style: prettier formatting in identity-lifecycle.md

Addresses the revision-2 re-review residuals and new findings:
- emailVerified joins the canonical set; defined reset rule on email change
- external-principal uniqueness moved to (issuer, subject)
- 'usable login method' defined for unlink refusal
- shipped delete affordances (web admin, mosaic CLI) must be removed or
  disabled with a defined visible state; deactivation exposed instead
- admin-creation switch dropped in favor of plain admin authorization
- verification matrix extended: IdP removal, forward-auth non-use,
  first-admin SSO, wizard-recorded JIT choice, step-up positive/expiry,
  issuer-aliasing witness, UI/CLI delete assertions, docs observable

docs/requirements/identity-lifecycle.md

@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
+# Identity Account-Lifecycle Contract
+
+Status: DRAFT — awaiting ratification (webui-audit S2, contract 4 of 9).
+Authority: PRD D10 (better-auth is the account system of record), Q1 ruled O1
+by Jason 2026-08-26 (webui-audit T10). This document turns that ruling into
+enforceable policy. It also carries the bootstrap/first-admin invariant from
+issue #1430, folded in here after PR #1431's independent review showed the
+quick-fix approach was insufficient.
+
+Revision 2: addresses the 9 findings of the independent review
+(`fleet/lanes/webui-audit/findings/pr1433-review.md`) — epoch enforcement
+tightened (§3), canonical email split from provider claims (§5), external
+principal keyed by issuer+subject with DB uniqueness and link step-up (§6),
+JIT default precedence and first-admin SSO path defined (§2, §4),
+deactivation made measurable (§7.1), deletion kept in scope and the existing
+hard-delete endpoint required to fail closed (§7.3), workspace identity
+reconciled with the native-kanban SOT (§1.4), verification matrix expanded
+(§8), factual labels corrected (§7.3, §8.1).
+
+Revision 3: addresses the residuals and new findings of the revision-2
+re-review (`fleet/lanes/webui-audit/findings/pr1433-review-r2.md`) —
+`users.emailVerified` added to the canonical set with a defined reset rule on
+email change (§5.1–5.2), external-principal uniqueness moved to
+(issuer, subject) (§6.1), "can actually use" defined (§6.5), the shipped
+delete affordances (web admin page, `mosaic auth users delete`) required to
+be removed or disabled with a defined user-visible state (§7.3), the
+admin-creation switch removed in favor of plain admin authorization (§2.3),
+and §8 extended with observables for IdP removal, forward-auth non-use,
+first-admin SSO, wizard-recorded JIT choice, the admin-guide statement, and
+positive/expiry-bound step-up cases.
+
+Scope: account creation, bootstrap, federated login, account linking, claim
+mapping, deactivation, and (minimally) deletion gating. Out of scope: RBAC
+grant semantics (contract 2), wizard UX flow (contract 3), hierarchy schema
+(contract 1), sensitive-data custody (contract 7 / D14).
+
+## 1. System of record
+
+1. better-auth's tables (`users`, `accounts`, `sessions`, `verifications`) are
+   the only account system of record. All foreign keys reference `users.id`.
+2. External IdPs (Authentik or any OIDC provider) are login methods, attached
+   through better-auth's generic-OAuth plugin (`packages/auth/src/sso.ts`).
+   They never own accounts. Removing an IdP removes a login method, not users.
+3. The forward-auth perimeter shim is a deployment measure. Once in-app OIDC
+   is configured for a deployment, the shim is demoted: it may stay as network
+   perimeter, but no application code may read identity from its headers.
+4. **Account ≠ workspace membership.** Creating an account (by any path:
+   bootstrap, sign-up, invite, JIT, admin creation) creates no workspace, no
+   hierarchy grant, and no workspace-scoped authority (native-kanban SOT
+   REQ-TEN-001 / REQ-ID-001). The better-auth `role` field is a platform/auth
+   role (`member` | `admin`), not workspace membership. Workspace grants are
+   defined by contract 2; until then a fresh account can authenticate and
+   holds no workspace authority.
+
+## 2. Registration gating
+
+Measured current state on `next`: `emailAndPassword.enabled: true` with no
+gating — anyone who can reach the Gateway can create an account via
+`POST /api/auth/sign-up/email` and receives role `member`.
+
+Contract:
+
+1. A single server-side setting `registration_mode` with values
+   `open | invite | closed`. It lives in the database (admin-mutable at
+   runtime), not in env config.
+2. Default after bootstrap: `closed`. The wizard (contract 3) may set a
+   different mode during setup, recorded as an explicit operator choice.
+   While the bootstrap epoch is open (§3), the effective mode is `closed`
+   regardless of any stored value: the setting takes effect only after the
+   epoch completes.
+3. `closed` blocks self-service email/password sign-up. It does not block
+   admin-created users or OIDC JIT (§4). Post-bootstrap admin creation is
+   gated by admin authorization alone — there is no separate switch for it.
+   JIT is gated by its per-provider flag (§4.1). All user-creating paths are
+   closed while the bootstrap epoch is open (§3).
+4. `invite` requires a single-use, expiring invite token bound to an email
+   address. Invite issuance is an admin operation and is audit-logged.
+5. Enforcement point: a better-auth hook (or equivalent middleware executed
+   inside the auth handler path), not a Gateway route guard in front of it —
+   the raw `/api/auth/*` handler must be incapable of bypassing the gate.
+
+## 3. Bootstrap / first-admin invariant (from #1430)
+
+Invariant: **the system transitions from zero users to one admin user exactly
+once per bootstrap epoch, atomically, regardless of concurrency or which code
+path writes users.**
+
+Constraints any implementation MUST satisfy (each traces to a verified defect
+in PR #1431's review, `fleet/lanes/webui-audit/findings/pr1431-review.md`):
+
+1. **Durable fail-closed epoch state, obeyed by every writer.** The epoch
+   lives in a constraint-backed one-row `bootstrap_state` table. While the
+   epoch is open, every non-bootstrap user-creating writer — better-auth
+   sign-up, OIDC JIT, admin creation — refuses, fail-closed, enforced inside
+   the writer's own path (better-auth hook for the raw handler; guard for
+   admin routes). A partial unique index or a winning epoch-transition row is
+   necessary but not sufficient on its own: neither stops an untagged insert
+   from a writer that never consulted the epoch. Both layers are required:
+   database-level transition safety (the epoch-completing write races safely
+   and at most one wins) and writer-level refusal (no path can create a user
+   without reading epoch state).
+2. **Atomic first-admin transition.** The admin user, its credential account,
+   the initial admin token, and the epoch-completed transition commit in one
+   database transaction or not at all. A better-auth call through
+   `drizzleAdapter(db)` runs on the root pool and is NOT part of any caller
+   transaction; it may be used inside the bootstrap transition only if the
+   adapter is explicitly bound to the transaction handle. Otherwise the
+   bootstrap writer must create the user rows itself within the transaction.
+3. **Pool safety.** No design may hold a pooled connection inside a
+   transaction while awaiting a write that acquires a second connection from
+   the same pool (`DB_POOL_MAX=1` is a supported configuration).
+4. **Re-runnability (D4).** Bootstrap is not a one-shot: after the first-admin
+   epoch completes, re-running the wizard reconfigures the system but never
+   re-opens the zero-user transition. "Setup already completed" is a stable,
+   testable state, and factory-reset (a future, explicitly destructive
+   operation) is the only way to open a new epoch.
+5. **No stranded partial outcome.** A failure at any point in the transition
+   leaves nothing observable (no admin user without its token, no completed
+   epoch without an admin) and setup remains retryable — this follows from
+   §3.2 and is stated separately because it is the pre-existing failure mode
+   the #1431 review verified.
+6. **First-admin via SSO (D4).** When the operator chooses SSO for the
+   initial user, the wizard executes the OIDC login as part of the bootstrap
+   transition itself: the bootstrap writer creates the account from the
+   asserted identity inside the §3.2 transaction. This path is the bootstrap
+   writer, not JIT — §4's JIT gate stays closed during the epoch and is not
+   an obstacle to D4.
+
+## 4. JIT provisioning (OIDC first login)
+
+1. A successful OIDC login with no matching account creates a user
+   just-in-time only when `jit_provisioning` is enabled for that provider.
+   The flag is per-provider and defaults off, always. There is no
+   mode-implied default: Enterprise setup enables JIT only when the wizard
+   records it as an explicit operator choice for a named provider (this
+   replaces revision 1's "Enterprise mode defaults to closed with OIDC JIT
+   enabled", which contradicted the per-provider default).
+2. JIT users receive platform role `member`, never an elevated role,
+   regardless of IdP claims (§5), and no workspace authority (§1.4).
+3. An optional per-provider email-domain allowlist constrains JIT. The
+   allowlist matches only when the IdP asserts the email with
+   `email_verified: true`; an unverified address never satisfies the
+   allowlist. Empty allowlist with JIT on means any authenticated subject at
+   that IdP gets an account — permitted, but the wizard must present it as an
+   explicit choice.
+4. JIT is disabled while the bootstrap epoch is open (§3.1). The first-admin
+   SSO path is §3.6, not JIT.
+
+## 5. Claim mapping
+
+1. **Two stores, not one.** Provider-observed claims (`email`,
+   `email_verified`, display name, avatar) are recorded per external
+   principal — keyed by issuer + subject (§6.1) — at first login and
+   refreshed at each login. The canonical account fields (`users.email`,
+   `users.emailVerified`, `users.name`, `users.image`) are set exactly once
+   at account creation and are never silently overwritten by a later login.
+   For SSO-created accounts (JIT or first-admin SSO), `users.emailVerified`
+   is set from the provider's `email_verified` claim at creation; for
+   password-created accounts it is false until the address completes
+   verification.
+2. **Canonical email changes only through an explicit workflow.** Either the
+   user-initiated email change (with verification of the new address) or an
+   admin edit. Any canonical email change — user- or admin-initiated — sets
+   `users.emailVerified` to false until the new address completes
+   verification; an admin may instead explicitly attest the address as
+   verified in the same operation, and that attestation is audit-logged. A
+   provider-claim refresh never rebinds `users.email` or
+   `users.emailVerified`; a divergence between canonical email and the latest
+   provider-observed email is surfaced per §6.4.
+3. Never mapped from IdP claims: `role` and any future authorization
+   attribute. Authorization lives in the system of record and in the RBAC
+   layer (contract 2). An IdP group/role claim may at most be recorded for
+   audit; it grants nothing.
+
+## 6. Account linking trust
+
+1. **External principal identity is issuer + subject.** A linked identity is
+   keyed by the OIDC issuer and subject claims, not by an unqualified
+   provider subject id and not by email. The linked-identity row stores the
+   issuer, and the database enforces at most one local account per
+   **(issuer, subject)** with a unique constraint on those stored columns —
+   uniqueness on (provider, subject) is insufficient because provider →
+   issuer is not one-to-one: two provider configurations can point at the
+   same issuer, and the identity must not alias across them. The current
+   non-unique `(provider_id, account_id)` index satisfies neither;
+   application-level checks without a uniqueness witness lose
+   concurrent-callback races. Each configured provider additionally binds to
+   exactly one issuer, immutable after creation (changing the issuer means
+   creating a new provider).
+2. Linking an OIDC identity to an existing account happens only in one of two
+   ways: (a) explicit link initiated by the logged-in user from settings,
+   which requires step-up: a fresh reauthentication (password or existing
+   linked method) no older than a short bound the implementation defines
+   (≤ 10 minutes) — a session cookie alone is insufficient, so a stolen
+   session cannot quietly attach a durable login method; or (b) automatic
+   link when the IdP asserts a verified email exactly matching an existing
+   account **and** the provider is marked `trusted_for_linking`
+   (per-provider flag, default off).
+3. Untrusted-provider email collision produces a login error naming the
+   conflict, not an auto-link and not a duplicate account.
+4. A linked identity whose IdP-observed email later diverges from the
+   canonical account email keeps working (the link is by issuer + subject,
+   §6.1) but the divergence is surfaced in the user's settings and audit log
+   (the per-principal claim store in §5.1 is what makes the divergence
+   representable).
+5. Unlinking a login method is refused when it would leave the account with
+   no **usable** login method. Usable means: a set password, or a linked
+   identity whose provider is currently configured and enabled on this
+   deployment. A linked identity whose provider has been removed or disabled
+   (§1.2) is not usable and does not count; setting a password first lifts
+   the refusal.
+
+## 7. Deactivation propagation
+
+1. **Deactivation (better-auth admin ban) is authoritative and bounded.**
+   Concretely:
+   - Ban and session revocation are one operation: the ban commit revokes all
+     better-auth sessions for the user. If revocation partially fails, the
+     ban itself must already be committed and every guard denies from that
+     point (fail closed); the operation is retryable.
+   - Every authenticated entry path checks banned state: HTTP session guards,
+     the admin bearer-token path (which today does not test `banned` — an
+     implementation defect this contract makes non-conformant), MCP, and
+     Socket.IO.
+   - Active socket connections are terminated or denied within 30 seconds of
+     the ban commit, or at the next inbound message on that socket, whichever
+     comes first (socket auth at connect-time only, as today, does not
+     satisfy this).
+   - The current admin ban route updates only the user row; it does not
+     conform to this section until revocation and guard coverage land.
+   - Admin tokens owned by the banned user are revoked in the same operation.
+2. Deactivation at an external IdP does not propagate automatically in this
+   contract's scope (no SCIM). Operational rule: removing a user from the IdP
+   without banning them in Mosaic leaves any password or other linked login
+   method usable — the admin guide must state this. SCIM/webhook-driven
+   propagation is future work and out of scope here.
+3. **Deletion is not deactivation, and deletion is gated here.** Account
+   deletion semantics (FK fan-out across the 21 foreign-key constraints to
+   `users.id`, spread over 19 referencing tables) require their own
+   deletion-and-retention contract, chartered as an addition to the S2 list —
+   contract 7 is the D14 sensitive-data custody contract and does not cover
+   account deletion. Until that deletion contract is ratified: the existing
+   hard-delete endpoint (`DELETE /api/admin/users/:id`) is disabled and fails
+   closed, and deactivation is the only supported removal operation. A
+   contract that merely declared deactivation "the only supported removal"
+   while the endpoint stayed live would be false on its face.
+   Disabling the endpoint alone is insufficient — its shipped callers must
+   not be left as advertised operations that now fail generically:
+   - The admin web UI delete action (`apps/web/src/app/(dashboard)/admin/page.tsx`
+     and any SPA port of it) is removed, or replaced by a disabled control
+     whose visible text states that deletion is unavailable pending the
+     deletion-and-retention contract and points at deactivation.
+   - The CLI command `mosaic auth users delete`
+     (`packages/mosaic/src/commands/auth.ts`) is removed, or exits non-zero
+     with a message stating the same and naming the deactivation command.
+   - Both surfaces expose deactivation as the supported operation.
+
+## 8. Verification requirements
+
+Every MUST above needs a bounded observable. The matrix:
+
+1. **Bootstrap invariant (§3).** Real-PostgreSQL concurrency tests using two
+   distinct physical connections (pattern:
+   `apps/gateway/src/agent/connector-lease.postgres.integration.test.ts`,
+   which runs in the `test` CI step against the `ci-postgres` PostgreSQL
+   service — note that pattern multiplexes one pooled handle, so the tests
+   here must explicitly open separate connections). Races to cover:
+   setup-vs-setup, setup-vs-raw-sign-up, setup-vs-JIT, setup-vs-admin-create.
+   Plus: liveness under `DB_POOL_MAX=1`; fault injection after each write in
+   the transition (user, credential, token, epoch) proving nothing observable
+   leaks and setup retries; wizard re-run after completion proving the
+   zero-user transition never re-opens. Mocked-transaction specs are
+   supplementary; they cannot prove serialization.
+2. **Registration gating (§2).** Spec coverage of all three modes against the
+   raw `/api/auth/` handler path, not only Gateway controllers; invite
+   lifecycle (single-use, expiry, email binding); effective-`closed` while
+   the epoch is open regardless of stored mode.
+3. **JIT (§4).** Provider flag off → no account on first OIDC login; on →
+   account with platform role `member` and no workspace grant; domain
+   allowlist rejects an unverified email claim even when the domain matches;
+   JIT refused while the epoch is open.
+4. **Claim mapping (§5).** Login refresh updates the per-principal claim
+   store and touches none of the canonical fields (`users.email`,
+   `users.emailVerified`, name, image); explicit email-change workflow is the
+   only path that rebinds canonical email; every canonical email change
+   resets `users.emailVerified` to false unless the admin attestation path
+   is taken, and that attestation appears in the audit log.
+5. **Linking (§6).** Unique-constraint witness: concurrent first-login
+   callbacks for the same (issuer, subject) yield exactly one account, and
+   two provider configurations sharing one issuer cannot create two accounts
+   for the same subject; trusted auto-link; untrusted collision error;
+   step-up both ways: an explicit link succeeds immediately after a fresh
+   reauthentication and is refused once the implementation's chosen bound
+   (≤ 10 minutes) has elapsed, and refused with no reauthentication at all;
+   unlink refusal when no remaining method is usable per §6.5, including the
+   removed-provider case, and acceptance after a password is set; divergence
+   surfaced after IdP email change.
+6. **Deactivation (§7).** Ban revokes sessions atomically or fails closed
+   (partial-failure injection); guard denial post-ban on each transport:
+   HTTP session, admin bearer token, MCP, Socket.IO; active socket terminated
+   within the 30-second/next-message bound; banned user's admin tokens
+   unusable; hard-delete endpoint returns a fail-closed error while the
+   deletion contract is unratified; the admin web UI renders no live delete
+   action (absent, or disabled with the §7.3 text) and `mosaic auth users
+delete` exits non-zero with the §7.3 message — both asserted by spec.
+7. **System of record and bootstrap edges (§1, §3.6, §4.3).** IdP removal:
+   deleting a provider configuration leaves every user row intact and every
+   other login method working (spec over the provider-config removal path).
+   Forward-auth non-use: with in-app OIDC configured, a request carrying
+   forward-auth identity headers and no session is treated as anonymous —
+   no code path derives identity from those headers (negative spec at the
+   Gateway entry). First-admin SSO: the §3.6 transition commits account,
+   token, and epoch atomically from the asserted identity, and fault
+   injection mid-transition leaves nothing observable (same harness as §8.1).
+   Wizard-recorded JIT choice: enabling JIT for a provider writes an
+   explicit per-provider operator-choice record, and no mode selection
+   enables it implicitly (assert the stored record, not UI behavior).
+8. **Documentation observable (§7.2).** The admin guide contains the
+   IdP-removal-does-not-deactivate statement; verified by a docs assertion
+   (content check in CI or an enumerated review-checklist item on the
+   implementing PR) — a MUST about documentation needs a checkable artifact,
+   not intent.
+
+## Ruling request
+
+Ratify sections 1–8 as written, with one decision embedded: registration
+defaults to `closed` after bootstrap (§2.2) — say "agreed" or name the mode
+you want as the default.

docs/requirements/rbac-grant-model.md

@@ -1,259 +0,0 @@
-# RBAC Grant Model Contract
-
-Status: DRAFT — awaiting ratification (webui-audit S2, contract 2 of 9).
-Authority: PRD Part I §4 ("Granular RBAC: admins restrict access per company,
-estate, and project; grants are evaluated down the chain") and the
-native-kanban SOT Amendment A1 (§8.1.3 RBAC evaluation, §8.3 acceptance 2).
-This document defines the grant vocabulary, evaluation semantics, and
-revocation propagation that the hierarchy schema contract
-(`docs/requirements/hierarchy-schema.md`, contract 1) attaches to. Contract 1
-pins the `hierarchy_grants` table shape and defers the `role` vocabulary and
-the meaning of "authority" here; the identity contract
-(`docs/requirements/identity-lifecycle.md` §1.4) pins that account creation
-grants nothing.
-
-Revision 2 (independent review, GLM 5.3): §1.1 consequence analysis
-completed — the two existing platform-admin bypass code paths are named as
-non-conformant and §7.4 retires them; team grant subjects suspended pending
-a team contract (§1.4, §3.3–3.4, §7.5); no-self-escalation restated with
-its true rationale and a constructible observable (§4.2, §7.7);
-node-creation seeding scoped to the bootstrap path, resolving the §7.7/§4.3
-contradiction; A1 quotation corrected; audit-field provenance corrected;
-principal-position consequence named (§1.3); membership-row,
-fail-closed-fault, and existence-oracle observables added (§7);
-role-string namespacing rule added (§4.5); ruling request now names the
-interpretive resolution of PRD "admins".
-
-Scope: the roles that can appear in `hierarchy_grants.role`, what a grant at
-each hierarchy level confers, how grants evaluate down the chain, how
-revocation propagates, and who may manage grants. Out of scope: the hierarchy
-tables themselves (contract 1), workspace-internal membership and its
-role/capability vocabulary (native-kanban SOT REQ-ID-001 and its implementing
-schema), roll-up projection semantics (contract 8), wizard seeding
-(contract 3), the team model (suspended here; see §1.4).
-
-## 1. Three authority layers, none substitutable
-
-1. **Platform role** (`users.role`, better-auth: `member` | `admin`) governs
-   instance administration — user management, system settings, provider
-   configuration. It is not tenancy authority: holding platform `admin`
-   confers **no implicit hierarchy grant and no workspace authorization**.
-   An operator who should see tenant content holds an explicit, audited
-   grant like anyone else. This is the deny-by-default consequence of A1
-   §8.1.3 ("not a bypass of workspace authorization"). `AdminGuard`'s
-   `role === 'admin'` check on admin endpoints stays the platform role's
-   only meaning. **Two shipped code paths violate this rule today and are
-   implementation defects this contract makes non-conformant:** (a) the
-   command authorization service short-circuits every command scope to
-   allowed for platform admins
-   (`apps/gateway/src/commands/command-authorization.service.ts`,
-   `hasScope` returning true when `role === 'admin'`), and (b) the MCP
-   scope derivation maps platform `admin` to tenant-admin MCP scopes
-   including task create/update
-   (`apps/gateway/src/mcp/mcp.service.ts`,
-   `deriveMcpToolScopesForUser`). Ratifying this contract revokes both;
-   §7.4 names them as the surfaces the deny-by-default test retires.
-2. **Hierarchy grants** (`hierarchy_grants`, contract 1 §3) declare tenancy
-   authority at company, estate, or platform-project scope and evaluate down
-   the chain to workspace-scoped authorization (§3 below).
-3. **Workspace membership** (SOT REQ-ID-001) remains its own mechanism.
-   A chain grant confers command authorization over descendant workspaces;
-   it does not create membership rows, and row-level principal positions
-   (task owner, proposer, decision actor) still require ACTIVE workspace
-   membership exactly as REQ-TEN-001/REQ-ID-001 acceptance states.
-   Consequence, stated so implementing PRs do not weaken REQ-TEN-001 to
-   remove the friction: a chain-granted actor who is not a workspace member
-   may issue the write commands their role implies but cannot occupy a
-   principal position — any command taking a principal argument must name
-   an ACTIVE member of the target workspace (§7.2 enumerates this cell).
-4. **Team grant subjects are suspended.** Contract 1 §3.1 reserves a
-   `team_id` attachment point, but no ratified contract yet defines the
-   team it would bind: the only existing `teams` table is the legacy global
-   Brain table (own authority columns, no workspace binding, not
-   repurposed per contract 1 §1.3), while the SOT's teams are
-   workspace-bound (REQ-ID-001) — and a workspace-bound team holding a
-   company-level grant would be a cross-workspace authority group nothing
-   has ratified. Until a team contract defines the subject (which table,
-   which membership rows, and its relation to D2/REQ-ID-001), creating a
-   grant with a team subject MUST be refused at the command surface (the
-   schema column remains, per contract 1). §3's evaluation semantics for
-   team-conferred grants are specified now so the team contract activates
-   them without amending this one.
-
-## 2. Role vocabulary
-
-One vocabulary at every hierarchy level, totally ordered — a higher role
-includes everything below it:
-
-1. `viewer` — read: sees the node, its subtree structure, and the roll-up
-   aggregates over descendant workspaces (within contract 8's carve-out
-   bounds); read access to descendant workspace content per the SOT's read
-   command families. No mutation of anything.
-2. `member` — work: everything `viewer` has, plus write authorization for
-   business/orchestration command families in descendant workspaces (the
-   concrete command-family mapping is implementation work under SOT
-   REQ-ID-001; this contract pins that `member` maps to the workspace write
-   families and nothing structural).
-3. `owner` — structure: everything `member` has, plus hierarchy mutations on
-   the subtree (create/rename/delete child nodes, transfers per §5), and
-   grant management on the node and its subtree (§4).
-
-No other value is valid in `hierarchy_grants.role`; the column is
-constraint-checked against exactly these three. Extending the vocabulary is a
-contract amendment, not an implementation decision.
-
-## 3. Evaluation semantics
-
-1. **Deny by default.** No grant on any ancestor → no authority. There are
-   no implicit grants: not from platform role (§1.1), not from creating a
-   node (§4.3), not from workspace membership (membership without a chain
-   grant confers exactly what the SOT's own membership rules confer inside
-   that workspace, nothing up the chain).
-2. **Down-the-chain only.** A grant on a node applies to that node and its
-   entire descendant subtree. Nothing evaluates upward or sideways: a grant
-   on an estate says nothing about the parent company or sibling estates.
-3. **Effective role = maximum.** A subject's effective role at any node is
-   the highest role among grants held directly by the subject's user on
-   that node or any ancestor — and, once the team contract activates team
-   subjects (§1.4), grants held by any team the user is a member of on that
-   node or any ancestor. Roles never subtract — there is no negative/deny
-   grant in this model; revocation is deletion (§6).
-4. **Team grants follow live membership** (specified now, active only per
-   §1.4). A team grant confers its role on the team's current members,
-   evaluated at decision time. Leaving the team is loss of the grant with
-   §6's propagation bound.
-5. **Live evaluation, fail closed.** Authorization decisions derive from the
-   live grant and team-membership rows (or from a cache that is invalidated
-   in the same transaction as any grant/membership/hierarchy mutation). A
-   decision path that cannot read grant state denies. No materialized ACL is
-   ever authoritative.
-6. **Tenant context stays derived from authenticated authority**
-   (REQ-TEN-001). The chain adds where grants can be declared; a workspace
-   request is still authorized against that workspace, with the chain
-   contributing the effective role — never letting the chain become what A1
-   §8.1.3 forbids: "a bypass of workspace authorization".
-
-## 4. Grant management
-
-1. Creating, changing, or revoking a grant on a node requires effective
-   `owner` on that node (directly or via any ancestor).
-2. **No self-escalation.** A grant manager cannot create a grant with a role
-   higher than their own effective role on the target node. Under the §2
-   vocabulary this rule is currently implied by §4.1 (managers are `owner`,
-   the top role — no constructible grant exceeds it); it is stated
-   explicitly so it survives any future amendment that decouples
-   grant-management authority from role height. Its observable is the §7.7
-   audit invariant, not a refusal test.
-3. **Bootstrap of authority is explicit; inheritance covers the rest.**
-   Creating the first company (the wizard path, contract 3) and any
-   top-level company creation MUST name the initial `owner` grant in the
-   same audited operation — a top-level node has no ancestor to inherit
-   from, so without this the node would be unownable. Creating a child node
-   (estate, platform-project, workspace) requires effective `owner` on the
-   parent (§2.3) and confers no automatic grant; the creator's authority
-   over the new node already follows from §3.2 down-the-chain evaluation.
-   The creating command MAY additionally name an explicit initial grant for
-   a child node; it is not required to.
-4. Every grant mutation is a semantic audit event under contract 1 §5.2's
-   guarantees, extended by this contract with two further fields: the event
-   carries actor, verb, target, **subject, and role** (subject and role are
-   this contract's addition; contract 1 §5.2 does not enumerate them).
-5. **Role strings are namespaced.** `viewer`/`member` exist at hierarchy
-   level, `member`/`admin` on `users.role`, and the current command layer
-   uses a third `viewer|member|admin` vocabulary — same strings, different
-   meanings. Any serialized role string (audit events per §4.4, API
-   responses, logs) MUST identify its layer (e.g. `hierarchy:owner`,
-   `platform:admin`); a bare role string in a serialized artifact is
-   non-conformant.
-
-## 5. Transfer authority (completes contract 1 §4.2)
-
-"Authority over BOTH the source and the destination parent" means: effective
-`owner` on the current parent node (or an ancestor) AND effective `owner` on
-the destination parent node (or an ancestor), evaluated at transfer time in
-the transfer's own transaction. One subject must hold both; two cooperating
-half-authorized subjects are not a transfer protocol this contract defines.
-
-## 6. Revocation propagation
-
-1. Revoking a grant (deleting the row), removing a user from a team that
-   carries a grant (once team subjects activate, §1.4), or the cascade
-   deletion of a node's grants during node deletion (contract 1 §3.3) all
-   propagate identically: the authority derived from that grant is gone for
-   every descendant workspace.
-2. **Bound:** the next authorization decision on any affected transport
-   decides against the revoked grant. Concretely: no new HTTP/MCP command
-   authorized by the revoked grant after the revoking transaction commits;
-   an open Socket.IO connection whose subscriptions depend on the revoked
-   grant is re-evaluated within 30 seconds or at its next inbound message,
-   whichever comes first (same bound as the identity contract's §7.1
-   deactivation rule; same mechanism may serve both).
-3. Revocation is subtractive only in effect, not in representation: the
-   evaluator never needs tombstones; deletion of the row is the revocation.
-
-## 7. Verification requirements
-
-Binding on the implementing PRs (extends A1 §8.3 acceptance 2–3 and
-contract 1 §6):
-
-1. Vocabulary: the role CHECK constraint rejects any value outside
-   `viewer|member|owner` (real-PostgreSQL witness, `ci-postgres` service in
-   the `test` CI step).
-2. Per-level conferral: for each of the three levels × three roles, a grant
-   yields exactly the implied workspace authorization in a descendant
-   workspace and nothing in a non-descendant workspace (the A1 §8.3
-   "exactly the permissions the chain implies" matrix, enumerated). The
-   matrix includes: a chain grant creates zero workspace-membership rows
-   (assert row counts); a chain-granted non-member is refused as the
-   principal argument of any principal-taking command while their
-   non-principal writes succeed (§1.3); structure reads leak no existence
-   of nodes the reader holds no grant on (no cross-tenant existence
-   oracle, A1 §8.3 acceptance 3).
-3. Ordering: `owner` ⊇ `member` ⊇ `viewer` behaviorally — each higher role
-   passes every lower role's positive cases.
-4. Deny-by-default: platform `admin` with no grant reaches no tenant
-   content — asserted against the two §1.1 non-conformant surfaces after
-   their retirement: the command-authorization admin short-circuit and the
-   MCP tenant-admin scope derivation both gone (a platform admin with no
-   grant is refused workspace commands and receives no tenant MCP scopes);
-   workspace member with no chain grant gains nothing outside SOT
-   membership semantics; fresh account reaches nothing (identity contract
-   §1.4 cross-check).
-5. Team subjects: while suspended (§1.4), creating a team-subject grant is
-   refused at the command surface. On activation by the team contract:
-   user-direct and team-conferred grants combine to the maximum; team-leave
-   drops authority within the §6.2 bound; decision-time evaluation
-   witnessed (grant added → next decision allows; no restart or re-login
-   required).
-6. Revocation: each revocation path in §6.1 denies the next command on
-   every transport; the socket bound is measured; a cached-authorization
-   implementation proves transactional invalidation (grant revoked and
-   decision made on two distinct physical connections). Fail-closed fault
-   witness for §3.5: with grant state unreadable (fault injection), the
-   decision denies.
-7. Grant management: non-`owner` cannot mutate grants; top-level company
-   creation without the named initial `owner` grant is refused, while child
-   node creation under ancestor authority succeeds without one (§4.3 both
-   directions); every mutation produces its audit event with the §4.4
-   fields. Self-escalation observable: over the audit event stream, every
-   grant-create/change event's role is ≤ the acting user's effective role
-   on the target at event time (reconstructable invariant, not a refusal
-   test — see §4.2).
-8. Transfer: both-sides `owner` accepted, each single-side case refused
-   (completing contract 1 §6.5).
-
-## Ruling request
-
-Ratify sections 1–7 as written, with one decision embedded and one
-interpretive resolution named:
-
-- Decision: platform `admin` confers no implicit tenant access — operators
-  see tenant content only through explicit, audited grants (§1.1), which
-  retires the two existing admin bypass paths named there. Say "agreed" or
-  name the implicit access you want platform admins to keep.
-- Interpretive resolution (for visibility, not a separate question): PRD
-  Part I §4 says "admins restrict access per company, estate, and project";
-  this contract resolves "admins" as hierarchy `owner`s (§4.1), not
-  platform admins. A1 §8.1.3 does not attribute grant declaration to
-  platform admins, and the §1.1 decision above is what makes this reading
-  binding.