('1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1');
+    if (!grantIdExt) {
+      throw new CaServiceError(
+        'Issued certificate is missing required Mosaic OID: mosaic_grant_id',
+        'The Step-CA federation.tpl template did not embed OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1. Check the provisioner template configuration.',
+        undefined,
+        'OID_MISSING',
+      );
+    }
+    const grantIdInCert = decoder.decode(grantIdExt.value.slice(2));
+    if (grantIdInCert !== req.grantId) {
+      throw new CaServiceError(
+        `Issued certificate mosaic_grant_id mismatch: expected ${req.grantId}, got ${grantIdInCert}`,
+        'The Step-CA issued a certificate with a different grant ID than requested. This may indicate a provisioner misconfiguration or a MITM.',
+        undefined,
+        'OID_MISMATCH',
+      );
+    }
+
+    const subjectUserIdExt = issuedCert.getExtension('1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2');
+    if (!subjectUserIdExt) {
+      throw new CaServiceError(
+        'Issued certificate is missing required Mosaic OID: mosaic_subject_user_id',
+        'The Step-CA federation.tpl template did not embed OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2. Check the provisioner template configuration.',
+        undefined,
+        'OID_MISSING',
+      );
+    }
+    const subjectUserIdInCert = decoder.decode(subjectUserIdExt.value.slice(2));
+    if (subjectUserIdInCert !== req.subjectUserId) {
+      throw new CaServiceError(
+        `Issued certificate mosaic_subject_user_id mismatch: expected ${req.subjectUserId}, got ${subjectUserIdInCert}`,
+        'The Step-CA issued a certificate with a different subject user ID than requested. This may indicate a provisioner misconfiguration or a MITM.',
+        undefined,
+        'OID_MISMATCH',
+      );
+    }
+
     this.logger.log(`Certificate issued — serial=${serialNumber} grantId=${req.grantId}`);
 
     const result = new IssuedCertDto();

apps/gateway/src/federation/client/__tests__/federation-client.service.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,553 @@
+/**
+ * Unit tests for FederationClientService (FED-M3-08).
+ *
+ * HTTP mocking strategy:
+ *   undici MockAgent is used to intercept outbound HTTP requests.  The service
+ *   uses `undici.fetch` with a `dispatcher` option, so MockAgent is set as the
+ *   global dispatcher and all requests flow through it.
+ *
+ *   Because the service builds one `undici.Agent` per peer and passes it as
+ *   the dispatcher on every fetch call, we cannot intercept at the Agent level
+ *   in unit tests without significant refactoring.  Instead, we set the global
+ *   dispatcher to a MockAgent and override the service's `doRequest` indirection
+ *   by spying on the internal fetch call.
+ *
+ *   For the cert/key wiring, we use the real `sealClientKey` function from
+ *   peer-key.util.ts with a test secret — no stubs.
+ *
+ * Sealed-key setup:
+ *   Each test (or beforeAll) calls `sealClientKey(TEST_PRIVATE_KEY_PEM)` with
+ *   BETTER_AUTH_SECRET set to a deterministic test value so that
+ *   `unsealClientKey` in the service recovers the original PEM.
+ */
+
+import 'reflect-metadata';
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach, beforeAll, afterAll } from 'vitest';
+import { MockAgent, setGlobalDispatcher, getGlobalDispatcher } from 'undici';
+import type { Dispatcher } from 'undici';
+import { writeFileSync, unlinkSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import type { Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
+import { FederationClientService, FederationClientError } from '../federation-client.service.js';
+import { sealClientKey } from '../../peer-key.util.js';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Test constants
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const TEST_SECRET = 'test-secret-for-federation-client-spec-only';
+const PEER_ID = 'aaaaaaaa-aaaa-aaaa-aaaa-aaaaaaaaaaaa';
+const ENDPOINT = 'https://peer.example.com';
+
+// Minimal valid RSA/EC private key PEM — does NOT need to be a real key for
+// unit tests because we only verify it round-trips through seal/unseal, not
+// that it actually negotiates TLS (MockAgent handles that).
+const TEST_PRIVATE_KEY_PEM = `-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQDummyKeyForTests
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----`;
+
+// Minimal self-signed cert PEM (dummy — only used for mTLS Agent construction)
+const TEST_CERT_PEM = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBdummyCertForFederationClientTests==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----`;
+
+const TEST_CERT_SERIAL = 'ABCDEF1234567890';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Sealed key (computed once in beforeAll)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+let SEALED_KEY: string;
+
+// Path to a stub Step-CA root cert file written in beforeAll. The cert is never
+// actually used to negotiate TLS in unit tests (MockAgent + spy on resolveEntry
+// short-circuit the network), but loadStepCaRoot() requires the file to exist.
+const STUB_CA_PEM_PATH = join(tmpdir(), 'federation-client-spec-ca.pem');
+const STUB_CA_PEM = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBdummyCAforFederationClientSpecOnly==
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+`;
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Peer row factory
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+function makePeerRow(overrides: Partial<Record<string, unknown>> = {}) {
+  return {
+    id: PEER_ID,
+    commonName: 'peer-example-com',
+    displayName: 'Test Peer',
+    certPem: TEST_CERT_PEM,
+    certSerial: TEST_CERT_SERIAL,
+    certNotAfter: new Date('2030-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
+    clientKeyPem: SEALED_KEY,
+    state: 'active' as const,
+    endpointUrl: ENDPOINT,
+    lastSeenAt: null,
+    createdAt: new Date('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
+    revokedAt: null,
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Mock DB builder
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+function makeDb(selectRows: unknown[] = [makePeerRow()]): Db {
+  const limitSelect = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(selectRows);
+  const whereSelect = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ limit: limitSelect });
+  const fromSelect = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ where: whereSelect });
+  const selectMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ from: fromSelect });
+
+  return {
+    select: selectMock,
+    insert: vi.fn(),
+    update: vi.fn(),
+    delete: vi.fn(),
+    transaction: vi.fn(),
+  } as unknown as Db;
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Helpers for MockAgent HTTP interception
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Create a MockAgent + MockPool for the peer endpoint, set it as the global
+ * dispatcher, and return both for per-test configuration.
+ */
+function makeMockAgent() {
+  const mockAgent = new MockAgent({ connections: 1 });
+  mockAgent.disableNetConnect();
+  setGlobalDispatcher(mockAgent);
+  const pool = mockAgent.get(ENDPOINT);
+  return { mockAgent, pool };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build a FederationClientService with a mock DB and a spy on the internal
+ * fetch so we can intercept at the HTTP layer via MockAgent.
+ *
+ * The service calls `fetch(url, { dispatcher: agent })` where `agent` is the
+ * mTLS undici.Agent built from the peer's cert+key.  To make MockAgent work,
+ * we need the fetch dispatcher to be the MockAgent, not the per-peer Agent.
+ *
+ * Strategy: we replace the private `resolveEntry` result's `agent` field with
+ * the MockAgent's pool, so fetch uses our interceptor.  We do this by spying
+ * on `resolveEntry` and returning a controlled entry.
+ */
+function makeService(db: Db, mockPool: Dispatcher): FederationClientService {
+  const svc = new FederationClientService(db);
+
+  // Override resolveEntry to inject MockAgent pool as the dispatcher
+  vi.spyOn(
+    svc as unknown as { resolveEntry: (peerId: string) => Promise<unknown> },
+    'resolveEntry',
+  ).mockImplementation(async (_peerId: string) => {
+    // Still call DB (via the real logic) to exercise peer validation,
+    // but return mock pool as the agent.
+    // For simplicity in unit tests, directly return a controlled entry.
+    return {
+      agent: mockPool,
+      endpointUrl: ENDPOINT,
+      certPem: TEST_CERT_PEM,
+      certSerial: TEST_CERT_SERIAL,
+    };
+  });
+
+  return svc;
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Test setup
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+let originalDispatcher: Dispatcher;
+
+beforeAll(() => {
+  // Seal the test key once — requires BETTER_AUTH_SECRET
+  const saved = process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
+  process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] = TEST_SECRET;
+  try {
+    SEALED_KEY = sealClientKey(TEST_PRIVATE_KEY_PEM);
+  } finally {
+    if (saved === undefined) {
+      delete process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
+    } else {
+      process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] = saved;
+    }
+  }
+  writeFileSync(STUB_CA_PEM_PATH, STUB_CA_PEM, 'utf8');
+});
+
+afterAll(() => {
+  try {
+    unlinkSync(STUB_CA_PEM_PATH);
+  } catch {
+    // best-effort cleanup
+  }
+});
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  originalDispatcher = getGlobalDispatcher();
+  process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] = TEST_SECRET;
+  process.env['STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH'] = STUB_CA_PEM_PATH;
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  setGlobalDispatcher(originalDispatcher);
+  vi.restoreAllMocks();
+  delete process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
+  delete process.env['STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH'];
+});
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Helpers
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/** Successful list response body */
+const LIST_BODY = {
+  items: [{ id: '1', title: 'Task One' }],
+  nextCursor: undefined,
+  _partial: false,
+};
+
+/** Successful get response body */
+const GET_BODY = {
+  item: { id: '1', title: 'Task One' },
+  _partial: false,
+};
+
+/** Successful capabilities response body */
+const CAP_BODY = {
+  resources: ['tasks'],
+  excluded_resources: [],
+  max_rows_per_query: 100,
+  supported_verbs: ['list', 'get', 'capabilities'] as const,
+};
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Tests
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+describe('FederationClientService', () => {
+  // ─── Successful verb calls ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  describe('list()', () => {
+    it('returns parsed typed response on success', async () => {
+      const db = makeDb();
+      const { mockAgent, pool } = makeMockAgent();
+      const svc = makeService(db, pool);
+
+      pool
+        .intercept({
+          path: '/api/federation/v1/list/tasks',
+          method: 'POST',
+        })
+        .reply(200, LIST_BODY, { headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' } });
+
+      const result = await svc.list(PEER_ID, 'tasks', {});
+
+      expect(result.items).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(result.items[0]).toMatchObject({ id: '1', title: 'Task One' });
+
+      await mockAgent.close();
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('get()', () => {
+    it('returns parsed typed response on success', async () => {
+      const db = makeDb();
+      const { mockAgent, pool } = makeMockAgent();
+      const svc = makeService(db, pool);
+
+      pool
+        .intercept({
+          path: '/api/federation/v1/get/tasks/1',
+          method: 'POST',
+        })
+        .reply(200, GET_BODY, { headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' } });
+
+      const result = await svc.get(PEER_ID, 'tasks', '1', {});
+
+      expect(result.item).toMatchObject({ id: '1', title: 'Task One' });
+
+      await mockAgent.close();
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('capabilities()', () => {
+    it('returns parsed capabilities response on success', async () => {
+      const db = makeDb();
+      const { mockAgent, pool } = makeMockAgent();
+      const svc = makeService(db, pool);
+
+      pool
+        .intercept({
+          path: '/api/federation/v1/capabilities',
+          method: 'GET',
+        })
+        .reply(200, CAP_BODY, { headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' } });
+
+      const result = await svc.capabilities(PEER_ID);
+
+      expect(result.resources).toContain('tasks');
+      expect(result.max_rows_per_query).toBe(100);
+
+      await mockAgent.close();
+    });
+  });
+
+  // ─── HTTP error surfaces ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  describe('non-2xx responses', () => {
+    it('surfaces 403 as FederationClientError({ status: 403, code: "FORBIDDEN" })', async () => {
+      const db = makeDb();
+      const { mockAgent, pool } = makeMockAgent();
+      const svc = makeService(db, pool);
+
+      pool.intercept({ path: '/api/federation/v1/list/tasks', method: 'POST' }).reply(
+        403,
+        { error: { code: 'forbidden', message: 'Access denied' } },
+        {
+          headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
+        },
+      );
+
+      await expect(svc.list(PEER_ID, 'tasks', {})).rejects.toMatchObject({
+        status: 403,
+        code: 'FORBIDDEN',
+        peerId: PEER_ID,
+      });
+
+      await mockAgent.close();
+    });
+
+    it('surfaces 404 as FederationClientError({ status: 404, code: "HTTP_404" })', async () => {
+      const db = makeDb();
+      const { mockAgent, pool } = makeMockAgent();
+      const svc = makeService(db, pool);
+
+      pool.intercept({ path: '/api/federation/v1/get/tasks/999', method: 'POST' }).reply(
+        404,
+        { error: { code: 'not_found', message: 'Not found' } },
+        {
+          headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
+        },
+      );
+
+      await expect(svc.get(PEER_ID, 'tasks', '999', {})).rejects.toMatchObject({
+        status: 404,
+        code: 'HTTP_404',
+        peerId: PEER_ID,
+      });
+
+      await mockAgent.close();
+    });
+  });
+
+  // ─── Network error ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  describe('network errors', () => {
+    it('surfaces network error as FederationClientError({ code: "NETWORK" })', async () => {
+      const db = makeDb();
+      const { mockAgent, pool } = makeMockAgent();
+      const svc = makeService(db, pool);
+
+      pool
+        .intercept({ path: '/api/federation/v1/capabilities', method: 'GET' })
+        .replyWithError(new Error('ECONNREFUSED'));
+
+      await expect(svc.capabilities(PEER_ID)).rejects.toMatchObject({
+        code: 'NETWORK',
+        peerId: PEER_ID,
+      });
+
+      await mockAgent.close();
+    });
+  });
+
+  // ─── Invalid response body ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  describe('invalid response body', () => {
+    it('surfaces as FederationClientError({ code: "INVALID_RESPONSE" }) when body shape is wrong', async () => {
+      const db = makeDb();
+      const { mockAgent, pool } = makeMockAgent();
+      const svc = makeService(db, pool);
+
+      // capabilities returns wrong shape (missing required fields)
+      pool
+        .intercept({ path: '/api/federation/v1/capabilities', method: 'GET' })
+        .reply(200, { totally: 'wrong' }, { headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' } });
+
+      await expect(svc.capabilities(PEER_ID)).rejects.toMatchObject({
+        code: 'INVALID_RESPONSE',
+        peerId: PEER_ID,
+      });
+
+      await mockAgent.close();
+    });
+  });
+
+  // ─── Peer DB validation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  describe('peer validation (without resolveEntry spy)', () => {
+    /**
+     * These tests exercise the real `resolveEntry` path — no spy on resolveEntry.
+     */
+
+    it('throws PEER_NOT_FOUND when peer is not in DB', async () => {
+      // DB returns empty array (peer not found)
+      const db = makeDb([]);
+      const svc = new FederationClientService(db);
+
+      await expect(svc.capabilities(PEER_ID)).rejects.toMatchObject({
+        code: 'PEER_NOT_FOUND',
+        peerId: PEER_ID,
+      });
+    });
+
+    it('throws PEER_INACTIVE when peer state is not "active"', async () => {
+      const db = makeDb([makePeerRow({ state: 'suspended' })]);
+      const svc = new FederationClientService(db);
+
+      await expect(svc.capabilities(PEER_ID)).rejects.toMatchObject({
+        code: 'PEER_INACTIVE',
+        peerId: PEER_ID,
+      });
+    });
+  });
+
+  // ─── Cache behaviour ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  describe('cache behaviour', () => {
+    it('hits cache on second call — only one DB lookup happens', async () => {
+      // Verify cache by calling the private resolveEntry directly twice and
+      // asserting the DB was queried only once. This avoids the HTTP layer,
+      // which would require either a real network or per-peer Agent rewiring
+      // that the cache invariant doesn't depend on.
+      const db = makeDb();
+      const selectSpy = vi.spyOn(db, 'select');
+      const svc = new FederationClientService(db);
+      const resolveEntry = (
+        svc as unknown as { resolveEntry: (peerId: string) => Promise<unknown> }
+      ).resolveEntry.bind(svc);
+
+      const first = await resolveEntry(PEER_ID);
+      const second = await resolveEntry(PEER_ID);
+
+      expect(first).toBe(second);
+      expect(selectSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    });
+
+    it('serializes concurrent resolveEntry calls — only one DB lookup', async () => {
+      const db = makeDb();
+      const selectSpy = vi.spyOn(db, 'select');
+      const svc = new FederationClientService(db);
+      const resolveEntry = (
+        svc as unknown as {
+          resolveEntry: (peerId: string) => Promise<unknown>;
+        }
+      ).resolveEntry.bind(svc);
+
+      const [a, b] = await Promise.all([resolveEntry(PEER_ID), resolveEntry(PEER_ID)]);
+      expect(a).toBe(b);
+      expect(selectSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    });
+
+    it('flushPeer destroys the evicted Agent so old TLS connections close', async () => {
+      const db = makeDb();
+      const svc = new FederationClientService(db);
+      const resolveEntry = (
+        svc as unknown as {
+          resolveEntry: (peerId: string) => Promise<{ agent: { destroy: () => Promise<void> } }>;
+        }
+      ).resolveEntry.bind(svc);
+
+      const entry = await resolveEntry(PEER_ID);
+      const destroySpy = vi.spyOn(entry.agent, 'destroy').mockResolvedValue();
+
+      svc.flushPeer(PEER_ID);
+      expect(destroySpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    });
+
+    it('flushPeer() invalidates cache — next call re-reads DB', async () => {
+      const db = makeDb();
+      const { mockAgent, pool } = makeMockAgent();
+      const svc = makeService(db, pool);
+
+      pool
+        .intercept({ path: '/api/federation/v1/capabilities', method: 'GET' })
+        .reply(200, CAP_BODY, { headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' } })
+        .times(2);
+
+      // First call — populates cache (via mock resolveEntry)
+      await svc.capabilities(PEER_ID);
+
+      // Flush the cache
+      svc.flushPeer(PEER_ID);
+
+      // The spy on resolveEntry is still active — check it's called again after flush
+      const resolveEntrySpy = vi.spyOn(
+        svc as unknown as { resolveEntry: (peerId: string) => Promise<unknown> },
+        'resolveEntry',
+      );
+
+      // Second call after flush — should call resolveEntry again
+      await svc.capabilities(PEER_ID);
+
+      // resolveEntry should have been called once after we started spying (post-flush)
+      expect(resolveEntrySpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+
+      await mockAgent.close();
+    });
+  });
+
+  // ─── loadStepCaRoot env-var guard ─────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  describe('loadStepCaRoot() env-var guard', () => {
+    it('throws PEER_MISCONFIGURED when STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH is not set', async () => {
+      delete process.env['STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH'];
+      const db = makeDb();
+      const svc = new FederationClientService(db);
+      const resolveEntry = (
+        svc as unknown as {
+          resolveEntry: (peerId: string) => Promise<unknown>;
+        }
+      ).resolveEntry.bind(svc);
+
+      await expect(resolveEntry(PEER_ID)).rejects.toMatchObject({
+        code: 'PEER_MISCONFIGURED',
+      });
+    });
+  });
+
+  // ─── FederationClientError class ──────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  describe('FederationClientError', () => {
+    it('is instanceof Error and FederationClientError', () => {
+      const err = new FederationClientError({
+        code: 'PEER_NOT_FOUND',
+        message: 'test',
+        peerId: PEER_ID,
+      });
+      expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
+      expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(FederationClientError);
+      expect(err.name).toBe('FederationClientError');
+    });
+
+    it('carries status, code, and peerId', () => {
+      const err = new FederationClientError({
+        status: 403,
+        code: 'FORBIDDEN',
+        message: 'forbidden',
+        peerId: PEER_ID,
+      });
+      expect(err.status).toBe(403);
+      expect(err.code).toBe('FORBIDDEN');
+      expect(err.peerId).toBe(PEER_ID);
+    });
+  });
+});

apps/gateway/src/federation/client/federation-client.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,500 @@
+/**
+ * FederationClientService — outbound mTLS client for federation requests (FED-M3-08).
+ *
+ * Dials peer gateways over mTLS using the cert+sealed-key stored in `federation_peers`,
+ * invokes federation verbs (list / get / capabilities), and surfaces all failure modes
+ * as typed `FederationClientError` instances.
+ *
+ * ## Error code taxonomy
+ *
+ * | Code               | When                                                          |
+ * | ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------- |
+ * | PEER_NOT_FOUND     | No row in federation_peers for the given peerId               |
+ * | PEER_INACTIVE      | Peer row exists but state !== 'active'                        |
+ * | PEER_MISCONFIGURED | Peer row is active but missing endpointUrl or clientKeyPem    |
+ * | NETWORK            | undici threw a connection / TLS / timeout error               |
+ * | HTTP_{status}      | Peer returned a non-2xx response (e.g. HTTP_403, HTTP_404)    |
+ * | FORBIDDEN          | Peer returned 403 (convenience alias alongside HTTP_403)      |
+ * | INVALID_RESPONSE   | Response body failed Zod schema validation                    |
+ *
+ * ## Cache strategy
+ *
+ * Per-peer `undici.Agent` instances are cached in a `Map<peerId, AgentCacheEntry>` for
+ * the lifetime of the service instance.  The cache is keyed on peerId (UUID).
+ *
+ * Cache invalidation:
+ *  - `flushPeer(peerId)` — removes the entry immediately.  M5/M6 MUST call this on
+ *    cert rotation or peer revocation events so the next request re-reads the DB and
+ *    builds a fresh TLS Agent with the new cert material.
+ *  - On cache miss: re-reads the DB, checks state === 'active', rebuilds Agent.
+ *
+ * Cache does NOT auto-expire.  The service is expected to be a singleton scoped to the
+ * NestJS application lifecycle; flushing on revocation/rotation is the only invalidation
+ * path by design (avoids redundant DB round-trips on the hot path).
+ */
+
+import { Injectable, Inject, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { Agent, fetch as undiciFetch } from 'undici';
+import type { Dispatcher } from 'undici';
+import { z } from 'zod';
+import { type Db, eq, federationPeers } from '@mosaicstack/db';
+import {
+  FederationListResponseSchema,
+  FederationGetResponseSchema,
+  FederationCapabilitiesResponseSchema,
+  FederationErrorEnvelopeSchema,
+  type FederationListResponse,
+  type FederationGetResponse,
+  type FederationCapabilitiesResponse,
+} from '@mosaicstack/types';
+import { DB } from '../../database/database.module.js';
+import { unsealClientKey } from '../peer-key.util.js';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Error taxonomy
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Client-side error code set.  Distinct from the server-side `FederationErrorCode`
+ * (which lives in `@mosaicstack/types`) because the client has additional failure
+ * modes (PEER_NOT_FOUND, PEER_INACTIVE, PEER_MISCONFIGURED, NETWORK) that the
+ * server never emits.
+ */
+export type FederationClientErrorCode =
+  | 'PEER_NOT_FOUND'
+  | 'PEER_INACTIVE'
+  | 'PEER_MISCONFIGURED'
+  | 'NETWORK'
+  | 'FORBIDDEN'
+  | 'INVALID_RESPONSE'
+  | `HTTP_${number}`;
+
+export interface FederationClientErrorOptions {
+  status?: number;
+  code: FederationClientErrorCode;
+  message: string;
+  peerId: string;
+  cause?: unknown;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Thrown by FederationClientService on every failure path.
+ * Callers can dispatch on `error.code` for programmatic handling.
+ */
+export class FederationClientError extends Error {
+  readonly status?: number;
+  readonly code: FederationClientErrorCode;
+  readonly peerId: string;
+  readonly cause?: unknown;
+
+  constructor(opts: FederationClientErrorOptions) {
+    super(opts.message);
+    this.name = 'FederationClientError';
+    this.status = opts.status;
+    this.code = opts.code;
+    this.peerId = opts.peerId;
+    this.cause = opts.cause;
+  }
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Internal cache types
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+interface AgentCacheEntry {
+  agent: Agent;
+  endpointUrl: string;
+  certPem: string;
+  certSerial: string;
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Service
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+@Injectable()
+export class FederationClientService {
+  private readonly logger = new Logger(FederationClientService.name);
+
+  /**
+   * Per-peer undici Agent cache.
+   * Key = peerId (UUID string).
+   *
+   * Values are either a resolved `AgentCacheEntry` or an in-flight
+   * `Promise<AgentCacheEntry>` (promise-cache pattern).  Storing the promise
+   * prevents duplicate DB lookups and duplicate key-unseal operations when two
+   * requests for the same peer arrive before the first build completes.
+   *
+   * Flush via `flushPeer(peerId)` on cert rotation / peer revocation (M5/M6).
+   */
+  private readonly cache = new Map<string, AgentCacheEntry | Promise<AgentCacheEntry>>();
+
+  /**
+   * Step-CA root cert PEM, loaded once from `STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH`.
+   * Used as the trust anchor for peer server certificates so federation TLS is
+   * pinned to our PKI, not the public trust store. Lazily loaded on first use
+   * so unit tests that don't exercise the agent path can run without the env var.
+   */
+  private cachedCaPem: string | null = null;
+
+  constructor(@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db) {}
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // Public verb API
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+  /**
+   * Invoke the `list` verb on a remote peer.
+   *
+   * @param peerId   UUID of the peer row in `federation_peers`.
+   * @param resource Resource path, e.g. "tasks".
+   * @param request  Free-form body sent as JSON in the POST body.
+   * @returns Parsed `FederationListResponse<T>`.
+   */
+  async list<T>(
+    peerId: string,
+    resource: string,
+    request: Record<string, unknown>,
+  ): Promise<FederationListResponse<T>> {
+    const { endpointUrl, agent } = await this.resolveEntry(peerId);
+    const url = `${endpointUrl}/api/federation/v1/list/${encodeURIComponent(resource)}`;
+    const body = await this.doPost(peerId, url, agent, request);
+    return this.parseWith<FederationListResponse<T>>(
+      peerId,
+      body,
+      FederationListResponseSchema(z.unknown()),
+    );
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Invoke the `get` verb on a remote peer.
+   *
+   * @param peerId   UUID of the peer row in `federation_peers`.
+   * @param resource Resource path, e.g. "tasks".
+   * @param id       Resource identifier.
+   * @param request  Free-form body sent as JSON in the POST body.
+   * @returns Parsed `FederationGetResponse<T>`.
+   */
+  async get<T>(
+    peerId: string,
+    resource: string,
+    id: string,
+    request: Record<string, unknown>,
+  ): Promise<FederationGetResponse<T>> {
+    const { endpointUrl, agent } = await this.resolveEntry(peerId);
+    const url = `${endpointUrl}/api/federation/v1/get/${encodeURIComponent(resource)}/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`;
+    const body = await this.doPost(peerId, url, agent, request);
+    return this.parseWith<FederationGetResponse<T>>(
+      peerId,
+      body,
+      FederationGetResponseSchema(z.unknown()),
+    );
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Invoke the `capabilities` verb on a remote peer.
+   *
+   * @param peerId UUID of the peer row in `federation_peers`.
+   * @returns Parsed `FederationCapabilitiesResponse`.
+   */
+  async capabilities(peerId: string): Promise<FederationCapabilitiesResponse> {
+    const { endpointUrl, agent } = await this.resolveEntry(peerId);
+    const url = `${endpointUrl}/api/federation/v1/capabilities`;
+    const body = await this.doGet(peerId, url, agent);
+    return this.parseWith<FederationCapabilitiesResponse>(
+      peerId,
+      body,
+      FederationCapabilitiesResponseSchema,
+    );
+  }
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // Cache management
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+  /**
+   * Flush the cached Agent for a specific peer.
+   *
+   * M5/M6 MUST call this on:
+   *  - cert rotation events (so new cert material is picked up)
+   *  - peer revocation events (so future requests fail at PEER_INACTIVE)
+   *
+   * After flushing, the next call to `list`, `get`, or `capabilities` for
+   * this peer will re-read the DB and rebuild the Agent.
+   */
+  flushPeer(peerId: string): void {
+    const entry = this.cache.get(peerId);
+    if (entry === undefined) {
+      return;
+    }
+    this.cache.delete(peerId);
+    if (!(entry instanceof Promise)) {
+      // best-effort destroy; promise-cached entries skip destroy because
+      // the in-flight build owns its own Agent which will be GC'd when the
+      // owning request handles the rejection from the cache miss
+      entry.agent.destroy().catch(() => {
+        // intentionally ignored — destroy errors are not actionable
+      });
+    }
+    this.logger.log(`Cache flushed for peer ${peerId}`);
+  }
+
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // Internal helpers
+  // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+  /**
+   * Load and cache the Step-CA root cert PEM from `STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH`.
+   * Throws `FederationClientError` if the env var is unset or the file cannot
+   * be read — mTLS to a peer without a pinned trust anchor would silently
+   * fall back to the public trust store.
+   */
+  private loadStepCaRoot(): string {
+    if (this.cachedCaPem !== null) {
+      return this.cachedCaPem;
+    }
+    const path = process.env['STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH'];
+    if (!path) {
+      throw new FederationClientError({
+        code: 'PEER_MISCONFIGURED',
+        message: 'STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH is not set; refusing to dial peer without pinned CA trust',
+        peerId: '',
+      });
+    }
+    try {
+      const pem = readFileSync(path, 'utf8');
+      this.cachedCaPem = pem;
+      return pem;
+    } catch (err) {
+      throw new FederationClientError({
+        code: 'PEER_MISCONFIGURED',
+        message: `Failed to read STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH (${path})`,
+        peerId: '',
+        cause: err,
+      });
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Resolve the cache entry for a peer, reading DB on miss.
+   *
+   * Uses a promise-cache pattern: concurrent callers for the same uncached
+   * `peerId` all `await` the same in-flight `Promise<AgentCacheEntry>` so
+   * only one DB lookup and one key-unseal ever runs per peer per cache miss.
+   * The promise is replaced with the concrete entry on success, or deleted on
+   * rejection so a transient error does not poison the cache permanently.
+   *
+   * Throws `FederationClientError` with appropriate code if the peer is not
+   * found, is inactive, or is missing required fields.
+   */
+  private async resolveEntry(peerId: string): Promise<AgentCacheEntry> {
+    const cached = this.cache.get(peerId);
+    if (cached) {
+      return cached; // Promise or concrete entry — both are awaitable
+    }
+
+    const inflight = this.buildEntry(peerId).then(
+      (entry) => {
+        this.cache.set(peerId, entry); // replace promise with concrete value
+        return entry;
+      },
+      (err: unknown) => {
+        this.cache.delete(peerId); // don't poison the cache with a rejected promise
+        throw err;
+      },
+    );
+
+    this.cache.set(peerId, inflight);
+    return inflight;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Build the `AgentCacheEntry` for a peer by reading the DB, validating the
+   * peer's state, unsealing the private key, and constructing the mTLS Agent.
+   *
+   * Throws `FederationClientError` with appropriate code if the peer is not
+   * found, is inactive, or is missing required fields.
+   */
+  private async buildEntry(peerId: string): Promise<AgentCacheEntry> {
+    // DB lookup
+    const [peer] = await this.db
+      .select()
+      .from(federationPeers)
+      .where(eq(federationPeers.id, peerId))
+      .limit(1);
+
+    if (!peer) {
+      throw new FederationClientError({
+        code: 'PEER_NOT_FOUND',
+        message: `Federation peer ${peerId} not found`,
+        peerId,
+      });
+    }
+
+    if (peer.state !== 'active') {
+      throw new FederationClientError({
+        code: 'PEER_INACTIVE',
+        message: `Federation peer ${peerId} is not active (state: ${peer.state})`,
+        peerId,
+      });
+    }
+
+    if (!peer.endpointUrl || !peer.clientKeyPem) {
+      throw new FederationClientError({
+        code: 'PEER_MISCONFIGURED',
+        message: `Federation peer ${peerId} is missing endpointUrl or clientKeyPem`,
+        peerId,
+      });
+    }
+
+    // Unseal the private key
+    let privateKeyPem: string;
+    try {
+      privateKeyPem = unsealClientKey(peer.clientKeyPem);
+    } catch (err) {
+      throw new FederationClientError({
+        code: 'PEER_MISCONFIGURED',
+        message: `Failed to unseal client key for peer ${peerId}`,
+        peerId,
+        cause: err,
+      });
+    }
+
+    // Build mTLS agent — pin trust to Step-CA root so we never accept
+    // a peer cert signed by a public CA (defense against MITM with a
+    // publicly-trusted DV cert for the peer's hostname).
+    const agent = new Agent({
+      connect: {
+        cert: peer.certPem,
+        key: privateKeyPem,
+        ca: this.loadStepCaRoot(),
+        // rejectUnauthorized: true is the undici default for HTTPS
+      },
+    });
+
+    const entry: AgentCacheEntry = {
+      agent,
+      endpointUrl: peer.endpointUrl,
+      certPem: peer.certPem,
+      certSerial: peer.certSerial,
+    };
+
+    this.logger.log(`Agent cached for peer ${peerId} (serial: ${peer.certSerial})`);
+
+    return entry;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Execute a POST request with a JSON body.
+   * Returns the parsed response body as an unknown value.
+   * Throws `FederationClientError` on network errors and non-2xx responses.
+   */
+  private async doPost(
+    peerId: string,
+    url: string,
+    agent: Dispatcher,
+    body: Record<string, unknown>,
+  ): Promise<unknown> {
+    return this.doRequest(peerId, url, agent, {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      body: JSON.stringify(body),
+    });
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Execute a GET request.
+   * Returns the parsed response body as an unknown value.
+   * Throws `FederationClientError` on network errors and non-2xx responses.
+   */
+  private async doGet(peerId: string, url: string, agent: Dispatcher): Promise<unknown> {
+    return this.doRequest(peerId, url, agent, { method: 'GET' });
+  }
+
+  private async doRequest(
+    peerId: string,
+    url: string,
+    agent: Dispatcher,
+    init: { method: string; headers?: Record<string, string>; body?: string },
+  ): Promise<unknown> {
+    let response: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof undiciFetch>>;
+
+    try {
+      response = await undiciFetch(url, {
+        ...init,
+        dispatcher: agent,
+      });
+    } catch (err) {
+      throw new FederationClientError({
+        code: 'NETWORK',
+        message: `Network error calling peer ${peerId} at ${url}: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
+        peerId,
+        cause: err,
+      });
+    }
+
+    const rawBody = await response.text().catch(() => '');
+
+    if (!response.ok) {
+      const status = response.status;
+
+      // Attempt to parse as federation error envelope
+      let serverMessage = `HTTP ${status}`;
+      try {
+        const json: unknown = JSON.parse(rawBody);
+        const result = FederationErrorEnvelopeSchema.safeParse(json);
+        if (result.success) {
+          serverMessage = result.data.error.message;
+        }
+      } catch {
+        // Not valid JSON or not a federation envelope — use generic message
+      }
+
+      // Specific code for 403 (most actionable for callers); generic HTTP_{n} for others
+      const code: FederationClientErrorCode = status === 403 ? 'FORBIDDEN' : `HTTP_${status}`;
+
+      throw new FederationClientError({
+        status,
+        code,
+        message: `Peer ${peerId} returned ${status}: ${serverMessage}`,
+        peerId,
+      });
+    }
+
+    try {
+      return JSON.parse(rawBody) as unknown;
+    } catch (err) {
+      throw new FederationClientError({
+        code: 'INVALID_RESPONSE',
+        message: `Peer ${peerId} returned non-JSON body`,
+        peerId,
+        cause: err,
+      });
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Parse and validate a response body against a Zod schema.
+   *
+   * For list/get, callers pass the result of `FederationListResponseSchema(z.unknown())`
+   * so that the envelope structure is validated without requiring a concrete item schema
+   * at the client level.  The generic `T` provides compile-time typing.
+   *
+   * Throws `FederationClientError({ code: 'INVALID_RESPONSE' })` on parse failure.
+   */
+  private parseWith<T>(peerId: string, body: unknown, schema: z.ZodTypeAny): T {
+    const result = schema.safeParse(body);
+    if (!result.success) {
+      const issues = result.error.issues
+        .map((e: z.ZodIssue) => `[${e.path.join('.') || 'root'}] ${e.message}`)
+        .join('; ');
+      throw new FederationClientError({
+        code: 'INVALID_RESPONSE',
+        message: `Peer ${peerId} returned invalid response shape: ${issues}`,
+        peerId,
+      });
+    }
+    return result.data as T;
+  }
+}

apps/gateway/src/federation/client/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+/**
+ * Federation client barrel — re-exports for FederationModule consumers.
+ *
+ * M3-09 (QuerySourceService) and future milestones should import from here,
+ * not directly from the implementation file.
+ */
+
+export {
+  FederationClientService,
+  FederationClientError,
+  type FederationClientErrorCode,
+  type FederationClientErrorOptions,
+} from './federation-client.service.js';

apps/gateway/src/federation/enrollment.controller.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/**
+ * EnrollmentController — federation enrollment HTTP layer (FED-M2-07).
+ *
+ * Routes:
+ *   POST /api/federation/enrollment/tokens   — admin creates a single-use token
+ *   POST /api/federation/enrollment/:token   — unauthenticated; token IS the auth
+ */
+
+import {
+  Body,
+  Controller,
+  HttpCode,
+  HttpStatus,
+  Inject,
+  Param,
+  Post,
+  UseGuards,
+} from '@nestjs/common';
+import { AdminGuard } from '../admin/admin.guard.js';
+import { EnrollmentService } from './enrollment.service.js';
+import { CreateEnrollmentTokenDto, RedeemEnrollmentTokenDto } from './enrollment.dto.js';
+
+@Controller('api/federation/enrollment')
+export class EnrollmentController {
+  constructor(@Inject(EnrollmentService) private readonly enrollmentService: EnrollmentService) {}
+
+  /**
+   * Admin-only: generate a single-use enrollment token for a pending grant.
+   * The token should be distributed out-of-band to the remote peer operator.
+   *
+   * POST /api/federation/enrollment/tokens
+   */
+  @Post('tokens')
+  @UseGuards(AdminGuard)
+  @HttpCode(HttpStatus.CREATED)
+  async createToken(@Body() dto: CreateEnrollmentTokenDto) {
+    return this.enrollmentService.createToken(dto);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Unauthenticated: remote peer redeems a token by submitting its CSR.
+   * The token itself is the credential — no session or bearer token required.
+   *
+   * POST /api/federation/enrollment/:token
+   *
+   * Returns the signed leaf cert and full chain PEM on success.
+   * Returns 410 Gone if the token was already used or has expired.
+   */
+  @Post(':token')
+  @HttpCode(HttpStatus.OK)
+  async redeem(@Param('token') token: string, @Body() dto: RedeemEnrollmentTokenDto) {
+    return this.enrollmentService.redeem(token, dto.csrPem);
+  }
+}

apps/gateway/src/federation/enrollment.dto.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/**
+ * DTOs for the federation enrollment flow (FED-M2-07).
+ *
+ * CreateEnrollmentTokenDto  — admin generates a single-use enrollment token
+ * RedeemEnrollmentTokenDto  — remote peer submits CSR to redeem the token
+ */
+
+import { IsInt, IsNotEmpty, IsOptional, IsString, IsUUID, Max, Min } from 'class-validator';
+
+export class CreateEnrollmentTokenDto {
+  /** UUID of the federation grant this token will activate on redemption. */
+  @IsUUID()
+  grantId!: string;
+
+  /** UUID of the peer record that will receive the issued cert on redemption. */
+  @IsUUID()
+  peerId!: string;
+
+  /**
+   * Token lifetime in seconds. Default 900 (15 min). Min 60. Max 900.
+   * After this time the token is rejected even if unused.
+   */
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsInt()
+  @Min(60)
+  @Max(900)
+  ttlSeconds: number = 900;
+}
+
+export class RedeemEnrollmentTokenDto {
+  /** PEM-encoded PKCS#10 Certificate Signing Request from the remote peer. */
+  @IsString()
+  @IsNotEmpty()
+  csrPem!: string;
+}

apps/gateway/src/federation/enrollment.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+/**
+ * EnrollmentService — single-use enrollment token lifecycle (FED-M2-07).
+ *
+ * Responsibilities:
+ *  1. Generate time-limited single-use enrollment tokens (admin action).
+ *  2. Redeem a token: validate → atomically claim token → issue cert via
+ *     CaService → transactionally activate grant + update peer + write audit.
+ *
+ * Replay protection: the token is claimed (UPDATE WHERE used_at IS NULL) BEFORE
+ * cert issuance. This prevents double cert minting on concurrent requests.
+ * If cert issuance fails after claim, the token is consumed and the grant
+ * stays pending — admin must create a new grant.
+ */
+
+import {
+  BadRequestException,
+  ConflictException,
+  GoneException,
+  Inject,
+  Injectable,
+  Logger,
+  NotFoundException,
+} from '@nestjs/common';
+import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
+// X509Certificate is available as a named export in Node.js ≥ 15.6
+const { X509Certificate } = crypto;
+import {
+  type Db,
+  and,
+  eq,
+  isNull,
+  sql,
+  federationEnrollmentTokens,
+  federationGrants,
+  federationPeers,
+  federationAuditLog,
+} from '@mosaicstack/db';
+import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
+import { CaService } from './ca.service.js';
+import { GrantsService } from './grants.service.js';
+import { FederationScopeError } from './scope-schema.js';
+import type { CreateEnrollmentTokenDto } from './enrollment.dto.js';
+
+export interface EnrollmentTokenResult {
+  token: string;
+  expiresAt: string;
+}
+
+export interface RedeemResult {
+  certPem: string;
+  certChainPem: string;
+}
+
+@Injectable()
+export class EnrollmentService {
+  private readonly logger = new Logger(EnrollmentService.name);
+
+  constructor(
+    @Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db,
+    private readonly caService: CaService,
+    private readonly grantsService: GrantsService,
+  ) {}
+
+  /**
+   * Generate a single-use enrollment token for an admin to distribute
+   * out-of-band to the remote peer operator.
+   */
+  async createToken(dto: CreateEnrollmentTokenDto): Promise<EnrollmentTokenResult> {
+    const ttl = Math.min(dto.ttlSeconds, 900);
+
+    // MED-3: Verify the grantId ↔ peerId binding — prevents attacker from
+    // cross-wiring grants to attacker-controlled peers.
+    const [grant] = await this.db
+      .select({ peerId: federationGrants.peerId })
+      .from(federationGrants)
+      .where(eq(federationGrants.id, dto.grantId))
+      .limit(1);
+    if (!grant) {
+      throw new NotFoundException(`Grant ${dto.grantId} not found`);
+    }
+    if (grant.peerId !== dto.peerId) {
+      throw new BadRequestException(`peerId does not match the grant's registered peer`);
+    }
+
+    const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
+    const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + ttl * 1000);
+
+    await this.db.insert(federationEnrollmentTokens).values({
+      token,
+      grantId: dto.grantId,
+      peerId: dto.peerId,
+      expiresAt,
+    });
+
+    this.logger.log(
+      `Enrollment token created — grantId=${dto.grantId} peerId=${dto.peerId} expiresAt=${expiresAt.toISOString()}`,
+    );
+
+    return { token, expiresAt: expiresAt.toISOString() };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Redeem an enrollment token.
+   *
+   * Full flow:
+   *  1. Fetch token row — NotFoundException if not found
+   *  2. usedAt set → GoneException (already used)
+   *  3. expiresAt < now → GoneException (expired)
+   *  4. Load grant — verify status is 'pending'
+   *  5. Atomically claim token (UPDATE WHERE used_at IS NULL RETURNING token)
+   *     — if no rows returned, concurrent request won → GoneException
+   *  6. Issue cert via CaService (network call, outside transaction)
+   *     — if this fails, token is consumed; grant stays pending; admin must recreate
+   *  7. Transaction: activate grant + update peer record + write audit log
+   *  8. Return { certPem, certChainPem }
+   */
+  async redeem(token: string, csrPem: string): Promise<RedeemResult> {
+    // HIGH-5: Track outcome so we can write a failure audit row on any error.
+    let outcome: 'allowed' | 'denied' = 'denied';
+    // row may be undefined if the token is not found — used defensively in catch.
+    let row: typeof federationEnrollmentTokens.$inferSelect | undefined;
+
+    try {
+      // 1. Fetch token row
+      const [fetchedRow] = await this.db
+        .select()
+        .from(federationEnrollmentTokens)
+        .where(eq(federationEnrollmentTokens.token, token))
+        .limit(1);
+
+      if (!fetchedRow) {
+        throw new NotFoundException('Enrollment token not found');
+      }
+      row = fetchedRow;
+
+      // 2. Already used?
+      if (row.usedAt !== null) {
+        throw new GoneException('Enrollment token has already been used');
+      }
+
+      // 3. Expired?
+      if (row.expiresAt < new Date()) {
+        throw new GoneException('Enrollment token has expired');
+      }
+
+      // 4. Load grant and verify it is still pending
+      let grant;
+      try {
+        grant = await this.grantsService.getGrant(row.grantId);
+      } catch (err) {
+        if (err instanceof FederationScopeError) {
+          throw new BadRequestException(err.message);
+        }
+        throw err;
+      }
+
+      if (grant.status !== 'pending') {
+        throw new GoneException(
+          `Grant ${row.grantId} is no longer pending (status: ${grant.status})`,
+        );
+      }
+
+      // 5. Atomically claim the token BEFORE cert issuance to prevent double-minting.
+      // WHERE used_at IS NULL ensures only one concurrent request wins.
+      // Using .returning() works on both node-postgres and PGlite without rowCount inspection.
+      const claimed = await this.db
+        .update(federationEnrollmentTokens)
+        .set({ usedAt: sql`NOW()` })
+        .where(
+          and(
+            eq(federationEnrollmentTokens.token, token),
+            isNull(federationEnrollmentTokens.usedAt),
+          ),
+        )
+        .returning({ token: federationEnrollmentTokens.token });
+
+      if (claimed.length === 0) {
+        throw new GoneException('Enrollment token has already been used (concurrent request)');
+      }
+
+      // 6. Issue certificate via CaService (network call — outside any transaction).
+      // If this throws, the token is already consumed. The grant stays pending.
+      // Admin must revoke the grant and create a new one.
+      let issued;
+      try {
+        issued = await this.caService.issueCert({
+          csrPem,
+          grantId: row.grantId,
+          subjectUserId: grant.subjectUserId,
+          ttlSeconds: 300,
+        });
+      } catch (err) {
+        // HIGH-4: Log only the first 8 hex chars of the token for correlation — never log the full token.
+        this.logger.error(
+          `issueCert failed after token ${token.slice(0, 8)}... was claimed — grant ${row.grantId} is stranded pending`,
+          err instanceof Error ? err.stack : String(err),
+        );
+        if (err instanceof FederationScopeError) {
+          throw new BadRequestException((err as Error).message);
+        }
+        throw err;
+      }
+
+      // 7. Atomically activate grant, update peer record, and write audit log.
+      const certNotAfter = this.extractCertNotAfter(issued.certPem);
+      await this.db.transaction(async (tx) => {
+        // CRIT-2: Guard activation with WHERE status='pending' to prevent double-activation.
+        const [activated] = await tx
+          .update(federationGrants)
+          .set({ status: 'active' })
+          .where(and(eq(federationGrants.id, row!.grantId), eq(federationGrants.status, 'pending')))
+          .returning({ id: federationGrants.id });
+        if (!activated) {
+          throw new ConflictException(
+            `Grant ${row!.grantId} is no longer pending — cannot activate`,
+          );
+        }
+
+        // CRIT-2: Guard peer update with WHERE state='pending'.
+        await tx
+          .update(federationPeers)
+          .set({
+            certPem: issued.certPem,
+            certSerial: issued.serialNumber,
+            certNotAfter,
+            state: 'active',
+          })
+          .where(and(eq(federationPeers.id, row!.peerId), eq(federationPeers.state, 'pending')));
+
+        await tx.insert(federationAuditLog).values({
+          requestId: crypto.randomUUID(),
+          peerId: row!.peerId,
+          grantId: row!.grantId,
+          verb: 'enrollment',
+          resource: 'federation_grant',
+          statusCode: 200,
+          outcome: 'allowed',
+        });
+      });
+
+      this.logger.log(
+        `Enrollment complete — peerId=${row.peerId} grantId=${row.grantId} serial=${issued.serialNumber}`,
+      );
+
+      outcome = 'allowed';
+
+      // 8. Return cert material
+      return {
+        certPem: issued.certPem,
+        certChainPem: issued.certChainPem,
+      };
+    } catch (err) {
+      // HIGH-5: Best-effort audit write on failure — do not let this throw.
+      if (outcome === 'denied') {
+        await this.db
+          .insert(federationAuditLog)
+          .values({
+            requestId: crypto.randomUUID(),
+            peerId: row?.peerId ?? null,
+            grantId: row?.grantId ?? null,
+            verb: 'enrollment',
+            resource: 'federation_grant',
+            statusCode:
+              err instanceof GoneException ? 410 : err instanceof NotFoundException ? 404 : 500,
+            outcome: 'denied',
+          })
+          .catch(() => {});
+      }
+      throw err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Extract the notAfter date from a PEM certificate.
+   * HIGH-2: No silent fallback — a cert that cannot be parsed should fail loud.
+   */
+  private extractCertNotAfter(certPem: string): Date {
+    const cert = new X509Certificate(certPem);
+    return new Date(cert.validTo);
+  }
+}

apps/gateway/src/federation/federation-admin.dto.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/**
+ * DTOs for the federation admin controller (FED-M2-08).
+ */
+
+import { IsInt, IsNotEmpty, IsOptional, IsString, IsUrl, Max, Min } from 'class-validator';
+
+export class CreatePeerKeypairDto {
+  @IsString()
+  @IsNotEmpty()
+  commonName!: string;
+
+  @IsString()
+  @IsNotEmpty()
+  displayName!: string;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsUrl()
+  endpointUrl?: string;
+}
+
+export class StorePeerCertDto {
+  @IsString()
+  @IsNotEmpty()
+  certPem!: string;
+}
+
+export class GenerateEnrollmentTokenDto {
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsInt()
+  @Min(60)
+  @Max(900)
+  ttlSeconds: number = 900;
+}
+
+export class RevokeGrantBodyDto {
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsString()
+  reason?: string;
+}

apps/gateway/src/federation/federation.controller.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+/**
+ * FederationController — admin REST API for federation management (FED-M2-08).
+ *
+ * Routes (all under /api/admin/federation, all require AdminGuard):
+ *
+ *   Grant management:
+ *     POST   /api/admin/federation/grants
+ *     GET    /api/admin/federation/grants
+ *     GET    /api/admin/federation/grants/:id
+ *     PATCH  /api/admin/federation/grants/:id/revoke
+ *     POST   /api/admin/federation/grants/:id/tokens
+ *
+ *   Peer management:
+ *     GET    /api/admin/federation/peers
+ *     POST   /api/admin/federation/peers/keypair
+ *     PATCH  /api/admin/federation/peers/:id/cert
+ *
+ * NOTE: The enrollment REDEMPTION endpoint (POST /api/federation/enrollment/:token)
+ * is handled by EnrollmentController — not duplicated here.
+ */
+
+import {
+  Body,
+  Controller,
+  Get,
+  HttpCode,
+  HttpStatus,
+  Inject,
+  NotFoundException,
+  Param,
+  Patch,
+  Post,
+  Query,
+  UseGuards,
+} from '@nestjs/common';
+import { webcrypto } from 'node:crypto';
+import { X509Certificate } from 'node:crypto';
+import { Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator } from '@peculiar/x509';
+import { type Db, eq, federationPeers } from '@mosaicstack/db';
+import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
+import { AdminGuard } from '../admin/admin.guard.js';
+import { GrantsService } from './grants.service.js';
+import { EnrollmentService } from './enrollment.service.js';
+import { sealClientKey } from './peer-key.util.js';
+import { CreateGrantDto, ListGrantsDto } from './grants.dto.js';
+import {
+  CreatePeerKeypairDto,
+  GenerateEnrollmentTokenDto,
+  RevokeGrantBodyDto,
+  StorePeerCertDto,
+} from './federation-admin.dto.js';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Helpers
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Convert an ArrayBuffer to a Base64 string (for PEM encoding).
+ */
+function arrayBufferToBase64(buf: ArrayBuffer): string {
+  const bytes = new Uint8Array(buf);
+  let binary = '';
+  for (const b of bytes) {
+    binary += String.fromCharCode(b);
+  }
+  return Buffer.from(binary, 'binary').toString('base64');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Wrap a Base64 string in PEM armour.
+ */
+function toPem(label: string, b64: string): string {
+  const lines = b64.match(/.{1,64}/g) ?? [];
+  return `-----BEGIN ${label}-----\n${lines.join('\n')}\n-----END ${label}-----\n`;
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Controller
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+@Controller('api/admin/federation')
+@UseGuards(AdminGuard)
+export class FederationController {
+  constructor(
+    @Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db,
+    @Inject(GrantsService) private readonly grantsService: GrantsService,
+    @Inject(EnrollmentService) private readonly enrollmentService: EnrollmentService,
+  ) {}
+
+  // ─── Grant management ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  /**
+   * POST /api/admin/federation/grants
+   * Create a new grant in pending state.
+   */
+  @Post('grants')
+  @HttpCode(HttpStatus.CREATED)
+  async createGrant(@Body() body: CreateGrantDto) {
+    return this.grantsService.createGrant(body);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * GET /api/admin/federation/grants
+   * List grants with optional filters.
+   */
+  @Get('grants')
+  async listGrants(@Query() query: ListGrantsDto) {
+    return this.grantsService.listGrants(query);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * GET /api/admin/federation/grants/:id
+   * Get a single grant by ID.
+   */
+  @Get('grants/:id')
+  async getGrant(@Param('id') id: string) {
+    return this.grantsService.getGrant(id);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * PATCH /api/admin/federation/grants/:id/revoke
+   * Revoke an active grant.
+   */
+  @Patch('grants/:id/revoke')
+  async revokeGrant(@Param('id') id: string, @Body() body: RevokeGrantBodyDto) {
+    return this.grantsService.revokeGrant(id, body.reason);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * POST /api/admin/federation/grants/:id/tokens
+   * Generate a single-use enrollment token for a pending grant.
+   * Returns the token plus an enrollmentUrl the operator shares out-of-band.
+   */
+  @Post('grants/:id/tokens')
+  @HttpCode(HttpStatus.CREATED)
+  async generateToken(@Param('id') id: string, @Body() body: GenerateEnrollmentTokenDto) {
+    const grant = await this.grantsService.getGrant(id);
+
+    const result = await this.enrollmentService.createToken({
+      grantId: id,
+      peerId: grant.peerId,
+      ttlSeconds: body.ttlSeconds ?? 900,
+    });
+
+    const baseUrl = process.env['BETTER_AUTH_URL'] ?? 'http://localhost:14242';
+    const enrollmentUrl = `${baseUrl}/api/federation/enrollment/${result.token}`;
+
+    return {
+      token: result.token,
+      expiresAt: result.expiresAt,
+      enrollmentUrl,
+    };
+  }
+
+  // ─── Peer management ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  /**
+   * GET /api/admin/federation/peers
+   * List all federation peer rows.
+   */
+  @Get('peers')
+  async listPeers() {
+    return this.db.select().from(federationPeers).orderBy(federationPeers.commonName);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * POST /api/admin/federation/peers/keypair
+   * Generate a new peer entry with EC P-256 key pair and a PKCS#10 CSR.
+   *
+   * Flow:
+   *  1. Generate EC P-256 key pair via webcrypto
+   *  2. Generate a self-signed CSR via @peculiar/x509
+   *  3. Export private key as PEM
+   *  4. sealClientKey(privatePem) → sealed blob
+   *  5. Insert pending peer row
+   *  6. Return { peerId, csrPem }
+   */
+  @Post('peers/keypair')
+  @HttpCode(HttpStatus.CREATED)
+  async createPeerKeypair(@Body() body: CreatePeerKeypairDto) {
+    // 1. Generate EC P-256 key pair via Web Crypto
+    const keyPair = await webcrypto.subtle.generateKey(
+      { name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256' },
+      true, // extractable
+      ['sign', 'verify'],
+    );
+
+    // 2. Generate PKCS#10 CSR
+    const csr = await Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator.create({
+      name: `CN=${body.commonName}`,
+      keys: keyPair,
+      signingAlgorithm: { name: 'ECDSA', hash: 'SHA-256' },
+    });
+
+    const csrPem = csr.toString('pem');
+
+    // 3. Export private key as PKCS#8 PEM
+    const pkcs8Der = await webcrypto.subtle.exportKey('pkcs8', keyPair.privateKey);
+    const privatePem = toPem('PRIVATE KEY', arrayBufferToBase64(pkcs8Der));
+
+    // 4. Seal the private key
+    const sealed = sealClientKey(privatePem);
+
+    // 5. Insert pending peer row
+    const [peer] = await this.db
+      .insert(federationPeers)
+      .values({
+        commonName: body.commonName,
+        displayName: body.displayName,
+        certPem: '',
+        certSerial: 'pending',
+        certNotAfter: new Date(0),
+        clientKeyPem: sealed,
+        state: 'pending',
+        endpointUrl: body.endpointUrl,
+      })
+      .returning();
+
+    return {
+      peerId: peer!.id,
+      csrPem,
+    };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * PATCH /api/admin/federation/peers/:id/cert
+   * Store a signed certificate after enrollment completes.
+   *
+   * Flow:
+   *  1. Parse the cert to extract serial and notAfter
+   *  2. Update the peer row with cert data + state='active'
+   *  3. Return the updated peer row
+   */
+  @Patch('peers/:id/cert')
+  async storePeerCert(@Param('id') id: string, @Body() body: StorePeerCertDto) {
+    // Ensure peer exists
+    const [existing] = await this.db
+      .select({ id: federationPeers.id })
+      .from(federationPeers)
+      .where(eq(federationPeers.id, id))
+      .limit(1);
+
+    if (!existing) {
+      throw new NotFoundException(`Peer ${id} not found`);
+    }
+
+    // 1. Parse cert
+    const x509 = new X509Certificate(body.certPem);
+    const certSerial = x509.serialNumber;
+    const certNotAfter = new Date(x509.validTo);
+
+    // 2. Update peer
+    const [updated] = await this.db
+      .update(federationPeers)
+      .set({
+        certPem: body.certPem,
+        certSerial,
+        certNotAfter,
+        state: 'active',
+      })
+      .where(eq(federationPeers.id, id))
+      .returning();
+
+    return updated;
+  }
+}

apps/gateway/src/federation/federation.module.ts

@@ -1,8 +1,29 @@
 import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { AdminGuard } from '../admin/admin.guard.js';
 import { CaService } from './ca.service.js';
+import { EnrollmentController } from './enrollment.controller.js';
+import { EnrollmentService } from './enrollment.service.js';
+import { FederationController } from './federation.controller.js';
+import { GrantsService } from './grants.service.js';
+import { FederationClientService } from './client/index.js';
+import { FederationAuthGuard } from './server/index.js';
 
 @Module({
-  providers: [CaService],
-  exports: [CaService],
+  controllers: [EnrollmentController, FederationController],
+  providers: [
+    AdminGuard,
+    CaService,
+    EnrollmentService,
+    GrantsService,
+    FederationClientService,
+    FederationAuthGuard,
+  ],
+  exports: [
+    CaService,
+    EnrollmentService,
+    GrantsService,
+    FederationClientService,
+    FederationAuthGuard,
+  ],
 })
 export class FederationModule {}

apps/gateway/src/federation/grants.dto.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+import { IsDateString, IsIn, IsObject, IsOptional, IsString, IsUUID } from 'class-validator';
+
+export class CreateGrantDto {
+  @IsUUID()
+  peerId!: string;
+
+  @IsUUID()
+  subjectUserId!: string;
+
+  @IsObject()
+  scope!: Record<string, unknown>;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsDateString()
+  expiresAt?: string;
+}
+
+export class ListGrantsDto {
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsUUID()
+  peerId?: string;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsUUID()
+  subjectUserId?: string;
+
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsIn(['pending', 'active', 'revoked', 'expired'])
+  status?: 'pending' | 'active' | 'revoked' | 'expired';
+}
+
+export class RevokeGrantDto {
+  @IsOptional()
+  @IsString()
+  reason?: string;
+}

apps/gateway/src/federation/grants.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+/**
+ * Federation grants service — CRUD + status transitions (FED-M2-06).
+ *
+ * Business logic only. CSR/cert work is handled by M2-07.
+ *
+ * Status lifecycle:
+ *   pending → active   (activateGrant, called by M2-07 enrollment controller after cert signed)
+ *   active  → revoked  (revokeGrant)
+ *   active  → expired  (expireGrant, called by M6 scheduler)
+ */
+
+import { ConflictException, Inject, Injectable, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { type Db, and, eq, federationGrants, federationPeers } from '@mosaicstack/db';
+import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
+import { parseFederationScope } from './scope-schema.js';
+import type { CreateGrantDto, ListGrantsDto } from './grants.dto.js';
+
+export type Grant = typeof federationGrants.$inferSelect;
+export type Peer = typeof federationPeers.$inferSelect;
+export type GrantWithPeer = Grant & { peer: Peer };
+
+@Injectable()
+export class GrantsService {
+  constructor(@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db) {}
+
+  /**
+   * Create a new grant in `pending` state.
+   * Validates the scope against the federation scope JSON schema before inserting.
+   */
+  async createGrant(dto: CreateGrantDto): Promise<Grant> {
+    // Throws FederationScopeError (a plain Error subclass) on invalid scope.
+    parseFederationScope(dto.scope);
+
+    const [grant] = await this.db
+      .insert(federationGrants)
+      .values({
+        peerId: dto.peerId,
+        subjectUserId: dto.subjectUserId,
+        scope: dto.scope,
+        status: 'pending',
+        expiresAt: dto.expiresAt != null ? new Date(dto.expiresAt) : null,
+      })
+      .returning();
+
+    return grant!;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Fetch a single grant by ID. Throws NotFoundException if not found.
+   */
+  async getGrant(id: string): Promise<Grant> {
+    const [grant] = await this.db
+      .select()
+      .from(federationGrants)
+      .where(eq(federationGrants.id, id))
+      .limit(1);
+
+    if (!grant) {
+      throw new NotFoundException(`Grant ${id} not found`);
+    }
+
+    return grant;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Fetch a single grant by ID, joined with its associated peer row.
+   * Used by FederationAuthGuard to perform grant status + cert serial checks
+   * in a single DB round-trip.
+   *
+   * Throws NotFoundException if the grant does not exist.
+   * Throws NotFoundException if the associated peer row is missing (data integrity issue).
+   */
+  async getGrantWithPeer(id: string): Promise<GrantWithPeer> {
+    const rows = await this.db
+      .select()
+      .from(federationGrants)
+      .innerJoin(federationPeers, eq(federationGrants.peerId, federationPeers.id))
+      .where(eq(federationGrants.id, id))
+      .limit(1);
+
+    const row = rows[0];
+    if (!row) {
+      throw new NotFoundException(`Grant ${id} not found`);
+    }
+
+    return {
+      ...row.federation_grants,
+      peer: row.federation_peers,
+    };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * List grants with optional filters for peerId, subjectUserId, and status.
+   */
+  async listGrants(filters: ListGrantsDto): Promise<Grant[]> {
+    const conditions = [];
+
+    if (filters.peerId != null) {
+      conditions.push(eq(federationGrants.peerId, filters.peerId));
+    }
+    if (filters.subjectUserId != null) {
+      conditions.push(eq(federationGrants.subjectUserId, filters.subjectUserId));
+    }
+    if (filters.status != null) {
+      conditions.push(eq(federationGrants.status, filters.status));
+    }
+
+    if (conditions.length === 0) {
+      return this.db.select().from(federationGrants);
+    }
+
+    return this.db
+      .select()
+      .from(federationGrants)
+      .where(and(...conditions));
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Transition a grant from `pending` → `active`.
+   * Called by M2-07 enrollment controller after cert is signed.
+   * Throws ConflictException if the grant is not in `pending` state.
+   */
+  async activateGrant(id: string): Promise<Grant> {
+    const grant = await this.getGrant(id);
+
+    if (grant.status !== 'pending') {
+      throw new ConflictException(
+        `Grant ${id} cannot be activated: expected status 'pending', got '${grant.status}'`,
+      );
+    }
+
+    const [updated] = await this.db
+      .update(federationGrants)
+      .set({ status: 'active' })
+      .where(eq(federationGrants.id, id))
+      .returning();
+
+    return updated!;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Transition a grant from `active` → `revoked`.
+   * Sets revokedAt and optionally revokedReason.
+   * Throws ConflictException if the grant is not in `active` state.
+   */
+  async revokeGrant(id: string, reason?: string): Promise<Grant> {
+    const grant = await this.getGrant(id);
+
+    if (grant.status !== 'active') {
+      throw new ConflictException(
+        `Grant ${id} cannot be revoked: expected status 'active', got '${grant.status}'`,
+      );
+    }
+
+    const [updated] = await this.db
+      .update(federationGrants)
+      .set({
+        status: 'revoked',
+        revokedAt: new Date(),
+        revokedReason: reason ?? null,
+      })
+      .where(eq(federationGrants.id, id))
+      .returning();
+
+    return updated!;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Transition a grant from `active` → `expired`.
+   * Intended for use by the M6 scheduler.
+   * Throws ConflictException if the grant is not in `active` state.
+   */
+  async expireGrant(id: string): Promise<Grant> {
+    const grant = await this.getGrant(id);
+
+    if (grant.status !== 'active') {
+      throw new ConflictException(
+        `Grant ${id} cannot be expired: expected status 'active', got '${grant.status}'`,
+      );
+    }
+
+    const [updated] = await this.db
+      .update(federationGrants)
+      .set({ status: 'expired' })
+      .where(eq(federationGrants.id, id))
+      .returning();
+
+    return updated!;
+  }
+}

apps/gateway/src/federation/oid.util.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+/**
+ * Shared OID extraction helpers for Mosaic federation certificates.
+ *
+ * Custom OID registry (PRD §6, docs/federation/SETUP.md):
+ *   1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1  — mosaic_grant_id
+ *   1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2  — mosaic_subject_user_id
+ *
+ * The encoding convention: each extension value is an OCTET STRING wrapping
+ * an ASN.1 UTF8String TLV:
+ *   0x0C (tag) + 1-byte length + UTF-8 bytes
+ *
+ * CaService encodes values this way via encodeUtf8String(), and this module
+ * decodes them with the corresponding `.slice(2)` to skip tag + length byte.
+ *
+ * This module is intentionally pure — no NestJS, no DB, no network I/O.
+ */
+
+import { X509Certificate } from '@peculiar/x509';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// OID constants
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+export const OID_MOSAIC_GRANT_ID = '1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1';
+export const OID_MOSAIC_SUBJECT_USER_ID = '1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Extraction result types
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+export interface MosaicOids {
+  grantId: string;
+  subjectUserId: string;
+}
+
+export type OidExtractionResult =
+  | { ok: true; value: MosaicOids }
+  | {
+      ok: false;
+      error: 'MISSING_GRANT_ID' | 'MISSING_SUBJECT_USER_ID' | 'PARSE_ERROR';
+      detail?: string;
+    };
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Helpers
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const decoder = new TextDecoder();
+
+/**
+ * Decode an extension value encoded as ASN.1 UTF8String TLV
+ * (tag 0x0C + 1-byte length + UTF-8 bytes).
+ * Validates tag, length byte, and buffer bounds before decoding.
+ * Throws a descriptive Error on malformed input; caller wraps in try/catch.
+ */
+function decodeUtf8StringTlv(value: ArrayBuffer): string {
+  const bytes = new Uint8Array(value);
+
+  // Need at least tag + length bytes
+  if (bytes.length < 2) {
+    throw new Error(`UTF8String TLV too short: expected at least 2 bytes, got ${bytes.length}`);
+  }
+
+  // Tag byte must be 0x0C (ASN.1 UTF8String)
+  if (bytes[0] !== 0x0c) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `UTF8String TLV tag mismatch: expected 0x0C, got 0x${bytes[0]!.toString(16).toUpperCase()}`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Only single-byte length form is supported (values 0–127); long form not needed
+  // for OID strings of this length.
+  const declaredLength = bytes[1]!;
+  if (declaredLength > 127) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `UTF8String TLV uses long-form length (0x${declaredLength.toString(16).toUpperCase()}), which is not supported`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Declared length must match actual remaining bytes
+  if (declaredLength !== bytes.length - 2) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `UTF8String TLV length mismatch: declared ${declaredLength}, actual ${bytes.length - 2}`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Skip: tag (1 byte) + length (1 byte)
+  return decoder.decode(bytes.slice(2));
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Public API
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Extract Mosaic custom OIDs (grantId, subjectUserId) from an X.509 certificate
+ * already parsed via @peculiar/x509.
+ *
+ * Returns `{ ok: true, value: MosaicOids }` on success, or
+ * `{ ok: false, error: <code>, detail? }` on any failure — never throws.
+ */
+export function extractMosaicOids(cert: X509Certificate): OidExtractionResult {
+  try {
+    const grantIdExt = cert.getExtension(OID_MOSAIC_GRANT_ID);
+    if (!grantIdExt) {
+      return { ok: false, error: 'MISSING_GRANT_ID' };
+    }
+
+    const subjectUserIdExt = cert.getExtension(OID_MOSAIC_SUBJECT_USER_ID);
+    if (!subjectUserIdExt) {
+      return { ok: false, error: 'MISSING_SUBJECT_USER_ID' };
+    }
+
+    const grantId = decodeUtf8StringTlv(grantIdExt.value);
+    const subjectUserId = decodeUtf8StringTlv(subjectUserIdExt.value);
+
+    return {
+      ok: true,
+      value: { grantId, subjectUserId },
+    };
+  } catch (err) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      error: 'PARSE_ERROR',
+      detail: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
+    };
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Parse a PEM-encoded certificate and extract Mosaic OIDs.
+ * Returns an OidExtractionResult — never throws.
+ */
+export function extractMosaicOidsFromPem(certPem: string): OidExtractionResult {
+  let cert: X509Certificate;
+  try {
+    cert = new X509Certificate(certPem);
+  } catch (err) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      error: 'PARSE_ERROR',
+      detail: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
+    };
+  }
+  return extractMosaicOids(cert);
+}

apps/gateway/src/federation/peer-key.util.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+import { seal, unseal } from '@mosaicstack/auth';
+
+export function sealClientKey(privateKeyPem: string): string {
+  return seal(privateKeyPem);
+}
+
+export function unsealClientKey(sealedKey: string): string {
+  return unseal(sealedKey);
+}

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/__tests__/federation-auth.guard.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,521 @@
+/**
+ * Unit tests for FederationAuthGuard (FED-M3-03).
+ *
+ * Coverage:
+ *  - Missing cert (no TLS socket / no getPeerCertificate) → 401
+ *  - Cert parse failure (corrupt DER raw bytes) → 401
+ *  - Missing grantId OID → 401
+ *  - Missing subjectUserId OID → 401
+ *  - Grant not found (GrantsService throws NotFoundException) → 403
+ *  - Grant in `pending` status → 403
+ *  - Grant in `revoked` status → 403
+ *  - Grant in `expired` status → 403
+ *  - Cert serial mismatch → 403
+ *  - Happy path: active grant + matching cert serial → context attached, returns true
+ */
+
+import 'reflect-metadata';
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
+import type { ExecutionContext } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { FederationAuthGuard } from '../federation-auth.guard.js';
+import { makeMosaicIssuedCert } from '../../__tests__/helpers/test-cert.js';
+import type { GrantsService, GrantWithPeer } from '../../grants.service.js';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Test constants
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const GRANT_ID = 'a1111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111';
+const USER_ID = 'b2222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222';
+const PEER_ID = 'c3333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333';
+
+// Node.js TLS serialNumber is uppercase hex (no colons)
+const CERT_SERIAL_HEX = '01';
+
+const VALID_SCOPE = { resources: ['tasks'], max_rows_per_query: 100 };
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Mock builders
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Build a minimal GrantWithPeer-shaped mock.
+ */
+function makeGrantWithPeer(overrides: Partial<GrantWithPeer> = {}): GrantWithPeer {
+  return {
+    id: GRANT_ID,
+    peerId: PEER_ID,
+    subjectUserId: USER_ID,
+    scope: VALID_SCOPE,
+    status: 'active',
+    expiresAt: null,
+    createdAt: new Date('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
+    revokedAt: null,
+    revokedReason: null,
+    peer: {
+      id: PEER_ID,
+      commonName: 'test-peer',
+      displayName: 'Test Peer',
+      certPem: '',
+      certSerial: CERT_SERIAL_HEX,
+      certNotAfter: new Date(Date.now() + 86_400_000),
+      clientKeyPem: null,
+      state: 'active',
+      endpointUrl: null,
+      lastSeenAt: null,
+      createdAt: new Date('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
+      revokedAt: null,
+    },
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build a mock ExecutionContext with a pre-built TLS peer certificate.
+ *
+ * `certPem` — PEM string to present as the raw DER cert (converted to Buffer).
+ *             Pass null to simulate "no cert presented".
+ * `certSerialHex` — serialNumber string returned by the TLS socket.
+ *                   Node.js returns uppercase hex.
+ * `hasTlsSocket` — if false, raw.socket has no getPeerCertificate (plain HTTP).
+ */
+function makeContext(opts: {
+  certPem: string | null;
+  certSerialHex?: string;
+  hasTlsSocket?: boolean;
+}): {
+  ctx: ExecutionContext;
+  statusMock: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
+  sendMock: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
+} {
+  const { certPem, certSerialHex = CERT_SERIAL_HEX, hasTlsSocket = true } = opts;
+
+  // Build peerCert object that Node.js TLS socket.getPeerCertificate() returns
+  let peerCert: Record<string, unknown>;
+  if (certPem === null) {
+    // Simulate no cert: Node.js returns object with empty string fields
+    peerCert = { raw: null, serialNumber: '' };
+  } else {
+    // Convert PEM to DER Buffer (strip headers + base64 decode)
+    const b64 = certPem
+      .replace(/-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----/, '')
+      .replace(/-----END CERTIFICATE-----/, '')
+      .replace(/\s+/g, '');
+    const raw = Buffer.from(b64, 'base64');
+    peerCert = { raw, serialNumber: certSerialHex };
+  }
+
+  const getPeerCertificate = vi.fn().mockReturnValue(peerCert);
+
+  const socket = hasTlsSocket ? { getPeerCertificate } : {}; // No getPeerCertificate → non-TLS
+
+  // Fastify reply mocks
+  const sendMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue(undefined);
+  const headerMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ send: sendMock });
+  const statusMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ header: headerMock });
+
+  const request = {
+    raw: {
+      socket,
+    },
+  };
+
+  const reply = {
+    status: statusMock,
+  };
+
+  const ctx = {
+    switchToHttp: () => ({
+      getRequest: () => request,
+      getResponse: () => reply,
+    }),
+  } as unknown as ExecutionContext;
+
+  return { ctx, statusMock, sendMock };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build a mock GrantsService.
+ */
+function makeGrantsService(
+  overrides: Partial<Pick<GrantsService, 'getGrantWithPeer'>> = {},
+): GrantsService {
+  return {
+    getGrantWithPeer: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(makeGrantWithPeer()),
+    ...overrides,
+  } as unknown as GrantsService;
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Test suite
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+describe('FederationAuthGuard', () => {
+  let certPem: string;
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    // Generate a real Mosaic-issued cert with the standard OIDs
+    certPem = await makeMosaicIssuedCert({ grantId: GRANT_ID, subjectUserId: USER_ID });
+  });
+
+  // ── 401: No TLS socket ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  it('returns 401 when there is no TLS socket (plain HTTP connection)', async () => {
+    const { ctx, statusMock, sendMock } = makeContext({
+      certPem: certPem,
+      hasTlsSocket: false,
+    });
+
+    const guard = new FederationAuthGuard(makeGrantsService());
+    const result = await guard.canActivate(ctx);
+
+    expect(result).toBe(false);
+    expect(statusMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(401);
+    expect(sendMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        error: expect.objectContaining({ code: 'unauthorized', message: expect.any(String) }),
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  // ── 401: Cert not presented ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  it('returns 401 when the peer did not present a certificate', async () => {
+    const { ctx, statusMock, sendMock } = makeContext({ certPem: null });
+
+    const guard = new FederationAuthGuard(makeGrantsService());
+    const result = await guard.canActivate(ctx);
+
+    expect(result).toBe(false);
+    expect(statusMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(401);
+    expect(sendMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        error: expect.objectContaining({ code: 'unauthorized', message: expect.any(String) }),
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  // ── 401: Cert parse failure ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  it('returns 401 when the certificate DER bytes are corrupt', async () => {
+    // Build context with a cert that has garbage DER bytes
+    const corruptPem = '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\naW52YWxpZA==\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----';
+    const { ctx, statusMock, sendMock } = makeContext({ certPem: corruptPem });
+
+    const guard = new FederationAuthGuard(makeGrantsService());
+    const result = await guard.canActivate(ctx);
+
+    expect(result).toBe(false);
+    expect(statusMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(401);
+    expect(sendMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        error: expect.objectContaining({ code: 'unauthorized', message: expect.any(String) }),
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  // ── 401: Missing grantId OID ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  it('returns 401 when the cert is missing the grantId OID', async () => {
+    // makeSelfSignedCert produces a cert without any Mosaic OIDs
+    const { makeSelfSignedCert } = await import('../../__tests__/helpers/test-cert.js');
+    const plainCert = await makeSelfSignedCert();
+    const { ctx, statusMock, sendMock } = makeContext({ certPem: plainCert });
+
+    const guard = new FederationAuthGuard(makeGrantsService());
+    const result = await guard.canActivate(ctx);
+
+    expect(result).toBe(false);
+    expect(statusMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(401);
+    expect(sendMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        error: expect.objectContaining({ code: 'unauthorized', message: expect.any(String) }),
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  // ── 401: Missing subjectUserId OID ───────────────────────────────────────
+
+  it('returns 401 when the cert has grantId OID but is missing subjectUserId OID', async () => {
+    // Build a cert with only the grantId OID by importing cert generator internals
+    const { webcrypto } = await import('node:crypto');
+    const {
+      X509CertificateGenerator,
+      Extension,
+      KeyUsagesExtension,
+      KeyUsageFlags,
+      BasicConstraintsExtension,
+      cryptoProvider,
+    } = await import('@peculiar/x509');
+
+    cryptoProvider.set(webcrypto as unknown as Parameters<typeof cryptoProvider.set>[0]);
+
+    const alg = { name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256', hash: 'SHA-256' } as const;
+    const keys = await webcrypto.subtle.generateKey(alg, false, ['sign', 'verify']);
+    const now = new Date();
+    const tomorrow = new Date(now.getTime() + 86_400_000);
+
+    // Encode grantId only — missing subjectUserId extension
+    const utf8 = new TextEncoder().encode(GRANT_ID);
+    const encoded = new Uint8Array(2 + utf8.length);
+    encoded[0] = 0x0c;
+    encoded[1] = utf8.length;
+    encoded.set(utf8, 2);
+
+    const cert = await X509CertificateGenerator.createSelfSigned({
+      serialNumber: '01',
+      name: 'CN=partial-oid-test',
+      notBefore: now,
+      notAfter: tomorrow,
+      signingAlgorithm: alg,
+      keys,
+      extensions: [
+        new BasicConstraintsExtension(false),
+        new KeyUsagesExtension(KeyUsageFlags.digitalSignature),
+        new Extension('1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1', false, encoded), // grantId only
+      ],
+    });
+
+    const { ctx, statusMock, sendMock } = makeContext({ certPem: cert.toString('pem') });
+
+    const guard = new FederationAuthGuard(makeGrantsService());
+    const result = await guard.canActivate(ctx);
+
+    expect(result).toBe(false);
+    expect(statusMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(401);
+    expect(sendMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        error: expect.objectContaining({ code: 'unauthorized', message: expect.any(String) }),
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  // ── 403: Grant not found ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  it('returns 403 when the grantId from the cert does not exist in DB', async () => {
+    const grantsService = makeGrantsService({
+      getGrantWithPeer: vi
+        .fn()
+        .mockRejectedValue(new NotFoundException(`Grant ${GRANT_ID} not found`)),
+    });
+
+    const { ctx, statusMock, sendMock } = makeContext({ certPem });
+
+    const guard = new FederationAuthGuard(grantsService);
+    const result = await guard.canActivate(ctx);
+
+    expect(result).toBe(false);
+    expect(statusMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(403);
+    expect(sendMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        error: expect.objectContaining({ code: 'forbidden', message: 'Federation access denied' }),
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  // ── 403: Grant in `pending` status ───────────────────────────────────────
+
+  it('returns 403 when the grant is in pending status', async () => {
+    const grantsService = makeGrantsService({
+      getGrantWithPeer: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(makeGrantWithPeer({ status: 'pending' })),
+    });
+
+    const { ctx, statusMock, sendMock } = makeContext({ certPem });
+
+    const guard = new FederationAuthGuard(grantsService);
+    const result = await guard.canActivate(ctx);
+
+    expect(result).toBe(false);
+    expect(statusMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(403);
+    expect(sendMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        error: expect.objectContaining({ code: 'forbidden', message: 'Federation access denied' }),
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  // ── 403: Grant in `revoked` status ───────────────────────────────────────
+
+  it('returns 403 when the grant is in revoked status', async () => {
+    const grantsService = makeGrantsService({
+      getGrantWithPeer: vi
+        .fn()
+        .mockResolvedValue(makeGrantWithPeer({ status: 'revoked', revokedAt: new Date() })),
+    });
+
+    const { ctx, statusMock, sendMock } = makeContext({ certPem });
+
+    const guard = new FederationAuthGuard(grantsService);
+    const result = await guard.canActivate(ctx);
+
+    expect(result).toBe(false);
+    expect(statusMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(403);
+    expect(sendMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        error: expect.objectContaining({ code: 'forbidden', message: 'Federation access denied' }),
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  // ── 403: Grant in `expired` status ───────────────────────────────────────
+
+  it('returns 403 when the grant is in expired status', async () => {
+    const grantsService = makeGrantsService({
+      getGrantWithPeer: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(makeGrantWithPeer({ status: 'expired' })),
+    });
+
+    const { ctx, statusMock, sendMock } = makeContext({ certPem });
+
+    const guard = new FederationAuthGuard(grantsService);
+    const result = await guard.canActivate(ctx);
+
+    expect(result).toBe(false);
+    expect(statusMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(403);
+    expect(sendMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        error: expect.objectContaining({ code: 'forbidden', message: 'Federation access denied' }),
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  // ── 403: Cert serial mismatch ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  it('returns 403 when the cert serial does not match the registered peer cert serial', async () => {
+    // Return a grant whose peer has a different stored serial
+    const grantsService = makeGrantsService({
+      getGrantWithPeer: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(
+        makeGrantWithPeer({
+          peer: {
+            id: PEER_ID,
+            commonName: 'test-peer',
+            displayName: 'Test Peer',
+            certPem: '',
+            certSerial: 'DEADBEEF', // different from CERT_SERIAL_HEX='01'
+            certNotAfter: new Date(Date.now() + 86_400_000),
+            clientKeyPem: null,
+            state: 'active',
+            endpointUrl: null,
+            lastSeenAt: null,
+            createdAt: new Date('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
+            revokedAt: null,
+          },
+        }),
+      ),
+    });
+
+    // Context presents cert with serial '01' but DB has 'DEADBEEF'
+    const { ctx, statusMock, sendMock } = makeContext({ certPem, certSerialHex: '01' });
+
+    const guard = new FederationAuthGuard(grantsService);
+    const result = await guard.canActivate(ctx);
+
+    expect(result).toBe(false);
+    expect(statusMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(403);
+    expect(sendMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        error: expect.objectContaining({ code: 'forbidden', message: 'Federation access denied' }),
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  // ── 403: subjectUserId cert/DB mismatch (CRIT-1 regression test) ─────────
+
+  it('returns 403 when the cert subjectUserId does not match the DB grant subjectUserId', async () => {
+    // Build a cert that claims an attacker's subjectUserId
+    const attackerSubjectUserId = 'attacker-user-id';
+    const attackerCertPem = await makeMosaicIssuedCert({
+      grantId: GRANT_ID,
+      subjectUserId: attackerSubjectUserId,
+    });
+
+    // DB returns a grant with the legitimate USER_ID
+    const grantsService = makeGrantsService({
+      getGrantWithPeer: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(makeGrantWithPeer({ subjectUserId: USER_ID })),
+    });
+
+    // Cert presents attacker-user-id but DB has USER_ID — should be rejected
+    const { ctx, statusMock, sendMock } = makeContext({
+      certPem: attackerCertPem,
+      certSerialHex: CERT_SERIAL_HEX,
+    });
+
+    const guard = new FederationAuthGuard(grantsService);
+    const result = await guard.canActivate(ctx);
+
+    expect(result).toBe(false);
+    expect(statusMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(403);
+    expect(sendMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        error: expect.objectContaining({ code: 'forbidden', message: 'Federation access denied' }),
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  // ── Happy path ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  it('returns true and attaches federationContext on happy path', async () => {
+    const grant = makeGrantWithPeer({
+      status: 'active',
+      peer: {
+        id: PEER_ID,
+        commonName: 'test-peer',
+        displayName: 'Test Peer',
+        certPem: '',
+        certSerial: CERT_SERIAL_HEX,
+        certNotAfter: new Date(Date.now() + 86_400_000),
+        clientKeyPem: null,
+        state: 'active',
+        endpointUrl: null,
+        lastSeenAt: null,
+        createdAt: new Date('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
+        revokedAt: null,
+      },
+    });
+
+    const grantsService = makeGrantsService({
+      getGrantWithPeer: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(grant),
+    });
+
+    // Build context manually to capture what gets set on request.federationContext
+    const b64 = certPem
+      .replace(/-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----/, '')
+      .replace(/-----END CERTIFICATE-----/, '')
+      .replace(/\s+/g, '');
+    const raw = Buffer.from(b64, 'base64');
+    const peerCert = { raw, serialNumber: CERT_SERIAL_HEX };
+
+    const sendMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue(undefined);
+    const headerMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ send: sendMock });
+    const statusMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ header: headerMock });
+
+    const request: Record<string, unknown> = {
+      raw: {
+        socket: { getPeerCertificate: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(peerCert) },
+      },
+    };
+
+    const reply = { status: statusMock };
+
+    const ctx = {
+      switchToHttp: () => ({
+        getRequest: () => request,
+        getResponse: () => reply,
+      }),
+    } as unknown as ExecutionContext;
+
+    const guard = new FederationAuthGuard(grantsService);
+    const result = await guard.canActivate(ctx);
+
+    expect(result).toBe(true);
+    expect(statusMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+
+    // Verify the context was attached correctly
+    expect(request['federationContext']).toEqual({
+      grantId: GRANT_ID,
+      subjectUserId: USER_ID,
+      peerId: PEER_ID,
+      scope: VALID_SCOPE,
+    });
+  });
+});

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/federation-auth.guard.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+/**
+ * FederationAuthGuard — NestJS CanActivate guard for inbound federation requests.
+ *
+ * Validates the mTLS client certificate presented by a peer gateway, extracts
+ * custom OIDs to identify the grant + subject user, loads the grant from DB,
+ * asserts it is active, and verifies the cert serial against the registered peer
+ * cert serial as a defense-in-depth measure.
+ *
+ * On success, attaches `request.federationContext` for downstream verb controllers.
+ * On failure, responds with the federation wire-format error envelope (not raw
+ * NestJS exception JSON) to match the federation protocol contract.
+ *
+ * ## Cert-serial check decision
+ * The guard validates that the inbound client cert's serial number matches the
+ * `certSerial` stored on the associated `federation_peers` row. This is a
+ * defense-in-depth measure: even if the mTLS handshake is compromised at the
+ * transport layer (e.g. misconfigured TLS terminator that forwards arbitrary
+ * client certs), an attacker cannot replay a cert with a different serial than
+ * what was registered during enrollment. This check is NOT loosened because:
+ *  1. It is O(1) — no additional DB round-trip (peerId is on the grant row,
+ *     so we join to federationPeers in the same query).
+ *  2. Cert renewal MUST update the stored serial — enforced by M6 scheduler.
+ *  3. The OID-only path (without serial check) would allow any cert from the
+ *     same CA bearing the same grantId OID to succeed after cert compromise.
+ *
+ * ## FastifyRequest typing path
+ * NestJS + Fastify wraps the raw Node.js IncomingMessage in a FastifyRequest.
+ * The underlying TLS socket is accessed via `request.raw.socket`, which is a
+ * `tls.TLSSocket` when the server is listening on HTTPS. In development/test
+ * the gateway may run over plain HTTP, in which case `getPeerCertificate` is
+ * not available. The guard safely handles both cases by checking for the
+ * method's existence before calling it.
+ *
+ * Note: The guard reads the peer certificate from the *already-completed*
+ * TLS handshake via `socket.getPeerCertificate(detailed=true)`. This relies
+ * on the server being configured with `requestCert: true` at the TLS level
+ * so Fastify/Node.js requests the client cert during the handshake.
+ * The guard does NOT verify the cert chain itself — that is handled by the
+ * TLS layer (Node.js `rejectUnauthorized: true` with the CA cert pinned).
+ */
+
+import {
+  type CanActivate,
+  type ExecutionContext,
+  Inject,
+  Injectable,
+  Logger,
+} from '@nestjs/common';
+import type { FastifyReply, FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
+import * as tls from 'node:tls';
+import { X509Certificate } from '@peculiar/x509';
+import { FederationForbiddenError, FederationUnauthorizedError } from '@mosaicstack/types';
+import { extractMosaicOids } from '../oid.util.js';
+import { GrantsService } from '../grants.service.js';
+import type { FederationContext } from './federation-context.js';
+import './federation-context.js'; // side-effect import: applies FastifyRequest module augmentation
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Internal helpers
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Send a federation wire-format error response directly on the Fastify reply.
+ * Returns false — callers return this value from canActivate.
+ */
+function sendFederationError(
+  reply: FastifyReply,
+  error: FederationUnauthorizedError | FederationForbiddenError,
+): boolean {
+  const statusCode = error.code === 'unauthorized' ? 401 : 403;
+  void reply.status(statusCode).header('content-type', 'application/json').send(error.toEnvelope());
+  return false;
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Guard
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+@Injectable()
+export class FederationAuthGuard implements CanActivate {
+  private readonly logger = new Logger(FederationAuthGuard.name);
+
+  constructor(@Inject(GrantsService) private readonly grantsService: GrantsService) {}
+
+  async canActivate(context: ExecutionContext): Promise<boolean> {
+    const http = context.switchToHttp();
+    const request = http.getRequest<FastifyRequest>();
+    const reply = http.getResponse<FastifyReply>();
+
+    // ── Step 1: Extract peer certificate from TLS socket ────────────────────
+    const rawSocket = request.raw.socket;
+
+    // Check TLS socket: getPeerCertificate is only available on TLS connections.
+    if (
+      !rawSocket ||
+      typeof (rawSocket as Partial<tls.TLSSocket>).getPeerCertificate !== 'function'
+    ) {
+      this.logger.warn('No TLS socket — client cert unavailable (non-mTLS connection)');
+      return sendFederationError(
+        reply,
+        new FederationUnauthorizedError('Client certificate required'),
+      );
+    }
+
+    const tlsSocket = rawSocket as tls.TLSSocket;
+    const peerCert = tlsSocket.getPeerCertificate(true);
+
+    // Node.js returns an object with empty string fields when no cert was presented.
+    if (!peerCert || !peerCert.raw) {
+      this.logger.warn('Peer certificate not presented (mTLS handshake did not supply cert)');
+      return sendFederationError(
+        reply,
+        new FederationUnauthorizedError('Client certificate required'),
+      );
+    }
+
+    // ── Step 2: Parse the DER-encoded certificate via @peculiar/x509 ────────
+    let cert: X509Certificate;
+    try {
+      // peerCert.raw is a Buffer containing the DER-encoded cert
+      cert = new X509Certificate(peerCert.raw);
+    } catch (err) {
+      this.logger.warn(
+        `Failed to parse peer certificate: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
+      );
+      return sendFederationError(
+        reply,
+        new FederationUnauthorizedError('Client certificate could not be parsed'),
+      );
+    }
+
+    // ── Step 3: Extract Mosaic custom OIDs ──────────────────────────────────
+    const oidResult = extractMosaicOids(cert);
+
+    if (!oidResult.ok) {
+      const message =
+        oidResult.error === 'MISSING_GRANT_ID'
+          ? 'Client certificate is missing required OID: mosaic_grant_id (1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1)'
+          : oidResult.error === 'MISSING_SUBJECT_USER_ID'
+            ? 'Client certificate is missing required OID: mosaic_subject_user_id (1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2)'
+            : `Client certificate OID extraction failed: ${oidResult.detail ?? 'unknown error'}`;
+      this.logger.warn(`OID extraction failure [${oidResult.error}]: ${message}`);
+      return sendFederationError(reply, new FederationUnauthorizedError(message));
+    }
+
+    const { grantId, subjectUserId } = oidResult.value;
+
+    // ── Step 4: Load grant from DB ───────────────────────────────────────────
+    let grant: Awaited<ReturnType<GrantsService['getGrantWithPeer']>>;
+    try {
+      grant = await this.grantsService.getGrantWithPeer(grantId);
+    } catch {
+      // getGrantWithPeer throws NotFoundException when not found
+      this.logger.warn(`Grant not found: ${grantId}`);
+      return sendFederationError(reply, new FederationForbiddenError('Federation access denied'));
+    }
+
+    // ── Step 5: Assert grant is active ──────────────────────────────────────
+    if (grant.status !== 'active') {
+      this.logger.warn(`Grant ${grantId} is not active — status=${grant.status}`);
+      return sendFederationError(reply, new FederationForbiddenError('Federation access denied'));
+    }
+
+    // ── Step 5b: Validate cert-extracted subjectUserId against DB (CRIT-1) ──
+    // The cert claim is untrusted input; the DB row is authoritative.
+    if (subjectUserId !== grant.subjectUserId) {
+      this.logger.warn(`subjectUserId mismatch for grant ${grantId}`);
+      return sendFederationError(reply, new FederationForbiddenError('Federation access denied'));
+    }
+
+    // ── Step 6: Defense-in-depth — cert serial must match registered peer ───
+    // The serial number from Node.js TLS is upper-case hex without colons.
+    // The @peculiar/x509 serialNumber is decimal. We compare using the native
+    // Node.js crypto cert serial which is uppercase hex, matching DB storage.
+    // Both are derived from the peerCert.serialNumber Node.js provides.
+    const inboundSerial: string = peerCert.serialNumber ?? '';
+
+    if (!grant.peer.certSerial) {
+      // Peer row exists but has no stored serial — something is wrong with enrollment
+      this.logger.error(`Peer ${grant.peerId} has no stored certSerial — enrollment incomplete`);
+      return sendFederationError(reply, new FederationForbiddenError('Federation access denied'));
+    }
+
+    // Normalize both to uppercase for comparison (Node.js serialNumber is
+    // already uppercase hex; DB value was stored from extractSerial() which
+    // returns crypto.X509Certificate.serialNumber — also uppercase hex).
+    if (inboundSerial.toUpperCase() !== grant.peer.certSerial.toUpperCase()) {
+      this.logger.warn(
+        `Cert serial mismatch for grant ${grantId}: ` +
+          `inbound=${inboundSerial} registered=${grant.peer.certSerial}`,
+      );
+      return sendFederationError(reply, new FederationForbiddenError('Federation access denied'));
+    }
+
+    // ── Step 7: Attach FederationContext to request ──────────────────────────
+    // Use grant.subjectUserId from DB (authoritative) — not the cert-extracted value.
+    const federationContext: FederationContext = {
+      grantId,
+      subjectUserId: grant.subjectUserId,
+      peerId: grant.peerId,
+      scope: grant.scope as Record<string, unknown>,
+    };
+
+    request.federationContext = federationContext;
+
+    this.logger.debug(
+      `Federation auth OK — grantId=${grantId} peerId=${grant.peerId} subjectUserId=${grant.subjectUserId}`,
+    );
+
+    return true;
+  }
+}

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/federation-context.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/**
+ * FederationContext — attached to inbound federation requests after successful
+ * mTLS + grant validation by FederationAuthGuard.
+ *
+ * Downstream verb controllers access this via `request.federationContext`.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Augment FastifyRequest so TypeScript knows about the federation context
+ * property that FederationAuthGuard attaches on success.
+ */
+declare module 'fastify' {
+  interface FastifyRequest {
+    federationContext?: FederationContext;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Typed context object attached to the request by FederationAuthGuard.
+ * Carries all data extracted from the mTLS cert + grant DB row needed
+ * by downstream federation verb handlers.
+ */
+export interface FederationContext {
+  /** The federation grant ID extracted from OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1 */
+  grantId: string;
+
+  /** The local subject user whose data is accessible under this grant */
+  subjectUserId: string;
+
+  /** The peer gateway ID (from the grant's peerId FK) */
+  peerId: string;
+
+  /**
+   * Grant scope — determines which resources the peer may query.
+   * Typed as Record<string, unknown> because the full scope schema lives in
+   * scope-schema.ts; downstream handlers should narrow via parseFederationScope.
+   */
+  scope: Record<string, unknown>;
+}

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+/**
+ * Federation server-side barrel — inbound request handling.
+ *
+ * Exports the mTLS auth guard and the FederationContext interface
+ * for use by verb controllers (M3-05/06/07).
+ *
+ * Usage:
+ *   import { FederationAuthGuard } from './server/index.js';
+ *   @UseGuards(FederationAuthGuard)
+ */
+
+export { FederationAuthGuard } from './federation-auth.guard.js';
+export type { FederationContext } from './federation-context.js';

docker/appservice.Dockerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+FROM node:22-alpine AS base
+ENV PNPM_HOME="/pnpm"
+ENV PATH="$PNPM_HOME:$PATH"
+RUN corepack enable
+
+FROM base AS builder
+WORKDIR /app
+# Copy workspace manifests first for layer-cached install
+COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json ./
+COPY apps/appservice/package.json ./apps/appservice/
+COPY packages/ ./packages/
+COPY plugins/ ./plugins/
+RUN pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
+COPY . .
+RUN pnpm turbo run build --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic-as...
+RUN pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic-as --prod deploy --legacy /deploy
+
+FROM base AS runner
+WORKDIR /app
+ENV NODE_ENV=production
+COPY --from=builder /deploy/node_modules ./node_modules
+COPY --from=builder /deploy/package.json ./package.json
+COPY --from=builder /app/apps/appservice/dist ./dist
+USER node
+EXPOSE 8008
+HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=15s --retries=5 \
+  CMD ["node", "-e", "require('http').get('http://127.0.0.1:8008/health',r=>process.exit(r.statusCode===200?0:1)).on('error',()=>process.exit(1))"]
+CMD ["node", "dist/main.js"]

docs/TASKS.md

@@ -22,14 +22,15 @@
 
 These are MVP-level checks that don't belong to any single workstream. Updated by the orchestrator at each session.
 
-| id      | status      | description                                                                                              | notes                                                                                   |
-| ------- | ----------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| MVP-T01 | done        | Author MVP-level manifest at `docs/MISSION-MANIFEST.md`                                                  | This session (2026-04-19); PR pending                                                   |
-| MVP-T02 | done        | Archive install-ux-v2 mission state to `docs/archive/missions/install-ux-v2-20260405/`                   | IUV-M03 retroactively closed (shipped via PR #446 + releases 0.0.27→0.0.29)             |
-| MVP-T03 | done        | Land federation v1 planning artifacts on `main`                                                          | PR #468 merged 2026-04-19 (commit `66512550`)                                           |
-| MVP-T04 | not-started | Sync `.mosaic/orchestrator/mission.json` MVP slot with this manifest (milestone enumeration, etc.)       | Coord state file; consider whether to repopulate via `mosaic coord` or accept hand-edit |
-| MVP-T05 | in-progress | Kick off W1 / FED-M1 — federated tier infrastructure                                                     | Session 16 (2026-04-19): FED-M1-01 in-progress on `feat/federation-m1-tier-config`      |
-| MVP-T06 | not-started | Declare additional workstreams (web dashboard, TUI/CLI parity, remote control, etc.) as scope solidifies | Track each new workstream by adding a row to the Workstream Rollup                      |
+| id         | status      | description                                                                                              | notes                                                                                                                         |
+| ---------- | ----------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| MVP-T01    | done        | Author MVP-level manifest at `docs/MISSION-MANIFEST.md`                                                  | This session (2026-04-19); PR pending                                                                                         |
+| MVP-T02    | done        | Archive install-ux-v2 mission state to `docs/archive/missions/install-ux-v2-20260405/`                   | IUV-M03 retroactively closed (shipped via PR #446 + releases 0.0.27→0.0.29)                                                   |
+| MVP-T03    | done        | Land federation v1 planning artifacts on `main`                                                          | PR #468 merged 2026-04-19 (commit `66512550`)                                                                                 |
+| MVP-T04    | not-started | Sync `.mosaic/orchestrator/mission.json` MVP slot with this manifest (milestone enumeration, etc.)       | Coord state file; consider whether to repopulate via `mosaic coord` or accept hand-edit                                       |
+| MVP-T05    | in-progress | Kick off W1 / FED-M1 — federated tier infrastructure                                                     | Session 16 (2026-04-19): FED-M1-01 in-progress on `feat/federation-m1-tier-config`                                            |
+| MVP-T06    | not-started | Declare additional workstreams (web dashboard, TUI/CLI parity, remote control, etc.) as scope solidifies | Track each new workstream by adding a row to the Workstream Rollup                                                            |
+| T-A292E96F | in-progress | Fix Mosaic Gitea PR metadata/login wrapper regression for U-Connect merge preflight                      | Kanban `t_a292e96f`; branch `fix/t-a292e96f-gitea-pr-metadata`; scratchpad `docs/scratchpads/t-a292e96f-gitea-pr-metadata.md` |
 
 ## Pointer to Active Workstream
 
@@ -38,3 +39,9 @@ Active workstream is **W1 — Federation v1**. Workers should:
 1. Read [docs/federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md](./federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md) for workstream scope
 2. Read [docs/federation/TASKS.md](./federation/TASKS.md) for the next pending task
 3. Follow per-task agent + tier guidance from the workstream manifest
+
+## Thin-core prompt diet (#528) — feat/contract-thin-core
+
+- Status: PR open, awaiting maintainer merge ratification (fleet-governing change).
+- Cut always-injected contract AGENTS+TOOLS+RUNTIME 8,827→4,122 tok (−53%); all 12 hard gates intact.
+- Validation: deterministic gate-checklist PASS; headless A/B thin 7/9 vs monolith 5/9. Detail: scratchpads/contract-thin-core.md.

docs/federation/ADMIN-CLI.md

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+# Mosaic Federation — Admin CLI Reference
+
+Available since: FED-M2
+
+## Grant Management
+
+### Create a grant
+
+```bash
+mosaic federation grant create --user <userId> --peer <peerId> --scope <scope-file.json>
+```
+
+The scope file defines what resources and rows the peer may access:
+
+```json
+{
+  "resources": ["tasks", "notes"],
+  "excluded_resources": ["credentials"],
+  "max_rows_per_query": 100
+}
+```
+
+Valid resource values: `tasks`, `notes`, `credentials`, `teams`, `users`
+
+### List grants
+
+```bash
+mosaic federation grant list [--peer <peerId>] [--status pending|active|revoked|expired]
+```
+
+Shows all federation grants, optionally filtered by peer or status.
+
+### Show a grant
+
+```bash
+mosaic federation grant show <grantId>
+```
+
+Display details of a single grant, including its scope, activation timestamp, and status.
+
+### Revoke a grant
+
+```bash
+mosaic federation grant revoke <grantId> [--reason "Reason text"]
+```
+
+Revoke an active grant immediately. Revoked grants cannot be reactivated. The optional reason is stored in the audit log.
+
+### Generate enrollment token
+
+```bash
+mosaic federation grant token <grantId> [--ttl <seconds>]
+```
+
+Generate a single-use enrollment token for the grant. The default TTL is 900 seconds (15 minutes); maximum 15 minutes.
+
+Output includes the token and the full enrollment URL for the peer to use.
+
+## Peer Management
+
+### Add a peer (remote enrollment)
+
+```bash
+mosaic federation peer add <enrollment-url>
+```
+
+Enroll a remote peer using the enrollment URL obtained from a grant token. The command:
+
+1. Generates a P-256 ECDSA keypair locally
+2. Creates a certificate signing request (CSR)
+3. Submits the CSR to the enrollment URL
+4. Verifies the returned certificate includes the correct custom OIDs (grant ID and subject user ID)
+5. Seals the private key at rest using `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`
+6. Stores the peer record and sealed key in the local gateway database
+
+Once enrollment completes, the peer can authenticate using the certificate and private key.
+
+### List peers
+
+```bash
+mosaic federation peer list
+```
+
+Shows all enrolled peers, including their certificate fingerprints and activation status.
+
+## REST API Reference
+
+All CLI commands call the local gateway admin API. Equivalent REST endpoints:
+
+| CLI Command  | REST Endpoint                                                                               | Method            |
+| ------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------- |
+| grant create | `/api/admin/federation/grants`                                                              | POST              |
+| grant list   | `/api/admin/federation/grants`                                                              | GET               |
+| grant show   | `/api/admin/federation/grants/:id`                                                          | GET               |
+| grant revoke | `/api/admin/federation/grants/:id/revoke`                                                   | PATCH             |
+| grant token  | `/api/admin/federation/grants/:id/tokens`                                                   | POST              |
+| peer list    | `/api/admin/federation/peers`                                                               | GET               |
+| peer add     | `/api/admin/federation/peers/keypair` + enrollment + `/api/admin/federation/peers/:id/cert` | POST, POST, PATCH |
+
+## Security Notes
+
+- **Enrollment tokens** are single-use and expire in 15 minutes (not configurable beyond 15 minutes)
+- **Peer private keys** are encrypted at rest using AES-256-GCM, keyed from `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`
+- **Custom OIDs** in issued certificates are verified post-issuance: the grant ID and subject user ID must match the certificate extensions
+- **Grant activation** is atomic — concurrent enrollment attempts for the same grant are rejected
+- **Revoked grants** cannot be activated; peers attempting to use a revoked grant's token will be rejected

docs/federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md

@@ -7,11 +7,11 @@
 
 **ID:** federation-v1-20260419
 **Statement:** Jarvis operates across 3–4 workstations in two physical locations (home, USC). The user currently reaches back to a single jarvis-brain checkout from every session; a prior OpenBrain attempt caused cache, latency, and opacity pain. This mission builds asymmetric federation between Mosaic Stack gateways so that a session on a user's home gateway can query their work gateway in real time without data ever persisting across the boundary, with full multi-tenant isolation and standard-PKI (X.509 / Step-CA) trust management.
-**Phase:** M2 active — Step-CA + grant schema + admin CLI; parallel test-deploy workstream stood up
-**Current Milestone:** FED-M2
-**Progress:** 1 / 7 milestones
+**Phase:** M3 active — mTLS handshake + list/get/capabilities verbs + scope enforcement
+**Current Milestone:** FED-M3
+**Progress:** 2 / 7 milestones
 **Status:** active
-**Last Updated:** 2026-04-21 (M2 decomposed; mos-test-1/-2 designated as federation E2E test hosts)
+**Last Updated:** 2026-04-21 (M2 closed via PR #503, tag `fed-v0.2.0-m2`, issue #461 closed; M3 decomposed into 14 tasks)
 **Parent Mission:** None — new mission
 
 ## Test Infrastructure
@@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ Key design references:
 | #   | ID     | Name                                          | Status      | Branch             | Issue | Started    | Completed  |
 | --- | ------ | --------------------------------------------- | ----------- | ------------------ | ----- | ---------- | ---------- |
 | 1   | FED-M1 | Federated tier infrastructure                 | done        | (12 PRs #470-#481) | #460  | 2026-04-19 | 2026-04-19 |
-| 2   | FED-M2 | Step-CA + grant schema + admin CLI            | in-progress | (decomposition)    | #461  | 2026-04-21 | —          |
-| 3   | FED-M3 | mTLS handshake + list/get + scope enforcement | not-started | —                  | #462  | —          | —          |
+| 2   | FED-M2 | Step-CA + grant schema + admin CLI            | done        | (PRs #483-#503)    | #461  | 2026-04-21 | 2026-04-21 |
+| 3   | FED-M3 | mTLS handshake + list/get + scope enforcement | in-progress | (decomposition)    | #462  | 2026-04-21 | —          |
 | 4   | FED-M4 | search verb + audit log + rate limit          | not-started | —                  | #463  | —          | —          |
 | 5   | FED-M5 | Cache + offline degradation + OTEL            | not-started | —                  | #464  | —          | —          |
 | 6   | FED-M6 | Revocation + auto-renewal + CRL               | not-started | —                  | #465  | —          | —          |
@@ -85,17 +85,24 @@ Key design references:
 
 ## Session History
 
-| Session | Date       | Runtime | Outcome                                                               |
-| ------- | ---------- | ------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| S1      | 2026-04-19 | claude  | PRD authored, MILESTONES decomposed, 7 issues filed                   |
-| S2-S4   | 2026-04-19 | claude  | FED-M1 complete: 12 tasks (PRs #470-#481) merged; tag `fed-v0.1.0-m1` |
+| Session | Date                    | Runtime | Outcome                                                                                                                               |
+| ------- | ----------------------- | ------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| S1      | 2026-04-19              | claude  | PRD authored, MILESTONES decomposed, 7 issues filed                                                                                   |
+| S2-S4   | 2026-04-19              | claude  | FED-M1 complete: 12 tasks (PRs #470-#481) merged; tag `fed-v0.1.0-m1`                                                                 |
+| S5-S22  | 2026-04-19 → 2026-04-21 | claude  | FED-M2 complete: 13 tasks (PRs #483-#503) merged; tag `fed-v0.2.0-m2`; issue #461 closed. Step-CA + grant schema + admin CLI shipped. |
+| S23     | 2026-04-21              | claude  | M3 decomposed into 14 tasks in `docs/federation/TASKS.md`. Manifest M3 row → in-progress. Next: kickoff M3-01.                        |
 
 ## Next Step
 
-FED-M2 active. Decomposition landed in `docs/federation/TASKS.md` (M2-01..M2-13 code workstream + DEPLOY-01..DEPLOY-05 parallel test-deploy workstream, ~88K total). Tracking issue #482.
+FED-M3 active. Decomposition landed in `docs/federation/TASKS.md` (M3-01..M3-14, ~100K estimate). Tracking issue #462.
 
-Parallel execution plan:
+Execution plan (parallel where possible):
 
-- **CODE workstream**: M2-01 (DB migration) starts immediately — sonnet subagent on `feat/federation-m2-schema`. Then M2-02 → M2-09 sequentially with M2-04/M2-05/M2-06/M2-07 having interleaved CA/storage/grant dependencies.
-- **DEPLOY workstream**: DEPLOY-01 (image verify) → DEPLOY-02 (stack template) → DEPLOY-03/04 (mos-test-1/-2 deploy) → DEPLOY-05 (TEST-INFRA.md). Gated on Portainer wrapper PR (`PORTAINER_INSECURE` flag) merging first.
-- **Re-converge** at M2-10 (E2E test) once both workstreams ready.
+- **Foundation**: M3-01 (DTOs in `packages/types/src/federation/`) starts immediately — sonnet subagent on `feat/federation-m3-types`. Blocks all server + client work.
+- **Server stream** (after M3-01): M3-03 (AuthGuard) + M3-04 (ScopeService) in series, then M3-05 / M3-06 / M3-07 (verbs) in parallel.
+- **Client stream** (after M3-01, parallel with server): M3-08 (FederationClient) → M3-09 (QuerySourceService).
+- **Harness** (parallel with everything): M3-02 (`tools/federation-harness/`) — needed for M3-11.
+- **Test gates**: M3-10 (Integration) → M3-11 (E2E with harness) → M3-12 (Independent security review, two rounds budgeted).
+- **Close**: M3-13 (Docs) → M3-14 (release tag `fed-v0.3.0-m3`, close #462).
+
+**Test-bed fallback:** `mos-test-1/-2` deploy is still blocked on `FED-M2-DEPLOY-IMG-FIX`. The harness in M3-02 ships a local two-gateway docker-compose so M3-11 is not blocked. Production-host validation is M7's responsibility (PRD AC-12).

docs/federation/SETUP.md

@@ -70,6 +70,96 @@ For JSON output (useful in CI/automation):
 mosaic gateway doctor --json
 ```
 
+## Step 2: Step-CA Bootstrap
+
+Step-CA is a certificate authority that issues X.509 certificates for federation peers. In Mosaic federation, it signs peer certificates with custom OIDs that embed grant and user identities, enforcing authorization at the certificate level.
+
+### Prerequisites for Step-CA
+
+Before starting the CA, you must set up the dev password:
+
+```bash
+cp infra/step-ca/dev-password.example infra/step-ca/dev-password
+# Edit dev-password and set your CA password (minimum 16 characters)
+```
+
+The password is required for the CA to boot and derive the provisioner key used by the gateway.
+
+### Start the Step-CA service
+
+Add the step-ca service to your federated stack:
+
+```bash
+docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml --profile federated up -d step-ca
+```
+
+On first boot, the init script (`infra/step-ca/init.sh`) runs automatically. It:
+
+- Generates the CA root key and certificate in the Docker volume
+- Creates the `mosaic-fed` JWK provisioner
+- Applies the X.509 template from `infra/step-ca/templates/federation.tpl`
+
+The volume is persistent, so subsequent boots reuse the existing CA keys.
+
+Verify the CA is healthy:
+
+```bash
+curl https://localhost:9000/health --cacert /tmp/step-ca-root.crt
+```
+
+(If the root cert file doesn't exist yet, see the extraction steps below.)
+
+### Extract credentials for the gateway
+
+The gateway requires two credentials from the running CA:
+
+**1. Provisioner key (for `STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON`)**
+
+```bash
+docker exec $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca) cat /home/step/secrets/mosaic-fed.json > /tmp/step-ca-provisioner.json
+```
+
+This JSON file contains the JWK public and private keys for the `mosaic-fed` provisioner. Store it securely and pass its contents to the gateway via the `STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON` environment variable.
+
+**2. Root certificate (for `STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH`)**
+
+```bash
+docker cp $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca):/home/step/certs/root_ca.crt /tmp/step-ca-root.crt
+```
+
+This PEM file is the CA's root certificate, used to verify peer certificates issued by step-ca. Pass its path to the gateway via `STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH`.
+
+### Custom OID Registry
+
+Federation certificates include custom OIDs in the certificate extension. These encode authorization metadata:
+
+| OID                 | Name                   | Description           |
+| ------------------- | ---------------------- | --------------------- |
+| 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1 | mosaic_grant_id        | Federation grant UUID |
+| 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2 | mosaic_subject_user_id | Subject user UUID     |
+
+These OIDs are verified by the gateway after the CSR is signed, ensuring the certificate was issued with the correct grant and user context.
+
+### Environment Variables
+
+Configure the gateway with the following environment variables before startup:
+
+| Variable                       | Required | Description                                                                                               |
+| ------------------------------ | -------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `STEP_CA_URL`                  | Yes      | Base URL of the step-ca instance, e.g. `https://step-ca:9000` (use `https://localhost:9000` in local dev) |
+| `STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON` | Yes      | JSON-encoded JWK from `/home/step/secrets/mosaic-fed.json`                                                |
+| `STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH`       | Yes      | Absolute path to the root CA certificate (e.g. `/tmp/step-ca-root.crt`)                                   |
+| `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`           | Yes      | Secret used to seal peer private keys at rest; already required for M1                                    |
+
+Example environment setup:
+
+```bash
+export STEP_CA_URL="https://localhost:9000"
+export STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON="$(cat /tmp/step-ca-provisioner.json)"
+export STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH="/tmp/step-ca-root.crt"
+export BETTER_AUTH_SECRET="<your-secret>"
+```
+
 ## Troubleshooting
 
 ### Port conflicts
@@ -118,6 +208,12 @@ docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml logs valkey-federated
 
 If Valkey is running, verify your firewall allows 6380. On macOS, Docker Desktop may require binding to `host.docker.internal` instead of `localhost`.
 
+## Key rotation (deferred)
+
+Federation peer private keys (`federation_peers.client_key_pem`) are sealed at rest using AES-256-GCM with a key derived from `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` via SHA-256. If `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` is rotated, all sealed `client_key_pem` values in the database become unreadable and must be re-sealed with the new key before rotation completes.
+
+The full key rotation procedure (decrypt all rows with old key, re-encrypt with new key, atomically swap the secret) is out of scope for M2. Operators must not rotate `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` without a migration plan for all sealed federation peer keys.
+
 ## OID Assignments — Mosaic Internal OID Arc
 
 Mosaic uses the private enterprise arc `1.3.6.1.4.1.99999` for custom X.509

docs/federation/TASKS.md

@@ -63,21 +63,21 @@ Goal: Two federated-tier gateways stood up on Portainer at `mos-test-1.woltje.co
 
 Goal: An admin can create a federation grant; counterparty enrolls; cert is signed by Step-CA with SAN OIDs for `grantId` + `subjectUserId`. No runtime federation traffic flows yet (that's M3).
 
-| id        | status      | description                                                                                                                                                                                      | issue | agent  | branch                             | depends_on       | estimate | notes                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
-| --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----- | ------ | ---------------------------------- | ---------------- | -------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| FED-M2-01 | needs-qa    | DB migration: `federation_grants`, `federation_peers`, `federation_audit_log` tables + enum types (`grant_status`, `peer_state`). Drizzle schema + migration generation; migration tests.        | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-schema          | —                | 5K       | PR #486 open. First review NEEDS CHANGES (missing DESC indexes + reserved cols). Remediation subagent `a673dd9355dc26f82` in flight in worktree `agent-a4404ac1`.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
-| FED-M2-02 | not-started | Add Step-CA sidecar to `docker-compose.federated.yml`: official `smallstep/step-ca` image, persistent CA volume, JWK provisioner config baked into init script.                                  | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-stepca          | DEPLOY-02        | 4K       | Profile-gated under `federated`. CA password from secret; dev compose uses dev-only password file.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
-| FED-M2-03 | not-started | Scope JSON schema + validator: `resources` allowlist, `excluded_resources`, `include_teams`, `include_personal`, `max_rows_per_query`. Vitest unit tests for valid + invalid scopes.             | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-scope-schema    | —                | 4K       | Validator independent of CA — reusable from grant CRUD + (later) M3 scope enforcement.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
-| FED-M2-04 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/ca.service.ts`: Step-CA client (CSR submission, OID-bearing cert retrieval). Mocked + integration tests against real Step-CA container.                             | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-ca-service      | M2-02            | 6K       | SAN OIDs: `grantId` (custom OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1) + `subjectUserId` (1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2). Document OID assignments in PRD/SETUP. **Acceptance**: must (a) wire `federation.tpl` template into `mosaic-fed` provisioner config and (b) include a unit/integration test asserting issued certs contain BOTH OIDs — fails-loud guard against silent OID stripping (carry-forward from M2-02 review). |
-| FED-M2-05 | not-started | Sealed storage for `client_key_pem` reusing existing `provider_credentials` sealing key. Tests prove DB-at-rest is ciphertext, not PEM. Key rotation path documented (deferred impl).            | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-key-sealing     | M2-01            | 5K       | Separate from M2-06 to keep crypto seam isolated; reviewer focus is sealing only.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
-| FED-M2-06 | not-started | `grants.service.ts`: CRUD + status transitions (`pending` → `active` → `revoked`); integrates M2-03 (scope) + M2-05 (sealing). Unit tests cover all transitions including invalid ones.          | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-grants-service  | M2-03, M2-05     | 6K       | Business logic only — CSR + cert work delegated to M2-04. Revocation handler is M6.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
-| FED-M2-07 | not-started | `enrollment.controller.ts`: short-lived single-use token endpoint; CSR signing; updates grant `pending` → `active`; emits enrollment audit (table-only write, M4 tightens).                      | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-enrollment      | M2-04, M2-06     | 6K       | Tokens single-use with 410 on replay; tokens TTL'd at 15min; rate-limited at request layer (M4 introduces guard, M2 uses simple lock).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
-| FED-M2-08 | not-started | Admin CLI: `mosaic federation grant create/list/show` + `peer add/list`. Integration with grants.service (no API duplication). Help output + machine-readable JSON option.                       | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-cli             | M2-06, M2-07     | 7K       | `peer add <enrollment-url>` is the client-side flow; resolves enrollment URL → CSR → store sealed key + cert.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
-| FED-M2-09 | not-started | Integration tests covering MILESTONES.md M2 acceptance tests #1, #2, #3, #5, #7, #8 (single-gateway suite). Real Step-CA container; vitest profile gated by `FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1`.           | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-integration     | M2-08            | 8K       | Tests #4 (cert OID match) + #6 (two-gateway peer-add) handled separately by M2-10 (E2E).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
-| FED-M2-10 | not-started | E2E test against deployed mos-test-1 + mos-test-2 (or local two-gateway docker-compose if Portainer not ready): MILESTONES test #6 `peer add` yields `active` peer record with valid cert + key. | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-e2e             | M2-08, DEPLOY-04 | 6K       | Falls back to local docker-compose-two-gateways if remote test hosts not yet available. Documents both paths.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
-| FED-M2-11 | not-started | Independent security review (sonnet, not author of M2-04/05/06/07): focus on single-use token replay, sealing leak surfaces, OID match enforcement, scope schema bypass paths.                   | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-security-review | M2-10            | 8K       | Apply M1 two-round pattern. Reviewer should explicitly attempt enrollment-token replay, OID-spoofing CSR, and key leak in error messages.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
-| FED-M2-12 | not-started | Docs update: `docs/federation/SETUP.md` Step-CA section; new `docs/federation/ADMIN-CLI.md` with grant/peer commands; scope schema reference; OID registration note. Runbook still M7-deferred.  | #461  | haiku  | feat/federation-m2-docs            | M2-11            | 4K       | Adds CA bootstrap section to SETUP.md with `docker compose --profile federated up step-ca` example.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
-| FED-M2-13 | not-started | PR aggregate close, CI green, merge to main, close #461. Release tag `fed-v0.2.0-m2`. Mark deploy stream complete. Update mission manifest M2 row.                                               | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-close           | M2-12            | 3K       | Same close pattern as M1-12; queue-guard before merge; tea release-create with notes including deploy-stream PRs.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
+| id        | status | description                                                                                                                                                                                      | issue | agent  | branch                             | depends_on       | estimate | notes                                                                                                                                                        |
+| --------- | ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----- | ------ | ---------------------------------- | ---------------- | -------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| FED-M2-01 | done   | DB migration: `federation_grants`, `federation_peers`, `federation_audit_log` tables + enum types (`grant_status`, `peer_state`). Drizzle schema + migration generation; migration tests.        | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-schema          | —                | 5K       | Shipped in PR #486. DESC indexes + reserved cols added after first review; migration tests green.                                                            |
+| FED-M2-02 | done   | Add Step-CA sidecar to `docker-compose.federated.yml`: official `smallstep/step-ca` image, persistent CA volume, JWK provisioner config baked into init script.                                  | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-stepca          | DEPLOY-02        | 4K       | Shipped in PR #494. Profile-gated under `federated`; CA password from secret; dev compose uses dev-only password file.                                       |
+| FED-M2-03 | done   | Scope JSON schema + validator: `resources` allowlist, `excluded_resources`, `include_teams`, `include_personal`, `max_rows_per_query`. Vitest unit tests for valid + invalid scopes.             | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-scope-schema    | —                | 4K       | Shipped in PR #496 (bundled with grants service). Validator independent of CA; reusable from grant CRUD + M3 scope enforcement.                              |
+| FED-M2-04 | done   | `apps/gateway/src/federation/ca.service.ts`: Step-CA client (CSR submission, OID-bearing cert retrieval). Mocked + integration tests against real Step-CA container.                             | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-ca-service      | M2-02            | 6K       | Shipped in PR #494. SAN OIDs 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1 (grantId) + 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2 (subjectUserId); integration test asserts both OIDs present in issued cert. |
+| FED-M2-05 | done   | Sealed storage for `client_key_pem` reusing existing `provider_credentials` sealing key. Tests prove DB-at-rest is ciphertext, not PEM. Key rotation path documented (deferred impl).            | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-key-sealing     | M2-01            | 5K       | Shipped in PR #495. Crypto seam isolated; tests confirm ciphertext-at-rest; key rotation deferred to M6.                                                     |
+| FED-M2-06 | done   | `grants.service.ts`: CRUD + status transitions (`pending` → `active` → `revoked`); integrates M2-03 (scope) + M2-05 (sealing). Unit tests cover all transitions including invalid ones.          | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-grants-service  | M2-03, M2-05     | 6K       | Shipped in PR #496. All status transitions covered; invalid transition tests green; revocation handler deferred to M6.                                       |
+| FED-M2-07 | done   | `enrollment.controller.ts`: short-lived single-use token endpoint; CSR signing; updates grant `pending` → `active`; emits enrollment audit (table-only write, M4 tightens).                      | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-enrollment      | M2-04, M2-06     | 6K       | Shipped in PR #497. Tokens single-use with 410 on replay; TTL 15min; rate-limited at request layer.                                                          |
+| FED-M2-08 | done   | Admin CLI: `mosaic federation grant create/list/show` + `peer add/list`. Integration with grants.service (no API duplication). Help output + machine-readable JSON option.                       | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-cli             | M2-06, M2-07     | 7K       | Shipped in PR #498. `peer add <enrollment-url>` client-side flow; JSON output flag; admin REST controller co-shipped.                                        |
+| FED-M2-09 | done   | Integration tests covering MILESTONES.md M2 acceptance tests #1, #2, #3, #5, #7, #8 (single-gateway suite). Real Step-CA container; vitest profile gated by `FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1`.           | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-integration     | M2-08            | 8K       | Shipped in PR #499. All 6 acceptance tests green; gated by FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1.                                                                          |
+| FED-M2-10 | done   | E2E test against deployed mos-test-1 + mos-test-2 (or local two-gateway docker-compose if Portainer not ready): MILESTONES test #6 `peer add` yields `active` peer record with valid cert + key. | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-e2e             | M2-08, DEPLOY-04 | 6K       | Shipped in PR #500. Local two-gateway docker-compose path used; `peer add` yields active peer with valid cert + sealed key.                                  |
+| FED-M2-11 | done   | Independent security review (sonnet, not author of M2-04/05/06/07): focus on single-use token replay, sealing leak surfaces, OID match enforcement, scope schema bypass paths.                   | #461  | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-security-review | M2-10            | 8K       | Shipped in PR #501. Two-round review; enrollment-token replay, OID-spoofing CSR, and key leak in error messages all verified and hardened.                   |
+| FED-M2-12 | done   | Docs update: `docs/federation/SETUP.md` Step-CA section; new `docs/federation/ADMIN-CLI.md` with grant/peer commands; scope schema reference; OID registration note. Runbook still M7-deferred.  | #461  | haiku  | feat/federation-m2-docs            | M2-11            | 4K       | Shipped in PR #502. SETUP.md CA bootstrap section added; ADMIN-CLI.md created; scope schema reference and OID note included.                                 |
+| FED-M2-13 | done   | PR aggregate close, CI green, merge to main, close #461. Release tag `fed-v0.2.0-m2`. Mark deploy stream complete. Update mission manifest M2 row.                                               | #461  | sonnet | chore/federation-m2-close          | M2-12            | 3K       | Release tag `fed-v0.2.0-m2` created; issue #461 closed; all M2 PRs #494–#502 merged to main.                                                                 |
 
 **M2 code workstream estimate:** ~72K tokens (vs MILESTONES.md 30K — same over-budget pattern as M1, where per-task breakdown including tests/review/docs catches the real cost).
 
@@ -85,7 +85,38 @@ Goal: An admin can create a federation grant; counterparty enrolls; cert is sign
 
 ## Milestone 3 — mTLS handshake + list/get + scope enforcement (FED-M3)
 
-_Deferred. Issue #462._
+Goal: Two federated gateways exchange real data over mTLS. Inbound requests pass through cert validation → grant lookup → scope enforcement → native RBAC → response. `list`, `get`, and `capabilities` verbs land. The federation E2E harness (`tools/federation-harness/`) is the new permanent test bed for M3+ and is gated on every milestone going forward.
+
+> **Critical trust boundary.** Every 401/403 path needs a test. Code review is non-negotiable; M3-12 budgets two review rounds.
+>
+> **Tracking issue:** #462.
+
+| id        | status      | description                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | issue | agent  | branch                               | depends_on       | estimate | notes                                                                                                                                                    |
+| --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----- | ------ | ------------------------------------ | ---------------- | -------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| FED-M3-01 | not-started | `packages/types/src/federation/` — request/response DTOs for `list`, `get`, `capabilities` verbs. Wire-format zod schemas + inferred TS types. Includes `FederationRequest`, `FederationListResponse<T>`, `FederationGetResponse<T>`, `FederationCapabilitiesResponse`, error envelope, `_source` tag. | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-types             | —                | 4K       | Reusable from gateway server + client + harness. Pure types — no I/O, no NestJS.                                                                         |
+| FED-M3-02 | not-started | `tools/federation-harness/` scaffold: `docker-compose.two-gateways.yml` (Server A + Server B + step-CA), `seed.ts` (provisions grants, peers, sample tasks/notes/credentials per scope variant), `harness.ts` helper (boots stack, returns typed clients). README documents harness use.               | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-harness           | DEPLOY-04 (soft) | 8K       | Falls back to local docker-compose if `mos-test-1/-2` not yet redeployed (DEPLOY chain blocked on IMG-FIX). Permanent test infra used by M3+.            |
+| FED-M3-03 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/federation-auth.guard.ts` (NestJS guard). Validates inbound client cert from Fastify TLS context, extracts `grantId` + `subjectUserId` from custom OIDs, loads grant from DB, asserts `status='active'`, attaches `FederationContext` to request.                  | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-auth-guard        | M3-01            | 8K       | Reuses OID parsing logic mirrored from `ca.service.ts` post-issuance verification. 401 on malformed/missing OIDs; 403 on revoked/expired/missing grant.  |
+| FED-M3-04 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/scope.service.ts`. Pipeline: (1) resource allowlist + excluded check, (2) native RBAC eval as `subjectUserId`, (3) scope filter intersection (`include_teams`, `include_personal`), (4) `max_rows_per_query` cap. Pure service — DB calls injected.                | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-scope-service     | M3-01            | 10K      | Hardest correctness target in M3. Reuses `parseFederationScope` (M2-03). Returns either `{ allowed: true, filter }` or structured deny reason for audit. |
+| FED-M3-05 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/list.controller.ts`. Wires AuthGuard → ScopeService → tasks/notes/memory query layer; applies row cap; tags rows with `_source`. Resource selector via path param.                                                                                           | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-list         | M3-03, M3-04     | 6K       | Routes: `POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource`. No body persistence. Audit write deferred to M4.                                                       |
+| FED-M3-06 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/get.controller.ts`. Single-resource fetch by id; same pipeline as list. 404 on not-found, 403 on RBAC/scope deny — both audited the same way.                                                                                                                | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-get          | M3-03, M3-04     | 6K       | `POST /api/federation/v1/get/:resource/:id`. Mirrors list controller patterns.                                                                           |
+| FED-M3-07 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/capabilities.controller.ts`. Read-only enumeration: returns `{ resources, excluded_resources, max_rows_per_query, supported_verbs }` derived from grant scope. Always allowed for an active grant — no RBAC eval.                                            | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-capabilities | M3-03            | 4K       | `GET /api/federation/v1/capabilities`. Smallest verb; useful sanity check that mTLS + auth guard work end-to-end.                                        |
+| FED-M3-08 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/client/federation-client.service.ts`. Outbound mTLS dialer: picks `(certPem, sealed clientKey)` from `federation_peers`, unwraps key, builds undici Agent with mTLS, calls peer verb, parses typed response, wraps non-2xx into `FederationClientError`.                  | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-client            | M3-01            | 8K       | Independent of server stream — can land in parallel with M3-03/04. Cert/key cached per-peer; flushed by future M5/M6 logic.                              |
+| FED-M3-09 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/client/query-source.service.ts`. Accepts `source: "local" \| "federated:<host>" \| "all"` from gateway query layer; for `"all"` fans out to local + each peer in parallel; merges results; tags every row with `_source`.                                                 | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-query-source      | M3-08            | 8K       | Per-peer failure surfaces as `_partial: true` in response, not hard failure (sets up M5 offline UX). M5 adds caching + circuit breaker on top.           |
+| FED-M3-10 | not-started | Integration tests for MILESTONES.md M3 acceptance #6 (malformed OIDs → 401; valid cert + revoked grant → 403) and #7 (`max_rows_per_query` cap). Real PG, mocked TLS context (Fastify req shim).                                                                                                       | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-integration       | M3-05, M3-06     | 8K       | Vitest profile gated by `FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1`. Single-gateway suite; no harness required.                                                            |
+| FED-M3-11 | not-started | E2E tests for MILESTONES.md M3 acceptance #1, #2, #3, #4, #5, #8, #9, #10 (8 cases). Uses harness from M3-02; two real gateways, real Step-CA, real mTLS. Each test asserts both happy-path response and audit/no-persist invariants.                                                                  | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-e2e               | M3-02, M3-09     | 12K      | Largest single task. Each acceptance gets its own `it(...)` for clear failure attribution.                                                               |
+| FED-M3-12 | not-started | Independent security review (sonnet, not author of M3-03/04/05/06/07/08/09): focus on cert-SAN spoofing, OID extraction edge cases, scope-bypass via filter manipulation, RBAC-bypass via subjectUser swap, response leakage when scope deny.                                                          | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-security-review   | M3-11            | 10K      | Two review rounds budgeted. PRD requires explicit test for every 401/403 path — review verifies coverage.                                                |
+| FED-M3-13 | not-started | Docs update: `docs/federation/SETUP.md` mTLS handshake section, new `docs/federation/HARNESS.md` for federation-harness usage, OID reference table in SETUP.md, scope enforcement pipeline diagram. Runbook still M7-deferred.                                                                         | #462  | haiku  | feat/federation-m3-docs              | M3-12            | 5K       | One ASCII diagram for the auth-guard → scope → RBAC pipeline; helps future reviewers reason about denial paths.                                          |
+| FED-M3-14 | not-started | PR aggregate close, CI green, merge to main, close #462. Release tag `fed-v0.3.0-m3`. Update mission manifest M3 row → done; M4 row → in-progress when work begins.                                                                                                                                    | #462  | sonnet | chore/federation-m3-close            | M3-13            | 3K       | Same close pattern as M1-12 / M2-13.                                                                                                                     |
+
+**M3 estimate:** ~100K tokens (vs MILESTONES.md 40K — same per-task breakdown pattern as M1/M2: tests, review, and docs split out from implementation cost). Largest milestone in the federation mission.
+
+**Parallelization opportunities:**
+
+- M3-08 (client) can land in parallel with M3-03/M3-04 (server pipeline) — they only share DTOs from M3-01.
+- M3-02 (harness) can land in parallel with everything except M3-11.
+- M3-05/M3-06/M3-07 (verbs) are independent of each other once M3-03/M3-04 land.
+
+**Test bed fallback:** If `mos-test-1.woltje.com` / `mos-test-2.woltje.com` are still blocked on `FED-M2-DEPLOY-IMG-FIX` when M3-11 is ready to run, the harness's local `docker-compose.two-gateways.yml` is a sufficient stand-in. Production-host validation moves to M7 acceptance suite (PRD AC-12).
 
 ## Milestone 4 — search + audit + rate limit (FED-M4)
 

docs/scratchpads/git-wrapper-rollup-20260526.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# Git Wrapper Rollup — 2026-05-26
+
+## Objective
+
+Consolidate pending Mosaic wrapper fixes after `mosaic update` reported the local framework package was already current (`@mosaicstack/mosaic 0.0.30`) but the installed `~/.config/mosaic/tools` wrappers still lacked the open Gitea/Woodpecker wrapper patches.
+
+## Scope
+
+Roll up the open wrapper-related Gitea PR branches into one integration branch:
+
+- PR #513: `pr-ci-wait.sh` stdin collision fix.
+- PR #518: Gitea PR metadata/merge preflight hardening.
+- PR #521: Gitea merge fallback + unsafe PR-number rejection.
+- PR #522: Woodpecker credential/pagination fixes and CI Postgres service collision fix.
+- PR #523: explicit Gitea repo/login args and `eval` removal for PR/issue creation.
+
+## Conflict resolutions
+
+- Kept array-based command construction where possible instead of reintroducing `eval`.
+- Kept explicit `--repo OWNER/REPO --login mosaicstack` Gitea arguments for `tea` calls.
+- Combined PR merge API fallback behavior from metadata hardening and empty-identity fallback branches.
+- Preserved numeric PR-number validation for `pr-merge.sh`.
+
+## Verification checklist
+
+- `bash -n` on changed shell scripts.
+- Wrapper smoke checks from a clean worktree.
+- Gitea PR verification after push.
+- CI status checked through Gitea/Woodpecker.
+
+## Notes
+
+`mosaic update` did not install these fixes because the package registry still reports `@mosaicstack/mosaic 0.0.30` as current. The source patches must merge/release before normal framework update will carry them.

docs/scratchpads/mvp-20260312.md

@@ -612,3 +612,44 @@ Independent security review surfaced three high-impact and four medium findings;
 7. DEPLOY-03/04 acceptance probes (`mosaic gateway doctor --json`, pgvector `vector(3)` round-trip)
 8. DEPLOY-05: author `docs/federation/TEST-INFRA.md`
 9. M2-02 (Step-CA sidecar) kicks off after image health is green
+
+### Session 23 — 2026-04-21 — M2 close + M3 decomposition
+
+**Closed at compaction boundary:** all 13 M2 tasks done, PRs #494–#503 merged to `main`, tag `fed-v0.2.0-m2` published, Gitea release notes posted, issue #461 closed. Main at `4ece6dc6`.
+
+**M2 hardening landed in PR #501** (security review remediation):
+
+- CRIT-1: post-issuance OID verification in `ca.service.ts` (rejects cert if `mosaic_grant_id` / `mosaic_subject_user_id` extensions missing or mismatched)
+- CRIT-2: atomic activation guard `WHERE status='pending'` on grant + `WHERE state='pending'` on peer; throws `ConflictException` if lost race
+- HIGH-2: removed try/catch fallback in `extractCertNotAfter` — parse failures propagate as 500 (no silent 90-day default)
+- HIGH-4: token slice for logging (`${token.slice(0, 8)}...`) — no full token in stdout
+- HIGH-5: `redeem()` wrapped in try/catch with best-effort failure audit; uses `null` (not `'unknown'`) for nullable UUID FK fallback
+- MED-3: `createToken` validates `grant.peerId === dto.peerId`; `BadRequestException` on mismatch
+
+**Remaining M2 security findings deferred to M3+:**
+
+- HIGH-1: peerId/subjectUserId tenancy validation on `createGrant` (M3 ScopeService work surfaces this)
+- HIGH-3: Step-CA cert SHA-256 fingerprint pinning (M5 cert handling)
+- MED-1: token entropy already 32 bytes — wontfix
+- MED-2: per-route rate limit on enrollment endpoint (M4 rate limit work)
+- MED-4: CSR CN binding to peer's commonName (M3 AuthGuard work)
+
+**M3 decomposition landed in this session:**
+
+- 14 tasks (M3-01..M3-14), ~100K estimate
+- Structure mirrors M1/M2 pattern: foundation → server stream + client stream + harness in parallel → integration → E2E → security review → docs → close
+- M3-02 ships local two-gateway docker-compose (`tools/federation-harness/`) so M3-11 E2E is not blocked on the Portainer test bed (which is still blocked on `FED-M2-DEPLOY-IMG-FIX`)
+
+**Subagent doctrine retained from M2:**
+
+- All worker subagents use `isolation: "worktree"` to prevent branch-race incidents
+- Code review is independent (different subagent, no overlap with author of work)
+- `tea pr create --repo mosaicstack/stack --login mosaicstack` is the working PR-create path; `pr-create.sh` has shell-quoting bugs (followup #45 if not already filed)
+- Cost tier: foundational implementation = sonnet, docs = haiku, complex multi-file architecture (security review, scope service) = sonnet with two review rounds
+
+**Next concrete step:**
+
+1. PR for the M3 planning artifact (this commit) — branch `docs/federation-m3-planning`
+2. After merge, kickoff M3-01 (DTOs) on `feat/federation-m3-types` with sonnet subagent in worktree
+3. Once M3-01 lands, fan out: M3-02 (harness) || M3-03 (AuthGuard) → M3-04 (ScopeService) || M3-08 (FederationClient)
+4. Re-converge at M3-10 (Integration) → M3-11 (E2E)

docs/scratchpads/t-a292e96f-gitea-pr-metadata.md

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# t_a292e96f — Gitea PR metadata wrapper fix
+
+## Objective
+
+Repair Mosaic git wrappers so Gitea PR metadata and merge preflight work for U-Connect PRs on `git.uscllc.com` without selecting the unrelated `git.mosaicstack.dev` tea login.
+
+## Findings
+
+- Reproduced the failure from `/src/uconnect-worktrees/t_39ce717c-authentik-smoke-gate` with the current `pr-metadata.sh`:
+  - PR #1905 returned JSON with `number=null`, `baseRefName=""`, `headRefName=""`.
+  - PR #1908 returned JSON with `number=null`, `baseRefName=""`, `headRefName=""`.
+- Root cause: the wrapper treated HTTP/API error payloads as PR payloads and normalized missing fields to empty strings.
+- The credential loader can return a non-working `git.uscllc.com` API token in this environment, while host-specific `~/.git-credentials` basic auth succeeds. The wrapper now falls back by host before normalization.
+- `tea login list` has only `git.mosaicstack.dev` configured here; `pr-merge.sh` previously forced `--login mosaicstack`, which is invalid for `git.uscllc.com` and caused `Login name mosaicstack does not exist`.
+
+## Changes
+
+- `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/detect-platform.sh`
+  - Added `get_gitea_basic_auth <host>` to retrieve host-specific HTTPS credentials from `~/.git-credentials` without printing secrets.
+- `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-metadata.sh`
+  - Uses strict bash mode.
+  - Checks Gitea HTTP status and fails nonzero on API errors/non-JSON instead of emitting empty branch fields.
+  - Falls back from token auth to host-specific basic auth.
+  - Normalizes standard `head.ref`/`base.ref` and fallback branch fields.
+  - Requires non-empty `headRefName` and `baseRefName`.
+  - Preserves GitHub `gh pr view` behavior.
+- `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-merge.sh`
+  - Reads metadata once for base-branch policy preflight.
+  - Selects a `tea` login only when its configured URL matches the repo host.
+  - Falls back to authenticated Gitea merge API when no matching `tea` login exists, avoiding the wrong `mosaicstack` login for USC repos.
+  - Keeps squash-only and main-only merge policy.
+- `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-metadata-gitea.sh`
+  - Added fixture-based regression harness for standard Gitea fields, fallback branch fields, `refs/pull/<n>/head` plus `head.label` normalization, and API error payloads.
+
+## Documentation / changelog note
+
+This repository currently has no root `CHANGELOG.md`; the scratchpad and `docs/TASKS.md` carry the task-level change record for this wrapper fix.
+
+## Verification log
+
+- Red regression check: copied the new `test-pr-metadata-gitea.sh` harness next to `origin/main` wrapper scripts and ran it with `MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR=$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/pr-metadata-gitea-red`; it failed as expected with `headRefName=''` and `baseRefName=''` on the fixture API-error path.
+- `bash -n packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/{detect-platform.sh,pr-metadata.sh,pr-merge.sh,test-pr-metadata-gitea.sh}`: passed.
+- `shellcheck -x -P . -e SC1090 packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/{detect-platform.sh,pr-metadata.sh,pr-merge.sh,test-pr-metadata-gitea.sh}`: passed.
+- `MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR=$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/pr-metadata-gitea packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-metadata-gitea.sh`: passed; verifies standard Gitea fields, fallback branch fields, `refs/pull/<n>/head` label normalization, and nonzero API-error handling.
+- Installed wrapper parity: `/home/hermes/.config/mosaic/tools/git/{detect-platform.sh,pr-metadata.sh,pr-merge.sh}` byte-match the PR source copies after validation, so active U-Connect wrapper invocations use the same fix while source PR review runs.
+- Live sanitized U-Connect metadata from `/src/uconnect` with `MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE=/src/jarvis-brain/credentials.json`:
+  - PR #1905: `number=1905`, `baseRefName=main`, `headRefName=edith/t_39ce717c-authentik-smoke-gate`, `state=open`, `host=git.uscllc.com`.
+  - PR #1908: `number=1908`, `baseRefName=main`, `headRefName=fix/t_23fa9e1d-portal-health-backend`, `state=closed`, `host=git.uscllc.com`.
+- Merge preflight dry runs from installed wrappers:
+  - PR #1905: `Dry run: would merge PR #1905 on git.uscllc.com with authenticated Gitea API fallback (base=main, method=squash).`
+  - PR #1908: `Dry run: would merge PR #1908 on git.uscllc.com with authenticated Gitea API fallback (base=main, method=squash).`
+- PR: `https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/518`, branch `fix/t-a292e96f-gitea-pr-metadata`.
+- CI: Recent PR/push pipelines failed before clone/test execution due Woodpecker/Kubernetes PVC API timeout: `dial tcp 10.43.0.1:443: i/o timeout`. No repository test step executed in CI; local targeted verification above remains clean.

docs/scratchpads/t_301e4e3b-pr-merge-gitea-empty-uid.md

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Scratchpad: t_301e4e3b pr-merge.sh Gitea empty-uid fallback
+
+## Task
+
+Implement a narrow hardening in `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-merge.sh` so Gitea merges recover from the known non-interactive `tea pr merge` identity failure: `user does not exist [uid: 0, name: ]`.
+
+## Constraints
+
+- Preserve Mosaic policy gates: squash-only, base branch `main`, queue guard unless explicitly skipped.
+- Preserve the existing authenticated Gitea API fallback when no tea login exists.
+- Do not fallback on arbitrary tea failures.
+- Do not expose tokens or credential-bearing remotes.
+- Scope is limited to the merge wrapper plus focused test/support/scratchpad files.
+
+## External issue
+
+- Gitea issue #520: Harden pr-merge.sh Gitea empty-uid fallback
+
+## Plan
+
+1. Add a focused shell regression harness with mocked `tea` and `curl` proving the known empty uid/name failure must fall back to Gitea API.
+2. Watch the harness fail on current code.
+3. Implement helper functions in `pr-merge.sh` for redacted command display, known failure classification, and authenticated Gitea API merge fallback.
+4. Keep unknown `tea` failures blocking by replaying stderr and exiting non-zero.
+5. Run syntax, shellcheck if available, focused regression, and repo quality gates before push/PR.
+
+## Session log
+
+- 2026-05-22: Read Kanban context, Mosaic global/repo instructions, created isolated branch `fix/t_301e4e3b-pr-merge-gitea-empty-uid`, and opened Gitea issue #520 using the Mosaic issue wrapper/API fallback.
+- 2026-05-22: Added regression harness and watched it fail on current behavior with `user does not exist [uid: 0, name: ]`; implemented narrow fallback and verified known-empty-identity fallback, arbitrary tea failure blocking, and no-tea-login API fallback paths.
+- 2026-05-22: Validation passed for `bash -n`, `shellcheck -x`, focused shell harness, `pnpm typecheck`, `pnpm lint`, `pnpm format:check`, and `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test`. Full `pnpm test` exposed an out-of-scope gateway DB setup failure (`relation "messages" does not exist`) in `apps/gateway/src/__tests__/cross-user-isolation.test.ts`.

docs/scratchpads/t_5aab9cc8-pr-merge-eval-injection.md

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+# t_5aab9cc8 — pr-merge.sh eval injection remediation
+
+## Objective
+
+Remediate PR #521 review blocker: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-merge.sh` must reject non-numeric PR numbers before metadata lookup/merge and must not use `eval` for GitHub merge execution.
+
+## Scope
+
+- Shell wrapper only: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-merge.sh`
+- Focused regression harness: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-merge-gitea-empty-uid.sh`
+- No API/frontend/infra surfaces.
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+- AC1: `PR_NUMBER` is validated as digits-only immediately after required-argument parsing, before metadata lookup.
+- AC2: GitHub merge path uses a quoted argv array, not command-string construction plus `eval`.
+- AC3: Focused tests prove PR-number metacharacters are rejected and cannot execute injected shell commands on GitHub path.
+- AC4: Focused tests prove PR-number metacharacters are rejected on Gitea path before tea/curl merge calls.
+- AC5: Existing Gitea empty-uid fallback behavior remains green.
+- AC6: Syntax, shellcheck where available, focused harness, and relevant repo gates are rerun or absence documented.
+
+## Plan
+
+1. Add failing regression tests for GitHub eval injection and Gitea invalid PR rejection.
+2. Implement fail-closed PR number validation before metadata lookup.
+3. Replace GitHub `eval` command with argv array execution.
+4. Run required validation and update this scratchpad with evidence.
+5. Commit, queue-guard, push branch, update PR #521.
+
+## TDD Log
+
+- RED: `AGENT_WORK_ROOT="$HERMES_KANBAN_WORKSPACE/work" bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-merge-gitea-empty-uid.sh` failed on vulnerable code with `Expected GitHub metacharacter PR number to be rejected` and showed the injected PR number reached the GitHub merge path.
+- GREEN: Added digits-only validation before metadata lookup and replaced GitHub `eval` with an argv array. The focused harness now passes and verifies invalid PR numbers are rejected before GitHub `gh` calls and before Gitea `tea`/`curl` calls.
+
+## Validation Evidence
+
+- PASS: `AGENT_WORK_ROOT="$HERMES_KANBAN_WORKSPACE/work" bash -n packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-merge.sh packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-merge-gitea-empty-uid.sh`
+- PASS: `shellcheck -x packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-merge.sh packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-merge-gitea-empty-uid.sh`
+- PASS: `AGENT_WORK_ROOT="$HERMES_KANBAN_WORKSPACE/work" bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-merge-gitea-empty-uid.sh`
+- PASS: `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic... build`
+- PASS: `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic lint`
+- PASS: `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic typecheck`
+- PASS: `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test` — 32 files / 291 tests passed.
+- REVIEW: `/home/hermes/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-code-review.sh --uncommitted` could not run due Codex 401 Unauthorized. Independent delegate review completed read-only with PASS / no blockers; non-blocking suggestion to assert GitHub mock log remains empty was applied.
+
+## Risks / Blockers
+
+- No active blockers.

eslint.config.mjs

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ export default tseslint.config(
             'apps/gateway/vitest.config.ts',
             'packages/storage/vitest.config.ts',
             'packages/mosaic/__tests__/*.ts',
+            'tools/federation-harness/*.ts',
           ],
         },
       },

infra/step-ca/templates/federation.tpl

@@ -39,12 +39,12 @@
     {
       "id": "1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1",
       "critical": false,
-      "value": "{{ printf "\x0c\x24%s" .Token.mosaic_grant_id | b64enc }}"
+      "value": "{{ printf "\x0c%c%s" (len .Token.mosaic_grant_id) .Token.mosaic_grant_id | b64enc }}"
     },
     {
       "id": "1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2",
       "critical": false,
-      "value": "{{ printf "\x0c\x24%s" .Token.mosaic_subject_user_id | b64enc }}"
+      "value": "{{ printf "\x0c%c%s" (len .Token.mosaic_subject_user_id) .Token.mosaic_subject_user_id | b64enc }}"
     }
   ],
 

packages/appservice/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{
+  "name": "@mosaicstack/appservice",
+  "version": "0.0.1",
+  "type": "module",
+  "repository": {
+    "type": "git",
+    "url": "https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git",
+    "directory": "packages/appservice"
+  },
+  "main": "dist/index.js",
+  "types": "dist/index.d.ts",
+  "exports": {
+    ".": {
+      "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
+      "default": "./dist/index.js"
+    }
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "build": "tsc",
+    "lint": "eslint src",
+    "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
+    "test": "vitest run --passWithNoTests"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "@types/node": "^22.0.0",
+    "typescript": "^5.8.0",
+    "vitest": "^2.0.0"
+  },
+  "publishConfig": {
+    "registry": "https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/",
+    "access": "public"
+  },
+  "files": [
+    "dist"
+  ]
+}

packages/appservice/src/__tests__/appservice.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
+
+import { validateBridgeMessage, validateBridgeTyping } from '../bridge.dto.js';
+import { AppserviceIntent, MatrixApiError } from '../intent.js';
+import { buildRegistration, registrationToYaml } from '../registration.js';
+import { TransactionHandler } from '../transactions.js';
+import type { AppserviceConfig, MatrixEvent } from '../types.js';
+
+const cfg: AppserviceConfig = {
+  homeserverUrl: 'https://hs.example',
+  domain: 'hs.example',
+  asToken: 'as-secret',
+  hsToken: 'hs-secret',
+};
+
+const jsonResponse = (status: number, body: unknown): Response =>
+  new Response(JSON.stringify(body), { status, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } });
+
+describe('TransactionHandler', () => {
+  const makeHandler = (onEvent = vi.fn()) => ({
+    onEvent,
+    handler: new TransactionHandler({ hsToken: 'hs-secret', onEvent }),
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a bad hs_token with M_FORBIDDEN', async () => {
+    const { handler, onEvent } = makeHandler();
+    const res = await handler.handle(
+      't1',
+      { events: [{ type: 'm.room.message' }] },
+      { authorizationHeader: 'Bearer wrong' },
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(res.body.errcode).toBe('M_FORBIDDEN');
+    expect(onEvent).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('accepts Bearer auth and legacy access_token param', async () => {
+    const { handler } = makeHandler();
+    expect(
+      (await handler.handle('t1', { events: [] }, { authorizationHeader: 'Bearer hs-secret' }))
+        .status,
+    ).toBe(200);
+    expect(
+      (await handler.handle('t2', { events: [] }, { accessTokenParam: 'hs-secret' })).status,
+    ).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  it('processes events once per txnId (idempotent retries)', async () => {
+    const { handler, onEvent } = makeHandler();
+    const body = { events: [{ type: 'm.room.message', event_id: '$e1' }] };
+    await handler.handle('t1', body, { authorizationHeader: 'Bearer hs-secret' });
+    const retry = await handler.handle('t1', body, { authorizationHeader: 'Bearer hs-secret' });
+    expect(retry.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(onEvent).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it('a throwing event handler does not fail the transaction', async () => {
+    const onError = vi.fn();
+    const handler = new TransactionHandler({
+      hsToken: 'hs-secret',
+      onEvent: () => {
+        throw new Error('boom');
+      },
+      onError,
+    });
+    const res = await handler.handle(
+      't1',
+      { events: [{ type: 'x' }, { type: 'y' }] },
+      { authorizationHeader: 'Bearer hs-secret' },
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(onError).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('AppserviceIntent', () => {
+  it('derives namespaced user ids and rejects bad slugs', () => {
+    const intent = new AppserviceIntent(cfg);
+    expect(intent.agentUserId('pi0-web1')).toBe('@agent-pi0-web1:hs.example');
+    expect(intent.agentUserId('Pi0-Web1')).toBe('@agent-pi0-web1:hs.example');
+    expect(() => intent.agentUserId('../evil')).toThrow();
+    expect(() => intent.agentUserId('')).toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it('uses uuid transaction ids', async () => {
+    const calls: string[] = [];
+    const fetchMock = vi.fn(async (input: URL | string) => {
+      calls.push(new URL(String(input)).pathname);
+      return jsonResponse(200, {});
+    });
+    const intent = new AppserviceIntent(cfg, fetchMock as unknown as typeof fetch);
+    await intent.sendAsAgent({ roomId: '!r:hs.example', agent: 'pi0', body: 'x' });
+    const send = calls.find((p) => p.includes('/send/m.room.message/'));
+    expect(send).toMatch(/mosaic-as-[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/);
+  });
+
+  it('registers once, impersonates via user_id, threads replies', async () => {
+    const calls: Array<{ url: URL; init: RequestInit }> = [];
+    const fetchMock = vi.fn(async (input: URL | string, init?: RequestInit) => {
+      calls.push({ url: new URL(String(input)), init: init ?? {} });
+      return jsonResponse(200, { event_id: '$sent' });
+    });
+    const intent = new AppserviceIntent(cfg, fetchMock as unknown as typeof fetch);
+
+    const eventId = await intent.sendAsAgent({
+      roomId: '!room:hs.example',
+      agent: 'pi0-web1',
+      body: 'hello',
+      threadRoot: '$req',
+    });
+    await intent.sendAsAgent({ roomId: '!room:hs.example', agent: 'pi0-web1', body: 'again' });
+
+    expect(eventId).toBe('$sent');
+    const paths = calls.map((c) => c.url.pathname);
+    expect(paths.filter((p) => p.endsWith('/register'))).toHaveLength(1); // cached
+    expect(paths.filter((p) => p.includes('/join'))).toHaveLength(1); // cached
+
+    const send = calls.find((c) => c.url.pathname.includes('/send/m.room.message/'));
+    expect(send).toBeDefined();
+    expect(send!.url.searchParams.get('user_id')).toBe('@agent-pi0-web1:hs.example');
+    const content = JSON.parse(String(send!.init.body)) as Record<string, unknown>;
+    const rel = content['m.relates_to'] as Record<string, unknown>;
+    expect(rel.rel_type).toBe('m.thread');
+    expect(rel.event_id).toBe('$req');
+    expect(rel.is_falling_back).toBe(true);
+    expect(
+      calls.every(
+        (c) => (c.init.headers as Record<string, string>).Authorization === 'Bearer as-secret',
+      ),
+    ).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('tolerates M_USER_IN_USE and surfaces other register errors', async () => {
+    const inUse = vi.fn(async () =>
+      jsonResponse(400, { errcode: 'M_USER_IN_USE', error: 'taken' }),
+    );
+    const intent = new AppserviceIntent(cfg, inUse as unknown as typeof fetch);
+    await expect(intent.ensureRegistered('pi0-web1')).resolves.toBe('@agent-pi0-web1:hs.example');
+
+    const denied = vi.fn(async () =>
+      jsonResponse(401, { errcode: 'M_UNKNOWN_TOKEN', error: 'nope' }),
+    );
+    const intent2 = new AppserviceIntent(cfg, denied as unknown as typeof fetch);
+    await expect(intent2.ensureRegistered('pi0-web1')).rejects.toThrow(MatrixApiError);
+  });
+
+  it('invites then joins on M_FORBIDDEN join', async () => {
+    const paths: string[] = [];
+    const fetchMock = vi.fn(async (input: URL | string) => {
+      const url = new URL(String(input));
+      paths.push(url.pathname);
+      if (url.pathname.endsWith('/join') && paths.filter((p) => p.endsWith('/join')).length === 1) {
+        return jsonResponse(403, { errcode: 'M_FORBIDDEN', error: 'not invited' });
+      }
+      return jsonResponse(200, {});
+    });
+    const intent = new AppserviceIntent(cfg, fetchMock as unknown as typeof fetch);
+    await intent.ensureJoined('!room:hs.example', 'pi0-web1');
+    expect(paths.filter((p) => p.endsWith('/invite'))).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(paths.filter((p) => p.endsWith('/join'))).toHaveLength(2);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('registration', () => {
+  it('builds an exclusive escaped user namespace', () => {
+    const reg = buildRegistration(cfg, { url: 'http://mosaic-as:8008' });
+    expect(reg.namespaces.users[0]).toEqual({
+      regex: '@agent-.*:hs\\.example',
+      exclusive: true,
+    });
+    expect(reg.rate_limited).toBe(false);
+    const yaml = registrationToYaml(reg);
+    expect(yaml).toContain("sender_localpart: 'mosaic-as'");
+    expect(yaml).toContain("as_token: 'as-secret'");
+    expect(yaml).toContain('exclusive: true');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('registration hardening', () => {
+  it('rejects control characters in registration values', () => {
+    const reg = buildRegistration(
+      { ...cfg, asToken: 'abc\nhttp_injected: true' },
+      { url: 'http://mosaic-as:8008' },
+    );
+    expect(() => registrationToYaml(reg)).toThrow(/control characters/);
+  });
+
+  it('escapes single quotes in token values', () => {
+    const reg = buildRegistration({ ...cfg, asToken: "it's" }, { url: 'http://mosaic-as:8008' });
+    expect(registrationToYaml(reg)).toContain("as_token: 'it''s'");
+  });
+});
+
+describe('bridge DTOs', () => {
+  it('validates message and typing payloads', () => {
+    expect(() =>
+      validateBridgeMessage({ room_id: '!r:hs', agent: 'pi0', body: 'x' }),
+    ).not.toThrow();
+    expect(() => validateBridgeMessage({ room_id: 'bad', agent: 'pi0', body: 'x' })).toThrow();
+    expect(() => validateBridgeMessage({ room_id: '!r:hs', agent: '', body: 'x' })).toThrow();
+    expect(() => validateBridgeMessage({ room_id: '!r:hs', agent: '../evil', body: 'x' })).toThrow(
+      /agent must match/,
+    );
+    expect(() =>
+      validateBridgeTyping({ room_id: '!r:hs', agent: 'pi0', typing: true }),
+    ).not.toThrow();
+    expect(() => validateBridgeTyping({ room_id: '!r:hs', agent: 'pi0', typing: 'yes' })).toThrow();
+  });
+});
+
+describe('event shape', () => {
+  it('transaction events flow through to the handler', async () => {
+    const seen: MatrixEvent[] = [];
+    const handler = new TransactionHandler({
+      hsToken: 'hs-secret',
+      onEvent: (e) => void seen.push(e),
+    });
+    await handler.handle(
+      't1',
+      {
+        events: [
+          { type: 'm.room.message', room_id: '!r:hs', sender: '@u:hs', content: { body: 'hi' } },
+        ],
+      },
+      { authorizationHeader: 'Bearer hs-secret' },
+    );
+    expect(seen).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(seen[0]!.content?.body).toBe('hi');
+  });
+});

packages/appservice/src/bridge.dto.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/** DTOs for the internal bridge API consumed by agent-comms host daemons. */
+
+export interface BridgeMessageDto {
+  room_id: string;
+  /** Agent slug (localpart suffix), e.g. "pi0-web1". */
+  agent: string;
+  body: string;
+  thread_root?: string;
+  msgtype?: string;
+  /** Optional protocol payload merged into content (e.g. org.uscllc.agent). */
+  extra_content?: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+
+export interface BridgeTypingDto {
+  room_id: string;
+  agent: string;
+  typing: boolean;
+}
+
+const AGENT_SLUG_RE = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_.-]*$/;
+
+const assertAgentSlug = (agent: unknown): void => {
+  if (typeof agent !== 'string' || !AGENT_SLUG_RE.test(agent.toLowerCase())) {
+    throw new Error('agent must match [a-z0-9][a-z0-9_.-]*');
+  }
+};
+
+export function validateBridgeMessage(input: unknown): asserts input is BridgeMessageDto {
+  const o = input as Partial<BridgeMessageDto> | null | undefined;
+  if (!o || typeof o !== 'object') throw new Error('payload must be an object');
+  if (typeof o.room_id !== 'string' || !o.room_id.startsWith('!'))
+    throw new Error('room_id must be a Matrix room id');
+  assertAgentSlug(o.agent);
+  if (typeof o.body !== 'string') throw new Error('body must be a string');
+  if (o.thread_root !== undefined && typeof o.thread_root !== 'string')
+    throw new Error('thread_root must be a string');
+  if (
+    o.extra_content !== undefined &&
+    (typeof o.extra_content !== 'object' || o.extra_content === null)
+  ) {
+    throw new Error('extra_content must be an object');
+  }
+}
+
+export function validateBridgeTyping(input: unknown): asserts input is BridgeTypingDto {
+  const o = input as Partial<BridgeTypingDto> | null | undefined;
+  if (!o || typeof o !== 'object') throw new Error('payload must be an object');
+  if (typeof o.room_id !== 'string' || !o.room_id.startsWith('!'))
+    throw new Error('room_id must be a Matrix room id');
+  assertAgentSlug(o.agent);
+  if (typeof o.typing !== 'boolean') throw new Error('typing must be a boolean');
+}

packages/appservice/src/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+export { AppserviceIntent, MatrixApiError } from './intent.js';
+export type { SendMessageOptions } from './intent.js';
+export { TransactionHandler } from './transactions.js';
+export type { TransactionHandlerOptions } from './transactions.js';
+export { buildRegistration, registrationToYaml } from './registration.js';
+export type { RegistrationOptions } from './registration.js';
+export { validateBridgeMessage, validateBridgeTyping } from './bridge.dto.js';
+export type { BridgeMessageDto, BridgeTypingDto } from './bridge.dto.js';
+export type {
+  AppserviceConfig,
+  EventHandler,
+  HandlerResult,
+  MatrixEvent,
+  Transaction,
+} from './types.js';

packages/appservice/src/intent.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+import crypto from 'node:crypto';
+
+import type { AppserviceConfig } from './types.js';
+
+export interface SendMessageOptions {
+  roomId: string;
+  /** Agent slug, e.g. "pi0-web1" -> @agent-pi0-web1:domain */
+  agent: string;
+  body: string;
+  /** Request event id to thread off (m.thread, spec v1.4). */
+  threadRoot?: string;
+  msgtype?: string;
+  /** Extra content keys merged into the message content (e.g. org.uscllc.agent). */
+  extraContent?: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+
+export class MatrixApiError extends Error {
+  constructor(
+    readonly status: number,
+    readonly errcode: string | undefined,
+    message: string,
+  ) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = 'MatrixApiError';
+  }
+}
+
+type FetchLike = typeof fetch;
+
+/**
+ * Acts on the homeserver as appservice-namespaced virtual users
+ * (Application Service API: as_token auth + user_id impersonation).
+ */
+export class AppserviceIntent {
+  private readonly registered = new Set<string>();
+  private readonly joined = new Set<string>();
+  private readonly fetchImpl: FetchLike;
+
+  constructor(
+    private readonly cfg: AppserviceConfig,
+    fetchImpl?: FetchLike,
+  ) {
+    this.fetchImpl = fetchImpl ?? fetch;
+  }
+
+  get userPrefix(): string {
+    return this.cfg.userPrefix ?? 'agent-';
+  }
+
+  get senderUserId(): string {
+    return `@${this.cfg.senderLocalpart ?? 'mosaic-as'}:${this.cfg.domain}`;
+  }
+
+  agentLocalpart(agent: string): string {
+    const slug = agent.toLowerCase();
+    if (!/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_.-]*$/.test(slug)) {
+      throw new Error(`invalid agent slug: ${agent}`);
+    }
+    return `${this.userPrefix}${slug}`;
+  }
+
+  agentUserId(agent: string): string {
+    return `@${this.agentLocalpart(agent)}:${this.cfg.domain}`;
+  }
+
+  private async request(
+    method: string,
+    path: string,
+    options: { userId?: string; body?: unknown } = {},
+  ): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
+    const url = new URL(this.cfg.homeserverUrl.replace(/\/$/, '') + path);
+    if (options.userId) {
+      url.searchParams.set('user_id', options.userId);
+    }
+    const res = await this.fetchImpl(url, {
+      method,
+      headers: {
+        Authorization: `Bearer ${this.cfg.asToken}`,
+        'Content-Type': 'application/json',
+      },
+      body: options.body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(options.body),
+    });
+    const text = await res.text();
+    const data = (text ? JSON.parse(text) : {}) as Record<string, unknown>;
+    if (!res.ok) {
+      throw new MatrixApiError(
+        res.status,
+        typeof data.errcode === 'string' ? data.errcode : undefined,
+        `${method} ${path} -> ${res.status}: ${text.slice(0, 300)}`,
+      );
+    }
+    return data;
+  }
+
+  /** Register the virtual user if it does not exist yet. Idempotent. */
+  async ensureRegistered(agent: string): Promise<string> {
+    const localpart = this.agentLocalpart(agent);
+    const userId = this.agentUserId(agent);
+    if (this.registered.has(userId)) return userId;
+    try {
+      await this.request('POST', '/_matrix/client/v3/register', {
+        body: { type: 'm.login.application_service', username: localpart },
+      });
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (!(err instanceof MatrixApiError && err.errcode === 'M_USER_IN_USE')) {
+        throw err;
+      }
+    }
+    this.registered.add(userId);
+    return userId;
+  }
+
+  /** Join the agent to a room; on invite-only rooms the AS sender invites first. */
+  async ensureJoined(roomId: string, agent: string): Promise<void> {
+    const userId = await this.ensureRegistered(agent);
+    const key = `${userId} ${roomId}`;
+    if (this.joined.has(key)) return;
+    const room = encodeURIComponent(roomId);
+    try {
+      await this.request('POST', `/_matrix/client/v3/rooms/${room}/join`, { userId, body: {} });
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (!(err instanceof MatrixApiError && err.errcode === 'M_FORBIDDEN')) throw err;
+      await this.request('POST', `/_matrix/client/v3/rooms/${room}/invite`, {
+        userId: this.senderUserId,
+        body: { user_id: userId },
+      });
+      await this.request('POST', `/_matrix/client/v3/rooms/${room}/join`, { userId, body: {} });
+    }
+    this.joined.add(key);
+  }
+
+  /** Send a message AS the agent's virtual user. */
+  async sendAsAgent(options: SendMessageOptions): Promise<string | undefined> {
+    const userId = this.agentUserId(options.agent);
+    await this.ensureJoined(options.roomId, options.agent);
+    const content: Record<string, unknown> = {
+      msgtype: options.msgtype ?? 'm.text',
+      body: options.body,
+      ...options.extraContent,
+    };
+    if (options.threadRoot) {
+      content['m.relates_to'] = {
+        rel_type: 'm.thread',
+        event_id: options.threadRoot,
+        is_falling_back: true,
+        'm.in_reply_to': { event_id: options.threadRoot },
+      };
+    }
+    const txn = `mosaic-as-${crypto.randomUUID()}`;
+    const room = encodeURIComponent(options.roomId);
+    const res = await this.request(
+      'PUT',
+      `/_matrix/client/v3/rooms/${room}/send/m.room.message/${txn}`,
+      { userId, body: content },
+    );
+    return typeof res.event_id === 'string' ? res.event_id : undefined;
+  }
+
+  /** Set the agent's typing indicator in a room. */
+  async setTyping(
+    roomId: string,
+    agent: string,
+    typing: boolean,
+    timeoutMs = 30000,
+  ): Promise<void> {
+    const userId = await this.ensureRegistered(agent);
+    const room = encodeURIComponent(roomId);
+    const user = encodeURIComponent(userId);
+    await this.request('PUT', `/_matrix/client/v3/rooms/${room}/typing/${user}`, {
+      userId,
+      body: typing ? { typing: true, timeout: timeoutMs } : { typing: false },
+    });
+  }
+
+  /** Set display name for an agent's virtual user. */
+  async setDisplayName(agent: string, displayName: string): Promise<void> {
+    const userId = await this.ensureRegistered(agent);
+    const user = encodeURIComponent(userId);
+    await this.request('PUT', `/_matrix/client/v3/profile/${user}/displayname`, {
+      userId,
+      body: { displayname: displayName },
+    });
+  }
+}

packages/appservice/src/registration.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+import type { AppserviceConfig } from './types.js';
+
+export interface RegistrationOptions {
+  /** Unique appservice id in Synapse. Default: "mosaic-as". */
+  id?: string;
+  /** URL where Synapse reaches the appservice, e.g. http://mosaic-as:8008 */
+  url: string;
+  /** Alias namespace regex prefix. Default: "#mosaic-". */
+  aliasPrefix?: string;
+}
+
+const escapeRegex = (value: string): string => value.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
+
+/**
+ * Build the Synapse appservice registration document (mosaic-as.yaml).
+ * Deployment (infrastructure repo) serializes this to YAML and mounts it via
+ * app_service_config_files.
+ */
+export function buildRegistration(cfg: AppserviceConfig, options: RegistrationOptions) {
+  const prefix = cfg.userPrefix ?? 'agent-';
+  return {
+    id: options.id ?? 'mosaic-as',
+    url: options.url,
+    as_token: cfg.asToken,
+    hs_token: cfg.hsToken,
+    sender_localpart: cfg.senderLocalpart ?? 'mosaic-as',
+    rate_limited: false,
+    namespaces: {
+      users: [
+        {
+          regex: `@${escapeRegex(prefix)}.*:${escapeRegex(cfg.domain)}`,
+          exclusive: true,
+        },
+      ],
+      aliases: [
+        {
+          regex: `${escapeRegex(options.aliasPrefix ?? '#mosaic-')}.*:${escapeRegex(cfg.domain)}`,
+          exclusive: false,
+        },
+      ],
+      rooms: [],
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+const assertYamlSafe = (field: string, value: string): string => {
+  // Tokens/urls/ids are single-line opaque strings; control characters would
+  // let a crafted value terminate the scalar and inject YAML keys.
+  if (/[\r\n\x00-\x08\x0b-\x1f]/.test(value)) {
+    throw new Error(`registration field ${field} contains control characters`);
+  }
+  return value.replace(/'/g, "''");
+};
+
+/** Minimal YAML serialization for the flat registration document. */
+export function registrationToYaml(registration: ReturnType<typeof buildRegistration>): string {
+  const ns = registration.namespaces;
+  const nsBlock = (entries: Array<{ regex: string; exclusive: boolean }>): string =>
+    entries.length === 0
+      ? ' []'
+      : '\n' +
+        entries.map((e) => `    - regex: '${e.regex}'\n      exclusive: ${e.exclusive}`).join('\n');
+  return [
+    `id: '${assertYamlSafe('id', registration.id)}'`,
+    `url: '${assertYamlSafe('url', registration.url)}'`,
+    `as_token: '${assertYamlSafe('as_token', registration.as_token)}'`,
+    `hs_token: '${assertYamlSafe('hs_token', registration.hs_token)}'`,
+    `sender_localpart: '${assertYamlSafe('sender_localpart', registration.sender_localpart)}'`,
+    `rate_limited: ${registration.rate_limited}`,
+    'namespaces:',
+    `  users:${nsBlock(ns.users)}`,
+    `  aliases:${nsBlock(ns.aliases)}`,
+    `  rooms:${nsBlock(ns.rooms)}`,
+    '',
+  ].join('\n');
+}

packages/appservice/src/transactions.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+import { timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
+
+import type { EventHandler, HandlerResult, Transaction } from './types.js';
+
+const MAX_SEEN_TXN_IDS = 1000;
+
+function safeTokenCompare(presented: string | undefined, expected: string): boolean {
+  if (presented === undefined) return false;
+  const a = Buffer.from(presented);
+  const b = Buffer.from(expected);
+  if (a.length !== b.length) {
+    // Compare against a same-length dummy so length is not a timing oracle.
+    timingSafeEqual(a, Buffer.alloc(a.length));
+    return false;
+  }
+  return timingSafeEqual(a, b);
+}
+
+export interface TransactionHandlerOptions {
+  hsToken: string;
+  onEvent: EventHandler;
+  /** Called for handler errors; events are at-most-once, errors must not 500. */
+  onError?: (error: unknown, txnId: string) => void;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Framework-agnostic handler for the Application Service transactions API
+ * (PUT /_matrix/app/v1/transactions/{txnId}). Host apps (Fastify/Nest) wrap
+ * this in a route.
+ *
+ * Spec requirements covered: hs_token verification (Authorization: Bearer,
+ * with legacy ?access_token fallback), txnId idempotency, always-200 on
+ * accepted transactions (homeserver retries on any other status).
+ *
+ * KNOWN LIMITATION: the txnId dedupe ring is in-process memory only. After a
+ * restart the homeserver may redeliver pending transactions — event handlers
+ * must be idempotent (delivery is at-least-once across process lifetimes).
+ */
+export class TransactionHandler {
+  private readonly seen: string[] = [];
+  private readonly seenSet = new Set<string>();
+
+  constructor(private readonly options: TransactionHandlerOptions) {}
+
+  authorized(
+    authorizationHeader: string | undefined,
+    accessTokenParam: string | undefined,
+  ): boolean {
+    const bearer = authorizationHeader?.startsWith('Bearer ')
+      ? authorizationHeader.slice('Bearer '.length)
+      : undefined;
+    const presented = bearer ?? accessTokenParam;
+    return safeTokenCompare(presented, this.options.hsToken);
+  }
+
+  async handle(
+    txnId: string,
+    body: unknown,
+    auth: { authorizationHeader?: string; accessTokenParam?: string },
+  ): Promise<HandlerResult> {
+    if (!this.authorized(auth.authorizationHeader, auth.accessTokenParam)) {
+      return { status: 403, body: { errcode: 'M_FORBIDDEN', error: 'bad hs_token' } };
+    }
+    if (this.seenSet.has(txnId)) {
+      return { status: 200, body: {} };
+    }
+    this.markSeen(txnId);
+    const txn = (body ?? {}) as Partial<Transaction>;
+    for (const event of txn.events ?? []) {
+      try {
+        await this.options.onEvent(event);
+      } catch (error) {
+        // A failing handler must not fail the transaction: the homeserver
+        // would retry the whole batch forever.
+        this.options.onError?.(error, txnId);
+      }
+    }
+    return { status: 200, body: {} };
+  }
+
+  private markSeen(txnId: string): void {
+    this.seen.push(txnId);
+    this.seenSet.add(txnId);
+    while (this.seen.length > MAX_SEEN_TXN_IDS) {
+      const evicted = this.seen.shift();
+      if (evicted !== undefined) this.seenSet.delete(evicted);
+    }
+  }
+}

packages/appservice/src/types.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+export interface AppserviceConfig {
+  /** Homeserver client-server API base, e.g. https://chat.uscllc.com */
+  homeserverUrl: string;
+  /** Server name used in user IDs, e.g. chat.uscllc.com */
+  domain: string;
+  /** Token the appservice presents to the homeserver (as_token). */
+  asToken: string;
+  /** Token the homeserver presents to the appservice (hs_token). */
+  hsToken: string;
+  /** Localpart prefix owned by this appservice. Default: "agent-". */
+  userPrefix?: string;
+  /** The appservice's own sender user localpart. Default: "mosaic-as". */
+  senderLocalpart?: string;
+}
+
+export interface MatrixEvent {
+  type: string;
+  event_id?: string;
+  room_id?: string;
+  sender?: string;
+  state_key?: string;
+  content?: Record<string, unknown>;
+  origin_server_ts?: number;
+}
+
+export interface Transaction {
+  events: MatrixEvent[];
+}
+
+export type EventHandler = (event: MatrixEvent) => void | Promise<void>;
+
+export interface HandlerResult {
+  status: number;
+  body: Record<string, unknown>;
+}

packages/appservice/tsconfig.json

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "extends": "../../tsconfig.base.json",
+  "compilerOptions": {
+    "outDir": "dist",
+    "rootDir": "src"
+  },
+  "include": ["src/**/*"],
+  "exclude": ["node_modules", "dist"]
+}

packages/auth/src/index.ts

@@ -10,3 +10,4 @@ export {
   type SsoTeamSyncConfig,
   type SupportedSsoProviderId,
 } from './sso.js';
+export { seal, unseal } from './seal.js';

packages/auth/src/seal.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
+
+const ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-gcm';
+const IV_LENGTH = 12; // 96-bit IV for GCM
+const TAG_LENGTH = 16; // 128-bit auth tag
+
+/**
+ * Derive a 32-byte AES-256 key from BETTER_AUTH_SECRET using SHA-256.
+ * Throws if BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is not set.
+ */
+function deriveKey(): Buffer {
+  const secret = process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
+  if (!secret) {
+    throw new Error('BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is not set — cannot derive encryption key');
+  }
+  return createHash('sha256').update(secret).digest();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Seal a plaintext string using AES-256-GCM.
+ * Output format: base64(IV || authTag || ciphertext)
+ */
+export function seal(plaintext: string): string {
+  const key = deriveKey();
+  const iv = randomBytes(IV_LENGTH);
+  const cipher = createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv);
+
+  const encrypted = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, 'utf8'), cipher.final()]);
+  const authTag = cipher.getAuthTag();
+
+  const combined = Buffer.concat([iv, authTag, encrypted]);
+  return combined.toString('base64');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Unseal a value sealed by `seal()`.
+ * Throws on authentication failure (tampered data) or if BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is unset.
+ */
+export function unseal(encoded: string): string {
+  const key = deriveKey();
+  const combined = Buffer.from(encoded, 'base64');
+
+  const iv = combined.subarray(0, IV_LENGTH);
+  const authTag = combined.subarray(IV_LENGTH, IV_LENGTH + TAG_LENGTH);
+  const ciphertext = combined.subarray(IV_LENGTH + TAG_LENGTH);
+
+  const decipher = createDecipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv);
+  decipher.setAuthTag(authTag);
+
+  const decrypted = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ciphertext), decipher.final()]);
+  return decrypted.toString('utf8');
+}

packages/db/drizzle/0009_federation_grant_pending.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+ALTER TYPE "public"."grant_status" ADD VALUE 'pending' BEFORE 'active';--> statement-breakpoint
+ALTER TABLE "federation_grants" ALTER COLUMN "status" SET DEFAULT 'pending';

packages/db/drizzle/0010_federation_enrollment_tokens.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+CREATE TABLE "federation_enrollment_tokens" (
+	"token" text PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
+	"grant_id" uuid NOT NULL,
+	"peer_id" uuid NOT NULL,
+	"expires_at" timestamp with time zone NOT NULL,
+	"used_at" timestamp with time zone,
+	"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL
+);
+--> statement-breakpoint
+ALTER TABLE "federation_enrollment_tokens" ADD CONSTRAINT "federation_enrollment_tokens_grant_id_federation_grants_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("grant_id") REFERENCES "public"."federation_grants"("id") ON DELETE cascade ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
+ALTER TABLE "federation_enrollment_tokens" ADD CONSTRAINT "federation_enrollment_tokens_peer_id_federation_peers_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("peer_id") REFERENCES "public"."federation_peers"("id") ON DELETE cascade ON UPDATE no action;

packages/db/drizzle/meta/_journal.json

@@ -64,6 +64,20 @@
       "when": 1776822435828,
       "tag": "0008_smart_lyja",
       "breakpoints": true
+    },
+    {
+      "idx": 9,
+      "version": "7",
+      "when": 1745280000000,
+      "tag": "0009_federation_grant_pending",
+      "breakpoints": true
+    },
+    {
+      "idx": 10,
+      "version": "7",
+      "when": 1745366400000,
+      "tag": "0010_federation_enrollment_tokens",
+      "breakpoints": true
     }
   ]
 }

packages/db/package.json

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
     "access": "public"
   },
   "files": [
-    "dist"
+    "dist",
+    "drizzle"
   ]
 }

packages/db/src/client-pglite.ts

@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
 import { PGlite } from '@electric-sql/pglite';
+import { vector } from '@electric-sql/pglite/vector';
 import { drizzle } from 'drizzle-orm/pglite';
 import * as schema from './schema.js';
 import type { DbHandle } from './client.js';
 
 export function createPgliteDb(dataDir: string): DbHandle {
-  const client = new PGlite(dataDir);
+  // pgvector extension is required by migration 0001 (insights.embedding column).
+  const client = new PGlite(dataDir, { extensions: { vector } });
   const db = drizzle(client, { schema });
   return {
     db: db as unknown as DbHandle['db'],

packages/db/src/federation.ts

@@ -17,4 +17,5 @@ export {
   federationPeers,
   federationGrants,
   federationAuditLog,
+  federationEnrollmentTokens,
 } from './schema.js';

packages/db/src/index.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 export { createDb, type Db, type DbHandle } from './client.js';
 export { createPgliteDb } from './client-pglite.js';
-export { runMigrations } from './migrate.js';
+export { runMigrations, runPgliteMigrations } from './migrate.js';
 export * from './schema.js';
 export * from './federation.js';
 export {

packages/db/src/migrate.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import { createPgliteDb } from './client-pglite.js';
+import { runPgliteMigrations } from './migrate.js';
+import type { DbHandle } from './client.js';
+
+interface PgliteExec {
+  exec(query: string): Promise<unknown>;
+}
+
+describe('runPgliteMigrations', () => {
+  let dataDir: string;
+  let handle: DbHandle;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    dataDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'mosaic-db-migrate-test-'));
+    handle = createPgliteDb(dataDir);
+  });
+
+  afterEach(async () => {
+    await handle.close();
+    rmSync(dataDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  it('creates the BetterAuth tables required by the gateway', async () => {
+    await runPgliteMigrations(handle);
+
+    const result = (await handle.db.execute(sql`
+      SELECT table_name FROM information_schema.tables
+      WHERE table_schema = 'public'
+      ORDER BY table_name
+    `)) as unknown as { rows: Array<{ table_name: string }> };
+
+    const tables = result.rows.map((r) => r.table_name);
+
+    // Auth tables — required for sign-in / bootstrap to function.
+    expect(tables).toContain('users');
+    expect(tables).toContain('sessions');
+    expect(tables).toContain('accounts');
+    expect(tables).toContain('verifications');
+
+    // Schema sanity check — admin token table consumed by mosaic gateway config.
+    expect(tables).toContain('admin_tokens');
+  });
+
+  it('is idempotent — running twice does not error', async () => {
+    await runPgliteMigrations(handle);
+    await expect(runPgliteMigrations(handle)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('surfaces statement-level error context on failure and leaves no ledger row', async () => {
+    // Pre-create a `users` table that conflicts with migration 0000's CREATE TABLE,
+    // forcing it to fail without IF NOT EXISTS.
+    const client = (handle.db as unknown as { $client: PgliteExec }).$client;
+    await client.exec('CREATE TABLE users (sentinel text)');
+
+    await expect(runPgliteMigrations(handle)).rejects.toThrow(
+      /migration hash=[a-f0-9]+ statement #\d+ failed/,
+    );
+
+    // Ledger should be empty — partial application must not pretend to be complete.
+    const ledger = (await handle.db.execute(
+      sql`SELECT count(*)::int AS count FROM drizzle.__drizzle_migrations`,
+    )) as unknown as { rows: Array<{ count: number }> };
+    expect(ledger.rows[0]?.count).toBe(0);
+  });
+});

packages/db/src/migrate.ts

@@ -1,18 +1,109 @@
 import { dirname, resolve } from 'node:path';
 import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { drizzle } from 'drizzle-orm/postgres-js';
-import { migrate } from 'drizzle-orm/postgres-js/migrator';
+import { sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
+import { drizzle as drizzlePostgres } from 'drizzle-orm/postgres-js';
+import { migrate as migratePostgres } from 'drizzle-orm/postgres-js/migrator';
+import { readMigrationFiles } from 'drizzle-orm/migrator';
 import postgres from 'postgres';
 import { DEFAULT_DATABASE_URL } from './defaults.js';
+import type { DbHandle } from './client.js';
+
+interface PgliteExecutor {
+  exec(query: string): Promise<unknown>;
+}
+
+interface ExecuteRows<T> {
+  rows: T[];
+}
+
+function migrationsFolder(): string {
+  const here = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
+  return resolve(here, '../drizzle');
+}
 
 export async function runMigrations(url?: string): Promise<void> {
   const connectionString = url ?? process.env['DATABASE_URL'] ?? DEFAULT_DATABASE_URL;
-  const sql = postgres(connectionString, { max: 1 });
-  const db = drizzle(sql);
-  const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
+  const sqlClient = postgres(connectionString, { max: 1 });
+  const db = drizzlePostgres(sqlClient);
   try {
-    await migrate(db, { migrationsFolder: resolve(__dirname, '../drizzle') });
+    // TODO: postgres-tier first-install also fails because (a) Drizzle wraps every
+    // migration in one transaction (breaks 0009's ALTER TYPE ADD VALUE → SET DEFAULT
+    // sequence) and (b) drizzle/meta/_journal.json has 0009 ordered before 0008,
+    // which the postgres-js migrator skips by `created_at < folderMillis`. The
+    // PGlite path below sidesteps both. A follow-up should either share the
+    // per-statement loop (see runPgliteMigrations) or fix the journal ordering.
+    await migratePostgres(db, { migrationsFolder: migrationsFolder() });
   } finally {
-    await sql.end();
+    await sqlClient.end();
+  }
+}
+
+// Apply Drizzle migrations against an embedded PGlite database.
+//
+// We don't reuse drizzle's pglite migrator because it wraps ALL migrations in
+// one outer transaction, which breaks Postgres' `check_safe_enum_use` rule —
+// e.g. migration 0009 does `ALTER TYPE ADD VALUE 'pending'` then references
+// `'pending'` as a default in the same tx. PGlite's `exec()` runs each
+// statement under the Simple Query protocol, autocommitting between them.
+//
+// We still write to the standard `drizzle.__drizzle_migrations` ledger so the
+// result is interoperable with `runMigrations()` on a postgres-backed deploy
+// (modulo the journal-ordering bug noted above).
+//
+// We skip-by-hash rather than skip-by-folderMillis (which is what Drizzle's
+// postgres-js migrator does). That's deliberate — out-of-order timestamps in
+// `_journal.json` won't silently drop migrations.
+//
+// Failure model: each statement autocommits, and the ledger row is written
+// only after all statements in a migration succeed. A crash mid-migration
+// leaves the prefix applied with no ledger entry, so the next boot will
+// replay those statements and fail loudly on "already exists". Recovery:
+// drop the partially-applied objects, or insert the migration's hash into
+// `drizzle.__drizzle_migrations` manually. The error log identifies which
+// statement of which migration was the culprit.
+export async function runPgliteMigrations(handle: DbHandle): Promise<void> {
+  const client = (handle.db as unknown as { $client?: PgliteExecutor }).$client;
+  if (!client || typeof client.exec !== 'function') {
+    throw new Error('runPgliteMigrations: handle.db is not backed by a PGlite client');
+  }
+
+  await client.exec('CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS drizzle');
+  await client.exec(`
+    CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS drizzle.__drizzle_migrations (
+      id SERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
+      hash text NOT NULL,
+      created_at bigint
+    )
+  `);
+
+  const appliedRows = (await handle.db.execute(
+    sql`SELECT hash FROM drizzle.__drizzle_migrations`,
+  )) as unknown as ExecuteRows<{ hash: string }>;
+  const applied = new Set(appliedRows.rows.map((r) => r.hash));
+
+  const migrations = readMigrationFiles({ migrationsFolder: migrationsFolder() });
+  for (const migration of migrations) {
+    if (applied.has(migration.hash)) continue;
+
+    // Run each statement-breakpoint chunk in its own exec() call so PGlite
+    // commits between statements — this is what lets `ALTER TYPE ADD VALUE`
+    // become visible before a subsequent statement references the new value.
+    for (const [stmtIdx, stmt] of migration.sql.entries()) {
+      const trimmed = stmt.trim();
+      if (!trimmed) continue;
+      try {
+        await client.exec(trimmed);
+      } catch (err) {
+        const cause = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+        throw new Error(
+          `runPgliteMigrations: migration hash=${migration.hash} statement #${stmtIdx} failed: ${cause}\n` +
+            `Statement: ${trimmed.slice(0, 200)}${trimmed.length > 200 ? '…' : ''}`,
+          { cause: err },
+        );
+      }
+    }
+    await handle.db.execute(
+      sql`INSERT INTO drizzle.__drizzle_migrations (hash, created_at) VALUES (${migration.hash}, ${migration.folderMillis})`,
+    );
   }
 }

packages/db/src/schema.ts

@@ -604,11 +604,12 @@ export const peerStateEnum = pgEnum('peer_state', ['pending', 'active', 'suspend
 
 /**
  * Lifecycle state of a federation grant.
+ * - pending: created but not yet activated (awaiting cert enrollment, M2-07)
  * - active:  grant is in effect
  * - revoked: manually revoked before expiry
  * - expired: natural expiry (expires_at passed)
  */
-export const grantStatusEnum = pgEnum('grant_status', ['active', 'revoked', 'expired']);
+export const grantStatusEnum = pgEnum('grant_status', ['pending', 'active', 'revoked', 'expired']);
 
 /**
  * A registered peer gateway identified by its Step-CA certificate CN.
@@ -696,7 +697,7 @@ export const federationGrants = pgTable(
     scope: jsonb('scope').notNull(),
 
     /** Current grant lifecycle state. */
-    status: grantStatusEnum('status').notNull().default('active'),
+    status: grantStatusEnum('status').notNull().default('pending'),
 
     /** Optional hard expiry. NULL means the grant does not expire automatically. */
     expiresAt: timestamp('expires_at', { withTimezone: true }),
@@ -777,3 +778,34 @@ export const federationAuditLog = pgTable(
     index('federation_audit_log_created_at_idx').on(t.createdAt.desc()),
   ],
 );
+
+/**
+ * Single-use enrollment tokens — M2-07.
+ *
+ * An admin creates a token (with a TTL) and hands it out-of-band to the
+ * remote peer operator.  The peer redeems it exactly once by posting its
+ * CSR to POST /api/federation/enrollment/:token.  The token is atomically
+ * marked as used to prevent replay attacks.
+ */
+export const federationEnrollmentTokens = pgTable('federation_enrollment_tokens', {
+  /** 32-byte hex token — crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex') */
+  token: text('token').primaryKey(),
+
+  /** The federation grant this enrollment activates. */
+  grantId: uuid('grant_id')
+    .notNull()
+    .references(() => federationGrants.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
+
+  /** The peer record that will be updated on successful enrollment. */
+  peerId: uuid('peer_id')
+    .notNull()
+    .references(() => federationPeers.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
+
+  /** Hard expiry — token rejected after this time even if not used. */
+  expiresAt: timestamp('expires_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull(),
+
+  /** NULL until the token is redeemed.  Set atomically to prevent replay. */
+  usedAt: timestamp('used_at', { withTimezone: true }),
+
+  createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
+});

packages/mosaic/framework/defaults/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,28 +1,24 @@
 # Mosaic Global Agent Contract
 
-Canonical file: `~/.config/mosaic/AGENTS.md`
+Canonical file: `~/.config/mosaic/AGENTS.md`. Mandatory behavior for all Mosaic agent runtimes.
 
-This file defines the mandatory behavior for all Mosaic agent runtimes.
+This is the THIN CORE — the launcher injects it (plus USER.md, the TOOLS index, and the runtime
+contract) into every session. It carries only what must be resident to avoid violating a gate.
+Depth lives in guides, read on demand (see Conditional Guide Loading).
 
-## MANDATORY Load Order (No Exceptions)
+## Session Start — Load Order
 
-Before responding to any user message, you MUST read these files in order:
+The core contract is ALREADY in your context (injected by `mosaic` launch). Do not re-read it.
+At session start, additionally:
 
-1. `~/.config/mosaic/SOUL.md`
-2. `~/.config/mosaic/USER.md`
-3. `~/.config/mosaic/STANDARDS.md`
-4. `~/.config/mosaic/AGENTS.md`
-5. `~/.config/mosaic/TOOLS.md`
-6. `~/.config/mosaic/guides/E2E-DELIVERY.md`
-7. `~/.config/mosaic/guides/MEMORY.md`
-8. Project-local `AGENTS.md` (if present)
-9. Runtime-specific reference:
-   - Pi: `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/RUNTIME.md`
-   - Claude: `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/claude/RUNTIME.md`
-   - Codex: `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/codex/RUNTIME.md`
-   - OpenCode: `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/opencode/RUNTIME.md`
-
-If any required file is missing, you MUST stop and report the missing file.
+1. Read `~/.config/mosaic/SOUL.md` (agent identity — small, once).
+2. Read project-local `AGENTS.md` / `CLAUDE.md` if present.
+3. Read guides ONLY as triggered by the Conditional Guide Loading table below. Do NOT pre-load
+   guides you do not need — role-relevant detail is pulled on demand, not up front.
+4. When you begin implementation work, read `~/.config/mosaic/guides/E2E-DELIVERY.md` (the full
+   delivery procedure: PRD/tracking gates, execution cycle, testing, review, completion).
+5. `~/.config/mosaic/STANDARDS.md` is available for reference; load it only if the task requires
+   standards validation (do NOT halt if missing).
 
 ## CRITICAL HARD GATES (Read First)
 
@@ -37,56 +33,39 @@ If any required file is missing, you MUST stop and report the missing file.
 9. Do NOT stop at "PR created". Do NOT ask "should I merge?" Do NOT ask "should I close the issue?".
 10. Manual `docker build` / `docker push` for deployment is FORBIDDEN when CI/CD pipelines exist in the repository. CI is the ONLY canonical build path for container images.
 11. Before ANY build or deployment action, you MUST check for existing CI/CD pipeline configuration (`.woodpecker/`, `.woodpecker.yml`, `.github/workflows/`, etc.). If pipelines exist, use them — do not build locally.
-12. The mandatory load order and intake procedure are NOT conditional on perceived task complexity. A "simple" commit-push-deploy task has the same procedural requirements as a multi-file feature. Skipping intake because a task "seems simple" is the most common framework violation.
+12. The mandatory intake procedure is NOT conditional on perceived task complexity. A "simple" commit-push-deploy task has the same procedural requirements as a multi-file feature. Skipping intake because a task "seems simple" is the most common framework violation.
 
-## Non-Negotiable Operating Rules
+## Non-Negotiable Operating Rules (condensed — full detail in `guides/E2E-DELIVERY.md`)
 
-1. You MUST create and maintain a task-specific scratchpad for every non-trivial task.
-2. You MUST follow the end-to-end procedure in `E2E-DELIVERY.md`.
-3. You MUST execute this cycle for implementation work: `plan -> code -> test -> review -> remediate -> review -> commit -> push -> greenfield situational test -> repeat`.
-4. Before coding begins, `docs/PRD.md` or `docs/PRD.json` MUST exist and be treated as the source of requirements.
-5. The main agent MUST prepare or update the PRD using user objectives, constraints, and available project context before implementation starts.
-6. In steered autonomy mode, the agent MUST make best-guess PRD decisions when needed, mark each with `ASSUMPTION:` and rationale, and continue without waiting for routine user approval.
-7. You MUST run baseline tests before claiming completion.
-8. Situational testing is the PRIMARY validation gate. You MUST run situational tests based on the change surface.
-9. TDD is risk-based and REQUIRED for bug fixes, security/auth/permission logic, and critical business logic/data mutations (see `~/.config/mosaic/guides/QA-TESTING.md`).
-10. If you modify source code, you MUST run an independent code review before completion.
-11. You MUST update required documentation for code/API/auth/infra changes per `~/.config/mosaic/guides/DOCUMENTATION.md`.
-12. You MUST provide verification evidence before completion claims.
-13. You MUST NOT use workarounds that bypass quality gates.
-14. You MUST NOT hardcode secrets.
-15. You MUST NOT use deprecated or unsupported dependencies.
-16. When a milestone is completed, you MUST create and push a release tag and publish a repository release.
-17. For every non-trivial implementation task, you MUST create or update `docs/TASKS.md` before coding and keep it current through completion.
-18. You MUST keep `docs/` root clean and place reports/artifacts in scoped folders per `~/.config/mosaic/guides/DOCUMENTATION.md`.
-19. For TypeScript codebases, DTO files are REQUIRED for module/API boundaries (`*.dto.ts`).
-20. You MUST honor user plan/token budgets: monitor estimated vs used tokens and adjust execution strategy to stay within limits.
-21. You MUST use trunk merge strategy: branch from `main`, merge to `main` via PR only, never push directly to `main`, and use squash merge only.
-22. You MUST own project execution end-to-end: planning, coding, testing, review, remediation, PR/repo operations, release/tag, and deployment when in scope.
-23. Human intervention is escalation-only; do not ask the human to perform routine coding, review, or repository management work.
-24. Deployment ownership is REQUIRED when deployment is in scope and target access is configured.
-25. For container deployments, you MUST use immutable image tags (`sha-*`, `vX.Y.Z-rc.N`) with digest-first promotion; `latest` is forbidden as a deployment reference.
-26. If an external git provider is available (Gitea/GitHub/GitLab), you MUST create or update issue(s) and link them in `docs/TASKS.md` before coding; if unavailable, use `TASKS:<id>` internal refs in `docs/TASKS.md`.
-27. For provider operations (issue/PR/milestone), you MUST detect platform first and use `~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/*.sh` wrappers before any raw provider CLI/API calls.
-28. Direct `gh`/`tea`/`glab` commands are forbidden as first choice when a Mosaic wrapper exists; use raw commands only as documented fallback.
-29. If the mission is orchestration-oriented (contains "orchestrate", issue/milestone coordination, or multi-task execution), you MUST load and follow `~/.config/mosaic/guides/ORCHESTRATOR.md` before taking action.
-30. At session start, you MUST declare the operating mode in your first response before any tool calls or implementation steps.
-31. For orchestration-oriented missions, the first line MUST be exactly: `Now initiating Orchestrator mode...`
-32. For non-orchestrator implementation missions, the first line MUST be exactly: `Now initiating Delivery mode...`
-33. For explicit review-only missions, the first line MUST be exactly: `Now initiating Review mode...`
-34. For source-code delivery through PR workflow, completion is forbidden until the PR is merged to `main`, CI/pipeline status is terminal green, and linked issue/internal task is closed.
-35. If merge/CI/issue-closure operations fail, you MUST report a blocker with the exact failed wrapper command and stop instead of declaring completion.
-36. Before push or PR merge, you MUST run CI queue guard and wait if the project has running/queued pipelines: `~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/ci-queue-wait.sh --purpose push|merge`.
-37. When an active mission is detected at session start (MISSION-MANIFEST.md, TASKS.md, or scratchpads/ present), you MUST load `~/.config/mosaic/guides/ORCHESTRATOR-PROTOCOL.md` and follow the Session Resume Protocol before taking any action.
+- **Source of requirements:** `docs/PRD.md`/`docs/PRD.json` MUST exist before coding. In steered autonomy, make best-guess PRD decisions, mark each `ASSUMPTION:` with rationale, continue. (`guides/PRD.md`)
+- **Tracking:** create/maintain a scratchpad and `docs/TASKS.md` for every non-trivial task; keep current through completion.
+- **Execution cycle:** `plan → code → test → review → remediate → review → commit → push → greenfield situational test → repeat`. On failure, remediate and re-run from the failed step.
+- **Testing:** run baseline tests before any completion claim. Situational testing is the PRIMARY gate. Risk-based TDD is REQUIRED for bug fixes, security/auth/permission logic, and critical data mutations. (`guides/QA-TESTING.md`)
+- **Review:** if you modify source code, an independent code review MUST pass before completion. (`guides/CODE-REVIEW.md`)
+- **Evidence:** provide explicit verification evidence before any completion claim. Never use workarounds that bypass quality gates.
+- **Secrets & deps:** never hardcode secrets (`guides/VAULT-SECRETS.md`); never use deprecated/unsupported dependencies.
+- **Git strategy:** trunk-based — branch from `main`, merge to `main` via PR only (squash merge), never push directly to `main`.
+- **Provider work:** detect platform first, then use `~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/*.sh` wrappers before any raw `gh`/`tea`/`glab`. Create/link issue(s) in `docs/TASKS.md` before coding; if no provider, use `TASKS:<id>` refs.
+- **Deployment:** own it when in scope and access is configured. Use immutable image tags (`sha-*`, `vX.Y.Z-rc.N`) with digest-first promotion; `latest` is forbidden as a deployment reference. (`guides/INFRASTRUCTURE.md`)
+- **Release:** on milestone completion, create + push a release tag and publish a repository release.
+- **Documentation:** update required docs for code/API/auth/infra changes; keep `docs/` root clean (scoped folders). (`guides/DOCUMENTATION.md`)
+- **TypeScript:** DTO files (`*.dto.ts`) REQUIRED for module/API boundaries. (`guides/TYPESCRIPT.md`)
+- **Ownership:** own execution end-to-end (plan→deploy). Human intervention is escalation-only — do not ask the human to do routine coding, review, or repo work.
+- **Budget:** honor user plan/token budgets; adjust execution strategy to stay within limits.
 
 ## Mode Declaration Protocol (Hard Rule)
 
-At session start, declare one mode before any actions:
+At session start, declare exactly one mode as the first line, before any tool call or step:
 
 1. Orchestration mission: `Now initiating Orchestrator mode...`
 2. Implementation mission: `Now initiating Delivery mode...`
 3. Review-only mission: `Now initiating Review mode...`
 
+Orchestration-oriented = contains "orchestrate", issue/milestone coordination, or multi-task
+execution → also load `guides/ORCHESTRATOR.md` before acting. If an active mission is detected at
+session start (MISSION-MANIFEST.md, TASKS.md, or scratchpads/ present) → load
+`guides/ORCHESTRATOR-PROTOCOL.md` and follow the Session Resume Protocol before any action.
+
 ## Steered Autonomy Escalation Triggers
 
 Only interrupt the human when one of these is true:
@@ -97,136 +76,69 @@ Only interrupt the human when one of these is true:
 4. Legal/compliance/security constraints are unknown and materially affect delivery.
 5. Objectives are mutually conflicting and cannot be resolved from PRD, repo, or prior decisions.
 
-## Conditional Guide Loading
+## Conditional Guide Loading (role/task-driven — load only what the task needs)
 
-Load additional guides when the task requires them.
+| Task                                               | Guide                              |
+| -------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------- |
+| Project bootstrap                                  | `guides/BOOTSTRAP.md`              |
+| PRD creation / requirements                        | `guides/PRD.md`                    |
+| Orchestration flow                                 | `guides/ORCHESTRATOR.md`           |
+| Mission lifecycle / multi-session orchestration    | `guides/ORCHESTRATOR-PROTOCOL.md`  |
+| Orchestrator estimation heuristics                 | `guides/ORCHESTRATOR-LEARNINGS.md` |
+| Frontend changes                                   | `guides/FRONTEND.md`               |
+| Backend/API changes                                | `guides/BACKEND.md`                |
+| Auth/authorization                                 | `guides/AUTHENTICATION.md`         |
+| CI/CD changes                                      | `guides/CI-CD-PIPELINES.md`        |
+| Infrastructure/DevOps/deployment                   | `guides/INFRASTRUCTURE.md`         |
+| Code review work                                   | `guides/CODE-REVIEW.md`            |
+| TypeScript strict typing                           | `guides/TYPESCRIPT.md`             |
+| QA / test strategy                                 | `guides/QA-TESTING.md`             |
+| Documentation (any code/API/auth/infra change)     | `guides/DOCUMENTATION.md`          |
+| Secrets / vault usage                              | `guides/VAULT-SECRETS.md`          |
+| Tool/credential reference (service CLIs, wrappers) | `guides/TOOLS-REFERENCE.md`        |
+| Memory protocol (OpenBrain capture/recall)         | `guides/MEMORY.md`                 |
 
-| Task                                                    | Required Guide                                      |
-| ------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- |
-| Project bootstrap                                       | `~/.config/mosaic/guides/BOOTSTRAP.md`              |
-| PRD creation and requirements definition                | `~/.config/mosaic/guides/PRD.md`                    |
-| Orchestration flow                                      | `~/.config/mosaic/guides/ORCHESTRATOR.md`           |
-| Frontend changes                                        | `~/.config/mosaic/guides/FRONTEND.md`               |
-| Backend/API changes                                     | `~/.config/mosaic/guides/BACKEND.md`                |
-| Documentation changes or any code/API/auth/infra change | `~/.config/mosaic/guides/DOCUMENTATION.md`          |
-| Authentication/authorization                            | `~/.config/mosaic/guides/AUTHENTICATION.md`         |
-| CI/CD changes                                           | `~/.config/mosaic/guides/CI-CD-PIPELINES.md`        |
-| Infrastructure/DevOps                                   | `~/.config/mosaic/guides/INFRASTRUCTURE.md`         |
-| Code review work                                        | `~/.config/mosaic/guides/CODE-REVIEW.md`            |
-| TypeScript strict typing                                | `~/.config/mosaic/guides/TYPESCRIPT.md`             |
-| QA and test strategy                                    | `~/.config/mosaic/guides/QA-TESTING.md`             |
-| Secrets and vault usage                                 | `~/.config/mosaic/guides/VAULT-SECRETS.md`          |
-| Orchestrator estimation heuristics                      | `~/.config/mosaic/guides/ORCHESTRATOR-LEARNINGS.md` |
-| Mission lifecycle / multi-session orchestration         | `~/.config/mosaic/guides/ORCHESTRATOR-PROTOCOL.md`  |
+## Subagent Model Selection (Cost — Hard Rule)
 
-## Embedded Delivery Cycle (Hard Rule)
+Select the cheapest model capable of the task; do NOT default to the most expensive. Omitting the
+tier defaults to the parent (usually opus) and wastes budget.
 
-- Implementation work MUST follow the embedded execution cycle:
-  - `plan -> code -> test -> review -> remediate -> review -> commit -> push -> greenfield situational test -> repeat`
-- If a step fails, you MUST remediate and re-run from the relevant step before proceeding.
+- **haiku** — search/grep/glob, codebase exploration, status/health checks, one-line mechanical fixes.
+- **sonnet** — code review, lint, test writing/fixing, standard feature implementation.
+- **opus** — complex architecture / multi-file refactors, security/auth logic, ambiguous design decisions.
 
-## Sequential-Thinking MCP (Hard Requirement)
-
-- `sequential-thinking` MCP server is REQUIRED for Mosaic operation.
-- Installation and configuration are managed by Mosaic bootstrap and runtime linking.
-- If sequential-thinking is unavailable, you MUST report the failure and stop planning-intensive execution.
-
-## Subagent Model Selection (Cost Optimization — Hard Rule)
-
-When delegating work to subagents, you MUST select the cheapest model capable of completing the task. Do NOT default to the most expensive model for every delegation.
-
-| Task Type                                     | Model Tier | Rationale                                               |
-| --------------------------------------------- | ---------- | ------------------------------------------------------- |
-| File search, grep, glob, codebase exploration | **haiku**  | Read-only, pattern matching, no reasoning depth needed  |
-| Status checks, health monitoring, heartbeat   | **haiku**  | Structured API calls, pass/fail output                  |
-| Simple code fixes (typos, rename, one-liner)  | **haiku**  | Minimal reasoning, mechanical changes                   |
-| Code review, lint, style checks               | **sonnet** | Needs judgment but not deep architectural reasoning     |
-| Test writing, test fixes                      | **sonnet** | Pattern-based, moderate complexity                      |
-| Standard feature implementation               | **sonnet** | Good balance of capability and cost for most coding     |
-| Complex architecture, multi-file refactors    | **opus**   | Requires deep reasoning, large context, design judgment |
-| Security review, auth logic                   | **opus**   | High-stakes reasoning where mistakes are costly         |
-| Ambiguous requirements, design decisions      | **opus**   | Needs nuanced judgment and tradeoff analysis            |
-
-**Decision rule**: Start with the cheapest viable tier. Only escalate if the task genuinely requires deeper reasoning — not as a safety default. Most coding tasks are sonnet-tier. Reserve opus for work where wrong answers are expensive.
-
-**Runtime-specific syntax**: See the runtime reference for how to specify model tier when spawning subagents (e.g., Claude Code Task tool `model` parameter).
+Start cheapest; escalate only when the task genuinely needs deeper reasoning. Runtime syntax for
+specifying tier is in the runtime contract.
 
 ## Superpowers Enforcement (Hard Rule)
 
-Mosaic provides capabilities beyond basic code editing: **skills**, **hooks**, **MCP tools**, and **plugins**. These are not optional extras — they are force multipliers that agents MUST actively use when applicable. Under-utilization of superpowers is a framework violation.
+Skills, hooks, MCP tools, and plugins are force multipliers you MUST use when applicable;
+under-utilization is a framework violation.
 
-### Skills
+- **Skills:** before implementation, scan `~/.config/mosaic/skills/` and load any matching the task
+  domain (e.g. `nestjs-best-practices` for NestJS). Include skill loading in worker kickstarts. Do
+  not load unrelated skills.
+- **Hooks:** never bypass or suppress hook output; treat hook failures like failing tests and fix
+  them. If a hook is wrong, report it as a framework issue — do not work around it.
+- **MCP:** sequential-thinking is REQUIRED for planning/architecture/multi-step reasoning. OpenBrain
+  (`capture`/`search`/`recent`) is the cross-agent memory layer — search at session start, capture
+  what you learn. Use web/browser/research MCP tools instead of asking the user to look things up.
+- **Plugins:** use code-review / pr-review / architecture plugins proactively after significant
+  changes and before opening a PR — do not wait to be asked.
+- **Self-evolution:** capture recurring patterns (`framework-improvement`), missing tooling
+  (`tooling-gap`), and value-less friction (`framework-friction`) to OpenBrain.
 
-Skills are domain-specific instruction sets in `~/.config/mosaic/skills/` that encode best practices, patterns, and guardrails. They are loaded into agents via the runtime's skill mechanism (e.g., Claude Code slash commands, Pi `--skill` flag).
+## Other Hard Rules
 
-**Rules:**
+- **Sequential-thinking MCP** is REQUIRED. If unavailable, report the failure and stop planning-intensive execution.
+- **Missing core file:** if `AGENTS.md`, `SOUL.md`, or the runtime contract is missing, stop and report it.
 
-1. Before starting implementation, scan available skills (`ls ~/.config/mosaic/skills/`) and load any that match the task domain.
-2. When a skill exists for the technology being used (e.g., `nestjs-best-practices` for NestJS work), you MUST load it.
-3. When spawning workers, include skill loading in the kickstart prompt.
-4. If you complete a task without loading a relevant available skill, that is a quality gap.
+## Session Closure
 
-### Hooks
-
-Hooks provide automated quality gates (lint, format, typecheck) that fire on file edits. They are configured in the runtime settings and run automatically.
-
-**Rules:**
-
-1. Do NOT bypass or suppress hook output. If a hook reports errors, fix them before proceeding.
-2. Hook failures are immediate feedback — treat them like failing tests.
-3. If a hook is consistently failing on valid code, report it as a framework issue rather than working around it.
-
-### MCP Tools
-
-MCP servers extend agent capabilities with external integrations (sequential-thinking, web search, memory, browser automation, etc.). Available MCP tools are listed at session start.
-
-**Rules:**
-
-1. **sequential-thinking** is REQUIRED for planning, architecture, and multi-step reasoning. Use it — do not skip structured thinking for complex decisions.
-2. **OpenBrain** (`capture`, `search`, `recent`) is the cross-agent memory layer. Capture discoveries and search for prior context at session start.
-3. When a task involves web research, browser testing, or external data, use the available MCP tools (web-search, chrome-devtools, web-reader) rather than asking the user to look things up.
-4. Check available MCP tools at session start and use them proactively throughout the session.
-
-### Plugins (Runtime-Specific)
-
-Runtime plugins (e.g., Claude Code's `feature-dev`, `pr-review-toolkit`, `code-review`) provide specialized agent capabilities like code review, architecture analysis, and test coverage analysis.
-
-**Rules:**
-
-1. After completing a significant code change, use code review plugins proactively — do not wait for the user to ask.
-2. Before creating a PR, use PR review plugins to catch issues early.
-3. When designing architecture, use planning/architecture plugins for structured analysis.
-
-### Self-Evolution
-
-The Mosaic framework should improve over time based on usage patterns:
-
-1. When you discover a recurring pattern that should be codified, capture it to OpenBrain with `type: "framework-improvement"`.
-2. When a hook, skill, or tool is missing for a common task, capture the gap to OpenBrain with `type: "tooling-gap"`.
-3. When a framework rule causes friction without adding value, capture the observation to OpenBrain with `type: "framework-friction"`.
-
-These captures feed the framework's continuous improvement cycle.
-
-## Skills Policy
-
-- Load skills that match the active task domain before starting implementation.
-- Do not load unrelated skills.
-- Follow skill trigger rules from the active runtime instruction layer.
-- Actively check `~/.config/mosaic/skills/` for applicable skills rather than passively waiting for them to be mentioned.
-
-## Session Closure Requirement
-
-Before closing any implementation task:
-
-1. Confirm required tests passed.
-2. Confirm situational tests passed (primary gate).
-3. Confirm implementation is aligned to the active `docs/PRD.md` or `docs/PRD.json`.
-4. Confirm acceptance criteria are mapped to verification evidence.
-5. If source code changed, confirm independent code review passed.
-6. Confirm required documentation updates were completed and reviewed.
-7. Update scratchpad with decisions, results, and open risks.
-8. Provide explicit completion evidence.
-9. If source code changed and external provider is available, confirm merged PR number and merge commit on `main`.
-10. Confirm CI/pipeline status is terminal green for the merged change (or merged PR head when equivalent).
-11. Confirm linked issue is closed (or internal `docs/TASKS.md` equivalent is closed when no provider exists).
-12. If any of items 9-11 are blocked by access/tooling failure, return `blocked` status with exact failed wrapper command and do not claim completion.
+Before closing an implementation task, confirm: required + situational tests passed (primary gate);
+aligned to `docs/PRD.md`; acceptance criteria mapped to evidence; independent code review passed (if
+code changed); required docs updated; scratchpad updated with decisions/results/risks; explicit
+completion evidence provided. For PR-workflow delivery: confirm merged PR number + merge commit on
+`main`, terminal-green CI, and linked issue closed (or `docs/TASKS.md` equivalent). If any of those
+are blocked by access/tooling failure, return `blocked` with the exact failed wrapper command — do
+not claim completion. Full checklist: `guides/E2E-DELIVERY.md`.

packages/mosaic/framework/defaults/TOOLS.md

@@ -1,257 +1,58 @@
-# Machine-Level Tool Reference
+# Machine Tools — Index
 
-Centralized reference for tools, credentials, and CLI patterns available across all projects.
+Tool suites live at `~/.config/mosaic/tools/<suite>/`. This is the index only.
+**Full CLI signatures, flags, and examples: `~/.config/mosaic/guides/TOOLS-REFERENCE.md`** —
+read it (or the relevant service guide) when your task actually touches that service.
 Project-specific tooling belongs in the project's `AGENTS.md`, not here.
 
-All tool suites are located at `~/.config/mosaic/tools/`.
-
-## Tool Suites
-
-### Git Wrappers (Use First)
-
-Mosaic wrappers at `~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/*.sh` handle platform detection and edge cases. Always use these before raw CLI commands.
-
-```bash
-# Issues
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/issue-create.sh
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/issue-close.sh
-
-# PRs
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/pr-create.sh
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/pr-merge.sh
-
-# Milestones
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/milestone-create.sh
-
-# CI queue guard (required before push/merge)
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/ci-queue-wait.sh --purpose push|merge
-```
-
-### Code Review (Codex)
-
-```bash
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-code-review.sh --uncommitted
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-security-review.sh --uncommitted
-```
-
-### Infrastructure — Portainer
-
-```bash
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/portainer/stack-status.sh -n <stack-name>
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/portainer/stack-redeploy.sh -n <stack-name>
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/portainer/stack-list.sh
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/portainer/endpoint-list.sh
-```
-
-### Infrastructure — Coolify (DEPRECATED)
-
-> Coolify has been superseded by Portainer Docker Swarm in this stack.
-> Tools remain for reference but should not be used for new deployments.
-
-```bash
-# DEPRECATED — do not use for new deployments
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/coolify/project-list.sh
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/coolify/service-list.sh
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/coolify/service-status.sh -u <uuid>
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/coolify/deploy.sh -u <uuid>
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/coolify/env-set.sh -u <uuid> -k KEY -v VALUE
-```
-
-### Identity — Authentik
-
-```bash
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/authentik/user-list.sh
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/authentik/user-create.sh -u <username> -n <name> -e <email>
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/authentik/group-list.sh
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/authentik/app-list.sh
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/authentik/flow-list.sh
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/authentik/admin-status.sh
-```
-
-### CI/CD — Woodpecker
-
-Multi-instance support: `-a <instance>` selects a named instance. Omit `-a` to use the default from `woodpecker.default` in credentials.json.
-
-| Instance           | URL                | Serves                             |
-| ------------------ | ------------------ | ---------------------------------- |
-| `mosaic` (default) | ci.mosaicstack.dev | Mosaic repos (git.mosaicstack.dev) |
-| `usc`              | ci.uscllc.com      | USC repos (git.uscllc.com)         |
-
-```bash
-# List recent pipelines
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/woodpecker/pipeline-list.sh [-r owner/repo] [-a instance]
-
-# Check latest or specific pipeline status
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/woodpecker/pipeline-status.sh [-r owner/repo] [-n number] [-a instance]
-
-# Trigger a build
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/woodpecker/pipeline-trigger.sh [-r owner/repo] [-b branch] [-a instance]
-```
-
-Instance selection rule: match `-a` to the git remote host of the target repo. If the repo is on `git.uscllc.com`, use `-a usc`. If on `git.mosaicstack.dev`, use `-a mosaic` (or omit, since it's the default).
-
-### DNS — Cloudflare
-
-Multi-instance support: `-a <instance>` selects a named instance (e.g. `personal`, `work`). Omit `-a` to use the default from `cloudflare.default` in credentials.json.
-
-```bash
-# List zones (domains)
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/cloudflare/zone-list.sh [-a instance]
-
-# List DNS records (zone by name or ID)
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/cloudflare/record-list.sh -z <zone> [-a instance] [-t type] [-n name]
-
-# Create DNS record
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/cloudflare/record-create.sh -z <zone> -t <type> -n <name> -c <content> [-a instance] [-p] [-l ttl] [-P priority]
-
-# Update DNS record
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/cloudflare/record-update.sh -z <zone> -r <record-id> -t <type> -n <name> -c <content> [-a instance] [-p] [-l ttl]
-
-# Delete DNS record
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/cloudflare/record-delete.sh -z <zone> -r <record-id> [-a instance]
-```
-
-### IT Service — GLPI
-
-```bash
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/glpi/ticket-list.sh
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/glpi/ticket-create.sh -t <title> -c <content>
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/glpi/computer-list.sh
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/glpi/user-list.sh
-```
-
-### Health Check
-
-```bash
-# Check all configured services
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/health/stack-health.sh
-
-# Check a specific service
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/health/stack-health.sh -s portainer
-
-# JSON output for automation
-~/.config/mosaic/tools/health/stack-health.sh -f json
-```
-
-### Shared Credential Loader
-
-```bash
-# Source in any script to load service credentials
-source ~/.config/mosaic/tools/_lib/credentials.sh
-load_credentials <service-name>
-# Supported: portainer, coolify, authentik, glpi, github, gitea-mosaicstack, gitea-usc, woodpecker, cloudflare, turbo-cache, openbrain
-```
-
-### OpenBrain — Semantic Memory (PRIMARY)
-
-Self-hosted semantic brain backed by pgvector. Primary shared memory layer for all agents across all sessions and harnesses. Stores and retrieves decisions, context, and observations via semantic search.
-
-**MANDATORY jarvis-brain rule:** When working in `~/src/jarvis-brain`, NEVER capture project data, meeting notes, status updates, timeline decisions, or task completions to OpenBrain. The flat files (`data/projects/*.json`, `data/tasks/*.json`) are the SSOT — use `tools/brain.py` and direct JSON edits. OpenBrain is for agent meta-observations ONLY (tooling gotchas, framework learnings, cross-project patterns). Violating this creates duplicate, divergent data.
-
-**Credentials:** `load_credentials openbrain` → exports `OPENBRAIN_URL`, `OPENBRAIN_TOKEN`
-
-Configure in your credentials.json:
-
-```json
-"openbrain": {
-  "url": "https://<your-openbrain-host>",
-  "api_key": "<your-api-key>"
-}
-```
-
-**REST API** (any language, any harness):
-
-```bash
-source ~/.config/mosaic/tools/_lib/credentials.sh && load_credentials openbrain
-
-# Search by meaning
-curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $OPENBRAIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-  -d '{"query": "your search", "limit": 5}' "$OPENBRAIN_URL/v1/search"
-
-# Capture a thought
-curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $OPENBRAIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-  -d '{"content": "...", "source": "agent-name", "metadata": {}}' "$OPENBRAIN_URL/v1/thoughts"
-
-# Recent activity
-curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $OPENBRAIN_TOKEN" "$OPENBRAIN_URL/v1/thoughts/recent?limit=5"
-
-# Stats
-curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $OPENBRAIN_TOKEN" "$OPENBRAIN_URL/v1/stats"
-```
-
-**Python client** (if jarvis-brain is available on PYTHONPATH):
-
-```bash
-python tools/openbrain_client.py search "topic"
-python tools/openbrain_client.py capture "decision or observation" --source agent-name
-python tools/openbrain_client.py recent --limit 5
-python tools/openbrain_client.py stats
-```
-
-**MCP (Claude Code sessions):** When connected, `mcp__openbrain__capture/search/recent/stats` tools are available natively — prefer those over CLI when in a Claude session.
-
-**Rule: capture when you LEARN something. Never when you DO something.**
-
-| Trigger                                   | Action                                    | Retention             |
-| ----------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------- | --------------------- |
-| Session start                             | `search` + `recent` to load prior context | —                     |
-| Architectural or tooling decision made    | Capture with rationale                    | `long` or `permanent` |
-| Gotcha or non-obvious behavior discovered | Capture immediately                       | `medium`              |
-| User preference stated or confirmed       | Capture                                   | `permanent`           |
-| Cross-project pattern identified          | Capture                                   | `permanent`           |
-| Prior decision superseded                 | UPDATE existing thought                   | (keep tier)           |
-
-**Never capture:** task started, commit pushed, PR opened, test results, file edits, CI status.
-
-Full protocol and cleanup tools: `~/.config/mosaic/guides/MEMORY.md`
-Smart capture wrapper (enforces schema + dedup): `~/.config/mosaic/tools/openbrain/capture.sh`
-
-### Excalidraw — Diagram Export (MCP)
-
-Headless `.excalidraw` → SVG export via `@excalidraw/excalidraw`. Available as MCP tools in Claude Code sessions.
-
-**MCP tools (when connected):**
-
-| Tool                                      | Input                                         | Output                                               |
-| ----------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------- |
-| `mcp__excalidraw__excalidraw_to_svg`      | `elements` JSON string + optional `app_state` | SVG string                                           |
-| `mcp__excalidraw__excalidraw_file_to_svg` | `file_path` to `.excalidraw`                  | SVG string + writes `.svg` alongside                 |
-| `mcp__excalidraw__list_diagrams`          | (none)                                        | Available templates (requires `EXCALIDRAW_GEN_PATH`) |
-| `mcp__excalidraw__generate_diagram`       | `name`, optional `output_path`                | Path to generated `.excalidraw`                      |
-| `mcp__excalidraw__generate_and_export`    | `name`, optional `output_path`                | Paths to `.excalidraw` and `.svg`                    |
-
-**Diagram generation** (`list_diagrams`, `generate_diagram`, `generate_and_export`) requires `EXCALIDRAW_GEN_PATH` env var pointing to `excalidraw_gen.py`. Set in environment or shell profile:
-
-```bash
-export EXCALIDRAW_GEN_PATH="$HOME/src/jarvis-brain/tools/excalidraw_export/excalidraw_gen.py"
-```
-
-**Manual registration:**
-
-```bash
-mosaic-ensure-excalidraw           # install deps + register with Claude
-mosaic-ensure-excalidraw --check   # verify registration
-```
-
-## Git Providers
-
-| Instance                      | URL | CLI | Purpose |
-| ----------------------------- | --- | --- | ------- |
-| (add your git providers here) |     |     |         |
+## Suites (use wrappers first)
+
+| Suite      | Path                                             | Purpose                                                                  |
+| ---------- | ------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| git        | `tools/git/*.sh`                                 | issues, PRs, milestones, CI queue guard (platform-auto-detected)         |
+| woodpecker | `tools/woodpecker/*.sh`                          | CI pipelines (`-a mosaic`\|`usc`; match git remote host)                 |
+| portainer  | `tools/portainer/*.sh`                           | Docker Swarm stacks (status/redeploy/list)                               |
+| coolify    | `tools/coolify/*.sh`                             | **DEPRECATED** — superseded by Portainer; do not use for new deployments |
+| authentik  | `tools/authentik/*.sh`                           | identity (users/groups/apps/flows)                                       |
+| cloudflare | `tools/cloudflare/*.sh`                          | DNS (zones/records; `-a` instance)                                       |
+| glpi       | `tools/glpi/*.sh`                                | IT tickets/computers/users                                               |
+| health     | `tools/health/stack-health.sh`                   | service health checks                                                    |
+| codex      | `tools/codex/*.sh`                               | code/security review (`--uncommitted`)                                   |
+| openbrain  | `tools/openbrain/*`, `tools/openbrain_client.py` | semantic memory (see below)                                              |
+| excalidraw | MCP `mcp__excalidraw__*`                         | diagram export/generation                                                |
+
+Git wrappers are MANDATORY-first for issue/PR/milestone ops (see AGENTS.md hard gates 6–8).
+Queue guard before push/merge: `tools/git/ci-queue-wait.sh --purpose push|merge`.
 
 ## Credentials
 
-**Location:** (configure your credential file path)
-**Loader:** `source ~/.config/mosaic/tools/_lib/credentials.sh && load_credentials <service>`
+`source ~/.config/mosaic/tools/_lib/credentials.sh && load_credentials <service>`
+Supported: portainer, coolify (deprecated), authentik, glpi, github, gitea-mosaicstack,
+gitea-usc, woodpecker, cloudflare, turbo-cache, openbrain. Never expose or commit values.
 
-**Never expose actual values. Never commit credential files.**
+## OpenBrain — Semantic Memory (PRIMARY) — capture when you LEARN, never when you DO
 
-## CLI Gotchas
+Primary cross-agent memory (pgvector). Capture decisions/gotchas/preferences/patterns; never task
+starts, commits, PRs, test results, or file edits. At session start, `search` + `recent` to load
+prior context. MCP (`mcp__openbrain__capture/search/recent/stats`) preferred when connected; else
+REST/`tools/openbrain_client.py`. Full protocol: `guides/MEMORY.md`.
 
-(Add platform-specific CLI gotchas as you discover them.)
+**MANDATORY jarvis-brain rule:** when working in `~/src/jarvis-brain`, NEVER capture project data,
+meeting notes, status, timelines, or task completions to OpenBrain — the flat files
+(`data/projects/*.json`, `data/tasks/*.json`) are the SSOT (use `tools/brain.py` + direct JSON
+edits). OpenBrain there is for agent meta-observations ONLY (tooling gotchas, framework learnings,
+cross-project patterns). Violating this creates duplicate, divergent data.
+
+## Git Providers
+
+| Host                | Instance         | CI                               |
+| ------------------- | ---------------- | -------------------------------- |
+| git.mosaicstack.dev | mosaic (default) | ci.mosaicstack.dev (`-a mosaic`) |
+| git.uscllc.com      | usc              | ci.uscllc.com (`-a usc`)         |
+
+Match Woodpecker `-a` and credential instance to the target repo's git remote host.
 
 ## Safety Defaults
 
-- Prefer `trash` over `rm` when available — recoverable beats gone forever
-- Never run destructive commands without explicit instruction
-- Write it down — "mental notes" don't survive session restarts; files do
+- Prefer `trash` over `rm` when available — recoverable beats gone forever.
+- Never run destructive commands without explicit instruction.

packages/mosaic/framework/guides/TOOLS-REFERENCE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+# Machine-Level Tool Reference
+
+Centralized reference for tools, credentials, and CLI patterns available across all projects.
+Project-specific tooling belongs in the project's `AGENTS.md`, not here.
+
+All tool suites are located at `~/.config/mosaic/tools/`.
+
+## Tool Suites
+
+### Git Wrappers (Use First)
+
+Mosaic wrappers at `~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/*.sh` handle platform detection and edge cases. Always use these before raw CLI commands.
+
+```bash
+# Issues
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/issue-create.sh
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/issue-close.sh
+
+# PRs
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/pr-create.sh
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/pr-merge.sh
+
+# Milestones
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/milestone-create.sh
+
+# CI queue guard (required before push/merge)
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/ci-queue-wait.sh --purpose push|merge
+```
+
+### Code Review (Codex)
+
+```bash
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-code-review.sh --uncommitted
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-security-review.sh --uncommitted
+```
+
+### Infrastructure — Portainer
+
+```bash
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/portainer/stack-status.sh -n <stack-name>
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/portainer/stack-redeploy.sh -n <stack-name>
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/portainer/stack-list.sh
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/portainer/endpoint-list.sh
+```
+
+### Infrastructure — Coolify (DEPRECATED)
+
+> Coolify has been superseded by Portainer Docker Swarm in this stack.
+> Tools remain for reference but should not be used for new deployments.
+
+```bash
+# DEPRECATED — do not use for new deployments
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/coolify/project-list.sh
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/coolify/service-list.sh
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/coolify/service-status.sh -u <uuid>
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/coolify/deploy.sh -u <uuid>
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/coolify/env-set.sh -u <uuid> -k KEY -v VALUE
+```
+
+### Identity — Authentik
+
+```bash
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/authentik/user-list.sh
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/authentik/user-create.sh -u <username> -n <name> -e <email>
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/authentik/group-list.sh
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/authentik/app-list.sh
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/authentik/flow-list.sh
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/authentik/admin-status.sh
+```
+
+### CI/CD — Woodpecker
+
+Multi-instance support: `-a <instance>` selects a named instance. Omit `-a` to use the default from `woodpecker.default` in credentials.json.
+
+| Instance           | URL                | Serves                             |
+| ------------------ | ------------------ | ---------------------------------- |
+| `mosaic` (default) | ci.mosaicstack.dev | Mosaic repos (git.mosaicstack.dev) |
+| `usc`              | ci.uscllc.com      | USC repos (git.uscllc.com)         |
+
+```bash
+# List recent pipelines
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/woodpecker/pipeline-list.sh [-r owner/repo] [-a instance]
+
+# Check latest or specific pipeline status
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/woodpecker/pipeline-status.sh [-r owner/repo] [-n number] [-a instance]
+
+# Trigger a build
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/woodpecker/pipeline-trigger.sh [-r owner/repo] [-b branch] [-a instance]
+```
+
+Instance selection rule: match `-a` to the git remote host of the target repo. If the repo is on `git.uscllc.com`, use `-a usc`. If on `git.mosaicstack.dev`, use `-a mosaic` (or omit, since it's the default).
+
+### DNS — Cloudflare
+
+Multi-instance support: `-a <instance>` selects a named instance (e.g. `personal`, `work`). Omit `-a` to use the default from `cloudflare.default` in credentials.json.
+
+```bash
+# List zones (domains)
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/cloudflare/zone-list.sh [-a instance]
+
+# List DNS records (zone by name or ID)
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/cloudflare/record-list.sh -z <zone> [-a instance] [-t type] [-n name]
+
+# Create DNS record
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/cloudflare/record-create.sh -z <zone> -t <type> -n <name> -c <content> [-a instance] [-p] [-l ttl] [-P priority]
+
+# Update DNS record
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/cloudflare/record-update.sh -z <zone> -r <record-id> -t <type> -n <name> -c <content> [-a instance] [-p] [-l ttl]
+
+# Delete DNS record
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/cloudflare/record-delete.sh -z <zone> -r <record-id> [-a instance]
+```
+
+### IT Service — GLPI
+
+```bash
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/glpi/ticket-list.sh
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/glpi/ticket-create.sh -t <title> -c <content>
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/glpi/computer-list.sh
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/glpi/user-list.sh
+```
+
+### Health Check
+
+```bash
+# Check all configured services
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/health/stack-health.sh
+
+# Check a specific service
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/health/stack-health.sh -s portainer
+
+# JSON output for automation
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/health/stack-health.sh -f json
+```
+
+### Shared Credential Loader
+
+```bash
+# Source in any script to load service credentials
+source ~/.config/mosaic/tools/_lib/credentials.sh
+load_credentials <service-name>
+# Supported: portainer, coolify, authentik, glpi, github, gitea-mosaicstack, gitea-usc, woodpecker, cloudflare, turbo-cache, openbrain
+```
+
+### OpenBrain — Semantic Memory (PRIMARY)
+
+Self-hosted semantic brain backed by pgvector. Primary shared memory layer for all agents across all sessions and harnesses. Stores and retrieves decisions, context, and observations via semantic search.
+
+**MANDATORY jarvis-brain rule:** When working in `~/src/jarvis-brain`, NEVER capture project data, meeting notes, status updates, timeline decisions, or task completions to OpenBrain. The flat files (`data/projects/*.json`, `data/tasks/*.json`) are the SSOT — use `tools/brain.py` and direct JSON edits. OpenBrain is for agent meta-observations ONLY (tooling gotchas, framework learnings, cross-project patterns). Violating this creates duplicate, divergent data.
+
+**Credentials:** `load_credentials openbrain` → exports `OPENBRAIN_URL`, `OPENBRAIN_TOKEN`
+
+Configure in your credentials.json:
+
+```json
+"openbrain": {
+  "url": "https://<your-openbrain-host>",
+  "api_key": "<your-api-key>"
+}
+```
+
+**REST API** (any language, any harness):
+
+```bash
+source ~/.config/mosaic/tools/_lib/credentials.sh && load_credentials openbrain
+
+# Search by meaning
+curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $OPENBRAIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d '{"query": "your search", "limit": 5}' "$OPENBRAIN_URL/v1/search"
+
+# Capture a thought
+curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $OPENBRAIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -d '{"content": "...", "source": "agent-name", "metadata": {}}' "$OPENBRAIN_URL/v1/thoughts"
+
+# Recent activity
+curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $OPENBRAIN_TOKEN" "$OPENBRAIN_URL/v1/thoughts/recent?limit=5"
+
+# Stats
+curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $OPENBRAIN_TOKEN" "$OPENBRAIN_URL/v1/stats"
+```
+
+**Python client** (if jarvis-brain is available on PYTHONPATH):
+
+```bash
+python tools/openbrain_client.py search "topic"
+python tools/openbrain_client.py capture "decision or observation" --source agent-name
+python tools/openbrain_client.py recent --limit 5
+python tools/openbrain_client.py stats
+```
+
+**MCP (Claude Code sessions):** When connected, `mcp__openbrain__capture/search/recent/stats` tools are available natively — prefer those over CLI when in a Claude session.
+
+**Rule: capture when you LEARN something. Never when you DO something.**
+
+| Trigger                                   | Action                                    | Retention             |
+| ----------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------- | --------------------- |
+| Session start                             | `search` + `recent` to load prior context | —                     |
+| Architectural or tooling decision made    | Capture with rationale                    | `long` or `permanent` |
+| Gotcha or non-obvious behavior discovered | Capture immediately                       | `medium`              |
+| User preference stated or confirmed       | Capture                                   | `permanent`           |
+| Cross-project pattern identified          | Capture                                   | `permanent`           |
+| Prior decision superseded                 | UPDATE existing thought                   | (keep tier)           |
+
+**Never capture:** task started, commit pushed, PR opened, test results, file edits, CI status.
+
+Full protocol and cleanup tools: `~/.config/mosaic/guides/MEMORY.md`
+Smart capture wrapper (enforces schema + dedup): `~/.config/mosaic/tools/openbrain/capture.sh`
+
+### Excalidraw — Diagram Export (MCP)
+
+Headless `.excalidraw` → SVG export via `@excalidraw/excalidraw`. Available as MCP tools in Claude Code sessions.
+
+**MCP tools (when connected):**
+
+| Tool                                      | Input                                         | Output                                               |
+| ----------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------- |
+| `mcp__excalidraw__excalidraw_to_svg`      | `elements` JSON string + optional `app_state` | SVG string                                           |
+| `mcp__excalidraw__excalidraw_file_to_svg` | `file_path` to `.excalidraw`                  | SVG string + writes `.svg` alongside                 |
+| `mcp__excalidraw__list_diagrams`          | (none)                                        | Available templates (requires `EXCALIDRAW_GEN_PATH`) |
+| `mcp__excalidraw__generate_diagram`       | `name`, optional `output_path`                | Path to generated `.excalidraw`                      |
+| `mcp__excalidraw__generate_and_export`    | `name`, optional `output_path`                | Paths to `.excalidraw` and `.svg`                    |
+
+**Diagram generation** (`list_diagrams`, `generate_diagram`, `generate_and_export`) requires `EXCALIDRAW_GEN_PATH` env var pointing to `excalidraw_gen.py`. Set in environment or shell profile:
+
+```bash
+export EXCALIDRAW_GEN_PATH="$HOME/src/jarvis-brain/tools/excalidraw_export/excalidraw_gen.py"
+```
+
+**Manual registration:**
+
+```bash
+mosaic-ensure-excalidraw           # install deps + register with Claude
+mosaic-ensure-excalidraw --check   # verify registration
+```
+
+## Git Providers
+
+| Instance                      | URL | CLI | Purpose |
+| ----------------------------- | --- | --- | ------- |
+| (add your git providers here) |     |     |         |
+
+## Credentials
+
+**Location:** (configure your credential file path)
+**Loader:** `source ~/.config/mosaic/tools/_lib/credentials.sh && load_credentials <service>`
+
+**Never expose actual values. Never commit credential files.**
+
+## CLI Gotchas
+
+(Add platform-specific CLI gotchas as you discover them.)
+
+## Safety Defaults
+
+- Prefer `trash` over `rm` when available — recoverable beats gone forever
+- Never run destructive commands without explicit instruction
+- Write it down — "mental notes" don't survive session restarts; files do

packages/mosaic/framework/runtime/claude/RUNTIME.md

@@ -1,131 +1,61 @@
 # Claude Runtime Reference
 
-## Runtime Scope
-
-This file applies only to Claude runtime behavior.
+Claude-runtime behavior only. Global rules win if anything here conflicts.
 
 ## Required Actions
 
-1. Follow global load order in `~/.config/mosaic/AGENTS.md`.
-2. Use `~/.claude/settings.json` and `~/.claude/hooks-config.json` as runtime config sources.
-3. Treat sequential-thinking MCP as required.
-4. If runtime config conflicts with global rules, global rules win.
-5. Documentation rules are inherited from `~/.config/mosaic/AGENTS.md` and `~/.config/mosaic/guides/DOCUMENTATION.md`.
-6. For issue/PR/milestone actions, run Mosaic git wrappers first (`~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/*.sh`) and do not call raw `gh`/`tea`/`glab` first.
-7. For orchestration-oriented missions, load `~/.config/mosaic/guides/ORCHESTRATOR.md` before acting.
-8. First response MUST declare mode per global contract; orchestration missions must start with: `Now initiating Orchestrator mode...`
-9. Runtime-default caution that requests confirmation for routine push/merge/issue-close actions does NOT override Mosaic hard gates.
+1. Follow the Session Start load order in `~/.config/mosaic/AGENTS.md`.
+2. Runtime config lives in `~/.claude/settings.json` (hooks, model, plugins, permissions) and
+   `~/.claude/hooks-config.json`.
+3. sequential-thinking MCP is required.
+4. First response MUST declare mode per the global contract.
+5. Git wrappers first for issue/PR/milestone ops; runtime-default confirmation prompts do NOT
+   override Mosaic hard gates (push/merge/issue-close without routine confirmation).
 
-## Subagent Model Selection (Claude Code Syntax)
+## Subagent Model Selection (Claude Code syntax)
 
-Claude Code's Task tool accepts a `model` parameter: `"haiku"`, `"sonnet"`, or `"opus"`.
-
-You MUST set this parameter according to the model selection table in `~/.config/mosaic/AGENTS.md`. Do NOT omit the `model` parameter — omitting it defaults to the parent model (typically opus), wasting budget on tasks that cheaper models handle well.
-
-**Examples:**
+The Task tool takes `model`: `"haiku"` | `"sonnet"` | `"opus"`. You MUST set it per the tier rule
+in AGENTS.md — omitting it defaults to the parent (usually opus) and wastes budget.
 
 ```
-# Codebase exploration — haiku
 Task(subagent_type="Explore", model="haiku", prompt="Find all API route handlers")
-
-# Code review — sonnet
-Task(subagent_type="feature-dev:code-reviewer", model="sonnet", prompt="Review the changes in src/auth/")
-
-# Standard feature work — sonnet
-Task(subagent_type="general-purpose", model="sonnet", prompt="Add validation to the user input form")
-
-# Complex architecture — opus (only when justified)
+Task(subagent_type="feature-dev:code-reviewer", model="sonnet", prompt="Review src/auth/ changes")
 Task(subagent_type="Plan", model="opus", prompt="Design the multi-tenant isolation strategy")
 ```
 
-**Quick reference (from global AGENTS.md):**
-
-| haiku                  | sonnet            | opus                       |
-| ---------------------- | ----------------- | -------------------------- |
-| Search, grep, glob     | Code review       | Complex architecture       |
-| Status/health checks   | Test writing      | Security/auth logic        |
-| Simple one-liner fixes | Standard features | Ambiguous design decisions |
-
 ## Memory Policy (Hard Gate)
 
-**OpenBrain is the primary cross-agent memory layer.** All agent learnings, gotchas, decisions, and project state MUST be captured to OpenBrain via the `capture` MCP tool or REST API.
+OpenBrain is the primary cross-agent memory layer — capture learnings/gotchas/decisions there
+(`capture` MCP tool or REST). `~/.claude/projects/*/memory/MEMORY.md` is **write-blocked** by the
+`prevent-memory-write.sh` PreToolUse hook (the rule alone proved insufficient — the hook is the
+hard gate). At session start, `search(topic)` + `recent()` to load prior context. Full protocol:
+`~/.config/mosaic/guides/MEMORY.md`.
 
-`~/.claude/projects/*/memory/MEMORY.md` files are **write-blocked by PreToolUse hook** (`prevent-memory-write.sh`). Any attempt to write agent learnings there will be rejected with an error directing you to OpenBrain.
-
-### What belongs where
-
-| Content                                         | Location                                                               |
-| ----------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| Discoveries, gotchas, decisions, observations   | OpenBrain `capture` — searchable by all agents                         |
-| Active task state                               | `docs/TASKS.md` or `docs/scratchpads/`                                 |
-| Behavioral guardrails that MUST be in load-path | `MEMORY.md` (read-mostly; write only for genuine behavioral overrides) |
-| Mosaic framework technical notes                | `~/.config/mosaic/memory/`                                             |
-
-### Using OpenBrain
-
-At session start, load prior context:
-
-```
-search("topic or project name")   # semantic search
-recent(limit=5)                    # what's been happening
-```
-
-When you discover something:
-
-```
-capture("The thing you learned", source="project/context", metadata={"type": "gotcha", ...})
-```
-
-### Why the hook exists
-
-Instructions in RUNTIME.md, CLAUDE.md, and MEMORY.md are insufficient — agents default to writing local MEMORY.md regardless of written rules. The PreToolUse hook is a hard technical gate that makes the correct behavior the only possible behavior.
+Quick placement: discoveries/decisions → OpenBrain; active task state → `docs/TASKS.md` or
+`docs/scratchpads/`; Mosaic framework notes → `~/.config/mosaic/memory/`.
 
 ## MCP Configuration
 
-**MCPs are configured in `~/.claude.json` — NOT `~/.claude/settings.json`.**
-
-`settings.json` controls hooks, model, plugins, and allowed commands.
-`~/.claude.json` is the global Claude Code state file where `mcpServers` lives.
-
-To register an MCP server that persists across all sessions:
+MCP servers are configured in `~/.claude.json` (key `mcpServers`) — NOT `~/.claude/settings.json`,
+where that key is ignored. `settings.json` controls hooks/model/plugins/permissions.
 
 ```bash
-# HTTP MCP (e.g. OpenBrain)
 claude mcp add --scope user --transport http <name> <url> --header "Authorization: Bearer <token>"
-
-# stdio MCP
-claude mcp add --scope user <name> -- npx -y <package>
+claude mcp add --scope user <name> -- npx -y <package>   # stdio
 ```
 
-`--scope user` = writes to `~/.claude.json` (global, all projects).
-`--scope project` = writes to `.claude/settings.json` in project root.
-`--scope local` = default, local-only (not committed).
+`--scope user` → `~/.claude.json` (global); `project` → `.claude/settings.json`; `local` (default)
+→ not committed.
 
-Do NOT add `mcpServers` to `~/.claude/settings.json` — that key is ignored for MCP loading.
+## Required Settings (launcher-audited, advisory)
 
-## Required Claude Code Settings (Enforced by Launcher)
+`mosaic claude` warns if `~/.claude/settings.json` is missing these (session still launches):
 
-The `mosaic claude` launcher validates that `~/.claude/settings.json` contains the required Mosaic configuration. Missing or outdated settings trigger a warning at launch.
+- **Hooks** — PreToolUse `prevent-memory-write.sh` (Write|Edit|MultiEdit); PostToolUse
+  `qa-hook-stdin.sh` + `typecheck-hook.sh` (Edit|MultiEdit|Write).
+- **Plugins** — `feature-dev`, `pr-review-toolkit`, `code-review`.
+- **Settings** — `enableAllMcpTools: true`; `model: "opus"` (orchestrator default; workers use
+  tiered models via the Task `model` param).
 
-**Required hooks:**
-
-| Event       | Matcher                  | Script                    | Purpose                                        |
-| ----------- | ------------------------ | ------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------- |
-| PreToolUse  | `Write\|Edit\|MultiEdit` | `prevent-memory-write.sh` | Block writes to `~/.claude/projects/*/memory/` |
-| PostToolUse | `Edit\|MultiEdit\|Write` | `qa-hook-stdin.sh`        | QA report generation after code edits          |
-| PostToolUse | `Edit\|MultiEdit\|Write` | `typecheck-hook.sh`       | Inline TypeScript type checking                |
-
-**Required plugins:**
-
-| Plugin              | Purpose                                                                                                  |
-| ------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| `feature-dev`       | Subagent architecture: code-reviewer, code-architect, code-explorer                                      |
-| `pr-review-toolkit` | PR review: code-simplifier, comment-analyzer, test-analyzer, silent-failure-hunter, type-design-analyzer |
-| `code-review`       | Standalone code review capabilities                                                                      |
-
-**Required settings:**
-
-- `enableAllMcpTools: true` — Allow all configured MCP tools without per-tool approval
-- `model: "opus"` — Default to opus for orchestrator-level sessions (workers use tiered models via Task tool)
-
-If `mosaic claude` detects missing hooks or plugins, it will print a warning with the exact settings to add. The session will still launch — enforcement is advisory, not blocking — but agents operating without these settings are running degraded.
+Note: PostToolUse hook plain stdout on exit 0 goes to the debug log, not model context — only
+`hookSpecificOutput.additionalContext` (or exit-2 stderr) enters context.

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/_lib/credentials.sh

@@ -52,6 +52,20 @@ _mosaic_sync_woodpecker_env() {
   printf '%s\n' "$expected" > "$env_file"
 }
 
+# Load legacy flat Woodpecker credentials (.woodpecker.url / .woodpecker.token).
+# Some environments export WOODPECKER_INSTANCE=mosaic, but the current
+# credentials.json may still use the legacy flat schema. Treat "mosaic" as the
+# default flat instance when a nested .woodpecker.mosaic object is absent.
+_mosaic_load_woodpecker_legacy() {
+  export WOODPECKER_URL="$(_mosaic_read_cred '.woodpecker.url')"
+  export WOODPECKER_TOKEN="$(_mosaic_read_cred '.woodpecker.token')"
+  export WOODPECKER_INSTANCE="${WOODPECKER_INSTANCE:-mosaic}"
+  WOODPECKER_URL="${WOODPECKER_URL%/}"
+  [[ -n "$WOODPECKER_URL" ]] || { echo "Error: woodpecker.url not found" >&2; return 1; }
+  [[ -n "$WOODPECKER_TOKEN" ]] || { echo "Error: woodpecker.token not found" >&2; return 1; }
+  _mosaic_sync_woodpecker_env "$WOODPECKER_INSTANCE" "$WOODPECKER_URL" "$WOODPECKER_TOKEN"
+}
+
 load_credentials() {
   local service="$1"
 
@@ -155,7 +169,14 @@ EOF
       ;;
     woodpecker-*)
       local wp_instance="${service#woodpecker-}"
-      # credentials.json is authoritative — always read from it, ignore env
+      # credentials.json is authoritative — always read from it, ignore env.
+      # Backward compatibility: the default Mosaic Woodpecker instance may be
+      # stored in the legacy flat schema (.woodpecker.url/.token) instead of
+      # .woodpecker.mosaic.url/.token.
+      if [[ "$wp_instance" == "mosaic" ]] && [[ -z "$(_mosaic_read_cred '.woodpecker.mosaic.url')" ]] && [[ -n "$(_mosaic_read_cred '.woodpecker.url')" ]]; then
+        WOODPECKER_INSTANCE="mosaic" _mosaic_load_woodpecker_legacy
+        return $?
+      fi
       export WOODPECKER_URL="$(_mosaic_read_cred ".woodpecker.${wp_instance}.url")"
       export WOODPECKER_TOKEN="$(_mosaic_read_cred ".woodpecker.${wp_instance}.token")"
       export WOODPECKER_INSTANCE="$wp_instance"
@@ -166,7 +187,10 @@ EOF
       _mosaic_sync_woodpecker_env "$wp_instance" "$WOODPECKER_URL" "$WOODPECKER_TOKEN"
       ;;
     woodpecker)
-      # Resolve default instance, then load it
+      # Resolve default instance, then load it. If WOODPECKER_INSTANCE is set to
+      # "mosaic" by a shell/profile but credentials.json still uses the legacy
+      # flat .woodpecker.url/.token schema, load the flat credentials instead of
+      # failing with "woodpecker.mosaic.url not found".
       local wp_default
       wp_default="${WOODPECKER_INSTANCE:-$(_mosaic_read_cred '.woodpecker.default')}"
       if [[ -z "$wp_default" ]]; then
@@ -174,18 +198,18 @@ EOF
         local legacy_url
         legacy_url="$(_mosaic_read_cred '.woodpecker.url')"
         if [[ -n "$legacy_url" ]]; then
-          export WOODPECKER_URL="${WOODPECKER_URL:-$legacy_url}"
-          export WOODPECKER_TOKEN="${WOODPECKER_TOKEN:-$(_mosaic_read_cred '.woodpecker.token')}"
-          WOODPECKER_URL="${WOODPECKER_URL%/}"
-          [[ -n "$WOODPECKER_URL" ]] || { echo "Error: woodpecker.url not found" >&2; return 1; }
-          [[ -n "$WOODPECKER_TOKEN" ]] || { echo "Error: woodpecker.token not found" >&2; return 1; }
+          _mosaic_load_woodpecker_legacy
         else
           echo "Error: woodpecker.default not set and no WOODPECKER_INSTANCE env var" >&2
           echo "Available instances: $(jq -r '.woodpecker | keys | join(", ")' "$MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE" 2>/dev/null)" >&2
           return 1
         fi
       else
-        load_credentials "woodpecker-${wp_default}"
+        if [[ "$wp_default" == "mosaic" ]] && [[ -z "$(_mosaic_read_cred '.woodpecker.mosaic.url')" ]] && [[ -n "$(_mosaic_read_cred '.woodpecker.url')" ]]; then
+          WOODPECKER_INSTANCE="mosaic" _mosaic_load_woodpecker_legacy
+        else
+          load_credentials "woodpecker-${wp_default}"
+        fi
       fi
       ;;
     cloudflare-*)

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/ci-queue-wait.sh

@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ gitea_get_branch_head_sha() {
     local branch="$3"
     local token="$4"
     local url="https://${host}/api/v1/repos/${repo}/branches/${branch}"
-    curl -fsS -H "Authorization: token ${token}" "$url" | python3 -c '
+    curl -fsSL -H "Authorization: token ${token}" "$url" | python3 -c '
 import json, sys
 data = json.load(sys.stdin)
 commit = data.get("commit") or {}
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ gitea_get_commit_status_json() {
     local sha="$3"
     local token="$4"
     local url="https://${host}/api/v1/repos/${repo}/commits/${sha}/status"
-    curl -fsS -H "Authorization: token ${token}" "$url"
+    curl -fsSL -H "Authorization: token ${token}" "$url"
 }
 
 while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/detect-platform.sh

@@ -74,6 +74,16 @@ get_repo_name() {
     echo "${repo_info##*/}"
 }
 
+get_repo_slug() {
+    get_repo_info
+}
+
+get_gitea_repo_args() {
+    local repo
+    repo=$(get_repo_slug) || return 1
+    printf -- '--repo %q --login %q' "$repo" "${GITEA_LOGIN:-mosaicstack}"
+}
+
 get_remote_host() {
     local remote_url
     remote_url=$(git remote get-url origin 2>/dev/null || true)
@@ -103,16 +113,28 @@ get_gitea_token() {
     if [[ -f "$cred_loader" ]]; then
         local token
         token=$(
+            # shellcheck source=/dev/null
             source "$cred_loader"
+            # Host-specific wrapper resolution must not inherit caller/global GITEA_*.
+            # load_credentials intentionally preserves existing env vars for interactive use,
+            # but metadata/merge wrappers need credentials matching the remote host.
+            unset GITEA_TOKEN GITEA_URL
             case "$host" in
                 git.mosaicstack.dev) load_credentials gitea-mosaicstack 2>/dev/null ;;
                 git.uscllc.com)      load_credentials gitea-usc 2>/dev/null ;;
                 *)
+                    local matched=false
                     for svc in gitea-mosaicstack gitea-usc; do
-                        load_credentials "$svc" 2>/dev/null || continue
-                        [[ "${GITEA_URL:-}" == *"$host"* ]] && break
                         unset GITEA_TOKEN GITEA_URL
+                        load_credentials "$svc" 2>/dev/null || continue
+                        if [[ "${GITEA_URL:-}" == "https://$host" || "${GITEA_URL:-}" == "http://$host" || "${GITEA_URL:-}" == *"//$host" ]]; then
+                            matched=true
+                            break
+                        fi
                     done
+                    if [[ "$matched" != true ]]; then
+                        unset GITEA_TOKEN GITEA_URL
+                    fi
                     ;;
             esac
             echo "${GITEA_TOKEN:-}"
@@ -123,10 +145,12 @@ get_gitea_token() {
         fi
     fi
 
-    # 2. GITEA_TOKEN env var (may be set by caller)
+    # 2. GITEA_TOKEN env var (only when GITEA_URL, if present, matches the remote host)
     if [[ -n "${GITEA_TOKEN:-}" ]]; then
-        echo "$GITEA_TOKEN"
-        return 0
+        if [[ -z "${GITEA_URL:-}" || "${GITEA_URL:-}" == "https://$host" || "${GITEA_URL:-}" == "http://$host" || "${GITEA_URL:-}" == *"//$host" ]]; then
+            echo "$GITEA_TOKEN"
+            return 0
+        fi
     fi
 
     # 3. ~/.git-credentials file
@@ -143,6 +167,37 @@ get_gitea_token() {
     return 1
 }
 
+# Resolve HTTPS basic auth credentials for a Gitea host from ~/.git-credentials.
+# Prints "username:password" for direct curl -u consumption. Callers must not log it.
+get_gitea_basic_auth() {
+    local host="$1"
+    local creds="$HOME/.git-credentials"
+    if [[ ! -f "$creds" ]]; then
+        return 1
+    fi
+
+    python3 - "$host" "$creds" <<'PY'
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+from urllib.parse import unquote, urlparse
+
+host = sys.argv[1]
+creds = Path(sys.argv[2])
+
+for line in creds.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
+    parsed = urlparse(line.strip())
+    if parsed.hostname != host:
+        continue
+    username = unquote(parsed.username or "")
+    password = unquote(parsed.password or "")
+    if username and password:
+        print(f"{username}:{password}")
+        raise SystemExit(0)
+
+raise SystemExit(1)
+PY
+}
+
 # If script is run directly (not sourced), output the platform
 if [[ "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" == "${0}" ]]; then
     detect_platform

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/issue-comment.sh

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
     gh issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" --body "$COMMENT"
     echo "Added comment to GitHub issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER"
 elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
-    tea issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" "$COMMENT"
+    tea issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" "$COMMENT" $(get_gitea_repo_args)
     echo "Added comment to Gitea issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER"
 else
     echo "Error: Unknown platform"

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/issue-create.sh

@@ -112,20 +112,22 @@ PLATFORM=$(detect_platform)
 
 case "$PLATFORM" in
     github)
-        CMD="gh issue create --title \"$TITLE\""
-        [[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD="$CMD --body \"$BODY\""
-        [[ -n "$LABELS" ]] && CMD="$CMD --label \"$LABELS\""
-        [[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]] && CMD="$CMD --milestone \"$MILESTONE\""
-        eval "$CMD"
+        CMD=(gh issue create --title "$TITLE")
+        [[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD+=(--body "$BODY")
+        [[ -n "$LABELS" ]] && CMD+=(--label "$LABELS")
+        [[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]] && CMD+=(--milestone "$MILESTONE")
+        "${CMD[@]}"
         ;;
     gitea)
         if command -v tea >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-            CMD="tea issue create --title \"$TITLE\""
-            [[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD="$CMD --description \"$BODY\""
-            [[ -n "$LABELS" ]] && CMD="$CMD --labels \"$LABELS\""
+            REPO_SLUG=$(get_repo_slug)
+            REPO_ARGS=(--repo "$REPO_SLUG" --login "${GITEA_LOGIN:-mosaicstack}")
+            CMD=(tea issue create "${REPO_ARGS[@]}" --title "$TITLE")
+            [[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD+=(--description "$BODY")
+            [[ -n "$LABELS" ]] && CMD+=(--labels "$LABELS")
             # tea accepts milestone by name directly (verified 2026-02-05)
-            [[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]] && CMD="$CMD --milestone \"$MILESTONE\""
-            if eval "$CMD"; then
+            [[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]] && CMD+=(--milestone "$MILESTONE")
+            if "${CMD[@]}"; then
                 exit 0
             fi
             echo "Warning: tea issue create failed, trying Gitea API fallback..." >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/issue-list.sh

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 # issue-list.sh - List issues on Gitea or GitHub
-# Usage: issue-list.sh [-s state] [-l label] [-m milestone] [-a assignee]
+# Usage: issue-list.sh [-r owner/repo] [-s state] [-l label] [-m milestone] [-a assignee]
 
 set -e
 
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ LABEL=""
 MILESTONE=""
 ASSIGNEE=""
 LIMIT=100
+REPO_OVERRIDE=""
 
 usage() {
     cat <<EOF
@@ -26,12 +27,14 @@ Options:
     -m, --milestone NAME    Filter by milestone name
     -a, --assignee USER     Filter by assignee
     -n, --limit N           Maximum issues to show (default: 100)
+    -r, --repo OWNER/REPO   Repository slug (default: infer from git origin)
     -h, --help              Show this help message
 
 Examples:
     $(basename "$0")                          # List open issues
     $(basename "$0") -s all -l bug            # All issues with 'bug' label
     $(basename "$0") -m "0.2.0"               # Issues in milestone 0.2.0
+    $(basename "$0") --repo ddk/ai-bma         # List issues from anywhere
 EOF
     exit 1
 }
@@ -59,6 +62,10 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             LIMIT="$2"
             shift 2
             ;;
+        -r|--repo)
+            REPO_OVERRIDE="$2"
+            shift 2
+            ;;
         -h|--help)
             usage
             ;;
@@ -69,25 +76,34 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
     esac
 done
 
-PLATFORM=$(detect_platform)
+if [[ -n "$REPO_OVERRIDE" ]]; then
+    REPO_INFO="$REPO_OVERRIDE"
+    PLATFORM=$(detect_platform 2>/dev/null || echo gitea)
+else
+    PLATFORM=$(detect_platform)
+    REPO_INFO=$(get_repo_info)
+fi
+
+if [[ -z "$REPO_INFO" || "$REPO_INFO" == error:* ]]; then
+    echo "Error: Could not determine repository from git origin. Run from a repo or pass --repo." >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
 
 case "$PLATFORM" in
     github)
-        CMD="gh issue list --state $STATE --limit $LIMIT"
-        [[ -n "$LABEL" ]] && CMD="$CMD --label \"$LABEL\""
-        [[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]] && CMD="$CMD --milestone \"$MILESTONE\""
-        [[ -n "$ASSIGNEE" ]] && CMD="$CMD --assignee \"$ASSIGNEE\""
-        eval "$CMD"
+        CMD=(gh issue list --repo "$REPO_INFO" --state "$STATE" --limit "$LIMIT")
+        [[ -n "$LABEL" ]] && CMD+=(--label "$LABEL")
+        [[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]] && CMD+=(--milestone "$MILESTONE")
+        [[ -n "$ASSIGNEE" ]] && CMD+=(--assignee "$ASSIGNEE")
+        "${CMD[@]}"
         ;;
     gitea)
-        CMD="tea issues list --state $STATE --limit $LIMIT"
-        [[ -n "$LABEL" ]] && CMD="$CMD --labels \"$LABEL\""
-        [[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]] && CMD="$CMD --milestones \"$MILESTONE\""
-        # Note: tea may not support assignee filter directly
-        eval "$CMD"
-        if [[ -n "$ASSIGNEE" ]]; then
-            echo "Note: Assignee filtering may require manual review for Gitea" >&2
-        fi
+        CMD=(tea issues list --repo "$REPO_INFO" --login "${GITEA_LOGIN:-mosaicstack}" --state "$STATE" --limit "$LIMIT")
+        [[ -n "$LABEL" ]] && CMD+=(--labels "$LABEL")
+        [[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]] && CMD+=(--milestones "$MILESTONE")
+        # Note: tea may not support assignee filter directly in all versions.
+        [[ -n "$ASSIGNEE" ]] && echo "Note: Assignee filtering may require manual review for Gitea" >&2
+        "${CMD[@]}"
         ;;
     *)
         echo "Error: Could not detect git platform" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/issue-reopen.sh

@@ -52,9 +52,9 @@ if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
     echo "Reopened GitHub issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER"
 elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
     if [[ -n "$COMMENT" ]]; then
-        tea issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" "$COMMENT"
+        tea issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" "$COMMENT" $(get_gitea_repo_args)
     fi
-    tea issue reopen "$ISSUE_NUMBER"
+    tea issue reopen "$ISSUE_NUMBER" $(get_gitea_repo_args)
     echo "Reopened Gitea issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER"
 else
     echo "Error: Unknown platform"

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/issue-view.sh

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
     gh issue view "$ISSUE_NUMBER"
 elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
     if command -v tea >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        if tea issue "$ISSUE_NUMBER"; then
+        if tea issue "$ISSUE_NUMBER" $(get_gitea_repo_args); then
             exit 0
         fi
         echo "Warning: tea issue view failed, trying Gitea API fallback..." >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-ci-wait.sh

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 # pr-ci-wait.sh - Wait for PR CI status to reach terminal state (GitHub/Gitea)
-# Usage: pr-ci-wait.sh -n <pr_number> [-t timeout_sec] [-i interval_sec]
+# Usage: pr-ci-wait.sh -n <pr_number> [-r owner/repo] [-t timeout_sec] [-i interval_sec]
 
 set -euo pipefail
 
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
 PR_NUMBER=""
 TIMEOUT_SEC=1800
 INTERVAL_SEC=15
+REPO_OVERRIDE=""
 
 usage() {
     cat <<EOF
@@ -17,12 +18,14 @@ Usage: $(basename "$0") -n <pr_number> [-t timeout_sec] [-i interval_sec]
 
 Options:
   -n, --number NUMBER      PR number (required)
+  -r, --repo OWNER/REPO    Repository slug (default: infer from git origin)
   -t, --timeout SECONDS    Max wait time in seconds (default: 1800)
   -i, --interval SECONDS   Poll interval in seconds (default: 15)
   -h, --help               Show this help
 
 Examples:
   $(basename "$0") -n 643
+  $(basename "$0") -n 643 --repo ddk/ai-bma
   $(basename "$0") -n 643 -t 900 -i 10
 EOF
 }
@@ -30,12 +33,19 @@ EOF
 # get_remote_host and get_gitea_token are provided by detect-platform.sh
 
 extract_state_from_status_json() {
-    python3 - <<'PY'
+    # Capture piped JSON BEFORE invoking `python3 - <<PY`. The heredoc binds
+    # stdin to the Python program text — so json.load(sys.stdin) inside would
+    # try to re-read stdin after `-` already consumed it for the program,
+    # yielding EOF and returning "unknown" every time. Pass payload via env.
+    local payload
+    payload=$(cat)
+    PR_CI_STATUS_JSON="$payload" python3 - <<'PY'
 import json
+import os
 import sys
 
 try:
-    payload = json.load(sys.stdin)
+    payload = json.loads(os.environ.get("PR_CI_STATUS_JSON", ""))
 except Exception:
     print("unknown")
     raise SystemExit(0)
@@ -66,12 +76,16 @@ PY
 }
 
 print_status_summary() {
-    python3 - <<'PY'
+    # Same stdin-collision fix as extract_state_from_status_json above.
+    local payload
+    payload=$(cat)
+    PR_CI_STATUS_JSON="$payload" python3 - <<'PY'
 import json
+import os
 import sys
 
 try:
-    payload = json.load(sys.stdin)
+    payload = json.loads(os.environ.get("PR_CI_STATUS_JSON", ""))
 except Exception:
     print("[pr-ci-wait] status payload unavailable")
     raise SystemExit(0)
@@ -95,7 +109,7 @@ PY
 }
 
 github_get_pr_head_sha() {
-    gh pr view "$PR_NUMBER" --json headRefOid --jq '.headRefOid'
+    gh pr view "$PR_NUMBER" --repo "$OWNER/$REPO" --json headRefOid --jq '.headRefOid'
 }
 
 github_get_commit_status_json() {
@@ -110,7 +124,7 @@ gitea_get_pr_head_sha() {
     local repo="$2"
     local token="$3"
     local url="https://${host}/api/v1/repos/${repo}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}"
-    curl -fsS -H "Authorization: token ${token}" "$url" | python3 -c '
+    curl -fsSL -H "Authorization: token ${token}" "$url" | python3 -c '
 import json, sys
 data = json.load(sys.stdin)
 print((data.get("head") or {}).get("sha", ""))
@@ -123,7 +137,7 @@ gitea_get_commit_status_json() {
     local token="$3"
     local sha="$4"
     local url="https://${host}/api/v1/repos/${repo}/commits/${sha}/status"
-    curl -fsS -H "Authorization: token ${token}" "$url"
+    curl -fsSL -H "Authorization: token ${token}" "$url"
 }
 
 while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
@@ -132,6 +146,10 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             PR_NUMBER="$2"
             shift 2
             ;;
+        -r|--repo)
+            REPO_OVERRIDE="$2"
+            shift 2
+            ;;
         -t|--timeout)
             TIMEOUT_SEC="$2"
             shift 2
@@ -163,10 +181,21 @@ if ! [[ "$TIMEOUT_SEC" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || ! [[ "$INTERVAL_SEC" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; th
     exit 1
 fi
 
-detect_platform > /dev/null
+if [[ -n "$REPO_OVERRIDE" ]]; then
+    REPO_INFO="$REPO_OVERRIDE"
+    PLATFORM=$(detect_platform 2>/dev/null || echo gitea)
+else
+    detect_platform > /dev/null
+    REPO_INFO=$(get_repo_info)
+fi
 
-OWNER=$(get_repo_owner)
-REPO=$(get_repo_name)
+if [[ -z "$REPO_INFO" || "$REPO_INFO" == error:* || "$REPO_INFO" != */* ]]; then
+    echo "Error: Could not determine repository from git origin. Run from a repo or pass --repo owner/repo." >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+OWNER=${REPO_INFO%%/*}
+REPO=${REPO_INFO##*/}
 START_TS=$(date +%s)
 DEADLINE_TS=$((START_TS + TIMEOUT_SEC))
 
@@ -182,10 +211,7 @@ if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
     fi
     echo "[pr-ci-wait] Platform=github PR=#${PR_NUMBER} head_sha=${HEAD_SHA}"
 elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
-    HOST=$(get_remote_host) || {
-        echo "Error: Could not determine remote host." >&2
-        exit 1
-    }
+    HOST=$(get_remote_host 2>/dev/null || echo "git.mosaicstack.dev")
     TOKEN=$(get_gitea_token "$HOST") || {
         echo "Error: Gitea token not found. Set GITEA_TOKEN or configure ~/.git-credentials." >&2
         exit 1
@@ -195,7 +221,7 @@ elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
         echo "Error: Could not resolve head SHA for PR #$PR_NUMBER." >&2
         exit 1
     fi
-    echo "[pr-ci-wait] Platform=gitea host=${HOST} PR=#${PR_NUMBER} head_sha=${HEAD_SHA}"
+    echo "[pr-ci-wait] Platform=gitea host=${HOST} repo=${OWNER}/${REPO} PR=#${PR_NUMBER} head_sha=${HEAD_SHA}"
 else
     echo "Error: Unsupported platform '${PLATFORM}'." >&2
     exit 1

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-close.sh

@@ -52,9 +52,9 @@ if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
     echo "Closed GitHub PR #$PR_NUMBER"
 elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
     if [[ -n "$COMMENT" ]]; then
-        tea pr comment "$PR_NUMBER" "$COMMENT"
+        tea pr comment "$PR_NUMBER" "$COMMENT" $(get_gitea_repo_args)
     fi
-    tea pr close "$PR_NUMBER"
+    tea pr close "$PR_NUMBER" $(get_gitea_repo_args)
     echo "Closed Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER"
 else
     echo "Error: Unknown platform"

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-create.sh

@@ -17,6 +17,51 @@ MILESTONE=""
 DRAFT=false
 ISSUE=""
 
+# get_remote_host, get_gitea_token, get_repo_info, and get_gitea_repo_args are provided by detect-platform.sh
+
+gitea_pr_create_api() {
+    local host repo token url payload
+    host=$(get_remote_host) || {
+        echo "Error: could not determine remote host for API fallback" >&2
+        return 1
+    }
+    repo=$(get_repo_info) || {
+        echo "Error: could not determine repo owner/name for API fallback" >&2
+        return 1
+    }
+    token=$(get_gitea_token "$host") || {
+        echo "Error: Gitea token not found for API fallback (set GITEA_TOKEN or configure ~/.git-credentials)" >&2
+        return 1
+    }
+
+    if [[ -n "$LABELS" || -n "$MILESTONE" || "$DRAFT" == true ]]; then
+        echo "Warning: API fallback applies title/body/head/base only; labels/milestone/draft require authenticated tea setup." >&2
+    fi
+
+    payload=$(TITLE="$TITLE" BODY="$BODY" HEAD_BRANCH="$HEAD_BRANCH" BASE_BRANCH="$BASE_BRANCH" python3 - <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+
+payload = {
+    "title": os.environ["TITLE"],
+    "head": os.environ["HEAD_BRANCH"],
+    "base": os.environ["BASE_BRANCH"] or "main",
+}
+body = os.environ.get("BODY", "")
+if body:
+    payload["body"] = body
+print(json.dumps(payload))
+PY
+)
+
+    url="https://${host}/api/v1/repos/${repo}/pulls"
+    curl -fsS -X POST \
+      -H "Authorization: token ${token}" \
+      -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+      -d "$payload" \
+      "$url"
+}
+
 usage() {
     cat <<EOF
 Usage: $(basename "$0") [OPTIONS]
@@ -118,33 +163,37 @@ PLATFORM=$(detect_platform)
 
 case "$PLATFORM" in
     github)
-        CMD="gh pr create --title \"$TITLE\""
-        [[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD="$CMD --body \"$BODY\""
-        [[ -n "$BASE_BRANCH" ]] && CMD="$CMD --base \"$BASE_BRANCH\""
-        [[ -n "$HEAD_BRANCH" ]] && CMD="$CMD --head \"$HEAD_BRANCH\""
-        [[ -n "$LABELS" ]] && CMD="$CMD --label \"$LABELS\""
-        [[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]] && CMD="$CMD --milestone \"$MILESTONE\""
-        [[ "$DRAFT" == true ]] && CMD="$CMD --draft"
-        eval "$CMD"
+        CMD=(gh pr create --title "$TITLE")
+        [[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD+=(--body "$BODY")
+        [[ -n "$BASE_BRANCH" ]] && CMD+=(--base "$BASE_BRANCH")
+        [[ -n "$HEAD_BRANCH" ]] && CMD+=(--head "$HEAD_BRANCH")
+        [[ -n "$LABELS" ]] && CMD+=(--label "$LABELS")
+        [[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]] && CMD+=(--milestone "$MILESTONE")
+        [[ "$DRAFT" == true ]] && CMD+=(--draft)
+        "${CMD[@]}"
         ;;
     gitea)
-        # tea pull create syntax
-        CMD="tea pr create --title \"$TITLE\""
-        [[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD="$CMD --description \"$BODY\""
-        [[ -n "$BASE_BRANCH" ]] && CMD="$CMD --base \"$BASE_BRANCH\""
-        [[ -n "$HEAD_BRANCH" ]] && CMD="$CMD --head \"$HEAD_BRANCH\""
+        # tea pull create syntax. Always pass --repo because tea repo inference
+        # is unreliable in Mosaic worktrees/profile shells. Use arrays instead
+        # of eval so markdown backticks/body content are not shell-executed.
+        REPO_SLUG=$(get_repo_slug)
+        REPO_ARGS=(--repo "$REPO_SLUG" --login "${GITEA_LOGIN:-mosaicstack}")
+        CMD=(tea pr create "${REPO_ARGS[@]}" --title "$TITLE")
+        [[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD+=(--description "$BODY")
+        [[ -n "$BASE_BRANCH" ]] && CMD+=(--base "$BASE_BRANCH")
+        [[ -n "$HEAD_BRANCH" ]] && CMD+=(--head "$HEAD_BRANCH")
 
         # Handle labels for tea
         if [[ -n "$LABELS" ]]; then
             # tea may use --labels flag
-            CMD="$CMD --labels \"$LABELS\""
+            CMD+=(--labels "$LABELS")
         fi
 
         # Handle milestone for tea
         if [[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]]; then
-            MILESTONE_ID=$(tea milestones list 2>/dev/null | grep -E "^\s*[0-9]+" | grep "$MILESTONE" | awk '{print $1}' | head -1)
+            MILESTONE_ID=$(tea milestones list "${REPO_ARGS[@]}" 2>/dev/null | grep -E "^\s*[0-9]+" | grep "$MILESTONE" | awk '{print $1}' | head -1)
             if [[ -n "$MILESTONE_ID" ]]; then
-                CMD="$CMD --milestone $MILESTONE_ID"
+                CMD+=(--milestone "$MILESTONE_ID")
             else
                 echo "Warning: Could not find milestone '$MILESTONE', creating without milestone" >&2
             fi
@@ -155,7 +204,11 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
             echo "Note: Draft PR may not be supported by your tea version" >&2
         fi
 
-        eval "$CMD"
+        if "${CMD[@]}"; then
+            exit 0
+        fi
+        echo "Warning: tea pr create failed, trying Gitea API fallback..." >&2
+        gitea_pr_create_api
         ;;
     *)
         echo "Error: Could not detect git platform" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-diff.sh

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 # pr-diff.sh - Get the diff for a pull request on GitHub or Gitea
-# Usage: pr-diff.sh -n <pr_number> [-o <output_file>]
+# Usage: pr-diff.sh -n <pr_number> [-r owner/repo] [-o <output_file>]
 
 set -e
 
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
 # Parse arguments
 PR_NUMBER=""
 OUTPUT_FILE=""
+REPO_OVERRIDE=""
 
 while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
     case $1 in
@@ -21,11 +22,16 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             OUTPUT_FILE="$2"
             shift 2
             ;;
+        -r|--repo)
+            REPO_OVERRIDE="$2"
+            shift 2
+            ;;
         -h|--help)
-            echo "Usage: pr-diff.sh -n <pr_number> [-o <output_file>]"
+            echo "Usage: pr-diff.sh -n <pr_number> [-r owner/repo] [-o <output_file>]"
             echo ""
             echo "Options:"
             echo "  -n, --number   PR number (required)"
+            echo "  -r, --repo     Repository slug (default: infer from git origin)"
             echo "  -o, --output   Output file (optional, prints to stdout if omitted)"
             echo "  -h, --help     Show this help"
             exit 0
@@ -42,31 +48,30 @@ if [[ -z "$PR_NUMBER" ]]; then
     exit 1
 fi
 
-detect_platform > /dev/null
+if [[ -n "$REPO_OVERRIDE" ]]; then
+    REPO_INFO="$REPO_OVERRIDE"
+    PLATFORM=$(detect_platform 2>/dev/null || echo gitea)
+else
+    detect_platform > /dev/null
+    REPO_INFO=$(get_repo_info)
+fi
+
+if [[ -z "$REPO_INFO" || "$REPO_INFO" == error:* ]]; then
+    echo "Error: Could not determine repository from git origin. Run from a repo or pass --repo." >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
 
 if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
     if [[ -n "$OUTPUT_FILE" ]]; then
-        gh pr diff "$PR_NUMBER" > "$OUTPUT_FILE"
+        gh pr diff "$PR_NUMBER" --repo "$REPO_INFO" > "$OUTPUT_FILE"
     else
-        gh pr diff "$PR_NUMBER"
+        gh pr diff "$PR_NUMBER" --repo "$REPO_INFO"
     fi
 elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
     # tea doesn't have a direct diff command — use the API
-    OWNER=$(get_repo_owner)
-    REPO=$(get_repo_name)
-    REMOTE_URL=$(git remote get-url origin 2>/dev/null)
+    HOST=$(get_remote_host 2>/dev/null || echo "git.mosaicstack.dev")
 
-    # Extract host from remote URL
-    if [[ "$REMOTE_URL" == https://* ]]; then
-        HOST=$(echo "$REMOTE_URL" | sed -E 's|https://([^/]+)/.*|\1|')
-    elif [[ "$REMOTE_URL" == git@* ]]; then
-        HOST=$(echo "$REMOTE_URL" | sed -E 's|git@([^:]+):.*|\1|')
-    else
-        echo "Error: Cannot determine host from remote URL" >&2
-        exit 1
-    fi
-
-    DIFF_URL="https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}.diff"
+    DIFF_URL="https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${REPO_INFO}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}.diff"
 
     GITEA_API_TOKEN=$(get_gitea_token "$HOST" || true)
 

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-list.sh

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 # pr-list.sh - List pull requests on Gitea or GitHub
-# Usage: pr-list.sh [-s state] [-l label] [-a author]
+# Usage: pr-list.sh [-r owner/repo] [-s state] [-l label] [-a author]
 
 set -e
 
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ STATE="open"
 LABEL=""
 AUTHOR=""
 LIMIT=100
+REPO_OVERRIDE=""
 
 usage() {
     cat <<EOF
@@ -24,12 +25,14 @@ Options:
     -l, --label LABEL       Filter by label
     -a, --author USER       Filter by author
     -n, --limit N           Maximum PRs to show (default: 100)
+    -r, --repo OWNER/REPO   Repository slug (default: infer from git origin)
     -h, --help              Show this help message
 
 Examples:
     $(basename "$0")                          # List open PRs
     $(basename "$0") -s all                   # All PRs
     $(basename "$0") -s merged -a username    # Merged PRs by user
+    $(basename "$0") --repo ddk/ai-bma         # List PRs from anywhere
 EOF
     exit 1
 }
@@ -53,6 +56,10 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             LIMIT="$2"
             shift 2
             ;;
+        -r|--repo)
+            REPO_OVERRIDE="$2"
+            shift 2
+            ;;
         -h|--help)
             usage
             ;;
@@ -63,18 +70,30 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
     esac
 done
 
-PLATFORM=$(detect_platform)
+if [[ -n "$REPO_OVERRIDE" ]]; then
+    REPO_INFO="$REPO_OVERRIDE"
+    # Explicit --repo is primarily for Gitea wrappers; if a git origin is present,
+    # still honor GitHub detection for cross-platform behavior.
+    PLATFORM=$(detect_platform 2>/dev/null || echo gitea)
+else
+    PLATFORM=$(detect_platform)
+    REPO_INFO=$(get_repo_info)
+fi
+
+if [[ -z "$REPO_INFO" || "$REPO_INFO" == error:* ]]; then
+    echo "Error: Could not determine repository from git origin. Run from a repo or pass --repo." >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
 
 case "$PLATFORM" in
     github)
-        CMD="gh pr list --state $STATE --limit $LIMIT"
-        [[ -n "$LABEL" ]] && CMD="$CMD --label \"$LABEL\""
-        [[ -n "$AUTHOR" ]] && CMD="$CMD --author \"$AUTHOR\""
-        eval "$CMD"
+        CMD=(gh pr list --repo "$REPO_INFO" --state "$STATE" --limit "$LIMIT")
+        [[ -n "$LABEL" ]] && CMD+=(--label "$LABEL")
+        [[ -n "$AUTHOR" ]] && CMD+=(--author "$AUTHOR")
+        "${CMD[@]}"
         ;;
     gitea)
-        # tea pr list - note: tea uses 'pulls' subcommand in some versions
-        CMD="tea pr list --state $STATE --limit $LIMIT"
+        CMD=(tea pr list --repo "$REPO_INFO" --login "${GITEA_LOGIN:-mosaicstack}" --state "$STATE" --limit "$LIMIT")
 
         # tea filtering may be limited
         if [[ -n "$LABEL" ]]; then
@@ -84,7 +103,7 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
             echo "Note: Author filtering may require manual review for Gitea" >&2
         fi
 
-        eval "$CMD"
+        "${CMD[@]}"
         ;;
     *)
         echo "Error: Could not detect git platform" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-merge.sh

@@ -2,9 +2,10 @@
 # pr-merge.sh - Merge pull requests on Gitea or GitHub
 # Usage: pr-merge.sh -n PR_NUMBER [-m squash] [-d] [--skip-queue-guard]
 
-set -e
+set -euo pipefail
 
 SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+# shellcheck source=packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/detect-platform.sh
 source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
 
 # Default values
@@ -12,6 +13,7 @@ PR_NUMBER=""
 MERGE_METHOD="squash"
 DELETE_BRANCH=false
 SKIP_QUEUE_GUARD=false
+DRY_RUN=false
 
 usage() {
     cat <<EOF
@@ -24,6 +26,7 @@ Options:
     -m, --method METHOD     Merge method: squash only (default: squash)
     -d, --delete-branch     Delete the head branch after merge
         --skip-queue-guard  Skip CI queue guard wait before merge
+        --dry-run           Run metadata/login preflight without merging
     -h, --help              Show this help message
 
 Examples:
@@ -54,6 +57,11 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             SKIP_QUEUE_GUARD=true
             shift
             ;;
+        --dry-run)
+            DRY_RUN=true
+            SKIP_QUEUE_GUARD=true
+            shift
+            ;;
         -h|--help)
             usage
             ;;
@@ -69,12 +77,18 @@ if [[ -z "$PR_NUMBER" ]]; then
     usage
 fi
 
+if [[ ! "$PR_NUMBER" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
+    echo "Error: Invalid PR number '$PR_NUMBER'. PR number must contain digits only." >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
 if [[ "$MERGE_METHOD" != "squash" ]]; then
     echo "Error: Mosaic policy enforces squash merge only. Received '$MERGE_METHOD'." >&2
     exit 1
 fi
 
-BASE_BRANCH="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-metadata.sh" -n "$PR_NUMBER" | python3 -c 'import json, sys; print((json.load(sys.stdin).get("baseRefName") or "").strip())')"
+PR_METADATA="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-metadata.sh" -n "$PR_NUMBER")"
+BASE_BRANCH="$(printf '%s' "$PR_METADATA" | python3 -c 'import json, sys; print((json.load(sys.stdin).get("baseRefName") or "").strip())')"
 if [[ "$BASE_BRANCH" != "main" ]]; then
     echo "Error: Mosaic policy allows merges only for PRs targeting 'main' (found '$BASE_BRANCH')." >&2
     exit 1
@@ -92,21 +106,163 @@ PLATFORM=$(detect_platform)
 OWNER=$(get_repo_owner)
 REPO=$(get_repo_name)
 
+find_tea_login_for_host() {
+    local host="$1"
+    local logins_json
+
+    command -v tea >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 1
+    logins_json=$(tea login list --output json 2>/dev/null) || return 1
+    TEA_LOGINS_JSON="$logins_json" python3 - "$host" <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+
+host = sys.argv[1]
+try:
+    logins = json.loads(os.environ.get("TEA_LOGINS_JSON", "[]"))
+except Exception:
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+for login in logins if isinstance(logins, list) else []:
+    url = str(login.get("url") or login.get("URL") or "")
+    name = str(login.get("name") or login.get("Name") or "")
+    if url.rstrip("/").endswith(host) and name:
+        print(name)
+        raise SystemExit(0)
+
+raise SystemExit(1)
+PY
+}
+
+is_known_tea_empty_identity_failure() {
+    local error_file="$1"
+
+    python3 - "$error_file" <<'PY'
+import re
+import sys
+
+with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as handle:
+    error = handle.read()
+
+known_empty_identity = re.search(
+    r"user does not exist.*\[.*uid:\s*0,\s*name:\s*\]",
+    error,
+    flags=re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL,
+)
+raise SystemExit(0 if known_empty_identity else 1)
+PY
+}
+
+merge_gitea_with_api() {
+    local host="$1" api_url token basic_auth body_file raw_code payload
+    api_url="https://${host}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}/merge"
+    mkdir -p "${AGENT_WORK_ROOT:-/home/hermes/agent-work}"
+    body_file=$(mktemp "${AGENT_WORK_ROOT:-/home/hermes/agent-work}/pr-merge-api-response.XXXXXX")
+    payload='{"Do":"squash"}'
+
+    token=$(get_gitea_token "$host" || true)
+    if [[ -n "$token" ]]; then
+        raw_code=$(curl -sS -w '%{http_code}' -o "$body_file" \
+            -X POST \
+            -H "Authorization: token $token" \
+            -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+            -d "$payload" \
+            "$api_url" || true)
+        if [[ "$raw_code" =~ ^2 ]]; then
+            rm -f "$body_file"
+            return 0
+        fi
+    fi
+
+    basic_auth=$(get_gitea_basic_auth "$host" || true)
+    if [[ -n "$basic_auth" ]]; then
+        raw_code=$(curl -sS -w '%{http_code}' -o "$body_file" \
+            -X POST \
+            -u "$basic_auth" \
+            -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+            -d "$payload" \
+            "$api_url" || true)
+        if [[ "$raw_code" =~ ^2 ]]; then
+            rm -f "$body_file"
+            return 0
+        fi
+    fi
+
+    python3 - "${raw_code:-000}" "$body_file" <<'PY' >&2
+import json
+import sys
+code, path = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
+try:
+    with open(path, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as handle:
+        raw = handle.read(500)
+    data = json.loads(raw) if raw else {}
+    message = data.get("message") or data.get("error") or raw or "empty response"
+except Exception:
+    try:
+        message = open(path, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").read(500) or "empty response"
+    except Exception:
+        message = "unreadable response"
+print(f"Error: Gitea API merge failed with HTTP {code}: {message}")
+PY
+    rm -f "$body_file"
+    return 1
+}
+
+if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]]; then
+    if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
+        HOST=$(get_remote_host) || {
+            echo "Error: Cannot determine host from origin remote URL" >&2
+            exit 1
+        }
+        TEA_LOGIN="${GITEA_LOGIN:-$(find_tea_login_for_host "$HOST" || true)}"
+        if [[ -n "$TEA_LOGIN" ]]; then
+            echo "Dry run: would merge PR #$PR_NUMBER on $HOST with tea login '$TEA_LOGIN' (base=$BASE_BRANCH, method=squash)."
+        else
+            echo "Dry run: would merge PR #$PR_NUMBER on $HOST with authenticated Gitea API fallback (base=$BASE_BRANCH, method=squash)."
+        fi
+    else
+        echo "Dry run: would merge PR #$PR_NUMBER on $PLATFORM (base=$BASE_BRANCH, method=squash)."
+    fi
+    exit 0
+fi
+
 case "$PLATFORM" in
     github)
-        CMD="gh pr merge $PR_NUMBER --squash"
-        [[ "$DELETE_BRANCH" == true ]] && CMD="$CMD --delete-branch"
-        eval "$CMD"
+        cmd=(gh pr merge "$PR_NUMBER" --squash)
+        [[ "$DELETE_BRANCH" == true ]] && cmd+=(--delete-branch)
+        "${cmd[@]}"
         ;;
     gitea)
-        CMD="tea pr merge $PR_NUMBER --style squash --repo $OWNER/$REPO --login ${GITEA_LOGIN:-mosaicstack}"
+        HOST=$(get_remote_host) || {
+            echo "Error: Cannot determine host from origin remote URL" >&2
+            exit 1
+        }
+        TEA_LOGIN="${GITEA_LOGIN:-$(find_tea_login_for_host "$HOST" || true)}"
+
+        if [[ -n "$TEA_LOGIN" ]]; then
+            mkdir -p "${AGENT_WORK_ROOT:-/home/hermes/agent-work}"
+            TEA_ERROR_FILE=$(mktemp "${AGENT_WORK_ROOT:-/home/hermes/agent-work}/pr-merge-tea-error.XXXXXX")
+            if tea pr merge "$PR_NUMBER" --style squash --repo "$OWNER/$REPO" --login "$TEA_LOGIN" 2> "$TEA_ERROR_FILE"; then
+                rm -f "$TEA_ERROR_FILE"
+            elif is_known_tea_empty_identity_failure "$TEA_ERROR_FILE"; then
+                cat "$TEA_ERROR_FILE" >&2
+                echo "Known tea empty identity failure detected; using authenticated Gitea API merge fallback." >&2
+                rm -f "$TEA_ERROR_FILE"
+                merge_gitea_with_api "$HOST"
+            else
+                cat "$TEA_ERROR_FILE" >&2
+                rm -f "$TEA_ERROR_FILE"
+                exit 1
+            fi
+        else
+            echo "No tea login configured for $HOST; using authenticated Gitea API merge fallback." >&2
+            merge_gitea_with_api "$HOST"
+        fi
 
         # Delete branch after merge if requested
         if [[ "$DELETE_BRANCH" == true ]]; then
             echo "Note: Branch deletion after merge may need to be done separately with tea" >&2
         fi
-
-        eval "$CMD"
         ;;
     *)
         echo "Error: Could not detect git platform" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-metadata.sh

@@ -2,9 +2,10 @@
 # pr-metadata.sh - Get PR metadata as JSON on GitHub or Gitea
 # Usage: pr-metadata.sh -n <pr_number> [-o <output_file>]
 
-set -e
+set -euo pipefail
 
 SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+# shellcheck source=packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/detect-platform.sh
 source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             exit 0
             ;;
         *)
-            echo "Unknown option: $1"
+            echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
             exit 1
             ;;
     esac
@@ -42,56 +43,168 @@ if [[ -z "$PR_NUMBER" ]]; then
     exit 1
 fi
 
+write_metadata() {
+    local metadata="$1"
+    if [[ -n "$OUTPUT_FILE" ]]; then
+        printf '%s\n' "$metadata" > "$OUTPUT_FILE"
+    else
+        printf '%s\n' "$metadata"
+    fi
+}
+
+curl_gitea_pull() {
+    local api_url="$1"
+    local token basic_auth raw_code body_file http_code
+    body_file=$(mktemp)
+
+    token=$(get_gitea_token "$HOST" || true)
+    if [[ -n "$token" ]]; then
+        raw_code=$(curl -sS -w '%{http_code}' -o "$body_file" -H "Authorization: token $token" "$api_url" || true)
+        if [[ "$raw_code" =~ ^2 ]]; then
+            cat "$body_file"
+            rm -f "$body_file"
+            return 0
+        fi
+        http_code="$raw_code"
+    fi
+
+    basic_auth=$(get_gitea_basic_auth "$HOST" || true)
+    if [[ -n "$basic_auth" ]]; then
+        raw_code=$(curl -sS -w '%{http_code}' -o "$body_file" -u "$basic_auth" "$api_url" || true)
+        if [[ "$raw_code" =~ ^2 ]]; then
+            cat "$body_file"
+            rm -f "$body_file"
+            return 0
+        fi
+        http_code="$raw_code"
+    fi
+
+    if [[ -z "${http_code:-}" ]]; then
+        raw_code=$(curl -sS -w '%{http_code}' -o "$body_file" "$api_url" || true)
+        http_code="$raw_code"
+    fi
+
+    python3 - "$http_code" "$body_file" <<'PY' >&2
+import json
+import sys
+
+code, path = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
+try:
+    data = json.load(open(path, encoding="utf-8"))
+    message = data.get("message") or data.get("error") or "unknown API error"
+except Exception:
+    message = open(path, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").read()[:200] or "empty response"
+print(f"Error: Gitea pull request API request failed with HTTP {code}: {message}")
+PY
+    rm -f "$body_file"
+    return 1
+}
+
 detect_platform > /dev/null
 
 if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
     METADATA=$(gh pr view "$PR_NUMBER" --json number,title,body,state,author,headRefName,baseRefName,files,labels,assignees,milestone,createdAt,updatedAt,url,isDraft)
-
-    if [[ -n "$OUTPUT_FILE" ]]; then
-        echo "$METADATA" > "$OUTPUT_FILE"
-    else
-        echo "$METADATA"
-    fi
+    write_metadata "$METADATA"
 elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
     OWNER=$(get_repo_owner)
     REPO=$(get_repo_name)
-    REMOTE_URL=$(git remote get-url origin 2>/dev/null)
-
-    # Extract host from remote URL
-    if [[ "$REMOTE_URL" == https://* ]]; then
-        HOST=$(echo "$REMOTE_URL" | sed -E 's|https://([^/]+)/.*|\1|')
-    elif [[ "$REMOTE_URL" == git@* ]]; then
-        HOST=$(echo "$REMOTE_URL" | sed -E 's|git@([^:]+):.*|\1|')
-    else
-        echo "Error: Cannot determine host from remote URL" >&2
+    HOST=$(get_remote_host) || {
+        echo "Error: Cannot determine host from origin remote URL" >&2
         exit 1
-    fi
+    }
 
     API_URL="https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}"
-
-    GITEA_API_TOKEN=$(get_gitea_token "$HOST" || true)
-
-    if [[ -n "$GITEA_API_TOKEN" ]]; then
-        RAW=$(curl -sS -H "Authorization: token $GITEA_API_TOKEN" "$API_URL")
+    if [[ -n "${MOSAIC_GITEA_PR_METADATA_RAW_FILE:-}" ]]; then
+        RAW=$(cat "$MOSAIC_GITEA_PR_METADATA_RAW_FILE")
     else
-        RAW=$(curl -sS "$API_URL")
+        RAW=$(curl_gitea_pull "$API_URL")
     fi
 
-    # Normalize Gitea response to match our expected schema
-    METADATA=$(echo "$RAW" | python3 -c "
-import json, sys
-data = json.load(sys.stdin)
+    # Normalize Gitea response to match GitHub's expected metadata schema.
+    METADATA=$(printf '%s' "$RAW" | python3 -c "
+import json
+import sys
+
+def first_non_empty(*values):
+    for value in values:
+        if value is None:
+            continue
+        if isinstance(value, str):
+            value = value.strip()
+        if value:
+            return value
+    return ''
+
+def nested(data, *keys):
+    current = data
+    for key in keys:
+        if not isinstance(current, dict):
+            return None
+        current = current.get(key)
+    return current
+
+try:
+    data = json.load(sys.stdin)
+except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
+    print(f'Error: Gitea API returned non-JSON response: {exc}', file=sys.stderr)
+    sys.exit(1)
+
+if not isinstance(data, dict):
+    print('Error: Gitea API returned an unexpected non-object response', file=sys.stderr)
+    sys.exit(1)
+
+if data.get('message') and not data.get('number'):
+    print(f\"Error: Gitea API error: {data.get('message')}\", file=sys.stderr)
+    sys.exit(1)
+
+head_ref = first_non_empty(
+    nested(data, 'head', 'ref'),
+    nested(data, 'head', 'name'),
+    nested(data, 'head', 'branch'),
+    data.get('head_branch'),
+    data.get('head_ref'),
+    nested(data, 'head', 'label'),
+    data.get('head_label'),
+)
+if isinstance(head_ref, str) and head_ref.startswith('refs/pull/'):
+    head_ref = first_non_empty(
+        nested(data, 'head', 'label'),
+        data.get('head_label'),
+        nested(data, 'head', 'name'),
+        nested(data, 'head', 'branch'),
+        data.get('head_branch'),
+        data.get('head_ref'),
+        head_ref,
+    )
+base_ref = first_non_empty(
+    nested(data, 'base', 'ref'),
+    nested(data, 'base', 'name'),
+    nested(data, 'base', 'branch'),
+    data.get('base_branch'),
+    data.get('base_ref'),
+    data.get('base_label'),
+)
+
+if not head_ref or not base_ref:
+    available = ', '.join(sorted(data.keys()))
+    print(
+        'Error: Unable to resolve non-empty Gitea PR head/base refs '
+        f'(headRefName={head_ref!r}, baseRefName={base_ref!r}; keys={available})',
+        file=sys.stderr,
+    )
+    sys.exit(1)
+
 normalized = {
     'number': data.get('number'),
     'title': data.get('title'),
     'body': data.get('body', ''),
     'state': data.get('state'),
-    'author': data.get('user', {}).get('login', ''),
-    'headRefName': data.get('head', {}).get('ref', ''),
-    'baseRefName': data.get('base', {}).get('ref', ''),
-    'labels': [l.get('name', '') for l in data.get('labels', [])],
-    'assignees': [a.get('login', '') for a in data.get('assignees', [])],
-    'milestone': data.get('milestone', {}).get('title', '') if data.get('milestone') else '',
+    'author': nested(data, 'user', 'login') or '',
+    'headRefName': head_ref,
+    'baseRefName': base_ref,
+    'labels': [l.get('name', '') for l in data.get('labels', []) if isinstance(l, dict)],
+    'assignees': [a.get('login', '') for a in data.get('assignees', []) if isinstance(a, dict)],
+    'milestone': nested(data, 'milestone', 'title') or '',
     'createdAt': data.get('created_at', ''),
     'updatedAt': data.get('updated_at', ''),
     'url': data.get('html_url', ''),
@@ -102,11 +215,7 @@ normalized = {
 json.dump(normalized, sys.stdout, indent=2)
 ")
 
-    if [[ -n "$OUTPUT_FILE" ]]; then
-        echo "$METADATA" > "$OUTPUT_FILE"
-    else
-        echo "$METADATA"
-    fi
+    write_metadata "$METADATA"
 else
     echo "Error: Unknown platform" >&2
     exit 1

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-review.sh

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
 elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
     case $ACTION in
         approve)
-            tea pr approve "$PR_NUMBER" ${COMMENT:+--comment "$COMMENT"}
+            tea pr approve "$PR_NUMBER" $(get_gitea_repo_args) ${COMMENT:+--comment "$COMMENT"}
             echo "Approved Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER"
             ;;
         request-changes)
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
                 echo "Error: Comment required for request-changes"
                 exit 1
             fi
-            tea pr reject "$PR_NUMBER" --comment "$COMMENT"
+            tea pr reject "$PR_NUMBER" $(get_gitea_repo_args) --comment "$COMMENT"
             echo "Requested changes on Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER"
             ;;
         comment)
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
                 echo "Error: Comment required"
                 exit 1
             fi
-            tea pr comment "$PR_NUMBER" "$COMMENT"
+            tea pr comment "$PR_NUMBER" "$COMMENT" $(get_gitea_repo_args)
             echo "Added comment to Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER"
             ;;
         *)

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-view.sh

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 # pr-view.sh - View pull request details on GitHub or Gitea
-# Usage: pr-view.sh -n <pr_number>
+# Usage: pr-view.sh -n <pr_number> [-r owner/repo]
 
 set -e
 
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
 
 # Parse arguments
 PR_NUMBER=""
+REPO_OVERRIDE=""
 
 while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
     case $1 in
@@ -16,11 +17,16 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             PR_NUMBER="$2"
             shift 2
             ;;
+        -r|--repo)
+            REPO_OVERRIDE="$2"
+            shift 2
+            ;;
         -h|--help)
-            echo "Usage: pr-view.sh -n <pr_number>"
+            echo "Usage: pr-view.sh -n <pr_number> [-r owner/repo]"
             echo ""
             echo "Options:"
             echo "  -n, --number   PR number (required)"
+            echo "  -r, --repo     Repository slug (default: infer from git origin)"
             echo "  -h, --help     Show this help"
             exit 0
             ;;
@@ -36,12 +42,23 @@ if [[ -z "$PR_NUMBER" ]]; then
     exit 1
 fi
 
-detect_platform
+if [[ -n "$REPO_OVERRIDE" ]]; then
+    REPO_INFO="$REPO_OVERRIDE"
+    PLATFORM=$(detect_platform 2>/dev/null || echo gitea)
+else
+    PLATFORM=$(detect_platform)
+    REPO_INFO=$(get_repo_info)
+fi
+
+if [[ -z "$REPO_INFO" || "$REPO_INFO" == error:* ]]; then
+    echo "Error: Could not determine repository from git origin. Run from a repo or pass --repo." >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
 
 if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
-    gh pr view "$PR_NUMBER"
+    gh pr view "$PR_NUMBER" --repo "$REPO_INFO"
 elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
-    tea pr "$PR_NUMBER"
+    tea pr "$PR_NUMBER" --repo "$REPO_INFO" --login "${GITEA_LOGIN:-mosaicstack}"
 else
     echo "Error: Unknown platform"
     exit 1

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-merge-gitea-empty-uid.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# Regression harness for pr-merge.sh Gitea non-interactive tea empty identity fallback.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+WORK_ROOT="${AGENT_WORK_ROOT:-/home/hermes/agent-work}"
+SANDBOX="$WORK_ROOT/pr-merge-empty-uid-test-$$"
+MOCK_BIN="$SANDBOX/bin"
+REPO_DIR="$SANDBOX/repo"
+LOG_FILE="$SANDBOX/mock.log"
+
+cleanup() {
+    rm -rf "$SANDBOX"
+}
+trap cleanup EXIT
+
+mkdir -p "$MOCK_BIN" "$REPO_DIR"
+: > "$LOG_FILE"
+
+cat > "$MOCK_BIN/tea" <<'EOF'
+#!/bin/bash
+set -euo pipefail
+printf 'tea %q ' "$@" >> "$PR_MERGE_TEST_LOG"
+printf '\n' >> "$PR_MERGE_TEST_LOG"
+if [[ "$*" == *"pr merge"* ]]; then
+    echo 'user does not exist [uid: 0, name: ]' >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+exit 0
+EOF
+chmod +x "$MOCK_BIN/tea"
+
+cat > "$MOCK_BIN/curl" <<'EOF'
+#!/bin/bash
+set -euo pipefail
+printf 'curl %q ' "$@" >> "$PR_MERGE_TEST_LOG"
+printf '\n' >> "$PR_MERGE_TEST_LOG"
+args=" $* "
+out_file=""
+write_code=false
+post_data=""
+prev=""
+for arg in "$@"; do
+    if [[ "$prev" == "-o" ]]; then
+        out_file="$arg"
+        prev=""
+        continue
+    fi
+    if [[ "$prev" == "-d" ]]; then
+        post_data="$arg"
+        prev=""
+        continue
+    fi
+    if [[ "$arg" == "-o" ]]; then
+        prev="-o"
+        continue
+    fi
+    if [[ "$arg" == "-d" ]]; then
+        prev="-d"
+        continue
+    fi
+    if [[ "$arg" == "-w" ]]; then
+        write_code=true
+    fi
+done
+emit_response() {
+    local body="$1"
+    if [[ -n "$out_file" ]]; then
+        printf '%s' "$body" > "$out_file"
+    else
+        printf '%s' "$body"
+    fi
+    if [[ "$write_code" == true ]]; then
+        printf '200'
+    fi
+}
+if [[ "$args" == *"/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/123"* && "$args" != *"/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/123/merge"* ]]; then
+    emit_response '{"number":123,"title":"mock","state":"open","user":{"login":"tester"},"head":{"ref":"feature/mock"},"base":{"ref":"main"},"labels":[],"assignees":[],"html_url":"https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/123","mergeable":true}'
+    exit 0
+fi
+if [[ "$args" == *"-X POST"* && "$args" == *"/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/123/merge"* ]]; then
+    if [[ "$post_data" != '{"Do":"squash"}' ]]; then
+        echo "unexpected merge payload: $post_data" >&2
+        exit 96
+    fi
+    emit_response '{"merged":true,"message":"mock merge complete"}'
+    exit 0
+fi
+echo "unexpected curl invocation: $*" >&2
+exit 97
+EOF
+chmod +x "$MOCK_BIN/curl"
+
+cd "$REPO_DIR"
+git init -q
+git remote add origin https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git
+
+export PATH="$MOCK_BIN:$PATH"
+export PR_MERGE_TEST_LOG="$LOG_FILE"
+export GITEA_LOGIN="git.mosaicstack.dev"
+export GITEA_TOKEN="redacted-test-token"
+
+OUTPUT="$SANDBOX/output.log"
+if ! "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-merge.sh" -n 123 -m squash --skip-queue-guard > "$OUTPUT" 2>&1; then
+    echo "Expected pr-merge.sh to recover via Gitea API fallback." >&2
+    echo "--- output ---" >&2
+    sed 's/redacted-test-token/***REDACTED***/g' "$OUTPUT" >&2
+    echo "--- mock log ---" >&2
+    sed 's/redacted-test-token/***REDACTED***/g' "$LOG_FILE" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+if ! grep -q '/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/123/merge' "$LOG_FILE"; then
+    echo "Expected authenticated Gitea merge API endpoint to be called." >&2
+    sed 's/redacted-test-token/***REDACTED***/g' "$LOG_FILE" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+if grep -q 'redacted-test-token' "$OUTPUT"; then
+    echo "Token leaked to pr-merge.sh output." >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+cat > "$MOCK_BIN/tea" <<'EOF'
+#!/bin/bash
+set -euo pipefail
+printf 'tea %q ' "$@" >> "$PR_MERGE_TEST_LOG"
+printf '\n' >> "$PR_MERGE_TEST_LOG"
+if [[ "$*" == *"pr merge"* ]]; then
+    echo 'tea network timeout' >&2
+    exit 2
+fi
+exit 0
+EOF
+chmod +x "$MOCK_BIN/tea"
+: > "$LOG_FILE"
+if "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-merge.sh" -n 123 -m squash --skip-queue-guard > "$OUTPUT" 2>&1; then
+    echo "Expected arbitrary tea failure to remain blocking." >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if grep -q '/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/123/merge' "$LOG_FILE"; then
+    echo "Arbitrary tea failure unexpectedly used Gitea API merge fallback." >&2
+    sed 's/redacted-test-token/***REDACTED***/g' "$LOG_FILE" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if ! grep -q 'tea network timeout' "$OUTPUT"; then
+    echo "Expected arbitrary tea error to be preserved in output." >&2
+    sed 's/redacted-test-token/***REDACTED***/g' "$OUTPUT" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+cat > "$MOCK_BIN/tea" <<'EOF'
+#!/bin/bash
+set -euo pipefail
+printf 'tea %q ' "$@" >> "$PR_MERGE_TEST_LOG"
+printf '\n' >> "$PR_MERGE_TEST_LOG"
+if [[ "$*" == *"login list"* ]]; then
+    echo '[]'
+    exit 0
+fi
+if [[ "$*" == *"pr merge"* ]]; then
+    echo 'tea merge should not run without a configured host login' >&2
+    exit 99
+fi
+exit 0
+EOF
+chmod +x "$MOCK_BIN/tea"
+unset GITEA_LOGIN
+: > "$LOG_FILE"
+if ! "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-merge.sh" -n 123 -m squash --skip-queue-guard > "$OUTPUT" 2>&1; then
+    echo "Expected missing tea login to use authenticated Gitea API fallback." >&2
+    sed 's/redacted-test-token/***REDACTED***/g' "$OUTPUT" >&2
+    sed 's/redacted-test-token/***REDACTED***/g' "$LOG_FILE" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if ! grep -q '/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/123/merge' "$LOG_FILE"; then
+    echo "Expected missing tea login path to call Gitea API merge endpoint." >&2
+    sed 's/redacted-test-token/***REDACTED***/g' "$LOG_FILE" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+SENTINEL="$SANDBOX/injected-sentinel"
+INJECTION="123; touch $SENTINEL #"
+
+cat > "$MOCK_BIN/gh" <<'EOF'
+#!/bin/bash
+set -euo pipefail
+printf 'gh %q ' "$@" >> "$PR_MERGE_TEST_LOG"
+printf '\n' >> "$PR_MERGE_TEST_LOG"
+if [[ "$*" == *"pr view"* ]]; then
+    cat <<'JSON'
+{"number":123,"title":"mock","baseRefName":"main","headRefName":"feature/mock"}
+JSON
+    exit 0
+fi
+if [[ "$*" == *"pr merge"* ]]; then
+    exit 0
+fi
+echo "unexpected gh invocation: $*" >&2
+exit 98
+EOF
+chmod +x "$MOCK_BIN/gh"
+
+cd "$REPO_DIR"
+git remote set-url origin https://github.com/mosaicstack/stack.git
+: > "$LOG_FILE"
+rm -f "$SENTINEL"
+if "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-merge.sh" -n "$INJECTION" -m squash --skip-queue-guard > "$OUTPUT" 2>&1; then
+    echo "Expected GitHub metacharacter PR number to be rejected." >&2
+    sed 's/redacted-test-token/***REDACTED***/g' "$OUTPUT" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if [[ -e "$SENTINEL" ]]; then
+    echo "GitHub metacharacter PR number executed injected shell command." >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if [[ -s "$LOG_FILE" ]]; then
+    echo "GitHub metacharacter PR number should be rejected before gh calls." >&2
+    sed 's/redacted-test-token/***REDACTED***/g' "$LOG_FILE" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if ! grep -q 'Invalid PR number' "$OUTPUT"; then
+    echo "Expected invalid PR number error for GitHub metacharacter input." >&2
+    sed 's/redacted-test-token/***REDACTED***/g' "$OUTPUT" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+cd "$REPO_DIR"
+git remote set-url origin https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git
+export GITEA_LOGIN="git.mosaicstack.dev"
+: > "$LOG_FILE"
+rm -f "$SENTINEL"
+if "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-merge.sh" -n "$INJECTION" -m squash --skip-queue-guard > "$OUTPUT" 2>&1; then
+    echo "Expected Gitea metacharacter PR number to be rejected." >&2
+    sed 's/redacted-test-token/***REDACTED***/g' "$OUTPUT" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if [[ -e "$SENTINEL" ]]; then
+    echo "Gitea metacharacter PR number executed injected shell command." >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if [[ -s "$LOG_FILE" ]]; then
+    echo "Gitea metacharacter PR number should be rejected before tea/curl calls." >&2
+    sed 's/redacted-test-token/***REDACTED***/g' "$LOG_FILE" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+if ! grep -q 'Invalid PR number' "$OUTPUT"; then
+    echo "Expected invalid PR number error for Gitea metacharacter input." >&2
+    sed 's/redacted-test-token/***REDACTED***/g' "$OUTPUT" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+echo "pr-merge.sh Gitea fallback regression passed"

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-metadata-gitea.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Regression harness for Gitea PR metadata normalization.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/pr-metadata-gitea}"
+REPO_DIR="$WORK_DIR/repo"
+FIXTURE_DIR="$WORK_DIR/fixtures"
+
+rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
+mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$FIXTURE_DIR"
+
+git -C "$REPO_DIR" init -q
+git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote add origin https://git.uscllc.com/USC/uconnect.git
+
+cat > "$FIXTURE_DIR/gitea-standard.json" <<'JSON'
+{
+  "number": 1905,
+  "title": "Smoke gate fix",
+  "state": "open",
+  "user": {"login": "edith"},
+  "head": {"ref": "edith/t_39ce717c-authentik-smoke-gate"},
+  "base": {"ref": "main"},
+  "labels": [{"name": "ci"}],
+  "assignees": [{"login": "edith"}],
+  "html_url": "https://git.uscllc.com/USC/uconnect/pulls/1905"
+}
+JSON
+
+cat > "$FIXTURE_DIR/gitea-fallback.json" <<'JSON'
+{
+  "number": 1908,
+  "title": "Fallback branch fields",
+  "state": "open",
+  "user": {"login": "edith"},
+  "head_branch": "fix/fallback-head",
+  "base_branch": "main",
+  "html_url": "https://git.uscllc.com/USC/uconnect/pulls/1908"
+}
+JSON
+
+cat > "$FIXTURE_DIR/gitea-refs-pull-label.json" <<'JSON'
+{
+  "number": 1908,
+  "title": "Closed merged PR with synthetic pull ref",
+  "state": "closed",
+  "user": {"login": "edith"},
+  "head": {"ref": "refs/pull/1908/head", "label": "fix/t_23fa9e1d-portal-health-backend"},
+  "base": {"ref": "main"},
+  "html_url": "https://git.uscllc.com/USC/uconnect/pulls/1908"
+}
+JSON
+
+cat > "$FIXTURE_DIR/gitea-error.json" <<'JSON'
+{"message": "user does not exist [uid: 0, name: ]", "url": "https://git.uscllc.com/api/swagger"}
+JSON
+
+run_case() {
+    local fixture="$1" expected_number="$2" expected_head="$3"
+    local output
+    output=$(cd "$REPO_DIR" && MOSAIC_GITEA_PR_METADATA_RAW_FILE="$fixture" "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-metadata.sh" -n "$expected_number")
+    PR_METADATA_OUTPUT="$output" python3 - "$expected_number" "$expected_head" <<'PY'
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+
+data = json.loads(os.environ["PR_METADATA_OUTPUT"])
+expected_number = int(sys.argv[1])
+expected_head = sys.argv[2]
+assert data["number"] == expected_number, data
+assert data["baseRefName"] == "main", data
+assert data["headRefName"] == expected_head, data
+PY
+}
+
+run_case "$FIXTURE_DIR/gitea-standard.json" 1905 edith/t_39ce717c-authentik-smoke-gate
+run_case "$FIXTURE_DIR/gitea-fallback.json" 1908 fix/fallback-head
+run_case "$FIXTURE_DIR/gitea-refs-pull-label.json" 1908 fix/t_23fa9e1d-portal-health-backend
+
+if cd "$REPO_DIR" && MOSAIC_GITEA_PR_METADATA_RAW_FILE="$FIXTURE_DIR/gitea-error.json" "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-metadata.sh" -n 1909 >/dev/null 2>"$WORK_DIR/error.log"; then
+    echo "Expected API error fixture to fail" >&2
+    exit 1
+fi
+grep -q "Gitea API error" "$WORK_DIR/error.log"
+
+echo "Gitea PR metadata regression harness passed"

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+# Inter-Agent tmux Comms — Standard & Tooling
+
+Reliable, self-identifying messaging between Mosaic agents running in tmux panes
+(Claude Code / Codex / OpenCode REPLs), across hosts.
+
+## The addressing standard (required)
+
+Every cross-agent tmux message MUST begin with an addressing preamble:
+
+```
+[<src_host>:<src_session> -> <dst_host>:<dst_session>] <message>
+```
+
+- `host` = `hostname -s` of the machine the agent runs on (e.g. `web1`, `sb-it-mgr-0-lt`).
+- `session` = the tmux session name (e.g. `mos-claude`, `rev0-4`, `installer-1`).
+- **Replies FLIP the preamble**: the recipient answers with `[<dst> -> <src>] ...`.
+
+Why: a fresh or context-wiped agent always knows who sent a message and to whom.
+No ambiguity about origin or lane after a tmux wipe / session restart.
+
+Example exchange:
+
+```
+[web1:mos-claude -> sb-it-mgr-0-lt:installer-1] status on #29?
+[sb-it-mgr-0-lt:installer-1 -> web1:mos-claude] Q2 done, opening PR #34.
+```
+
+## The helper: `agent-send.sh`
+
+Prepends the preamble automatically (auto-detecting your own `host:session`) and
+delivers reliably to local OR remote panes.
+
+```bash
+# Local target (same host)
+agent-send.sh -s <dst_session> -m "message"
+
+# Remote target (over ssh)
+agent-send.sh -H user@host -s <dst_session> -m "message"
+
+# From a file / stdin
+agent-send.sh -H user@host -s <dst_session> -f msg.txt
+echo "msg" | agent-send.sh -s <dst_session>
+```
+
+Key flags: `-s` dst session (required) · `-H` ssh target for remote · `-n` dst
+hostname for the preamble (else auto-resolved) · `-m`/`-f`/stdin body · `-S`
+override source label · `-v` verbose · `-r N` Enter-flush attempts.
+
+## Why a helper exists (the submission gotcha)
+
+Pasting into an interactive REPL via raw `tmux send-keys` is unreliable: a
+trailing `Enter` is frequently swallowed and the message sits as an **unsubmitted
+draft** ("Press up to edit queued messages"). Over an `ssh -> nested tmux` hop the
+plain `Enter` keyname often does not register at all — `C-m` is needed.
+
+`send-message.sh` solves this for a **local** pane: bracketed-paste the body
+(so multi-line content doesn't submit early), pause, then send `Enter` as its own
+keystroke and flush with a second, verifying against a draft heuristic.
+
+`agent-send.sh` solves the **remote** case by _shipping `send-message.sh` over ssh_
+(`ssh host bash -s -- ... < send-message.sh`) and running it local to the target
+pane — so the reliable send-keys always happens on the pane's own host. The remote
+needs only `bash` + `tmux` + `base64`; **no mosaic install required there**. The
+message crosses the wire as base64 (`-b`) to avoid all shell-quoting hazards.
+
+## Files
+
+- `agent-send.sh` — inter-agent wrapper (preamble + local/remote dispatch).
+- `send-message.sh` — low-level reliable single-pane submitter (`-b` base64 input).
+
+## Distribution
+
+These live in the installed framework copy at
+`~/.config/mosaic/tools/tmux/`. `install.sh` rsyncs the framework **source tree**
+to each host, so to propagate permanently, land both files in the framework
+source repo and re-run the installer on each host. Until then, `agent-send.sh`
+already works against any reachable host because it ships `send-message.sh` over
+ssh per-send — no pre-install on the target host is needed to _send to_ it.