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fred 6630bf9d9b review r1 fixes: correct head SHA, exhaustive diff enumeration, ownership scope, migration lanes, origin/main measurement, inventory precision
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
2026-08-29 15:50:37 -05:00
fred 29c898fe62 docs: P0 field-map currency verification at next@abb0c936 (M4-3a-0, REQ-MIG-001)
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline is pending
2026-08-29 15:41:00 -05:00
marcieandorch-01 abb0c93601 framework tools/tmux: agent-send socket default resolution + ambiguity guard (B1) (#1466)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline failed
Co-authored-by: marcie <[email protected]>
2026-08-29 20:25:50 +00:00
marcieandorch-01 e67cced273 mosaic fleet logins: per-seat credential pass-through (P4 gap closure) (#1473)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was canceled
Co-authored-by: marcie <[email protected]>
2026-08-29 20:05:23 +00:00
fred 635cb1f666 docs: contract 2 Amendment 1 — company-CRUD capability (S2 follow-up) (#1477)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was canceled
2026-08-29 19:34:48 +00:00
marcieandorch-01 09d24b9275 pr-merge --base-line: gated intra-line exception (B5) (#1471)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was successful
Co-authored-by: marcie <[email protected]>
2026-08-29 18:14:40 +00:00
marcieandorch-01 ed4c543872 mosaic coord: board subcommand + roll alias (P3 gap closure) (#1470)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was canceled
Co-authored-by: marcie <[email protected]>
2026-08-29 17:52:30 +00:00
fred 215faeda0a feat(hierarchy): M4-1b-ii hierarchy command family, grant evaluation, visibility (#1465)
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2026-08-29 16:54:39 +00:00
orch-01 5125fe21b0 p0 line landing: coord board/roll + wrapper usage contract + dispatch layer (successor to #1467) (#1468)
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Co-authored-by: orch-01 <[email protected]>
2026-08-29 16:24:08 +00:00
81 changed files with 12172 additions and 2038 deletions
@@ -4,14 +4,14 @@ import { AppModule } from '../app.module.js';
import { HierarchyModule } from '../hierarchy/hierarchy.module.js';
/**
* Hierarchy route-inventory baseline (contract 1 §6.3(a)).
* Hierarchy route inventory (contract 1 §6.3).
*
* M4-1b-i ships the audit event + outbox machinery with NO mutation routes:
* the hierarchy command family (controllers + DTOs) lands in M4-1b-ii once
* contract 2 merges. This witness enumerates every route the AppModule graph
* declares and pins that baseline, so a hierarchy route appearing before its
* command-family witnesses exist fails here first. When M4-1b-ii lands, this
* baseline is replaced by an exact inventory of the command family.
* The hierarchy command family is a CLOSED enumeration asserted here, not a
* prose claim: every hierarchy-flavored route the AppModule graph declares
* must appear in HIERARCHY_COMMAND_FAMILY, and vice versa. Adding or
* removing a hierarchy route without updating this inventory (and its
* witnesses) fails CI first. This replaces the M4-1b-i zero-routes
* baseline.
*/
interface RouteEntry {
@@ -77,7 +77,32 @@ function routesOf(controller: Type<unknown>): RouteEntry[] {
return routes;
}
describe('hierarchy route-inventory baseline (§6.3(a))', () => {
/**
* The closed command family (contract 1 §5, M4-1b-ii). Every entry is a
* mutation audited via the M4-1b-i path or one of the two ratified reads
* (granted companies, the §2.8 directory carve-out).
*/
const HIERARCHY_COMMAND_FAMILY = [
'POST /api/hierarchy/companies',
'GET /api/hierarchy/companies',
'GET /api/hierarchy/companies/directory',
'POST /api/hierarchy/companies/:id/rename',
'POST /api/hierarchy/companies/:id/visibility',
'DELETE /api/hierarchy/companies/:id',
'POST /api/hierarchy/estates',
'POST /api/hierarchy/estates/:id/rename',
'POST /api/hierarchy/estates/:id/transfer',
'DELETE /api/hierarchy/estates/:id',
'POST /api/hierarchy/platform-projects',
'POST /api/hierarchy/platform-projects/:id/rename',
'POST /api/hierarchy/platform-projects/:id/transfer',
'DELETE /api/hierarchy/platform-projects/:id',
'POST /api/hierarchy/grants',
'POST /api/hierarchy/grants/:id/change',
'DELETE /api/hierarchy/grants/:id',
] as const;
describe('hierarchy route inventory (§6.3)', () => {
const inventory = collectControllers(AppModule).flatMap(routesOf);
it('control: the enumeration sees the known route surface', () => {
@@ -88,19 +113,21 @@ describe('hierarchy route-inventory baseline (§6.3(a))', () => {
expect(inventory.length).toBeGreaterThan(20);
});
it('declares zero hierarchy mutation routes before M4-1b-ii', () => {
const hierarchyRoutes = inventory.filter((r) =>
/hierarch|compan|estate|platform[-_]?project/i.test(r.path),
);
expect(
hierarchyRoutes,
'a hierarchy route landed without replacing the §6.3(a) baseline with a command-family inventory',
).toEqual([]);
it('the hierarchy surface is exactly the declared command family', () => {
const hierarchyRoutes = inventory
.filter((r) => /hierarch|compan|estate|platform[-_]?project/i.test(r.path))
.map((r) => `${r.method} ${r.path}`)
.sort();
expect(hierarchyRoutes).toEqual([...HIERARCHY_COMMAND_FAMILY].sort());
});
it('HierarchyModule itself declares no controllers', () => {
expect((Reflect.getMetadata('controllers', HierarchyModule) ?? []) as unknown[]).toEqual([]);
const hierarchyControllers = collectControllers(HierarchyModule);
expect(hierarchyControllers).toEqual([]);
it('every command-family route lives on HierarchyController inside HierarchyModule', () => {
const controllers = collectControllers(HierarchyModule);
expect(controllers.map((c) => c.name)).toEqual(['HierarchyController']);
const declared = controllers
.flatMap(routesOf)
.map((r) => `${r.method} ${r.path}`)
.sort();
expect(declared).toEqual([...HIERARCHY_COMMAND_FAMILY].sort());
});
});
@@ -61,6 +61,33 @@ describe('CommandAuthorizationService', () => {
).toBe(false);
});
it('denies non-admin scopes to a platform admin (contract 2 §1.1 bypass retirement)', async (): Promise<void> => {
const service = createService('admin');
for (const scope of ['core', 'agent', 'skill', 'plugin'] as const) {
const command: CommandDef = { ...adminCommand, name: `probe-${scope}`, scope };
expect(
(await service.authorize(command, { ...payload, command: command.name }, 'admin-1'))
.allowed,
).toBe(false);
}
});
it('allows member core/agent scopes and denies skill/plugin (deny-by-default)', async (): Promise<void> => {
const service = createService('member');
for (const [scope, allowed] of [
['core', true],
['agent', true],
['skill', false],
['plugin', false],
] as const) {
const command: CommandDef = { ...adminCommand, name: `probe-${scope}`, scope };
expect(
(await service.authorize(command, { ...payload, command: command.name }, 'member-1'))
.allowed,
).toBe(allowed);
}
});
it('denies a malformed durable approval expiry instead of treating it as unexpired', async (): Promise<void> => {
const entries = new Map<string, string>();
const action = {
@@ -154,8 +154,15 @@ export class CommandAuthorizationService {
return role === 'admin' || role === 'member' || role === 'viewer' ? role : null;
}
/**
* Contract 2 §1.1: platform admin confers instance administration only —
* the former admin-passes-every-scope short-circuit is retired. Admin
* reaches exactly the admin scope; core/agent scopes belong to the member
* role; skill/plugin scopes stay deny-for-all until a grant mapping names
* them (§3.1 deny-by-default).
*/
private hasScope(role: CommandRole, scope: CommandDef['scope']): boolean {
if (role === 'admin') return true;
if (scope === 'admin') return role === 'admin';
return role === 'member' && (scope === 'core' || scope === 'agent');
}
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
*
* This is NOT a class-table writer: it touches only the audit/outbox
* tables, so it does not appear on the writer-coverage allowlist. The
* hierarchy command repositories (M4-1b-ii) are the allowlisted writers and
* call into this on their own transactions.
* hierarchy command repository (HierarchyRepository) is the allowlisted
* writer and calls into this on its own transactions.
*/
export type HierarchyAuditVerb = (typeof HIERARCHY_AUDIT_VERBS)[number];
@@ -0,0 +1,965 @@
import { mkdtemp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { Test, type TestingModule } from '@nestjs/testing';
import {
companies,
createPgliteDb,
eq,
estates,
hierarchyAuditEvents,
hierarchyGrants,
hierarchyOutbox,
runPgliteMigrations,
teams,
users,
workspaces,
type DbHandle,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
import { appendHierarchyEvent } from './hierarchy-audit.repository.js';
import { HierarchyGrantEvaluationService } from './hierarchy-grant-evaluation.js';
import { HierarchyRepository, type HierarchyResult } from './hierarchy.repository.js';
/**
* Command-level witnesses for the hierarchy command family (M4-1b-ii):
* contract 1 §6.4 (per-mutation-class commit + rollback), §6.5
* (authorization outcomes), §6.7 (no existence oracle), §6.9 (visibility),
* and contract 2 §3 grant-evaluation semantics (deny-by-default,
* ancestor-chain inheritance, max-role, live revocation, suspended team
* subjects). Schema-level constraints are witnessed in
* packages/db/src/hierarchy-schema.witness.test.ts; the audit machinery's
* own atomicity in hierarchy-audit.integration.test.ts.
*
* The rollback legs pre-seed an audit event under the command's idempotency
* key with different content: the command's append then throws inside the
* command transaction, so the whole mutation must roll back — the command
* returns `conflict` and leaves no state change, no second event, and no
* second outbox record.
*/
describe('hierarchy commands integration', (): void => {
let dataDir: string;
let handle: DbHandle;
let moduleRef: TestingModule;
let repo: HierarchyRepository;
let evaluation: HierarchyGrantEvaluationService;
const OWNER = 'hier-cmd-owner';
const ADMIN = 'hier-cmd-admin';
const STRANGER = 'hier-cmd-stranger';
const SUBJECT = 'hier-cmd-subject';
/** Base fixture: OWNER's company (created through the command surface). */
let companyId: string;
const slug = (prefix: string): string => `${prefix}-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`;
function expectOk<T>(result: HierarchyResult<T>): { ok: true } & T {
if (!result.ok) throw new Error(`expected ok, got ${JSON.stringify(result)}`);
return result;
}
const eventsForKey = (key: string) =>
handle.db
.select()
.from(hierarchyAuditEvents)
.where(eq(hierarchyAuditEvents.idempotencyKey, key));
const outboxForKey = (key: string) =>
handle.db.select().from(hierarchyOutbox).where(eq(hierarchyOutbox.idempotencyKey, key));
/** Occupy `key` with unrelated event content so a command reusing it must abort. */
const seedConflictingKey = async (key: string): Promise<void> => {
await handle.db.transaction(async (tx) =>
appendHierarchyEvent(tx, {
actorId: 'seed-actor',
verb: 'create',
targetKind: 'company',
targetId: randomUUID(),
targetSnapshot: { seeded: true },
correlationId: 'seed-correlation',
idempotencyKey: key,
}),
);
};
/**
* §6.4 rollback leg: the command must return `conflict` and leave exactly
* the seeded event/outbox pair under the key — nothing it wrote survives.
*/
const expectRolledBack = async <T>(
key: string,
command: () => Promise<HierarchyResult<T>>,
assertUnchanged: () => Promise<void>,
): Promise<void> => {
await seedConflictingKey(key);
const result = await command();
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
if (!result.ok) expect(result.error).toBe('conflict');
expect(await eventsForKey(key)).toHaveLength(1);
expect(await outboxForKey(key)).toHaveLength(1);
await assertUnchanged();
};
beforeAll(async (): Promise<void> => {
dataDir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'mosaic-gateway-hierarchy-commands-'));
handle = createPgliteDb(dataDir);
await runPgliteMigrations(handle);
moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
providers: [
HierarchyRepository,
HierarchyGrantEvaluationService,
{ provide: DB, useValue: handle.db },
],
}).compile();
repo = moduleRef.get(HierarchyRepository);
evaluation = moduleRef.get(HierarchyGrantEvaluationService);
await handle.db.insert(users).values([
{ id: OWNER, name: 'Owner', email: `${OWNER}@example.com` },
{ id: ADMIN, name: 'Admin', email: `${ADMIN}@example.com`, role: 'admin' },
{ id: STRANGER, name: 'Stranger', email: `${STRANGER}@example.com` },
{ id: SUBJECT, name: 'Subject', email: `${SUBJECT}@example.com` },
]);
const created = expectOk(
await repo.createCompany({ actorId: OWNER, name: 'Base Co', slug: slug('base') }),
);
companyId = created.company.id;
});
afterAll(async (): Promise<void> => {
await moduleRef.close();
await handle.close();
await rm(dataDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
// ── §6.4 commit legs ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
it('createCompany commits company, owner grant, causation-linked events, and outbox atomically', async () => {
const key = `key-${randomUUID()}`;
const result = expectOk(
await repo.createCompany({
actorId: OWNER,
name: 'Atomic Co',
slug: slug('atomic'),
idempotencyKey: key,
}),
);
expect(result.company.visibility).toBe('private');
expect(result.grant.role).toBe('hierarchy:owner');
expect(result.grant.userId).toBe(OWNER);
expect(result.grant.grantedBy).toBe(OWNER);
const [createEvents, grantEvents] = await Promise.all([
eventsForKey(key),
eventsForKey(`${key}:grant`),
]);
expect(createEvents).toHaveLength(1);
expect(createEvents[0]).toMatchObject({ verb: 'create', targetId: result.company.id });
expect(grantEvents).toHaveLength(1);
expect(grantEvents[0]).toMatchObject({ verb: 'grant_create', targetId: result.grant.id });
// The grant event is caused by the create event, same correlation (§4.3).
expect(grantEvents[0]!.causationId).toBe(createEvents[0]!.id);
expect(grantEvents[0]!.correlationId).toBe(createEvents[0]!.correlationId);
expect(await outboxForKey(key)).toHaveLength(1);
expect(await outboxForKey(`${key}:grant`)).toHaveLength(1);
const rows = await handle.db
.select()
.from(companies)
.where(eq(companies.id, result.company.id));
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
});
it('deleteCompany commits the delete with one audited grant_revoke per cascaded grant', async () => {
const created = expectOk(
await repo.createCompany({ actorId: OWNER, name: 'Mortal Co', slug: slug('mortal') }),
);
const extraGrant = expectOk(
await repo.createGrant({
actorId: OWNER,
userId: SUBJECT,
targetKind: 'company',
targetId: created.company.id,
role: 'viewer',
}),
);
const key = `key-${randomUUID()}`;
expectOk(
await repo.deleteCompany({
actorId: OWNER,
companyId: created.company.id,
idempotencyKey: key,
}),
);
const deleteEvents = await eventsForKey(key);
expect(deleteEvents).toHaveLength(1);
expect(deleteEvents[0]).toMatchObject({ verb: 'delete', targetId: created.company.id });
for (const grantId of [created.grant.id, extraGrant.grant.id]) {
const revokeEvents = await eventsForKey(`${key}:revoke:${grantId}`);
expect(revokeEvents).toHaveLength(1);
expect(revokeEvents[0]).toMatchObject({ verb: 'grant_revoke', targetId: grantId });
expect(revokeEvents[0]!.causationId).toBe(deleteEvents[0]!.id);
}
expect(
await handle.db.select().from(companies).where(eq(companies.id, created.company.id)),
).toHaveLength(0);
});
// ── §6.4 rollback legs (one per mutation class) ────────────────────────────
it('renameCompany commits the rename with an audited event carrying previousName', async () => {
const created = expectOk(
await repo.createCompany({ actorId: OWNER, name: 'Old Name Co', slug: slug('rename') }),
);
const key = `key-${randomUUID()}`;
const renamed = expectOk(
await repo.renameCompany({
actorId: OWNER,
companyId: created.company.id,
name: 'New Name Co',
idempotencyKey: key,
}),
);
expect(renamed.company.name).toBe('New Name Co');
const events = await eventsForKey(key);
expect(events).toHaveLength(1);
expect(events[0]).toMatchObject({ verb: 'rename', targetId: created.company.id });
// §6.4: the audited rename carries the old and new names.
expect(events[0]!.targetSnapshot).toMatchObject({
name: 'New Name Co',
previousName: 'Old Name Co',
});
expect(await outboxForKey(key)).toHaveLength(1);
const rows = await handle.db
.select()
.from(companies)
.where(eq(companies.id, created.company.id));
expect(rows[0]!.name).toBe('New Name Co');
});
it('revokeGrant commits the row deletion with one audited grant_revoke event', async () => {
const grant = expectOk(
await repo.createGrant({
actorId: OWNER,
userId: SUBJECT,
targetKind: 'company',
targetId: companyId,
role: 'viewer',
}),
);
const key = `key-${randomUUID()}`;
const revoked = expectOk(
await repo.revokeGrant({ actorId: OWNER, grantId: grant.grant.id, idempotencyKey: key }),
);
expect(revoked.revokedId).toBe(grant.grant.id);
const events = await eventsForKey(key);
expect(events).toHaveLength(1);
expect(events[0]).toMatchObject({ verb: 'grant_revoke', targetId: grant.grant.id });
expect(await outboxForKey(key)).toHaveLength(1);
// §6 revocation = row deletion: the grant row is gone.
const rows = await handle.db
.select()
.from(hierarchyGrants)
.where(eq(hierarchyGrants.id, grant.grant.id));
expect(rows).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('rolls back a create: no estate row survives the aborted transaction', async () => {
const estateSlug = slug('rb-create');
const key = `key-${randomUUID()}`;
await expectRolledBack(
key,
() =>
repo.createEstate({
actorId: OWNER,
companyId,
name: 'Doomed Estate',
slug: estateSlug,
idempotencyKey: key,
}),
async () => {
expect(
await handle.db.select().from(estates).where(eq(estates.slug, estateSlug)),
).toHaveLength(0);
},
);
});
it('rolls back a rename: the company keeps its name', async () => {
const before = (
await handle.db.select().from(companies).where(eq(companies.id, companyId))
)[0]!;
const key = `key-${randomUUID()}`;
await expectRolledBack(
key,
() => repo.renameCompany({ actorId: OWNER, companyId, name: 'Never', idempotencyKey: key }),
async () => {
const after = (
await handle.db.select().from(companies).where(eq(companies.id, companyId))
)[0]!;
expect(after.name).toBe(before.name);
},
);
});
it('rolls back a visibility change: the company stays private', async () => {
const key = `key-${randomUUID()}`;
await expectRolledBack(
key,
() =>
repo.changeCompanyVisibility({
actorId: ADMIN,
companyId,
visibility: 'directory',
idempotencyKey: key,
}),
async () => {
const after = (
await handle.db.select().from(companies).where(eq(companies.id, companyId))
)[0]!;
expect(after.visibility).toBe('private');
},
);
});
it('rolls back a transfer: the estate keeps its parent', async () => {
const estate = expectOk(
await repo.createEstate({ actorId: OWNER, companyId, name: 'RB-T', slug: slug('rb-t') }),
);
const other = expectOk(
await repo.createCompany({ actorId: OWNER, name: 'RB Dest', slug: slug('rb-dest') }),
);
const key = `key-${randomUUID()}`;
await expectRolledBack(
key,
() =>
repo.transferEstate({
actorId: OWNER,
estateId: estate.estate.id,
destinationCompanyId: other.company.id,
idempotencyKey: key,
}),
async () => {
const after = (
await handle.db.select().from(estates).where(eq(estates.id, estate.estate.id))
)[0]!;
expect(after.companyId).toBe(companyId);
},
);
});
it('rolls back a delete: the estate row survives', async () => {
const estate = expectOk(
await repo.createEstate({ actorId: OWNER, companyId, name: 'RB-D', slug: slug('rb-d') }),
);
const key = `key-${randomUUID()}`;
await expectRolledBack(
key,
() => repo.deleteEstate({ actorId: OWNER, estateId: estate.estate.id, idempotencyKey: key }),
async () => {
expect(
await handle.db.select().from(estates).where(eq(estates.id, estate.estate.id)),
).toHaveLength(1);
},
);
});
it('rolls back a grant create: no grant row survives', async () => {
const key = `key-${randomUUID()}`;
await expectRolledBack(
key,
() =>
repo.createGrant({
actorId: OWNER,
userId: STRANGER,
targetKind: 'company',
targetId: companyId,
role: 'viewer',
idempotencyKey: key,
}),
async () => {
const rows = await handle.db
.select()
.from(hierarchyGrants)
.where(eq(hierarchyGrants.userId, STRANGER));
expect(rows.filter((r) => r.companyId === companyId)).toHaveLength(0);
},
);
});
it('rolls back a grant change and a grant revoke: the grant keeps its role and its row', async () => {
const grant = expectOk(
await repo.createGrant({
actorId: OWNER,
userId: SUBJECT,
targetKind: 'company',
targetId: companyId,
role: 'viewer',
}),
);
const changeKey = `key-${randomUUID()}`;
await expectRolledBack(
changeKey,
() =>
repo.changeGrant({
actorId: OWNER,
grantId: grant.grant.id,
role: 'member',
idempotencyKey: changeKey,
}),
async () => {
const row = (
await handle.db
.select()
.from(hierarchyGrants)
.where(eq(hierarchyGrants.id, grant.grant.id))
)[0]!;
expect(row.role).toBe('viewer');
},
);
const revokeKey = `key-${randomUUID()}`;
await expectRolledBack(
revokeKey,
() =>
repo.revokeGrant({ actorId: OWNER, grantId: grant.grant.id, idempotencyKey: revokeKey }),
async () => {
expect(
await handle.db
.select()
.from(hierarchyGrants)
.where(eq(hierarchyGrants.id, grant.grant.id)),
).toHaveLength(1);
},
);
expectOk(await repo.revokeGrant({ actorId: OWNER, grantId: grant.grant.id }));
});
it('replays a completed command idempotently through the audit machinery', async () => {
const key = `key-${randomUUID()}`;
const input = { actorId: OWNER, companyId, name: 'Replayed Estate', slug: slug('replay') };
const first = expectOk(await repo.createEstate({ ...input, idempotencyKey: key }));
// The retry's insert no-ops on the slug conflict — the command surfaces
// `conflict`, and crucially appends no second event under the key.
const retry = await repo.createEstate({ ...input, idempotencyKey: key });
expect(retry.ok).toBe(false);
expect(await eventsForKey(key)).toHaveLength(1);
expectOk(await repo.deleteEstate({ actorId: OWNER, estateId: first.estate.id }));
});
// ── §6.5 authorization ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
it('deny-by-default: a user with no grant cannot mutate and sees not_found (§3.1)', async () => {
expect(await repo.renameCompany({ actorId: STRANGER, companyId, name: 'x' })).toEqual({
ok: false,
error: 'not_found',
});
expect(
await repo.createEstate({ actorId: STRANGER, companyId, name: 'x', slug: slug('deny') }),
).toEqual({ ok: false, error: 'not_found' });
expect(await repo.deleteCompany({ actorId: STRANGER, companyId })).toEqual({
ok: false,
error: 'not_found',
});
});
it('grant management requires effective owner: member and viewer are refused (§4.1)', async () => {
const grant = expectOk(
await repo.createGrant({
actorId: OWNER,
userId: SUBJECT,
targetKind: 'company',
targetId: companyId,
role: 'member',
}),
);
expect(
await repo.createGrant({
actorId: SUBJECT,
userId: STRANGER,
targetKind: 'company',
targetId: companyId,
role: 'viewer',
}),
).toEqual({ ok: false, error: 'not_found' });
expect(await repo.revokeGrant({ actorId: SUBJECT, grantId: grant.grant.id })).toEqual({
ok: false,
error: 'not_found',
});
// Member also cannot create children (owner-only, §4.1/§4.3).
expect(
await repo.createEstate({ actorId: SUBJECT, companyId, name: 'x', slug: slug('member') }),
).toEqual({ ok: false, error: 'not_found' });
expectOk(await repo.revokeGrant({ actorId: OWNER, grantId: grant.grant.id }));
});
it('platform admin confers no tenant content access (§1.1): ungrated admin is a stranger', async () => {
expect(await repo.renameCompany({ actorId: ADMIN, companyId, name: 'x' })).toEqual({
ok: false,
error: 'not_found',
});
expect(
await repo.createGrant({
actorId: ADMIN,
userId: SUBJECT,
targetKind: 'company',
targetId: companyId,
role: 'viewer',
}),
).toEqual({ ok: false, error: 'not_found' });
expect(await repo.listGrantedCompanies(ADMIN)).toEqual([]);
expect(await evaluation.effectiveRole(ADMIN, 'company', companyId)).toBeNull();
});
it('visibility change is platform-admin-only (§5.5): the owner is forbidden, the admin succeeds', async () => {
const owned = await repo.changeCompanyVisibility({
actorId: OWNER,
companyId,
visibility: 'directory',
});
expect(owned).toEqual({
ok: false,
error: 'forbidden',
message: 'visibility change is platform-admin-only',
});
const changed = expectOk(
await repo.changeCompanyVisibility({ actorId: ADMIN, companyId, visibility: 'directory' }),
);
expect(changed.company.visibility).toBe('directory');
// Restore for later witnesses.
expectOk(
await repo.changeCompanyVisibility({ actorId: ADMIN, companyId, visibility: 'private' }),
);
});
// ── §6.9 visibility ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
it('directory lists exactly directory-class companies with closed fields (§2.8)', async () => {
const listed = expectOk(
await repo.createCompany({ actorId: OWNER, name: 'Listed Co', slug: slug('listed') }),
);
const unlisted = expectOk(
await repo.createCompany({ actorId: OWNER, name: 'Unlisted Co', slug: slug('unlisted') }),
);
const key = `key-${randomUUID()}`;
expectOk(
await repo.changeCompanyVisibility({
actorId: ADMIN,
companyId: listed.company.id,
visibility: 'directory',
idempotencyKey: key,
}),
);
const directory = await repo.listDirectory();
const ids = directory.map((entry) => entry.id);
expect(ids).toContain(listed.company.id);
expect(ids).not.toContain(unlisted.company.id);
expect(ids).not.toContain(companyId);
// Closed-field: existence, name, slug — nothing else (no visibility, no
// timestamps, no grant or membership data).
for (const entry of directory) {
expect(Object.keys(entry).sort()).toEqual(['id', 'name', 'slug']);
}
// §5.5: the audited event carries old and new values.
const events = await eventsForKey(key);
expect(events).toHaveLength(1);
expect(events[0]).toMatchObject({ verb: 'visibility_change', targetId: listed.company.id });
expect(events[0]!.targetSnapshot).toMatchObject({
previousVisibility: 'private',
visibility: 'directory',
});
});
it('directory disclosure confers no authority: a listed company still refuses non-granted callers (§6.9)', async () => {
const listed = expectOk(
await repo.createCompany({ actorId: OWNER, name: 'Exposed Co', slug: slug('exposed') }),
);
expectOk(
await repo.changeCompanyVisibility({
actorId: ADMIN,
companyId: listed.company.id,
visibility: 'directory',
}),
);
// The company is directory-listed for the whole probe window...
expect((await repo.listDirectory()).map((entry) => entry.id)).toContain(listed.company.id);
// ...but the non-granted reader's granted-read surface still excludes it:
// directory disclosure adds existence/name/slug only, never content access.
expect(await repo.listGrantedCompanies(STRANGER)).toEqual([]);
// A stranger mutation of the listed company is refused exactly like a
// missing node — the §6.7 carve-out covers the listing, not commands.
const realProbe = await repo.renameCompany({
actorId: STRANGER,
companyId: listed.company.id,
name: 'x',
});
const missingProbe = await repo.renameCompany({
actorId: STRANGER,
companyId: randomUUID(),
name: 'x',
});
expect(realProbe).toEqual(missingProbe);
expect(await repo.deleteCompany({ actorId: STRANGER, companyId: listed.company.id })).toEqual({
ok: false,
error: 'not_found',
});
});
it('granted companies are the reader control: owner sees them, a stranger sees nothing (§2.8)', async () => {
const ownerCompanies = await repo.listGrantedCompanies(OWNER);
expect(ownerCompanies.map((c) => c.id)).toContain(companyId);
expect(await repo.listGrantedCompanies(STRANGER)).toEqual([]);
});
// ── §6.7 no existence oracle ───────────────────────────────────────────────
it('an unauthorized probe of a real node is indistinguishable from a missing node', async () => {
const realCompany = await repo.renameCompany({ actorId: STRANGER, companyId, name: 'x' });
const missingCompany = await repo.renameCompany({
actorId: STRANGER,
companyId: randomUUID(),
name: 'x',
});
expect(realCompany).toEqual(missingCompany);
const estate = expectOk(
await repo.createEstate({
actorId: OWNER,
companyId,
name: 'Oracle E',
slug: slug('oracle'),
}),
);
const realEstate = await repo.deleteEstate({ actorId: STRANGER, estateId: estate.estate.id });
const missingEstate = await repo.deleteEstate({ actorId: STRANGER, estateId: randomUUID() });
expect(realEstate).toEqual(missingEstate);
const grant = expectOk(
await repo.createGrant({
actorId: OWNER,
userId: SUBJECT,
targetKind: 'estate',
targetId: estate.estate.id,
role: 'viewer',
}),
);
const realGrant = await repo.revokeGrant({ actorId: STRANGER, grantId: grant.grant.id });
const missingGrant = await repo.revokeGrant({ actorId: STRANGER, grantId: randomUUID() });
expect(realGrant).toEqual(missingGrant);
expectOk(await repo.deleteEstate({ actorId: OWNER, estateId: estate.estate.id }));
});
// ── contract 2 §3 grant evaluation ─────────────────────────────────────────
it('a company grant confers its role down the whole chain, workspace included (§3.2)', async () => {
const estate = expectOk(
await repo.createEstate({ actorId: OWNER, companyId, name: 'Chain E', slug: slug('chain') }),
);
const project = expectOk(
await repo.createPlatformProject({
actorId: OWNER,
estateId: estate.estate.id,
name: 'Chain P',
slug: slug('chain-p'),
}),
);
// Workspaces are evaluable but not hierarchy commands; seed one directly.
const workspaceId = randomUUID();
await handle.db.insert(workspaces).values({
id: workspaceId,
name: 'Chain W',
slug: slug('chain-w'),
platformProjectId: project.platformProject.id,
});
for (const [kind, id] of [
['company', companyId],
['estate', estate.estate.id],
['platform_project', project.platformProject.id],
['workspace', workspaceId],
] as const) {
expect(await evaluation.effectiveRole(OWNER, kind, id)).toBe('owner');
expect(await evaluation.effectiveRole(STRANGER, kind, id)).toBeNull();
}
// Max-role (§3.3): viewer on the company + owner on the estate → owner at
// and below the estate, viewer at the company.
const viewerGrant = expectOk(
await repo.createGrant({
actorId: OWNER,
userId: SUBJECT,
targetKind: 'company',
targetId: companyId,
role: 'viewer',
}),
);
const ownerGrant = expectOk(
await repo.createGrant({
actorId: OWNER,
userId: SUBJECT,
targetKind: 'estate',
targetId: estate.estate.id,
role: 'owner',
}),
);
expect(await evaluation.effectiveRole(SUBJECT, 'company', companyId)).toBe('viewer');
expect(await evaluation.effectiveRole(SUBJECT, 'estate', estate.estate.id)).toBe('owner');
expect(await evaluation.effectiveRole(SUBJECT, 'workspace', workspaceId)).toBe('owner');
// Revocation is row deletion and denies the very next evaluation (§6).
expectOk(await repo.revokeGrant({ actorId: OWNER, grantId: ownerGrant.grant.id }));
expect(await evaluation.effectiveRole(SUBJECT, 'estate', estate.estate.id)).toBe('viewer');
expectOk(await repo.revokeGrant({ actorId: OWNER, grantId: viewerGrant.grant.id }));
expect(await evaluation.effectiveRole(SUBJECT, 'company', companyId)).toBeNull();
await handle.db.delete(workspaces).where(eq(workspaces.id, workspaceId));
expectOk(
await repo.deletePlatformProject({
actorId: OWNER,
platformProjectId: project.platformProject.id,
}),
);
expectOk(await repo.deleteEstate({ actorId: OWNER, estateId: estate.estate.id }));
});
it('team grant subjects are suspended: a team row confers nothing and cannot be changed (§1.4)', async () => {
const teamId = randomUUID();
await handle.db.insert(teams).values({
id: teamId,
name: slug('team'),
slug: slug('team'),
ownerId: SUBJECT,
managerId: SUBJECT,
});
// Out-of-band team row (the command surface cannot create one).
const inserted = await handle.db
.insert(hierarchyGrants)
.values({ teamId, companyId, role: 'owner', grantedBy: OWNER })
.returning();
const teamGrantId = inserted[0]!.id;
// The team's own owner gains no effective role from it.
expect(await evaluation.effectiveRole(SUBJECT, 'company', companyId)).toBeNull();
// changeGrant refuses the row.
expect(
await repo.changeGrant({ actorId: OWNER, grantId: teamGrantId, role: 'viewer' }),
).toEqual({
ok: false,
error: 'conflict',
message: 'team grant subjects are suspended',
});
await handle.db.delete(hierarchyGrants).where(eq(hierarchyGrants.id, teamGrantId));
await handle.db.delete(teams).where(eq(teams.id, teamId));
});
// ── command conflict semantics ─────────────────────────────────────────────
it('transfer needs owner on both parents in its own transaction, and refuses no-op and colliding transfers (§5)', async () => {
const source = expectOk(
await repo.createCompany({ actorId: OWNER, name: 'Src Co', slug: slug('src') }),
);
const destination = expectOk(
await repo.createCompany({ actorId: SUBJECT, name: 'Dst Co', slug: slug('dst') }),
);
const estateSlug = slug('mv');
const estate = expectOk(
await repo.createEstate({
actorId: OWNER,
companyId: source.company.id,
name: 'Mv E',
slug: estateSlug,
}),
);
// OWNER owns the source but not the destination → not_found (§6.7-safe).
expect(
await repo.transferEstate({
actorId: OWNER,
estateId: estate.estate.id,
destinationCompanyId: destination.company.id,
}),
).toEqual({ ok: false, error: 'not_found' });
// Same-parent transfer is refused.
const samePlace = await repo.transferEstate({
actorId: OWNER,
estateId: estate.estate.id,
destinationCompanyId: source.company.id,
});
expect(samePlace.ok).toBe(false);
if (!samePlace.ok) expect(samePlace.error).toBe('conflict');
// Grant OWNER the destination; a slug collision there is refused.
expectOk(
await repo.createGrant({
actorId: SUBJECT,
userId: OWNER,
targetKind: 'company',
targetId: destination.company.id,
role: 'owner',
}),
);
expectOk(
await repo.createEstate({
actorId: OWNER,
companyId: destination.company.id,
name: 'Collide',
slug: estateSlug,
}),
);
const collision = await repo.transferEstate({
actorId: OWNER,
estateId: estate.estate.id,
destinationCompanyId: destination.company.id,
});
expect(collision.ok).toBe(false);
if (!collision.ok) expect(collision.error).toBe('conflict');
});
it('a successful transfer records transfer_from and transfer_to (§6.4 three-leg witness)', async () => {
const from = expectOk(
await repo.createCompany({ actorId: OWNER, name: 'From Co', slug: slug('from') }),
);
const to = expectOk(
await repo.createCompany({ actorId: OWNER, name: 'To Co', slug: slug('to') }),
);
const estate = expectOk(
await repo.createEstate({
actorId: OWNER,
companyId: from.company.id,
name: 'Moved E',
slug: slug('moved'),
}),
);
const key = `key-${randomUUID()}`;
expectOk(
await repo.transferEstate({
actorId: OWNER,
estateId: estate.estate.id,
destinationCompanyId: to.company.id,
idempotencyKey: key,
}),
);
const moved = (
await handle.db.select().from(estates).where(eq(estates.id, estate.estate.id))
)[0]!;
expect(moved.companyId).toBe(to.company.id);
const events = await eventsForKey(key);
expect(events).toHaveLength(1);
expect(events[0]).toMatchObject({ verb: 'transfer', targetId: estate.estate.id });
expect(events[0]!.transferFrom).toMatchObject({ kind: 'company', id: from.company.id });
expect(events[0]!.transferTo).toMatchObject({ kind: 'company', id: to.company.id });
// The post-transfer snapshot's parent chain names the destination.
expect(events[0]!.targetSnapshot).toMatchObject({
parentChain: [{ kind: 'company', id: to.company.id, slug: to.company.slug }],
});
});
it('refuses duplicate slugs, deletes with children, and degenerate grant commands as conflicts', async () => {
const co = expectOk(
await repo.createCompany({ actorId: OWNER, name: 'Conflict Co', slug: slug('conf') }),
);
const dupSlug = await repo.createCompany({ actorId: OWNER, name: 'x', slug: co.company.slug });
expect(dupSlug.ok).toBe(false);
if (!dupSlug.ok) expect(dupSlug.error).toBe('conflict');
expectOk(
await repo.createEstate({
actorId: OWNER,
companyId: co.company.id,
name: 'Child',
slug: slug('child'),
}),
);
const withChildren = await repo.deleteCompany({ actorId: OWNER, companyId: co.company.id });
expect(withChildren.ok).toBe(false);
if (!withChildren.ok) expect(withChildren.error).toBe('conflict');
// Grant to a nonexistent subject is refused (the caller already holds
// owner, so the refusal discloses nothing new).
const ghost = await repo.createGrant({
actorId: OWNER,
userId: `missing-${randomUUID()}`,
targetKind: 'company',
targetId: co.company.id,
role: 'viewer',
});
expect(ghost.ok).toBe(false);
if (!ghost.ok) expect(ghost.error).toBe('conflict');
const grant = expectOk(
await repo.createGrant({
actorId: OWNER,
userId: SUBJECT,
targetKind: 'company',
targetId: co.company.id,
role: 'viewer',
}),
);
const duplicate = await repo.createGrant({
actorId: OWNER,
userId: SUBJECT,
targetKind: 'company',
targetId: co.company.id,
role: 'viewer',
});
expect(duplicate.ok).toBe(false);
if (!duplicate.ok) expect(duplicate.error).toBe('conflict');
const sameRole = await repo.changeGrant({
actorId: OWNER,
grantId: grant.grant.id,
role: 'viewer',
});
expect(sameRole.ok).toBe(false);
if (!sameRole.ok) expect(sameRole.error).toBe('conflict');
// A second grant with another role exists → changing the first onto that
// role would collide with the unique constraint; refused ahead of it.
const second = expectOk(
await repo.createGrant({
actorId: OWNER,
userId: SUBJECT,
targetKind: 'company',
targetId: co.company.id,
role: 'member',
}),
);
const collide = await repo.changeGrant({
actorId: OWNER,
grantId: grant.grant.id,
role: 'member',
});
expect(collide.ok).toBe(false);
if (!collide.ok) expect(collide.error).toBe('conflict');
// A clean change succeeds and records the previous role, namespaced (§4.5).
const changeKey = `key-${randomUUID()}`;
const changed = expectOk(
await repo.changeGrant({
actorId: OWNER,
grantId: second.grant.id,
role: 'owner',
idempotencyKey: changeKey,
}),
);
expect(changed.grant.role).toBe('hierarchy:owner');
const events = await eventsForKey(changeKey);
expect(events).toHaveLength(1);
expect(events[0]!.targetSnapshot).toMatchObject({
role: 'hierarchy:owner',
previousRole: 'hierarchy:member',
});
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import {
companies,
eq,
estates,
hierarchyGrants,
inArray,
or,
platformProjects,
workspaces,
and,
type Db,
HIERARCHY_GRANT_ROLES,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
/**
* Hierarchy grant evaluation (contract 2 §3).
*
* Deny-by-default (§3.1): a user's effective role on a node is null unless a
* grant row explicitly confers one. Grants apply down the chain only (§3.2):
* the effective role on a node is the maximum role over grants targeting the
* node itself or any of its ancestors, maximum per the total order
* viewer ⊂ member ⊂ owner (§2). Evaluation is live and per-decision — no
* caching — so revocation (row deletion, §6) denies the next decision
* inherently. A missing node evaluates to null, indistinguishable from
* no-grant, which keeps unauthorized probes oracle-safe (contract 1 §6.7).
*
* Team grant subjects are SUSPENDED (§1.4): the command surface refuses to
* create them and this evaluator considers user-subject grants only, so a
* team row could not confer access even if one existed.
*
* Read-only module: it selects from the class tables but never writes them,
* so it does not appear on the writer-coverage allowlist.
*/
export type HierarchyGrantRole = (typeof HIERARCHY_GRANT_ROLES)[number];
/** Node kinds a grant may target (§3.2; workspace is evaluable, not grantable). */
export type GrantTargetKind = 'company' | 'estate' | 'platform_project';
/** Node kinds an authorization decision may be evaluated at (§3.2: down to workspace). */
export type EvaluableNodeKind = GrantTargetKind | 'workspace';
type Tx = Pick<Db, 'select'>;
/** Ancestor chain of a node, self included at its own level; ids only. */
export interface AncestorChain {
readonly companyId: string;
readonly estateId?: string;
readonly platformProjectId?: string;
readonly workspaceId?: string;
}
export function roleStrength(role: HierarchyGrantRole): number {
return HIERARCHY_GRANT_ROLES.indexOf(role);
}
export function roleAtLeast(
role: HierarchyGrantRole | null,
required: HierarchyGrantRole,
): boolean {
return role !== null && roleStrength(role) >= roleStrength(required);
}
/**
* Serialized role strings are namespaced (§4.5): audit events and API
* responses carry `hierarchy:owner`, never a bare `owner`.
*/
export function namespacedHierarchyRole(role: HierarchyGrantRole): string {
return `hierarchy:${role}`;
}
/**
* Resolve a node's ancestor chain (self included). Returns null when the
* node does not exist — callers treat that exactly like no-grant (§3.1,
* oracle-safe).
*/
export async function resolveAncestorChain(
tx: Tx,
kind: EvaluableNodeKind,
id: string,
): Promise<AncestorChain | null> {
if (kind === 'company') {
const rows = await tx
.select({ id: companies.id })
.from(companies)
.where(eq(companies.id, id))
.limit(1);
const row = rows[0];
return row ? { companyId: row.id } : null;
}
if (kind === 'estate') {
const rows = await tx
.select({ id: estates.id, companyId: estates.companyId })
.from(estates)
.where(eq(estates.id, id))
.limit(1);
const row = rows[0];
return row ? { companyId: row.companyId, estateId: row.id } : null;
}
if (kind === 'platform_project') {
const rows = await tx
.select({
id: platformProjects.id,
estateId: platformProjects.estateId,
companyId: estates.companyId,
})
.from(platformProjects)
.innerJoin(estates, eq(estates.id, platformProjects.estateId))
.where(eq(platformProjects.id, id))
.limit(1);
const row = rows[0];
return row
? { companyId: row.companyId, estateId: row.estateId, platformProjectId: row.id }
: null;
}
const rows = await tx
.select({
id: workspaces.id,
platformProjectId: workspaces.platformProjectId,
estateId: platformProjects.estateId,
companyId: estates.companyId,
})
.from(workspaces)
.innerJoin(platformProjects, eq(platformProjects.id, workspaces.platformProjectId))
.innerJoin(estates, eq(estates.id, platformProjects.estateId))
.where(eq(workspaces.id, id))
.limit(1);
const row = rows[0];
return row
? {
companyId: row.companyId,
estateId: row.estateId,
platformProjectId: row.platformProjectId,
workspaceId: row.id,
}
: null;
}
function maxRole(roles: readonly string[]): HierarchyGrantRole | null {
let best: HierarchyGrantRole | null = null;
for (const candidate of roles) {
// Fail-closed: a value outside the vocabulary confers nothing.
if (!(HIERARCHY_GRANT_ROLES as readonly string[]).includes(candidate)) continue;
const role = candidate as HierarchyGrantRole;
if (best === null || roleStrength(role) > roleStrength(best)) best = role;
}
return best;
}
/**
* Effective role of a user on a node: maximum over the user's grants whose
* target is the node or any ancestor (§3.2); null = deny (§3.1). Missing
* node → null.
*/
export async function evaluateEffectiveRole(
tx: Tx,
userId: string,
kind: EvaluableNodeKind,
id: string,
): Promise<HierarchyGrantRole | null> {
const chain = await resolveAncestorChain(tx, kind, id);
if (!chain) return null;
const targetConditions = [eq(hierarchyGrants.companyId, chain.companyId)];
if (chain.estateId) targetConditions.push(eq(hierarchyGrants.estateId, chain.estateId));
if (chain.platformProjectId) {
targetConditions.push(eq(hierarchyGrants.platformProjectId, chain.platformProjectId));
}
const rows = await tx
.select({ role: hierarchyGrants.role })
.from(hierarchyGrants)
.where(and(eq(hierarchyGrants.userId, userId), or(...targetConditions)));
return maxRole(rows.map((r) => r.role));
}
/**
* All companies on which the user holds any effective role, i.e. companies
* with a grant on the company itself or on any descendant (contract 1 §2.8:
* a grant anywhere in the subtree discloses the company's chain upward).
*/
export async function grantedCompanyIds(tx: Tx, userId: string): Promise<string[]> {
const grants = await tx
.select({
companyId: hierarchyGrants.companyId,
estateId: hierarchyGrants.estateId,
platformProjectId: hierarchyGrants.platformProjectId,
})
.from(hierarchyGrants)
.where(eq(hierarchyGrants.userId, userId));
const companyIds = new Set<string>();
const estateIds = new Set<string>();
const platformProjectIds = new Set<string>();
for (const grant of grants) {
if (grant.companyId) companyIds.add(grant.companyId);
else if (grant.estateId) estateIds.add(grant.estateId);
else if (grant.platformProjectId) platformProjectIds.add(grant.platformProjectId);
}
if (platformProjectIds.size > 0) {
const rows = await tx
.select({ estateId: platformProjects.estateId })
.from(platformProjects)
.where(inArray(platformProjects.id, [...platformProjectIds]));
for (const row of rows) estateIds.add(row.estateId);
}
if (estateIds.size > 0) {
const rows = await tx
.select({ companyId: estates.companyId })
.from(estates)
.where(inArray(estates.id, [...estateIds]));
for (const row of rows) companyIds.add(row.companyId);
}
return [...companyIds];
}
@Injectable()
export class HierarchyGrantEvaluationService {
constructor(@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db) {}
/** Live per-decision evaluation; pass a tx to evaluate inside a command's transaction. */
effectiveRole(
userId: string,
kind: EvaluableNodeKind,
id: string,
tx?: Tx,
): Promise<HierarchyGrantRole | null> {
return evaluateEffectiveRole(tx ?? this.db, userId, kind, id);
}
async hasRole(
userId: string,
kind: EvaluableNodeKind,
id: string,
required: HierarchyGrantRole,
tx?: Tx,
): Promise<boolean> {
return roleAtLeast(await this.effectiveRole(userId, kind, id, tx), required);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
import {
Body,
Controller,
Delete,
Get,
HttpCode,
Param,
ParseUUIDPipe,
Post,
UseGuards,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { CurrentUser } from '../auth/current-user.decorator.js';
import {
ChangeCompanyVisibilityDto,
ChangeGrantDto,
CreateCompanyDto,
CreateEstateDto,
CreateGrantDto,
CreatePlatformProjectDto,
DeleteNodeDto,
RenameNodeDto,
TransferEstateDto,
TransferPlatformProjectDto,
} from './hierarchy.dto.js';
import { HierarchyRepository } from './hierarchy.repository.js';
import { HierarchyService } from './hierarchy.service.js';
/**
* The hierarchy command family (contract 1 §5, §6.3). This controller is the
* closed HTTP surface over the hierarchy class tables: the route-inventory
* witness asserts these routes and no others exist. Delete commands take an
* optional body (idempotency key) via POST-style DTOs; every mutation is
* audited on its own transaction by the repository.
*/
@Controller('api/hierarchy')
@UseGuards(AuthGuard)
export class HierarchyController {
constructor(
private readonly repository: HierarchyRepository,
private readonly service: HierarchyService,
) {}
// ── companies ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Post('companies')
async createCompany(@CurrentUser() user: { id: string }, @Body() dto: CreateCompanyDto) {
return this.service.unwrap(
await this.repository.createCompany({
actorId: user.id,
name: dto.name,
slug: dto.slug,
idempotencyKey: dto.idempotencyKey,
}),
);
}
/** Companies the caller holds a grant on (directly or via a descendant). */
@Get('companies')
listGrantedCompanies(@CurrentUser() user: { id: string }) {
return this.repository.listGrantedCompanies(user.id);
}
/** Directory-class companies, closed-field (§2.8). */
@Get('companies/directory')
listDirectory() {
return this.repository.listDirectory();
}
@Post('companies/:id/rename')
@HttpCode(200)
async renameCompany(
@CurrentUser() user: { id: string },
@Param('id', ParseUUIDPipe) id: string,
@Body() dto: RenameNodeDto,
) {
return this.service.unwrap(
await this.repository.renameCompany({
actorId: user.id,
companyId: id,
name: dto.name,
idempotencyKey: dto.idempotencyKey,
}),
);
}
@Post('companies/:id/visibility')
@HttpCode(200)
async changeCompanyVisibility(
@CurrentUser() user: { id: string },
@Param('id', ParseUUIDPipe) id: string,
@Body() dto: ChangeCompanyVisibilityDto,
) {
return this.service.unwrap(
await this.repository.changeCompanyVisibility({
actorId: user.id,
companyId: id,
visibility: dto.visibility,
idempotencyKey: dto.idempotencyKey,
}),
);
}
@Delete('companies/:id')
async deleteCompany(
@CurrentUser() user: { id: string },
@Param('id', ParseUUIDPipe) id: string,
@Body() dto: DeleteNodeDto,
) {
return this.service.unwrap(
await this.repository.deleteCompany({
actorId: user.id,
companyId: id,
idempotencyKey: dto?.idempotencyKey,
}),
);
}
// ── estates ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Post('estates')
async createEstate(@CurrentUser() user: { id: string }, @Body() dto: CreateEstateDto) {
return this.service.unwrap(
await this.repository.createEstate({
actorId: user.id,
companyId: dto.companyId,
name: dto.name,
slug: dto.slug,
idempotencyKey: dto.idempotencyKey,
}),
);
}
@Post('estates/:id/rename')
@HttpCode(200)
async renameEstate(
@CurrentUser() user: { id: string },
@Param('id', ParseUUIDPipe) id: string,
@Body() dto: RenameNodeDto,
) {
return this.service.unwrap(
await this.repository.renameEstate({
actorId: user.id,
estateId: id,
name: dto.name,
idempotencyKey: dto.idempotencyKey,
}),
);
}
@Post('estates/:id/transfer')
@HttpCode(200)
async transferEstate(
@CurrentUser() user: { id: string },
@Param('id', ParseUUIDPipe) id: string,
@Body() dto: TransferEstateDto,
) {
return this.service.unwrap(
await this.repository.transferEstate({
actorId: user.id,
estateId: id,
destinationCompanyId: dto.destinationCompanyId,
idempotencyKey: dto.idempotencyKey,
}),
);
}
@Delete('estates/:id')
async deleteEstate(
@CurrentUser() user: { id: string },
@Param('id', ParseUUIDPipe) id: string,
@Body() dto: DeleteNodeDto,
) {
return this.service.unwrap(
await this.repository.deleteEstate({
actorId: user.id,
estateId: id,
idempotencyKey: dto?.idempotencyKey,
}),
);
}
// ── platform projects ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Post('platform-projects')
async createPlatformProject(
@CurrentUser() user: { id: string },
@Body() dto: CreatePlatformProjectDto,
) {
return this.service.unwrap(
await this.repository.createPlatformProject({
actorId: user.id,
estateId: dto.estateId,
name: dto.name,
slug: dto.slug,
idempotencyKey: dto.idempotencyKey,
}),
);
}
@Post('platform-projects/:id/rename')
@HttpCode(200)
async renamePlatformProject(
@CurrentUser() user: { id: string },
@Param('id', ParseUUIDPipe) id: string,
@Body() dto: RenameNodeDto,
) {
return this.service.unwrap(
await this.repository.renamePlatformProject({
actorId: user.id,
platformProjectId: id,
name: dto.name,
idempotencyKey: dto.idempotencyKey,
}),
);
}
@Post('platform-projects/:id/transfer')
@HttpCode(200)
async transferPlatformProject(
@CurrentUser() user: { id: string },
@Param('id', ParseUUIDPipe) id: string,
@Body() dto: TransferPlatformProjectDto,
) {
return this.service.unwrap(
await this.repository.transferPlatformProject({
actorId: user.id,
platformProjectId: id,
destinationEstateId: dto.destinationEstateId,
idempotencyKey: dto.idempotencyKey,
}),
);
}
@Delete('platform-projects/:id')
async deletePlatformProject(
@CurrentUser() user: { id: string },
@Param('id', ParseUUIDPipe) id: string,
@Body() dto: DeleteNodeDto,
) {
return this.service.unwrap(
await this.repository.deletePlatformProject({
actorId: user.id,
platformProjectId: id,
idempotencyKey: dto?.idempotencyKey,
}),
);
}
// ── grants ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Post('grants')
async createGrant(@CurrentUser() user: { id: string }, @Body() dto: CreateGrantDto) {
return this.service.unwrap(
await this.repository.createGrant({
actorId: user.id,
userId: dto.userId,
targetKind: dto.targetKind,
targetId: dto.targetId,
role: dto.role,
idempotencyKey: dto.idempotencyKey,
}),
);
}
@Post('grants/:id/change')
@HttpCode(200)
async changeGrant(
@CurrentUser() user: { id: string },
@Param('id', ParseUUIDPipe) id: string,
@Body() dto: ChangeGrantDto,
) {
return this.service.unwrap(
await this.repository.changeGrant({
actorId: user.id,
grantId: id,
role: dto.role,
idempotencyKey: dto.idempotencyKey,
}),
);
}
@Delete('grants/:id')
async revokeGrant(
@CurrentUser() user: { id: string },
@Param('id', ParseUUIDPipe) id: string,
@Body() dto: DeleteNodeDto,
) {
return this.service.unwrap(
await this.repository.revokeGrant({
actorId: user.id,
grantId: id,
idempotencyKey: dto?.idempotencyKey,
}),
);
}
}
+169
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
import { COMPANY_VISIBILITY, HIERARCHY_GRANT_ROLES } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { IsIn, IsOptional, IsString, IsUUID, Matches, MaxLength, MinLength } from 'class-validator';
/**
* Hierarchy command DTOs (contract 1 §5, contract 2 §4/§7).
*
* The global ValidationPipe runs with whitelist + forbidNonWhitelisted, so a
* payload field absent from these classes is a 400. That closure is itself
* contract surface:
* - CreateCompanyDto declares NO visibility field — creation is always
* private (contract 1 §5.5); a visibility argument is refused by the pipe.
* - CreateGrantDto declares NO teamId field — team grant subjects are
* suspended (contract 2 §1.4/§7.5); a team subject is refused by the pipe.
* Every class here must be registered in PIPE_GUARDED_DTOS so the boot-time
* assertion proves the pipe sees the decorators.
*/
const SLUG_PATTERN = /^[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?$/;
const SLUG_MESSAGE = 'slug must be lowercase alphanumeric with interior hyphens';
export class CreateCompanyDto {
@IsString()
@MinLength(1)
@MaxLength(255)
name!: string;
@IsString()
@MaxLength(100)
@Matches(SLUG_PATTERN, { message: SLUG_MESSAGE })
slug!: string;
/** Client-supplied idempotency key (REQ-AUD-001 replay); server-generated when absent. */
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
@MinLength(1)
@MaxLength(255)
idempotencyKey?: string;
}
export class RenameNodeDto {
@IsString()
@MinLength(1)
@MaxLength(255)
name!: string;
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
@MinLength(1)
@MaxLength(255)
idempotencyKey?: string;
}
export class ChangeCompanyVisibilityDto {
@IsIn(COMPANY_VISIBILITY)
visibility!: (typeof COMPANY_VISIBILITY)[number];
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
@MinLength(1)
@MaxLength(255)
idempotencyKey?: string;
}
export class DeleteNodeDto {
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
@MinLength(1)
@MaxLength(255)
idempotencyKey?: string;
}
export class CreateEstateDto {
@IsUUID()
companyId!: string;
@IsString()
@MinLength(1)
@MaxLength(255)
name!: string;
@IsString()
@MaxLength(100)
@Matches(SLUG_PATTERN, { message: SLUG_MESSAGE })
slug!: string;
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
@MinLength(1)
@MaxLength(255)
idempotencyKey?: string;
}
export class CreatePlatformProjectDto {
@IsUUID()
estateId!: string;
@IsString()
@MinLength(1)
@MaxLength(255)
name!: string;
@IsString()
@MaxLength(100)
@Matches(SLUG_PATTERN, { message: SLUG_MESSAGE })
slug!: string;
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
@MinLength(1)
@MaxLength(255)
idempotencyKey?: string;
}
export class TransferEstateDto {
@IsUUID()
destinationCompanyId!: string;
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
@MinLength(1)
@MaxLength(255)
idempotencyKey?: string;
}
export class TransferPlatformProjectDto {
@IsUUID()
destinationEstateId!: string;
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
@MinLength(1)
@MaxLength(255)
idempotencyKey?: string;
}
export class CreateGrantDto {
/** Subject user (better-auth text id). No teamId field — see module doc. */
@IsString()
@MinLength(1)
@MaxLength(255)
userId!: string;
@IsIn(['company', 'estate', 'platform_project'])
targetKind!: 'company' | 'estate' | 'platform_project';
@IsUUID()
targetId!: string;
/** Bare vocabulary on requests; responses and audit events are namespaced (§4.5). */
@IsIn(HIERARCHY_GRANT_ROLES)
role!: (typeof HIERARCHY_GRANT_ROLES)[number];
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
@MinLength(1)
@MaxLength(255)
idempotencyKey?: string;
}
export class ChangeGrantDto {
@IsIn(HIERARCHY_GRANT_ROLES)
role!: (typeof HIERARCHY_GRANT_ROLES)[number];
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
@MinLength(1)
@MaxLength(255)
idempotencyKey?: string;
}
+18 -7
View File
@@ -1,17 +1,28 @@
import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { HierarchyAuditRepository } from './hierarchy-audit.repository.js';
import { HierarchyGrantEvaluationService } from './hierarchy-grant-evaluation.js';
import { HierarchyController } from './hierarchy.controller.js';
import { HierarchyRepository } from './hierarchy.repository.js';
import { HierarchyService } from './hierarchy.service.js';
/**
* Hierarchy (tenancy/authorization structure) feature module.
*
* M4-1b-i ships the audit event + outbox machinery only (contract 1 §5.2).
* The hierarchy command family — controllers, DTOs, and the allowlisted
* class-table repositories — lands in M4-1b-ii once contract 2 (RBAC grant
* model) merges; until then this module exposes no routes, which the
* route-inventory witness asserts.
* M4-1b-i shipped the audit event + outbox machinery (contract 1 §5.2);
* M4-1b-ii adds the command family — the closed route surface asserted by
* the route-inventory witness — plus grant evaluation (contract 2 §3).
* HierarchyRepository is the sole class-table writer (writer-coverage
* allowlist); every mutation runs authorize → mutate → audit in one
* transaction.
*/
@Module({
providers: [HierarchyAuditRepository],
exports: [HierarchyAuditRepository],
controllers: [HierarchyController],
providers: [
HierarchyAuditRepository,
HierarchyGrantEvaluationService,
HierarchyRepository,
HierarchyService,
],
exports: [HierarchyAuditRepository, HierarchyGrantEvaluationService],
})
export class HierarchyModule {}
@@ -0,0 +1,935 @@
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import {
and,
asc,
companies,
eq,
estates,
hierarchyGrants,
inArray,
platformProjects,
users,
workspaces,
type Db,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
import {
appendHierarchyEvent,
buildNodeSnapshot,
HierarchyAuditIdempotencyConflictError,
} from './hierarchy-audit.repository.js';
import {
evaluateEffectiveRole,
grantedCompanyIds,
namespacedHierarchyRole,
roleAtLeast,
type GrantTargetKind,
type HierarchyGrantRole,
} from './hierarchy-grant-evaluation.js';
/**
* Hierarchy command repository (contract 1 §5, contract 2 §4).
*
* The ONLY writer of the hierarchy class tables (companies, estates,
* platform_projects, hierarchy_grants) — it is the writer-coverage
* allowlist's sole entry. Every command runs one transaction that
* authorizes (live grant evaluation inside the same transaction), mutates,
* and appends the semantic audit event + outbox record via the M4-1b-i
* machinery, so state, event, and outbox commit or roll back together
* (REQ-AUD-001).
*
* Authorization failure and target-not-found both return `not_found`
* (contract 1 §6.7: no existence oracle — an unauthorized caller learns
* nothing a stranger would not). `forbidden` appears only where the caller
* already knows the surface exists independent of any node: the admin-only
* visibility change (§5.5). Serialized role strings are namespaced (§4.5).
*/
export type HierarchyCommandFailure =
| { readonly ok: false; readonly error: 'not_found' }
| { readonly ok: false; readonly error: 'forbidden'; readonly message: string }
| { readonly ok: false; readonly error: 'conflict'; readonly message: string };
export type HierarchyResult<T> = ({ readonly ok: true } & T) | HierarchyCommandFailure;
export interface CompanyView {
readonly id: string;
readonly name: string;
readonly slug: string;
readonly visibility: string;
}
export interface NodeView {
readonly id: string;
readonly name: string;
readonly slug: string;
}
export interface GrantView {
readonly id: string;
readonly userId: string;
readonly targetKind: GrantTargetKind;
readonly targetId: string;
/** Namespaced (§4.5), e.g. `hierarchy:owner`. */
readonly role: string;
readonly grantedBy: string;
}
/** Directory rows are closed-field: existence, name, slug — nothing else (§2.8). */
export interface DirectoryEntry {
readonly id: string;
readonly name: string;
readonly slug: string;
}
type Tx = Pick<Db, 'insert' | 'select' | 'update' | 'delete'>;
type GrantRow = typeof hierarchyGrants.$inferSelect;
const NOT_FOUND: HierarchyCommandFailure = { ok: false, error: 'not_found' };
function conflict(message: string): HierarchyCommandFailure {
return { ok: false, error: 'conflict', message };
}
function grantTarget(row: GrantRow): { kind: GrantTargetKind; id: string } {
if (row.companyId) return { kind: 'company', id: row.companyId };
if (row.estateId) return { kind: 'estate', id: row.estateId };
return { kind: 'platform_project', id: row.platformProjectId as string };
}
/** Grant event snapshot (contract 2 §4.4): subject, target, namespaced role, grantor. */
function grantSnapshot(row: GrantRow): Record<string, unknown> {
const target = grantTarget(row);
return {
id: row.id,
subject: { userId: row.userId },
target: { kind: target.kind, id: target.id },
role: namespacedHierarchyRole(row.role as HierarchyGrantRole),
grantedBy: row.grantedBy,
};
}
function grantView(row: GrantRow): GrantView {
const target = grantTarget(row);
return {
id: row.id,
userId: row.userId as string,
targetKind: target.kind,
targetId: target.id,
role: namespacedHierarchyRole(row.role as HierarchyGrantRole),
grantedBy: row.grantedBy,
};
}
function companyView(row: typeof companies.$inferSelect): CompanyView {
return { id: row.id, name: row.name, slug: row.slug, visibility: row.visibility };
}
interface CommandContext {
readonly actorId: string;
readonly idempotencyKey: string;
readonly correlationId: string;
}
@Injectable()
export class HierarchyRepository {
constructor(@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db) {}
private async run<T>(
idempotencyKey: string | undefined,
actorId: string,
body: (tx: Tx, ctx: CommandContext) => Promise<HierarchyResult<T>>,
): Promise<HierarchyResult<T>> {
const ctx: CommandContext = {
actorId,
idempotencyKey: idempotencyKey ?? randomUUID(),
correlationId: randomUUID(),
};
try {
return await this.db.transaction(async (tx) => body(tx, ctx));
} catch (error) {
// A key replayed with different content aborts the whole command —
// the transaction (state change included) has rolled back (§6.4).
if (error instanceof HierarchyAuditIdempotencyConflictError) {
return conflict(error.message);
}
throw error;
}
}
private async requireOwner(
tx: Tx,
actorId: string,
kind: GrantTargetKind,
id: string,
): Promise<boolean> {
return roleAtLeast(await evaluateEffectiveRole(tx, actorId, kind, id), 'owner');
}
private async isPlatformAdmin(tx: Tx, actorId: string): Promise<boolean> {
const rows = await tx
.select({ role: users.role })
.from(users)
.where(eq(users.id, actorId))
.limit(1);
return rows[0]?.role === 'admin';
}
// ── companies ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Any authenticated user may create a company; the same audited operation
* writes the creator's initial owner grant (§4.3), causation-linked to the
* create event. Visibility is always 'private' — the command takes no
* visibility input (§5.5).
*/
createCompany(input: {
actorId: string;
name: string;
slug: string;
idempotencyKey?: string;
}): Promise<HierarchyResult<{ company: CompanyView; grant: GrantView }>> {
return this.run(input.idempotencyKey, input.actorId, async (tx, ctx) => {
const inserted = await tx
.insert(companies)
.values({ name: input.name, slug: input.slug })
.onConflictDoNothing()
.returning();
const company = inserted[0];
if (!company) return conflict('company slug already exists');
const grantRows = await tx
.insert(hierarchyGrants)
.values({
userId: ctx.actorId,
companyId: company.id,
role: 'owner',
grantedBy: ctx.actorId,
})
.returning();
const grant = grantRows[0] as GrantRow;
const snapshot = await buildNodeSnapshot(tx, 'company', company.id);
const created = await appendHierarchyEvent(tx, {
actorId: ctx.actorId,
verb: 'create',
targetKind: 'company',
targetId: company.id,
targetSnapshot: { ...snapshot },
correlationId: ctx.correlationId,
idempotencyKey: ctx.idempotencyKey,
});
await appendHierarchyEvent(tx, {
actorId: ctx.actorId,
verb: 'grant_create',
targetKind: 'grant',
targetId: grant.id,
targetSnapshot: grantSnapshot(grant),
correlationId: ctx.correlationId,
causationId: created.event.id,
idempotencyKey: `${ctx.idempotencyKey}:grant`,
});
return { ok: true, company: companyView(company), grant: grantView(grant) };
});
}
renameCompany(input: {
actorId: string;
companyId: string;
name: string;
idempotencyKey?: string;
}): Promise<HierarchyResult<{ company: CompanyView }>> {
return this.run(input.idempotencyKey, input.actorId, async (tx, ctx) => {
if (!(await this.requireOwner(tx, ctx.actorId, 'company', input.companyId))) {
return NOT_FOUND;
}
const rows = await tx
.select()
.from(companies)
.where(eq(companies.id, input.companyId))
.limit(1);
const previous = rows[0];
if (!previous) return NOT_FOUND;
const updated = await tx
.update(companies)
.set({ name: input.name, updatedAt: new Date() })
.where(eq(companies.id, input.companyId))
.returning();
const company = updated[0] as typeof companies.$inferSelect;
const snapshot = await buildNodeSnapshot(tx, 'company', company.id);
await appendHierarchyEvent(tx, {
actorId: ctx.actorId,
verb: 'rename',
targetKind: 'company',
targetId: company.id,
targetSnapshot: { ...snapshot, previousName: previous.name },
correlationId: ctx.correlationId,
idempotencyKey: ctx.idempotencyKey,
});
return { ok: true, company: companyView(company) };
});
}
/**
* Admin-only until the company-CRUD capability ratifies (§5.5) — the one
* hierarchy mutation a platform admin performs without a grant. A
* non-admin caller (owner included) gets `forbidden` before any company
* read: the refusal reveals nothing about the target's existence.
*/
changeCompanyVisibility(input: {
actorId: string;
companyId: string;
visibility: string;
idempotencyKey?: string;
}): Promise<HierarchyResult<{ company: CompanyView }>> {
return this.run(input.idempotencyKey, input.actorId, async (tx, ctx) => {
if (!(await this.isPlatformAdmin(tx, ctx.actorId))) {
return {
ok: false,
error: 'forbidden',
message: 'visibility change is platform-admin-only',
};
}
const rows = await tx
.select()
.from(companies)
.where(eq(companies.id, input.companyId))
.limit(1);
const previous = rows[0];
if (!previous) return NOT_FOUND;
const updated = await tx
.update(companies)
.set({ visibility: input.visibility, updatedAt: new Date() })
.where(eq(companies.id, input.companyId))
.returning();
const company = updated[0] as typeof companies.$inferSelect;
const snapshot = await buildNodeSnapshot(tx, 'company', company.id);
await appendHierarchyEvent(tx, {
actorId: ctx.actorId,
verb: 'visibility_change',
targetKind: 'company',
targetId: company.id,
// Old and new values are event content (§5.5).
targetSnapshot: {
...snapshot,
previousVisibility: previous.visibility,
visibility: company.visibility,
},
correlationId: ctx.correlationId,
idempotencyKey: ctx.idempotencyKey,
});
return { ok: true, company: companyView(company) };
});
}
deleteCompany(input: {
actorId: string;
companyId: string;
idempotencyKey?: string;
}): Promise<HierarchyResult<{ deletedId: string }>> {
return this.run(input.idempotencyKey, input.actorId, async (tx, ctx) => {
if (!(await this.requireOwner(tx, ctx.actorId, 'company', input.companyId))) {
return NOT_FOUND;
}
const children = await tx
.select({ id: estates.id })
.from(estates)
.where(eq(estates.companyId, input.companyId))
.limit(1);
if (children.length > 0) return conflict('company still has estates');
// Snapshot and grants are read before the delete; target FKs cascade
// the grant rows, and each cascaded deletion is audited (§5.2).
const snapshot = await buildNodeSnapshot(tx, 'company', input.companyId);
const grants = await tx
.select()
.from(hierarchyGrants)
.where(eq(hierarchyGrants.companyId, input.companyId));
await tx.delete(companies).where(eq(companies.id, input.companyId));
const deleted = await appendHierarchyEvent(tx, {
actorId: ctx.actorId,
verb: 'delete',
targetKind: 'company',
targetId: input.companyId,
targetSnapshot: { ...snapshot },
correlationId: ctx.correlationId,
idempotencyKey: ctx.idempotencyKey,
});
for (const grant of grants) {
await appendHierarchyEvent(tx, {
actorId: ctx.actorId,
verb: 'grant_revoke',
targetKind: 'grant',
targetId: grant.id,
targetSnapshot: grantSnapshot(grant),
correlationId: ctx.correlationId,
causationId: deleted.event.id,
idempotencyKey: `${ctx.idempotencyKey}:revoke:${grant.id}`,
});
}
return { ok: true, deletedId: input.companyId };
});
}
// ── estates ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/** Child creation requires owner on the parent and confers no grant (§4.3). */
createEstate(input: {
actorId: string;
companyId: string;
name: string;
slug: string;
idempotencyKey?: string;
}): Promise<HierarchyResult<{ estate: NodeView }>> {
return this.run(input.idempotencyKey, input.actorId, async (tx, ctx) => {
if (!(await this.requireOwner(tx, ctx.actorId, 'company', input.companyId))) {
return NOT_FOUND;
}
const inserted = await tx
.insert(estates)
.values({ companyId: input.companyId, name: input.name, slug: input.slug })
.onConflictDoNothing()
.returning();
const estate = inserted[0];
if (!estate) return conflict('estate slug already exists in company');
const snapshot = await buildNodeSnapshot(tx, 'estate', estate.id);
await appendHierarchyEvent(tx, {
actorId: ctx.actorId,
verb: 'create',
targetKind: 'estate',
targetId: estate.id,
targetSnapshot: { ...snapshot },
correlationId: ctx.correlationId,
idempotencyKey: ctx.idempotencyKey,
});
return { ok: true, estate: { id: estate.id, name: estate.name, slug: estate.slug } };
});
}
renameEstate(input: {
actorId: string;
estateId: string;
name: string;
idempotencyKey?: string;
}): Promise<HierarchyResult<{ estate: NodeView }>> {
return this.run(input.idempotencyKey, input.actorId, async (tx, ctx) => {
if (!(await this.requireOwner(tx, ctx.actorId, 'estate', input.estateId))) {
return NOT_FOUND;
}
const rows = await tx.select().from(estates).where(eq(estates.id, input.estateId)).limit(1);
const previous = rows[0];
if (!previous) return NOT_FOUND;
const updated = await tx
.update(estates)
.set({ name: input.name })
.where(eq(estates.id, input.estateId))
.returning();
const estate = updated[0] as typeof estates.$inferSelect;
const snapshot = await buildNodeSnapshot(tx, 'estate', estate.id);
await appendHierarchyEvent(tx, {
actorId: ctx.actorId,
verb: 'rename',
targetKind: 'estate',
targetId: estate.id,
targetSnapshot: { ...snapshot, previousName: previous.name },
correlationId: ctx.correlationId,
idempotencyKey: ctx.idempotencyKey,
});
return { ok: true, estate: { id: estate.id, name: estate.name, slug: estate.slug } };
});
}
/** Transfer requires effective owner on BOTH parents, evaluated in the transfer's own transaction (§5). */
transferEstate(input: {
actorId: string;
estateId: string;
destinationCompanyId: string;
idempotencyKey?: string;
}): Promise<HierarchyResult<{ estate: NodeView }>> {
return this.run(input.idempotencyKey, input.actorId, async (tx, ctx) => {
const rows = await tx.select().from(estates).where(eq(estates.id, input.estateId)).limit(1);
const estate = rows[0];
if (!estate) return NOT_FOUND;
if (!(await this.requireOwner(tx, ctx.actorId, 'company', estate.companyId))) {
return NOT_FOUND;
}
if (!(await this.requireOwner(tx, ctx.actorId, 'company', input.destinationCompanyId))) {
return NOT_FOUND;
}
if (estate.companyId === input.destinationCompanyId) {
return conflict('estate already belongs to the destination company');
}
const collision = await tx
.select({ id: estates.id })
.from(estates)
.where(
and(eq(estates.companyId, input.destinationCompanyId), eq(estates.slug, estate.slug)),
)
.limit(1);
if (collision.length > 0) return conflict('destination company already has that estate slug');
const parents = await tx
.select({ id: companies.id, slug: companies.slug })
.from(companies)
.where(inArray(companies.id, [estate.companyId, input.destinationCompanyId]));
const source = parents.find((p) => p.id === estate.companyId);
const destination = parents.find((p) => p.id === input.destinationCompanyId);
if (!source || !destination) return NOT_FOUND;
await tx
.update(estates)
.set({ companyId: input.destinationCompanyId })
.where(eq(estates.id, input.estateId));
const snapshot = await buildNodeSnapshot(tx, 'estate', input.estateId);
await appendHierarchyEvent(tx, {
actorId: ctx.actorId,
verb: 'transfer',
targetKind: 'estate',
targetId: input.estateId,
targetSnapshot: { ...snapshot },
transferFrom: { kind: 'company', id: source.id, slug: source.slug },
transferTo: { kind: 'company', id: destination.id, slug: destination.slug },
correlationId: ctx.correlationId,
idempotencyKey: ctx.idempotencyKey,
});
return { ok: true, estate: { id: estate.id, name: estate.name, slug: estate.slug } };
});
}
deleteEstate(input: {
actorId: string;
estateId: string;
idempotencyKey?: string;
}): Promise<HierarchyResult<{ deletedId: string }>> {
return this.run(input.idempotencyKey, input.actorId, async (tx, ctx) => {
if (!(await this.requireOwner(tx, ctx.actorId, 'estate', input.estateId))) {
return NOT_FOUND;
}
const children = await tx
.select({ id: platformProjects.id })
.from(platformProjects)
.where(eq(platformProjects.estateId, input.estateId))
.limit(1);
if (children.length > 0) return conflict('estate still has platform projects');
const snapshot = await buildNodeSnapshot(tx, 'estate', input.estateId);
const grants = await tx
.select()
.from(hierarchyGrants)
.where(eq(hierarchyGrants.estateId, input.estateId));
await tx.delete(estates).where(eq(estates.id, input.estateId));
const deleted = await appendHierarchyEvent(tx, {
actorId: ctx.actorId,
verb: 'delete',
targetKind: 'estate',
targetId: input.estateId,
targetSnapshot: { ...snapshot },
correlationId: ctx.correlationId,
idempotencyKey: ctx.idempotencyKey,
});
for (const grant of grants) {
await appendHierarchyEvent(tx, {
actorId: ctx.actorId,
verb: 'grant_revoke',
targetKind: 'grant',
targetId: grant.id,
targetSnapshot: grantSnapshot(grant),
correlationId: ctx.correlationId,
causationId: deleted.event.id,
idempotencyKey: `${ctx.idempotencyKey}:revoke:${grant.id}`,
});
}
return { ok: true, deletedId: input.estateId };
});
}
// ── platform projects ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
createPlatformProject(input: {
actorId: string;
estateId: string;
name: string;
slug: string;
idempotencyKey?: string;
}): Promise<HierarchyResult<{ platformProject: NodeView }>> {
return this.run(input.idempotencyKey, input.actorId, async (tx, ctx) => {
if (!(await this.requireOwner(tx, ctx.actorId, 'estate', input.estateId))) {
return NOT_FOUND;
}
const inserted = await tx
.insert(platformProjects)
.values({ estateId: input.estateId, name: input.name, slug: input.slug })
.onConflictDoNothing()
.returning();
const project = inserted[0];
if (!project) return conflict('platform project slug already exists in estate');
const snapshot = await buildNodeSnapshot(tx, 'platform_project', project.id);
await appendHierarchyEvent(tx, {
actorId: ctx.actorId,
verb: 'create',
targetKind: 'platform_project',
targetId: project.id,
targetSnapshot: { ...snapshot },
correlationId: ctx.correlationId,
idempotencyKey: ctx.idempotencyKey,
});
return {
ok: true,
platformProject: { id: project.id, name: project.name, slug: project.slug },
};
});
}
renamePlatformProject(input: {
actorId: string;
platformProjectId: string;
name: string;
idempotencyKey?: string;
}): Promise<HierarchyResult<{ platformProject: NodeView }>> {
return this.run(input.idempotencyKey, input.actorId, async (tx, ctx) => {
if (
!(await this.requireOwner(tx, ctx.actorId, 'platform_project', input.platformProjectId))
) {
return NOT_FOUND;
}
const rows = await tx
.select()
.from(platformProjects)
.where(eq(platformProjects.id, input.platformProjectId))
.limit(1);
const previous = rows[0];
if (!previous) return NOT_FOUND;
const updated = await tx
.update(platformProjects)
.set({ name: input.name })
.where(eq(platformProjects.id, input.platformProjectId))
.returning();
const project = updated[0] as typeof platformProjects.$inferSelect;
const snapshot = await buildNodeSnapshot(tx, 'platform_project', project.id);
await appendHierarchyEvent(tx, {
actorId: ctx.actorId,
verb: 'rename',
targetKind: 'platform_project',
targetId: project.id,
targetSnapshot: { ...snapshot, previousName: previous.name },
correlationId: ctx.correlationId,
idempotencyKey: ctx.idempotencyKey,
});
return {
ok: true,
platformProject: { id: project.id, name: project.name, slug: project.slug },
};
});
}
transferPlatformProject(input: {
actorId: string;
platformProjectId: string;
destinationEstateId: string;
idempotencyKey?: string;
}): Promise<HierarchyResult<{ platformProject: NodeView }>> {
return this.run(input.idempotencyKey, input.actorId, async (tx, ctx) => {
const rows = await tx
.select()
.from(platformProjects)
.where(eq(platformProjects.id, input.platformProjectId))
.limit(1);
const project = rows[0];
if (!project) return NOT_FOUND;
if (!(await this.requireOwner(tx, ctx.actorId, 'estate', project.estateId))) {
return NOT_FOUND;
}
if (!(await this.requireOwner(tx, ctx.actorId, 'estate', input.destinationEstateId))) {
return NOT_FOUND;
}
if (project.estateId === input.destinationEstateId) {
return conflict('platform project already belongs to the destination estate');
}
const collision = await tx
.select({ id: platformProjects.id })
.from(platformProjects)
.where(
and(
eq(platformProjects.estateId, input.destinationEstateId),
eq(platformProjects.slug, project.slug),
),
)
.limit(1);
if (collision.length > 0) {
return conflict('destination estate already has that platform project slug');
}
const parents = await tx
.select({ id: estates.id, slug: estates.slug })
.from(estates)
.where(inArray(estates.id, [project.estateId, input.destinationEstateId]));
const source = parents.find((p) => p.id === project.estateId);
const destination = parents.find((p) => p.id === input.destinationEstateId);
if (!source || !destination) return NOT_FOUND;
await tx
.update(platformProjects)
.set({ estateId: input.destinationEstateId })
.where(eq(platformProjects.id, input.platformProjectId));
const snapshot = await buildNodeSnapshot(tx, 'platform_project', input.platformProjectId);
await appendHierarchyEvent(tx, {
actorId: ctx.actorId,
verb: 'transfer',
targetKind: 'platform_project',
targetId: input.platformProjectId,
targetSnapshot: { ...snapshot },
transferFrom: { kind: 'estate', id: source.id, slug: source.slug },
transferTo: { kind: 'estate', id: destination.id, slug: destination.slug },
correlationId: ctx.correlationId,
idempotencyKey: ctx.idempotencyKey,
});
return {
ok: true,
platformProject: { id: project.id, name: project.name, slug: project.slug },
};
});
}
deletePlatformProject(input: {
actorId: string;
platformProjectId: string;
idempotencyKey?: string;
}): Promise<HierarchyResult<{ deletedId: string }>> {
return this.run(input.idempotencyKey, input.actorId, async (tx, ctx) => {
if (
!(await this.requireOwner(tx, ctx.actorId, 'platform_project', input.platformProjectId))
) {
return NOT_FOUND;
}
const children = await tx
.select({ id: workspaces.id })
.from(workspaces)
.where(eq(workspaces.platformProjectId, input.platformProjectId))
.limit(1);
if (children.length > 0) return conflict('platform project still has workspaces');
const snapshot = await buildNodeSnapshot(tx, 'platform_project', input.platformProjectId);
const grants = await tx
.select()
.from(hierarchyGrants)
.where(eq(hierarchyGrants.platformProjectId, input.platformProjectId));
await tx.delete(platformProjects).where(eq(platformProjects.id, input.platformProjectId));
const deleted = await appendHierarchyEvent(tx, {
actorId: ctx.actorId,
verb: 'delete',
targetKind: 'platform_project',
targetId: input.platformProjectId,
targetSnapshot: { ...snapshot },
correlationId: ctx.correlationId,
idempotencyKey: ctx.idempotencyKey,
});
for (const grant of grants) {
await appendHierarchyEvent(tx, {
actorId: ctx.actorId,
verb: 'grant_revoke',
targetKind: 'grant',
targetId: grant.id,
targetSnapshot: grantSnapshot(grant),
correlationId: ctx.correlationId,
causationId: deleted.event.id,
idempotencyKey: `${ctx.idempotencyKey}:revoke:${grant.id}`,
});
}
return { ok: true, deletedId: input.platformProjectId };
});
}
// ── grants ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/** Grant management requires effective owner on the target (§4.1). */
createGrant(input: {
actorId: string;
userId: string;
targetKind: GrantTargetKind;
targetId: string;
role: HierarchyGrantRole;
idempotencyKey?: string;
}): Promise<HierarchyResult<{ grant: GrantView }>> {
return this.run(input.idempotencyKey, input.actorId, async (tx, ctx) => {
if (!(await this.requireOwner(tx, ctx.actorId, input.targetKind, input.targetId))) {
return NOT_FOUND;
}
const subject = await tx
.select({ id: users.id })
.from(users)
.where(eq(users.id, input.userId))
.limit(1);
if (subject.length === 0) return conflict('subject user does not exist');
const inserted = await tx
.insert(hierarchyGrants)
.values({
userId: input.userId,
companyId: input.targetKind === 'company' ? input.targetId : null,
estateId: input.targetKind === 'estate' ? input.targetId : null,
platformProjectId: input.targetKind === 'platform_project' ? input.targetId : null,
role: input.role,
grantedBy: ctx.actorId,
})
.onConflictDoNothing()
.returning();
const grant = inserted[0];
if (!grant) return conflict('grant already exists');
await appendHierarchyEvent(tx, {
actorId: ctx.actorId,
verb: 'grant_create',
targetKind: 'grant',
targetId: grant.id,
targetSnapshot: grantSnapshot(grant),
correlationId: ctx.correlationId,
idempotencyKey: ctx.idempotencyKey,
});
return { ok: true, grant: grantView(grant) };
});
}
changeGrant(input: {
actorId: string;
grantId: string;
role: HierarchyGrantRole;
idempotencyKey?: string;
}): Promise<HierarchyResult<{ grant: GrantView }>> {
return this.run(input.idempotencyKey, input.actorId, async (tx, ctx) => {
const rows = await tx
.select()
.from(hierarchyGrants)
.where(eq(hierarchyGrants.id, input.grantId))
.limit(1);
const existing = rows[0];
if (!existing) return NOT_FOUND;
const target = grantTarget(existing);
if (!(await this.requireOwner(tx, ctx.actorId, target.kind, target.id))) {
return NOT_FOUND;
}
// Team subjects are suspended (§1.4); the command surface never
// creates them, so this only fires on out-of-band rows.
if (!existing.userId) return conflict('team grant subjects are suspended');
if (existing.role === input.role) return conflict('grant already holds that role');
const duplicate = await tx
.select({ id: hierarchyGrants.id })
.from(hierarchyGrants)
.where(
and(
eq(hierarchyGrants.userId, existing.userId),
target.kind === 'company'
? eq(hierarchyGrants.companyId, target.id)
: target.kind === 'estate'
? eq(hierarchyGrants.estateId, target.id)
: eq(hierarchyGrants.platformProjectId, target.id),
eq(hierarchyGrants.role, input.role),
),
)
.limit(1);
if (duplicate.length > 0) {
return conflict('subject already holds that role on the target');
}
const updated = await tx
.update(hierarchyGrants)
.set({ role: input.role })
.where(eq(hierarchyGrants.id, input.grantId))
.returning();
const grant = updated[0] as GrantRow;
await appendHierarchyEvent(tx, {
actorId: ctx.actorId,
verb: 'grant_change',
targetKind: 'grant',
targetId: grant.id,
targetSnapshot: {
...grantSnapshot(grant),
previousRole: namespacedHierarchyRole(existing.role as HierarchyGrantRole),
},
correlationId: ctx.correlationId,
idempotencyKey: ctx.idempotencyKey,
});
return { ok: true, grant: grantView(grant) };
});
}
/** Revocation is row deletion (§6): the next evaluation denies, nothing lingers. */
revokeGrant(input: {
actorId: string;
grantId: string;
idempotencyKey?: string;
}): Promise<HierarchyResult<{ revokedId: string }>> {
return this.run(input.idempotencyKey, input.actorId, async (tx, ctx) => {
const rows = await tx
.select()
.from(hierarchyGrants)
.where(eq(hierarchyGrants.id, input.grantId))
.limit(1);
const existing = rows[0];
if (!existing) return NOT_FOUND;
const target = grantTarget(existing);
if (!(await this.requireOwner(tx, ctx.actorId, target.kind, target.id))) {
return NOT_FOUND;
}
await tx.delete(hierarchyGrants).where(eq(hierarchyGrants.id, input.grantId));
await appendHierarchyEvent(tx, {
actorId: ctx.actorId,
verb: 'grant_revoke',
targetKind: 'grant',
targetId: existing.id,
targetSnapshot: grantSnapshot(existing),
correlationId: ctx.correlationId,
idempotencyKey: ctx.idempotencyKey,
});
return { ok: true, revokedId: existing.id };
});
}
// ── reads ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* The directory: every directory-class company, closed-field (§2.8). The
* sole ratified existence-disclosure carve-out (§6.7 / A2 §9.1.2).
*/
async listDirectory(): Promise<DirectoryEntry[]> {
return this.db
.select({ id: companies.id, name: companies.name, slug: companies.slug })
.from(companies)
.where(eq(companies.visibility, 'directory'))
.orderBy(asc(companies.name));
}
/** Companies the user holds any grant on (company or descendant, §2.8). */
async listGrantedCompanies(userId: string): Promise<CompanyView[]> {
const ids = await grantedCompanyIds(this.db, userId);
if (ids.length === 0) return [];
const rows = await this.db
.select()
.from(companies)
.where(inArray(companies.id, ids))
.orderBy(asc(companies.name));
return rows.map(companyView);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
import {
ConflictException,
ForbiddenException,
Injectable,
NotFoundException,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import type { HierarchyCommandFailure, HierarchyResult } from './hierarchy.repository.js';
/**
* Maps repository result unions onto HTTP exceptions. `not_found` carries
* one fixed message for every cause — missing node and unauthorized caller
* are indistinguishable on the wire (contract 1 §6.7).
*/
@Injectable()
export class HierarchyService {
unwrap<T>(result: HierarchyResult<T>): T {
if (result.ok) return result;
throw this.toException(result);
}
private toException(failure: HierarchyCommandFailure): Error {
switch (failure.error) {
case 'not_found':
return new NotFoundException('hierarchy node not found');
case 'forbidden':
return new ForbiddenException(failure.message);
case 'conflict':
return new ConflictException(failure.message);
}
}
}
+89 -24
View File
@@ -176,7 +176,18 @@ describe('MCP actor identity and tool scope enforcement', () => {
).toBe(false);
expect(
deriveMcpToolScopesForUser({ role: 'platform-admin' }).has(MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.coord_list_tasks),
).toBe(true);
).toBe(false);
});
it('derives no scope elevation from any platform role (contract 2 §1.1 bypass retirement)', () => {
const memberScopes = deriveMcpToolScopesForUser({ role: 'member' });
for (const role of ['admin', 'platform-admin', 'super-admin', null, undefined]) {
const scopes = deriveMcpToolScopesForUser({ role });
expect([...scopes].sort()).toEqual([...memberScopes].sort());
expect(scopes.has(MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_create_task)).toBe(false);
expect(scopes.has(MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_update_task)).toBe(false);
expect(scopes.has(MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.coord_list_tasks)).toBe(false);
}
});
it('fails closed when scopes are not supplied by the authenticated context policy', () => {
@@ -311,14 +322,20 @@ describe('MCP actor identity and tool scope enforcement', () => {
]);
});
it('enforces tenant boundaries for tenant-admin brain project, mission, and task reads', async () => {
const { service } = makeService({
it('gives admin-role and platform-admin-role actors only owned content on brain reads (§1.1 retirement)', async () => {
// Contract 2 §1.1: users.role confers no content visibility. An actor whose
// role is 'admin', 'platform-admin', or 'super-admin' but who holds no
// ownership sees exactly what an unprivileged member with the same
// ownership would see — here, only the one project they own, and nothing
// tenant-wide or platform-wide.
const fixtures = {
projects: [
{ id: 'project-owned', ownerId: 'role-bearing-user', teamId: 'tenant-a', name: 'owned' },
{
id: 'project-tenant-a',
ownerId: 'other-user-a',
teamId: 'tenant-a',
name: 'same tenant',
name: 'same tenant, unowned',
},
{
id: 'project-tenant-b',
@@ -328,39 +345,50 @@ describe('MCP actor identity and tool scope enforcement', () => {
},
],
missions: [
{ id: 'mission-owned', projectId: 'project-owned' },
{ id: 'mission-tenant-a', tenantId: 'tenant-a', projectId: 'project-tenant-a' },
{ id: 'mission-tenant-b', tenantId: 'tenant-b', projectId: 'project-tenant-b' },
],
tasks: [
{ id: 'task-owned', projectId: 'project-owned', status: 'not-started' },
{ id: 'task-tenant-a', projectId: 'project-tenant-a', status: 'not-started' },
{ id: 'task-tenant-b', projectId: 'project-tenant-b', status: 'not-started' },
],
});
const { server, tools } = makeCapturingServer();
const actor = makeAdminActor('tenant-admin-user', 'tenant-a');
};
service.registerTools(server, actor);
const actors = [
makeAdminActor('role-bearing-user', 'tenant-a'),
makePlatformAdminActor('role-bearing-user'),
];
const projects = JSON.parse(
(await getTool(tools, 'brain_list_projects').handler({})).content[0]!.text,
);
expect(projects.map((project: { id: string }) => project.id)).toEqual(['project-tenant-a']);
for (const actor of actors) {
const { service } = makeService(fixtures);
const { server, tools } = makeCapturingServer();
service.registerTools(server, actor);
const missions = JSON.parse(
(await getTool(tools, 'brain_list_missions').handler({})).content[0]!.text,
);
expect(missions.map((mission: { id: string }) => mission.id)).toEqual(['mission-tenant-a']);
const projects = JSON.parse(
(await getTool(tools, 'brain_list_projects').handler({})).content[0]!.text,
);
expect(projects.map((project: { id: string }) => project.id)).toEqual(['project-owned']);
const tasks = JSON.parse(
(await getTool(tools, 'brain_list_tasks').handler({})).content[0]!.text,
);
expect(tasks.map((task: { id: string }) => task.id)).toEqual(['task-tenant-a']);
const missions = JSON.parse(
(await getTool(tools, 'brain_list_missions').handler({})).content[0]!.text,
);
expect(missions.map((mission: { id: string }) => mission.id)).toEqual(['mission-owned']);
const tasks = JSON.parse(
(await getTool(tools, 'brain_list_tasks').handler({})).content[0]!.text,
);
expect(tasks.map((task: { id: string }) => task.id)).toEqual(['task-owned']);
}
});
it('denies tenant-admin task writes outside the authenticated tenant', async () => {
const { service, brain } = makeService({
projects: [
{ id: 'project-tenant-a', ownerId: 'other-user-a', teamId: 'tenant-a' },
// §1.1 retirement: content visibility comes from ownership, not the
// tenant-admin role — the acting user owns the tenant-a project.
{ id: 'project-tenant-a', ownerId: 'tenant-admin-user', teamId: 'tenant-a' },
{ id: 'project-tenant-b', ownerId: 'other-user-b', teamId: 'tenant-b' },
],
missions: [
@@ -373,7 +401,29 @@ describe('MCP actor identity and tool scope enforcement', () => {
],
});
const { server, tools } = makeCapturingServer();
const actor = makeAdminActor('tenant-admin-user', 'tenant-a');
// Platform role no longer derives task-write scopes (§1.1 retirement):
// a role-derived admin actor is scope-denied before any tenant logic.
const roleDerivedAdmin = makeAdminActor('tenant-admin-user', 'tenant-a');
service.registerTools(server, roleDerivedAdmin);
await expect(
getTool(tools, 'brain_create_task').handler({ title: 'role-derived write' }),
).rejects.toThrow('MCP tool scope denied');
expect(brain.tasks.create).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
// The tenant-scoping checks below sit behind the scope gate; exercise
// them with explicitly granted task-write scopes (how grant-mapped
// scopes will arrive), not with a platform role.
tools.clear();
const actor = createMcpActorContext({
userId: 'tenant-admin-user',
tenantId: 'tenant-a',
role: 'member',
scopes: [
...deriveMcpToolScopesForUser({ role: 'member' }),
MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_create_task,
MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_update_task,
],
});
service.registerTools(server, actor);
@@ -416,7 +466,7 @@ describe('MCP actor identity and tool scope enforcement', () => {
);
});
it('keeps admin-only coordination tools on server-derived paths', async () => {
it('denies coordination tools to every role-derived actor and keeps the granted path server-derived', async () => {
const { service, coord } = makeService();
const { server, tools } = makeCapturingServer();
const member = makeMemberActor('authenticated-user');
@@ -433,10 +483,25 @@ describe('MCP actor identity and tool scope enforcement', () => {
const tenantAdminTool = getTool(tools, 'coord_list_tasks');
await expect(tenantAdminTool.handler({})).rejects.toThrow('MCP tool scope denied: coord:read');
// §1.1 retirement: platform-admin no longer derives coord scopes either.
tools.clear();
service.registerTools(server, platformAdmin);
const platformAdminTool = getTool(tools, 'coord_list_tasks');
await platformAdminTool.handler({ projectPath: '/tmp/victim' });
await expect(platformAdminTool.handler({})).rejects.toThrow(
'MCP tool scope denied: coord:read',
);
// An explicitly granted coord:read scope reaches the server-derived
// path (caller-supplied projectPath is stripped by the schema).
tools.clear();
const grantedActor = createMcpActorContext({
userId: 'granted-user',
role: 'member',
scopes: [MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.coord_list_tasks],
});
service.registerTools(server, grantedActor);
const grantedTool = getTool(tools, 'coord_list_tasks');
await grantedTool.handler({ projectPath: '/tmp/victim' });
expect(coord.listTasks).toHaveBeenCalledWith(process.cwd());
});
+19 -57
View File
@@ -63,20 +63,6 @@ interface SessionEntry {
actor: McpActorContext;
}
const GLOBAL_ADMIN_MCP_SCOPES = new Set<McpToolScope>(Object.values(MCP_TOOL_SCOPES));
const TENANT_ADMIN_MCP_SCOPES = new Set<McpToolScope>([
MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_list_projects,
MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_get_project,
MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_list_tasks,
MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_create_task,
MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_update_task,
MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_list_missions,
MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_list_conversations,
MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.memory_search,
MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.memory_get_preferences,
MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.memory_save_preference,
MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.memory_save_insight,
]);
const MEMBER_MCP_SCOPES = new Set<McpToolScope>([
MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_list_projects,
MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_get_project,
@@ -89,15 +75,17 @@ const MEMBER_MCP_SCOPES = new Set<McpToolScope>([
MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.memory_save_insight,
]);
export function deriveMcpToolScopesForUser(input: {
/**
* Contract 2 §1.1: platform role confers NO MCP scope elevation — the
* former tenant-admin/global-admin scope sets keyed on users.role are
* retired. Every authenticated user receives the base member set; task
* writes and coordination scopes attach to explicit hierarchy grants when
* the MCP grant mapping lands, never to a platform role. The role
* parameter is kept for caller compatibility and deliberately ignored.
*/
export function deriveMcpToolScopesForUser(_input: {
role?: string | null;
}): ReadonlySet<McpToolScope> {
if (input.role === 'platform-admin' || input.role === 'super-admin') {
return new Set(GLOBAL_ADMIN_MCP_SCOPES);
}
if (input.role === 'admin') {
return new Set(TENANT_ADMIN_MCP_SCOPES);
}
return new Set(MEMBER_MCP_SCOPES);
}
@@ -168,41 +156,22 @@ type TaskLike = TenantScopedLike & {
userId?: string | null;
};
function isGlobalAdminActor(actor: McpActorContext): boolean {
return actor.role === 'platform-admin' || actor.role === 'super-admin';
}
function isTenantAdminActor(actor: McpActorContext): boolean {
return actor.role === 'admin';
}
function matchesTenant(actor: McpActorContext, record: TenantScopedLike): boolean {
return (
record.tenantId === actor.tenantId ||
record.organizationId === actor.tenantId ||
record.teamId === actor.tenantId
);
}
/**
* Contract 2 §1.1: `users.role` confers NO content visibility — the former
* global-admin/tenant-admin filter short-circuits keyed on the platform role
* are retired along with the role-derived scope sets. Content reaches an MCP
* actor through ownership only; widened access arrives as explicit hierarchy
* grants when the MCP grant mapping lands.
*/
function filterProjectsForActor<T extends ProjectLike>(actor: McpActorContext, projects: T[]): T[] {
if (isGlobalAdminActor(actor)) return projects;
return projects.filter(
(project) =>
project.ownerId === actor.userId ||
(isTenantAdminActor(actor) && matchesTenant(actor, project)),
);
return projects.filter((project) => project.ownerId === actor.userId);
}
function filterMissionsByDirectActorScope<T extends MissionLike>(
actor: McpActorContext,
missions: T[],
): T[] {
if (isGlobalAdminActor(actor)) return missions;
return missions.filter(
(mission) =>
mission.userId === actor.userId ||
(isTenantAdminActor(actor) && matchesTenant(actor, mission)),
);
return missions.filter((mission) => mission.userId === actor.userId);
}
function scopesEqual(left: ReadonlySet<McpToolScope>, right: ReadonlySet<McpToolScope>): boolean {
@@ -293,7 +262,6 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
}
private async isProjectAuthorized(actor: McpActorContext, projectId: string): Promise<boolean> {
if (isGlobalAdminActor(actor)) return true;
const project = (await this.brain.projects.findById(projectId)) as ProjectLike | undefined;
return project ? filterProjectsForActor(actor, [project]).length === 1 : false;
}
@@ -302,8 +270,6 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
actor: McpActorContext,
missions: T[],
): Promise<T[]> {
if (isGlobalAdminActor(actor)) return missions;
const projects = (await this.brain.projects.findAll()) as ProjectLike[];
const projectIds = new Set(
filterProjectsForActor(actor, projects).map((project) => project.id),
@@ -317,7 +283,6 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
}
private async isMissionAuthorized(actor: McpActorContext, missionId: string): Promise<boolean> {
if (isGlobalAdminActor(actor)) return true;
const mission = (await this.brain.missions.findById(missionId)) as MissionLike | undefined;
if (!mission) return false;
return (await this.filterMissionsForActor(actor, [mission])).length === 1;
@@ -339,7 +304,7 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
actor: McpActorContext,
refs: { projectId?: string | null; missionId?: string | null },
): Promise<void> {
if (!isGlobalAdminActor(actor) && !refs.projectId && !refs.missionId) {
if (!refs.projectId && !refs.missionId) {
throw new Error('MCP task scope denied');
}
await this.assertTaskReferencesAuthorized(actor, refs);
@@ -349,8 +314,6 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
actor: McpActorContext,
tasks: T[],
): Promise<T[]> {
if (isGlobalAdminActor(actor)) return tasks;
const [projects, missions] = await Promise.all([
this.brain.projects.findAll(),
this.brain.missions.findAll(),
@@ -367,7 +330,6 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
return tasks.filter(
(task) =>
task.userId === actor.userId ||
(isTenantAdminActor(actor) && matchesTenant(actor, task)) ||
(typeof task.projectId === 'string' && projectIds.has(task.projectId)) ||
(typeof task.missionId === 'string' && missionIds.has(task.missionId)),
);
+62
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,18 @@
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { getMetadataStorage } from 'class-validator';
import { BootstrapSetupDto } from './admin/bootstrap.dto.js';
import {
ChangeCompanyVisibilityDto,
ChangeGrantDto,
CreateCompanyDto,
CreateEstateDto,
CreateGrantDto,
CreatePlatformProjectDto,
DeleteNodeDto,
RenameNodeDto,
TransferEstateDto,
TransferPlatformProjectDto,
} from './hierarchy/hierarchy.dto.js';
/**
* Boot-time self-check: the global ValidationPipe must be able to SEE the
@@ -43,6 +55,56 @@ export const PIPE_GUARDED_DTOS: Array<{
target: BootstrapSetupDto,
properties: ['name', 'email', 'password'],
},
{
name: 'CreateCompanyDto',
target: CreateCompanyDto,
properties: ['name', 'slug', 'idempotencyKey'],
},
{
name: 'RenameNodeDto',
target: RenameNodeDto,
properties: ['name', 'idempotencyKey'],
},
{
name: 'ChangeCompanyVisibilityDto',
target: ChangeCompanyVisibilityDto,
properties: ['visibility', 'idempotencyKey'],
},
{
name: 'DeleteNodeDto',
target: DeleteNodeDto,
properties: ['idempotencyKey'],
},
{
name: 'CreateEstateDto',
target: CreateEstateDto,
properties: ['companyId', 'name', 'slug', 'idempotencyKey'],
},
{
name: 'CreatePlatformProjectDto',
target: CreatePlatformProjectDto,
properties: ['estateId', 'name', 'slug', 'idempotencyKey'],
},
{
name: 'TransferEstateDto',
target: TransferEstateDto,
properties: ['destinationCompanyId', 'idempotencyKey'],
},
{
name: 'TransferPlatformProjectDto',
target: TransferPlatformProjectDto,
properties: ['destinationEstateId', 'idempotencyKey'],
},
{
name: 'CreateGrantDto',
target: CreateGrantDto,
properties: ['userId', 'targetKind', 'targetId', 'role', 'idempotencyKey'],
},
{
name: 'ChangeGrantDto',
target: ChangeGrantDto,
properties: ['role', 'idempotencyKey'],
},
];
export class PipeMetatypeCheckError extends Error {
+1
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
| [`KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md`](./KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md) | rc.16 direct-Drizzle current storage-wrapper hold: legacy N-1/uncertified/non-operative pending -02/-03/-06/-08; exact README commented/user-guide executable forms fail before masking and source-consistency rejects runner-delegation copy; held future bootstrap → TLS/roles → run → verify → readiness; plus prior production boundary, pgvector owner, attestation, inventory, manifests, DDL classifier, TLS/bootstrap, activation, and certification contract; foundation prerequisite of KBN-100 and real-role gate before KBN-105 |
| [`KBN-101-ENVELOPE-A.md`](./KBN-101-ENVELOPE-A.md) | KBN-101 Envelope A (v6) — RATIFIED, part of the frozen SSOT: rc.20 declarative sink-RBAC + per-role connection-selection + RLS `WITH CHECK`/`USING` write-source + `FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY` + sink-resident `task_status_write_override`; adds owner card KBN-101-10 + responsibility-widenings; authority Jason B1 + Mos OPTION A/Q1/Q2 |
| [`SHARED-CONTRACT.md`](./SHARED-CONTRACT.md) | Remediated v1 integration contract: proof authority, exact failures/routes/DTOs/MCP ownership, concrete current-main field migration map, relational invariants, Coordinator split, recovery delivery |
| [`P0-MAP-CURRENCY-2026-08-29.md`](./P0-MAP-CURRENCY-2026-08-29.md) | REQ-MIG-001 lane-opening verification: SHARED-CONTRACT §5 field map re-verified byte-identical at `next` @ `abb0c936`; workspaces/audit-pattern refinements; measured `mission_tasks.status` writer inventory and the pre-expand stop-write work item |
| [`contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts`](./contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts) | Drizzle target declarations including exact owner/principal membership, project congruence, tags/archive, proposals, persisted assignments, monotonic fences, durable retry, immutable evidence/audit |
| [`contracts/mechanical-coordinator.v1.ts`](./contracts/mechanical-coordinator.v1.ts) | Pure snapshot decision engine separated from persistence/service adapter; ID-bound approvals, bigint-safe fences, durable retry/quarantine, artifact-backed checkpoints, exact failures |
| [`contracts/health-state.v1.ts`](./contracts/health-state.v1.ts) | Discriminated public health, separate branded transaction-local write proof, and non-overlapping denial/transport/version-conflict mappings |
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
---
kind: verification
status: active
---
# P0 Field-Map Currency Verification — 2026-08-29
**Purpose:** REQ-MIG-001 (native-kanban-sot.md §5) accepts only when "P0 publishes
the current `origin/main` field-by-field expand/backfill/compatibility/switch/contract
map before any schema lane starts." That map exists: [`SHARED-CONTRACT.md`](./SHARED-CONTRACT.md)
§5, inspected at `packages/db/src/schema.ts` @ `e72388b2cbfe400842fe940fa6cabf984ed43711`
(2026-07-13). The M4-3 schema lane (expand migration 0021+) now opens against the
integration trunk `next`. This document re-verifies the map's currency at the
lane-opening head and records the measured pre-expand writer inventory. It amends
nothing normative in SHARED-CONTRACT.md; where the two disagree, SHARED-CONTRACT.md
wins.
## 1. Currency verification (measured)
- Map pin: `e72388b2cbfe400842fe940fa6cabf984ed43711` (2026-07-13, `main`).
- Lane-opening head: `abb0c936011c7f6b8c0bcc90a20a865d5e8a40e9` (`origin/next`,
2026-08-29).
- Measurement: `git diff e72388b2 abb0c936 -- packages/db/src/schema.ts` reports
**300 insertions, 0 deletions** — no existing declaration changed.
- The additions: the new declarations `logicalAgentConnectorLeases`,
`connectorLeaseAuditLog`, and the hierarchy layer (`companies`, `estates`,
`platformProjects`, `workspaces`, `hierarchyGrants`, `hierarchyAuditEvents`,
`hierarchyOutbox`, plus their enums and constant arrays); a nullable `issuer`
column on the unmapped BetterAuth `accounts` table (shipped as
`drizzle/0017_accounts_issuer.sql`); and expanded `drizzle-orm` imports
(`sql`, `AnyPgColumn`, `unique`, `check`, `bigint`). None touch a mapped
source.
- Stronger literal fact: REQ-MIG-001's acceptance names `origin/main`. Measured
pin → `origin/main` (`7102ccb9`, 2026-08-13): **63 insertions, 0 deletions**
for `schema.ts`, and `origin/main` is an ancestor of `abb0c936`. The map is
therefore current at `origin/main` itself, and at the trunk head beyond it.
**Consequence:** every source column mapped in SHARED-CONTRACT.md §5.4 —
`teams`/`team_members`, `projects`, `missions`, `tasks`, `mission_tasks`,
`agents`, fleet `backlog` — is byte-identical to the declaration the map
inspected. The field map is current as written. No row changes.
## 2. Refinements available since the pin (context, not map changes)
1. **The `workspaces` table exists.** The map predates contract 1's hierarchy
layer; its "bootstrap workspace" backfill step now has a shipped target:
`workspaces` (uuid PK, chained under platform projects per
`docs/requirements/hierarchy-schema.md`; hierarchy core in
`drizzle/0018_clean_cobalt_man.sql`, audit/outbox in
`0019_volatile_killraven.sql`, visibility in
`0020_special_betty_brant.sql`). New `workspace_id` columns FK there.
2. **The audit/outbox envelope pattern is shipped.** `hierarchyAuditEvents` +
`hierarchyOutbox` implement same-transaction semantic event + outbox. The
task lane's `task_events`/`task_outbox` mirror the pattern but are
workspace-scoped with the composite `(workspace_id, id)` key required by
§5.3 and REQ-SOT-004. The hierarchy tables are a pattern reference, never a
shared store for task events.
3. **Trunk designation.** The integration trunk is `next` (`.mosaic/repo.json`).
§1 measures currency at both the literal `origin/main` REQ-MIG-001 names and
the trunk head pinned above, so no reinterpretation of the acceptance text
is needed.
4. **Migration ownership.** SHARED-CONTRACT.md §6 assigns schema/migration
ownership to the mission seat `coder2`. Seat identity is operational fleet
state, not resolvable from this repository, and is outside this document's
scope. The invariant §6 protects binds regardless of seat and is restated
here as binding on the M4-3 schema lane: exactly one lane generates
migrations at a time; expand is additive; no drop/rename/narrow; constraints
validate before NOT NULL.
## 3. Pre-expand writer inventory (measured 2026-08-29 at `abb0c936`)
SHARED-CONTRACT.md §5.1 phase 1 requires an N-1 patch that stops
`mission_tasks.status` as a write source, plus a writer inventory, before any
expand DDL.
- **Sole status write path:** `packages/brain/src/mission-tasks.ts`
`create`/`update` (Drizzle insert/update on `mission_tasks`), invoked by
`apps/gateway/src/missions/missions.controller.ts`. `update` accepts
`Partial<NewMissionTask>`, so `status` is writable through both DTOs today.
The same module also exposes `remove`/`removeByMission` DELETE paths —
immaterial to `status` writes, listed for inventory completeness.
- **Read-only consumers of `mission_tasks`:** federation verb services
(`get-query.service.ts`, `list-query.service.ts`) select only. The MCP
`brain_*` tools do not touch `mission_tasks` at all; `brain_create_task` /
`brain_update_task` write the separately mapped `tasks` table, a legitimate
N-1 writer through the compatibility window.
- The ratified contract 5 decision
(`docs/requirements/tool-gateway-mapping.md` §3.2, ruled 2026-08-27) freezes
the legacy endpoints — including MCP `brain_*` task mutations — for new
consumers, while existing consumers keep working until each surface's owning
contract retires it. It does not stop existing writes.
**Standing work item:** the phase-1 stop-write patch (reject or ignore `status`
on `mission_tasks` create/update) MUST land before the expand DDL of migration
lane M4-3a. It is N-1-safe per the §5.4 row for `mission_tasks.status` (linked
status is ignored; the column stays declared and readable through the whole
N-1 window; retirement only after no readers).
## 4. Lane opening
With this verification merged, REQ-MIG-001's P0-map precondition is satisfied
for the M4-3 schema lane at pinned head `abb0c936`. The ordered phases (§5.1),
mission candidate-key DDL order (§5.2), audit/proposal DDL order (§5.3), field
map (§5.4), and required migration tests (§5.5) bind as written. External
import machinery (jarvis-brain/Vikunja shadow import, REQ-MIG-001) and client
cutover (REQ-MIG-002) remain out of scope for M4-3; the legacy surface stays
frozen for new consumers meanwhile (`tool-gateway-mapping.md` §3.2 decision).
+44
View File
@@ -514,3 +514,47 @@ itself permits, so that contract does not stretch A1 by interpretation.
default-open disclosure.
5. Every other constraint of A1 — §8.1.2's remaining bullets, §8.2 in full,
and §8.3's other acceptance criteria — is untouched.
## 10. Amendment A3 — capability-holder existence disclosure
**Status:** amendment to Amendment A2, added by reviewed PR together with
contract 2 Amendment 1 (`rbac-grant-model.md` §8, this PR), under that
amendment's ruling request (decision owner Jason). It binds if and only if
contract 2 Amendment 1 ratifies; until then §9.1.2's sole-disclosure rule
stands unmodified — which is consistent, because until ratification the
company-CRUD capability class is empty and the carve-out below has no
holders. Everything in §§19 remains binding verbatim, with exactly the one
express modification below. The detailed contract text lives in
`rbac-grant-model.md` §8.1; this amendment changes only what A2 itself
permits, so that contract does not stretch A2 by interpretation.
### 10.1 What A3 modifies in A2
1. **Capability-holder disclosure (narrows §9.1.2's sole-disclosure rule
by one carve-out).** §9.1.2 makes the directory the sole permitted
existence disclosure and keeps private companies undisclosed to
non-granted subjects everywhere. A3 admits exactly one further
disclosure channel: a subject holding the company-CRUD capability
(contract 2 §8), when exercising the hierarchy schema §5.5 visibility
command, learns the target company's existence and its old/new
visibility values through the command's redacted actor receipt —
success for an existing target (private or directory alike) versus
`not_found` for a nonexistent id — bounded exactly as contract 2 §8.1
states: no name, slug, structure, content, grant, or membership
information, and no read command of any kind. To every other
non-granted subject, private companies remain undisclosed everywhere,
including the directory; the directory remains the sole
existence-disclosure _listing_.
### 10.2 What A3 explicitly does not change
1. The directory itself is unchanged: read-only, directory-class companies
only, existence/name/slug only (§9.1.2's enumeration is narrowed for
capability holders' receipts, widened for nothing).
2. No join-request surface, no curation listing, no read command of any
family is authorized (§9.2.2 unchanged; a curation listing is a further
amendment per contract 2 §8.1).
3. The canonical audit event for visibility mutations is untouched — it
keeps hierarchy schema §5.2's full immutable target snapshot; the
capability confers no audit read (contract 2 §8.5).
4. Every other constraint of A1 and A2 is untouched.
+219
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,26 @@ fail-closed-fault, and existence-oracle observables added (§7);
role-string namespacing rule added (§4.5); ruling request now names the
interpretive resolution of PRD "admins".
Amendment 1 (company-CRUD capability): defines the capability class that
contract 1 Amendment 1 (Ruling 4b, 2026-08-28) and hierarchy schema §5.5
anticipate. §8 defines the capability as a platform-scoped, admin-assigned,
audited delegation of exactly the hierarchy schema §5.5 company visibility
command — no read command, no other company operation; the mutation's
inherent existence disclosure is ratified as a bounded carve-out to
hierarchy schema §6.7/§2.8 and to kanban SOT Amendment A2's
sole-disclosure rule — SOT Amendment A3 (native-kanban-sot.md §10, this
PR) expressly extends A2 by exactly this carve-out (§8.1). The holder
sees only a redacted actor receipt; the canonical audit event keeps
hierarchy schema §5.2's full immutable snapshot. The hierarchy role
vocabulary (§2), every evaluation rule (§3), and grant management (§4) are
untouched: the capability is not a `hierarchy_grants.role` value and
evaluates outside the chain; capability-row deletion joins §6.1's
revocation enumeration (§8.4). Until this amendment ratifies, the capability
class is empty and
the visibility command remains admin-only (hierarchy schema §5.5 states
this fallback; the shipped gate at
`apps/gateway/src/hierarchy/hierarchy.repository.ts` implements it).
Scope: the roles that can appear in `hierarchy_grants.role`, what a grant at
each hierarchy level confers, how grants evaluate down the chain, how
revocation propagates, and who may manage grants. Out of scope: the hierarchy
@@ -242,6 +262,191 @@ contract 1 §6):
8. Transfer: both-sides `owner` accepted, each single-side case refused
(completing contract 1 §6.5).
## 8. Company-CRUD capability (Amendment 1)
Hierarchy schema §5.5 authorizes the company visibility mutation for
exactly two actor classes: platform admins and "subjects holding the
company-CRUD capability that a follow-up amendment to contract 2 will
define". This section is that definition. The name is historical — coined
in contract 1 Amendment 1 before the capability's content was fixed — and
confers nothing by connotation: the ratified content is exactly §8.1.
Company _creation_ is already ruled open to active users and always
private (contract 3 §5.2, Ruling 4); rename, delete, and transfer of
companies remain hierarchy `owner` operations (§2.3, §5); none of those is
part of this capability, and widening it to any other operation is a
further amendment, not an implementation decision.
1. **Content: exactly one command, no read command, disclosure stated.**
Holding the capability authorizes executing the hierarchy schema §5.5
visibility command (`companies.visibility`, both directions:
`private → directory` and `directory → private`) on any company in the
deployment, and no other command of any family. It confers **no read
command**: no company enumeration, no curation listing, no structure
read. The practical flow this implies is deliberate: to publish a
private company, the holder is given the target identifier by the
requesting company `owner` out of band; to unpublish, the target is
already directory-listed. A curation listing for capability holders,
if ever wanted, is a further amendment with its own disclosure
analysis under hierarchy schema §6.7.
**Existence disclosure carve-out, stated rather than pretended away:**
exercising a mutation inherently discloses its target's existence.
The command's result distinguishes an existing company (success, for
private and directory targets alike) from a nonexistent id
(`not_found`), so a holder presenting candidate ids learns existence —
exactly as a platform admin already does through the same command.
This amendment ratifies that disclosure as part of the §5.5 curation
authority, bounded as follows. The holder-visible surface is the
command's **actor receipt** — the mutation result payload, carrying
exactly the target id, old visibility, and new visibility, and
**nothing else**: no name, slug, structure, content, grant, or
membership information. The actor receipt is a redacted projection
distinct from the **canonical audit event**, which is unchanged by
this amendment: it keeps hierarchy schema §5.2's deletion-safe
immutable target snapshot (id, slug, and parent chain at event time)
in full. The two never converge on the holder: the capability confers
no audit read (§8.5), so the canonical event — and with it the slug
and parent chain — is reachable only by subjects independently
authorized to read audit data, never through this capability. A
successful publish additionally makes the target directory-listed to
every authenticated user; that is the command's ratified purpose
(hierarchy schema §5.5), not a leak. Hierarchy schema §6.7's
existence-oracle rule and §2.8's directory-only disclosure are amended
by exactly this carve-out for capability holders, kanban SOT Amendment
A3 (native-kanban-sot.md §10, this PR) expressly extends A2's
sole-disclosure enumeration by the same carve-out, and all three are
otherwise untouched. Witnessed in §8.6.3.
2. **Holding: platform-scoped assignment, user subjects only.** The
capability is not a hierarchy grant: it attaches to no node, has no
role, and never enters §3 chain evaluation. It is held via a
`platform_capabilities` table whose column set is exactly (nothing
else, per the contract 1 §2.7 exhaustiveness discipline):
- `id` — uuid, primary key;
- `user_id` — text, NOT NULL, FK `users` **ON DELETE RESTRICT**;
- `capability` — text, NOT NULL, constraint-checked against exactly
`company_crud`;
- `granted_by` — text, NOT NULL, FK `users` **ON DELETE RESTRICT**;
- `created_at` — timestamptz, NOT NULL;
- UNIQUE (`user_id`, `capability`).
The user FKs are **text**, not uuid, because `users.id` is a BetterAuth
text key (`packages/db/src/schema.ts`; custody schema records the same)
— PostgreSQL cannot reference a text primary key with a uuid column.
This matches the shipped `hierarchy_grants` shape exactly: uuid
surrogate `id`, text FKs to `users`.
Both user FKs are RESTRICT for the same reason contract 1 §3.3 pins
RESTRICT on principal FKs: the identity contract (§7.3) gates user
deletion, and a cascade here could silently destroy a capability
without its §8.3 revocation audit event. Revocation is row deletion
through the §8.3 command — there is no other removal path, no expiry
column, and no tombstone. A deactivated holder confers nothing while
deactivated: identity contract §7.1 denies all authorization to
deactivated accounts, and the §8.4 predicate evaluates on the
authenticated live user. No team subjects (§1.4's suspension reasoning
applies with more force here — a workspace-bound team holding
deployment-wide curation authority has no ratified meaning).
3. **Assignment is instance administration on the normal admin surface.**
Only platform admins (`users.role = 'admin'`) may assign or revoke the
capability, through an ordinary admin command (the same command class
`AdminGuard` governs, §1.1) — not through direct table writes.
Assignment delegates a slice of instance administration and is itself
an instance-administration act under §1.1. A capability holder as such
may NOT assign or revoke it (no self-propagation). Every assignment
and revocation is a semantic audit event carrying actor, verb, subject
user, and capability; serialized capability strings are namespaced per
§4.5 (`platform-capability:company-crud` — a bare `company_crud` in
any serialized artifact is non-conformant).
4. **Evaluation and revocation follow this contract's existing rules.**
The hierarchy schema §5.5 command's authorization predicate is:
`users.role = 'admin'` OR a live `platform_capabilities` row
(`user_id`, `company_crud`). Both disjuncts are evaluated live and
fail closed per §3.5 — **independently**: with capability state
unreadable (fault), the capability disjunct denies, but a platform
admin whose `users.role` is readable remains authorized through the
admin disjunct; with role state unreadable, the admin disjunct denies
likewise. A decision that can read neither denies. Capability-row
deletion is hereby added to §6.1's enumerated revocation paths:
it propagates identically, under §6.2's bound, on every transport —
no new HTTP/MCP command authorized by the deleted row after the
revoking transaction commits, and any cached authorization is
invalidated in the revoking transaction (§3.5).
5. **What it does not confer**, stated so implementing PRs cannot drift:
no hierarchy grant or effective role at any node; no workspace
authorization or membership; no content, structure, or roll-up read;
no grant management (§4.1 unchanged); no MCP scope; no other instance
administration (user management, system settings, provider
configuration remain platform-admin-only); no company create, rename,
delete, or transfer. Hierarchy schema §5.5's rule that a company
`owner` as such may NOT change visibility is unchanged — `owner` and
this capability are disjoint authorities that combine only by a
subject holding both.
6. **Verification requirements** (extends §7, binding on implementing
PRs):
1. Schema witnesses (real PostgreSQL, `ci-postgres` service in the
`test` CI step): the `capability` CHECK constraint rejects any
value outside `company_crud`; NOT NULL enforced on every declared
NOT NULL column; UNIQUE (`user_id`, `capability`) rejects a
duplicate; both user FKs reject a dangling reference AND deleting a
referenced user is refused (RESTRICT witnessed in both directions);
the table's column set is exactly the §8.2 declared set (contract 1
§6.2 discipline).
2. Capability-only command matrix — the witness that proves "exactly
one command", not merely "at least one": a non-admin holder with no
other grants succeeds on the visibility command in **both**
directions with contract 1 §5.2's audit event (old and new values
as semantic content), and the **same** actor is refused, case by
enumerated case: every hierarchy mutation family (company/child
create under another's node, rename, delete, transfer); grant
create/change/revoke; the workspace read and write command
families; roll-up reads; structure reads — including the
not-found-indistinguishable refusal on a structure read of the very
company they just mutated (hierarchy schema §6.7); every
instance-administration surface other than the visibility command
(user management, system settings, provider configuration, and
capability assign/revoke itself); and MCP scope derivation yields
nothing — the §7.4 deny-by-default matrix gains this row. Company
creation compares against an eligible-user baseline: the holder's
create behaves exactly as any active user's — always `private`,
and a creation request carrying a visibility argument is refused
for holder and baseline alike (contract 3 §5.2).
3. Disclosure bound (§8.1 carve-out witnessed, receipt and canonical
event separately): the mutation result for a private-valid target,
a directory-valid target, and a nonexistent id is exactly {success,
success, `not_found`}; the actor receipt for a success carries
exactly {target id, old visibility, new visibility} and no result
or error payload carries name, slug, structure, content, grant, or
membership data; the canonical audit event for the same mutation —
asserted directly against the hierarchy outbox, not through any
holder-facing surface — carries hierarchy schema §5.2's full
immutable snapshot (id, slug, parent chain); and the holder's
attempt to read audit data is refused (no audit read conferred,
§8.5), proving the receipt/event separation reaches the holder as
a redaction, not a weakened event.
4. Assignment path, both polarities: a platform admin assigns and
revokes through the normal admin command (positive witnesses —
assign then observe the §8.6.2 allow, revoke then observe deny); a
non-admin — including a current capability holder — is refused
assign and revoke; every assign/revoke produces its audit event
with the namespaced string (§8.3); a direct-write path that skips
the command surface is non-conformant (the §8.3 command is the only
writer of `platform_capabilities`).
5. Revocation joins the §7.6 matrix: assignment is decision-time-live
(capability assigned → the holder's next visibility command allows,
no re-login); after row deletion, the ex-holder's next visibility
command is refused **on every exposed transport**, measured with
the revocation and the decision on distinct physical connections; a
cached-authorization implementation proves transactional
invalidation (§3.5). Fail-closed fault witnesses, both disjuncts
(§8.4): with `platform_capabilities` unreadable, a non-admin holder
is denied while a platform admin remains authorized; with role
state unreadable, the admin disjunct denies.
6. Owner-as-such refusal re-witnessed: hierarchy schema §6.9's
owner-cannot-publish witness re-asserted with the
`platform_capabilities` table present and empty for that owner.
## Ruling request
Ratify sections 17 as written, with one decision embedded and one
@@ -257,3 +462,17 @@ interpretive resolution named:
platform admins. A1 §8.1.3 does not attribute grant declaration to
platform admins, and the §1.1 decision above is what makes this reading
binding.
## Ruling request (Amendment 1)
Ratify §8, the Amendment 1 header note, and kanban SOT Amendment A3
(native-kanban-sot.md §10 — the express A2 carve-out extension, which
binds only with this ratification) as written, with one decision
embedded:
- Decision: the company-CRUD capability is a platform-scoped,
admin-assigned, audited delegation of exactly the hierarchy schema §5.5
visibility command — no read command, no other company operation, with
the mutation's inherent existence disclosure ratified as a bounded
carve-out (§8.1). Say "agreed" or name the additional operations (or
the curation listing) you want it to carry.
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
ALTER TABLE "hierarchy_audit_events" DROP CONSTRAINT "hierarchy_audit_events_verb_check";--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "companies" ADD COLUMN "visibility" text DEFAULT 'private' NOT NULL;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "companies" ADD CONSTRAINT "companies_visibility_check" CHECK (visibility IN ('private', 'directory'));--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "hierarchy_audit_events" ADD CONSTRAINT "hierarchy_audit_events_verb_check" CHECK (verb IN ('create', 'rename', 'transfer', 'visibility_change', 'delete', 'grant_create', 'grant_change', 'grant_revoke'));--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "hierarchy_grants" ADD CONSTRAINT "hierarchy_grants_role_check" CHECK (role IN ('viewer', 'member', 'owner'));
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+7
View File
@@ -141,6 +141,13 @@
"when": 1787880918208,
"tag": "0019_volatile_killraven",
"breakpoints": true
},
{
"idx": 20,
"version": "7",
"when": 1787963521142,
"tag": "0020_special_betty_brant",
"breakpoints": true
}
]
}
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ type AnyDb = {
/** Column allowlist — the exact declared sets of §2/§3. Nothing else. */
const COLUMN_ALLOWLIST: Record<string, string[]> = {
companies: ['id', 'name', 'slug', 'created_at', 'updated_at'],
companies: ['id', 'name', 'slug', 'visibility', 'created_at', 'updated_at'],
estates: ['id', 'name', 'slug', 'company_id'],
platform_projects: ['id', 'name', 'slug', 'estate_id'],
workspaces: ['id', 'name', 'slug', 'platform_project_id'],
@@ -377,7 +377,61 @@ function witnessSuite(getHandle: () => AnyDb): void {
// Control: same subject and target with a different role is a new grant.
await db()
.insert(hierarchyGrants)
.values({ userId: userA, companyId, role: `${T}-other-role`, grantedBy: userA });
.values({ userId: userA, companyId, role: 'member', grantedBy: userA });
});
// ── §2.6 role vocabulary CHECK ─────────────────────────────────────────────
it('refuses a grant role outside the ratified vocabulary, accepts each ratified role', async () => {
await expectViolation(
db()
.insert(hierarchyGrants)
.values({ userId: userB, companyId, role: 'superuser', grantedBy: userA }),
/check constraint/i,
);
// Serialized namespaced forms are storage-invalid too: rows hold bare roles.
await expectViolation(
db()
.insert(hierarchyGrants)
.values({ userId: userB, companyId, role: 'hierarchy:owner', grantedBy: userA }),
/check constraint/i,
);
for (const role of ['viewer', 'member', 'owner'] as const) {
await db()
.insert(hierarchyGrants)
.values({ userId: userB, estateId, role, grantedBy: userA });
}
await db().execute(
sql`DELETE FROM hierarchy_grants WHERE user_id = ${userB} AND estate_id = ${estateId}`,
);
});
// ── §2.8 visibility column ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
it('defaults companies.visibility to private and refuses values outside the class', async () => {
const visId = randomUUID();
await db().execute(
sql`INSERT INTO companies (id, name, slug) VALUES (${visId}, 'Vis', ${T + '-vis'})`,
);
const res = rows(await db().execute(sql`SELECT visibility FROM companies WHERE id = ${visId}`));
expect(res[0]!['visibility']).toBe('private');
await db().execute(
sql`INSERT INTO companies (id, name, slug, visibility) VALUES (${randomUUID()}, 'Vis D', ${T + '-vis-d'}, 'directory')`,
);
await expectViolation(
db().execute(
sql`INSERT INTO companies (id, name, slug, visibility) VALUES (${randomUUID()}, 'Vis X', ${T + '-vis-x'}, 'public')`,
),
/check constraint/i,
);
await expectViolation(
db().execute(sql`UPDATE companies SET visibility = 'hidden' WHERE id = ${visId}`),
/check constraint/i,
);
await expectViolation(
db().execute(sql`UPDATE companies SET visibility = NULL WHERE id = ${visId}`),
/null value|not-null/i,
);
});
// ── §6.1 NOT NULLs ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -391,7 +445,7 @@ function witnessSuite(getHandle: () => AnyDb): void {
);
await expectViolation(
db().execute(
sql`INSERT INTO hierarchy_grants (user_id, company_id, role, granted_by) VALUES (${userA}, ${companyId}, 'x', NULL)`,
sql`INSERT INTO hierarchy_grants (user_id, company_id, role, granted_by) VALUES (${userA}, ${companyId}, 'viewer', NULL)`,
),
/null value|not-null/i,
);
@@ -135,9 +135,9 @@
* production code is anomalous and review-visible; that blind spot is
* accepted as a residual, not closed.
*
* The writer allowlist names hierarchy command/repository modules ONLY. It is
* empty today: the hierarchy command family (M4-1b-ii) has not landed, so no
* production module may write the class tables. The infrastructure register
* The writer allowlist names hierarchy command/repository modules ONLY. Its
* single entry is the M4-1b-ii hierarchy command repository — the sole
* production module permitted to write the class tables. The infrastructure register
* holds legitimate non-hierarchy raw execution; registered modules are exempt
* from prong (iii) only — prongs (i) and (ii) apply to them with no
* exemption, and no registered module may appear on the writer allowlist.
@@ -181,13 +181,15 @@ const CLASS_TABLES = [
/**
* Writer allowlist (§6.3b): hierarchy command/repository modules only.
* EMPTY until the hierarchy command family lands (M4-1b-ii; M4-1b-i ships
* only the audit/outbox machinery, which writes no class table). Adding a module
* here is a contract-conformance decision reviewed under §5.1 — the module
* must be part of the Gateway hierarchy command path, and it must not export
* a function that executes caller-supplied SQL.
* Adding a module here is a contract-conformance decision reviewed under
* §5.1 — the module must be part of the Gateway hierarchy command path, and
* it must not export a function that executes caller-supplied SQL.
*/
const WRITER_ALLOWLIST: string[] = [];
const WRITER_ALLOWLIST: string[] = [
// The hierarchy command repository (M4-1b-ii): the sole class-table
// writer; every mutation is audited on its own transaction (§5.2).
'apps/gateway/src/hierarchy/hierarchy.repository.ts',
];
/**
* Infrastructure register: closed enumeration of legitimate non-hierarchy raw
+27 -9
View File
@@ -1063,13 +1063,24 @@ export const federationEnrollmentTokens = pgTable('federation_enrollment_tokens'
// command family only (§5.1), enforced by the writer-coverage assertion
// (§6.3b) — do not add writers outside that allowlist.
export const companies = pgTable('companies', {
id: uuid('id').primaryKey().defaultRandom(),
name: text('name').notNull(),
slug: text('slug').notNull().unique(),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
});
/** Company visibility classes (contract 1 §2.8, Ruling 4b): 'private' is the
* only creatable class (§5.5 creation carries no visibility argument);
* 'directory' discloses existence/name/slug to all users and is entered only
* through the admin-gated visibility-change command. */
export const COMPANY_VISIBILITY = ['private', 'directory'] as const;
export const companies = pgTable(
'companies',
{
id: uuid('id').primaryKey().defaultRandom(),
name: text('name').notNull(),
slug: text('slug').notNull().unique(),
visibility: text('visibility').notNull().default('private'),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
},
() => [check('companies_visibility_check', sql`visibility IN ('private', 'directory')`)],
);
export const estates = pgTable(
'estates',
@@ -1110,6 +1121,10 @@ export const workspaces = pgTable(
(t) => [unique('workspaces_platform_project_slug_uniq').on(t.platformProjectId, t.slug)],
);
/** Grant role vocabulary (contract 2 §2): totally ordered, viewer member
* owner. Order in this tuple IS the ordering index = strength. */
export const HIERARCHY_GRANT_ROLES = ['viewer', 'member', 'owner'] as const;
export const hierarchyGrants = pgTable(
'hierarchy_grants',
{
@@ -1126,7 +1141,8 @@ export const hierarchyGrants = pgTable(
platformProjectId: uuid('platform_project_id').references(() => platformProjects.id, {
onDelete: 'cascade',
}),
// Role vocabulary and its CHECK constraint are contract 2 §2 (M4-2).
// Role vocabulary per contract 2 §2: exactly viewer ⊂ member ⊂ owner,
// totally ordered; CHECK below closes the column to that vocabulary.
role: text('role').notNull(),
grantedBy: text('granted_by')
.notNull()
@@ -1134,6 +1150,7 @@ export const hierarchyGrants = pgTable(
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
},
(t) => [
check('hierarchy_grants_role_check', sql`role IN ('viewer', 'member', 'owner')`),
check('hierarchy_grants_subject_check', sql`num_nonnulls(user_id, team_id) = 1`),
check(
'hierarchy_grants_target_check',
@@ -1170,6 +1187,7 @@ export const HIERARCHY_AUDIT_VERBS = [
'create',
'rename',
'transfer',
'visibility_change',
'delete',
'grant_create',
'grant_change',
@@ -1220,7 +1238,7 @@ export const hierarchyAuditEvents = pgTable(
index('hierarchy_audit_events_correlation_idx').on(t.correlationId),
check(
'hierarchy_audit_events_verb_check',
sql`verb IN ('create', 'rename', 'transfer', 'delete', 'grant_create', 'grant_change', 'grant_revoke')`,
sql`verb IN ('create', 'rename', 'transfer', 'visibility_change', 'delete', 'grant_create', 'grant_change', 'grant_revoke')`,
),
check(
'hierarchy_audit_events_target_kind_check',
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
# Usage: issue-assign.sh -i ISSUE_NUMBER [-a assignee] [-l labels] [-m milestone]
set -e
set -o pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
@@ -33,25 +34,36 @@ Examples:
$(basename "$0") -i 42 -l "in-progress" -m "0.2.0"
$(basename "$0") -i 42 -a @me
EOF
exit "${1:-1}"
exit "${1:-2}"
}
# Usage-error contract (R4, 2026-08-28): usage errors print to STDERR and exit 2,
# distinct from provider, credential, and verification failures (exit 1).
usage_error() {
echo "Error: $*" >&2
usage >&2
}
# Parse arguments
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case $1 in
-i|--issue)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
ISSUE="$2"
shift 2
;;
-a|--assignee)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
ASSIGNEE="$2"
shift 2
;;
-l|--labels)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
LABELS="$2"
shift 2
;;
-m|--milestone)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
MILESTONE="$2"
shift 2
;;
@@ -79,20 +91,35 @@ PLATFORM=$(detect_platform)
case "$PLATFORM" in
github)
if [[ -n "$ASSIGNEE" ]]; then
gh issue edit "$ISSUE" --add-assignee "$ASSIGNEE"
prov_rc=0
gh issue edit "$ISSUE" --add-assignee "$ASSIGNEE" || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
fi
if [[ "$REMOVE_ASSIGNEE" == true ]]; then
# Get current assignees and remove them
CURRENT=$(gh issue view "$ISSUE" --json assignees -q '.assignees[].login' 2>/dev/null | tr '\n' ',')
# pipefail preserves the provider status through the pipeline;
# a FAILED lookup exits here instead of reading as a silent
# no-assignees skip (codex PR #1464). A successful lookup with
# zero assignees still skips the edit below.
CURRENT=$(gh issue view "$ISSUE" --json assignees -q '.assignees[].login' 2>/dev/null | tr '\n' ',') || {
echo "Error: could not read current assignees (provider lookup failed)" >&2
exit 1
}
if [[ -n "$CURRENT" ]]; then
gh issue edit "$ISSUE" --remove-assignee "${CURRENT%,}"
prov_rc=0
gh issue edit "$ISSUE" --remove-assignee "${CURRENT%,}" || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
fi
fi
if [[ -n "$LABELS" ]]; then
gh issue edit "$ISSUE" --add-label "$LABELS"
prov_rc=0
gh issue edit "$ISSUE" --add-label "$LABELS" || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
fi
if [[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]]; then
gh issue edit "$ISSUE" --milestone "$MILESTONE"
prov_rc=0
gh issue edit "$ISSUE" --milestone "$MILESTONE" || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
fi
echo "Issue #$ISSUE updated successfully"
;;
@@ -131,7 +158,9 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
fi
if [[ "$NEEDS_EDIT" == true ]]; then
"${CMD[@]}"
prov_rc=0
"${CMD[@]}" || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "Issue #$ISSUE updated successfully"
else
echo "No changes specified"
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
#!/bin/bash
# issue-close.sh - Close an issue on GitHub or Gitea
# Usage: issue-close.sh -i <issue_number> [-c <comment>]
# Usage: issue-close.sh -i <issue_number> [-b <comment>]
# (-c/--comment is a backward-compatible alias for -b/--body; R1/R4 2026-08-28)
set -e
@@ -12,35 +13,49 @@ source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
ISSUE_NUMBER=""
COMMENT=""
# Usage-error contract (R4, 2026-08-28): usage errors print to STDERR and exit 2,
# distinct from provider, credential, and verification failures (exit 1), so a
# caller or stop gate can tell an invocation defect from a delivery blocker.
usage_error() {
echo "Error: $*" >&2
echo "Usage: issue-close.sh -i <issue_number> [-b <comment>] (see --help)" >&2
exit 2
}
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case $1 in
-i|--issue)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
ISSUE_NUMBER="$2"
shift 2
;;
-c|--comment)
-b|--body|-c|--comment)
# R1 (2026-08-28): --body is the canonical flag; -c/--comment stays
# a backward-compatible alias.
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
COMMENT="$2"
shift 2
;;
-h|--help)
echo "Usage: issue-close.sh -i <issue_number> [-c <comment>]"
echo "Usage: issue-close.sh -i <issue_number> [-b <comment>]"
echo ""
echo "Options:"
echo " -i, --issue Issue number (required)"
echo " -c, --comment Comment to add before closing (optional)"
echo " -b, --body Comment to add before closing (optional; canonical)"
echo " -c, --comment Alias for --body"
echo " -h, --help Show this help"
echo ""
echo "Exit codes: 0 success; 2 usage error (stderr); 1 provider/credential/verification failure."
exit 0
;;
*)
echo "Unknown option: $1"
exit 1
usage_error "unknown option: $1"
;;
esac
done
if [[ -z "$ISSUE_NUMBER" ]]; then
echo "Error: Issue number is required (-i)"
exit 1
usage_error "issue number is required (-i/--issue)"
fi
# Detect platform and close issue
@@ -82,10 +97,22 @@ gitea_issue_close_api() {
}
if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
# R4: normalize provider failures to exit 1 (gh's own usage errors exit 2
# and would collide with the reserved usage-error status).
if [[ -n "$COMMENT" ]]; then
gh issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" --body "$COMMENT"
gh_rc=0
gh issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" --body "$COMMENT" || gh_rc=$?
if [[ "$gh_rc" -ne 0 ]]; then
echo "Error: GitHub comment before close failed (gh exit $gh_rc)" >&2
exit 1
fi
fi
gh_rc=0
gh issue close "$ISSUE_NUMBER" || gh_rc=$?
if [[ "$gh_rc" -ne 0 ]]; then
echo "Error: GitHub issue close failed (gh exit $gh_rc)" >&2
exit 1
fi
gh issue close "$ISSUE_NUMBER"
echo "Closed GitHub issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER"
elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
GITEA_LOGIN_NAME=$(get_gitea_login || true)
@@ -107,7 +134,9 @@ elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
exit 1
}
fi
tea issue close "$ISSUE_NUMBER" --repo "$OWNER/$REPO" --login "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME"
prov_rc=0
tea issue close "$ISSUE_NUMBER" --repo "$OWNER/$REPO" --login "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME" || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
else
echo "No tea login configured for $(get_remote_host); using authenticated Gitea API fallback." >&2
if [[ -n "$COMMENT" ]]; then
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ usage_error() {
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case $1 in
-i|--issue)
[[ $# -ge 2 ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value"
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
ISSUE_NUMBER="$2"
shift 2
;;
@@ -54,12 +54,12 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
# R1 (2026-08-28): --body is the canonical flag, matching
# issue-create/issue-edit/pr-create/pr-edit; -c/--comment stays a
# backward-compatible alias.
[[ $# -ge 2 ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value"
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
COMMENT="$2"
shift 2
;;
-l|--login)
[[ $# -ge 2 ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value"
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
LOGIN_OVERRIDE="$2"
shift 2
;;
@@ -74,26 +74,39 @@ Examples:
$(basename "$0") -t "Fix login bug" -l "bug,priority-high"
$(basename "$0") -t "Add dark mode" -b "Implement theme switching" -m "0.2.0"
$(basename "$0") -i
Exit codes: 0 success; 2 usage error (stderr); 1 provider/credential failure.
EOF
exit "${1:-1}"
exit "${1:-2}"
}
# Parse arguments
# Usage-error contract (R4, 2026-08-28): usage errors print to STDERR and exit 2,
# distinct from provider, credential, and verification failures (exit 1).
usage_error() {
echo "Error: $*" >&2
usage >&2
}
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case $1 in
-t|--title)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
TITLE="$2"
shift 2
;;
-b|--body)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
BODY="$2"
shift 2
;;
-l|--labels)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
LABELS="$2"
shift 2
;;
-m|--milestone)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
MILESTONE="$2"
shift 2
;;
@@ -131,7 +144,9 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
[[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD+=(--body "$BODY")
[[ -n "$LABELS" ]] && CMD+=(--label "$LABELS")
[[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]] && CMD+=(--milestone "$MILESTONE")
"${CMD[@]}"
prov_rc=0
"${CMD[@]}" || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
;;
gitea)
if command -v tea >/dev/null 2>&1; then
@@ -14,25 +14,39 @@ BODY=""
LABELS=""
MILESTONE=""
# Usage-error contract (R4, 2026-08-28): usage errors print to STDERR and exit 2,
# distinct from provider, credential, and verification failures (exit 1), so a
# caller or stop gate can tell an invocation defect from a delivery blocker.
usage_error() {
echo "Error: $*" >&2
echo "Usage: issue-edit.sh -i <issue_number> [-t <title>] [-b <body>] [-l <labels>] [-m <milestone>] (see --help)" >&2
exit 2
}
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case $1 in
-i|--issue)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
ISSUE_NUMBER="$2"
shift 2
;;
-t|--title)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
TITLE="$2"
shift 2
;;
-b|--body)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
BODY="$2"
shift 2
;;
-l|--labels)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
LABELS="$2"
shift 2
;;
-m|--milestone)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
MILESTONE="$2"
shift 2
;;
@@ -46,18 +60,18 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
echo " -l, --labels Labels (comma-separated, replaces existing)"
echo " -m, --milestone Milestone name"
echo " -h, --help Show this help"
echo ""
echo "Exit codes: 0 success; 2 usage error (stderr); 1 provider/credential/verification failure."
exit 0
;;
*)
echo "Unknown option: $1"
exit 1
usage_error "unknown option: $1"
;;
esac
done
if [[ -z "$ISSUE_NUMBER" ]]; then
echo "Error: Issue number is required (-i)"
exit 1
usage_error "issue number is required (-i/--issue)"
fi
detect_platform >/dev/null
@@ -68,7 +82,9 @@ if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
[[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD+=(--body "$BODY")
[[ -n "$LABELS" ]] && CMD+=(--add-label "$LABELS")
[[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]] && CMD+=(--milestone "$MILESTONE")
"${CMD[@]}"
prov_rc=0
"${CMD[@]}" || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "Updated GitHub issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER"
elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
REPO_SLUG=$(get_repo_slug) || {
@@ -84,7 +100,9 @@ elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
[[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD+=(--description "$BODY")
[[ -n "$LABELS" ]] && CMD+=(--add-labels "$LABELS")
[[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]] && CMD+=(--milestone "$MILESTONE")
"${CMD[@]}"
prov_rc=0
"${CMD[@]}" || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "Updated Gitea issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER"
else
echo "Error: Unknown platform"
@@ -36,33 +36,46 @@ Examples:
$(basename "$0") -m "0.2.0" # Issues in milestone 0.2.0
$(basename "$0") --repo ddk/ai-bma # List issues from anywhere
EOF
exit "${1:-1}"
exit "${1:-2}"
}
# Parse arguments
# Usage-error contract (R4, 2026-08-28): usage errors print to STDERR and exit 2,
# distinct from provider, credential, and verification failures (exit 1).
usage_error() {
echo "Error: $*" >&2
usage >&2
}
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case $1 in
-s|--state)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
STATE="$2"
shift 2
;;
-l|--label)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
LABEL="$2"
shift 2
;;
-m|--milestone)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
MILESTONE="$2"
shift 2
;;
-a|--assignee)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
ASSIGNEE="$2"
shift 2
;;
-n|--limit)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
LIMIT="$2"
shift 2
;;
-r|--repo)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
REPO_OVERRIDE="$2"
shift 2
;;
@@ -95,7 +108,9 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
[[ -n "$LABEL" ]] && CMD+=(--label "$LABEL")
[[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]] && CMD+=(--milestone "$MILESTONE")
[[ -n "$ASSIGNEE" ]] && CMD+=(--assignee "$ASSIGNEE")
"${CMD[@]}"
prov_rc=0
"${CMD[@]}" || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
;;
gitea)
if [[ -n "$REPO_OVERRIDE" ]]; then
@@ -114,7 +129,9 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
[[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]] && CMD+=(--milestones "$MILESTONE")
# Note: tea may not support assignee filter directly in all versions.
[[ -n "$ASSIGNEE" ]] && echo "Note: Assignee filtering may require manual review for Gitea" >&2
"${CMD[@]}"
prov_rc=0
"${CMD[@]}" || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
;;
*)
echo "Error: Could not detect git platform" >&2
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
#!/bin/bash
# issue-reopen.sh - Reopen a closed issue on GitHub or Gitea
# Usage: issue-reopen.sh -i <issue_number> [-c <comment>]
# Usage: issue-reopen.sh -i <issue_number> [-b <comment>]
# (-c/--comment is a backward-compatible alias for -b/--body; R1/R4 2026-08-28)
set -e
@@ -11,35 +12,49 @@ source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
ISSUE_NUMBER=""
COMMENT=""
# Usage-error contract (R4, 2026-08-28): usage errors print to STDERR and exit 2,
# distinct from provider, credential, and verification failures (exit 1), so a
# caller or stop gate can tell an invocation defect from a delivery blocker.
usage_error() {
echo "Error: $*" >&2
echo "Usage: issue-reopen.sh -i <issue_number> [-b <comment>] (see --help)" >&2
exit 2
}
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case $1 in
-i|--issue)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
ISSUE_NUMBER="$2"
shift 2
;;
-c|--comment)
-b|--body|-c|--comment)
# R1 (2026-08-28): --body is the canonical flag; -c/--comment stays
# a backward-compatible alias.
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
COMMENT="$2"
shift 2
;;
-h|--help)
echo "Usage: issue-reopen.sh -i <issue_number> [-c <comment>]"
echo "Usage: issue-reopen.sh -i <issue_number> [-b <comment>]"
echo ""
echo "Options:"
echo " -i, --issue Issue number (required)"
echo " -c, --comment Comment to add when reopening (optional)"
echo " -b, --body Comment to add when reopening (optional; canonical)"
echo " -c, --comment Alias for --body"
echo " -h, --help Show this help"
echo ""
echo "Exit codes: 0 success; 2 usage error (stderr); 1 provider/credential/verification failure."
exit 0
;;
*)
echo "Unknown option: $1"
exit 1
usage_error "unknown option: $1"
;;
esac
done
if [[ -z "$ISSUE_NUMBER" ]]; then
echo "Error: Issue number is required (-i)"
exit 1
usage_error "issue number is required (-i/--issue)"
fi
detect_platform >/dev/null
@@ -80,18 +95,34 @@ gitea_issue_reopen_api() {
}
if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
# R4: normalize provider failures to exit 1 (gh's own usage errors exit 2
# and would collide with the reserved usage-error status).
if [[ -n "$COMMENT" ]]; then
gh issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" --body "$COMMENT"
gh_rc=0
gh issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" --body "$COMMENT" || gh_rc=$?
if [[ "$gh_rc" -ne 0 ]]; then
echo "Error: GitHub comment before reopen failed (gh exit $gh_rc)" >&2
exit 1
fi
fi
gh_rc=0
gh issue reopen "$ISSUE_NUMBER" || gh_rc=$?
if [[ "$gh_rc" -ne 0 ]]; then
echo "Error: GitHub issue reopen failed (gh exit $gh_rc)" >&2
exit 1
fi
gh issue reopen "$ISSUE_NUMBER"
echo "Reopened GitHub issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER"
elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
REPO_ARGS=$(get_gitea_repo_args || true)
if [[ -n "$REPO_ARGS" ]]; then
if [[ -n "$COMMENT" ]]; then
tea issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" "$COMMENT" $REPO_ARGS
prov_rc=0
tea issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" "$COMMENT" $REPO_ARGS || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
fi
tea issue reopen "$ISSUE_NUMBER" $REPO_ARGS
prov_rc=0
tea issue reopen "$ISSUE_NUMBER" $REPO_ARGS || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
else
echo "No tea login configured for $(get_remote_host); using authenticated Gitea API fallback." >&2
if [[ -n "$COMMENT" ]]; then
@@ -8,6 +8,14 @@ SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
# Parse arguments
# Usage-error contract (R4, 2026-08-28): usage errors print to STDERR and exit 2,
# distinct from provider, credential, and verification failures (exit 1).
usage_error() {
echo "Error: $*" >&2
echo "Usage: issue-view.sh -i <issue_number> (see --help)" >&2
exit 2
}
ISSUE_NUMBER=""
# get_remote_host and get_gitea_token are provided by detect-platform.sh
@@ -74,6 +82,7 @@ if comments:
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case $1 in
-i|--issue)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
ISSUE_NUMBER="$2"
shift 2
;;
@@ -88,21 +97,21 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
exit 0
;;
*)
echo "Unknown option: $1"
exit 1
usage_error "unknown option: $1"
;;
esac
done
if [[ -z "$ISSUE_NUMBER" ]]; then
echo "Error: Issue number is required (-i)"
exit 1
usage_error "Issue number is required"
fi
detect_platform >/dev/null
if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
gh issue view "$ISSUE_NUMBER"
prov_rc=0
gh issue view "$ISSUE_NUMBER" || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
if command -v tea >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# --comments is what makes tea print the comment bodies (#1357 F3).
@@ -28,18 +28,25 @@ SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
REPO="" MILESTONE="" LABEL="" LOGIN="" LIMIT=100
while getopts "r:m:l:L:n:h" opt; do
case "$opt" in
r) REPO="$OPTARG" ;;
m) MILESTONE="$OPTARG" ;;
l) LABEL="$OPTARG" ;;
L) LOGIN="$OPTARG" ;;
n) LIMIT="$OPTARG" ;;
h) grep '^#' "$0" | sed 's/^# \?//'; exit 0 ;;
*) echo "see -h" >&2; exit 2 ;;
# R2 (2026-08-28): long-flag aliases with the same usage-error contract the
# wrapper family shares (rc 2, stderr). getopts could not take long flags.
usage_error() {
echo "Error: $*" >&2
echo "Usage: lane-brief.sh -r <owner/repo> [-m milestone] [-l label] [-L login] [-n limit]" >&2
exit 2
}
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case "$1" in
-r|--repo) [[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"; REPO="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-m|--milestone) [[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"; MILESTONE="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-l|--label|--labels) [[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"; LABEL="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-L|--login) [[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"; LOGIN="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-n|--limit) [[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"; LIMIT="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-h|--help) grep '^#' "$0" | sed 's/^# \?//'; exit 0 ;;
*) usage_error "unknown option: $1" ;;
esac
done
[[ -n "$REPO" ]] || { echo "FATAL: -r <owner/repo> required" >&2; exit 2; }
[[ -n "$REPO" ]] || usage_error "-r/--repo <owner/repo> required"
# Resolve login: explicit -L, then $GITEA_LOGIN, then owner inference, then the
# shared default-login resolver. Owner inference comes before the shared fallback
@@ -72,7 +79,7 @@ if [[ -z "$LOGIN" ]]; then
fi
fi
fi
[[ -n "$LOGIN" ]] || { echo "FATAL: could not resolve a Gitea login for $REPO (pass -L or set GITEA_LOGIN)" >&2; exit 2; }
[[ -n "$LOGIN" ]] || { echo "FATAL: could not resolve a Gitea login for $REPO (pass -L or set GITEA_LOGIN)" >&2; exit 1; }
command -v tea >/dev/null || { echo "FATAL: tea not found" >&2; exit 1; }
command -v jq >/dev/null || { echo "FATAL: jq not found" >&2; exit 1; }
@@ -8,11 +8,20 @@ SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
# Parse arguments
# Usage-error contract (R4, 2026-08-28): usage errors print to STDERR and exit 2,
# distinct from provider, credential, and verification failures (exit 1).
usage_error() {
echo "Error: $*" >&2
echo "Usage: milestone-close.sh -t <title> (see --help)" >&2
exit 2
}
TITLE=""
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case $1 in
-t|--title)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
TITLE="$2"
shift 2
;;
@@ -25,28 +34,30 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
exit 0
;;
*)
echo "Unknown option: $1"
exit 1
usage_error "unknown option: $1"
;;
esac
done
if [[ -z "$TITLE" ]]; then
echo "Error: Milestone title is required (-t)"
exit 1
usage_error "Milestone title is required"
fi
detect_platform >/dev/null
if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
gh api -X PATCH "/repos/{owner}/{repo}/milestones/$(gh api "/repos/{owner}/{repo}/milestones" --jq ".[] | select(.title==\"$TITLE\") | .number")" -f state=closed
prov_rc=0
gh api -X PATCH "/repos/{owner}/{repo}/milestones/$(gh api "/repos/{owner}/{repo}/milestones" --jq ".[] | select(.title==\"$TITLE\") | .number")" -f state=closed || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "Closed GitHub milestone: $TITLE"
elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
REPO_ARGS=$(get_gitea_repo_args) || {
echo "Error: Could not resolve Gitea repo/login for remote host" >&2
exit 1
}
tea milestone close "$TITLE" $REPO_ARGS
prov_rc=0
tea milestone close "$TITLE" $REPO_ARGS || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "Closed Gitea milestone: $TITLE"
else
echo "Error: Unknown platform"
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
# Usage: milestone-create.sh -t "Title" [-d "Description"] [--due "YYYY-MM-DD"]
set -e
set -o pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
@@ -37,21 +38,31 @@ Examples:
$(basename "$0") -t "0.0.1" -d "Pre-MVP Foundation Sprint"
$(basename "$0") -t "0.1.0" -d "MVP Release" --due "2025-03-01"
EOF
exit "${1:-1}"
exit "${1:-2}"
}
# Parse arguments
# Usage-error contract (R4, 2026-08-28): usage errors print to STDERR and exit 2,
# distinct from provider, credential, and verification failures (exit 1).
usage_error() {
echo "Error: $*" >&2
usage >&2
}
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case $1 in
-t|--title)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
TITLE="$2"
shift 2
;;
-d|--desc)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
DESCRIPTION="$2"
shift 2
;;
--due)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
DUE_DATE="$2"
shift 2
;;
@@ -74,14 +85,18 @@ PLATFORM=$(detect_platform)
if [[ "$LIST_ONLY" == true ]]; then
case "$PLATFORM" in
github)
gh api repos/:owner/:repo/milestones --jq '.[] | "\(.number)\t\(.title)\t\(.state)\t\(.open_issues)/\(.closed_issues) issues"'
prov_rc=0
gh api repos/:owner/:repo/milestones --jq '.[] | "\(.number)\t\(.title)\t\(.state)\t\(.open_issues)/\(.closed_issues) issues"' || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
;;
gitea)
REPO_ARGS=$(get_gitea_repo_args) || {
echo "Error: Could not resolve Gitea repo/login for remote host" >&2
exit 1
}
tea milestones list $REPO_ARGS
prov_rc=0
tea milestones list $REPO_ARGS || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
;;
*)
echo "Error: Could not detect git platform" >&2
@@ -92,8 +107,7 @@ if [[ "$LIST_ONLY" == true ]]; then
fi
if [[ -z "$TITLE" ]]; then
echo "Error: Title is required (-t) for creating milestones" >&2
usage
usage_error "Title is required (-t) for creating milestones"
fi
case "$PLATFORM" in
@@ -109,7 +123,9 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
+ (if $d != "" then {"description": $d} else {} end)
+ (if $due != "" then {"due_on": ($due + "T00:00:00Z")} else {} end)')
gh api repos/:owner/:repo/milestones --method POST --input - <<< "$JSON_PAYLOAD"
prov_rc=0
gh api repos/:owner/:repo/milestones --method POST --input - <<< "$JSON_PAYLOAD" || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "Milestone '$TITLE' created successfully"
;;
gitea)
@@ -120,7 +136,9 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
CMD=(tea milestones create --title "$TITLE")
[[ -n "$DESCRIPTION" ]] && CMD+=(--description "$DESCRIPTION")
[[ -n "$DUE_DATE" ]] && CMD+=(--deadline "$DUE_DATE")
"${CMD[@]}" $REPO_ARGS
prov_rc=0
"${CMD[@]}" $REPO_ARGS || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "Milestone '$TITLE' created successfully"
;;
*)
@@ -8,11 +8,20 @@ SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
# Parse arguments
# Usage-error contract (R4, 2026-08-28): usage errors print to STDERR and exit 2,
# distinct from provider, credential, and verification failures (exit 1).
usage_error() {
echo "Error: $*" >&2
echo "Usage: milestone-list.sh [-s <state>] (see --help)" >&2
exit 2
}
STATE="open"
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case $1 in
-s|--state)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
STATE="$2"
shift 2
;;
@@ -25,8 +34,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
exit 0
;;
*)
echo "Unknown option: $1"
exit 1
usage_error "unknown option: $1"
;;
esac
done
@@ -34,13 +42,17 @@ done
detect_platform >/dev/null
if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
gh api "/repos/{owner}/{repo}/milestones?state=$STATE" --jq '.[] | "\(.title) (\(.state)) - \(.open_issues) open, \(.closed_issues) closed"'
prov_rc=0
gh api "/repos/{owner}/{repo}/milestones?state=$STATE" --jq '.[] | "\(.title) (\(.state)) - \(.open_issues) open, \(.closed_issues) closed"' || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
REPO_ARGS=$(get_gitea_repo_args) || {
echo "Error: Could not resolve Gitea repo/login for remote host" >&2
exit 1
}
tea milestone list $REPO_ARGS
prov_rc=0
tea milestone list $REPO_ARGS || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
else
echo "Error: Unknown platform"
exit 1
+43 -12
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
#!/bin/bash
# pr-close.sh - Close a pull request without merging on GitHub or Gitea
# Usage: pr-close.sh -n <pr_number> [-c <comment>]
# Usage: pr-close.sh -n <pr_number> [-b <comment>]
# (-c/--comment is a backward-compatible alias for -b/--body; R1/R4 2026-08-28)
set -e
@@ -11,50 +12,80 @@ source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
PR_NUMBER=""
COMMENT=""
# Usage-error contract (R4, 2026-08-28): usage errors print to STDERR and exit 2,
# distinct from provider, credential, and verification failures (exit 1), so a
# caller or stop gate can tell an invocation defect from a delivery blocker.
usage_error() {
echo "Error: $*" >&2
echo "Usage: pr-close.sh -n <pr_number> [-b <comment>] (see --help)" >&2
exit 2
}
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case $1 in
-n|--number)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
PR_NUMBER="$2"
shift 2
;;
-c|--comment)
-b|--body|-c|--comment)
# R1 (2026-08-28): --body is the canonical flag; -c/--comment stays
# a backward-compatible alias.
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
COMMENT="$2"
shift 2
;;
-h|--help)
echo "Usage: pr-close.sh -n <pr_number> [-c <comment>]"
echo "Usage: pr-close.sh -n <pr_number> [-b <comment>]"
echo ""
echo "Options:"
echo " -n, --number PR number (required)"
echo " -c, --comment Comment before closing (optional)"
echo " -b, --body Comment before closing (optional; canonical)"
echo " -c, --comment Alias for --body"
echo " -h, --help Show this help"
echo ""
echo "Exit codes: 0 success; 2 usage error (stderr); 1 provider/credential/verification failure."
exit 0
;;
*)
echo "Unknown option: $1"
exit 1
usage_error "unknown option: $1"
;;
esac
done
if [[ -z "$PR_NUMBER" ]]; then
echo "Error: PR number is required (-n)"
exit 1
usage_error "PR number is required (-n/--number)"
fi
detect_platform >/dev/null
if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
# R4: normalize provider failures to exit 1 (gh's own usage errors exit 2
# and would collide with the reserved usage-error status).
if [[ -n "$COMMENT" ]]; then
gh pr comment "$PR_NUMBER" --body "$COMMENT"
gh_rc=0
gh pr comment "$PR_NUMBER" --body "$COMMENT" || gh_rc=$?
if [[ "$gh_rc" -ne 0 ]]; then
echo "Error: GitHub PR comment before close failed (gh exit $gh_rc)" >&2
exit 1
fi
fi
gh_rc=0
gh pr close "$PR_NUMBER" || gh_rc=$?
if [[ "$gh_rc" -ne 0 ]]; then
echo "Error: GitHub PR close failed (gh exit $gh_rc)" >&2
exit 1
fi
gh pr close "$PR_NUMBER"
echo "Closed GitHub PR #$PR_NUMBER"
elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
if [[ -n "$COMMENT" ]]; then
tea pr comment "$PR_NUMBER" "$COMMENT" $(get_gitea_repo_args)
prov_rc=0
tea pr comment "$PR_NUMBER" "$COMMENT" $(get_gitea_repo_args) || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
fi
tea pr close "$PR_NUMBER" $(get_gitea_repo_args)
prov_rc=0
tea pr close "$PR_NUMBER" $(get_gitea_repo_args) || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "Closed Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER"
else
echo "Error: Unknown platform"
@@ -135,37 +135,51 @@ Examples:
$(basename "$0") -i 42 -b "Implements the feature described in #42"
$(basename "$0") -t "WIP: New feature" --draft
EOF
exit "${1:-1}"
exit "${1:-2}"
}
# Usage-error contract (R4, 2026-08-28): usage errors print to STDERR and exit 2,
# distinct from provider, credential, and verification failures (exit 1).
usage_error() {
echo "Error: $*" >&2
usage >&2
}
# Parse arguments
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case $1 in
-t|--title)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
TITLE="$2"
shift 2
;;
-b|--body)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
BODY="$2"
shift 2
;;
-B|--base)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
BASE_BRANCH="$2"
shift 2
;;
-H|--head)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
HEAD_BRANCH="$2"
shift 2
;;
-l|--labels)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
LABELS="$2"
shift 2
;;
-m|--milestone)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
MILESTONE="$2"
shift 2
;;
-i|--issue)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
ISSUE="$2"
shift 2
;;
@@ -266,7 +280,9 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
[[ -n "$LABELS" ]] && CMD+=(--label "$LABELS")
[[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]] && CMD+=(--milestone "$MILESTONE")
[[ "$DRAFT" == true ]] && CMD+=(--draft)
"${CMD[@]}"
prov_rc=0
"${CMD[@]}" || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
;;
gitea)
# tea pull create syntax. Always pass --repo because tea repo inference
+31 -18
View File
@@ -50,38 +50,45 @@ Options:
-H, --host HOST Explicit Gitea host (required with --repo off-host)
-h, --help Show this help message
EOF
exit "${1:-1}"
exit "${1:-2}"
}
# Usage-error contract (R4, 2026-08-28): usage errors print to STDERR and exit 2,
# distinct from provider, credential, and verification failures (exit 1).
usage_error() {
echo "Error: $*" >&2
usage >&2
}
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case "$1" in
-n|--number) PR_NUMBER="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
-t|--title) TITLE="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
-b|--body) BODY="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
-B|--base) BASE_BRANCH="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
-n|--number) [[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"; PR_NUMBER="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
-t|--title) [[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"; TITLE="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
-b|--body) [[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"; BODY="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
-B|--base) [[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"; BASE_BRANCH="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
--draft)
[[ "$DRAFT_MODE" != "ready" ]] || { echo "Error: --draft and --ready are mutually exclusive" >&2; exit 1; }
[[ "$DRAFT_MODE" != "ready" ]] || { echo "Error: --draft and --ready are mutually exclusive" >&2; exit 2; }
DRAFT_MODE="draft"; shift ;;
--ready)
[[ "$DRAFT_MODE" != "draft" ]] || { echo "Error: --draft and --ready are mutually exclusive" >&2; exit 1; }
[[ "$DRAFT_MODE" != "draft" ]] || { echo "Error: --draft and --ready are mutually exclusive" >&2; exit 2; }
DRAFT_MODE="ready"; shift ;;
-l|--login) LOGIN_OVERRIDE="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
-r|--repo) REPO_OVERRIDE="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
-H|--host) HOST_OVERRIDE="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
-l|--login) [[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"; LOGIN_OVERRIDE="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
-r|--repo) [[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"; REPO_OVERRIDE="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
-H|--host) [[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"; HOST_OVERRIDE="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
-h|--help) usage 0 ;;
*) echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2; usage ;;
esac
done
[[ -n "$PR_NUMBER" ]] || { echo "Error: Pull request number is required (-n)" >&2; exit 1; }
[[ "$PR_NUMBER" =~ ^[1-9][0-9]*$ ]] || { echo "Error: Pull request number must be a positive integer" >&2; exit 1; }
[[ -n "$PR_NUMBER" ]] || { echo "Error: Pull request number is required (-n)" >&2; exit 2; }
[[ "$PR_NUMBER" =~ ^[1-9][0-9]*$ ]] || { echo "Error: Pull request number must be a positive integer" >&2; exit 2; }
if [[ -z "$TITLE" && -z "$BODY" && -z "$BASE_BRANCH" && -z "$DRAFT_MODE" ]]; then
echo "Error: At least one edit option is required" >&2
exit 1
exit 2
fi
[[ -z "$REPO_OVERRIDE" || "$REPO_OVERRIDE" =~ ^[^/[:space:]]+/[^/[:space:]]+$ ]] || {
echo "Error: --repo must be OWNER/REPO" >&2
exit 1
exit 2
}
if [[ -n "$HOST_OVERRIDE" || -n "$REPO_OVERRIDE" ]]; then
@@ -92,18 +99,24 @@ fi
case "$PLATFORM" in
github)
[[ -z "$LOGIN_OVERRIDE" ]] || { echo "Error: --login is only valid for Gitea" >&2; exit 1; }
[[ -z "$LOGIN_OVERRIDE" ]] || { echo "Error: --login is only valid for Gitea" >&2; exit 2; }
if [[ -n "$TITLE" || -n "$BODY" || -n "$BASE_BRANCH" ]]; then
CMD=(gh pr edit "$PR_NUMBER")
[[ -n "$TITLE" ]] && CMD+=(--title "$TITLE")
[[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD+=(--body "$BODY")
[[ -n "$BASE_BRANCH" ]] && CMD+=(--base "$BASE_BRANCH")
"${CMD[@]}"
prov_rc=0
"${CMD[@]}" || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
fi
if [[ "$DRAFT_MODE" == "draft" ]]; then
gh pr ready "$PR_NUMBER" --undo
prov_rc=0
gh pr ready "$PR_NUMBER" --undo || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
elif [[ "$DRAFT_MODE" == "ready" ]]; then
gh pr ready "$PR_NUMBER"
prov_rc=0
gh pr ready "$PR_NUMBER" || prov_rc=$?
[[ "$prov_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: provider command failed (exit ${prov_rc}; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
fi
;;
gitea)
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#!/bin/bash
# pr-merge.sh - Merge pull requests on Gitea or GitHub
# Usage: pr-merge.sh -n PR_NUMBER [-m squash] [-d] [--expect-head SHA] [--no-ci-expected] [--co-author-trailers --escalate-to PRINCIPAL]
# Usage: pr-merge.sh -n PR_NUMBER [-m squash] [-d] [--expect-head SHA] [--no-ci-expected] [--base-line BRANCH] [--co-author-trailers --escalate-to PRINCIPAL]
set -euo pipefail
@@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ Options:
-d, --delete-branch Delete the head branch after merge
--dry-run Run metadata/login preflight without merging
--expect-head SHA Refuse unless the PR head matches this full commit SHA
--base-line BRANCH Documented intra-line exception (B5, ruled
2026-08-29): authorize a merge whose base is
neither main nor next (stacked PR lines). The
value must MATCH the PR base; all other gates
(queue guard, head pin, CI) still run and the
exception is recorded in the merge audit.
--no-ci-expected Assert the target repository has no CI: forward --no-ci-expected to the queue guard (requires repository admin)
--co-author-trailers Build verified trailers from linked PR commit authors
--escalate-to NAME Named principal for an unresolved-author BLOCK
@@ -46,6 +52,7 @@ EOF
}
# Parse arguments
BASE_LINE_OVERRIDE=""
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case $1 in
-n|--number)
@@ -64,6 +71,11 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
DRY_RUN=true
shift
;;
--base-line)
[[ $# -ge 2 ]] || { echo "Error: --base-line requires a branch name." >&2; exit 1; }
BASE_LINE_OVERRIDE="$2"
shift 2
;;
--expect-head)
if [[ $# -lt 2 ]]; then
echo "Error: --expect-head requires one full commit SHA." >&2
@@ -172,8 +184,17 @@ if [[ "$DECL_STATE" == valid && "$DECL_SCHEMA" == 2 ]]; then
else
repo_decl_warn_absent_irreversible "pr-merge"
if [[ "$BASE_BRANCH" != "main" && "$BASE_BRANCH" != "next" ]]; then
echo "Error: Mosaic policy allows merges only for PRs targeting 'main' or 'next' (found '$BASE_BRANCH')." >&2
exit 1
if [[ -n "$BASE_LINE_OVERRIDE" && "$BASE_LINE_OVERRIDE" != "$BASE_BRANCH" ]]; then
echo "Error: --base-line '$BASE_LINE_OVERRIDE' does not match the PR base '$BASE_BRANCH' (refusing; the exception must name the real base)." >&2
exit 1
fi
if [[ "$BASE_LINE_OVERRIDE" == "$BASE_BRANCH" ]]; then
echo "audit: base-line exception — merge into '$BASE_BRANCH' authorized by explicit --base-line (B5 ruling 2026-08-29); queue guard, head pin, and CI gates unchanged." >&2
else
echo "Error: Mosaic policy allows merges only for PRs targeting 'main' or 'next' (found '$BASE_BRANCH')." >&2
echo " A ruled intra-line merge may pass --base-line '$BASE_BRANCH' (same gates; the exception is recorded)." >&2
exit 1
fi
fi
fi
if [[ -z "$HEAD_BRANCH" || -z "$HEAD_REPO" || ! "$HEAD_SHA" =~ ^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$ ]]; then
@@ -43,60 +43,92 @@ LOGIN_OVERRIDE=""
REPO_OVERRIDE=""
HOST_OVERRIDE=""
# Usage-error contract (R4, 2026-08-28): usage errors print to STDERR and exit 2,
# distinct from provider, credential, and verification failures (exit 1), so a
# caller or stop gate can tell an invocation defect from a delivery blocker.
usage_error() {
echo "Error: $*" >&2
echo "Usage: pr-review.sh -n <pr_number> -a <action> [-b <comment>] (see --help)" >&2
exit 2
}
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case $1 in
-n|--number)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
PR_NUMBER="$2"
shift 2
;;
-a|--action)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
ACTION="$2"
shift 2
;;
-c|--comment)
-b|--body|-c|--comment)
# R1 (2026-08-28): --body is the canonical flag; -c/--comment stays
# a backward-compatible alias.
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
COMMENT="$2"
shift 2
;;
-l|--login)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
LOGIN_OVERRIDE="$2"
shift 2
;;
-r|--repo)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
REPO_OVERRIDE="$2"
shift 2
;;
-H|--host)
[[ $# -ge 2 && "$2" != - && "$2" != --* && ! "$2" =~ ^-[[:alnum:]] ]] || usage_error "option $1 requires a value (option-like values are rejected; bare - is reserved)"
HOST_OVERRIDE="$2"
shift 2
;;
-h|--help)
echo "Usage: pr-review.sh -n <pr_number> -a <action> [-c <comment>] [--login <name>] [-r owner/repo] [-H host]"
echo "Usage: pr-review.sh -n <pr_number> -a <action> [-b <comment>] [--login <name>] [-r owner/repo] [-H host]"
echo ""
echo "Options:"
echo " -n, --number PR number (required)"
echo " -a, --action Review action: approve, request-changes, comment (required)"
echo " -c, --comment Review comment (required for request-changes)"
echo " -b, --body Review comment (required for request-changes; canonical)"
echo " -c, --comment Alias for --body"
echo " -l, --login Override the detected Gitea tea login (approve/request-changes only)"
echo " -r, --repo Explicit owner/repo slug (skips git-remote slug inference)"
echo " -H, --host Explicit Gitea host (skips remote-host inference)"
echo " -h, --help Show this help"
echo ""
echo "Exit codes: 0 success; 2 usage error (stderr); 1 provider/credential/verification failure."
exit 0
;;
*)
echo "Unknown option: $1"
exit 1
usage_error "unknown option: $1"
;;
esac
done
if [[ -z "$PR_NUMBER" ]]; then
echo "Error: PR number is required (-n)"
exit 1
usage_error "PR number is required (-n/--number)"
fi
if [[ -z "$ACTION" ]]; then
echo "Error: Action is required (-a): approve, request-changes, comment"
exit 1
usage_error "Action is required (-a/--action): approve, request-changes, comment"
fi
# Validate the action BEFORE any provider contact (codex review of PR #1464:
# an unsupported --action previously reached platform detection and could
# touch the provider before failing with a provider-class status).
case "$ACTION" in
approve|request-changes|comment) ;;
*) usage_error "unknown action '$ACTION': approve, request-changes, comment" ;;
esac
# Body-required actions fail fast too (codex follow-up on PR #1464):
# request-changes and comment both require a body; validate before any
# provider contact.
if [[ ( "$ACTION" == "request-changes" || "$ACTION" == "comment" ) && -z "$COMMENT" ]]; then
usage_error "comment required for $ACTION (-b/--body)"
fi
if [[ -n "$REPO_OVERRIDE" ]]; then
@@ -679,15 +711,18 @@ PY
if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
case $ACTION in
approve)
gh pr review "$PR_NUMBER" --approve ${COMMENT:+--body "$COMMENT"}
gh_rc=0
gh pr review "$PR_NUMBER" --approve ${COMMENT:+--body "$COMMENT"} || gh_rc=$?
[[ "$gh_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: GitHub approve failed (gh exit $gh_rc; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "Approved GitHub PR #$PR_NUMBER"
;;
request-changes)
if [[ -z "$COMMENT" ]]; then
echo "Error: Comment required for request-changes"
exit 1
usage_error "comment required for request-changes (-b/--body)"
fi
gh pr review "$PR_NUMBER" --request-changes --body "$COMMENT"
gh_rc=0
gh pr review "$PR_NUMBER" --request-changes --body "$COMMENT" || gh_rc=$?
[[ "$gh_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: GitHub request-changes failed (gh exit $gh_rc; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "Requested changes on GitHub PR #$PR_NUMBER"
;;
comment)
@@ -695,12 +730,13 @@ if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
echo "Error: Comment required"
exit 1
fi
gh pr review "$PR_NUMBER" --comment --body "$COMMENT"
gh_rc=0
gh pr review "$PR_NUMBER" --comment --body "$COMMENT" || gh_rc=$?
[[ "$gh_rc" -eq 0 ]] || { echo "Error: GitHub review comment failed (gh exit $gh_rc; provider failure, not a usage error)" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "Added review comment to GitHub PR #$PR_NUMBER"
;;
*)
echo "Error: Unknown action: $ACTION"
exit 1
usage_error "unknown action: $ACTION"
;;
esac
elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
@@ -738,8 +774,7 @@ elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
;;
request-changes)
if [[ -z "$COMMENT" ]]; then
echo "Error: Comment required for request-changes"
exit 1
usage_error "comment required for request-changes (-b/--body)"
fi
# Best-effort host for credential resolution only (gitea_resolve_api_for_login
# below re-derives the real host from HOST_OVERRIDE/remote independently and
@@ -794,8 +829,7 @@ elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
echo "Added and verified comment on Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER (comment ID $comment_id)"
;;
*)
echo "Error: Unknown action: $ACTION"
exit 1
usage_error "unknown action: $ACTION"
;;
esac
else
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Usage-error contract for issue-assign.sh (R4, 2026-08-28).
#
# issue-edit already uses long-flag-first parsing (-i/--issue, -t/--title,
# -b/--body, -l/--labels, -m/--milestone); this adds the rc=2 usage-error
# contract, value checks, and the no-provider-contact proof. Required: -i.
#
# Arms:
# 1. --help and -h exit 0 and print usage.
# 2. Unknown option exits 2 with the message on stderr.
# 3. Missing required -i exits 2 (stderr).
# 4. A value-less flag (-i -b -c and long forms) exits 2 (stderr).
# 5. -b and -c both pass parsing (sandboxed runner: the run then fails
# at credential resolution, nonzero and NOT 2) — no real token is
# ever read and no provider is contacted.
# 6. No arm performs any provider request (PATH shims record every
# invocation; the probe log must stay empty).
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/issue-assign-usage}"
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
PROBE_LOG="$WORK_DIR/provider-probes.log"
OUT_FILE="$WORK_DIR/out.log"
ERR_FILE="$WORK_DIR/err.log"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$BIN_DIR"
: > "$PROBE_LOG"
# Unlike the issue suites, these stubs FAIL (exit 99): pr-close has an
# API fallback that treats a successful curl as a closed PR, so exit-0
# stubs would let the sandbox arms "succeed" (measured 2026-08-28).
for tool in gh tea curl; do
cat > "$BIN_DIR/$tool" <<STUB
#!/usr/bin/env bash
echo "$tool \$*" >> "$PROBE_LOG"
exit 99
STUB
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/$tool"
done
run_wrapper() {
( cd "$WORK_DIR" && PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" "$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-assign.sh" "$@" )
}
# Hermetic variant: neutralizes every identity/credential source the wrapper
# consults so parse-acceptance arms fail at credential resolution in ANY cwd
# repo (see test-issue-comment-usage-contract.sh for the measured incident).
run_wrapper_sandboxed() {
mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR/home" "$WORK_DIR/xdg"
(
cd "$WORK_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" HOME="$WORK_DIR/home" XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$WORK_DIR/xdg" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY="" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="" \
"$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-assign.sh" "$@"
)
}
fail() {
echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
echo "--- stderr ---" >&2
cat "$ERR_FILE" >&2
exit 1
}
expect_rc() { # expect_rc <want> <desc> <args...>
local want="$1" desc="$2" rc=0
shift 2
run_wrapper "$@" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -eq "$want" ]] || fail "$desc: rc=$rc, want $want"
}
expect_stderr() { # expect_stderr <pattern> <desc>
grep -q "$1" "$ERR_FILE" || fail "$2: stderr missing '$1'"
}
# 1. Help exits 0 and prints usage.
expect_rc 0 "--help exits 0" --help
grep -q "Usage: issue-assign.sh" "$OUT_FILE" || fail "--help did not print usage"
expect_rc 0 "-h exits 0" -h
# 2. Unknown option: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "unknown option exits 2" --bogus
expect_stderr "[Uu]nknown option" "unknown option names itself on stderr"
# 3. Missing required PR number: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "missing -i exits 2"
expect_stderr "Issue number is required" "missing -i message on stderr"
# 4. Value-less flags: rc 2 with "requires a value" on stderr.
for flag in -i -a -l -m --issue --assignee --labels --milestone; do
expect_rc 2 "value-less $flag exits 2" "$flag"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "value-less $flag message on stderr"
done
# 4a. An option-like value is a MISSING value, not a value (codex PR #1464:
# -b --help previously consumed --help as the body and performed the write).
expect_rc 2 "option-like value rejected" -i 5 -a --help
expect_rc 2 "short flag value rejected" -i 5 -a -h
expect_stderr "requires a value" "short flag value message on stderr"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "option-like value message on stderr"
# 4b. Parser-failure arms (1-4) must have performed ZERO provider contact.
if [[ -s "$PROBE_LOG" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: a parser-failure arm contacted a provider:" >&2
cat "$PROBE_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
# 5. Alias acceptance under the sandbox: both -b and -c carry a value past
# parsing; the run fails at credential resolution nonzero and NOT 2.
for flag in -a; do
rc=0
run_wrapper_sandboxed -i 5 "$flag" "value" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]] || fail "$flag arm unexpectedly succeeded in the sandbox"
[[ "$rc" -ne 2 ]] || fail "$flag arm misclassified credential failure as a usage error"
done
# 6. Post-sandbox provider assertions are intentionally NOT applied here:
# pr-close's gitea path attempts a tea WRITE (tea pr comment) when a
# comment parses, then falls back to the API. Hermeticity for this
# wrapper comes from the FAILING stubs (exit 99), not from non-contact —
# the arm above proves only parse acceptance and non-usage classification.
# Parser-failure arms (1-4) remain zero-contact (asserted at 4b).
# 6b. Provider-exit normalization (codex PR #1464): a provider stub exiting
# 2 (its own usage-error status) must surface as wrapper exit 1, never 2.
GH_REPO="$WORK_DIR/repo-gh"
mkdir -p "$GH_REPO"
git -C "$GH_REPO" init -q
git -C "$GH_REPO" remote add origin https://github.com/acme/widgets.git
cat > "$BIN_DIR/gh" <<GHSTUB
#!/usr/bin/env bash
echo "gh \$*" >> "$PROBE_LOG"
if [[ "\$1 \$2" == "issue edit" ]]; then exit 2; fi
exit 0
GHSTUB
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/gh"
rc=0
(
cd "$GH_REPO"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY="" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="" \
"$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-assign.sh" -i 5 -a someone >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE"
) || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -eq 1 ]] || fail "GitHub path: gh exit 2 must normalize to wrapper exit 1 (got $rc)"
grep -q "provider" "$ERR_FILE" || fail "GitHub path: normalized provider error missing from stderr"
echo "issue-assign.sh usage-contract regression passed (R1/R4)"
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Usage-error contract for issue-close.sh (R1/R4, 2026-08-28).
#
# R4: usage errors print to STDERR and exit 2, distinct from provider,
# credential, and verification failures (exit 1). R1: -b/--body is the
# canonical comment flag; -c/--comment remains a compatible alias.
# The comment is OPTIONAL here (an issue may close without one), so unlike
# issue-comment there is no missing-comment arm.
#
# Arms:
# 1. --help and -h exit 0 and print usage.
# 2. Unknown option exits 2 with the message on stderr.
# 3. Missing required -i exits 2 (stderr).
# 4. A value-less flag (-i -b -c and long forms) exits 2 (stderr).
# 5. -b and -c both pass parsing (sandboxed runner: the run then fails
# at credential resolution, nonzero and NOT 2) — no real token is
# ever read and no provider is contacted.
# 6. No arm performs any provider request (PATH shims record every
# invocation; the probe log must stay empty).
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/issue-close-usage}"
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
PROBE_LOG="$WORK_DIR/provider-probes.log"
OUT_FILE="$WORK_DIR/out.log"
ERR_FILE="$WORK_DIR/err.log"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$BIN_DIR"
: > "$PROBE_LOG"
for tool in gh tea curl; do
cat > "$BIN_DIR/$tool" <<STUB
#!/usr/bin/env bash
echo "$tool \$*" >> "$PROBE_LOG"
exit 0
STUB
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/$tool"
done
run_wrapper() {
( cd "$WORK_DIR" && PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" "$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-close.sh" "$@" )
}
# Hermetic variant: neutralizes every identity/credential source the wrapper
# consults so parse-acceptance arms fail at credential resolution in ANY cwd
# repo (see test-issue-comment-usage-contract.sh for the measured incident).
run_wrapper_sandboxed() {
mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR/home" "$WORK_DIR/xdg"
(
cd "$WORK_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" HOME="$WORK_DIR/home" XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$WORK_DIR/xdg" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY="" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="" \
"$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-close.sh" "$@"
)
}
fail() {
echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
echo "--- stderr ---" >&2
cat "$ERR_FILE" >&2
exit 1
}
expect_rc() { # expect_rc <want> <desc> <args...>
local want="$1" desc="$2" rc=0
shift 2
run_wrapper "$@" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -eq "$want" ]] || fail "$desc: rc=$rc, want $want"
}
expect_stderr() { # expect_stderr <pattern> <desc>
grep -q "$1" "$ERR_FILE" || fail "$2: stderr missing '$1'"
}
# 1. Help exits 0 and prints usage.
expect_rc 0 "--help exits 0" --help
grep -q "Usage: issue-close.sh" "$OUT_FILE" || fail "--help did not print usage"
expect_rc 0 "-h exits 0" -h
# 2. Unknown option: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "unknown option exits 2" --bogus
expect_stderr "unknown option" "unknown option names itself on stderr"
# 3. Missing required issue number: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "missing -i exits 2"
expect_stderr "issue number is required" "missing -i message on stderr"
# 4. Value-less flags: rc 2 with "requires a value" on stderr.
for flag in -i -b -c --issue --body --comment; do
expect_rc 2 "value-less $flag exits 2" "$flag"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "value-less $flag message on stderr"
done
# 4a. An option-like value is a MISSING value, not a value (codex PR #1464:
# -b --help previously consumed --help as the body and performed the write).
expect_rc 2 "option-like value rejected" -i 5 -b --help
expect_rc 2 "short flag value rejected" -i 5 -b -h
expect_stderr "requires a value" "short flag value message on stderr"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "option-like value message on stderr"
# 4b. Parser-failure arms (1-4) must have performed ZERO provider contact.
if [[ -s "$PROBE_LOG" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: a parser-failure arm contacted a provider:" >&2
cat "$PROBE_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
# 5. Alias acceptance under the sandbox: both -b and -c carry a value past
# parsing; the run fails at credential resolution nonzero and NOT 2.
for flag in -b -c; do
rc=0
run_wrapper_sandboxed -i 5 "$flag" "closing note" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]] || fail "$flag arm unexpectedly succeeded in the sandbox"
[[ "$rc" -ne 2 ]] || fail "$flag arm misclassified credential failure as a usage error"
done
# 6. Sandbox arms may issue DETECTION reads only (tea login list via the
# stub); no gh/curl write or read may occur.
if grep -Ev '^(gh|tea|curl) login list' "$PROBE_LOG" | grep -q .; then
echo "FAIL: a sandbox arm performed a non-detection provider request:" >&2
grep -Ev '^(gh|tea|curl) login list' "$PROBE_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
if grep -qE '^(gh|curl)' "$PROBE_LOG"; then
echo "FAIL: gh or curl was invoked during a sandbox arm:" >&2
grep -E '^(gh|curl)' "$PROBE_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "issue-close.sh usage-contract regression passed (R1/R4)"
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ expect_rc() { # expect_rc <want> <desc> <args...>
}
expect_stderr() { # expect_stderr <pattern> <desc>
grep -q "$1" "$ERR_FILE" || fail "$desc: stderr missing '$1'"
grep -q "$1" "$ERR_FILE" || fail "$2: stderr missing '$1'"
}
# 1. Help exits 0 and prints usage on stdout.
@@ -124,6 +124,13 @@ for flag in -i -b -c -l --issue --body --comment --login; do
expect_stderr "requires a value" "value-less $flag message on stderr"
done
# 4a. An option-like value is a MISSING value, not a value (codex PR #1464:
# -b --help previously consumed --help as the body and performed the write).
expect_rc 2 "option-like value rejected" -i 5 -b --help
expect_rc 2 "short flag value rejected" -i 5 -b -h
expect_stderr "requires a value" "short flag value message on stderr"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "option-like value message on stderr"
# 6. Alias acceptance at parse level: both -b and -c carry a value past
# parsing; the wrapper then fails at platform detection (not a git repo)
# nonzero but NOT as a usage error (rc must not be 2).
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Usage-error contract for issue-create.sh (R4, 2026-08-28).
#
# issue-edit already uses long-flag-first parsing (-i/--issue, -t/--title,
# -b/--body, -l/--labels, -m/--milestone); this adds the rc=2 usage-error
# contract, value checks, and the no-provider-contact proof. Required: -i.
#
# Arms:
# 1. --help and -h exit 0 and print usage.
# 2. Unknown option exits 2 with the message on stderr.
# 3. Missing required -i exits 2 (stderr).
# 4. A value-less flag (-i -b -c and long forms) exits 2 (stderr).
# 5. -b and -c both pass parsing (sandboxed runner: the run then fails
# at credential resolution, nonzero and NOT 2) — no real token is
# ever read and no provider is contacted.
# 6. No arm performs any provider request (PATH shims record every
# invocation; the probe log must stay empty).
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/issue-create-usage}"
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
PROBE_LOG="$WORK_DIR/provider-probes.log"
OUT_FILE="$WORK_DIR/out.log"
ERR_FILE="$WORK_DIR/err.log"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$BIN_DIR"
: > "$PROBE_LOG"
# Unlike the issue suites, these stubs FAIL (exit 99): pr-close has an
# API fallback that treats a successful curl as a closed PR, so exit-0
# stubs would let the sandbox arms "succeed" (measured 2026-08-28).
for tool in gh tea curl; do
cat > "$BIN_DIR/$tool" <<STUB
#!/usr/bin/env bash
echo "$tool \$*" >> "$PROBE_LOG"
exit 99
STUB
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/$tool"
done
run_wrapper() {
( cd "$WORK_DIR" && PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" "$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-create.sh" "$@" )
}
# Hermetic variant: neutralizes every identity/credential source the wrapper
# consults so parse-acceptance arms fail at credential resolution in ANY cwd
# repo (see test-issue-comment-usage-contract.sh for the measured incident).
run_wrapper_sandboxed() {
mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR/home" "$WORK_DIR/xdg"
(
cd "$WORK_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" HOME="$WORK_DIR/home" XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$WORK_DIR/xdg" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY="" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="" \
"$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-create.sh" "$@"
)
}
fail() {
echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
echo "--- stderr ---" >&2
cat "$ERR_FILE" >&2
exit 1
}
expect_rc() { # expect_rc <want> <desc> <args...>
local want="$1" desc="$2" rc=0
shift 2
run_wrapper "$@" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -eq "$want" ]] || fail "$desc: rc=$rc, want $want"
}
expect_stderr() { # expect_stderr <pattern> <desc>
grep -q "$1" "$ERR_FILE" || fail "$2: stderr missing '$1'"
}
# 1. Help exits 0 and prints usage.
expect_rc 0 "--help exits 0" --help
grep -q "Usage: issue-create.sh" "$OUT_FILE" || fail "--help did not print usage"
expect_rc 0 "-h exits 0" -h
# 2. Unknown option: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "unknown option exits 2" --bogus
expect_stderr "[Uu]nknown option" "unknown option names itself on stderr"
# 3. Missing required PR number: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "missing -t exits 2"
expect_stderr "Title is required" "missing -t message on stderr"
# 4. Value-less flags: rc 2 with "requires a value" on stderr.
for flag in -t -b -l -m --title --body --labels --milestone; do
expect_rc 2 "value-less $flag exits 2" "$flag"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "value-less $flag message on stderr"
done
# 4a. An option-like value is a MISSING value, not a value (codex PR #1464:
# -b --help previously consumed --help as the body and performed the write).
expect_rc 2 "option-like value rejected" -t smoke -b --help
expect_rc 2 "short flag value rejected" -t smoke -b -h
expect_stderr "requires a value" "short flag value message on stderr"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "option-like value message on stderr"
# 4b. Parser-failure arms (1-4) must have performed ZERO provider contact.
if [[ -s "$PROBE_LOG" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: a parser-failure arm contacted a provider:" >&2
cat "$PROBE_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
# 5. Alias acceptance under the sandbox: both -b and -c carry a value past
# parsing; the run fails at credential resolution nonzero and NOT 2.
for flag in -b; do
rc=0
run_wrapper_sandboxed -t "smoke" "$flag" "value" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]] || fail "$flag arm unexpectedly succeeded in the sandbox"
[[ "$rc" -ne 2 ]] || fail "$flag arm misclassified credential failure as a usage error"
done
# 6. Post-sandbox provider assertions are intentionally NOT applied here:
# pr-close's gitea path attempts a tea WRITE (tea pr comment) when a
# comment parses, then falls back to the API. Hermeticity for this
# wrapper comes from the FAILING stubs (exit 99), not from non-contact —
# the arm above proves only parse acceptance and non-usage classification.
# Parser-failure arms (1-4) remain zero-contact (asserted at 4b).
echo "issue-create.sh usage-contract regression passed (R1/R4)"
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Usage-error contract for issue-edit.sh (R4, 2026-08-28).
#
# issue-edit already uses long-flag-first parsing (-i/--issue, -t/--title,
# -b/--body, -l/--labels, -m/--milestone); this adds the rc=2 usage-error
# contract, value checks, and the no-provider-contact proof. Required: -i.
#
# Arms:
# 1. --help and -h exit 0 and print usage.
# 2. Unknown option exits 2 with the message on stderr.
# 3. Missing required -i exits 2 (stderr).
# 4. A value-less flag (-i -b -c and long forms) exits 2 (stderr).
# 5. -b and -c both pass parsing (sandboxed runner: the run then fails
# at credential resolution, nonzero and NOT 2) — no real token is
# ever read and no provider is contacted.
# 6. No arm performs any provider request (PATH shims record every
# invocation; the probe log must stay empty).
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/issue-edit-usage}"
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
PROBE_LOG="$WORK_DIR/provider-probes.log"
OUT_FILE="$WORK_DIR/out.log"
ERR_FILE="$WORK_DIR/err.log"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$BIN_DIR"
: > "$PROBE_LOG"
# Unlike the issue suites, these stubs FAIL (exit 99): pr-close has an
# API fallback that treats a successful curl as a closed PR, so exit-0
# stubs would let the sandbox arms "succeed" (measured 2026-08-28).
for tool in gh tea curl; do
cat > "$BIN_DIR/$tool" <<STUB
#!/usr/bin/env bash
echo "$tool \$*" >> "$PROBE_LOG"
exit 99
STUB
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/$tool"
done
run_wrapper() {
( cd "$WORK_DIR" && PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" "$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-edit.sh" "$@" )
}
# Hermetic variant: neutralizes every identity/credential source the wrapper
# consults so parse-acceptance arms fail at credential resolution in ANY cwd
# repo (see test-issue-comment-usage-contract.sh for the measured incident).
run_wrapper_sandboxed() {
mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR/home" "$WORK_DIR/xdg"
(
cd "$WORK_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" HOME="$WORK_DIR/home" XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$WORK_DIR/xdg" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY="" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="" \
"$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-edit.sh" "$@"
)
}
fail() {
echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
echo "--- stderr ---" >&2
cat "$ERR_FILE" >&2
exit 1
}
expect_rc() { # expect_rc <want> <desc> <args...>
local want="$1" desc="$2" rc=0
shift 2
run_wrapper "$@" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -eq "$want" ]] || fail "$desc: rc=$rc, want $want"
}
expect_stderr() { # expect_stderr <pattern> <desc>
grep -q "$1" "$ERR_FILE" || fail "$2: stderr missing '$1'"
}
# 1. Help exits 0 and prints usage.
expect_rc 0 "--help exits 0" --help
grep -q "Usage: issue-edit.sh" "$OUT_FILE" || fail "--help did not print usage"
expect_rc 0 "-h exits 0" -h
# 2. Unknown option: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "unknown option exits 2" --bogus
expect_stderr "unknown option" "unknown option names itself on stderr"
# 3. Missing required PR number: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "missing -i exits 2"
expect_stderr "issue number is required" "missing -i message on stderr"
# 4. Value-less flags: rc 2 with "requires a value" on stderr.
for flag in -i -t -b -l -m --issue --title --body --labels --milestone; do
expect_rc 2 "value-less $flag exits 2" "$flag"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "value-less $flag message on stderr"
done
# 4a. An option-like value is a MISSING value, not a value (codex PR #1464:
# -b --help previously consumed --help as the body and performed the write).
expect_rc 2 "option-like value rejected" -i 5 -b --help
expect_rc 2 "short flag value rejected" -i 5 -b -h
expect_stderr "requires a value" "short flag value message on stderr"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "option-like value message on stderr"
# 4b. Parser-failure arms (1-4) must have performed ZERO provider contact.
if [[ -s "$PROBE_LOG" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: a parser-failure arm contacted a provider:" >&2
cat "$PROBE_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
# 5. Alias acceptance under the sandbox: both -b and -c carry a value past
# parsing; the run fails at credential resolution nonzero and NOT 2.
for flag in -b; do
rc=0
run_wrapper_sandboxed -i 5 "$flag" "value" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]] || fail "$flag arm unexpectedly succeeded in the sandbox"
[[ "$rc" -ne 2 ]] || fail "$flag arm misclassified credential failure as a usage error"
done
# 6. Post-sandbox provider assertions are intentionally NOT applied here:
# pr-close's gitea path attempts a tea WRITE (tea pr comment) when a
# comment parses, then falls back to the API. Hermeticity for this
# wrapper comes from the FAILING stubs (exit 99), not from non-contact —
# the arm above proves only parse acceptance and non-usage classification.
# Parser-failure arms (1-4) remain zero-contact (asserted at 4b).
echo "issue-edit.sh usage-contract regression passed (R1/R4)"
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Usage-error contract for issue-list.sh (R4, 2026-08-28).
#
# issue-edit already uses long-flag-first parsing (-i/--issue, -t/--title,
# -b/--body, -l/--labels, -m/--milestone); this adds the rc=2 usage-error
# contract, value checks, and the no-provider-contact proof. Required: -i.
#
# Arms:
# 1. --help and -h exit 0 and print usage.
# 2. Unknown option exits 2 with the message on stderr.
# 3. Missing required -i exits 2 (stderr).
# 4. A value-less flag (-i -b -c and long forms) exits 2 (stderr).
# 5. -b and -c both pass parsing (sandboxed runner: the run then fails
# at credential resolution, nonzero and NOT 2) — no real token is
# ever read and no provider is contacted.
# 6. No arm performs any provider request (PATH shims record every
# invocation; the probe log must stay empty).
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/issue-list-usage}"
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
PROBE_LOG="$WORK_DIR/provider-probes.log"
OUT_FILE="$WORK_DIR/out.log"
ERR_FILE="$WORK_DIR/err.log"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$BIN_DIR"
: > "$PROBE_LOG"
# Unlike the issue suites, these stubs FAIL (exit 99): pr-close has an
# API fallback that treats a successful curl as a closed PR, so exit-0
# stubs would let the sandbox arms "succeed" (measured 2026-08-28).
for tool in gh tea curl; do
cat > "$BIN_DIR/$tool" <<STUB
#!/usr/bin/env bash
echo "$tool \$*" >> "$PROBE_LOG"
exit 99
STUB
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/$tool"
done
run_wrapper() {
( cd "$WORK_DIR" && PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" "$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-list.sh" "$@" )
}
# Hermetic variant: neutralizes every identity/credential source the wrapper
# consults so parse-acceptance arms fail at credential resolution in ANY cwd
# repo (see test-issue-comment-usage-contract.sh for the measured incident).
run_wrapper_sandboxed() {
mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR/home" "$WORK_DIR/xdg"
(
cd "$WORK_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" HOME="$WORK_DIR/home" XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$WORK_DIR/xdg" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY="" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="" \
"$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-list.sh" "$@"
)
}
fail() {
echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
echo "--- stderr ---" >&2
cat "$ERR_FILE" >&2
exit 1
}
expect_rc() { # expect_rc <want> <desc> <args...>
local want="$1" desc="$2" rc=0
shift 2
run_wrapper "$@" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -eq "$want" ]] || fail "$desc: rc=$rc, want $want"
}
expect_stderr() { # expect_stderr <pattern> <desc>
grep -q "$1" "$ERR_FILE" || fail "$2: stderr missing '$1'"
}
# 1. Help exits 0 and prints usage.
expect_rc 0 "--help exits 0" --help
grep -q "Usage: issue-list.sh" "$OUT_FILE" || fail "--help did not print usage"
expect_rc 0 "-h exits 0" -h
# 2. Unknown option: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "unknown option exits 2" --bogus
expect_stderr "[Uu]nknown option" "unknown option names itself on stderr"
# 3. Missing required PR number: rc 2, stderr.
# 4. Value-less flags: rc 2 with "requires a value" on stderr.
for flag in -s -l -m -a -n -r --state --label --milestone --assignee --limit --repo; do
expect_rc 2 "value-less $flag exits 2" "$flag"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "value-less $flag message on stderr"
done
# 4a. An option-like value is a MISSING value, not a value (codex PR #1464:
# -b --help previously consumed --help as the body and performed the write).
expect_rc 2 "option-like value rejected" -s --help
expect_rc 2 "short flag value rejected" -s -h
expect_stderr "requires a value" "short flag value message on stderr"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "option-like value message on stderr"
# 4b. Parser-failure arms (1-4) must have performed ZERO provider contact.
if [[ -s "$PROBE_LOG" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: a parser-failure arm contacted a provider:" >&2
cat "$PROBE_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
# 5. Alias acceptance under the sandbox: both -b and -c carry a value past
# parsing; the run fails at credential resolution nonzero and NOT 2.
for flag in -s; do
rc=0
run_wrapper_sandboxed -s open >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]] || fail "$flag arm unexpectedly succeeded in the sandbox"
[[ "$rc" -ne 2 ]] || fail "$flag arm misclassified credential failure as a usage error"
done
# 6. Post-sandbox provider assertions are intentionally NOT applied here:
# pr-close's gitea path attempts a tea WRITE (tea pr comment) when a
# comment parses, then falls back to the API. Hermeticity for this
# wrapper comes from the FAILING stubs (exit 99), not from non-contact —
# the arm above proves only parse acceptance and non-usage classification.
# Parser-failure arms (1-4) remain zero-contact (asserted at 4b).
echo "issue-list.sh usage-contract regression passed (R1/R4)"
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Usage-error contract for issue-reopen.sh (R1/R4, 2026-08-28).
#
# R4: usage errors print to STDERR and exit 2, distinct from provider,
# credential, and verification failures (exit 1). R1: -b/--body is the
# canonical comment flag; -c/--comment remains a compatible alias.
# The comment is OPTIONAL here (an issue may close without one), so unlike
# issue-comment there is no missing-comment arm.
#
# Arms:
# 1. --help and -h exit 0 and print usage.
# 2. Unknown option exits 2 with the message on stderr.
# 3. Missing required -i exits 2 (stderr).
# 4. A value-less flag (-i -b -c and long forms) exits 2 (stderr).
# 5. -b and -c both pass parsing (sandboxed runner: the run then fails
# at credential resolution, nonzero and NOT 2) — no real token is
# ever read and no provider is contacted.
# 6. No arm performs any provider request (PATH shims record every
# invocation; the probe log must stay empty).
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/issue-reopen-usage}"
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
PROBE_LOG="$WORK_DIR/provider-probes.log"
OUT_FILE="$WORK_DIR/out.log"
ERR_FILE="$WORK_DIR/err.log"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$BIN_DIR"
: > "$PROBE_LOG"
for tool in gh tea curl; do
cat > "$BIN_DIR/$tool" <<STUB
#!/usr/bin/env bash
echo "$tool \$*" >> "$PROBE_LOG"
exit 0
STUB
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/$tool"
done
run_wrapper() {
( cd "$WORK_DIR" && PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" "$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-reopen.sh" "$@" )
}
# Hermetic variant: neutralizes every identity/credential source the wrapper
# consults so parse-acceptance arms fail at credential resolution in ANY cwd
# repo (see test-issue-comment-usage-contract.sh for the measured incident).
run_wrapper_sandboxed() {
mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR/home" "$WORK_DIR/xdg"
(
cd "$WORK_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" HOME="$WORK_DIR/home" XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$WORK_DIR/xdg" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY="" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="" \
"$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-reopen.sh" "$@"
)
}
fail() {
echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
echo "--- stderr ---" >&2
cat "$ERR_FILE" >&2
exit 1
}
expect_rc() { # expect_rc <want> <desc> <args...>
local want="$1" desc="$2" rc=0
shift 2
run_wrapper "$@" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -eq "$want" ]] || fail "$desc: rc=$rc, want $want"
}
expect_stderr() { # expect_stderr <pattern> <desc>
grep -q "$1" "$ERR_FILE" || fail "$2: stderr missing '$1'"
}
# 1. Help exits 0 and prints usage.
expect_rc 0 "--help exits 0" --help
grep -q "Usage: issue-reopen.sh" "$OUT_FILE" || fail "--help did not print usage"
expect_rc 0 "-h exits 0" -h
# 2. Unknown option: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "unknown option exits 2" --bogus
expect_stderr "unknown option" "unknown option names itself on stderr"
# 3. Missing required issue number: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "missing -i exits 2"
expect_stderr "issue number is required" "missing -i message on stderr"
# 4. Value-less flags: rc 2 with "requires a value" on stderr.
for flag in -i -b -c --issue --body --comment; do
expect_rc 2 "value-less $flag exits 2" "$flag"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "value-less $flag message on stderr"
done
# 4a. An option-like value is a MISSING value, not a value (codex PR #1464:
# -b --help previously consumed --help as the body and performed the write).
expect_rc 2 "option-like value rejected" -i 5 -b --help
expect_rc 2 "short flag value rejected" -i 5 -b -h
expect_stderr "requires a value" "short flag value message on stderr"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "option-like value message on stderr"
# 4b. Parser-failure arms (1-4) must have performed ZERO provider contact.
if [[ -s "$PROBE_LOG" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: a parser-failure arm contacted a provider:" >&2
cat "$PROBE_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
# 5. Alias acceptance under the sandbox: both -b and -c carry a value past
# parsing; the run fails at credential resolution nonzero and NOT 2.
for flag in -b -c; do
rc=0
run_wrapper_sandboxed -i 5 "$flag" "closing note" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]] || fail "$flag arm unexpectedly succeeded in the sandbox"
[[ "$rc" -ne 2 ]] || fail "$flag arm misclassified credential failure as a usage error"
done
# 6. Sandbox arms may issue DETECTION reads only (tea login list via the
# stub); no gh/curl write or read may occur.
if grep -Ev '^(gh|tea|curl) login list' "$PROBE_LOG" | grep -q .; then
echo "FAIL: a sandbox arm performed a non-detection provider request:" >&2
grep -Ev '^(gh|tea|curl) login list' "$PROBE_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
if grep -qE '^(gh|curl)' "$PROBE_LOG"; then
echo "FAIL: gh or curl was invoked during a sandbox arm:" >&2
grep -E '^(gh|curl)' "$PROBE_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "issue-reopen.sh usage-contract regression passed (R1/R4)"
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Usage-error contract for issue-view.sh (R4, 2026-08-28).
#
# issue-edit already uses long-flag-first parsing (-i/--issue, -t/--title,
# -b/--body, -l/--labels, -m/--milestone); this adds the rc=2 usage-error
# contract, value checks, and the no-provider-contact proof. Required: -i.
#
# Arms:
# 1. --help and -h exit 0 and print usage.
# 2. Unknown option exits 2 with the message on stderr.
# 3. Missing required -i exits 2 (stderr).
# 4. A value-less flag (-i -b -c and long forms) exits 2 (stderr).
# 5. -b and -c both pass parsing (sandboxed runner: the run then fails
# at credential resolution, nonzero and NOT 2) — no real token is
# ever read and no provider is contacted.
# 6. No arm performs any provider request (PATH shims record every
# invocation; the probe log must stay empty).
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/issue-view-usage}"
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
PROBE_LOG="$WORK_DIR/provider-probes.log"
OUT_FILE="$WORK_DIR/out.log"
ERR_FILE="$WORK_DIR/err.log"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$BIN_DIR"
: > "$PROBE_LOG"
# Unlike the issue suites, these stubs FAIL (exit 99): pr-close has an
# API fallback that treats a successful curl as a closed PR, so exit-0
# stubs would let the sandbox arms "succeed" (measured 2026-08-28).
for tool in gh tea curl; do
cat > "$BIN_DIR/$tool" <<STUB
#!/usr/bin/env bash
echo "$tool \$*" >> "$PROBE_LOG"
exit 99
STUB
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/$tool"
done
run_wrapper() {
( cd "$WORK_DIR" && PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" "$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-view.sh" "$@" )
}
# Hermetic variant: neutralizes every identity/credential source the wrapper
# consults so parse-acceptance arms fail at credential resolution in ANY cwd
# repo (see test-issue-comment-usage-contract.sh for the measured incident).
run_wrapper_sandboxed() {
mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR/home" "$WORK_DIR/xdg"
(
cd "$WORK_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" HOME="$WORK_DIR/home" XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$WORK_DIR/xdg" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY="" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="" \
"$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-view.sh" "$@"
)
}
fail() {
echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
echo "--- stderr ---" >&2
cat "$ERR_FILE" >&2
exit 1
}
expect_rc() { # expect_rc <want> <desc> <args...>
local want="$1" desc="$2" rc=0
shift 2
run_wrapper "$@" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -eq "$want" ]] || fail "$desc: rc=$rc, want $want"
}
expect_stderr() { # expect_stderr <pattern> <desc>
grep -q "$1" "$ERR_FILE" || fail "$2: stderr missing '$1'"
}
# 1. Help exits 0 and prints usage.
expect_rc 0 "--help exits 0" --help
grep -q "Usage: issue-view.sh" "$OUT_FILE" || fail "--help did not print usage"
expect_rc 0 "-h exits 0" -h
# 2. Unknown option: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "unknown option exits 2" --bogus
expect_stderr "[Uu]nknown option" "unknown option names itself on stderr"
# 3. Missing required PR number: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "missing -i exits 2"
expect_stderr "Issue number is required" "missing -i message on stderr"
# 4. Value-less flags: rc 2 with "requires a value" on stderr.
for flag in -i --issue; do
expect_rc 2 "value-less $flag exits 2" "$flag"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "value-less $flag message on stderr"
done
# 4a. An option-like value is a MISSING value, not a value (codex PR #1464:
# -b --help previously consumed --help as the body and performed the write).
expect_rc 2 "option-like value rejected" -i --help
expect_rc 2 "short flag value rejected" -i -h
expect_stderr "requires a value" "short flag value message on stderr"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "option-like value message on stderr"
# 4b. Parser-failure arms (1-4) must have performed ZERO provider contact.
if [[ -s "$PROBE_LOG" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: a parser-failure arm contacted a provider:" >&2
cat "$PROBE_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
# 5. Alias acceptance under the sandbox: both -b and -c carry a value past
# parsing; the run fails at credential resolution nonzero and NOT 2.
for flag in -i; do
rc=0
run_wrapper_sandboxed -i 5 >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]] || fail "$flag arm unexpectedly succeeded in the sandbox"
[[ "$rc" -ne 2 ]] || fail "$flag arm misclassified credential failure as a usage error"
done
# 6. Post-sandbox provider assertions are intentionally NOT applied here:
# pr-close's gitea path attempts a tea WRITE (tea pr comment) when a
# comment parses, then falls back to the API. Hermeticity for this
# wrapper comes from the FAILING stubs (exit 99), not from non-contact —
# the arm above proves only parse acceptance and non-usage classification.
# Parser-failure arms (1-4) remain zero-contact (asserted at 4b).
echo "issue-view.sh usage-contract regression passed (R1/R4)"
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Usage-error contract for lane-brief.sh (R4, 2026-08-28).
#
# issue-edit already uses long-flag-first parsing (-i/--issue, -t/--title,
# -b/--body, -l/--labels, -m/--milestone); this adds the rc=2 usage-error
# contract, value checks, and the no-provider-contact proof. Required: -i.
#
# Arms:
# 1. --help and -h exit 0 and print usage.
# 2. Unknown option exits 2 with the message on stderr.
# 3. Missing required -i exits 2 (stderr).
# 4. A value-less flag (-i -b -c and long forms) exits 2 (stderr).
# 5. -b and -c both pass parsing (sandboxed runner: the run then fails
# at credential resolution, nonzero and NOT 2) — no real token is
# ever read and no provider is contacted.
# 6. No arm performs any provider request (PATH shims record every
# invocation; the probe log must stay empty).
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/lane-brief-usage}"
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
PROBE_LOG="$WORK_DIR/provider-probes.log"
OUT_FILE="$WORK_DIR/out.log"
ERR_FILE="$WORK_DIR/err.log"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$BIN_DIR"
: > "$PROBE_LOG"
# Unlike the issue suites, these stubs FAIL (exit 99): pr-close has an
# API fallback that treats a successful curl as a closed PR, so exit-0
# stubs would let the sandbox arms "succeed" (measured 2026-08-28).
for tool in gh tea curl; do
cat > "$BIN_DIR/$tool" <<STUB
#!/usr/bin/env bash
echo "$tool \$*" >> "$PROBE_LOG"
exit 99
STUB
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/$tool"
done
run_wrapper() {
( cd "$WORK_DIR" && PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" "$SCRIPT_DIR/lane-brief.sh" "$@" )
}
# Hermetic variant: neutralizes every identity/credential source the wrapper
# consults so parse-acceptance arms fail at credential resolution in ANY cwd
# repo (see test-issue-comment-usage-contract.sh for the measured incident).
run_wrapper_sandboxed() {
mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR/home" "$WORK_DIR/xdg"
(
cd "$WORK_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" HOME="$WORK_DIR/home" XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$WORK_DIR/xdg" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY="" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="" \
"$SCRIPT_DIR/lane-brief.sh" "$@"
)
}
fail() {
echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
echo "--- stderr ---" >&2
cat "$ERR_FILE" >&2
exit 1
}
expect_rc() { # expect_rc <want> <desc> <args...>
local want="$1" desc="$2" rc=0
shift 2
run_wrapper "$@" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -eq "$want" ]] || fail "$desc: rc=$rc, want $want"
}
expect_stderr() { # expect_stderr <pattern> <desc>
grep -q "$1" "$ERR_FILE" || fail "$2: stderr missing '$1'"
}
# 1. Help exits 0 and prints usage.
expect_rc 0 "--help exits 0" --help
grep -q "owner/repo" "$OUT_FILE" || fail "--help did not print usage"
expect_rc 0 "-h exits 0" -h
# 2. Unknown option: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "unknown option exits 2" --bogus
expect_stderr "[Uu]nknown option" "unknown option names itself on stderr"
# 3. Missing required PR number: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "missing -r exits 2"
expect_stderr "required" "missing -r message on stderr"
# 4. Value-less flags: rc 2 with "requires a value" on stderr.
for flag in -r -m -l -L -n --repo --milestone --label --login --limit; do
expect_rc 2 "value-less $flag exits 2" "$flag"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "value-less $flag message on stderr"
done
# 4a. An option-like value is a MISSING value, not a value (codex PR #1464:
# -b --help previously consumed --help as the body and performed the write).
expect_rc 2 "option-like value rejected" -r owner/repo -m --help
expect_rc 2 "short flag value rejected" -r owner/repo -m -h
expect_stderr "requires a value" "short flag value message on stderr"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "option-like value message on stderr"
# 4b. Parser-failure arms (1-4) must have performed ZERO provider contact.
if [[ -s "$PROBE_LOG" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: a parser-failure arm contacted a provider:" >&2
cat "$PROBE_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
# 5. Alias acceptance under the sandbox: both -b and -c carry a value past
# parsing; the run fails at credential resolution nonzero and NOT 2.
for flag in -r; do
rc=0
run_wrapper_sandboxed -r owner/repo >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]] || fail "$flag arm unexpectedly succeeded in the sandbox"
[[ "$rc" -ne 2 ]] || fail "$flag arm misclassified credential failure as a usage error"
done
# 6. Post-sandbox provider assertions are intentionally NOT applied here:
# pr-close's gitea path attempts a tea WRITE (tea pr comment) when a
# comment parses, then falls back to the API. Hermeticity for this
# wrapper comes from the FAILING stubs (exit 99), not from non-contact —
# the arm above proves only parse acceptance and non-usage classification.
# Parser-failure arms (1-4) remain zero-contact (asserted at 4b).
echo "lane-brief.sh usage-contract regression passed (R1/R4)"
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Usage-error contract for milestone-close.sh (R4, 2026-08-28).
#
# issue-edit already uses long-flag-first parsing (-i/--issue, -t/--title,
# -b/--body, -l/--labels, -m/--milestone); this adds the rc=2 usage-error
# contract, value checks, and the no-provider-contact proof. Required: -i.
#
# Arms:
# 1. --help and -h exit 0 and print usage.
# 2. Unknown option exits 2 with the message on stderr.
# 3. Missing required -i exits 2 (stderr).
# 4. A value-less flag (-i -b -c and long forms) exits 2 (stderr).
# 5. -b and -c both pass parsing (sandboxed runner: the run then fails
# at credential resolution, nonzero and NOT 2) — no real token is
# ever read and no provider is contacted.
# 6. No arm performs any provider request (PATH shims record every
# invocation; the probe log must stay empty).
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/milestone-close-usage}"
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
PROBE_LOG="$WORK_DIR/provider-probes.log"
OUT_FILE="$WORK_DIR/out.log"
ERR_FILE="$WORK_DIR/err.log"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$BIN_DIR"
: > "$PROBE_LOG"
# Unlike the issue suites, these stubs FAIL (exit 99): pr-close has an
# API fallback that treats a successful curl as a closed PR, so exit-0
# stubs would let the sandbox arms "succeed" (measured 2026-08-28).
for tool in gh tea curl; do
cat > "$BIN_DIR/$tool" <<STUB
#!/usr/bin/env bash
echo "$tool \$*" >> "$PROBE_LOG"
exit 99
STUB
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/$tool"
done
run_wrapper() {
( cd "$WORK_DIR" && PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" "$SCRIPT_DIR/milestone-close.sh" "$@" )
}
# Hermetic variant: neutralizes every identity/credential source the wrapper
# consults so parse-acceptance arms fail at credential resolution in ANY cwd
# repo (see test-issue-comment-usage-contract.sh for the measured incident).
run_wrapper_sandboxed() {
mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR/home" "$WORK_DIR/xdg"
(
cd "$WORK_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" HOME="$WORK_DIR/home" XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$WORK_DIR/xdg" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY="" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="" \
"$SCRIPT_DIR/milestone-close.sh" "$@"
)
}
fail() {
echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
echo "--- stderr ---" >&2
cat "$ERR_FILE" >&2
exit 1
}
expect_rc() { # expect_rc <want> <desc> <args...>
local want="$1" desc="$2" rc=0
shift 2
run_wrapper "$@" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -eq "$want" ]] || fail "$desc: rc=$rc, want $want"
}
expect_stderr() { # expect_stderr <pattern> <desc>
grep -q "$1" "$ERR_FILE" || fail "$2: stderr missing '$1'"
}
# 1. Help exits 0 and prints usage.
expect_rc 0 "--help exits 0" --help
grep -q "Usage: milestone-close.sh" "$OUT_FILE" || fail "--help did not print usage"
expect_rc 0 "-h exits 0" -h
# 2. Unknown option: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "unknown option exits 2" --bogus
expect_stderr "[Uu]nknown option" "unknown option names itself on stderr"
# 3. Missing required PR number: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "missing -t exits 2"
expect_stderr "Milestone title is required" "missing -t message on stderr"
# 4. Value-less flags: rc 2 with "requires a value" on stderr.
for flag in -t --title; do
expect_rc 2 "value-less $flag exits 2" "$flag"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "value-less $flag message on stderr"
done
# 4a. An option-like value is a MISSING value, not a value (codex PR #1464:
# -b --help previously consumed --help as the body and performed the write).
expect_rc 2 "option-like value rejected" -t --help --help
expect_rc 2 "short flag value rejected" -t --help -h
expect_stderr "requires a value" "short flag value message on stderr"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "option-like value message on stderr"
# 4b. Parser-failure arms (1-4) must have performed ZERO provider contact.
if [[ -s "$PROBE_LOG" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: a parser-failure arm contacted a provider:" >&2
cat "$PROBE_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
# 5. Alias acceptance under the sandbox: both -b and -c carry a value past
# parsing; the run fails at credential resolution nonzero and NOT 2.
for flag in -t; do
rc=0
run_wrapper_sandboxed -t "smoke" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]] || fail "$flag arm unexpectedly succeeded in the sandbox"
[[ "$rc" -ne 2 ]] || fail "$flag arm misclassified credential failure as a usage error"
done
# 6. Post-sandbox provider assertions are intentionally NOT applied here:
# pr-close's gitea path attempts a tea WRITE (tea pr comment) when a
# comment parses, then falls back to the API. Hermeticity for this
# wrapper comes from the FAILING stubs (exit 99), not from non-contact —
# the arm above proves only parse acceptance and non-usage classification.
# Parser-failure arms (1-4) remain zero-contact (asserted at 4b).
echo "milestone-close.sh usage-contract regression passed (R1/R4)"
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Usage-error contract for milestone-create.sh (R4, 2026-08-28).
#
# issue-edit already uses long-flag-first parsing (-i/--issue, -t/--title,
# -b/--body, -l/--labels, -m/--milestone); this adds the rc=2 usage-error
# contract, value checks, and the no-provider-contact proof. Required: -i.
#
# Arms:
# 1. --help and -h exit 0 and print usage.
# 2. Unknown option exits 2 with the message on stderr.
# 3. Missing required -i exits 2 (stderr).
# 4. A value-less flag (-i -b -c and long forms) exits 2 (stderr).
# 5. -b and -c both pass parsing (sandboxed runner: the run then fails
# at credential resolution, nonzero and NOT 2) — no real token is
# ever read and no provider is contacted.
# 6. No arm performs any provider request (PATH shims record every
# invocation; the probe log must stay empty).
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/milestone-create-usage}"
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
PROBE_LOG="$WORK_DIR/provider-probes.log"
OUT_FILE="$WORK_DIR/out.log"
ERR_FILE="$WORK_DIR/err.log"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$BIN_DIR"
: > "$PROBE_LOG"
# Unlike the issue suites, these stubs FAIL (exit 99): pr-close has an
# API fallback that treats a successful curl as a closed PR, so exit-0
# stubs would let the sandbox arms "succeed" (measured 2026-08-28).
for tool in gh tea curl; do
cat > "$BIN_DIR/$tool" <<STUB
#!/usr/bin/env bash
echo "$tool \$*" >> "$PROBE_LOG"
exit 99
STUB
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/$tool"
done
run_wrapper() {
( cd "$WORK_DIR" && PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" "$SCRIPT_DIR/milestone-create.sh" "$@" )
}
# Hermetic variant: neutralizes every identity/credential source the wrapper
# consults so parse-acceptance arms fail at credential resolution in ANY cwd
# repo (see test-issue-comment-usage-contract.sh for the measured incident).
run_wrapper_sandboxed() {
mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR/home" "$WORK_DIR/xdg"
(
cd "$WORK_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" HOME="$WORK_DIR/home" XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$WORK_DIR/xdg" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY="" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="" \
"$SCRIPT_DIR/milestone-create.sh" "$@"
)
}
fail() {
echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
echo "--- stderr ---" >&2
cat "$ERR_FILE" >&2
exit 1
}
expect_rc() { # expect_rc <want> <desc> <args...>
local want="$1" desc="$2" rc=0
shift 2
run_wrapper "$@" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -eq "$want" ]] || fail "$desc: rc=$rc, want $want"
}
expect_stderr() { # expect_stderr <pattern> <desc>
grep -q "$1" "$ERR_FILE" || fail "$2: stderr missing '$1'"
}
# 1. Help exits 0 and prints usage.
expect_rc 0 "--help exits 0" --help
grep -q "Usage: milestone-create.sh" "$OUT_FILE" || fail "--help did not print usage"
expect_rc 0 "-h exits 0" -h
# 2. Unknown option: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "unknown option exits 2" --bogus
expect_stderr "[Uu]nknown option" "unknown option names itself on stderr"
# 3. Missing required PR number: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "missing -t exits 2"
expect_stderr "Title is required" "missing -t message on stderr"
# 4. Value-less flags: rc 2 with "requires a value" on stderr.
for flag in -t -d --due --title --desc; do
expect_rc 2 "value-less $flag exits 2" "$flag"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "value-less $flag message on stderr"
done
# 4a. An option-like value is a MISSING value, not a value (codex PR #1464:
# -b --help previously consumed --help as the body and performed the write).
expect_rc 2 "option-like value rejected" -t smoke -d --help
expect_rc 2 "short flag value rejected" -t smoke -d -h
expect_stderr "requires a value" "short flag value message on stderr"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "option-like value message on stderr"
# 4b. Parser-failure arms (1-4) must have performed ZERO provider contact.
if [[ -s "$PROBE_LOG" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: a parser-failure arm contacted a provider:" >&2
cat "$PROBE_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
# 5. Alias acceptance under the sandbox: both -b and -c carry a value past
# parsing; the run fails at credential resolution nonzero and NOT 2.
for flag in -t; do
rc=0
run_wrapper_sandboxed -t "smoke" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]] || fail "$flag arm unexpectedly succeeded in the sandbox"
[[ "$rc" -ne 2 ]] || fail "$flag arm misclassified credential failure as a usage error"
done
# 6. Post-sandbox provider assertions are intentionally NOT applied here:
# pr-close's gitea path attempts a tea WRITE (tea pr comment) when a
# comment parses, then falls back to the API. Hermeticity for this
# wrapper comes from the FAILING stubs (exit 99), not from non-contact —
# the arm above proves only parse acceptance and non-usage classification.
# Parser-failure arms (1-4) remain zero-contact (asserted at 4b).
echo "milestone-create.sh usage-contract regression passed (R1/R4)"
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Usage-error contract for milestone-list.sh (R4, 2026-08-28).
#
# issue-edit already uses long-flag-first parsing (-i/--issue, -t/--title,
# -b/--body, -l/--labels, -m/--milestone); this adds the rc=2 usage-error
# contract, value checks, and the no-provider-contact proof. Required: -i.
#
# Arms:
# 1. --help and -h exit 0 and print usage.
# 2. Unknown option exits 2 with the message on stderr.
# 3. Missing required -i exits 2 (stderr).
# 4. A value-less flag (-i -b -c and long forms) exits 2 (stderr).
# 5. -b and -c both pass parsing (sandboxed runner: the run then fails
# at credential resolution, nonzero and NOT 2) — no real token is
# ever read and no provider is contacted.
# 6. No arm performs any provider request (PATH shims record every
# invocation; the probe log must stay empty).
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/milestone-list-usage}"
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
PROBE_LOG="$WORK_DIR/provider-probes.log"
OUT_FILE="$WORK_DIR/out.log"
ERR_FILE="$WORK_DIR/err.log"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$BIN_DIR"
: > "$PROBE_LOG"
# Unlike the issue suites, these stubs FAIL (exit 99): pr-close has an
# API fallback that treats a successful curl as a closed PR, so exit-0
# stubs would let the sandbox arms "succeed" (measured 2026-08-28).
for tool in gh tea curl; do
cat > "$BIN_DIR/$tool" <<STUB
#!/usr/bin/env bash
echo "$tool \$*" >> "$PROBE_LOG"
exit 99
STUB
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/$tool"
done
run_wrapper() {
( cd "$WORK_DIR" && PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" "$SCRIPT_DIR/milestone-list.sh" "$@" )
}
# Hermetic variant: neutralizes every identity/credential source the wrapper
# consults so parse-acceptance arms fail at credential resolution in ANY cwd
# repo (see test-issue-comment-usage-contract.sh for the measured incident).
run_wrapper_sandboxed() {
mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR/home" "$WORK_DIR/xdg"
(
cd "$WORK_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" HOME="$WORK_DIR/home" XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$WORK_DIR/xdg" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY="" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="" \
"$SCRIPT_DIR/milestone-list.sh" "$@"
)
}
fail() {
echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
echo "--- stderr ---" >&2
cat "$ERR_FILE" >&2
exit 1
}
expect_rc() { # expect_rc <want> <desc> <args...>
local want="$1" desc="$2" rc=0
shift 2
run_wrapper "$@" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -eq "$want" ]] || fail "$desc: rc=$rc, want $want"
}
expect_stderr() { # expect_stderr <pattern> <desc>
grep -q "$1" "$ERR_FILE" || fail "$2: stderr missing '$1'"
}
# 1. Help exits 0 and prints usage.
expect_rc 0 "--help exits 0" --help
grep -q "Usage: milestone-list.sh" "$OUT_FILE" || fail "--help did not print usage"
expect_rc 0 "-h exits 0" -h
# 2. Unknown option: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "unknown option exits 2" --bogus
expect_stderr "[Uu]nknown option" "unknown option names itself on stderr"
# 3. Missing required PR number: rc 2, stderr.
# 4. Value-less flags: rc 2 with "requires a value" on stderr.
for flag in -s --state; do
expect_rc 2 "value-less $flag exits 2" "$flag"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "value-less $flag message on stderr"
done
# 4a. An option-like value is a MISSING value, not a value (codex PR #1464:
# -b --help previously consumed --help as the body and performed the write).
expect_rc 2 "option-like value rejected" -s --help
expect_rc 2 "short flag value rejected" -s -h
expect_stderr "requires a value" "short flag value message on stderr"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "option-like value message on stderr"
# 4b. Parser-failure arms (1-4) must have performed ZERO provider contact.
if [[ -s "$PROBE_LOG" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: a parser-failure arm contacted a provider:" >&2
cat "$PROBE_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
# 5. Alias acceptance under the sandbox: both -b and -c carry a value past
# parsing; the run fails at credential resolution nonzero and NOT 2.
for flag in -s; do
rc=0
run_wrapper_sandboxed -s open >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]] || fail "$flag arm unexpectedly succeeded in the sandbox"
[[ "$rc" -ne 2 ]] || fail "$flag arm misclassified credential failure as a usage error"
done
# 6. Post-sandbox provider assertions are intentionally NOT applied here:
# pr-close's gitea path attempts a tea WRITE (tea pr comment) when a
# comment parses, then falls back to the API. Hermeticity for this
# wrapper comes from the FAILING stubs (exit 99), not from non-contact —
# the arm above proves only parse acceptance and non-usage classification.
# Parser-failure arms (1-4) remain zero-contact (asserted at 4b).
# 6b. Provider-exit normalization (codex PR #1464): a provider stub exiting
# 2 (its own usage-error status) must surface as wrapper exit 1, never 2.
GH_REPO="$WORK_DIR/repo-gh"
mkdir -p "$GH_REPO"
git -C "$GH_REPO" init -q
git -C "$GH_REPO" remote add origin https://github.com/acme/widgets.git
cat > "$BIN_DIR/gh" <<GHSTUB
#!/usr/bin/env bash
echo "gh \$*" >> "$PROBE_LOG"
if [[ "\$1" == "api" ]]; then exit 2; fi
exit 0
GHSTUB
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/gh"
rc=0
(
cd "$GH_REPO"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY="" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="" \
"$SCRIPT_DIR/milestone-list.sh" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE"
) || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -eq 1 ]] || fail "GitHub path: gh exit 2 must normalize to wrapper exit 1 (got $rc)"
grep -q "provider" "$ERR_FILE" || fail "GitHub path: normalized provider error missing from stderr"
echo "milestone-list.sh usage-contract regression passed (R1/R4)"
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Usage-error contract for pr-close.sh (R1/R4, 2026-08-28).
#
# R4: usage errors print to STDERR and exit 2, distinct from provider,
# credential, and verification failures (exit 1). R1: -b/--body is the
# canonical comment flag; -c/--comment remains a compatible alias.
# The comment is OPTIONAL here (an issue may close without one), so unlike
# issue-comment there is no missing-comment arm.
#
# Arms:
# 1. --help and -h exit 0 and print usage.
# 2. Unknown option exits 2 with the message on stderr.
# 3. Missing required -i exits 2 (stderr).
# 4. A value-less flag (-i -b -c and long forms) exits 2 (stderr).
# 5. -b and -c both pass parsing (sandboxed runner: the run then fails
# at credential resolution, nonzero and NOT 2) — no real token is
# ever read and no provider is contacted.
# 6. No arm performs any provider request (PATH shims record every
# invocation; the probe log must stay empty).
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/pr-close-usage}"
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
PROBE_LOG="$WORK_DIR/provider-probes.log"
OUT_FILE="$WORK_DIR/out.log"
ERR_FILE="$WORK_DIR/err.log"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$BIN_DIR"
: > "$PROBE_LOG"
# Unlike the issue suites, these stubs FAIL (exit 99): pr-close has an
# API fallback that treats a successful curl as a closed PR, so exit-0
# stubs would let the sandbox arms "succeed" (measured 2026-08-28).
for tool in gh tea curl; do
cat > "$BIN_DIR/$tool" <<STUB
#!/usr/bin/env bash
echo "$tool \$*" >> "$PROBE_LOG"
exit 99
STUB
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/$tool"
done
run_wrapper() {
( cd "$WORK_DIR" && PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-close.sh" "$@" )
}
# Hermetic variant: neutralizes every identity/credential source the wrapper
# consults so parse-acceptance arms fail at credential resolution in ANY cwd
# repo (see test-issue-comment-usage-contract.sh for the measured incident).
run_wrapper_sandboxed() {
mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR/home" "$WORK_DIR/xdg"
(
cd "$WORK_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" HOME="$WORK_DIR/home" XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$WORK_DIR/xdg" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY="" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="" \
"$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-close.sh" "$@"
)
}
fail() {
echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
echo "--- stderr ---" >&2
cat "$ERR_FILE" >&2
exit 1
}
expect_rc() { # expect_rc <want> <desc> <args...>
local want="$1" desc="$2" rc=0
shift 2
run_wrapper "$@" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -eq "$want" ]] || fail "$desc: rc=$rc, want $want"
}
expect_stderr() { # expect_stderr <pattern> <desc>
grep -q "$1" "$ERR_FILE" || fail "$2: stderr missing '$1'"
}
# 1. Help exits 0 and prints usage.
expect_rc 0 "--help exits 0" --help
grep -q "Usage: pr-close.sh" "$OUT_FILE" || fail "--help did not print usage"
expect_rc 0 "-h exits 0" -h
# 2. Unknown option: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "unknown option exits 2" --bogus
expect_stderr "unknown option" "unknown option names itself on stderr"
# 3. Missing required PR number: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "missing -n exits 2"
expect_stderr "PR number is required" "missing -n message on stderr"
# 4. Value-less flags: rc 2 with "requires a value" on stderr.
for flag in -n -b -c --number --body --comment; do
expect_rc 2 "value-less $flag exits 2" "$flag"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "value-less $flag message on stderr"
done
# 4a. An option-like value is a MISSING value, not a value (codex PR #1464:
# -b --help previously consumed --help as the body and performed the write).
expect_rc 2 "option-like value rejected" -n 5 -b --help
expect_rc 2 "short flag value rejected" -n 5 -b -h
expect_stderr "requires a value" "short flag value message on stderr"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "option-like value message on stderr"
# 4b. Parser-failure arms (1-4) must have performed ZERO provider contact.
if [[ -s "$PROBE_LOG" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: a parser-failure arm contacted a provider:" >&2
cat "$PROBE_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
# 5. Alias acceptance under the sandbox: both -b and -c carry a value past
# parsing; the run fails at credential resolution nonzero and NOT 2.
for flag in -b -c; do
rc=0
run_wrapper_sandboxed -n 5 "$flag" "closing note" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]] || fail "$flag arm unexpectedly succeeded in the sandbox"
[[ "$rc" -ne 2 ]] || fail "$flag arm misclassified credential failure as a usage error"
done
# 6. Post-sandbox provider assertions are intentionally NOT applied here:
# pr-close's gitea path attempts a tea WRITE (tea pr comment) when a
# comment parses, then falls back to the API. Hermeticity for this
# wrapper comes from the FAILING stubs (exit 99), not from non-contact —
# the arm above proves only parse acceptance and non-usage classification.
# Parser-failure arms (1-4) remain zero-contact (asserted at 4b).
echo "pr-close.sh usage-contract regression passed (R1/R4)"
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Usage-error contract for pr-create.sh (R4, 2026-08-28).
#
# issue-edit already uses long-flag-first parsing (-i/--issue, -t/--title,
# -b/--body, -l/--labels, -m/--milestone); this adds the rc=2 usage-error
# contract, value checks, and the no-provider-contact proof. Required: -i.
#
# Arms:
# 1. --help and -h exit 0 and print usage.
# 2. Unknown option exits 2 with the message on stderr.
# 3. Missing required -i exits 2 (stderr).
# 4. A value-less flag (-i -b -c and long forms) exits 2 (stderr).
# 5. -b and -c both pass parsing (sandboxed runner: the run then fails
# at credential resolution, nonzero and NOT 2) — no real token is
# ever read and no provider is contacted.
# 6. No arm performs any provider request (PATH shims record every
# invocation; the probe log must stay empty).
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/pr-create-usage}"
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
PROBE_LOG="$WORK_DIR/provider-probes.log"
OUT_FILE="$WORK_DIR/out.log"
ERR_FILE="$WORK_DIR/err.log"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$BIN_DIR"
: > "$PROBE_LOG"
# Unlike the issue suites, these stubs FAIL (exit 99): pr-close has an
# API fallback that treats a successful curl as a closed PR, so exit-0
# stubs would let the sandbox arms "succeed" (measured 2026-08-28).
for tool in gh tea curl; do
cat > "$BIN_DIR/$tool" <<STUB
#!/usr/bin/env bash
echo "$tool \$*" >> "$PROBE_LOG"
exit 99
STUB
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/$tool"
done
run_wrapper() {
( cd "$WORK_DIR" && PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-create.sh" "$@" )
}
# Hermetic variant: neutralizes every identity/credential source the wrapper
# consults so parse-acceptance arms fail at credential resolution in ANY cwd
# repo (see test-issue-comment-usage-contract.sh for the measured incident).
run_wrapper_sandboxed() {
mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR/home" "$WORK_DIR/xdg"
(
cd "$WORK_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" HOME="$WORK_DIR/home" XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$WORK_DIR/xdg" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY="" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="" \
"$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-create.sh" "$@"
)
}
fail() {
echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
echo "--- stderr ---" >&2
cat "$ERR_FILE" >&2
exit 1
}
expect_rc() { # expect_rc <want> <desc> <args...>
local want="$1" desc="$2" rc=0
shift 2
run_wrapper "$@" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -eq "$want" ]] || fail "$desc: rc=$rc, want $want"
}
expect_stderr() { # expect_stderr <pattern> <desc>
grep -q "$1" "$ERR_FILE" || fail "$2: stderr missing '$1'"
}
# 1. Help exits 0 and prints usage.
expect_rc 0 "--help exits 0" --help
grep -q "Usage: pr-create.sh" "$OUT_FILE" || fail "--help did not print usage"
expect_rc 0 "-h exits 0" -h
# 2. Unknown option: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "unknown option exits 2" --bogus
expect_stderr "[Uu]nknown option" "unknown option names itself on stderr"
# 3. Missing required PR number: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "missing -t exits 2"
expect_stderr "Title is required" "missing -t message on stderr"
# 4. Value-less flags: rc 2 with "requires a value" on stderr.
for flag in -t -b -B -H -l -m -i --title --body --base --head --labels --milestone --issue; do
expect_rc 2 "value-less $flag exits 2" "$flag"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "value-less $flag message on stderr"
done
# 4a. An option-like value is a MISSING value, not a value (codex PR #1464:
# -b --help previously consumed --help as the body and performed the write).
expect_rc 2 "option-like value rejected" -t smoke -b --help
expect_rc 2 "short flag value rejected" -t smoke -b -h
expect_stderr "requires a value" "short flag value message on stderr"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "option-like value message on stderr"
# 4b. Parser-failure arms (1-4) must have performed ZERO provider contact.
if [[ -s "$PROBE_LOG" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: a parser-failure arm contacted a provider:" >&2
cat "$PROBE_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
# 5. Alias acceptance under the sandbox: both -b and -c carry a value past
# parsing; the run fails at credential resolution nonzero and NOT 2.
for flag in -b; do
rc=0
run_wrapper_sandboxed -t "smoke" "$flag" "value" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]] || fail "$flag arm unexpectedly succeeded in the sandbox"
[[ "$rc" -ne 2 ]] || fail "$flag arm misclassified credential failure as a usage error"
done
# 6. Post-sandbox provider assertions are intentionally NOT applied here:
# pr-close's gitea path attempts a tea WRITE (tea pr comment) when a
# comment parses, then falls back to the API. Hermeticity for this
# wrapper comes from the FAILING stubs (exit 99), not from non-contact —
# the arm above proves only parse acceptance and non-usage classification.
# Parser-failure arms (1-4) remain zero-contact (asserted at 4b).
echo "pr-create.sh usage-contract regression passed (R1/R4)"
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Usage-error contract for pr-edit.sh (R4, 2026-08-28).
#
# issue-edit already uses long-flag-first parsing (-i/--issue, -t/--title,
# -b/--body, -l/--labels, -m/--milestone); this adds the rc=2 usage-error
# contract, value checks, and the no-provider-contact proof. Required: -i.
#
# Arms:
# 1. --help and -h exit 0 and print usage.
# 2. Unknown option exits 2 with the message on stderr.
# 3. Missing required -i exits 2 (stderr).
# 4. A value-less flag (-i -b -c and long forms) exits 2 (stderr).
# 5. -b and -c both pass parsing (sandboxed runner: the run then fails
# at credential resolution, nonzero and NOT 2) — no real token is
# ever read and no provider is contacted.
# 6. No arm performs any provider request (PATH shims record every
# invocation; the probe log must stay empty).
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/pr-edit-usage}"
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
PROBE_LOG="$WORK_DIR/provider-probes.log"
OUT_FILE="$WORK_DIR/out.log"
ERR_FILE="$WORK_DIR/err.log"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$BIN_DIR"
: > "$PROBE_LOG"
# Unlike the issue suites, these stubs FAIL (exit 99): pr-close has an
# API fallback that treats a successful curl as a closed PR, so exit-0
# stubs would let the sandbox arms "succeed" (measured 2026-08-28).
for tool in gh tea curl; do
cat > "$BIN_DIR/$tool" <<STUB
#!/usr/bin/env bash
echo "$tool \$*" >> "$PROBE_LOG"
exit 99
STUB
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/$tool"
done
run_wrapper() {
( cd "$WORK_DIR" && PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-edit.sh" "$@" )
}
# Hermetic variant: neutralizes every identity/credential source the wrapper
# consults so parse-acceptance arms fail at credential resolution in ANY cwd
# repo (see test-issue-comment-usage-contract.sh for the measured incident).
run_wrapper_sandboxed() {
mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR/home" "$WORK_DIR/xdg"
(
cd "$WORK_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" HOME="$WORK_DIR/home" XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$WORK_DIR/xdg" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY="" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="" \
"$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-edit.sh" "$@"
)
}
fail() {
echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
echo "--- stderr ---" >&2
cat "$ERR_FILE" >&2
exit 1
}
expect_rc() { # expect_rc <want> <desc> <args...>
local want="$1" desc="$2" rc=0
shift 2
run_wrapper "$@" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -eq "$want" ]] || fail "$desc: rc=$rc, want $want"
}
expect_stderr() { # expect_stderr <pattern> <desc>
grep -q "$1" "$ERR_FILE" || fail "$2: stderr missing '$1'"
}
# 1. Help exits 0 and prints usage.
expect_rc 0 "--help exits 0" --help
grep -q "Usage: pr-edit.sh" "$OUT_FILE" || fail "--help did not print usage"
expect_rc 0 "-h exits 0" -h
# 2. Unknown option: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "unknown option exits 2" --bogus
expect_stderr "[Uu]nknown option" "unknown option names itself on stderr"
# 3. Missing required PR number: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "missing -n exits 2"
expect_stderr "Pull request number is required" "missing -n message on stderr"
expect_rc 2 "no edit option exits 2" -n 5
expect_stderr "At least one edit option is required" "no-edit-option message on stderr"
expect_rc 2 "non-integer PR number exits 2" -n abc -t x
expect_stderr "positive integer" "integer check on stderr"
expect_rc 2 "mutually exclusive draft/ready exits 2" -n 5 --draft --ready
expect_stderr "mutually exclusive" "mutual exclusion on stderr"
expect_rc 2 "bad repo format exits 2" -n 5 -t x -r not-a-slug
expect_stderr "OWNER/REPO" "repo format on stderr"
# 4. Value-less flags: rc 2 with "requires a value" on stderr.
for flag in -n -t -b -B -l -r -H --number --title --body --base --login --repo --host; do
expect_rc 2 "value-less $flag exits 2" "$flag"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "value-less $flag message on stderr"
done
# 4a. An option-like value is a MISSING value, not a value (codex PR #1464:
# -b --help previously consumed --help as the body and performed the write).
expect_rc 2 "option-like value rejected" -n 5 -t smoke -b --help
expect_rc 2 "short flag value rejected" -n 5 -t smoke -b -h
expect_stderr "requires a value" "short flag value message on stderr"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "option-like value message on stderr"
# 4b. Parser-failure arms (1-4) must have performed ZERO provider contact.
if [[ -s "$PROBE_LOG" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: a parser-failure arm contacted a provider:" >&2
cat "$PROBE_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
# 5. Alias acceptance under the sandbox: both -b and -c carry a value past
# parsing; the run fails at credential resolution nonzero and NOT 2.
for flag in -b; do
rc=0
run_wrapper_sandboxed -n 5 "$flag" "value" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]] || fail "$flag arm unexpectedly succeeded in the sandbox"
[[ "$rc" -ne 2 ]] || fail "$flag arm misclassified credential failure as a usage error"
done
# 6. Post-sandbox provider assertions are intentionally NOT applied here:
# pr-close's gitea path attempts a tea WRITE (tea pr comment) when a
# comment parses, then falls back to the API. Hermeticity for this
# wrapper comes from the FAILING stubs (exit 99), not from non-contact —
# the arm above proves only parse acceptance and non-usage classification.
# Parser-failure arms (1-4) remain zero-contact (asserted at 4b).
echo "pr-edit.sh usage-contract regression passed (R1/R4)"
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# B5 (ruled 2026-08-29, orch-01-adopted): pr-merge --base-line — the
# documented intra-line exception. Arms:
# 1. Base neither main nor next, no flag: policy refusal (rc 1), queue
# guard NOT invoked, hint names the exception.
# 2. Base neither main nor next, matching --base-line: authorized; the
# queue guard IS invoked with the same args (rc from the stub proves
# gates still run) and the audit line is emitted.
# 3. Mismatched --base-line (different branch than the PR base): refusal
# rc 1 with the mismatch named; queue guard NOT invoked.
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/pr-merge-baseline}"
FIXTURE_DIR="$WORK_DIR/tools/git"
CALL_LOG="$WORK_DIR/queue-call.log"
OUT_LOG="$WORK_DIR/out.log"
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
mkdir -p "$FIXTURE_DIR"
cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-merge.sh" "$FIXTURE_DIR/pr-merge.sh"
cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh" "$FIXTURE_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
cat > "$FIXTURE_DIR/pr-metadata.sh" <<'SH'
#!/usr/bin/env bash
printf '%s\n' '{"baseRefName":"mosaic-cli-p0","baseRepository":"mosaicstack/stack","headRefName":"mosaic-cli-p2-socket-res","headRefOid":"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567","headRepository":"mosaicstack/stack"}'
SH
cat > "$FIXTURE_DIR/ci-queue-wait.sh" <<'SH'
#!/usr/bin/env bash
printf '%s\n' "$*" > "${MOSAIC_QUEUE_CALL_LOG:?}"
exit 42
SH
chmod +x "$FIXTURE_DIR"/*.sh
run_case() { # run_case <extra-args...>
: > "$CALL_LOG"
set +e
(
cd "$WORK_DIR"
export MOSAIC_QUEUE_CALL_LOG="$CALL_LOG"
"$FIXTURE_DIR/pr-merge.sh" -n 123 "$@"
) >"$OUT_LOG" 2>&1
rc=$?
set -e
}
# 1. No flag: policy refusal, no gate invocation.
run_case
[[ "$rc" -eq 1 ]] || { echo "FAIL arm1: rc=$rc want 1" >&2; cat "$OUT_LOG" >&2; exit 1; }
[[ ! -s "$CALL_LOG" ]] || { echo "FAIL arm1: queue guard ran without authorization" >&2; exit 1; }
grep -q "only for PRs targeting" "$OUT_LOG" || { echo "FAIL arm1: policy message missing" >&2; exit 1; }
grep -q -- "--base-line 'mosaic-cli-p0'" "$OUT_LOG" || { echo "FAIL arm1: hint missing" >&2; exit 1; }
# 2. Matching flag: authorized, audit line emitted, gates RUN (stub rc 42).
run_case --base-line mosaic-cli-p0
[[ "$rc" -eq 42 ]] || { echo "FAIL arm2: rc=$rc want 42 (gate stub rc must propagate)" >&2; cat "$OUT_LOG" >&2; exit 1; }
[[ -s "$CALL_LOG" ]] || { echo "FAIL arm2: queue guard NOT invoked despite authorization" >&2; exit 1; }
grep -q -- '-B mosaic-cli-p2-socket-res' "$CALL_LOG" || { echo "FAIL arm2: guard args wrong" >&2; cat "$CALL_LOG" >&2; exit 1; }
grep -q "base-line exception" "$OUT_LOG" || { echo "FAIL arm2: audit line missing" >&2; exit 1; }
# 3. Mismatched flag: refusal, mismatch named, no gate invocation.
run_case --base-line some-other-line
[[ "$rc" -eq 1 ]] || { echo "FAIL arm3: rc=$rc want 1" >&2; cat "$OUT_LOG" >&2; exit 1; }
[[ ! -s "$CALL_LOG" ]] || { echo "FAIL arm3: queue guard ran on a refused merge" >&2; exit 1; }
grep -q "does not match the PR base" "$OUT_LOG" || { echo "FAIL arm3: mismatch message missing" >&2; exit 1; }
echo "pr-merge --base-line exception regression passed (B5)"
View File
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ if grep -q 'Unknown option' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then
cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
exit 1
fi
grep -q 'Unknown action: bogus-action' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
grep -q "unknown action 'bogus-action'" "$OUTPUT_FILE"
# --- Case 2: -h/--help documents both overrides.
HELP_TEXT="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-review.sh" -h)"
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Usage-error contract for pr-review.sh (R1/R4, 2026-08-28).
#
# R4: usage errors print to STDERR and exit 2, distinct from provider,
# credential, and verification failures (exit 1). R1: -b/--body is the
# canonical comment flag; -c/--comment remains a compatible alias.
# Required: -n AND -a. The comment is required only for the
# request-changes action (semantic usage check, also rc 2).
#
# Arms:
# 1. --help and -h exit 0 and print usage.
# 2. Unknown option exits 2 with the message on stderr.
# 3. Missing required -i exits 2 (stderr).
# 4. A value-less flag (-i -b -c and long forms) exits 2 (stderr).
# 5. -b and -c both pass parsing (sandboxed runner: the run then fails
# at credential resolution, nonzero and NOT 2) — no real token is
# ever read and no provider is contacted.
# 6. No arm performs any provider request (PATH shims record every
# invocation; the probe log must stay empty).
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/pr-review-usage}"
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
PROBE_LOG="$WORK_DIR/provider-probes.log"
OUT_FILE="$WORK_DIR/out.log"
ERR_FILE="$WORK_DIR/err.log"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$BIN_DIR"
: > "$PROBE_LOG"
# Unlike the issue suites, these stubs FAIL (exit 99): pr-close has an
# API fallback that treats a successful curl as a closed PR, so exit-0
# stubs would let the sandbox arms "succeed" (measured 2026-08-28).
for tool in gh tea curl; do
cat > "$BIN_DIR/$tool" <<STUB
#!/usr/bin/env bash
echo "$tool \$*" >> "$PROBE_LOG"
exit 99
STUB
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/$tool"
done
run_wrapper() {
( cd "$WORK_DIR" && PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-review.sh" "$@" )
}
# Hermetic variant: neutralizes every identity/credential source the wrapper
# consults so parse-acceptance arms fail at credential resolution in ANY cwd
# repo (see test-issue-comment-usage-contract.sh for the measured incident).
run_wrapper_sandboxed() {
mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR/home" "$WORK_DIR/xdg"
(
cd "$WORK_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" HOME="$WORK_DIR/home" XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$WORK_DIR/xdg" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY="" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="" \
"$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-review.sh" "$@"
)
}
fail() {
echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
echo "--- stderr ---" >&2
cat "$ERR_FILE" >&2
exit 1
}
expect_rc() { # expect_rc <want> <desc> <args...>
local want="$1" desc="$2" rc=0
shift 2
run_wrapper "$@" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -eq "$want" ]] || fail "$desc: rc=$rc, want $want"
}
expect_stderr() { # expect_stderr <pattern> <desc>
grep -q "$1" "$ERR_FILE" || fail "$2: stderr missing '$1'"
}
# 1. Help exits 0 and prints usage.
expect_rc 0 "--help exits 0" --help
grep -q "Usage: pr-review.sh" "$OUT_FILE" || fail "--help did not print usage"
expect_rc 0 "-h exits 0" -h
# 2. Unknown option: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "unknown option exits 2" --bogus
expect_stderr "unknown option" "unknown option names itself on stderr"
# 3. Missing required PR number: rc 2, stderr.
expect_rc 2 "missing -n exits 2"
expect_stderr "PR number is required" "missing -n message on stderr"
expect_rc 2 "missing -a exits 2" -n 5
expect_stderr "Action is required" "missing -a message on stderr"
expect_rc 2 "request-changes without comment exits 2" -n 5 -a request-changes
expect_stderr "comment required for request-changes" "request-changes message on stderr"
expect_rc 2 "comment without body exits 2 pre-detection" -n 5 -a comment
expect_stderr "comment required for comment" "comment-without-body message on stderr"
expect_rc 2 "invalid action exits 2 pre-detection" -n 5 -a bogus
expect_stderr "unknown action" "invalid action message on stderr"
# Invalid-action arms must not contact any provider (validation precedes
# detect_platform): probe log empty at this point.
if [[ -s "$PROBE_LOG" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: an invalid-action arm contacted a provider:" >&2
cat "$PROBE_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
# 4. Value-less flags: rc 2 with "requires a value" on stderr.
for flag in -n -a -b -c -l -r --number --action --body --comment --login --repo; do
expect_rc 2 "value-less $flag exits 2" "$flag"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "value-less $flag message on stderr"
done
# 4a. An option-like value is a MISSING value, not a value (codex PR #1464:
# -b --help previously consumed --help as the body and performed the write).
expect_rc 2 "option-like value rejected" -n 5 -a comment -b --help
expect_rc 2 "short flag value rejected" -n 5 -a comment -b -h
expect_stderr "requires a value" "short flag value message on stderr"
expect_stderr "requires a value" "option-like value message on stderr"
# 4b. Parser-failure arms (1-4) must have performed ZERO provider contact.
if [[ -s "$PROBE_LOG" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: a parser-failure arm contacted a provider:" >&2
cat "$PROBE_LOG" >&2
exit 1
fi
# 5. Alias acceptance under the sandbox: both -b and -c carry a value past
# parsing; the run fails at credential resolution nonzero and NOT 2.
for flag in -b -c; do
rc=0
run_wrapper_sandboxed -n 5 -a comment "$flag" "review note" >"$OUT_FILE" 2>"$ERR_FILE" || rc=$?
[[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]] || fail "$flag arm unexpectedly succeeded in the sandbox"
[[ "$rc" -ne 2 ]] || fail "$flag arm misclassified credential failure as a usage error"
done
# 6. Post-sandbox provider assertions are intentionally NOT applied here:
# pr-close's gitea path attempts a tea WRITE (tea pr comment) when a
# comment parses, then falls back to the API. Hermeticity for this
# wrapper comes from the FAILING stubs (exit 99), not from non-contact —
# the arm above proves only parse acceptance and non-usage classification.
# Parser-failure arms (1-4) remain zero-contact (asserted at 4b).
echo "pr-review.sh usage-contract regression passed (R1/R4)"
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@
#
# OPTIONS
# -L NAME tmux socket name passed to `tmux -L NAME` on the target host
#
# Exit 4: local target session exists on multiple socket servers and no
# -L / MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET disambiguated it (B1 stale-twin guard).
# -s DST_SESSION target tmux session (or session:window.pane) [required]
# -H SSH_TARGET ssh target (user@host) for a remote pane; omit for local
# -n DST_HOST hostname to show in the preamble for the target.
@@ -63,8 +66,10 @@
# group 1 = src label group 2 = dst host:session
# group 3 = class (absent => actionable) group 4 = message body
#
# EXIT CODES (passed through from send-message.sh)
# EXIT CODES (passed through from send-message.sh, except 4)
# 0 delivered/queued · 1 target not found · 2 still draft · 3 usage error
# 4 agent-send refusal: local target session exists on multiple socket
# servers and no -L / MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET disambiguated it (B1)
set -uo pipefail
SELF_DIR=$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)
@@ -154,6 +159,61 @@ FULL="${PREAMBLE} ${MSG}"
B64=$(printf '%s' "$FULL" | base64 -w0)
vflag=""; [ "$VERBOSE" = 1 ] && vflag="-v"
# Exact session matching for the sender target (codex PR #1466): without
# '=', tmux target syntax accepts an unambiguous PREFIX, so a delivery
# aimed at session X can land in X-old. Compound targets (session:win.pane)
# and already-exact ('=...') forms pass through untouched. Computed BEFORE
# socket discovery so the discovery probes use the same target semantics
# (probing '==name' for an already-exact input was a false-negative hit).
DST_TARGET="$DST_SESSION"
case "$DST_SESSION" in
=*) ;;
*:*)
# Compound target (session:win.pane): pin the SESSION component exact
# (=session:win.pane); unpinned, the session part still prefix-matches
# (codex PR #1466: 'agent:0.0' can resolve into 'agent-old').
DST_TARGET="=${DST_SESSION%%:*}:${DST_SESSION#*:}"
;;
*) DST_TARGET="=$DST_SESSION" ;;
esac
# Socket default resolution (B1, 2026-08-29). Precedence: explicit -L >
# launcher-exported MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET > unique socket hit > refusal on
# ambiguity > tmux default socket. The ambiguity refusal fires ONLY when
# no explicit or env choice exists and the session name lives on multiple
# servers (measured 2026-08-28/29: tasking sends landed in a stale
# default-socket twin; rc 0 reported honest delivery to the wrong pane).
# Socket discovery scans tmux's own socket dir, ${TMUX_TMPDIR:-/tmp}/tmux-UID
# (codex PR #1466: TMPDIR is not where tmux keeps -L sockets).
# MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET is LOCAL-host state (launcher-exported): it must not
# leak into remote sends, where -L would target a socket on the remote
# host (codex PR #1466).
if [ -z "$SOCKET_NAME" ] && [ -z "$SSH_TARGET" ] && [ -n "${MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET:-}" ]; then
SOCKET_NAME="$MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET"
fi
if [ -z "$SOCKET_NAME" ] && [ -z "$SSH_TARGET" ]; then
socket_dir="${TMUX_TMPDIR:-/tmp}/tmux-$(id -u)"
hits=""
for sf in "$socket_dir"/*; do
[ -S "$sf" ] || continue
sname="${sf##*/}"
# '=' forces exact session-name matching: tmux target syntax otherwise
# accepts an unambiguous PREFIX, so a session named X-old on a socket
# would count as a false hit for target X (codex PR #1466).
tmux -L "$sname" has-session -t "$DST_TARGET" 2>/dev/null && hits="$hits$sname"$'\n'
done
hit_count=$(printf '%s' "$hits" | grep -c . || true)
if [ "$hit_count" -gt 1 ]; then
echo "agent-send.sh: REFUSING - session '$DST_SESSION' exists on multiple sockets:" >&2
printf ' %s\n' $hits >&2
echo " Pass -L <socket> explicitly (or export MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET to disambiguate)." >&2
exit 4
elif [ "$hit_count" -eq 1 ]; then
SOCKET_NAME="$(printf '%s' "$hits")"
fi
fi
socket_args=()
if [ -n "$SOCKET_NAME" ]; then
socket_args=(-L "$SOCKET_NAME")
@@ -161,9 +221,9 @@ fi
if [ -z "$SSH_TARGET" ]; then
# Local pane: call the canonical sender directly.
exec "$SENDER" "${socket_args[@]}" -t "$DST_SESSION" -b "$B64" -r "$RETRIES" $vflag
exec "$SENDER" "${socket_args[@]}" -t "$DST_TARGET" -b "$B64" -r "$RETRIES" $vflag
else
# Remote pane: ship the sender over ssh and run it local to the target.
ssh -o ConnectTimeout=10 "$SSH_TARGET" \
"bash -s -- ${socket_args[*]@Q} -t '$DST_SESSION' -b '$B64' -r '$RETRIES' $vflag" < "$SENDER"
"bash -s -- ${socket_args[*]@Q} -t '$DST_TARGET' -b '$B64' -r '$RETRIES' $vflag" < "$SENDER"
fi
@@ -8,7 +8,15 @@ SOCKET="mosaic-test-$RANDOM-$$"
TARGET="target-$RANDOM"
DEFAULT_TARGET="default-target-$RANDOM"
TMPDIR=$(mktemp -d)
trap 'tmux -L "$SOCKET" kill-server >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; tmux kill-session -t "$DEFAULT_TARGET" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; rm -rf "$TMPDIR"' EXIT
ART_OUT=$(mktemp)
AMB_OUT=$(mktemp)
AMB_ERR=$(mktemp)
A2_OUT=$(mktemp)
A2_ERR=$(mktemp)
UNIQ_OUT=$(mktemp)
UNIQ_ERR=$(mktemp)
TWIN="twin-$RANDOM-$$"
trap 'tmux -L "$SOCKET" kill-server >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; tmux kill-session -t "$DEFAULT_TARGET" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; tmux kill-session -t "$TWIN" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; rm -rf "$TMPDIR" $ART_OUT $AMB_OUT $AMB_ERR $A2_OUT $A2_ERR $UNIQ_OUT $UNIQ_ERR' EXIT
fail() {
echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
@@ -79,4 +87,83 @@ for i in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
done
done
# B1 (2026-08-29): socket default resolution in agent-send.sh. Measured
# defect: tasking sends without -L landed in a stale default-socket twin of
# the target seat; rc 0 reported honest delivery to the wrong pane.
# Arm A: session on MULTIPLE sockets, no -L -> refuse with rc 4 naming both.
tmux -L "$SOCKET" new-session -d -s "$TWIN" -c "$TMPDIR" 'PS1=" " exec bash --noprofile --norc -i'
tmux new-session -d -s "$TWIN" -c "$TMPDIR" 'PS1=" " exec bash --noprofile --norc -i'
amb_rc=0
env -u MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET "$AGENT_SEND" -s "$TWIN" -m "must refuse" >$AMB_OUT 2>$AMB_ERR || amb_rc=$?
[ "$amb_rc" -eq 4 ] || fail "ambiguity refusal: rc=$amb_rc want 4 (stderr: $(cat $AMB_ERR))"
grep -q "multiple sockets" $AMB_ERR || fail "ambiguity refusal message missing socket list"
grep -qF "$SOCKET" $AMB_ERR || fail "ambiguity refusal message does not name the test socket"
tmux kill-session -t "$TWIN" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
tmux -L "$SOCKET" kill-session -t "$TWIN" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
# Arm A2: with MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET exported, a twin session is NOT ambiguous:
# the env var disambiguates by precedence (codex PR #1466 blocker).
tmux -L "$SOCKET" new-session -d -s "$TWIN" -c "$TMPDIR" 'PS1=" " exec bash --noprofile --norc -i'
tmux new-session -d -s "$TWIN" -c "$TMPDIR" 'PS1=" " exec bash --noprofile --norc -i'
a2_rc=0
MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET="$SOCKET" "$AGENT_SEND" -s "$TWIN" -m "env disambiguated" >$A2_OUT 2>$A2_ERR || a2_rc=$?
[ "$a2_rc" -eq 0 ] || fail "env disambiguation: rc=$a2_rc (stderr: $(cat $A2_ERR))"
sleep 0.2
a2_pane="$(tmux -L "$SOCKET" capture-pane -t "=$TWIN:0.0" -p)" || fail "cannot capture twin (arm A2)"
grep -qF "env disambiguated" <<<"$a2_pane" || fail "env disambiguation did not deliver on the named socket"
a2_default="$(tmux capture-pane -t "=$TWIN:0.0" -p)" || true
if grep -qF "env disambiguated" <<<"$a2_default"; then
fail "env disambiguation cross-delivered to the default-socket twin"
fi
tmux kill-session -t "$TWIN" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
tmux -L "$SOCKET" kill-session -t "$TWIN" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
# Arm B: session unique to ONE socket, no -L -> auto-resolve to that socket
# and deliver there.
# Arm A3: prefix matching must not produce false socket hits (codex PR
# #1466): a session named TWIN-old must not count as a hit for target
# TWIN (tmux target syntax prefix-matches without '=').
PSEUDO="${TWIN}-old"
tmux new-session -d -s "$PSEUDO" -c "$TMPDIR" 'PS1=" " exec bash --noprofile --norc -i'
A3_ERR=$(mktemp)
a3_rc=0
env -u MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET "$AGENT_SEND" -s "$TWIN" -m "prefix trap" >/dev/null 2>"$A3_ERR" || a3_rc=$?
# TWIN exists nowhere (both twins killed after arm A2); with '=' the
# PSEUDO session is not a hit, so the sender must fail target-not-found
# (rc 1) instead of delivering into the prefix-named session.
[ "$a3_rc" -eq 1 ] || fail "prefix false-hit: rc=$a3_rc want 1 (stderr: $(cat "$A3_ERR"))"
a3_pane="$(tmux capture-pane -t "=$PSEUDO:0.0" -p 2>/dev/null)" || a3_pane=""
if printf '%s' "$a3_pane" | grep -F "prefix trap" >/dev/null; then
fail "delivery landed in the prefix-named session (false socket hit)"
fi
tmux kill-session -t "$PSEUDO" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
rm -f "$A3_ERR"
# Arm A4: compound targets pin the SESSION component exact (codex PR
# #1466): 'TWIN:0.0' must not resolve into the prefix-named session.
PSEUDO2="${TWIN}-old"
tmux new-session -d -s "$PSEUDO2" -c "$TMPDIR" 'PS1=" " exec bash --noprofile --norc -i'
A4_ERR=$(mktemp)
a4_rc=0
env -u MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET "$AGENT_SEND" -s "$TWIN:0.0" -m "compound trap" >/dev/null 2>"$A4_ERR" || a4_rc=$?
[ "$a4_rc" -eq 1 ] || fail "compound prefix false-hit: rc=$a4_rc want 1 (stderr: $(cat "$A4_ERR"))"
a4_pane="$(tmux capture-pane -t "=$PSEUDO2:0.0" -p 2>/dev/null)" || a4_pane=""
if printf '%s' "$a4_pane" | grep -F "compound trap" >/dev/null; then
fail "compound delivery landed in the prefix-named session"
fi
tmux kill-session -t "$PSEUDO2" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
rm -f "$A4_ERR"
uniq_rc=0
env -u MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET "$AGENT_SEND" -s "$TARGET" -m "autoresolved hello" >$UNIQ_OUT 2>$UNIQ_ERR || uniq_rc=$?
[ "$uniq_rc" -eq 0 ] || fail "unique auto-resolution: rc=$uniq_rc (stderr: $(cat $UNIQ_ERR))"
sleep 0.2
auto_pane="$(capture_named)" || fail "could not capture named socket pane (arm B)"
grep -qF "autoresolved hello" <<<"$auto_pane" || fail "auto-resolution did not deliver to the named-socket pane"
default_pane2="$(capture_default)" || fail "could not capture default socket pane (arm B)"
if grep -qF "autoresolved hello" <<<"$default_pane2"; then
fail "auto-resolution cross-delivered to the default socket pane"
fi
echo "ok - named tmux socket send tools"
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+6
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ import { registerQualityRails } from '@mosaicstack/quality-rails';
import { registerQueueCommand } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
import { registerStorageCommand } from '@mosaicstack/storage';
import { registerTelemetryCommand } from './commands/telemetry.js';
import { registerCommsCommand } from './commands/comms.js';
import { registerQCommand } from './commands/q.js';
import { registerWatchCommand } from './commands/watch.js';
import { registerAgentCommand } from './commands/agent.js';
import { registerInteractionCommand } from './commands/interaction.js';
import { registerConfigCommand } from './commands/config.js';
@@ -428,6 +431,9 @@ registerSkillCommand(program);
// ─── telemetry ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
registerTelemetryCommand(program);
registerWatchCommand(program);
registerQCommand(program);
registerCommsCommand(program);
// ─── update ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { accessSync, constants } from 'node:fs';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { resolveBrainHome } from '../fleet/brain-home.js';
/**
* Shared brain-tool dispatch (fleet CLI integration, Jason ruling
* 2026-08-28): the npm package embeds the COMMAND SURFACE; operator-owned
* implementations stay in the brain (tools/). Commands resolve the brain
* home (MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME wins see brain-home.ts) and exec the tool
* there. Nothing operator-specific ships inside the package.
*
* Pass-through contract: arguments, stdout/stderr, and the exit code belong
* to the tool. The CLI adds nothing on success; absent tools fail loudly
* with the resolved path (127) instead of guessing.
*/
/** Absolute path of a brain-relative tool. */
export function resolveBrainTool(mosaicHome: string, relPath: string): string {
return join(resolveBrainHome(mosaicHome), ...relPath.split('/'));
}
/** Map a spawnSync result + tool existence to the CLI exit status. */
export function exitStatusFor(
result: { status: number | null; error?: NodeJS.ErrnoException },
toolExists: boolean,
): number {
if (!toolExists) return 127;
if (result.status !== null) return result.status;
return 125; // killed by signal / could not run
}
export function brainToolExists(tool: string): boolean {
try {
accessSync(tool, constants.X_OK);
return true;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
/**
* Exec a brain tool with full pass-through. `interpreter` runs the tool
* through e.g. python3 (renderers); omit it for executable scripts.
* Returns the process exit status; callers assign it to process.exitCode.
*/
export function execBrainTool(
mosaicHome: string,
relPath: string,
args: string[],
interpreter?: string,
): number {
const tool = resolveBrainTool(mosaicHome, relPath);
if (!brainToolExists(tool)) {
console.error(
`mosaic: brain tool not found (expected ${tool}). ` +
'Tool suites live in the brain tree under tools/; ' +
'check MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME or the brain checkout.',
);
return 127;
}
const result = interpreter
? spawnSync(interpreter, [tool, ...args], { stdio: 'inherit', env: process.env })
: spawnSync(tool, args, { stdio: 'inherit', env: process.env });
return exitStatusFor(result, true);
}
+143
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
import {
chmodSync,
existsSync,
mkdirSync,
mkdtempSync,
writeFileSync,
readFileSync,
} from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { Command } from 'commander';
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { fleetCommsSendArgs, registerCommsCommand, tmuxSendArgs } from './comms.js';
describe('arg translation', () => {
it('tmux path: -s/-C/-L/-f/-m per agent-send.sh getopts', () => {
expect(tmuxSendArgs('orch-01', 'hello', {})).toEqual(['-s', 'orch-01', '-m', 'hello']);
expect(
tmuxSendArgs('orch-01', 'unused', {
class: 'actionable',
socket: 'mosaic-fleet',
file: '/tmp/body.txt',
}),
).toEqual(['-s', 'orch-01', '-C', 'actionable', '-L', 'mosaic-fleet', '-f', '/tmp/body.txt']);
});
it('fleet-comms path: -t site/agent and -c class', () => {
expect(fleetCommsSendArgs('usc', 'fred', 'hi', {})).toEqual(['-t', 'usc/fred', '-m', 'hi']);
expect(fleetCommsSendArgs('usc', 'fred', 'hi', { class: 'human' })).toEqual([
'-t',
'usc/fred',
'-c',
'human',
'-m',
'hi',
]);
});
});
describe('registerCommsCommand routing', () => {
const savedBrain = process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'];
const savedRepo = process.env['MOSAIC_FLEET_COMMS_REPO'];
const savedAgent = process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'];
afterEach(() => {
for (const [k, v] of [
['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME', savedBrain],
['MOSAIC_FLEET_COMMS_REPO', savedRepo],
['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME', savedAgent],
] as const) {
if (v === undefined) delete process.env[k];
else process.env[k] = v;
}
process.exitCode = undefined;
});
function fixture(): { brain: string; repo: string; tmuxLog: string; commsLog: string } {
const brain = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'comms-brain-'));
const repo = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'comms-repo-'));
mkdirSync(join(brain, 'tools', 'tmux'), { recursive: true });
mkdirSync(join(repo, 'tools'), { recursive: true });
const tmuxLog = join(brain, 'tmux.log');
const commsLog = join(repo, 'comms.log');
writeFileSync(
join(brain, 'tools', 'tmux', 'agent-send.sh'),
`#!/usr/bin/env bash\nprintf '%s\\n' "$*" >> ${JSON.stringify(tmuxLog)}\nexit 7\n`,
);
writeFileSync(
join(repo, 'tools', 'comms-send.sh'),
`#!/usr/bin/env bash\nprintf '%s\\n' "$*" >> ${JSON.stringify(commsLog)}\nprintf 'FLEET_COMMS_REPO=%s FLEET_COMMS_SITE=%s\\n' "$FLEET_COMMS_REPO" "$FLEET_COMMS_SITE" >> ${JSON.stringify(commsLog)}\nexit 5\n`,
);
chmodSync(join(brain, 'tools', 'tmux', 'agent-send.sh'), 0o755);
chmodSync(join(repo, 'tools', 'comms-send.sh'), 0o755);
process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'] = brain;
process.env['MOSAIC_FLEET_COMMS_REPO'] = repo;
process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'] = 'tester';
return { brain, repo, tmuxLog, commsLog };
}
it('default routes same-host via agent-send with translated flags and passes rc through', async () => {
const f = fixture();
const program = new Command();
registerCommsCommand(program);
await program.parseAsync(
[
'comms',
'send',
'orch-01',
'--class',
'actionable',
'--socket',
'mosaic-fleet',
'verdict',
'landed',
],
{ from: 'user' },
);
expect(process.exitCode).toBe(7);
expect(readFileSync(f.tmuxLog, 'utf8').trim()).toBe(
'-s orch-01 -C actionable -L mosaic-fleet -m verdict landed',
);
expect(existsSync(f.commsLog)).toBe(false); // inter-site tool never invoked
});
it('--site routes inter-site via comms-send with site-prefixed target and passes rc through', async () => {
const f = fixture();
const program = new Command();
registerCommsCommand(program);
await program.parseAsync(
['comms', 'send', 'fred', '--site', 'usc', '--class', 'human', 'hello', 'there'],
{ from: 'user' },
);
expect(process.exitCode).toBe(5);
expect(readFileSync(f.commsLog, 'utf8').split('\n')[0]?.trim()).toBe(
'-t usc/fred -c human -m hello there',
);
// The sender must bind comms-send.sh to the SELECTED repo (codex 9c8b6ebf).
expect(readFileSync(f.commsLog, 'utf8')).toContain(
`FLEET_COMMS_REPO=${f.repo} FLEET_COMMS_SITE=usc`,
);
expect(existsSync(f.tmuxLog)).toBe(false); // same-host tool never invoked
});
it('inter-site without MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME is an invocation defect (exit 2)', async () => {
const f = fixture();
delete process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'];
const program = new Command();
registerCommsCommand(program);
await program.parseAsync(['comms', 'send', 'fred', '--site', 'usc', 'hi'], { from: 'user' });
expect(process.exitCode).toBe(2);
expect(existsSync(f.commsLog)).toBe(false); // inter-site tool never invoked
});
it('missing fleet-comms repo fails 127 naming the expected path', async () => {
fixture();
process.env['MOSAIC_FLEET_COMMS_REPO'] = '/nonexistent-comms-repo';
const program = new Command();
registerCommsCommand(program);
await program.parseAsync(['comms', 'send', 'fred', '--site', 'usc', 'hi'], { from: 'user' });
expect(process.exitCode).toBe(127);
});
});
+135
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
import type { Command } from 'commander';
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { accessSync, constants } from 'node:fs';
import { homedir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { DEFAULT_MOSAIC_HOME } from '../constants.js';
import { execBrainTool } from './brain-dispatch.js';
/**
* `mosaic comms send` routed agent messaging (FLEET-COMMS.md doctrine).
*
* Same-host (default): brain tools/tmux/agent-send.sh. Inter-site
* (--site <site>): the fleet-comms repo's comms-send.sh never for
* local traffic (a git round trip per message; Jason 2026-08-28).
*
* Exit codes pass through BOTH paths. rc=2 (text in pane, still draft) is
* a CONTRACT, not a failure: never retry, confirm with capture-pane.
*/
export interface CommsSendOptions {
readonly class?: string;
readonly file?: string;
readonly socket?: string;
readonly site?: string;
readonly commsRepo?: string;
}
export function defaultCommsRepo(): string {
return process.env['MOSAIC_FLEET_COMMS_REPO'] ?? join(homedir(), 'src', 'fleet-comms');
}
/** Build the agent-send.sh argv for the same-host path. */
export function tmuxSendArgs(target: string, message: string, opts: CommsSendOptions): string[] {
const args = ['-s', target];
if (opts.class) args.push('-C', opts.class);
if (opts.socket) args.push('-L', opts.socket);
if (opts.file) args.push('-f', opts.file);
else args.push('-m', message);
return args;
}
/** Build the comms-send.sh argv for the inter-site path. */
export function fleetCommsSendArgs(
site: string,
target: string,
message: string,
opts: CommsSendOptions,
): string[] {
const args = ['-t', `${site}/${target}`];
if (opts.class) args.push('-c', opts.class);
args.push('-m', message);
return args;
}
export function registerCommsCommand(program: Command): void {
const cmd: Command = program
.command('comms')
.description(
'Routed agent messaging: tmux same-host (default), fleet-comms inter-site (--site)',
)
.command('send')
.description('send <target> [message...] — same-host tmux unless --site is given')
.option('--class <class>', 'terminal-log | actionable | human | reaction | digest')
.option('--file <path>', 'message body from file (same-host path only)')
.option('--socket <name>', 'tmux socket for the same-host send (e.g. mosaic-fleet)')
.option('--site <site>', 'route via fleet-comms to <site>/<target>')
.option('--comms-repo <path>', 'fleet-comms checkout', defaultCommsRepo())
.argument('<target>', 'destination seat (session name)')
.argument('[message...]', 'message text (joined; or use --file)')
.action(
async (
target: string,
messageWords: string[],
opts: CommsSendOptions & Record<string, unknown>,
command: Command,
) => {
let mosaicHome: string | undefined;
for (let anc: Command | null = command; anc; anc = anc.parent) {
const v = (anc.opts() as Record<string, string | undefined>)['mosaicHome'];
if (v !== undefined) {
mosaicHome = v;
break;
}
}
const home = mosaicHome ?? DEFAULT_MOSAIC_HOME;
const message = messageWords.join(' ');
if (opts.site) {
const repo = opts.commsRepo ?? defaultCommsRepo();
const tool = join(repo, 'tools', 'comms-send.sh');
try {
accessSync(tool, constants.X_OK);
} catch {
console.error(
`mosaic comms: fleet-comms sender not found (expected ${tool}). ` +
'Clone the fleet-comms repo or point --comms-repo at it.',
);
process.exitCode = 127;
return;
}
if (!process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME']) {
console.error(
'mosaic comms: inter-site sends require MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME (sending identity).',
);
process.exitCode = 2; // invocation defect: fixable by the caller
return;
}
// comms-send.sh locates its working repo via FLEET_COMMS_REPO
// (default $HOME/src/fleet-comms); without this, --comms-repo
// would select the executable but not the repository it operates
// on (codex review of 9c8b6ebf).
const env = { ...process.env, FLEET_COMMS_SITE: opts.site, FLEET_COMMS_REPO: repo };
const result = spawnSync(tool, fleetCommsSendArgs(opts.site, target, message, opts), {
stdio: 'inherit',
env,
});
process.exitCode = result.status ?? 125;
return;
}
// Same-host: the brain tool owns validation (bad class -> its rc 3)
// and absence (execBrainTool -> 127 with the resolved path).
process.exitCode = execBrainTool(
home,
'tools/tmux/agent-send.sh',
tmuxSendArgs(target, message, opts),
);
},
);
cmd.addHelpText(
'after',
'\nExit codes pass through. rc=2 means the text reached the pane but is still a draft: NEVER retry (double-send); confirm with tmux capture-pane.',
);
}
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ describe('registerFleetCommand', () => {
'init',
'install',
'install-systemd',
'logins',
'migrate-v1',
'persona',
'plan',
+19 -1
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import { homedir, hostname, userInfo } from 'node:os';
import { dirname, join, resolve } from 'node:path';
import { fleetAgentEnvDir } from '../fleet/brain-home.js';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
import { spawn, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
import * as readline from 'node:readline';
import type { Command } from 'commander';
import YAML from 'yaml';
@@ -1606,6 +1606,24 @@ export function registerFleetCommand(program: Command, deps: FleetCommandDeps =
.option('--mosaic-home <path>', 'Mosaic home directory', paths.mosaicHome)
.option('--roster <path>', 'Fleet roster path');
// fleet logins (P4 gap closure, 2026-08-29): project per-seat git tokens
// from the brain into usable credentials. The implementation is the
// framework fleet tool; args pass through verbatim (--apply --seat X).
cmd
.command('logins')
.description('Per-seat git credentials: seat-logins.sh pass-through (--apply --seat <name>)')
.allowUnknownOption(true)
.allowExcessArguments(true)
.action((...rest: unknown[]) => {
const cmdObj = rest[rest.length - 1] as { args: string[] };
const script = `${frameworkRoot}/tools/fleet/seat-logins.sh`;
const result = spawnSync('bash', [script, ...cmdObj.args], {
stdio: 'inherit',
env: process.env,
});
process.exit(result.status ?? 125);
});
cmd
.command('init')
.description('Initialize a local fleet roster')
+3
View File
@@ -1162,6 +1162,8 @@ const COORD_SUBCMDS: Record<string, string> = {
test: 'smoke-test.sh',
resume: 'session-resume.sh',
recover: 'session-resume.sh',
board: 'board-roll.sh',
roll: 'board-roll.sh',
};
function runCoord(args: string[]): never {
@@ -1195,6 +1197,7 @@ Commands:
run [--project <path>] Launch runtime with mission context
smoke Run orchestration smoke checks
resume [--project <path>] Crash recovery
board Roll the orchestration board (board-roll.sh)
Runtime: --claude (default) | --codex | --pi | --yolo`);
process.exit(subcmd === 'help' ? 0 : 1);
+91
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
import { mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, writeFileSync, chmodSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { Command } from 'commander';
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { registerQCommand, resolveQuestionTool } from './q.js';
import { exitStatusFor, resolveBrainTool } from './brain-dispatch.js';
describe('resolveBrainTool', () => {
const saved = process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'];
afterEach(() => {
if (saved === undefined) delete process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'];
else process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'] = saved;
});
it('joins brain home with the relative tool path', () => {
const tmp = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'dispatch-resolve-'));
process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'] = tmp;
expect(resolveBrainTool('/nonexistent/mosaic-home', 'tools/questions/q-new.sh')).toBe(
join(tmp, 'tools', 'questions', 'q-new.sh'),
);
});
});
describe('resolveQuestionTool', () => {
const saved = process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'];
afterEach(() => {
if (saved === undefined) delete process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'];
else process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'] = saved;
});
it('maps new/render subcommands to their brain tools', () => {
const tmp = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'q-resolve-'));
process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'] = tmp;
expect(resolveQuestionTool(tmp, 'new')).toBe(join(tmp, 'tools', 'questions', 'q-new.sh'));
expect(resolveQuestionTool(tmp, 'render')).toBe(join(tmp, 'tools', 'questions', 'render.py'));
expect(resolveQuestionTool(tmp, 'bogus')).toBeUndefined();
});
});
describe('registerQCommand usage + dispatch', () => {
const saved = process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'];
afterEach(() => {
if (saved === undefined) delete process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'];
else process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'] = saved;
process.exitCode = undefined;
});
it('exit 2 with the subcommand list when no/unknown subcommand', async () => {
process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'] = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'q-usage-'));
const program = new Command();
registerQCommand(program);
await program.parseAsync(['q'], { from: 'user' });
expect(process.exitCode).toBe(2);
process.exitCode = undefined;
await program.parseAsync(['q', 'bogus'], { from: 'user' });
expect(process.exitCode).toBe(2);
process.exitCode = undefined;
// Reserved property names must not leak through the record lookup.
await program.parseAsync(['q', 'toString'], { from: 'user' });
expect(process.exitCode).toBe(2);
});
it('execs the brain tool with pass-through args and exit code', async () => {
const tmp = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'q-live-'));
process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'] = tmp;
mkdirSync(join(tmp, 'tools', 'questions'), { recursive: true });
const stub = join(tmp, 'tools', 'questions', 'q-new.sh');
writeFileSync(stub, '#!/usr/bin/env bash\necho "called with: $*"\nexit 7\n');
chmodSync(stub, 0o755);
const program = new Command();
registerQCommand(program);
await program.parseAsync(['q', 'new', '--slug', 'x', '--question', 'why'], { from: 'user' });
expect(process.exitCode).toBe(7);
});
});
describe('exitStatusFor (shared dispatch contract)', () => {
it('maps absent tool to 127', () => {
expect(exitStatusFor({ status: 0 }, false)).toBe(127);
});
it('passes tool status through', () => {
expect(exitStatusFor({ status: 7 }, true)).toBe(7);
});
it('maps signal death to 125', () => {
expect(exitStatusFor({ status: null }, true)).toBe(125);
});
});
+63
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
import type { Command } from 'commander';
import { DEFAULT_MOSAIC_HOME } from '../constants.js';
import { execBrainTool, resolveBrainTool } from './brain-dispatch.js';
/**
* `mosaic q` tracked decision questions (brain tools/questions).
* `new` files a question file (one FILE per question, merge-conflict
* impossible by construction); `render` regenerates the
* docs/OPEN-QUESTIONS.md index (id allocation happens in the renderer).
*/
const SUBCOMMANDS: Record<string, { path: string; interpreter?: string; help: string }> = {
new: {
path: 'tools/questions/q-new.sh',
help: 'file a question (--question, --slug, --owed-by, ...)',
},
render: {
path: 'tools/questions/render.py',
interpreter: 'python3',
help: 'regenerate docs/OPEN-QUESTIONS.md (owns Q-id allocation)',
},
};
export function resolveQuestionTool(mosaicHome: string, sub: string): string | undefined {
const entry = SUBCOMMANDS[sub];
return entry ? resolveBrainTool(mosaicHome, entry.path) : undefined;
}
export function registerQCommand(program: Command): void {
const cmd: Command = program
.command('q')
.description('Tracked decision questions: file and render (brain tools/questions)')
.allowUnknownOption()
.argument('[args...]', 'subcommand + args passed through to the question tools')
.action(async (args: string[], _opts: unknown, command: Command) => {
let mosaicHome: string | undefined;
for (let anc: Command | null = command; anc; anc = anc.parent) {
const v = (anc.opts() as Record<string, string | undefined>)['mosaicHome'];
if (v !== undefined) {
mosaicHome = v;
break;
}
}
const home = mosaicHome ?? DEFAULT_MOSAIC_HOME;
const sub = args[0];
if (!sub || !Object.hasOwn(SUBCOMMANDS, sub)) {
console.error('mosaic q: expected a subcommand:');
for (const [name, entry] of Object.entries(SUBCOMMANDS)) {
console.error(` mosaic q ${name} ${entry.help}`);
}
process.exitCode = 2; // usage error contract: invocation defect
return;
}
const entry = SUBCOMMANDS[sub]!;
process.exitCode = execBrainTool(home, entry.path, args.slice(1), entry.interpreter);
});
cmd.addHelpText(
'after',
'\nEverything after the subcommand is passed through verbatim (args, output, exit code).',
);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
import { mkdirSync, mkdtempSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { Command } from 'commander';
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { exitStatusFor, registerWatchCommand, resolveAgentWatchTool } from './watch.js';
// The dispatch command execs a real process with inherited stdio; the spec
// covers the pure resolution and exit-mapping surfaces plus the absent-tool
// path (which exits without spawning). Live pass-through is exercised by the
// fleet smoke test against the real brain tool.
describe('resolveAgentWatchTool', () => {
const saved = process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'];
afterEach(() => {
if (saved === undefined) delete process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'];
else process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'] = saved;
});
it('honors MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME over the canonical brain', () => {
const tmp = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'watch-resolve-'));
process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'] = tmp;
expect(resolveAgentWatchTool('/nonexistent/mosaic-home')).toBe(
join(tmp, 'tools', 'agent-watch', 'agent-watch.sh'),
);
});
it('resolves inside the brain tools tree', () => {
const tmp = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'watch-resolve-'));
process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'] = tmp;
const tool = resolveAgentWatchTool(tmp);
expect(tool.endsWith(join('tools', 'agent-watch', 'agent-watch.sh'))).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('exitStatusFor', () => {
it('maps absent tool to 127', () => {
expect(exitStatusFor({ status: 0 }, false)).toBe(127);
});
it('passes the tool exit status through', () => {
expect(exitStatusFor({ status: 2 }, true)).toBe(2);
expect(exitStatusFor({ status: 78 }, true)).toBe(78);
});
it('maps signal death / null status to 125', () => {
expect(exitStatusFor({ status: null }, true)).toBe(125);
});
});
describe('registerWatchCommand absent-tool path', () => {
const saved = process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'];
afterEach(() => {
if (saved === undefined) delete process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'];
else process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'] = saved;
process.exitCode = undefined;
});
it('sets exitCode 127 with the resolved path when the tool is missing', async () => {
const tmp = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'watch-missing-'));
// The suite directory exists but the tool file does not.
mkdirSync(join(tmp, 'tools', 'agent-watch'), { recursive: true });
process.env['MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME'] = tmp;
const program = new Command();
registerWatchCommand(program);
await program.parseAsync(['watch', 'list'], { from: 'user' });
expect(process.exitCode).toBe(127);
});
});
+68
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
import type { Command } from 'commander';
import { DEFAULT_MOSAIC_HOME } from '../constants.js';
import {
brainToolExists,
execBrainTool,
exitStatusFor,
resolveBrainTool,
} from './brain-dispatch.js';
export { exitStatusFor };
/**
* `mosaic watch` dispatch to the brain's agent-watch suite.
* See brain-dispatch.ts for the architecture and pass-through contract.
*/
export function resolveAgentWatchTool(mosaicHome: string): string {
return resolveBrainTool(mosaicHome, 'tools/agent-watch/agent-watch.sh');
}
export function registerWatchCommand(program: Command): void {
const cmd: Command = program
.command('watch')
.description('Wake-me-when watchers (agent-watch): start, list, stop')
// allowUnknownOption + variadic = full ordered pass-through: unknown
// options (--name, --when, ...) and their values land in args verbatim
// (commander 13 measured behavior), so the tool owns its own flag
// surface without the CLI needing passThroughOptions (which would
// force enablePositionalOptions fleet-wide on the root program).
.allowUnknownOption()
// The tool owns help too: without this, commander would intercept
// --help and answer with wrapper help instead of agent-watch's own
// (codex review of 18f3dd49).
.helpOption(false)
.argument('[args...]', 'args passed through to agent-watch.sh')
.action(async (args: string[], _opts: unknown, command: Command) => {
// --mosaic-home is not global in this CLI; walk parents for it and
// fall back to the default. MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME (seat launchers export
// it) wins inside resolveBrainHome regardless.
let mosaicHome: string | undefined;
for (let anc: Command | null = command; anc; anc = anc.parent) {
const v = (anc.opts() as Record<string, string | undefined>)['mosaicHome'];
if (v !== undefined) {
mosaicHome = v;
break;
}
}
const home = mosaicHome ?? DEFAULT_MOSAIC_HOME;
const tool = resolveAgentWatchTool(home);
if (!brainToolExists(tool)) {
console.error(
`mosaic watch: agent-watch not found (expected ${tool}). ` +
'The watcher suite lives in the brain tree under tools/agent-watch/; ' +
'check MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME or the brain checkout.',
);
process.exitCode = 127;
return;
}
process.exitCode = execBrainTool(home, 'tools/agent-watch/agent-watch.sh', args);
});
cmd.addHelpText(
'after',
'\nEverything after `mosaic watch` is passed through to agent-watch.sh verbatim (args, output, exit code).',
);
}
@@ -1,213 +0,0 @@
/**
* Read-only adapters for the installation config pipeline (§16).
*
* Every adapter is a bounded, side-effect-free read. The registry resolver
* is DEPENDENCY-BLOCKED (§2.2): its stub returns CONFIG_REGISTRY_INVALID
* with the blocked-interface marker. When the reviewed resolver ships, the
* stub binds to it without schema changes.
*/
import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
import * as fs from 'node:fs';
import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';
import * as path from 'node:path';
import {
type ConfigDiagnostic,
type RegistryProvenance,
type InstallationBindings,
type FrameworkBindingDefaults,
FRAMEWORK_BINDING_DEFAULTS,
REGISTRY_RESOLVER_BLOCKED,
} from './types.js';
// ─── Digest helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/** SHA-256 over canonical JSON with recursively sorted keys (§9). */
export function digestCanonical(value: unknown): string {
const canonical = JSON.stringify(sortKeysDeep(value));
return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(canonical).digest('hex');
}
function sortKeysDeep(value: unknown): unknown {
if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') return value;
if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map(sortKeysDeep);
const sorted: Record<string, unknown> = {};
for (const key of Object.keys(value as Record<string, unknown>).sort()) {
sorted[key] = sortKeysDeep((value as Record<string, unknown>)[key]);
}
return sorted;
}
export function digestBytes(content: string | Buffer): string {
return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(content).digest('hex');
}
// ─── 1. Registry resolver adapter (§16, dependency-blocked) ──────────────────
export interface RegistryAdapter {
resolve(): { provenance: RegistryProvenance; diagnostics: ConfigDiagnostic[] };
}
/**
* DEPENDENCY GATE (§2.2): the approved MosaicRegistryResolver does not exist
* at the pinned baseline. This stub returns the blocked marker. When the
* reviewed resolver ships (CFG-REQ-001..006), replace this stub's resolve()
* to delegate to it. The interface is stable.
*/
export class BlockedRegistryAdapter implements RegistryAdapter {
resolve(): { provenance: RegistryProvenance; diagnostics: ConfigDiagnostic[] } {
return {
provenance: {
resolved: false,
brainHome: null,
sourceKeys: [],
},
diagnostics: [
{
code: 'CONFIG_REGISTRY_INVALID',
message: REGISTRY_RESOLVER_BLOCKED,
retryable: false,
},
],
};
}
}
// ─── 2. Bounded file reader (§14.1, §14.2) ───────────────────────────────────
export interface BoundedReadResult {
ok: boolean;
content?: string;
diagnostics: ConfigDiagnostic[];
}
export function boundedRead(filePath: string, context: string): BoundedReadResult {
const diagnostics: ConfigDiagnostic[] = [];
try {
const stat = fs.lstatSync(filePath);
if (stat.isSymbolicLink()) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_ADAPTER_UNAVAILABLE',
message: `${context}: symlink input rejected`,
retryable: false,
});
return { ok: false, diagnostics };
}
if (!stat.isFile()) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_ADAPTER_UNAVAILABLE',
message: `${context}: not a regular file`,
retryable: false,
});
return { ok: false, diagnostics };
}
if (stat.size > 1024 * 1024) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_ADAPTER_UNAVAILABLE',
message: `${context}: file exceeds 1 MiB limit`,
retryable: false,
});
return { ok: false, diagnostics };
}
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf-8');
return { ok: true, content, diagnostics: [] };
} catch (e) {
if (e instanceof Error && 'code' in e && e.code === 'ENOENT') {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_MISSING',
message: `${context}: file not found at ${filePath}`,
retryable: false,
});
return { ok: false, diagnostics };
}
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_ADAPTER_UNAVAILABLE',
message: `${context}: read error: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}`,
retryable: false,
});
return { ok: false, diagnostics };
}
}
// ─── 3. Bindings resolution (§5.2, §7, A5) ───────────────────────────────────
export interface ResolvedBindings {
runtime: string;
runtimeByClass: Record<string, string>;
workingDirectory: string;
source: 'file' | 'framework-default';
digest: string;
}
export function resolveBindings(
bindings: InstallationBindings | null,
frameworkDefaults?: FrameworkBindingDefaults,
): ResolvedBindings {
const defaults = frameworkDefaults ?? FRAMEWORK_BINDING_DEFAULTS;
if (!bindings) {
return {
runtime: defaults.runtime,
runtimeByClass: {},
workingDirectory: defaults.workingDirectory,
source: 'framework-default',
digest: digestCanonical(defaults),
};
}
const fleet = bindings.spec.fleet;
return {
runtime: fleet.runtime?.default ?? defaults.runtime,
runtimeByClass: fleet.runtime?.byClass ?? {},
workingDirectory: fleet.workingDirectory ?? defaults.workingDirectory,
source: 'file',
digest: digestCanonical(bindings),
};
}
// ─── 4. Git tracking/ignore probe (§7.2) ────────────────────────────────────
export function isBindingsIgnored(bindingsPath: string, repoRoot: string): boolean {
try {
const relative = path.relative(repoRoot, bindingsPath);
if (relative.startsWith('..')) return true; // outside repo = not tracked
// Check if the file is tracked
try {
execSync(`git ls-files --error-unmatch "${relative}"`, {
cwd: repoRoot,
stdio: 'pipe',
env: { ...process.env, GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS: '0' },
});
return false; // tracked = NOT ignored
} catch {
// Not tracked; check if ignored
try {
execSync(`git check-ignore "${relative}"`, {
cwd: repoRoot,
stdio: 'pipe',
env: { ...process.env, GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS: '0' },
});
return true; // check-ignore succeeded = ignored
} catch {
return false; // not tracked but not ignored either = fail
}
}
} catch {
return true; // no git evidence = treat as ignored (valid absence)
}
}
// ─── 5. Blueprint path resolver ───────────────────────────────────────────────
export function resolveBlueprintPath(brainHome: string): string {
return path.join(brainHome, 'fleet', 'configuration', 'installation.yaml');
}
export function resolveBindingsPath(brainHome: string): string {
return path.join(brainHome, 'config', 'installation.local.yaml');
}
export function resolveRosterPath(brainHome: string): string {
return path.join(brainHome, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
}
@@ -1,483 +0,0 @@
/**
* InstallationConfigCore shared pure pipeline for validate and plan (§9).
*
* Both commands call this core in the same order. No mutation, no network,
* no subprocess. The core is deterministic: identical inputs identical
* outputs (except the caller-supplied or generated correlation ID).
*/
import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
import {
type InstallationBlueprint,
type InstallationBindings,
type ConfigDiagnostic,
type ConfigValidationDataV1,
type ConfigPlanDataV1,
type ConfigPlanActionV1,
type ConfigPlanFieldDiff,
EXIT_OK,
EXIT_INVALID,
EXIT_NONCONFORMANT,
EXIT_UNAVAILABLE,
BOOTSTRAP_MINIMAL_V1,
} from './types.js';
import { loadStrictYaml, validateBlueprint, validateBindings } from './schema.js';
import {
digestCanonical,
digestBytes,
boundedRead,
resolveBindings,
resolveBlueprintPath,
resolveBindingsPath,
resolveRosterPath,
isBindingsIgnored,
type RegistryAdapter,
} from './adapters.js';
// ─── Pipeline input/output ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
export interface CoreInput {
registryAdapter: RegistryAdapter;
/** Explicit blueprint file path, or null to use --preset. */
filePath: string | null;
/** Preset ID, or null to use --file. */
presetId: string | null;
/** Resolved brainHome (from registry). */
brainHome: string;
}
export interface CoreResult {
exitCode: number;
diagnostics: ConfigDiagnostic[];
validationData?: ConfigValidationDataV1;
planData?: ConfigPlanDataV1;
}
// ─── The pipeline (§9, steps 1-11) ───────────────────────────────────────────
export function runPipeline(input: CoreInput, mode: 'validate' | 'plan'): CoreResult {
const diagnostics: ConfigDiagnostic[] = [];
// Step 1: resolve central registry
const registryResult = input.registryAdapter.resolve();
diagnostics.push(...registryResult.diagnostics);
if (diagnostics.some((d) => d.code === 'CONFIG_REGISTRY_INVALID')) {
return { exitCode: EXIT_UNAVAILABLE, diagnostics };
}
const brainHome = input.brainHome;
// Step 2: select and bounded-read blueprint or preset
let blueprintContent: string;
let blueprintSource: 'file' | 'preset';
let blueprintId: string;
if (input.presetId) {
if (input.presetId !== BOOTSTRAP_MINIMAL_V1.id) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_PRESET_UNKNOWN' as const,
message: `Unknown preset '${input.presetId}'. Available: ${BOOTSTRAP_MINIMAL_V1.id}`,
retryable: false,
});
return { exitCode: EXIT_INVALID, diagnostics };
}
blueprintContent = JSON.stringify(BOOTSTRAP_MINIMAL_V1.blueprint, null, 2);
blueprintSource = 'preset';
blueprintId = BOOTSTRAP_MINIMAL_V1.id;
} else {
const bpPath = input.filePath ?? resolveBlueprintPath(brainHome);
const readResult = boundedRead(bpPath, 'blueprint');
if (!readResult.ok) {
diagnostics.push(...readResult.diagnostics);
return { exitCode: EXIT_INVALID, diagnostics };
}
blueprintContent = readResult.content!;
blueprintSource = 'file';
blueprintId = bpPath;
}
const blueprintDigest = digestBytes(blueprintContent);
// Step 3: bounded-read optional bindings
const bindingsPath = resolveBindingsPath(brainHome);
const bindingsRead = boundedRead(bindingsPath, 'bindings');
let bindings: InstallationBindings | null = null;
let bindingsDigest: string;
if (bindingsRead.ok && bindingsRead.content) {
// Step 4 (bindings): parse strict YAML + validate schema
const bYaml = loadStrictYaml(bindingsRead.content, 'bindings');
if (!bYaml.ok) {
diagnostics.push(...bYaml.diagnostics);
return { exitCode: EXIT_INVALID, diagnostics };
}
const bValid = validateBindings(bYaml.value, 'bindings');
if (!bValid.ok) {
diagnostics.push(...bValid.diagnostics);
return { exitCode: EXIT_INVALID, diagnostics };
}
bindings = bValid.bindings!;
// §7.2: bindings must be ignored/untracked
if (!isBindingsIgnored(bindingsPath, brainHome)) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BINDINGS_NOT_IGNORED',
message: `Host bindings at ${bindingsPath} are tracked or not ignored`,
path: bindingsPath,
retryable: false,
});
return { exitCode: EXIT_INVALID, diagnostics };
}
bindingsDigest = digestCanonical(bindings);
} else if (bindingsRead.diagnostics.some((d) => d.code === 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_MISSING')) {
// Absent bindings = valid (§7.1)
bindingsDigest = digestCanonical(null);
} else {
diagnostics.push(...bindingsRead.diagnostics);
return { exitCode: EXIT_INVALID, diagnostics };
}
// Step 4 (blueprint): parse strict YAML + validate schema
const yamlResult = loadStrictYaml(blueprintContent, 'blueprint');
if (!yamlResult.ok) {
diagnostics.push(...yamlResult.diagnostics);
return { exitCode: EXIT_INVALID, diagnostics };
}
const bpValid = validateBlueprint(yamlResult.value, 'blueprint');
if (!bpValid.ok) {
diagnostics.push(...bpValid.diagnostics);
return { exitCode: EXIT_INVALID, diagnostics };
}
const blueprint = bpValid.blueprint!;
// Step 5: load and validate the selected profile
// (delegates to the existing profile loader — this is the resolution step
// that would call the profile adapter; for the dependency-gated v1 we
// accept the profile reference as structurally valid and mark semantic
// resolution as notChecked)
const profileId = blueprint.spec.fleet.profile;
const profileDigest = digestCanonical({ profile: profileId });
// Step 6: resolve permitted host bindings
const resolved = resolveBindings(bindings);
// Step 7: generate the desired roster in memory
// (pure profile-to-roster generation — delegates to the adapter; for the
// dependency-gated v1 we mark this as notChecked since the generator
// depends on the full profile catalog)
const desiredRoster = {
version: 1,
transport: 'tmux',
tmux: { socket_name: 'mosaic-fleet' },
defaults: { working_directory: resolved.workingDirectory },
agents: [] as Array<Record<string, unknown>>,
};
const desiredRosterDigest = digestCanonical(desiredRoster);
// Step 8: bounded-read and validate observed roster
const rosterPath = resolveRosterPath(brainHome);
const rosterRead = boundedRead(rosterPath, 'roster');
let observedRoster: Record<string, unknown> | null = null;
let observedRosterDigest: string | null = null;
if (rosterRead.ok && rosterRead.content) {
const rYaml = loadStrictYaml(rosterRead.content, 'roster');
if (!rYaml.ok) {
diagnostics.push(...rYaml.diagnostics);
return { exitCode: EXIT_INVALID, diagnostics };
}
observedRoster = rYaml.value as Record<string, unknown>;
observedRosterDigest = digestCanonical(observedRoster);
} else if (rosterRead.diagnostics.some((d) => d.code === 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_MISSING')) {
// Missing roster = valid observed absence (§10.1)
observedRoster = null;
observedRosterDigest = null;
} else {
diagnostics.push(...rosterRead.diagnostics);
return { exitCode: EXIT_UNAVAILABLE, diagnostics };
}
// Step 9-10: normalize and compare semantically
const conformant = observedRoster !== null && observedRosterDigest === desiredRosterDigest;
// Step 11: render
const checks = [
{ id: 'registry-resolution', status: 'passed' as const },
{ id: 'blueprint-schema', status: 'passed' as const },
{ id: 'bindings-schema', status: 'passed' as const },
{ id: 'profile-resolution', status: 'notChecked' as const }, // dependency-gated
{ id: 'role-resolution', status: 'notChecked' as const }, // dependency-gated
{ id: 'desired-roster-generation', status: 'notChecked' as const }, // dependency-gated
{
id: 'observed-roster-valid',
status: observedRoster ? ('passed' as const) : ('notChecked' as const),
},
{ id: 'conformance', status: conformant ? ('passed' as const) : ('failed' as const) },
{ id: 'operational-availability', status: 'notChecked' as const },
];
const validationData: ConfigValidationDataV1 = {
resultSchemaVersion: 1,
valid: true,
conformant,
blueprint: { source: blueprintSource, id: blueprintId, digest: blueprintDigest },
bindings: { source: resolved.source, digest: bindingsDigest },
profile: { id: profileId, digest: profileDigest, selection: blueprint.spec.fleet.selection },
observed: { roster: observedRoster ? 'present' : 'absent', digest: observedRosterDigest },
checks,
};
if (!conformant) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_NONCONFORMANT',
message: observedRoster
? 'Observed roster differs from desired state within the v1 ownership mask'
: 'Observed roster is absent; desired state requires one',
retryable: false,
});
if (observedRoster === null) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_ROSTER_MISSING' as const,
message: 'Observed roster absent at expected path',
retryable: false,
});
}
}
if (mode === 'validate') {
return {
exitCode: conformant ? EXIT_OK : EXIT_NONCONFORMANT,
diagnostics,
validationData,
};
}
// Plan mode: compute actions
const actions = computeActions(
blueprint,
desiredRoster,
observedRoster,
desiredRosterDigest,
observedRosterDigest,
);
const planId = computePlanId(
blueprintDigest,
bindingsDigest,
profileDigest,
observedRosterDigest,
actions,
);
const planData: ConfigPlanDataV1 = {
resultSchemaVersion: 1,
planSchemaVersion: 1,
planId,
applySupported: false,
valid: true,
conformant,
changeCount: actions.filter((a) => a.operation !== 'blocked').length,
blockedCount: actions.filter((a) => a.operation === 'blocked').length,
inputs: {
blueprintDigest,
bindingsDigest,
profileDigest,
observedRosterDigest,
},
actions,
};
return {
exitCode: EXIT_OK, // plan returns 0 whether zero or more actions (§11.1)
diagnostics,
validationData,
planData,
};
}
// ─── Action computation (§11.2) ──────────────────────────────────────────────
function computeActions(
_blueprint: InstallationBlueprint,
desiredRoster: Record<string, unknown>,
observedRoster: Record<string, unknown> | null,
desiredDigest: string,
observedDigest: string | null,
): ConfigPlanActionV1[] {
const actions: ConfigPlanActionV1[] = [];
if (observedRoster === null) {
// §11.2 rule 4: missing roster = one roster create + seat creates
actions.push(
makeAction(
'fleet-roster',
'roster',
'create',
'none',
'CONFIG_DRIFT_CREATE',
null,
desiredDigest,
[],
),
);
// seat creates are dependency-gated (profile resolution notChecked)
return actions;
}
if (desiredDigest === observedDigest) {
return []; // §11.2 rule 5: exact conformance = zero actions
}
// v1 ownership mask: compare owned fields
const fieldDiffs: ConfigPlanFieldDiff[] = [];
const ownedPaths = ['version', 'transport', 'tmux.socket_name', 'defaults.working_directory'];
for (const p of ownedPaths) {
const before = getPath(observedRoster, p);
const after = getPath(desiredRoster, p);
if (JSON.stringify(before) !== JSON.stringify(after)) {
fieldDiffs.push({ path: p, before: renderValue(before), after: renderValue(after) });
}
}
// Agent membership: extra observed agents are blocked (§9.1)
const observedAgents = Array.isArray(observedRoster.agents)
? (observedRoster.agents as Array<Record<string, unknown>>)
: [];
const desiredAgents = Array.isArray(desiredRoster.agents)
? (desiredRoster.agents as Array<Record<string, unknown>>)
: [];
const desiredNames = new Set(desiredAgents.map((a) => String(a.name ?? '')));
for (const agent of observedAgents) {
const name = String(agent.name ?? '');
if (!desiredNames.has(name)) {
actions.push(
makeAction(
'fleet-seat',
name,
'blocked',
'full-engine-required',
'CONFIG_DRIFT_FULL_ENGINE_REQUIRED',
digestCanonical(agent),
null,
[],
['full-engine: seat removal'],
),
);
}
}
if (fieldDiffs.length > 0) {
actions.push(
makeAction(
'fleet-roster',
'roster',
'update',
'none',
'CONFIG_DRIFT_UPDATE',
observedDigest,
desiredDigest,
fieldDiffs,
),
);
}
// Sort (§11.2 rule 6)
actions.sort((a, b) => {
if (a.resourceKind !== b.resourceKind) return a.resourceKind < b.resourceKind ? -1 : 1;
if (a.resourceId !== b.resourceId) return a.resourceId < b.resourceId ? -1 : 1;
if (a.operation !== b.operation) return a.operation < b.operation ? -1 : 1;
return 0;
});
return actions;
}
function makeAction(
resourceKind: 'fleet-roster' | 'fleet-seat',
resourceId: string,
operation: 'create' | 'update' | 'blocked',
risk: 'none' | 'review-required' | 'full-engine-required',
reasonCode: string,
beforeDigest: string | null,
afterDigest: string | null,
fieldDiffs: ConfigPlanFieldDiff[],
blockedBy: string[] = [],
): ConfigPlanActionV1 {
const payload = {
resourceKind,
resourceId,
operation,
risk,
reasonCode,
beforeDigest,
afterDigest,
fieldDiffs,
};
const id = crypto
.createHash('sha256')
.update(JSON.stringify(sortKeys(payload)))
.digest('hex')
.substring(0, 16);
return {
id,
resourceKind,
resourceId,
operation,
risk,
reasonCode,
beforeDigest,
afterDigest,
fieldDiffs,
blockedBy,
};
}
function getPath(obj: Record<string, unknown>, dotPath: string): unknown {
const parts = dotPath.split('.');
let current: unknown = obj;
for (const part of parts) {
if (current === null || typeof current !== 'object') return null;
current = (current as Record<string, unknown>)[part] ?? null;
}
return current;
}
function renderValue(v: unknown): string | number | boolean | null {
if (v === null || v === undefined) return null;
if (typeof v === 'string' || typeof v === 'number' || typeof v === 'boolean') return v;
return JSON.stringify(v);
}
function sortKeys(value: unknown): unknown {
if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') return value;
if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map(sortKeys);
const sorted: Record<string, unknown> = {};
for (const key of Object.keys(value as Record<string, unknown>).sort()) {
sorted[key] = sortKeys((value as Record<string, unknown>)[key]);
}
return sorted;
}
function computePlanId(
blueprintDigest: string,
bindingsDigest: string,
profileDigest: string,
observedRosterDigest: string | null,
actions: ConfigPlanActionV1[],
): string {
const parts = {
planSchemaVersion: 1,
blueprintDigest,
bindingsDigest,
profileDigest,
observedRosterDigest: observedRosterDigest ?? 'absent',
actions: actions.map((a) => a.id),
};
return crypto
.createHash('sha256')
.update(JSON.stringify(sortKeys(parts)))
.digest('hex');
}
@@ -1,277 +0,0 @@
/**
* Installation config minimal-subset tests.
*
* Covers: schema validation (positive + hostile), preset identity,
* pipeline exit codes, and the no-mutation contract's type shape.
* The dependency-gated adapters are tested through their stubs.
*/
import { describe, it, expect, afterEach } from 'vitest';
import * as fs from 'node:fs';
import * as path from 'node:path';
import * as os from 'node:os';
import { BOOTSTRAP_MINIMAL_V1, BLUEPRINT_API_VERSION, EXIT_UNAVAILABLE } from './types.js';
import { loadStrictYaml, validateBlueprint, validateBindings } from './schema.js';
import { runPipeline } from './core.js';
import { BlockedRegistryAdapter, digestCanonical } from './adapters.js';
import { renderJsonValidate, renderTableValidate } from './render.js';
const SB = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'configimpl-test-'));
describe('schema: strict YAML loader', () => {
it('accepts a valid single-document mapping', () => {
const result = loadStrictYaml('a: 1\nb: two', 'test');
expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects multi-document YAML', () => {
const result = loadStrictYaml('a: 1\n---\nb: 2', 'test');
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
expect(result.diagnostics[0]?.code).toBe('CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA');
});
it('rejects null/empty input', () => {
const result = loadStrictYaml('', 'test');
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects non-mapping top level', () => {
const result = loadStrictYaml('- just\n- a\n- list', 'test');
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('schema: blueprint validation', () => {
const validBlueprint = {
apiVersion: BLUEPRINT_API_VERSION,
kind: 'InstallationBlueprint',
metadata: { name: 'test', generation: 1 },
spec: { fleet: { profile: 'software-delivery', selection: 'floor' } },
};
it('accepts the valid canonical shape', () => {
const r = validateBlueprint(validBlueprint, 'test');
expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
expect(r.blueprint?.metadata.name).toBe('test');
});
it('rejects unknown top-level key', () => {
const r = validateBlueprint({ ...validBlueprint, extra: true }, 'test');
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.diagnostics.some((d) => d.message.includes("unknown top-level key 'extra'"))).toBe(
true,
);
});
it('rejects wrong apiVersion', () => {
const r = validateBlueprint({ ...validBlueprint, apiVersion: 'wrong' }, 'test');
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects wrong kind', () => {
const r = validateBlueprint({ ...validBlueprint, kind: 'Wrong' }, 'test');
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects invalid name (uppercase)', () => {
const r = validateBlueprint(
{ ...validBlueprint, metadata: { ...validBlueprint.metadata, name: 'Bad' } },
'test',
);
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects generation < 1', () => {
const r = validateBlueprint(
{ ...validBlueprint, metadata: { ...validBlueprint.metadata, generation: 0 } },
'test',
);
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects invalid selection', () => {
const r = validateBlueprint(
{
...validBlueprint,
spec: { fleet: { profile: 'test', selection: 'partial' } },
},
'test',
);
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects unknown spec key', () => {
const r = validateBlueprint(
{
...validBlueprint,
spec: { fleet: validBlueprint.spec.fleet, extra: 1 },
},
'test',
);
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('schema: bindings validation', () => {
const validBindings = {
apiVersion: BLUEPRINT_API_VERSION,
kind: 'InstallationBindings',
spec: {
fleet: {
runtime: { default: 'pi' },
workingDirectory: '~/src',
},
},
};
it('accepts the valid canonical shape', () => {
const r = validateBindings(validBindings, 'test');
expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects empty spec', () => {
const r = validateBindings(
{ apiVersion: BLUEPRINT_API_VERSION, kind: 'InstallationBindings', spec: {} },
'test',
);
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects unknown fleet key', () => {
const r = validateBindings(
{
...validBindings,
spec: { fleet: { ...validBindings.spec.fleet, socket: 'override' } },
},
'test',
);
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects relative workingDirectory', () => {
const r = validateBindings(
{
...validBindings,
spec: { fleet: { workingDirectory: 'relative/path' } },
},
'test',
);
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects control bytes in workingDirectory', () => {
const r = validateBindings(
{
...validBindings,
spec: { fleet: { workingDirectory: '/tmp/\x00bad' } },
},
'test',
);
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('preset: bootstrap-minimal@1', () => {
it('has the correct ID', () => {
expect(BOOTSTRAP_MINIMAL_V1.id).toBe('bootstrap-minimal@1');
});
it('validates against the blueprint schema', () => {
const r = validateBlueprint(BOOTSTRAP_MINIMAL_V1.blueprint, 'preset');
expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
});
it('selects software-delivery floor per A4', () => {
expect(BOOTSTRAP_MINIMAL_V1.blueprint.spec.fleet.profile).toBe('software-delivery');
expect(BOOTSTRAP_MINIMAL_V1.blueprint.spec.fleet.selection).toBe('floor');
});
});
describe('core: pipeline', () => {
it('returns EXIT_UNAVAILABLE when registry is dependency-blocked', () => {
const result = runPipeline(
{
registryAdapter: new BlockedRegistryAdapter(),
filePath: null,
presetId: null,
brainHome: SB,
},
'validate',
);
expect(result.exitCode).toBe(EXIT_UNAVAILABLE);
expect(result.diagnostics.some((d) => d.code === 'CONFIG_REGISTRY_INVALID')).toBe(true);
});
it('returns EXIT_INVALID for unknown preset', () => {
// NOTE: registry is blocked, so this test would hit the registry gate first.
// The preset check happens after registry resolution in the current pipeline.
// This is documented as the dependency-gate behavior.
const result = runPipeline(
{
registryAdapter: new BlockedRegistryAdapter(),
filePath: null,
presetId: 'unknown@9',
brainHome: SB,
},
'validate',
);
expect(result.exitCode).toBe(EXIT_UNAVAILABLE); // registry gate fires first
});
});
describe('render: output', () => {
it('JSON validate envelope has the correct capability ID', () => {
const data = {
resultSchemaVersion: 1 as const,
valid: true,
conformant: true,
blueprint: { source: 'preset' as const, id: 'test', digest: 'abc' },
bindings: { source: 'framework-default' as const, digest: 'def' },
profile: { id: 'test', digest: 'ghi', selection: 'floor' as const },
observed: { roster: 'present' as const, digest: 'jkl' },
checks: [],
};
const json = renderJsonValidate(data, 'test-corr');
const parsed = JSON.parse(json);
expect(parsed.capabilityId).toBe('config.installation.validate');
expect(parsed.status).toBe('succeeded');
expect(parsed.correlationId).toBe('test-corr');
});
it('table and JSON agree on conformant', () => {
const data = {
resultSchemaVersion: 1 as const,
valid: true,
conformant: false,
blueprint: { source: 'preset' as const, id: 'test', digest: 'abc' },
bindings: { source: 'framework-default' as const, digest: 'def' },
profile: { id: 'test', digest: 'ghi', selection: 'floor' as const },
observed: { roster: 'present' as const, digest: 'jkl' },
checks: [],
};
const json = renderJsonValidate(data, 'test');
const table = renderTableValidate(data, []);
expect(json).toContain('"conformant": false');
expect(table).toContain('Conformant: false');
});
});
describe('digest: determinism', () => {
it('produces identical digests for identical inputs with different key order', () => {
const a = { z: 1, a: { y: 2, b: 3 } };
const b = { a: { b: 3, y: 2 }, z: 1 };
expect(digestCanonical(a)).toBe(digestCanonical(b));
});
it('produces different digests for different values', () => {
expect(digestCanonical({ a: 1 })).not.toBe(digestCanonical({ a: 2 }));
});
});
// cleanup
afterEach(() => {
// no per-test cleanup needed (sandbox is shared)
});
// Note: the suite creates the sandbox directory at module load and relies on
// the OS to clean /tmp. For CI, a trap would be added. This is documented.
@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
/**
* Table and JSON renderers for validate and plan results (§12).
*
* Table is a human rendering of the same envelope. Text and JSON must
* never disagree on valid, conformant, change, blocked, or exit status.
*/
import type {
CapabilityResultV1,
ConfigValidationDataV1,
ConfigPlanDataV1,
ConfigDiagnostic,
} from './types.js';
// ─── JSON renderer ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export function renderJsonValidate(data: ConfigValidationDataV1, correlationId: string): string {
const envelope: CapabilityResultV1<ConfigValidationDataV1> = {
capabilityId: 'config.installation.validate',
status: data.conformant ? 'succeeded' : 'failed',
data,
correlationId,
executionMode: 'local-adapter',
identityTrust: 'local-asserted',
audit: { authority: 'none', recorded: false },
};
return JSON.stringify(envelope, null, 2);
}
export function renderJsonPlan(data: ConfigPlanDataV1, correlationId: string): string {
const envelope: CapabilityResultV1<ConfigPlanDataV1> = {
capabilityId: 'config.installation.plan',
status: 'succeeded', // plan always succeeds (§11.1)
data,
correlationId,
executionMode: 'local-adapter',
identityTrust: 'local-asserted',
audit: { authority: 'none', recorded: false },
};
return JSON.stringify(envelope, null, 2);
}
// ─── Table renderer (§12) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export function renderTableValidate(
data: ConfigValidationDataV1,
diagnostics: ConfigDiagnostic[],
): string {
const lines: string[] = [];
lines.push('Installation Validation');
lines.push('======================');
lines.push('');
lines.push(`Valid: ${data.valid}`);
lines.push(`Conformant: ${data.conformant}`);
lines.push(
`Blueprint: ${data.blueprint.source === 'preset' ? data.blueprint.id : data.blueprint.id} (${data.blueprint.digest.substring(0, 12)}…)`,
);
lines.push(`Bindings: ${data.bindings.source} (${data.bindings.digest.substring(0, 12)}…)`);
lines.push(`Profile: ${data.profile.id} / ${data.profile.selection}`);
lines.push(
`Roster: ${data.observed.roster}${data.observed.digest ? ` (${data.observed.digest.substring(0, 12)}…)` : ''}`,
);
lines.push('');
lines.push('Checks:');
for (const check of data.checks) {
const icon = check.status === 'passed' ? '✓' : check.status === 'failed' ? '✗' : '';
lines.push(` ${icon} ${check.id}: ${check.status}`);
}
if (diagnostics.length > 0) {
lines.push('');
lines.push('Diagnostics:');
for (const d of diagnostics) {
lines.push(` [${d.code}] ${d.message}`);
}
}
lines.push('');
lines.push('Details:');
lines.push(` blueprint digest: ${data.blueprint.digest}`);
lines.push(` bindings digest: ${data.bindings.digest}`);
lines.push(` profile digest: ${data.profile.digest}`);
lines.push(` observed digest: ${data.observed.digest ?? '(absent)'}`);
return lines.join('\n');
}
export function renderTablePlan(data: ConfigPlanDataV1): string {
const lines: string[] = [];
lines.push('Installation Plan');
lines.push('=================');
lines.push('');
lines.push(`Conformant: ${data.conformant}`);
lines.push(`Changes: ${data.changeCount}`);
lines.push(`Blocked: ${data.blockedCount}`);
lines.push(`Apply: not supported (read-only v1)`);
lines.push(`Plan ID: ${data.planId}`);
lines.push('');
if (data.actions.length === 0) {
lines.push('No actions — installation is conformant.');
} else {
lines.push('Actions:');
for (const action of data.actions) {
lines.push(` [${action.operation}] ${action.resourceKind}/${action.resourceId}`);
lines.push(` reason: ${action.reasonCode} risk: ${action.risk}`);
if (action.fieldDiffs.length > 0) {
for (const fd of action.fieldDiffs) {
lines.push(` ${fd.path}: ${JSON.stringify(fd.before)}${JSON.stringify(fd.after)}`);
}
}
if (action.blockedBy.length > 0) {
lines.push(` blocked by: ${action.blockedBy.join(', ')}`);
}
}
}
lines.push('');
lines.push('Inputs:');
lines.push(` blueprint digest: ${data.inputs.blueprintDigest}`);
lines.push(` bindings digest: ${data.inputs.bindingsDigest}`);
lines.push(` profile digest: ${data.inputs.profileDigest}`);
lines.push(` observed digest: ${data.inputs.observedRosterDigest ?? '(absent)'}`);
return lines.join('\n');
}
// ─── Correlation ID ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export function makeCorrelationId(): string {
const timestamp = new Date().toISOString().replace(/[:.]/g, '-');
const random = Math.random().toString(36).substring(2, 8);
return `config-${timestamp}-${random}`;
}
@@ -1,450 +0,0 @@
/**
* Strict YAML schema validation for blueprint and bindings.
*
* §6/§7 of the spec: closed mappings, no aliases/anchors/merges/tags,
* single document, strict type checking on every field.
*/
import * as yaml from 'yaml';
import {
BLUEPRINT_API_VERSION,
BLUEPRINT_KIND,
BINDINGS_KIND,
type InstallationBlueprint,
type InstallationBindings,
type FleetSelection,
type ConfigDiagnostic,
} from './types.js';
const MAX_INPUT_BYTES = 1024 * 1024; // 1 MiB (§14.1)
// ─── Strict YAML loader (§14.4) ──────────────────────────────────────────────
export interface StrictYamlResult {
ok: boolean;
value?: unknown;
diagnostics: ConfigDiagnostic[];
}
export function loadStrictYaml(content: string, context: string): StrictYamlResult {
const diagnostics: ConfigDiagnostic[] = [];
if (content.length > MAX_INPUT_BYTES) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA',
message: `${context} exceeds 1 MiB limit (${content.length} bytes)`,
retryable: false,
});
return { ok: false, diagnostics };
}
if (content.includes('\n---\n') || content.trimStart().startsWith('---')) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: multiple YAML documents rejected`,
retryable: false,
});
return { ok: false, diagnostics };
}
let value: unknown;
try {
value = yaml.parse(content, { strict: true, mapAsMap: false });
} catch (e) {
const msg = e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e);
if (
content.includes('&') ||
content.includes('*') ||
content.includes('<<') ||
content.includes('!')
) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: YAML aliases/anchors/merges/tags rejected`,
retryable: false,
});
} else {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: YAML parse error: ${msg.substring(0, 200)}`,
retryable: false,
});
}
return { ok: false, diagnostics };
}
if (value === null || value === undefined) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: empty document`,
retryable: false,
});
return { ok: false, diagnostics };
}
if (typeof value !== 'object' || Array.isArray(value)) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: top level must be a mapping`,
retryable: false,
});
return { ok: false, diagnostics };
}
return { ok: true, value, diagnostics };
}
// ─── ID grammar (§6.2) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
const ID_PATTERN = /^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$/;
export function isValidId(id: string): boolean {
return ID_PATTERN.test(id);
}
// ─── Blueprint validation (§6) ───────────────────────────────────────────────
const BLUEPRINT_TOP_KEYS = new Set(['apiVersion', 'kind', 'metadata', 'spec']);
const BLUEPRINT_METADATA_KEYS = new Set(['name', 'generation']);
const BLUEPRINT_SPEC_KEYS = new Set(['fleet']);
const BLUEPRINT_FLEET_KEYS = new Set(['profile', 'selection']);
export function validateBlueprint(
value: unknown,
context: string,
): { ok: boolean; blueprint?: InstallationBlueprint; diagnostics: ConfigDiagnostic[] } {
const diagnostics: ConfigDiagnostic[] = [];
const obj = value as Record<string, unknown>;
for (const key of Object.keys(obj)) {
if (!BLUEPRINT_TOP_KEYS.has(key)) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: unknown top-level key '${key}'`,
path: key,
retryable: false,
});
}
}
if (obj.apiVersion !== BLUEPRINT_API_VERSION) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: apiVersion must be exactly '${BLUEPRINT_API_VERSION}'`,
path: 'apiVersion',
retryable: false,
});
}
if (obj.kind !== BLUEPRINT_KIND) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: kind must be exactly '${BLUEPRINT_KIND}'`,
path: 'kind',
retryable: false,
});
}
if (!obj.metadata || typeof obj.metadata !== 'object') {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: metadata is required`,
path: 'metadata',
retryable: false,
});
} else {
const meta = obj.metadata as Record<string, unknown>;
for (const key of Object.keys(meta)) {
if (!BLUEPRINT_METADATA_KEYS.has(key)) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: unknown metadata key '${key}'`,
path: `metadata.${key}`,
retryable: false,
});
}
}
if (typeof meta.name !== 'string' || !isValidId(meta.name)) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: metadata.name must match [a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,62}`,
path: 'metadata.name',
retryable: false,
});
}
if (
typeof meta.generation !== 'number' ||
!Number.isInteger(meta.generation) ||
meta.generation < 1
) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: metadata.generation must be an integer >= 1`,
path: 'metadata.generation',
retryable: false,
});
}
}
if (!obj.spec || typeof obj.spec !== 'object') {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: spec is required`,
path: 'spec',
retryable: false,
});
} else {
const spec = obj.spec as Record<string, unknown>;
for (const key of Object.keys(spec)) {
if (!BLUEPRINT_SPEC_KEYS.has(key)) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: unknown spec key '${key}'`,
path: `spec.${key}`,
retryable: false,
});
}
}
if (!spec.fleet || typeof spec.fleet !== 'object') {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: spec.fleet is required`,
path: 'spec.fleet',
retryable: false,
});
} else {
const fleet = spec.fleet as Record<string, unknown>;
for (const key of Object.keys(fleet)) {
if (!BLUEPRINT_FLEET_KEYS.has(key)) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: unknown fleet key '${key}'`,
path: `spec.fleet.${key}`,
retryable: false,
});
}
}
if (typeof fleet.profile !== 'string' || !isValidId(fleet.profile)) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: spec.fleet.profile must match [a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,62}`,
path: 'spec.fleet.profile',
retryable: false,
});
}
if (fleet.selection !== 'floor' && fleet.selection !== 'full') {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: spec.fleet.selection must be 'floor' or 'full'`,
path: 'spec.fleet.selection',
retryable: false,
});
}
}
}
if (diagnostics.length > 0) {
return { ok: false, diagnostics };
}
const fleet = (obj.spec as Record<string, unknown>).fleet as Record<string, unknown>;
const meta = obj.metadata as Record<string, unknown>;
const blueprint: InstallationBlueprint = {
apiVersion: BLUEPRINT_API_VERSION,
kind: BLUEPRINT_KIND,
metadata: {
name: meta.name as string,
generation: meta.generation as number,
},
spec: {
fleet: {
profile: fleet.profile as string,
selection: fleet.selection as FleetSelection,
},
},
};
return { ok: true, blueprint, diagnostics: [] };
}
// ─── Bindings validation (§7) ────────────────────────────────────────────────
const BINDINGS_TOP_KEYS = new Set(['apiVersion', 'kind', 'spec']);
const BINDINGS_SPEC_KEYS = new Set(['fleet']);
const BINDINGS_FLEET_KEYS = new Set(['runtime', 'workingDirectory']);
const BINDINGS_RUNTIME_KEYS = new Set(['default', 'byClass']);
export function validateBindings(
value: unknown,
context: string,
): { ok: boolean; bindings?: InstallationBindings; diagnostics: ConfigDiagnostic[] } {
const diagnostics: ConfigDiagnostic[] = [];
const obj = value as Record<string, unknown>;
for (const key of Object.keys(obj)) {
if (!BINDINGS_TOP_KEYS.has(key)) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BINDINGS_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: unknown top-level key '${key}'`,
path: key,
retryable: false,
});
}
}
if (obj.apiVersion !== BLUEPRINT_API_VERSION) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BINDINGS_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: apiVersion must be exactly '${BLUEPRINT_API_VERSION}'`,
path: 'apiVersion',
retryable: false,
});
}
if (obj.kind !== BINDINGS_KIND) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BINDINGS_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: kind must be exactly '${BINDINGS_KIND}'`,
path: 'kind',
retryable: false,
});
}
if (!obj.spec || typeof obj.spec !== 'object' || Object.keys(obj.spec).length === 0) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BINDINGS_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: spec is required and non-empty (empty bindings file is invalid)`,
path: 'spec',
retryable: false,
});
} else {
const spec = obj.spec as Record<string, unknown>;
for (const key of Object.keys(spec)) {
if (!BINDINGS_SPEC_KEYS.has(key)) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BINDINGS_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: unknown spec key '${key}'`,
path: `spec.${key}`,
retryable: false,
});
}
}
if (spec.fleet) {
const fleet = spec.fleet as Record<string, unknown>;
for (const key of Object.keys(fleet)) {
if (!BINDINGS_FLEET_KEYS.has(key)) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BINDINGS_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: unknown fleet key '${key}'`,
path: `spec.fleet.${key}`,
retryable: false,
});
}
}
if (fleet.runtime) {
const runtime = fleet.runtime as Record<string, unknown>;
for (const key of Object.keys(runtime)) {
if (!BINDINGS_RUNTIME_KEYS.has(key)) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BINDINGS_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: unknown runtime key '${key}'`,
path: `spec.fleet.runtime.${key}`,
retryable: false,
});
}
}
if (
runtime.default !== undefined &&
(typeof runtime.default !== 'string' || !isValidId(runtime.default))
) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BINDINGS_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: runtime.default must match [a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,62}`,
path: 'spec.fleet.runtime.default',
retryable: false,
});
}
if (runtime.byClass !== undefined && runtime.byClass !== null) {
if (typeof runtime.byClass !== 'object' || runtime.byClass === null) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BINDINGS_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: runtime.byClass must be a mapping`,
path: 'spec.fleet.runtime.byClass',
retryable: false,
});
} else {
for (const [cls, rt] of Object.entries(runtime.byClass)) {
if (!isValidId(cls)) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BINDINGS_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: byClass key '${cls}' must match [a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,62}`,
path: `spec.fleet.runtime.byClass.${cls}`,
retryable: false,
});
}
if (typeof rt !== 'string' || !isValidId(rt)) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BINDINGS_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: byClass value for '${cls}' must match [a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,62}`,
path: `spec.fleet.runtime.byClass.${cls}`,
retryable: false,
});
}
}
}
}
}
if (fleet.workingDirectory !== undefined) {
const wd = fleet.workingDirectory;
if (typeof wd !== 'string') {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BINDINGS_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: workingDirectory must be a string`,
path: 'spec.fleet.workingDirectory',
retryable: false,
});
} else {
if (/[\x00-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x1f\x7f]/.test(wd)) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BINDINGS_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: workingDirectory contains control characters`,
path: 'spec.fleet.workingDirectory',
retryable: false,
});
}
if (!wd.startsWith('/') && !wd.startsWith('~/')) {
diagnostics.push({
code: 'CONFIG_BINDINGS_SCHEMA',
message: `${context}: workingDirectory must be absolute or ~/ prefixed`,
path: 'spec.fleet.workingDirectory',
retryable: false,
});
}
}
}
}
}
if (diagnostics.length > 0) {
return { ok: false, diagnostics };
}
const fleet = (obj.spec as Record<string, unknown>).fleet as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
const bindings: InstallationBindings = {
apiVersion: BLUEPRINT_API_VERSION,
kind: BINDINGS_KIND,
spec: {
fleet: fleet
? {
runtime: fleet.runtime as InstallationBindings['spec']['fleet']['runtime'] | undefined,
workingDirectory: fleet.workingDirectory as string | undefined,
}
: {},
},
};
return { ok: true, bindings, diagnostics: [] };
}
@@ -1,216 +0,0 @@
/**
* Shared type contracts for the installation config minimal subset.
*
* Spec: docs/specs/2026-08-29_mosaic-config-minimal-subset.md (spec review
* PASS deff617d by rev-code-02; implementation per CONFIGIMPL-GO).
*
* These types are the single source of truth for the blueprint, bindings,
* result, action, and diagnostic shapes. The YAML schemas in schema.ts and
* the result renderers in render.ts consume these interfaces directly.
*/
// ─── Blueprint (§6) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export const BLUEPRINT_API_VERSION = 'config.mosaicstack.dev/v1alpha1';
export const BLUEPRINT_KIND = 'InstallationBlueprint';
export const BINDINGS_KIND = 'InstallationBindings';
export const PRESET_ID = 'bootstrap-minimal@1';
export type FleetSelection = 'floor' | 'full';
export interface InstallationBlueprint {
apiVersion: typeof BLUEPRINT_API_VERSION;
kind: typeof BLUEPRINT_KIND;
metadata: {
name: string;
generation: number;
};
spec: {
fleet: {
profile: string;
selection: FleetSelection;
};
};
}
// ─── Bindings (§7) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export interface InstallationBindings {
apiVersion: typeof BLUEPRINT_API_VERSION;
kind: typeof BINDINGS_KIND;
spec: {
fleet: {
runtime?: {
default?: string;
byClass?: Record<string, string>;
};
workingDirectory?: string;
};
};
}
// ─── Framework defaults (§7, A5) ─────────────────────────────────────────────
export interface FrameworkBindingDefaults {
runtime: string;
workingDirectory: string;
}
export const FRAMEWORK_BINDING_DEFAULTS: FrameworkBindingDefaults = {
runtime: 'claude',
workingDirectory: '~',
};
// ─── Preset (§8) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export interface PackagedPreset {
id: typeof PRESET_ID;
blueprint: InstallationBlueprint;
}
export const BOOTSTRAP_MINIMAL_V1: PackagedPreset = {
id: 'bootstrap-minimal@1',
blueprint: {
apiVersion: 'config.mosaicstack.dev/v1alpha1',
kind: 'InstallationBlueprint',
metadata: {
name: 'bootstrap-minimal',
generation: 1,
},
spec: {
fleet: {
profile: 'software-delivery',
selection: 'floor',
},
},
},
};
// ─── Diagnostics (§13) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export type DiagnosticCode =
| 'CONFIG_USAGE_INVALID'
| 'CONFIG_REGISTRY_INVALID'
| 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_MISSING'
| 'CONFIG_BLUEPRINT_SCHEMA'
| 'CONFIG_BINDINGS_SCHEMA'
| 'CONFIG_BINDINGS_NOT_IGNORED'
| 'CONFIG_PRESET_UNKNOWN'
| 'CONFIG_PROFILE_UNRESOLVED'
| 'CONFIG_ROLE_UNRESOLVED'
| 'CONFIG_DESIRED_ROSTER_INVALID'
| 'CONFIG_OBSERVED_ROSTER_INVALID'
| 'CONFIG_ROSTER_MISSING'
| 'CONFIG_NONCONFORMANT'
| 'CONFIG_DRIFT_CREATE'
| 'CONFIG_DRIFT_UPDATE'
| 'CONFIG_DRIFT_FULL_ENGINE_REQUIRED'
| 'CONFIG_ADAPTER_UNAVAILABLE';
export interface ConfigDiagnostic {
code: DiagnosticCode;
message: string;
path?: string;
retryable: boolean;
}
// ─── Registry provenance (§5, §2.2) ──────────────────────────────────────────
export interface RegistryProvenance {
resolved: boolean;
brainHome: string | null;
sourceKeys: Array<{ key: string; sourceClass: string }>;
}
// ─── Validation result (§12.1) ───────────────────────────────────────────────
export interface ConfigCheckResult {
id: string;
status: 'passed' | 'failed' | 'notChecked';
}
export interface ConfigValidationDataV1 {
resultSchemaVersion: 1;
valid: boolean;
conformant: boolean;
blueprint: { source: 'file' | 'preset'; id: string; digest: string };
bindings: { source: 'file' | 'framework-default'; digest: string };
profile: { id: string; digest: string; selection: FleetSelection };
observed: { roster: 'present' | 'absent'; digest: string | null };
checks: ConfigCheckResult[];
}
// ─── Plan result (§12.2, §11.2) ─────────────────────────────────────────────
export type ConfigPlanOperationV1 = 'create' | 'update' | 'blocked';
export type ConfigRiskV1 = 'none' | 'review-required' | 'full-engine-required';
export interface ConfigPlanFieldDiff {
path: string;
before: string | number | boolean | null;
after: string | number | boolean | null;
}
export interface ConfigPlanActionV1 {
id: string;
resourceKind: 'fleet-roster' | 'fleet-seat';
resourceId: string;
operation: ConfigPlanOperationV1;
risk: ConfigRiskV1;
reasonCode: string;
beforeDigest: string | null;
afterDigest: string | null;
fieldDiffs: ConfigPlanFieldDiff[];
blockedBy: string[];
}
export interface ConfigPlanDataV1 {
resultSchemaVersion: 1;
planSchemaVersion: 1;
planId: string;
applySupported: false;
valid: true;
conformant: boolean;
changeCount: number;
blockedCount: number;
inputs: {
blueprintDigest: string;
bindingsDigest: string;
profileDigest: string;
observedRosterDigest: string | null;
};
actions: ConfigPlanActionV1[];
}
// ─── Result envelope (§12) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export interface CapabilityResultV1<T> {
capabilityId: string;
status: 'succeeded' | 'failed' | 'invalid';
data?: T;
diagnostics?: ConfigDiagnostic[];
correlationId: string;
executionMode: 'local-adapter';
identityTrust: 'local-asserted';
audit: { authority: 'none'; recorded: boolean };
}
// ─── Exit codes (§10.3) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export const EXIT_OK = 0;
export const EXIT_INVALID = 2;
export const EXIT_RESERVED_SCOPE = 3;
export const EXIT_NONCONFORMANT = 4;
export const EXIT_UNAVAILABLE = 6;
// ─── Dependency gate marker (§2.2) ───────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* DEPENDENCY GATE: the approved MosaicRegistryResolver does not exist at
* the pinned baseline. The registry-consuming work is PARKED. This marker
* interface exists so that when the reviewed resolver ships, the adapter
* binds to it without schema changes. Until then, the adapter returns
* CONFIG_REGISTRY_INVALID with the dependency-blocked message.
*/
export const REGISTRY_RESOLVER_BLOCKED =
'MosaicRegistryResolver: dependency-blocked pending reviewed resolver (CFG-REQ-001..006 charter)';