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@@ -79,52 +79,6 @@ Jarvis (v0.2.0) is a self-hosted AI assistant with a Python FastAPI backend and
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---
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## Fleet Declarative Configuration Management Workstream (FCM, #758)
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### Problem and objective
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The local Mosaic fleet has a roster, generated agent environment files, user-systemd units, tmux
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sessions, heartbeat files, examples, profiles, and separate gateway-backed agent records. These
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planes have drifted and are not one safe operator lifecycle. The objective is one **local fleet
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roster** as the desired-state SSOT, with generated environment, systemd, tmux, and heartbeat
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artifacts as rebuildable projections; it does not merge the local fleet control plane with the
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gateway-backed agent catalog.
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### Normative requirements
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| ID | Requirement |
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| ------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `FCM-REQ-01` | The roster SHALL be the sole writable desired-state source for local fleet membership, launch policy, and persisted lifecycle target. Generated environment files, systemd enablement, tmux sessions, and heartbeat state SHALL be non-authoritative projections. |
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| `FCM-REQ-02` | The implementation SHALL provide one executable structural contract for YAML/JSON input and one shared semantic validator. Roster load, profile validation, provision, migration, and apply SHALL reuse the existing baseline-plus-`roles.local` profile/persona resolver; a parallel role resolver is forbidden. |
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| `FCM-REQ-03` | The local fleet CLI SHALL expose documented programmatic validate, show, plan, apply/reconcile, create, inspect, update, delete, start, stop, restart, status, verify, and doctor operations with stable JSON and exit-code behavior. Existing `fleet add/remove` compatibility aliases may remain during the stated deprecation window. |
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| `FCM-REQ-04` | A fresh create SHALL persist `enabled:true` and `desired_state:stopped` unless an explicit persisted start is requested. The model SHALL distinguish enabled state, persisted desired state, and observed state. Migration, apply, reboot, and rollback SHALL not start an agent that was observed stopped before cutover. |
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| `FCM-REQ-05` | The launch chain SHALL consume deterministic, digest-stamped generated input only. Optional local overrides SHALL be parsed as strict data, may not shadow authoritative generated keys, and may not contain arbitrary commands, credential values, channels, or unknown `MOSAIC_AGENT_*` keys. Forbidden legacy keys, including `MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND`, SHALL be privately quarantined before launch and reported only by key name and content hash. |
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| `FCM-REQ-06` | Mutations and apply SHALL validate before mutation, use an expected generation/lock, write projections atomically, produce a deterministic plan, and emit recovery information on partial failure. Reconciliation SHALL act only on local, enabled, roster-owned projections and SHALL not kill unmanaged tmux sessions by fuzzy name. |
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| `FCM-REQ-07` | Canonical required classes are `code`, `review`, `validator`, `orchestrator`, `team-leader`, `enhancer`, and `interaction`. `validator` issues an independent final certificate but has no merge authority; `merge-gate` remains sole approve-to-land/merge authority. Team-leader capacity is bounded by an orchestrator-issued lease, and interaction is request/status only. Tess and Ultron are configurable instance/display names, not required machine identities. |
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| `FCM-REQ-08` | v1 migration SHALL be field-complete, reversible, and explicit about aliases, unresolved classes, lifecycle inference, generated-file regeneration, local override quarantine, schema-only remote/connector fields, and rollback. Every shipped example, profile, and service preset SHALL be migrated and executable, retained as an explicitly versioned v1 fixture, or retired with a replacement and deprecation note. |
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| `FCM-REQ-09` | M1–M5 SHALL remain local tmux/systemd control-plane work. Remote/SSH reconciliation, connector mutation, secret references, arbitrary command/channel overrides, gateway/API convergence, and UI configuration storage are excluded and require a separate PRD/threat model. |
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| `FCM-REQ-10` | Documentation and examples are delivery gates. The M0 checklist at [docs/fleet/FLEET-CONFIG-DOCS-IA-CHECKLIST.md](./fleet/FLEET-CONFIG-DOCS-IA-CHECKLIST.md) and the baseline disposition inventory at [docs/fleet/LEGACY-EXAMPLE-PROFILE-DISPOSITION-INVENTORY.md](./fleet/LEGACY-EXAMPLE-PROFILE-DISPOSITION-INVENTORY.md) SHALL be maintained as acceptance evidence. |
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### Acceptance criteria
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1. `AC-FCM-01`: A valid local v2 roster can be parsed from YAML or JSON, validated structurally and semantically through the shared resolver, and rendered canonically; invalid fields, duplicate names, unresolved classes, unsupported runtime/model combinations, socket ambiguity, and incompatible options fail closed.
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2. `AC-FCM-02`: `plan` reports deterministic desired-versus-observed differences for roster, generated environment, systemd enablement, tmux/session, heartbeat, installed-asset revision, and provable orphans without mutation; `apply --check` reports drift without mutation.
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3. `AC-FCM-03`: Local create/update/delete is generation-guarded, atomic, idempotent, and safe by default; it permits supported runtime/model/harness/effort/workdir/role changes without direct editing of generated environment files and does not start a newly created agent unless explicitly persisted.
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4. `AC-FCM-04`: The generated-env/local-override launch chain rejects generated-key shadowing, arbitrary command override, unknown keys, shell evaluation, and sensitive-value diagnostics before any agent starts; known-safe legacy input is regenerated or strictly relocated, and forbidden input is quarantined.
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5. `AC-FCM-05`: Local lifecycle reconciliation implements the persisted/transient start-stop rules, exact default/named tmux socket targeting, systemd/tmux status, stale generated state, unmanaged-session reporting, and rollback without surprise restarts or fuzzy destructive targeting.
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6. `AC-FCM-06`: A v1 roster migration previews field-by-field disposition, preserves observed stopped/running state, inventories rather than reconciles remote/schema-only entries, supports a canary and rollback, and classifies every shipped example, profile, and service preset according to the M0 inventory.
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7. `AC-FCM-07`: Required role authority is validated: validator certificate is consumed but does not merge, merge-gate is the sole merge authority, team-leader leases do not change roster/credentials/authority, and interaction/Tess cannot claim orchestration or merge powers.
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8. `AC-FCM-08`: Documentation, examples, migration, troubleshooting, operational recovery, package/update asset drift, schema/example/profile validation, independent code/security review, validator certificate, and terminal-green CI are complete before #758 closes.
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### M0 implementation gate
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No source, schema, role, example, profile, systemd, or live-fleet change is authorized before M0
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lands. M0 consists only of these normative requirements, the complete task DAG, the scoped
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documentation IA checklist, and the legacy example/profile disposition inventory. Subsequent cards
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are defined in [docs/TASKS.md](./TASKS.md) and must remain one card/one PR.
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---
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## Tess Interaction Agent Workstream (TESS)
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### Problem and Objective
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@@ -14,12 +14,11 @@
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## Workstream Rollup
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| id | status | workstream | progress | tasks file | notes |
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| --- | ----------------- | ------------------------------ | ---------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| W1 | planning-complete | Federation v1 (FED) | 0 / 7 milestones | [docs/federation/TASKS.md](./federation/TASKS.md) | M1 task breakdown populated; M2–M7 deferred to mission planning |
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| W2 | planning-complete | Tess interaction agent | 0 / 5 milestones | [docs/tess/TASKS.md](./tess/TASKS.md) | Issue #706; independent planning gate PASS; M1 issue #707 ready |
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| W3 | planning-complete | Native Kanban/SOT | 0 / 4 phases | [docs/native-kanban-sot/TASKS.md](./native-kanban-sot/TASKS.md) | Issue #751; canon independently approved; implementation held until canon merges |
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| W4 | planning-complete | Fleet configuration management | 0 / 12 cards | This file (§ Fleet configuration management #758) | Issue #758; M0 docs gate defines the implementation DAG before any fleet mutation |
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| id | status | workstream | progress | tasks file | notes |
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| --- | ----------------- | ---------------------- | ---------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| W1 | planning-complete | Federation v1 (FED) | 0 / 7 milestones | [docs/federation/TASKS.md](./federation/TASKS.md) | M1 task breakdown populated; M2–M7 deferred to mission planning |
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| W2 | planning-complete | Tess interaction agent | 0 / 5 milestones | [docs/tess/TASKS.md](./tess/TASKS.md) | Issue #706; independent planning gate PASS; M1 issue #707 ready |
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| W3 | planning-complete | Native Kanban/SOT | 0 / 4 phases | [docs/native-kanban-sot/TASKS.md](./native-kanban-sot/TASKS.md) | Issue #751; canon independently approved; implementation held until canon merges |
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## Cross-Cutting Tracking
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@@ -43,30 +42,6 @@ Active workstream is **W1 — Federation v1**. Workers should:
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2. Read [docs/federation/TASKS.md](./federation/TASKS.md) for the next pending task
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3. Follow per-task agent + tier guidance from the workstream manifest
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## Fleet configuration management (#758) — M0–M5 implementation DAG
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> **PRD:** [Fleet declarative configuration management](./PRD.md#fleet-declarative-configuration-management-workstream-fcm-758) · **M0 acceptance:** [docs IA checklist](./fleet/FLEET-CONFIG-DOCS-IA-CHECKLIST.md) · **baseline dispositions:** [legacy example/profile inventory](./fleet/LEGACY-EXAMPLE-PROFILE-DISPOSITION-INVENTORY.md)
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>
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> Every row below is one independently reviewable card and **one PR**. `depends_on` is a
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> hard DAG edge; no card may silently absorb another card's scope. All source cards require
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> the repository quality gates, independent code and security review, terminal-green CI, and
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> the applicable acceptance evidence before merge. Issue #758 remains open until M5 closes.
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| id | status | description | issue | agent | repo | branch | depends_on | estimate | notes |
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| ---------- | ----------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----- | ------ | ----------------- | --------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------- | -------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| FCM-M0-001 | in-progress | Publish normative PRD requirements/acceptance criteria, this M0–M5 DAG, docs-IA checklist, and legacy example/profile disposition inventory; no implementation changes | #758 | sonnet | mosaicstack/stack | `docs/758-fleet-config-management` | — | 18K | M0 exit: approved docs; every shipped example/profile/service preset classified; docs-only PR |
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| FCM-M1-001 | not-started | Implement narrow local-tmux v2 roster structural contract/compiler with YAML/JSON canonicalization and schema/parser parity tests | #758 | codex | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-roster-v2-compiler` | FCM-M0-001 | 30K | No lifecycle, remote, connector, secret, channel, or gateway work |
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| FCM-M1-002 | not-started | Reuse existing profile/persona/provision resolver for roster semantics; add canonical class/authority validation and approved aliases | #758 | codex | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-shared-role-resolution` | FCM-M0-001 | 25K | Validator is certificate-only; merge-gate remains sole merge authority |
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| FCM-M1-003 | not-started | Convert the M0 legacy inventory into executable example/profile/service-preset validation and explicit v1-version/retirement checks | #758 | codex | mosaicstack/stack | `test/758-example-profile-dispositions` | FCM-M1-001, FCM-M1-002 | 20K | Every shipped artifact must validate, be versioned v1, or be retired with replacement |
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| FCM-M2-001 | not-started | Migrate generic launch chain to deterministic `.env.generated` plus strict data-only `.env.local`; quarantine forbidden legacy keys | #758 | codex | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-generated-env-boundary` | FCM-M1-001, FCM-M1-002 | 30K | No arbitrary command compatibility path; diagnostics expose key names/hashes only |
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| FCM-M2-002 | not-started | Add generation-guarded local fleet agent create/get/update/delete mutations with plan/dry-run, atomic roster writes, and recovery output | #758 | codex | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-fleet-agent-crud` | FCM-M1-001, FCM-M2-001 | 30K | Fresh create persists stopped unless explicit persisted start |
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| FCM-M3-001 | not-started | Implement local roster-owned reconcile/apply plus lifecycle/status/verify/doctor contracts and stable JSON/exit codes | #758 | codex | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-local-reconciler` | FCM-M2-001, FCM-M2-002 | 35K | Exact systemd/tmux ownership; remote/schema-only entries are inventory only |
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| FCM-M3-002 | not-started | Add isolated systemd/tmux lifecycle, drift, socket, unmanaged-session, crash, and rollback acceptance coverage | #758 | sonnet | mosaicstack/stack | `test/758-reconciler-lifecycle-gates` | FCM-M3-001 | 25K | Proves stopped-state preservation and zero fuzzy destructive targeting |
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| FCM-M4-001 | not-started | Implement field-complete v1-to-v2 inventory/preview/migrator with alias, lifecycle, env-quarantine, and remote/connector disposition evidence | #758 | codex | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-v1-v2-migrator` | FCM-M1-003, FCM-M3-001 | 35K | Preview first; no unreviewed lifecycle inference |
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| FCM-M4-002 | not-started | Add reversible canary migration, rollback, stale-projection/orphan classification, and current-host 9-managed/3-unmanaged fixture coverage | #758 | sonnet | mosaicstack/stack | `test/758-migration-rollback-gates` | FCM-M4-001, FCM-M3-002 | 25K | Never starts a previously stopped agent or kills an unproven unmanaged session |
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| FCM-M5-001 | not-started | Deliver the accepted fleet documentation IA, how-to/operations/migration references, and link/example validation | #758 | haiku | mosaicstack/stack | `docs/758-fleet-config-operator-docs` | FCM-M1-003, FCM-M2-002, FCM-M3-001, FCM-M4-001 | 24K | Must close every checklist item or record an approved deferral |
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| FCM-M5-002 | not-started | Package/update asset-drift checks, rolling local canary, independent validation certificate, and release evidence | #758 | sonnet | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-fleet-config-release-gate` | FCM-M3-002, FCM-M4-002, FCM-M5-001 | 30K | Final #758 gate: quality, independent code/security review, validator certificate, merge-gate approval, green CI |
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## Thin-core prompt diet (#528) — feat/contract-thin-core
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- Status: PR open, awaiting maintainer merge ratification (fleet-governing change).
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@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
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# Fleet Configuration Management — Documentation IA Acceptance Checklist
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**Issue:** #758 · **Scope:** M0 documentation gate for the local fleet declarative-configuration program.
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This checklist is an acceptance contract for documentation and examples. It does not authorize
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schema, runtime, systemd, role, profile, or live-fleet changes. An item is complete only when its
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named artifact exists, is linked from the fleet documentation entry point, and its evidence is
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recorded in the M0 task/PR.
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## M0 baseline acceptance
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- [ ] `docs/PRD.md` states the roster as desired-state SSOT; generated environment, systemd,
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tmux, and heartbeat artifacts as non-authoritative projections; and fail-closed handling of
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unsupported or quarantined legacy input.
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- [ ] `docs/PRD.md` defines the required classes and authority boundary: `validator` certifies but
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does not merge; `merge-gate` remains sole approve-to-land/merge authority; `team-leader`
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capacity is lease-bounded; `interaction` is request/status only; instance names such as Tess
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and Ultron remain configurable.
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- [ ] `docs/PRD.md` defines local lifecycle semantics for `enabled`, persisted desired state, and
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observed state, including stopped-state preservation through migration, apply, and reboot.
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- [ ] `docs/PRD.md` defines the generated-env/local-override boundary, explicitly denies arbitrary
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command overrides in M1–M5, and requires key-name/hash-only quarantine diagnostics.
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- [ ] `docs/PRD.md` identifies the M1–M5 local-tmux scope and excludes remote reconciliation,
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connector mutation, secret references, arbitrary commands/channels, gateway convergence, and
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UI configuration storage.
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- [ ] `docs/TASKS.md` contains the complete M0–M5 one-card/one-PR dependency DAG for #758 with
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agent tier, branch, dependency, estimate, and evidence expectations.
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- [ ] `docs/fleet/LEGACY-EXAMPLE-PROFILE-DISPOSITION-INVENTORY.md` classifies every current shipped
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fleet example, profile, and service preset before M1 implementation starts.
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## Required documentation IA for M1–M5
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| Path | Minimum content | Delivery gate |
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| ------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------- |
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| `docs/fleet/README.md` | Fleet configuration entry point, desired-vs-observed decision tree, link map | M5 |
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| `docs/fleet/concepts/desired-vs-observed-state.md` | SSOT/projection model, drift, generation and ownership | M5 |
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| `docs/fleet/concepts/identity-class-runtime.md` | Stable name, display alias, class, runtime/provider/model separation | M5 |
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| `docs/fleet/concepts/role-authority-and-leases.md` | Required roles, validator/merge-gate separation, lease limits | M5 |
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| `docs/fleet/concepts/generated-env-launch-chain.md` | Generated/local files, precedence, quarantine and non-shell parsing | M5 |
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| `docs/fleet/reference/roster-v2.schema.json` | Executable v2 structural contract | M1 |
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| `docs/fleet/reference/roster-v2-fields.md` | Every field, default, constraint, compatibility behavior and examples | M1 |
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| `docs/fleet/reference/cli.md` | `config`, `agent`, lifecycle, plan/apply, JSON and exit-code contracts | M2–M3 |
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| `docs/fleet/reference/role-classes.md` | Canonical classes, aliases, authority matrix and instance-name rule | M1 |
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| `docs/fleet/reference/lifecycle-transitions.md` | Create/start/stop/restart/apply/reboot/rollback transition table | M3 |
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| `docs/fleet/reference/status-and-drift.md` | Desired/observed/managed state, orphans, revision mismatch, doctor output | M3 |
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| `docs/fleet/how-to/create-update-delete-agent.md` | Safe CRUD, expected generation, dry-run and rollback | M2 |
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| `docs/fleet/how-to/start-stop-restart.md` | Persisted versus one-shot lifecycle actions | M3 |
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| `docs/fleet/how-to/configure-tess-interaction.md` | Configurable interaction instance; no hardcoded identity | M5 |
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| `docs/fleet/how-to/configure-ultron-validator.md` | Configurable validator instance; no merge authority | M5 |
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| `docs/fleet/how-to/customize-roles.md` | Existing baseline + `roles.local` resolution and validation | M1 |
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| `docs/fleet/operations/reconcile-and-recover.md` | Plan/apply failure recovery, generation lock and canary rollout | M3 |
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| `docs/fleet/operations/env-quarantine.md` | Legacy-key inventory, private quarantine and redaction behavior | M2 |
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| `docs/fleet/operations/systemd-tmux-troubleshooting.md` | Socket ambiguity, ownership proof, systemd/tmux drift | M3 |
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| `docs/fleet/operations/backup-restore.md` | Roster/projection backup and rollback boundaries | M4 |
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| `docs/fleet/operations/upgrade-assets.md` | Source-vs-installed asset revision detection and safe refresh | M5 |
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| `docs/fleet/migration/v1-to-v2.md` | Normative field map, observed-state preservation and rollback | M4 |
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| `docs/fleet/migration/example-profile-disposition.md` | Final disposition of every shipped example/profile | M1–M4 |
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||||
| `docs/fleet/migration/legacy-class-aliases.md` | Alias, unresolved-class, and retirement rules | M1 |
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## PRD acceptance-criteria mapping
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| PRD acceptance criterion | Owning card(s) | Required evidence |
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| ------------------------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `AC-FCM-01` schema, semantic validation, canonical rendering | FCM-M1-001, FCM-M1-002 | YAML/JSON positive/negative and schema/parser/resolver parity tests |
|
||||
| `AC-FCM-02` deterministic plan and no-mutation check | FCM-M3-001 | Stable JSON/exit-code and desired-versus-observed fixture tests |
|
||||
| `AC-FCM-03` safe generation-guarded CRUD | FCM-M2-002 | Create/update/delete idempotency, expected-generation, dry-run, and recovery tests |
|
||||
| `AC-FCM-04` generated/local boundary and quarantine | FCM-M2-001 | Launch-chain, shadow, injection, redaction, and forbidden-key tests |
|
||||
| `AC-FCM-05` lifecycle/reconcile/socket/drift safety | FCM-M3-001, FCM-M3-002 | Isolated systemd/tmux, stopped-state, orphan, socket, and rollback evidence |
|
||||
| `AC-FCM-06` v1 migration and example/profile disposition | FCM-M4-001, FCM-M4-002, FCM-M1-003 | Preview/canary/rollback fixture plus executable disposition inventory |
|
||||
| `AC-FCM-07` authority and lease boundaries | FCM-M1-002 | Role/authority/lease denial tests and resolved role contracts |
|
||||
| `AC-FCM-08` documentation and final release gate | FCM-M5-001, FCM-M5-002 | Checklist closure, link/example validation, reviews, certificate, and terminal-green CI |
|
||||
|
||||
## Cross-cutting evidence gates
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Every retained or migrated YAML/JSON example, profile, and service preset validates through the
|
||||
same executable schema and shared baseline-plus-`roles.local` resolver used by the CLI.
|
||||
- [ ] Every retired example/profile/service preset has a replacement link and deprecation note; no
|
||||
unresolved legacy class or tool-policy alias remains silently shipped.
|
||||
- [ ] Documentation examples contain no secret values, arbitrary command override, or product-hardcoded
|
||||
Tess/Ultron identity.
|
||||
- [ ] CLI snippets distinguish local fleet desired-state commands from the separate gateway-backed
|
||||
`mosaic agent` catalog.
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||||
- [ ] Migration, quarantine, lifecycle, status, and troubleshooting documentation state that values of
|
||||
legacy sensitive keys are never printed.
|
||||
- [ ] M5 release review verifies links, schema/example validation, and that all checklist rows have
|
||||
owner/evidence or an explicit approved deferral.
|
||||
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Fleet Configuration Management — Legacy Example, Profile, and Service Disposition Inventory
|
||||
|
||||
**Issue:** #758 · **Baseline:** `origin/main` `49e8a541` · **Status:** M0 inventory; no source
|
||||
examples or profiles are changed by this document.
|
||||
|
||||
The v2 compiler may not silently accept an unresolved class. Before M1 exits, every shipped file
|
||||
below must be either migrated and executable, retained as an explicitly versioned v1 fixture, or
|
||||
retired with a replacement/deprecation note. Class resolution must use the existing
|
||||
profile/persona/provision baseline-plus-`roles.local` resolver; this inventory does not create a
|
||||
parallel resolver.
|
||||
|
||||
## Examples
|
||||
|
||||
| Shipped file | Current class evidence | M0 disposition decision | Required M1/M4 evidence |
|
||||
| ---------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `framework/fleet/examples/coding.yaml` | `orchestrator`, `enhancer`, `implementer`, `reviewer` | Migrate: `implementer → code`, `reviewer → review`; retain orchestration/enhancer intent | v2 fixture validates; role aliases and authority matrix tested |
|
||||
| `framework/fleet/examples/general.yaml` | `orchestrator`, `enhancer`, `worker` | Migrate only after operator chooses a concrete canonical role for `worker`; no implicit conversion | Explicit replacement class, or versioned v1 fixture/retirement note |
|
||||
| `framework/fleet/examples/hybrid.yaml` | `orchestrator`, `enhancer`, `implementer`, `researcher`, `reviewer` | Migrate aliases; resolve `researcher` through existing role resolver or retain/version | Shared resolver validation; no ad-hoc class scanner |
|
||||
| `framework/fleet/examples/local-canary.yaml` | `orchestrator`, `implementer`, `reviewer` | Migrate aliases; preserve its local-tmux canary purpose | v2 fixture validates and preserves safe stopped/running behavior |
|
||||
| `framework/fleet/examples/minimal.yaml` | `canary` | Retire or version as v1 unless an existing canonical role contract is selected deliberately | Replacement link/deprecation note or CI-valid v1 fixture |
|
||||
| `framework/fleet/examples/operator-interaction.yaml` | `operator-interaction` | Migrate alias to `interaction`; preserve instance/display name as configuration, not schema identity | v2 interaction fixture validates; no Tess literal is required |
|
||||
| `framework/fleet/examples/research.yaml` | `orchestrator`, `enhancer`, `researcher`, `analyst` | Resolve `researcher`/`analyst` through baseline + `roles.local`, or version/retire | Resolver evidence and explicit disposition for each unresolved class |
|
||||
|
||||
## Profiles
|
||||
|
||||
| Shipped file | Current class evidence | M0 disposition decision | Required M1/M4 evidence |
|
||||
| -------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `framework/fleet/profiles/business.yaml` | `ceo`, `coo`, `cfo`, `product-manager`, `marketing-lead`, `sales-lead`, `operations-manager`, `customer-success-manager`, `code`, `review` | Retain only if every class resolves through the existing role library/`roles.local`; otherwise version/retire rather than weakening validation | Shared resolver CI result for every class; documented role source or replacement |
|
||||
| `framework/fleet/profiles/marketing.yaml` | `marketing-lead`, `content-strategist`, `copywriter`, `seo-specialist`, `social-media-manager`, `brand-strategist`, `growth-marketer`, `ux-designer` | Same resolver-or-version/retire rule | Per-class resolver CI result and replacement/deprecation record if unresolved |
|
||||
| `framework/fleet/profiles/personal-assistant.yaml` | `personal-assistant`, `executive-assistant`, `scheduler`, `inbox-manager`, `researcher` | Same resolver-or-version/retire rule | Per-class resolver CI result; do not infer `interaction` equivalence |
|
||||
| `framework/fleet/profiles/research.yaml` | `lead-researcher`, `researcher`, `data-analyst`, `data-scientist`, `market-analyst`, `documentation`, `review` | Same resolver-or-version/retire rule | Per-class resolver CI result and explicit compatibility posture |
|
||||
| `framework/fleet/profiles/software-delivery.yaml` | `orchestrator`, `board`, `planner`, `decomposition`, `code`, `review`, `security-review`, `site-tester`, `documentation`, `merge-gate`, `rebase`, `operator`, `session-review`, `enhancer` | Retain as the governance reference; add `validator`, `team-leader`, and `interaction` only through approved role/profile work, not silent substitution | CI validates all current classes; separate fixture proves required M1 authority seats |
|
||||
|
||||
## Service presets
|
||||
|
||||
| Shipped file | Current policy evidence | M0 disposition decision | Required M1/M4 evidence |
|
||||
| ---------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `framework/fleet/services/operator-interaction.yaml` | Generic policy only: `runtime: pi`, `model: openai/gpt-5.6-sol`, `reasoning: high`, `tool_policy: operator-interaction`; provisioning supplies the agent name as data | Retain as a generic service policy, not a Tess identity. Migrate `tool_policy: operator-interaction` only through the approved interaction tool-policy alias/semantic resolver; do not infer a class or machine name from this file. | Service-policy fixture validates runtime/model/reasoning and alias behavior; generic provisioning proves a configured interaction instance is supplied without a hardcoded Tess name. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Required disposition controls
|
||||
|
||||
1. **No silent aliasing:** only `implementer → code`, `reviewer → review`, and
|
||||
`operator-interaction → interaction` are approved deterministic aliases in this M0 baseline.
|
||||
`worker`, `analyst`, `canary`, and domain-specific classes require resolver evidence or an
|
||||
explicit version/retirement decision.
|
||||
2. **No identity hardcoding:** Tess and Ultron are optional instance/display names. An example/profile
|
||||
may demonstrate the capability but must not make a product name a required class or machine ID.
|
||||
3. **No lifecycle inference from an example:** examples describe desired configuration only; migration
|
||||
of an installed v1 roster separately preserves observed stopped/running state.
|
||||
4. **No secret or command migration:** examples/profiles must not introduce credential values or
|
||||
`MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND`; those legacy keys are M2 quarantine inputs, never v2 authoring fields.
|
||||
5. **Service presets are included:** service policies are inventoried alongside examples/profiles.
|
||||
They may express launch/tool policy, but do not create a class, a canonical agent identity, or a
|
||||
second validation path.
|
||||
6. **Evidence is executable:** M1/M4 CI must enumerate these exact files, validate retained/migrated
|
||||
inputs through the shared resolver, and fail if a file lacks its documented disposition.
|
||||
@@ -1,415 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# KBN-010 — Threat, Authorization, and Constraint-Impact Gate
|
||||
|
||||
- **Issue:** [#753](https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/issues/753)
|
||||
- **Gate status:** **PASS / GO**
|
||||
- **Reviewed baseline:** `origin/main` at `49e8a54` (2026-07-14)
|
||||
- **Frozen target:** `SHARED-CONTRACT.md` v1.0.0-rc.4 and `contracts/*.v1.ts`
|
||||
- **Disposition input:** contract commit `3f6a3387b419eb99453ee10dd25ba888faaab0b5`, tree `7ebab8fa530a7180036928cea9527f808548aa14`
|
||||
- **Scope:** documentation and future-test planning only; no runtime, schema, migration, API, configuration, dependency, CI, or deployment change
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Decision
|
||||
|
||||
KBN-010 is **PASS / GO** against frozen contract rc.4. The original rc.3 finding remains historical detection evidence:
|
||||
|
||||
- **KBN010-SI-001 — rc.3 invalid mission composite-FK candidate key.** At rc.3, `missionsV1` declared a primary key on `id` and a unique key on `(workspace_id, project_id, id)`, but not a candidate key on `(workspace_id, id)`. Both `artifacts_workspace_mission_fk` and `approval_decisions_workspace_mission_fk` referenced exactly `(missions.workspace_id, missions.id)`. PostgreSQL requires the referenced column list of a foreign key to match a non-partial unique/primary candidate key; uniqueness of `id` alone did not satisfy that two-column reference. The rc.3 DDL was therefore invalid, and KBN-010 correctly blocked it.
|
||||
|
||||
Contract rc.4 resolves SI-001 by adding the non-partial `missions_workspace_id_uidx` candidate key on `(workspace_id, id)` while retaining the global `id` primary key and the project-congruent `(workspace_id, project_id, id)` key. Both polymorphic child FKs retain their exact workspace-safe ordered columns and `ON DELETE RESTRICT`; no target, tenancy, project-congruence, exactly-one-target, N-1, rollback, no-cascade, identity, approval, or fencing authority is weakened.
|
||||
|
||||
Independent Homelab non-author schema/security review returned **APPROVE** for the exact rc.4 commit/tree/content and found no collision with #757 connector fencing. SI-001 has no unresolved contract/schema-design impact.
|
||||
|
||||
This GO completes the KBN-010 analysis/review prerequisite only. It does **not** claim that runtime schema or migration DDL exists. KBN-100 remains held and may be released only after this PR squash-merges, the merged change reaches terminal-green CI on `main`, and issue #753 closes.
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.1 Independent rc.4 evidence identity
|
||||
|
||||
- **Commit:** `3f6a3387b419eb99453ee10dd25ba888faaab0b5`
|
||||
- **Tree:** `7ebab8fa530a7180036928cea9527f808548aa14`
|
||||
- **Stable full-index SHA-256:** `6b40a76265c4f3e6d1d30a7f262a2dd16e0d51997e99c146b59f527e6524cd42`
|
||||
- **Stable patch-id:** `058cf98026fcd1043703c866aee047c8bb144740`
|
||||
- **Verdict:** Homelab independent non-author schema/security review **APPROVE**.
|
||||
- **Reviewed conclusions:** the candidate key repairs both dependent FKs; tenant safety, polymorphic exactly-one-target semantics, RESTRICT/no-cascade behavior, and N-1/rollback semantics remain valid; #757 uses separate tables/indexes/FKs/identity/fence authority and has no collision.
|
||||
|
||||
A command-rendered patch SHA may differ when Git rendering options, headers, or command form differ. That rendering digest is non-authoritative. Canonical review identity is the Git commit object plus tree and exact file content; the stable full-index digest and stable patch-id above are corroborating identities.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Method and trust boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.1 Inputs inspected
|
||||
|
||||
- Canonical requirements: `docs/requirements/native-kanban-sot.md`.
|
||||
- Workstream manifest and read-only task plan.
|
||||
- Frozen health, schema, Mechanical Coordinator, and recovery contracts in full.
|
||||
- Actual current-main schema, Better Auth guard/scope helpers, project/task/mission/team controllers and repositories, fleet backlog, and `TASKS.md` parser/writer.
|
||||
- Issue #753 through the Mosaic provider wrapper.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.2 Current-main exposure that the target must replace, not inherit
|
||||
|
||||
| Current-main fact | Constraint on future implementation |
|
||||
| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| Teams are global; projects, missions, tasks, agents, and fleet backlog have no `workspace_id`. | KBN-100 must add the workspace boundary and KBN-110 must query by server-derived workspace in every repository operation. |
|
||||
| `AuthGuard` authenticates a Better Auth user, while `scopeFromUser` falls back through optional tenant/team/org claims and finally user ID. | Kanban tenancy must derive from an authenticated **active workspace membership**, not this compatibility fallback or caller data. |
|
||||
| Team list/get/member endpoints return global team data to any authenticated user. | New Kanban endpoints must use a uniform no-oracle denial and must not reuse global team lookup as authorization. |
|
||||
| Project/task repositories load and mutate by bare IDs; controller checks are separate and sometimes distinguish not-found from forbidden. | Workspace predicates and authorization must be inside the authoritative transaction/repository command path. |
|
||||
| Tasks can have nullable project/mission links, free-text assignee, JSON tags, no aggregate version, and no fence. | Expand/backfill/quarantine must precede NOT NULL/composite constraints; new commands cannot trust legacy fields. |
|
||||
| `mission_tasks.status` is a second status writer. | Pre-expand must prohibit it as a write source and later retire it only after N-1 evidence. |
|
||||
| Fleet `backlog` has global JSON dependencies and TTL claims without workspace, assignment, approval, session, or fencing. | It must be frozen and imported as non-dispatching shadow data; it cannot be adapted into the canonical lease path. |
|
||||
| `packages/coord/src/tasks-file.ts` parses and mutates `TASKS.md`. | KBN-120 must replace production use with generated, read-only projection code and prove there is no import/mutation path. |
|
||||
| No Kanban transaction-local health proof, semantic audit/event chain, change proposals, canonical outbox, approval binding, or fenced lease model exists. | These are new frozen invariants, not behaviors that may be inferred from current endpoints. |
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Authorization matrix
|
||||
|
||||
The exact route/DTO freeze belongs to KBN-105. This matrix fixes the minimum authorization behavior that freeze and later implementation must preserve.
|
||||
|
||||
| Principal/state | Permitted authority | Required authoritative checks | Explicit denials |
|
||||
| -------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| Unauthenticated caller | Public health observation only, if deployment exposes it | Health DTO validation; no proof field accepted | All canonical reads/mutations; health observation never authorizes a write |
|
||||
| Active workspace `owner`/`admin` user | Policy-allowed workspace administration and domain commands | Better Auth session; active membership; server-derived workspace; command-family role; expected version/idempotency | Foreign workspace, suspended workspace, revoked membership, caller workspace override |
|
||||
| Active workspace `member` user | Policy-allowed project/task/proposal commands | Active membership plus project/team capability and target checks in the same transaction | Admin, approval, purge, service-only Coordinator, and unrelated project commands |
|
||||
| Active workspace `auditor` user | Workspace-scoped reads and audit/evidence inspection | Active membership and read capability | Every mutation, approval, lease, token issuance, purge |
|
||||
| Active workspace `service` identity | Only explicitly issued command families | Credential maps to workspace+agent+session; agent enabled; session live; role/capability allowlist; token expiry/audience; DB recheck per command | Raw DB credentials, user/admin fallback, cross-workspace scope, command families absent from token and registry |
|
||||
| Enabled agent with live session | Agent commands matching its declared and policy-approved specialist role/capabilities | Exact workspace+agent+session binding, heartbeat/state, assignment target, lease, current decimal-string fence | Ended/offline/degraded session where policy disallows; disabled agent; another assignment/session/fence |
|
||||
| Mechanical Coordinator engine | Pure eligibility/order/expiry decisions from immutable snapshots | Complete workspace-local snapshot and policy revision | Authentication, ID loading, SQL, proof minting, scope invention, approval, certification, merge |
|
||||
| Coordinator persistence service | Service-only assignment/lease/checkpoint/recovery commands | Fresh transaction-local proof; locks; current assignment/approval/task/session/policy/fence | Public/user proof-by-value, stale approval/policy, direct completion/certification/merge |
|
||||
| Reviewer/SecReview/Certifier | Attributable evidence decisions allowed by gate policy | Active authority, author differs from reviewer, mandatory SecReview classification, immutable artifacts | Self-review; missing evidence; Certifier merge/issue-close/release |
|
||||
| Break-glass retention operator | Narrow, time-bounded purge procedure only | Separate break-glass authority, reason, scope, approvals, immutable pre-purge evidence, semantic audit, post-action reconciliation | Normal application role DELETE/UPDATE, bulk unscoped purge, unaudited hard delete |
|
||||
| Revoked/expired/disabled identity or ended session | None beyond policy-permitted public observation | Revocation/lifecycle checked from PostgreSQL on every command | Cached token/Valkey state cannot preserve authority |
|
||||
|
||||
**No-oracle rule:** authentication may return 401, but once authenticated, a foreign-workspace, nonexistent, inaccessible, or wrong-project identifier must follow the one KBN-105-frozen 404/403 policy with the same response shape and no foreign metadata, timing-derived detail, or WebSocket/MCP discrepancy.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Threat matrix
|
||||
|
||||
Every disposition is against the frozen target, not a claim about current-main behavior.
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Attacker or failure | Asset | Precondition and abuse path | Frozen preventive/detective control | Required schema/API/negative-test evidence | Future owner | Residual risk | Disposition |
|
||||
| --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
||||
| T01 | Authenticated user supplies a foreign workspace/resource ID | Tenant confidentiality and integrity | Caller knows or guesses project/task/mission/team IDs and probes REST, MCP, WebSocket, repository, or Coordinator paths | `workspace_id` on every canonical row; composite relations; server-derived tenant; uniform no-oracle denial | Composite FK/unique DDL; every repository predicate includes workspace; N100-01/02, N110-01..05, N130-01 | KBN-100, 105, 110, 130 | Timing/volume side channels require operational review | Controlled after evidence |
|
||||
| T02 | Revoked or inactive member retains an old session | Ownership and mutation authority | Authentication remains valid after workspace membership revocation | Active membership rechecked in the authoritative transaction for owners, principals, proposers, and decision actors | Active/inactive membership fixtures; N100-03, N110-06/07; no cached membership authority | KBN-100, 110 | Better Auth session may remain valid for unrelated features | Controlled after evidence |
|
||||
| T03 | User joins/forges a team relation outside its workspace | Team-owned projects and tasks | Global-current-main team behavior or a stale membership is reused | Team is intra-workspace only; workspace/team composites; active workspace membership precedes team authorization | Cross-workspace team/member/owner insert and command denials; N100-04/05, N110-08 | KBN-100, 110 | Team-role policy mistakes remain possible | Controlled after evidence |
|
||||
| T04 | Same-workspace IDs from a different project are combined | Planning hierarchy integrity | Valid mission/milestone/parent/current-milestone UUIDs are substituted | Project-congruent composite relations and serialized hierarchy validation | Mission/milestone/parent/current milestone mismatch and parent-cycle tests; N100-06..10, N110-09 | KBN-100, 110 | Deep hierarchy checks can be expensive | Controlled after evidence |
|
||||
| T05 | Foreign or unrelated evidence/link/artifact IDs are attached | Review and audit truth | Caller has a valid same-workspace or foreign artifact UUID | Workspace-aware joins; immutable artifact digest/revision; semantic same-target validation in authoritative transaction | Mixed-workspace and same-workspace wrong-task/mission checkpoint/approval evidence tests; N100-11..14, N210-15/16 | KBN-100, 110, 210 | Same-workspace semantic validation is application-enforced | Controlled after evidence |
|
||||
| T06 | Stolen, over-scoped, or replayed service token | Coordinator and task mutation authority | Service credential is accepted as admin/user or claims are trusted without DB state | Command-family least privilege; agent/session workspace binding; no raw DB credentials; enabled/live state checked per command | Auth registry fixtures prove audience/expiry/role/capability; revoked agent and ended session denials; N105-01, N110-10..13, N210-01/02 | KBN-105, 110, 210 | Credential theft until expiry/revocation check | Controlled after evidence |
|
||||
| T07 | Caller forges public `healthy` or replays a stale health response | Sole-writer/fail-closed invariant | Public health body or caller field reaches mutation context | Public DTO is observation only; public DTOs reject proof/health fields; Gateway mints internal proof after live PG transaction probe | Contradictory union and forbidden-field tests; N105-02, N110-14..17 | KBN-105, 110, 140 | Health endpoint can still be used for reconnaissance | Controlled after evidence |
|
||||
| T08 | Internal stale, wrong-policy, or wrong-transaction proof is reused | Transaction integrity | A branded value leaks or an adapter fails to revalidate it | Non-exported brand; transaction identity, `checkedAt <= now < validUntil`, and policy revision revalidated immediately before mutation | Wrong transaction, expiry boundary, future timestamp, policy mismatch, commit-after-expiry tests; N110-18..22 | KBN-110, 140 | In-process code can bypass TypeScript; runtime checks are mandatory | Controlled after evidence |
|
||||
| T09 | DB/transport uncertainty is mislabeled as deliberate denial or conflict | Safe retry and exactly-once result | Timeout occurs before/after commit and client changes key or retries 503 | Exact 503/502/504/timeout/409 union; unknown outcome retries only with same idempotency key | Exhaustive fixture mapping and commit-before-timeout replay; N105-03, N110-23..27, N120-01/02 | KBN-105, 110, 120, 140 | External client may ignore retry rules | Controlled after evidence |
|
||||
| T10 | Assignment payload forges task version, target agent/session, role, expiry, or proposer | Work routing authority | Lease service trusts command DTO rather than persisted assignment | Persisted assignment identity; exactly-one principal/proposer; exact agent/session composite; acquire accepts IDs then reloads+locks | Cross-workspace and same-workspace target substitutions, stale task version, invalid role, expired assignment; N100-15..18, N210-03..08 | KBN-100, 200, 210 | Compromised authorized proposer can make harmful proposals | Controlled by approval/audit |
|
||||
| T11 | Approval proof is forged by value or borrowed from another assignment | Gate integrity | Caller submits `approved=true`, unrelated decision ID, stale policy, or self-approval | Relational approval bound to assignment; lock/reload; policy revision; author≠reviewer and mandatory SecReview | No proof-by-value DTO; wrong assignment/task/workspace/policy/actor/decision tests; N105-04, N210-09..14, N230-01 | KBN-105, 210, 230 | Colluding principals remain an organizational risk | Controlled after evidence |
|
||||
| T12 | Revoked policy or expired proposal/assignment is raced against lease acquisition | Routing policy | Approval and lease transactions do not lock/revalidate current rows | Lock assignment, approval, task, target session; compare current policy and expiry inside fresh-proof transaction | Concurrent revoke/expire/acquire tests with one valid terminal result; N210-17..19 | KBN-210, 230 | Clock skew if DB time is not canonical | Controlled after evidence |
|
||||
| T13 | Stale worker sends ack/heartbeat/checkpoint/review after reassignment | Canonical task and evidence state | Old process retains task/session IDs | Task-row-locked atomic monotonic bigint fence; every worker command carries exact lease/session/fence | Lower, expired, future, and other-task fences denied; old worker loses after new lease; N100-19/20, N210-20..24 | KBN-100, 210, 230 | Signed bigint exhaustion is theoretical | Controlled after evidence |
|
||||
| T14 | JavaScript precision truncates a fence | Stale-worker exclusion | bigint token is serialized as number above `2^53-1` | Drizzle bigint and decimal-string wire type only | `9007199254740993` and near-`int8` boundary round trips; numeric JSON rejected; N105-05, N210-25 | KBN-105, 210 | Nonconforming external clients | Controlled after evidence |
|
||||
| T15 | Checkpoint/evidence from another lease/task/session is submitted | Recovery and certification evidence | Same-workspace valid IDs are mixed | Exact lease composite binds workspace+task+assignment/session+fence; checkpoint composite binds lease+fence; evidence join plus semantic artifact-owner check | Same-workspace mismatched task/assignment/lease/session/checkpoint/artifact tests; N100-21..23, N210-26..31 | KBN-100, 210 | Artifact URI target may disappear outside DB | Controlled with digest/retention |
|
||||
| T16 | Outage note or pending/rejected proposal mutates/orders work | Sole SOT and gate integrity | Importer/UI treats note/proposal as task state | Proposals are inert; only explicit accept invokes normal typed command after recovery | Row/outbox/task counts unchanged for pending/rejected; no readiness/dependency/lease effect; N110-28..31 | KBN-110, 140 | Humans may act outside Mosaic operationally | Accepted as attributable residual |
|
||||
| T17 | Submission event is missing, foreign, or for another proposal | Proposal audit chain | Caller supplies an existing event UUID | Preallocated proposal ID; event-first same transaction; workspace composite FK; exact event type/aggregate/version semantic check | Missing/foreign/wrong-type/wrong-proposal event rolls back event+proposal; N100-24/25, N110-32..36 | KBN-100, 110 | Semantic checks are transaction code, not only FK | Controlled after evidence |
|
||||
| T18 | Acceptance borrows an unrelated command event | Proposal and target integrity | Same-workspace event exists for another target/command/proposal | Accept locks proposal+target, executes normal command, requires workspace/target match, causation=submission event, payload proposal ID | Foreign, wrong target/type/command/causation/payload event aborts target/event/proposal atomically; N100-26, N110-37..43 | KBN-100, 110 | Event payload schema drift | Controlled by KBN-105 fixtures |
|
||||
| T19 | Application role updates/deletes audit, approval evidence, checkpoint, or artifact | Nonrepudiation | Broad DB grants or parent cascade exists | INSERT/SELECT-only application roles; RESTRICT parent deletes; archive/cancel normal lifecycle | Role-level UPDATE/DELETE denied; parent delete RESTRICT; digest unchanged; N100-27..31 | KBN-100 | DB superuser can alter state | Break-glass/infra audit residual |
|
||||
| T20 | Break-glass purge is used as routine deletion or erases its own evidence | Retention and incident forensics | Elevated credential available | Separate audited retention procedure, bounded scope, reason, pre/post evidence, authority separation | Normal role denied; expired/missing approval denied; purge cannot delete its authorizing audit package; N115-01, N230-02/03 | KBN-115, 230 | Privileged DBA compromise | Accepted operational residual |
|
||||
| T21 | PostgreSQL unavailable or partitioned | Canonical state | Public health/Valkey remains live while transaction probe fails | Fail closed; no alternate writer/hidden queue; 503 only for proven not-applied; transport uncertainty remains unknown | Fault injection proves DB rows/outbox/files/Valkey unchanged on deliberate denial; commit-unknown replay; N110-44..48, N140-01 | KBN-110, 140, 230 | Availability loss is intentional | Accepted by Option A |
|
||||
| T22 | Valkey unavailable, duplicated, stale, or partitioned | Scheduling notifications | Queue wake is treated as truth or publication fails | Valkey derived/expendable; transactional outbox in PG; idempotent publisher; recovery from PG | Commit with Valkey down leaves pending outbox; replay publishes once logically; stale wake reloads PG; N110-49, N140-02, N230-04..06 | KBN-110, 210, 230 | Duplicate at-least-once delivery | Consumers must be idempotent |
|
||||
| T23 | Coordinator restarts between assignment, lease, checkpoint, or outbox steps | Durable orchestration truth | Process-local cache is treated as authority | PostgreSQL stores assignments, execution state, leases, fences, checkpoints, events, outbox; `recoverFromPostgres` | Restart at every transaction boundary reconstructs identical active/expired/pending sets without Valkey/files; N210-32..36, N230-07 | KBN-210, 230 | Recovery latency | Controlled after evidence |
|
||||
| T24 | Dependency cycle or concurrent reciprocal edge | Readiness and dispatch safety | Two transactions each see an acyclic graph before inserting | Unique directed edge; no self-edge; serialized recursive cycle check; readiness evaluates all blockers | Self/duplicate/cycle and concurrent A→B/B→A tests; all predecessor property test; N100-32..35, N200-01/02 | KBN-100, 200, 230 | Very large DAG performance | Bounded operational residual |
|
||||
| T25 | Parent-task cycle or project-incongruent relation | Planning hierarchy | Valid same-workspace IDs are arranged into an invalid tree | Project-congruent composites; serialized parent-cycle/orphan validation required by REQ-PLAN-001 | Self/indirect parent cycle, orphan, and cross-project mission/milestone/parent tests; N100-06..10 | KBN-100, 110 | Cycle validation is service/transaction enforced | Controlled after evidence |
|
||||
| T26 | Concurrent update, duplicate retry, or idempotency payload drift | Aggregate consistency | Two clients use same version/key with different payloads | Expected-version check; semantic event and outbox in same transaction; key returns prior immutable result only for identical command | One update wins; stale gets 409; duplicate identical returns prior; payload drift rejected; N110-50..54, N140-03 | KBN-105, 110, 140 | Long-lived clients face visible conflicts | Intentional user-visible residual |
|
||||
| T27 | State/event/outbox partial commit | Audit and notification consistency | Separate transactions or exception after state write | One PostgreSQL transaction for state+semantic event+outbox | Failure injected after each insert rolls all three back; success revisions align; N110-55..58 | KBN-110, 140 | Outbox publication remains asynchronous | Controlled after evidence |
|
||||
| T28 | Malicious/incorrect importer injects foreign workspace data or dispatchable work | Migration integrity | Source keys collide, lineage is absent, or importer has direct DB authority | Immutable source snapshots/checksums; one-way Gateway/migration-only port; workspace-safe idempotent modes; shadow records cannot dispatch | Foreign/malformed/duplicate/partial-resume/lineage checksum and no-dispatch tests; N300-01..08 | KBN-300, 330 | Source data may be semantically ambiguous | Quarantine and owner sign-off |
|
||||
| T29 | Cutover leaves legacy writer or forward/reverse sync active | Sole-writer invariant | Credentials/processes survive switch or rollback is improvised | Writer inventory, freeze, final delta, Gateway switch, credential shutdown, no dual write; rollback authority changes after first DB mutation | Process/credential inventory; concurrent-writer assertion; before/after-mutation rollback rehearsal; N320-01..06, N330-01 | KBN-320, 330, 340 | Missed external automation | Owner-gated residual |
|
||||
| T30 | Generated `TASKS.md`/`mission.json` is edited or parsed into DB | Canonical state | Current-main parser/writer remains reachable or file watcher imports changes | Generated non-authoritative header/IDs/time/revision; no production importer; regenerate/overwrite only | Static import search, tamper/regeneration, read-only permission, source-revision parity; N120-03..07, N140-04 | KBN-120, 140 | Humans may mistake snapshots for live data | Header and docs mitigate |
|
||||
| T31 | N-1 compatibility copies legacy ambiguity into canonical authority | Data integrity | Nullable/global/current-main fields are guessed during backfill | Nullable-first expand; deterministic mapping or quarantine; checksums; no new-only status before switch; legacy fields retained | Production-shape, ambiguous owner/assignee, status shadow, JSON/config/digest, rollback tests; N100-36..44 | KBN-100 | Quarantined records require human decision | Controlled by signed reconciliation |
|
||||
| T32 | Recovery posture claims durability not provided by mechanisms | Availability and audit retention | Shape-only validation or optimistic RPO is accepted | Normative validator; WAL/PITR/RPO/storage/high-assurance constraints; mechanism and restore evidence | Unknown/impossible/weakened configuration plus actual mechanism/restore tests; N115-02..08 | KBN-115 | Backup operator or storage compromise | Separate failure domain residual |
|
||||
| T33 | rc.3 frozen DDL could not create mission-scoped evidence/approval FKs | Tenant/evidence relational integrity | KBN-100 generated DDL from the rc.3 contract without an exact composite candidate key | rc.4 adds non-partial `missions_workspace_id_uidx(workspace_id,id)` before both dependent FKs while retaining global and project-congruent keys | KBN-100 must execute N100-45..50: exact-key reconciliation, candidate-before-FKs, duplicate feasibility, empty/prod/N-1/rollback, and both-child foreign-workspace negatives | KBN-100 after PR/CI/#753 release | Runtime DDL remains unimplemented and must prove the frozen order | **Resolved by rc.4 + independent APPROVE; implementation evidence remains required** |
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Constraint-impact matrix
|
||||
|
||||
| Impact ID | Required invariant | Frozen schema impact | API/transaction impact | Required evidence | Owner | Status |
|
||||
| --------- | ------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| CI-01 | Hard workspace tenancy and no oracle | `workspace_id`, workspace-aware unique/FKs on all canonical rows | Server-derived workspace; uniform denial on all surfaces | N100-01..14; N110-01..09; N130-01 | KBN-100/105/110/130 | Resolved by frozen controls |
|
||||
| CI-02 | Active user membership | Membership row plus unique `(workspace_id,user_id)`; active state retained | Recheck active membership in same authoritative transaction | N100-03; N110-06/07 | KBN-100/110 | Resolved; not FK-only |
|
||||
| CI-03 | Service identity least privilege/revocation | Agent/session workspace, lifecycle, state, roles, capabilities | Token maps to exact agent/session; command-family allowlist; DB recheck; no admin/raw DB fallback | N105-01; N110-10..13; N210-01/02 | KBN-105/110/210 | Resolved at auth/API layer |
|
||||
| CI-04 | Project-congruent hierarchy | Composite project/mission/milestone/parent/current-milestone relations | Lock/serialized parent-cycle and orphan validation | N100-06..10 | KBN-100/110 | Resolved; cycle behavior required |
|
||||
| CI-05 | Health-proof authority | Internal branded proof has transaction/time/policy fields | Probe and revalidate on same PG transaction; no public field | N105-02/03; N110-14..27 | KBN-105/110 | Resolved by frozen controls |
|
||||
| CI-06 | Assignment/approval identity | Exactly-one principal/proposer, exact agent/session assignment, relational approval | Reload+lock all IDs; compare version/target/state/expiry/policy/decision | N100-15..18; N210-03..19 | KBN-100/210 | Resolved by frozen controls |
|
||||
| CI-07 | Monotonic bigint fencing | Durable bigint counter, exact lease/fence keys, one active lease | Atomic increment/RETURNING; decimal-string DTO; reject every stale worker command | N100-19..23; N210-20..31 | KBN-100/105/210 | Resolved by frozen controls |
|
||||
| CI-08 | Proposal event chain | Both workspace-aware event FKs; event table created first | Exact submission/acceptance semantic checks in one transaction | N100-24..26; N110-28..43 | KBN-100/110 | Resolved; semantic checks not FK-only |
|
||||
| CI-09 | Immutable audit/evidence retention | RESTRICT parents; INSERT/SELECT-only immutable tables | Archive/cancel normal flow; separately authorized purge | N100-27..31; N115-01; N230-02/03 | KBN-100/115/230 | Resolved by frozen controls |
|
||||
| CI-10 | DB/Valkey/outbox/restart semantics | PG outbox and durable orchestration rows | Fail closed; same-key uncertainty retry; Valkey reloads PG; restart from PG | N110-44..49; N140-01/02; N230-04..07 | KBN-110/210/230 | Resolved by frozen controls |
|
||||
| CI-11 | DAG/race/idempotency/version | Unique edge; self check; event idempotency; aggregate versions | Serialized recursive cycle check; payload binding; expected-version conflict | N100-32..35; N110-50..58; N200-01/02 | KBN-100/110/200 | Resolved by frozen controls |
|
||||
| CI-12 | Import/cutover trust boundary | Lineage/artifact/event fields; shadow state cannot dispatch | One-way scoped importer, freeze, no direct DB/file authority, no dual writer | N300-01..08; N320-01..06 | KBN-300/320/330 | Resolved by frozen controls |
|
||||
| CI-13 | Generated-file no-import | No canonical file schema/import contract | Projection-only package; static reachability check removes current parser from production Kanban paths | N120-03..07; N140-04 | KBN-120/140 | Resolved by frozen controls |
|
||||
| CI-14 | Mission-scoped artifact and approval FKs | rc.4 adds non-partial `missions_workspace_id_uidx(workspace_id,id)` and retains global/project-congruent keys | KBN-100 must emit the candidate before both exact RESTRICT FKs and preserve N-1/rollback order | N100-45..50: exact reconciliation, duplicate feasibility, empty/prod/N-1/rollback, and separate artifact/approval foreign-workspace negatives | KBN-100 after PR/CI/#753 release | **Resolved by rc.4 and independent APPROVE; future executable evidence required** |
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Exact future negative-test catalog
|
||||
|
||||
These names are normative evidence identifiers for future slices. Equivalent test-file names are acceptable only if traceability retains these IDs and expected outcomes.
|
||||
|
||||
### KBN-100 — schema and migration
|
||||
|
||||
- **N100-01** reject every canonical child row whose `workspace_id` differs from its parent.
|
||||
- **N100-02** reject foreign-workspace link, artifact, proposal target, dependency, assignment, lease, checkpoint, approval, and event relationships.
|
||||
- **N100-03** reject an inactive/revoked member as accountable owner, proposer, decision actor, archive actor, or user principal in the authoritative command transaction.
|
||||
- **N100-04** reject a team/project relation crossing workspaces.
|
||||
- **N100-05** reject a team authorization path when the user lacks active membership in the team's workspace.
|
||||
- **N100-06** reject task→mission project mismatch.
|
||||
- **N100-07** reject task→milestone and project→current-milestone project mismatch.
|
||||
- **N100-08** reject task→parent project mismatch and self-parent.
|
||||
- **N100-09** reject indirect parent cycles under concurrent transactions.
|
||||
- **N100-10** reject mission→milestone project mismatch/orphan.
|
||||
- **N100-11** reject checkpoint artifact from another workspace.
|
||||
- **N100-12** reject checkpoint artifact owned by another same-workspace task/mission unless an explicitly frozen evidence rule permits it.
|
||||
- **N100-13** reject approval evidence from another workspace.
|
||||
- **N100-14** reject same-workspace approval evidence unrelated to the approval target.
|
||||
- **N100-15** reject zero/multiple assignment principals and zero/multiple proposers.
|
||||
- **N100-16** reject target session without its exact target agent.
|
||||
- **N100-17** reject assignment task/agent/session crossing workspaces.
|
||||
- **N100-18** reject non-positive task version and expired assignment acquisition.
|
||||
- **N100-19** concurrent lease insert permits one active lease and returns one winner.
|
||||
- **N100-20** successive leases return strictly increasing bigint fences.
|
||||
- **N100-21** reject checkpoint with another task, lease, or fence.
|
||||
- **N100-22** reject duplicate/non-monotonic checkpoint sequence.
|
||||
- **N100-23** reject evidence join for a mismatched checkpoint/task.
|
||||
- **N100-24** proposal insert without exact submission event fails atomically.
|
||||
- **N100-25** foreign/wrong-type/wrong-proposal submission event fails atomically.
|
||||
- **N100-26** foreign/wrong-target/unrelated acceptance event fails atomically.
|
||||
- **N100-27** application role cannot UPDATE/DELETE `task_events`.
|
||||
- **N100-28** application role cannot UPDATE/DELETE checkpoints/artifacts/evidence joins.
|
||||
- **N100-29** parent hard delete is RESTRICTed while audit/evidence children exist.
|
||||
- **N100-30** archive does not alter canonical lifecycle status.
|
||||
- **N100-31** purge without break-glass authority/evidence is denied.
|
||||
- **N100-32** reject dependency self-edge and duplicate directed pair regardless of type.
|
||||
- **N100-33** reject direct and indirect dependency cycles.
|
||||
- **N100-34** concurrent reciprocal dependency inserts cannot both commit.
|
||||
- **N100-35** readiness remains false until every blocking predecessor and completion condition passes.
|
||||
- **N100-36** empty DB migration succeeds after the contract amendment.
|
||||
- **N100-37** production-shape expand retains all legacy declarations.
|
||||
- **N100-38** crash/resume backfill is idempotent and checksum-stable.
|
||||
- **N100-39** ambiguous workspace/owner/assignee is quarantined, never guessed.
|
||||
- **N100-40** no `ready`/`in_review` status is emitted to N-1 readers before switch.
|
||||
- **N100-41** `mission_tasks.status` cannot remain a write source.
|
||||
- **N100-42** tags/assignee/date/mission JSON/config/description/agent fields reconcile without loss.
|
||||
- **N100-43** claimed fleet backlog rows are quarantined and imported rows cannot dispatch.
|
||||
- **N100-44** pre-switch rollback works while post-first-mutation rollback requires freeze/reconciliation.
|
||||
- **N100-45** reconcile both exact child FK column lists to the rc.4 `(workspace_id,id)` mission candidate while retaining the global `id` primary key and `(workspace_id,project_id,id)` key.
|
||||
- **N100-46** empty-DB migration creates `missions_workspace_id_uidx` before `artifacts_workspace_mission_fk` and `approval_decisions_workspace_mission_fk`.
|
||||
- **N100-47** production-shape preflight finds no duplicate `(workspace_id,id)` groups, preserves global `id` uniqueness, and applies the candidate before both dependent FKs.
|
||||
- **N100-48** N-1 startup/read/write remains unchanged; pre-switch rollback drops both dependents before the candidate and preserves the global/project-congruent keys.
|
||||
- **N100-49** artifact insert using a valid mission ID paired with a foreign workspace fails before commit.
|
||||
- **N100-50** approval-decision insert using a valid mission ID paired with a foreign workspace fails before commit.
|
||||
|
||||
### KBN-105/KBN-110/KBN-120/KBN-130/KBN-140 — API and P1
|
||||
|
||||
- **N105-01** every route has an explicit user/service command-family policy; user/admin tokens cannot call service-only Coordinator mutations.
|
||||
- **N105-02** public DTO validation rejects `writeProof`, internal context, body `workspaceId`, and caller-asserted health.
|
||||
- **N105-03** fixture exhaustiveness prevents 503, 502/504/timeout, and 409 cross-mapping.
|
||||
- **N105-04** approval DTO accepts an ID and decision command only, never approval proof-by-value.
|
||||
- **N105-05** all fence fields accept/emit decimal strings and reject JSON numbers.
|
||||
- **N110-01** listing with a foreign `workspaceId` or foreign filter ID follows the frozen no-oracle denial and returns no rows/counts/cursors.
|
||||
- **N110-02** get by foreign or nonexistent aggregate ID has the same frozen denial shape and no foreign metadata.
|
||||
- **N110-03** create/update/archive with a foreign owner, parent, project, mission, milestone, tag, or target ID is denied before mutation.
|
||||
- **N110-04** dependency/proposal commands with foreign target IDs are denied with unchanged state/event/outbox counts.
|
||||
- **N110-05** REST, MCP, WebSocket, and internal Coordinator paths produce equivalent no-oracle behavior for the same foreign ID.
|
||||
- **N110-06** a revoked/inactive owner is denied even with a still-valid Better Auth session.
|
||||
- **N110-07** stale membership/team cache cannot authorize a proposer, decision actor, archive actor, or principal after revocation.
|
||||
- **N110-08** a team ID from another workspace cannot authorize or own the command target.
|
||||
- **N110-09** same-workspace but wrong-project mission/milestone/parent IDs are denied inside the transaction.
|
||||
- **N110-10** an expired service token is denied before repository access.
|
||||
- **N110-11** an audience- or workspace-mismatched service token is denied without an existence oracle.
|
||||
- **N110-12** an over-scoped service token cannot call a command family absent from its role/capability allowlist.
|
||||
- **N110-13** disabled agent or ended session revokes service-token command authority immediately on PostgreSQL recheck.
|
||||
- **N110-14** contradictory public health state/boolean combinations fail validation.
|
||||
- **N110-15** Valkey-only liveness cannot mint or substitute a PostgreSQL write proof.
|
||||
- **N110-16** caller-forged public `healthy` cannot enter internal mutation context.
|
||||
- **N110-17** public REST/MCP/CLI bodies containing health/proof fields are rejected.
|
||||
- **N110-18** an expired internal proof produces no state/event/outbox write.
|
||||
- **N110-19** a future-dated or not-yet-valid proof produces no write.
|
||||
- **N110-20** a policy-revision-mismatched proof produces no write.
|
||||
- **N110-21** a proof minted on another transaction/connection produces no write.
|
||||
- **N110-22** a proof that expires before the final pre-mutation check produces no write.
|
||||
- **N110-23** deliberate read-only/write-unavailable denial maps only to authoritative 503/not-applied/non-retryable.
|
||||
- **N110-24** timeout before commit maps to transport-unknown and permits only same-key retry.
|
||||
- **N110-25** timeout after commit maps to transport-unknown and same-key retry returns the committed canonical result once.
|
||||
- **N110-26** expected-version mismatch maps only to 409/not-applied/non-retryable.
|
||||
- **N110-27** recovery replay with a changed idempotency key cannot masquerade as the original uncertain request.
|
||||
- **N110-28** pending proposal cannot alter target fields/status/rank/version.
|
||||
- **N110-29** rejected proposal cannot affect readiness, dependencies, or gates.
|
||||
- **N110-30** pending/rejected proposal cannot create an assignment or lease.
|
||||
- **N110-31** direct proposal-row state manipulation cannot bypass normal command execution.
|
||||
- **N110-32** proposal submission without a submission event rolls back fully.
|
||||
- **N110-33** foreign-workspace submission event rolls back fully.
|
||||
- **N110-34** wrong aggregate/event type submission event rolls back fully.
|
||||
- **N110-35** same-workspace event for another proposal rolls back fully.
|
||||
- **N110-36** submission event with wrong previous/new version semantics rolls back fully.
|
||||
- **N110-37** foreign-workspace acceptance event rolls back proposal, target, event, and outbox.
|
||||
- **N110-38** same-workspace event for another target aggregate rolls back acceptance.
|
||||
- **N110-39** event from an unrelated normal command rolls back acceptance.
|
||||
- **N110-40** event caused by a different submission event rolls back acceptance.
|
||||
- **N110-41** event whose payload lacks or changes `changeProposalId` rolls back acceptance.
|
||||
- **N110-42** event for another proposal with the same target/command rolls back acceptance.
|
||||
- **N110-43** missing accepted-command event after target handling rolls back the entire transaction.
|
||||
- **N110-44** read-only-degraded denial changes no DB row/outbox/file/Valkey/provider state.
|
||||
- **N110-45** write-unavailable denial changes no DB row/outbox/file/Valkey/provider state.
|
||||
- **N110-46** PostgreSQL disconnect cannot redirect a command to any fallback writer.
|
||||
- **N110-47** commit uncertainty remains `unknown` and never becomes a fabricated 503/not-applied result.
|
||||
- **N110-48** same-key replay after recovery returns one canonical result with no duplicate event/outbox row.
|
||||
- **N110-49** Valkey publication failure leaves committed PG outbox pending and replayable.
|
||||
- **N110-50** two same-version updates produce one winner and one visible 409 loser.
|
||||
- **N110-51** identical duplicate key+payload returns the prior immutable result without another event/outbox row.
|
||||
- **N110-52** same key with payload/command drift is rejected as an idempotency conflict.
|
||||
- **N110-53** the same key in another workspace cannot reveal or reuse the first workspace's result.
|
||||
- **N110-54** stale reconnect/update cannot silently overwrite a newer aggregate revision.
|
||||
- **N110-55** failure after state write but before semantic event rolls back state.
|
||||
- **N110-56** failure after semantic event but before outbox rolls back state and event.
|
||||
- **N110-57** failure after outbox insert but before commit rolls back state, event, and outbox.
|
||||
- **N110-58** success commits matching aggregate/event/outbox revisions and correlation/causation.
|
||||
- **N120-01** CLI never retries an authoritative 503 deliberate denial.
|
||||
- **N120-02** CLI retries only transport-unknown outcomes and preserves the exact idempotency key.
|
||||
- **N120-03** generated projection header contains non-authoritative warning, workspace/project IDs, generated time, and source revision.
|
||||
- **N120-04** projection revision and records match the API snapshot revision exactly.
|
||||
- **N120-05** hand-tampering is overwritten or rejected by regeneration and never mutates PostgreSQL.
|
||||
- **N120-06** static/runtime reachability finds no parser/import path from `TASKS.md`, `mission.json`, or another export.
|
||||
- **N120-07** projection writer has no domain mutation/raw SQL/Valkey authority.
|
||||
- **N130-01** UI foreign/no-access/not-found state follows the frozen no-oracle response and renders no stale foreign data.
|
||||
- **N140-01** real-Gateway DB fault journey proves fail-closed no-fallback behavior.
|
||||
- **N140-02** real-Gateway Valkey-loss journey proves pending outbox replay.
|
||||
- **N140-03** real-Gateway concurrent update/retry journey proves version and idempotency semantics.
|
||||
- **N140-04** generated-file tamper journey proves projection parity and no import.
|
||||
|
||||
### KBN-115/KBN-200/KBN-210/KBN-230 — recovery and coordination
|
||||
|
||||
- **N115-01** retention purge without current break-glass authority, reason, immutable evidence, or bounded scope is denied and audited.
|
||||
- **N115-02** recovery posture with an unknown top-level or storage field is rejected.
|
||||
- **N115-03** PITR retention without WAL archival is rejected.
|
||||
- **N115-04** WAL archival with zero PITR retention is rejected.
|
||||
- **N115-05** claimed RPO better than the configured backup/WAL mechanism is rejected.
|
||||
- **N115-06** unencrypted, optional, or same-failure-domain storage is rejected.
|
||||
- **N115-07** weakened high-assurance values are rejected.
|
||||
- **N115-08** shape-only validation cannot pass without normative mechanism and restore evidence.
|
||||
- **N200-01** cyclic/incomplete dependency snapshots never become eligible.
|
||||
- **N200-02** identical immutable snapshot+policy+time returns identical ordering and explanation with no I/O/model import.
|
||||
- **N210-01** disabled agent cannot claim, ack, heartbeat, checkpoint, or submit review.
|
||||
- **N210-02** ended/offline/mismatched session cannot claim, ack, heartbeat, checkpoint, or submit review.
|
||||
- **N210-03** foreign-workspace task is rejected after lock/reload without an oracle.
|
||||
- **N210-04** stale task version is rejected before fence increment.
|
||||
- **N210-05** assignment target agent mismatch is rejected.
|
||||
- **N210-06** target session mismatch is rejected.
|
||||
- **N210-07** expired assignment is rejected.
|
||||
- **N210-08** assignment in rejected/released/expired/superseded/leased-invalid state is rejected.
|
||||
- **N210-09** missing approval is rejected.
|
||||
- **N210-10** rejected/escalated/requested approval is rejected as approval authority.
|
||||
- **N210-11** stale policy-revision approval is rejected.
|
||||
- **N210-12** foreign-workspace approval is rejected without an oracle.
|
||||
- **N210-13** approval for another assignment is rejected.
|
||||
- **N210-14** author self-approval/review is rejected when independence is required.
|
||||
- **N210-15** foreign-workspace artifact evidence is rejected.
|
||||
- **N210-16** same-workspace artifact unrelated to the assignment/task/gate is rejected.
|
||||
- **N210-17** concurrent policy revocation versus acquire cannot produce a lease under the revoked revision.
|
||||
- **N210-18** concurrent assignment expiry versus acquire cannot produce a lease after expiry.
|
||||
- **N210-19** concurrent session end versus acquire cannot produce a lease for the ended session.
|
||||
- **N210-20** lower fencing token is rejected without writes.
|
||||
- **N210-21** token from an older lease is rejected without writes.
|
||||
- **N210-22** token paired with another task is rejected without writes.
|
||||
- **N210-23** token paired with another session is rejected without writes.
|
||||
- **N210-24** token on an expired/revoked/released lease is rejected without writes.
|
||||
- **N210-25** fences above JavaScript safe integer round-trip exactly as decimal strings.
|
||||
- **N210-26** lease task does not match assignment task and is rejected.
|
||||
- **N210-27** lease agent/session does not match assignment target and is rejected.
|
||||
- **N210-28** checkpoint task does not match lease task and is rejected.
|
||||
- **N210-29** checkpoint fence does not match exact lease fence and is rejected.
|
||||
- **N210-30** checkpoint sequence duplicate/regression is rejected.
|
||||
- **N210-31** checkpoint artifact does not match workspace/task/evidence semantics and is rejected.
|
||||
- **N210-32** restart after assignment persistence reconstructs the pending assignment.
|
||||
- **N210-33** restart after lease commit reconstructs exact active lease and fence.
|
||||
- **N210-34** restart after checkpoint commit reconstructs checkpoint/recovery state.
|
||||
- **N210-35** restart during expiry/retry/quarantine reconstructs durable disposition and eligibility.
|
||||
- **N210-36** restart with pending outbox reconstructs publication work without Valkey/files.
|
||||
- **N230-01** author=self-review and missing mandatory SecReview cannot certify or complete.
|
||||
- **N230-02** normal application role cannot execute retention purge.
|
||||
- **N230-03** break-glass purge cannot delete or alter its own authorization/evidence chain.
|
||||
- **N230-04** Valkey down leaves canonical work in PostgreSQL/outbox.
|
||||
- **N230-05** duplicate wake produces one logical effect after PostgreSQL reload/idempotency.
|
||||
- **N230-06** stale wake cannot revive an expired/revoked assignment or lease.
|
||||
- **N230-07** restart with no Valkey/files reconstructs leases/retry/quarantine/outbox exactly.
|
||||
|
||||
### KBN-300/KBN-320/KBN-330/KBN-340 — migration and cutover
|
||||
|
||||
- **N300-01** source record targeting another workspace is denied/quarantined without an oracle.
|
||||
- **N300-02** malformed source record is rejected with attributable reject evidence.
|
||||
- **N300-03** duplicate source system/key/batch replay is idempotent.
|
||||
- **N300-04** source snapshot/checksum drift aborts apply/verify.
|
||||
- **N300-05** partial import resumes from durable lineage without duplicating state/events.
|
||||
- **N300-06** imported shadow record cannot become ready, assigned, or leased automatically.
|
||||
- **N300-07** missing source key/file/checksum/batch lineage prevents apply/sign-off.
|
||||
- **N300-08** importer cannot use direct DB, generated file, Valkey, or provider issue as canonical write authority.
|
||||
- **N320-01** cutover without a verified write freeze fails safe.
|
||||
- **N320-02** active legacy writer process or credential blocks cutover.
|
||||
- **N320-03** reverse and forward synchronization cannot run concurrently.
|
||||
- **N320-04** failed final delta/reconciliation blocks client switch.
|
||||
- **N320-05** rollback before first canonical DB mutation may switch authority back only after freeze assertion.
|
||||
- **N320-06** rollback after first canonical mutation requires freeze, DB-delta export/reconciliation, and owner decision.
|
||||
- **N330-01** rehearsal cannot sign off while counts/checksums/exceptions/writer inventory differ.
|
||||
- **N340-01** cutover cannot proceed without owner authorization, terminal evidence, scoped identities, and zero active legacy writers.
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Requirements traceability
|
||||
|
||||
| Requirement | Threats/impacts | Planned evidence |
|
||||
| ---------------- | ---------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| REQ-SOT-001 | T16, T21, T22, T27, T29, T30 | N110-28..31, N110-44..49, N110-55..58, N120-03..07, N320-01..06 |
|
||||
| REQ-SOT-002 | T07, T08, T09, T21 | N105-02/03, N110-14..27, N110-44..48 |
|
||||
| REQ-SOT-003 | T30 | N120-03..07, N140-04 |
|
||||
| REQ-SOT-004 | T16..18 | N100-24..26, N110-28..43 |
|
||||
| REQ-TEN-001 | T01..05, T15, T33 | N100-01..14, N100-45..50, N110-01..09, N210-15/16 |
|
||||
| REQ-ID-001 | T02, T03, T06, T10..12 | N105-01, N110-06..13, N210-01..19 |
|
||||
| REQ-PLAN-001 | T04, T25 | N100-06..10 |
|
||||
| REQ-TASK-001 | T13, T26, T31 | N100-20, N100-37..42, N110-50..54 |
|
||||
| REQ-TASK-002 | T16, T24 | N110-28..31, N100-35, N200-01 |
|
||||
| REQ-DEP-001 | T24 | N100-32..35, N200-01 |
|
||||
| REQ-ASN-001 | T10..12 | N100-15..18, N210-03..19 |
|
||||
| REQ-AUD-001 | T17..20, T22, T27 | N100-24..31, N110-32..43, N110-49, N110-55..58 |
|
||||
| REQ-API-001 | T01, T06..18, T26 | N105-01..05 plus KBN-110 catalog |
|
||||
| REQ-UI-002/003 | T01, T15, T26 | N130-01 and real-Gateway KBN-140 journeys |
|
||||
| REQ-COORD-001 | T22..24 | N200-01/02, N210-32..36 |
|
||||
| REQ-COORD-002 | T10..12, T16 | N210-03..19, N110-28..31 |
|
||||
| REQ-COORD-003 | T13..15, T23 | N100-19..23, N210-20..36 |
|
||||
| REQ-COORD-004 | T23, T26 | N210-32..36, N230-07 |
|
||||
| REQ-GATE-001/002 | T11, T19, T20 | N210-09..14, N230-01..03 |
|
||||
| REQ-REC-001 | T20, T32 | N115-01..08 |
|
||||
| REQ-MIG-001/002 | T28, T29, T31 | N100-37..44, N300-01..08, N320-01..06, N330-01, N340-01 |
|
||||
|
||||
REQ-UI-001 and REQ-UI-004 are downstream functional/accessibility requirements rather than schema-threat controls; they remain owned by KBN-130/KBN-140. Their security-relevant tenancy, conflict, and stale-reconnect portions are covered above.
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Issue #753 acceptance mapping
|
||||
|
||||
| Issue requirement/criterion | Evidence in this document | Result |
|
||||
| --------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| Cross-workspace owners, principals, evidence, project hierarchy | T01–T05, T15, T25; CI-01–04 | Mapped |
|
||||
| Active membership and service-token boundaries | Authorization matrix; T02, T03, T06; CI-02/03 | Mapped |
|
||||
| Stale/forged health and transaction-local proof | T07–T09, T21; CI-05 | Mapped |
|
||||
| Assignment/approval forgery and monotonic fencing | T10–T15; CI-06/07 | Mapped |
|
||||
| Change-proposal abuse and event binding | T16–T18; CI-08 | Mapped |
|
||||
| Immutable audit and break-glass | T19/T20; CI-09 | Mapped |
|
||||
| PostgreSQL/Valkey failures | T21–T23; CI-10 | Mapped |
|
||||
| Dependency/idempotency/version races | T24–T27; CI-11 | Mapped |
|
||||
| Import/cutover and generated-file boundary | T28–T31; CI-12/13 | Mapped |
|
||||
| Every schema/API/test impact explicit | Constraint matrix and negative-test catalog | Mapped |
|
||||
| No unresolved schema impact | CI-14; rc.4 resolved-impact record | **PASS — none unresolved** |
|
||||
| Independent SecReview | Homelab non-author exact commit/tree/content review | **PASS / APPROVE** |
|
||||
| PR merge, terminal-green main CI, and #753 closure | Orchestrator-owned post-worker gates | Pending; KBN-100 remains held until completion |
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. UNRESOLVED SCHEMA IMPACTS
|
||||
|
||||
none
|
||||
|
||||
### Resolved-impact record — KBN010-SI-001
|
||||
|
||||
- **Historical detection:** rc.3 lacked an exact `(workspace_id,id)` candidate key for the artifact and approval-decision mission FKs. This document's original BLOCKED verdict was correct and remains preserved in §1 and T33.
|
||||
- **Resolution:** rc.4 adds non-partial `missions_workspace_id_uidx(workspace_id,id)` before both exact dependent FKs while retaining the global primary key and project-congruent key.
|
||||
- **Reviewed object:** commit `3f6a3387b419eb99453ee10dd25ba888faaab0b5`, tree `7ebab8fa530a7180036928cea9527f808548aa14`.
|
||||
- **Corroborating identities:** full-index SHA-256 `6b40a76265c4f3e6d1d30a7f262a2dd16e0d51997e99c146b59f527e6524cd42`; stable patch-id `058cf98026fcd1043703c866aee047c8bb144740`.
|
||||
- **Independent verdict:** Homelab non-author schema/security review **APPROVE**. It confirmed PostgreSQL candidate/FK validity, unchanged tenant and polymorphic exactly-one-target safety, RESTRICT/no-cascade semantics, N-1/rollback validity, and no shared table/index/FK/identity/fence authority collision with #757.
|
||||
- **Digest interpretation:** a command-rendered patch digest varied with rendering command/options and is non-authoritative. Git commit + tree + exact file content are canonical; stable full-index SHA-256 and stable patch-id corroborate that identity.
|
||||
- **Residual implementation obligations:** KBN-100 must create the candidate before both dependent FKs; prove production-shape duplicate feasibility without weakening global uniqueness; pass empty/prod/N-1/rollback tests; reconcile both exact FK targets; and separately reject foreign-workspace mission references for artifacts and approval decisions (N100-45..50).
|
||||
- **Implementation status:** no runtime schema, migration, API, or deployment implementation is claimed by this gate disposition.
|
||||
|
||||
## 10. Residual risk and handoff
|
||||
|
||||
- Active membership, polymorphic targets, same-task evidence semantics, parent/DAG cycle checks, token scope, and no-oracle behavior depend on authoritative transaction code and must not be treated as FK-only guarantees.
|
||||
- DB superuser and break-glass compromise cannot be eliminated by application constraints; separation of duties, immutable external backup/audit evidence, drills, and monitoring remain required.
|
||||
- PostgreSQL unavailability intentionally sacrifices writes for integrity. Transport-unknown outcomes remain safe only when clients preserve the exact idempotency key.
|
||||
- Imported ambiguous records remain quarantined until owner sign-off; no automated mapping may convert ambiguity into authority.
|
||||
- SI-001 is resolved at frozen contract/design-review level only. KBN-100 still owes N100-45..50 executable migration evidence.
|
||||
|
||||
**Handoff status:** KBN-010 **PASS / GO** at rc.4. KBN-100 remains held until this PR squash-merges, terminal-green CI completes on `main`, and issue #753 closes; the orchestrator owns those remaining gates.
|
||||
@@ -1,21 +1,9 @@
|
||||
# Native Kanban/SOT — Remediated Shared Contract v1
|
||||
|
||||
**Status:** CONTROL-PLANE SI-001 AMENDMENT AUTHORIZED; prior KCR-001–016 independent-review GO retained; rc.4 requires independent schema/SecReview before KBN-100
|
||||
**Version:** 1.0.0-rc.4
|
||||
**Status:** INDEPENDENT REVIEW GO; freezes as v1 when issue #751 canon merges to `main`
|
||||
**Version:** 1.0.0-rc.3
|
||||
**Date:** 2026-07-14
|
||||
**Change authority:** Mosaic control plane/Jason only
|
||||
**SI-001 amendment authority:** `web1:mosaic-100` control-plane decision under issue #753
|
||||
|
||||
## Amendment record
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.0.0-rc.4 — KBN010-SI-001
|
||||
|
||||
- **Choice:** add the explicitly named, non-partial unique candidate key `missions_workspace_id_uidx` on `missions(workspace_id, id)` and retain `missions_workspace_project_id_uidx` on `(workspace_id, project_id, id)`.
|
||||
- **Rationale:** mission `id` remains globally unique, while the composite candidate key makes the frozen tenant-safe generic mission relations valid. `artifacts` and `approval_decisions` are polymorphic exactly-one-target records and do not consistently carry `project_id`; widening both children would unnecessarily broaden v1 and its target semantics.
|
||||
- **Exact effect:** `artifacts_workspace_mission_fk` and `approval_decisions_workspace_mission_fk` continue to reference the exact ordered columns `missions(workspace_id, id)` with RESTRICT deletion, now backed by a matching candidate key.
|
||||
- **Non-effect:** no SOT, tenancy, project-congruence, proposal-audit, approval, fencing, immutability, no-cascade, API, or wire-version invariant changes. The `SuccessEnvelopeV1.contractVersion` remains `1.0.0`.
|
||||
- **Historical evidence boundary:** `KBN-010-THREAT-AUTH-CONSTRAINT-GATE.md` intentionally remains the immutable rc.3 blocker verdict that detected SI-001; this rc.4 record and the #753 scratchpad append are the authorized disposition. Rewriting the gate verdict is outside this amendment's exclusive scope.
|
||||
- **Gate:** this amendment resolves the DDL defect identified by KBN010-SI-001 but does not itself lift KBN-100; independent schema/SecReview remains required.
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Authority
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -55,7 +43,6 @@ Complete declaration: `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts`.
|
||||
- Specialist roles everywhere: `planning | enhance | coder | review | security-review | pr-monitor | certifier`.
|
||||
- Owner uses exactly-one user/team; assignment principal exactly-one user/team/agent; users require active membership; agent/session and all evidence are workspace-bound.
|
||||
- Task→mission/milestone/parent, mission→milestone, and project→current-milestone are project-congruent composite relations.
|
||||
- Mission `id` remains globally unique. The additional non-partial `missions_workspace_id_uidx` candidate key on `(workspace_id, id)` exists only to support the frozen workspace-safe polymorphic artifact and approval-decision mission relations; the project-congruent `(workspace_id, project_id, id)` key remains authoritative wherever `project_id` is present.
|
||||
- Dependency identity is workspace+predecessor+successor independent of type.
|
||||
- Approval evidence and checkpoint evidence are workspace-scoped joins to immutable artifacts, never JSON ID arrays.
|
||||
- Proposal audit links are composite relations: `(workspace_id, submitted_audit_event_id)` and `(workspace_id, accepted_command_audit_event_id)` reference `task_events(workspace_id, id)` with RESTRICT deletion.
|
||||
@@ -89,20 +76,7 @@ Legacy columns remain declared in unified `schema.ts` for expand + full N-1/roll
|
||||
6. **Switch:** stop N-1 writers; Gateway sole command boundary; enable canonical statuses.
|
||||
7. **Contract release:** later release after rollback/N-1; remove compatibility/global uniques/legacy fields.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.2 Mission candidate-key and dependent-FK DDL order
|
||||
|
||||
KBN-100 migration DDL must execute the SI-001 portion in this order:
|
||||
|
||||
1. expand/backfill `missions.workspace_id` and `missions.project_id` while preserving the global `missions.id` primary key and the project-congruent `missions_workspace_project_id_uidx` key;
|
||||
2. prove duplicate-key feasibility on the production-shape dataset: `(workspace_id, id)` has no duplicate groups and global `id` uniqueness remains intact;
|
||||
3. create the non-partial unique index `missions_workspace_id_uidx` on exact ordered columns `(workspace_id, id)`;
|
||||
4. only after step 3, create/alter `artifacts` and add `artifacts_workspace_mission_fk` from `(workspace_id, mission_id)` to exact `missions(workspace_id, id)` with `ON DELETE RESTRICT`;
|
||||
5. only after step 3, create/alter `approval_decisions` and add `approval_decisions_workspace_mission_fk` from `(workspace_id, mission_id)` to exact `missions(workspace_id, id)` with `ON DELETE RESTRICT`;
|
||||
6. validate both constraints and prove a mission ID paired with a foreign workspace is rejected for each child.
|
||||
|
||||
The candidate key is intentionally redundant with globally unique `missions.id`, but PostgreSQL requires a matching unique candidate key for the exact two-column FK target. It is additive and N-1-safe. Pre-switch rollback drops the two dependent FKs/tables before dropping this candidate key, preserves the global primary key and project-congruent key, and follows the existing freeze/reconciliation rule after the first canonical mutation.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.3 New audit/proposal DDL order
|
||||
### 5.2 New audit/proposal DDL order
|
||||
|
||||
KBN-100 migration DDL must execute in this order:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -114,39 +88,36 @@ KBN-100 migration DDL must execute in this order:
|
||||
|
||||
The submission transaction inserts the event first using a preallocated proposal UUID, then the proposal. Acceptance inserts the normal command event before updating the locked proposal. Neither FK is omitted or replaced by a bare UUID/index check.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.4 Field map
|
||||
### 5.3 Field map
|
||||
|
||||
| Current | Expand/backfill | N-1 compatibility | Switch/contract |
|
||||
| ---------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| global `teams`, `team_members` | add workspace nullable; bootstrap; validate active owners | retain global slug/FKs | workspace composites; global unique contracts later |
|
||||
| `projects.status` | add `canonical_status`; map active/paused/completed/archived | mirror representable values; no `planning` | canonical authority; legacy contracts later |
|
||||
| project `owner_id/team_id/owner_type` | add exact accountable user/team; deterministic map or quarantine | preserve old reads and compare drift | canonical exact-one; remove legacy after parity |
|
||||
| current milestone | create milestones then join table (no circular DDL) | absent to N-1 | join is authority |
|
||||
| nullable `missions.project_id` | derive workspace/project; null/orphan exception, never guess | keep nullable legacy read | canonical required; validate/set NOT NULL later |
|
||||
| mission relational candidate keys | retain global `id` PK and project-congruent key; add non-partial `(workspace_id,id)` key before artifact/approval FKs | additive key is ignored safely by N-1 readers/writers | retain both composite keys; generic mission children use exact workspace+ID target |
|
||||
| mission `description` | add objective; preserve description; reviewed nonblank mapping | N-1 description | objective authority; retain until signed review |
|
||||
| `missions.status` | add canonical; planning→draft, active/paused/completed/failed same | no new-only statuses emitted | canonical authority |
|
||||
| mission `milestones` JSON | normalize with source digest; preserve malformed/original | N-1 reads JSON; no reverse sync | normalized authority; JSON removed after checksum sign-off |
|
||||
| mission config/metadata/phase/user | retain all; map known typed policy only | all remain declared | remove only by signed consumer inventory |
|
||||
| nullable `tasks.project_id` | derive explicit/mission project; orphan quarantine | retain nullable read/write during compatibility | canonical required; NOT NULL later |
|
||||
| `tasks.mission_id` | add project-congruent composite | old relation readable | composite authority |
|
||||
| `tasks.status` | canonical: not-started→backlog, in-progress→in_progress, others same | no ready/in_review emission | canonical authority |
|
||||
| `tasks.assignee` | deterministic active user/team/agent assignment; raw value preserved if ambiguous | mirror text only if unambiguous | canonical owner/assignment; remove after no-loss sign-off |
|
||||
| `tasks.tags` JSON | normalize trim/case/dedupe with original digest | transactionally mirror normalized rows | normalized authority; JSON later removed |
|
||||
| `tasks.due_date` | copy exactly to `due_at` | mirror | due_at authority; legacy later |
|
||||
| task common fields | preserve metadata byte-for-byte; add criteria/rank/retry/archive/version/fence | old reads valid | new fields canonical |
|
||||
| `mission_tasks.status` | keep; prohibit as write source; linked status ignored; unlinked becomes task or reject | read-only compatibility value | membership uses task mission; status dropped after no readers |
|
||||
| mission-task notes/PR/user | map to metadata/artifact/event/link/attribution; preserve | read-only | remove after parity |
|
||||
| `agents.status` | add workspace/lifecycle/runtime/roles; status remains presence | retain all legacy fields | lifecycle/roles authority; status may remain telemetry |
|
||||
| agent project/owner/prompt/tools/skills/config | preserve; validate tenant; derive typed capabilities without loss | N-1 reads | removal only by separate inventory |
|
||||
| fleet `backlog` | map to designated-project tasks; edges; claimed rows quarantine | freeze claims before switch; read-only compare | task/lease authority; retire after stabilization |
|
||||
| Current | Expand/backfill | N-1 compatibility | Switch/contract |
|
||||
| ---------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| global `teams`, `team_members` | add workspace nullable; bootstrap; validate active owners | retain global slug/FKs | workspace composites; global unique contracts later |
|
||||
| `projects.status` | add `canonical_status`; map active/paused/completed/archived | mirror representable values; no `planning` | canonical authority; legacy contracts later |
|
||||
| project `owner_id/team_id/owner_type` | add exact accountable user/team; deterministic map or quarantine | preserve old reads and compare drift | canonical exact-one; remove legacy after parity |
|
||||
| current milestone | create milestones then join table (no circular DDL) | absent to N-1 | join is authority |
|
||||
| nullable `missions.project_id` | derive workspace/project; null/orphan exception, never guess | keep nullable legacy read | canonical required; validate/set NOT NULL later |
|
||||
| mission `description` | add objective; preserve description; reviewed nonblank mapping | N-1 description | objective authority; retain until signed review |
|
||||
| `missions.status` | add canonical; planning→draft, active/paused/completed/failed same | no new-only statuses emitted | canonical authority |
|
||||
| mission `milestones` JSON | normalize with source digest; preserve malformed/original | N-1 reads JSON; no reverse sync | normalized authority; JSON removed after checksum sign-off |
|
||||
| mission config/metadata/phase/user | retain all; map known typed policy only | all remain declared | remove only by signed consumer inventory |
|
||||
| nullable `tasks.project_id` | derive explicit/mission project; orphan quarantine | retain nullable read/write during compatibility | canonical required; NOT NULL later |
|
||||
| `tasks.mission_id` | add project-congruent composite | old relation readable | composite authority |
|
||||
| `tasks.status` | canonical: not-started→backlog, in-progress→in_progress, others same | no ready/in_review emission | canonical authority |
|
||||
| `tasks.assignee` | deterministic active user/team/agent assignment; raw value preserved if ambiguous | mirror text only if unambiguous | canonical owner/assignment; remove after no-loss sign-off |
|
||||
| `tasks.tags` JSON | normalize trim/case/dedupe with original digest | transactionally mirror normalized rows | normalized authority; JSON later removed |
|
||||
| `tasks.due_date` | copy exactly to `due_at` | mirror | due_at authority; legacy later |
|
||||
| task common fields | preserve metadata byte-for-byte; add criteria/rank/retry/archive/version/fence | old reads valid | new fields canonical |
|
||||
| `mission_tasks.status` | keep; prohibit as write source; linked status ignored; unlinked becomes task or reject | read-only compatibility value | membership uses task mission; status dropped after no readers |
|
||||
| mission-task notes/PR/user | map to metadata/artifact/event/link/attribution; preserve | read-only | remove after parity |
|
||||
| `agents.status` | add workspace/lifecycle/runtime/roles; status remains presence | retain all legacy fields | lifecycle/roles authority; status may remain telemetry |
|
||||
| agent project/owner/prompt/tools/skills/config | preserve; validate tenant; derive typed capabilities without loss | N-1 reads | removal only by separate inventory |
|
||||
| fleet `backlog` | map to designated-project tasks; edges; claimed rows quarantine | freeze claims before switch; read-only compare | task/lease authority; retire after stabilization |
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.5 Required migration tests
|
||||
### 5.4 Required migration tests
|
||||
|
||||
Empty DB; exact production-shape snapshot; crash/resume; rollback before switch; N-1 startup/read/write; workspace/member negatives; status-shadow/no premature new status; `mission_tasks.status` write prohibition; tags/assignee/date/mission JSON/config/description/agent checksum; project congruence/current-milestone order; backlog freeze/no dispatch; and proof legacy declarations persist until contract release.
|
||||
|
||||
SI-001 adds frozen future executable evidence: empty and production-shape migrations create `missions_workspace_id_uidx` before either dependent FK; duplicate-key feasibility preflight returns no `(workspace_id,id)` duplicate groups without weakening global `id` uniqueness; N-1 startup/read/write behavior is unchanged; pre-switch rollback removes dependents before the candidate key; both exact FK column lists reconcile to the candidate key; and foreign-workspace mission references fail for both artifacts and approval decisions. TDD is not applicable to this design-only amendment; KBN-100 must implement these negative migration tests before runtime schema release.
|
||||
|
||||
Proposal-specific negatives must attempt: missing submission event, foreign-workspace submission event, foreign-workspace acceptance event, same-workspace event for another proposal, event for another target aggregate, and unrelated normal-command event. Every attempt must fail atomically with no accepted proposal and no target mutation.
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Ownership and Coordinator split
|
||||
@@ -245,10 +216,4 @@ KBN-115/coder2 owns `packages/config/src/recovery-posture.ts`, tests, and recove
|
||||
|
||||
Required release evidence includes empty/prod/partial/rollback/N-1 migration tests; cross-workspace and same-workspace wrong-project negatives; active-membership owners/principals; proposal inertness/normal acceptance; exact failure mapping; concurrent monotonic bigint fences; relational lease/checkpoint/evidence mismatch; immutability privileges/RESTRICT; recovery validation/mechanism evidence; endpoint registry alignment; accessible web journeys; author≠reviewer; mandatory SecReview; final Certifier pass/no merge authority.
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.1 SI-001 amendment gate and #757 boundary
|
||||
|
||||
- KBN-100 must provide the §5.2 candidate-key ordering, duplicate-feasibility, exact-FK reconciliation, empty/prod/N-1/rollback, and two-child foreign-workspace evidence before SI-001 can be certified closed.
|
||||
- All prior KCR-001–016 decisions and fixed SOT/tenant/authority, proposal-audit, approval, task-fencing, immutability, and no-cascade invariants remain unchanged.
|
||||
- Read-only PR #757 cross-check: its logical-agent connector lease/CAS fencing uses separate runtime tables/contracts and `lease_epoch`; rc.4 changes only the frozen `missions` candidate key. There is no shared table, index, FK, identity, fence, or authority semantic to consume or reconcile, and #757 remains owned by its existing lane.
|
||||
|
||||
The build hold remains active until independent re-review reports GO for KCR-001–016 and the rc.4 SI-001 amendment. Mos alone releases waves and serializes integration roots.
|
||||
The build hold remains active until independent re-review reports GO for KCR-001–016. Mos alone releases waves and serializes integration roots.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -70,21 +70,19 @@ No consumer implementation begins before KBN-105. No schema work begins before K
|
||||
|
||||
### KBN-000 — Remediate and publish canon
|
||||
|
||||
- **Status:** COMPLETE — PR #752 squash-merged as `49e8a54`; issue #751 closed; post-merge pipeline #1798 terminal success.
|
||||
- **Owner:** Mosaic publication control plane.
|
||||
- **Mode:** SERIAL; completed.
|
||||
- **Owner:** Mos / publication control plane.
|
||||
- **Mode:** SERIAL; publication gate in progress.
|
||||
- **IN:** Resolve KCR-001–016 in requirements, schema, health, Coordinator, recovery, migration map, and slices; independent re-review.
|
||||
- **OUT:** Feature implementation.
|
||||
- **Depends on:** none.
|
||||
- **Contract surfaces:** all canon.
|
||||
- **Evidence:** strict TS; Prettier; per-finding traceability; independent author≠reviewer GO; Ultron GO; terminal-green CI.
|
||||
- **Evidence:** strict TS; Prettier; per-finding traceability; independent author≠reviewer GO.
|
||||
|
||||
### KBN-010 — Threat, authorization, and constraint-impact gate
|
||||
|
||||
- **Status:** IN PROGRESS — issue [#753](https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/issues/753).
|
||||
- **Owner:** `kbn-coder3`; independent `secrev`.
|
||||
- **Owner:** coder3; independent `secrev`.
|
||||
- **Mode:** SERIAL prerequisite of KBN-100.
|
||||
- **Exclusive files:** `docs/native-kanban-sot/KBN-010-THREAT-AUTH-CONSTRAINT-GATE.md` and task scratchpad only.
|
||||
- **Exclusive files:** Mos-selected threat/auth docs only.
|
||||
- **IN:** Cross-workspace owners/principals/evidence; active membership; stale/forged health; approval forgery; fence monotonicity; audit retention; proposal target/audit-event forgery; service tokens; DB/Valkey outage.
|
||||
- **OUT:** Runtime/schema edits.
|
||||
- **Depends on:** KBN-000 independent re-review GO.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -485,7 +485,6 @@ export const missionsV1 = pgTable(
|
||||
foreignColumns: [projectsV1.workspaceId, projectsV1.id],
|
||||
}).onDelete('restrict'),
|
||||
uniqueIndex('missions_workspace_project_id_uidx').on(t.workspaceId, t.projectId, t.id),
|
||||
uniqueIndex('missions_workspace_id_uidx').on(t.workspaceId, t.id),
|
||||
index('missions_workspace_project_status_idx').on(
|
||||
t.workspaceId,
|
||||
t.projectId,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Issue #753 — KBN-010 threat, authorization, and constraint-impact gate
|
||||
|
||||
## Objective
|
||||
|
||||
Complete the mandatory threat/auth/constraint-impact analysis that gates KBN-100 schema implementation.
|
||||
|
||||
## Scope
|
||||
|
||||
- In: threat matrix, frozen-control mapping, schema/API/test impact inventory, security evidence plan.
|
||||
- Out: runtime, schema, migration, API, dependency, CI, deployment, and secret changes.
|
||||
- Canonical requirements: `docs/requirements/native-kanban-sot.md`.
|
||||
- Frozen contract: `docs/native-kanban-sot/SHARED-CONTRACT.md` and `contracts/*.v1.ts`.
|
||||
- Tracking: Mosaic Stack issue #753.
|
||||
|
||||
## Plan
|
||||
|
||||
1. Independently inspect current-main implementation and frozen canon.
|
||||
2. Enumerate tenant, identity, health-proof, approval, fencing, proposal, audit, token, and outage threats.
|
||||
3. Map every threat to required constraints, command behavior, negative tests, and owning future slice.
|
||||
4. Surface any unresolved schema impact as a blocker; do not silently amend the frozen contract.
|
||||
5. Run documentation/static validation and submit for independent SecReview.
|
||||
|
||||
## Execution log
|
||||
|
||||
- 2026-07-14: KBN-000 completed through PR #752 and post-merge pipeline #1798.
|
||||
- 2026-07-14: KBN-010 issue #753 created; task marked in progress; fresh GPT worker pending dispatch.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification evidence
|
||||
|
||||
Pending worker validation, independent SecReview, Ultron gate, PR merge, post-merge CI, and issue closure.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2026-07-14 worker analysis checkpoint
|
||||
|
||||
- Inspected issue #753, canonical requirements, all frozen v1 contracts, and actual `origin/main` at `49e8a54` across DB schema, Better Auth scope, project/task/mission/team repositories/controllers, fleet backlog, and `TASKS.md` parsing/writing.
|
||||
- Confirmed the worker branch has no source/runtime/schema delta from `origin/main`; orchestrator-owned `.mosaic` state remains dirty and untouched.
|
||||
- Authored the threat, authorization, constraint-impact, negative-test, and requirements-traceability analysis in `docs/native-kanban-sot/KBN-010-THREAT-AUTH-CONSTRAINT-GATE.md`.
|
||||
- Gate decision: **BLOCKED** by `KBN010-SI-001`. `missionsV1` lacks a unique candidate key on `(workspace_id, id)`, while `artifacts_workspace_mission_fk` and `approval_decisions_workspace_mission_fk` both reference that exact pair. PostgreSQL cannot create the frozen composite foreign keys as declared.
|
||||
- Decision: do not select or apply a schema fix. Contract authority must version either a `(workspace_id, id)` mission candidate key or project-congruent child keys, then obtain independent re-review before KBN-100.
|
||||
- Additional risks are controlled by frozen transaction/API behavior but require the exact future negative tests cataloged in the deliverable, especially active membership, service-token revocation, same-workspace semantic evidence checks, no-oracle behavior, and serialized parent/DAG cycle checks.
|
||||
- OpenBrain startup recall was attempted but unavailable because `/home/hermes/.config/mosaic/credentials.json` is absent; no project state was written to an alternate memory silo.
|
||||
- TDD: not applicable; this slice changes documentation/test-plan analysis only and implements no runtime behavior.
|
||||
|
||||
## Validation log
|
||||
|
||||
- `pnpm exec prettier --check docs/native-kanban-sot/KBN-010-THREAT-AUTH-CONSTRAINT-GATE.md docs/scratchpads/753-kbn010-threat-gate.md` — PASS.
|
||||
- Changed-doc link validator — PASS (`relative_links=0`, one external issue link); `curl -fsSIL https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/issues/753` — PASS.
|
||||
- The first inline link-validator invocation had a Python f-string syntax error; corrected once and rerun successfully without changing the deliverable.
|
||||
- `pnpm format:check` — PASS.
|
||||
- `pnpm lint` — PASS (23 tasks successful).
|
||||
- `pnpm typecheck` — PASS (42 tasks successful).
|
||||
- `pnpm exec tsc -p docs/native-kanban-sot/tsconfig.json --noEmit` — PASS.
|
||||
- Scoped diff review — PASS: authored delta is limited to the exclusive deliverable and this scratchpad; no runtime/schema/config/dependency/CI/deployment file is changed, and `docs/native-kanban-sot/TASKS.md` has no worker worktree delta from tracking commit `9b55de0`.
|
||||
- Independent SecReview remains pending and cannot return PASS until contract authority resolves `KBN010-SI-001`.
|
||||
- Final formatting/diff/test-ID completeness review — PASS (all catalog prefixes contiguous with no duplicate IDs).
|
||||
- Remaining: scoped commit, queue guard, and push.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2026-07-14 KBN010-SI-001 contract-authority amendment
|
||||
|
||||
- Authority: `web1:mosaic-100` directed the minimal rc.4 amendment under issue #753: add a non-partial unique candidate key on `missions(workspace_id, id)` while retaining global `missions.id` uniqueness and the project-congruent `(workspace_id, project_id, id)` key.
|
||||
- Rationale: artifacts and approval decisions are polymorphic exactly-one-target records and do not consistently carry `project_id`; widening both children would broaden frozen v1 semantics without improving tenant safety.
|
||||
- Plan: amend only the frozen schema contract and shared contract, freeze exact DDL ordering and future migration negatives, run scoped/full validation and independent review, then commit and push without opening/merging a PR or closing #753.
|
||||
- TDD: not applicable because this is a design-contract amendment with no runtime schema or migration implementation; rc.4 freezes future executable empty/prod/N-1/rollback/foreign-workspace and duplicate-key-feasibility tests.
|
||||
- Budget: no explicit cap supplied; use a 20K-equivalent soft working cap and one bounded worker lane.
|
||||
- Read-only #757 boundary: PR #757 adds separate logical-agent connector lease/CAS fencing (`logical_agent_connector_leases.lease_epoch`) in runtime schema and connector contracts. SI-001 changes only the frozen mission candidate key; it does not consume, alter, or reinterpret connector fencing, task fencing, lease authority, or #757 ownership.
|
||||
|
||||
### Amendment verification evidence
|
||||
|
||||
- Frozen schema: added exactly one non-partial `missions_workspace_id_uidx` on `(workspace_id, id)`; retained the global `id` primary key and `missions_workspace_project_id_uidx` on `(workspace_id, project_id, id)`.
|
||||
- FK reconciliation: targeted static checks prove the candidate key precedes both `artifacts_workspace_mission_fk` and `approval_decisions_workspace_mission_fk`; each continues to reference exact ordered columns `(workspace_id, mission_id)` → `missions(workspace_id, id)` with RESTRICT deletion.
|
||||
- Shared contract: candidate version is `1.0.0-rc.4`; authority, rationale, exact effect/non-effect, candidate-before-FK DDL order, duplicate feasibility, empty/prod/N-1/rollback/foreign-workspace future tests, and unchanged KCR/SOT/tenant/proposal/fencing/no-cascade invariants are explicit.
|
||||
- Changed-file Prettier, contract ESLint, `pnpm exec tsc -p docs/native-kanban-sot/tsconfig.json`, and targeted SI-001 static checks — PASS.
|
||||
- Full `pnpm format:check && pnpm lint && pnpm typecheck` — PASS (23 lint tasks and 42 typecheck/build tasks).
|
||||
- Independent Codex security review — PASS, zero critical/high/medium/low findings; tenant isolation is preserved.
|
||||
- Independent Codex code review confirmed the candidate key repairs both FK targets and reported no blocker on the authorized delta. Its initial request to rewrite the historical KBN-010 verdict conflicts with the exclusive scope and was resolved by documenting the immutable-evidence boundary in rc.4; its remaining finding concerns pre-existing live `.mosaic` session files, which are untouched and excluded from this commit.
|
||||
- Scoped diff: only the two frozen contract files and this append-only scratchpad amendment are staged for delivery; no runtime schema, migration, task plan, gate verdict, provider artifact, or #757-owned file is included.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2026-07-14 final rc.4 KBN-010 disposition
|
||||
|
||||
- Control-plane direction authorized final disposition edits only to `docs/native-kanban-sot/KBN-010-THREAT-AUTH-CONSTRAINT-GATE.md` and this append-only scratchpad; contract author `web1:kbn-contract` remained idle and undisturbed.
|
||||
- Exact reviewed contract object: commit `3f6a3387b419eb99453ee10dd25ba888faaab0b5`, tree `7ebab8fa530a7180036928cea9527f808548aa14`.
|
||||
- Corroborating review identities: full-index SHA-256 `6b40a76265c4f3e6d1d30a7f262a2dd16e0d51997e99c146b59f527e6524cd42`; stable patch-id `058cf98026fcd1043703c866aee047c8bb144740`. A command-rendered patch digest varied by Git rendering command/options and is non-authoritative; commit+tree+exact file content are canonical.
|
||||
- Independent Homelab non-author schema/security review verdict: **APPROVE**. It confirmed the rc.4 `missions_workspace_id_uidx(workspace_id,id)` repairs both dependent FKs while retaining the global PK and project-congruent key; tenant, polymorphic exactly-one-target, RESTRICT/no-cascade, N-1/rollback semantics remain valid.
|
||||
- Read-only #757 cross-check: no shared table, index, FK, identity, fence, or authority collision with connector lease/CAS fencing.
|
||||
- Final KBN-010 gate decision: **PASS / GO** at rc.4 with `UNRESOLVED SCHEMA IMPACTS` equal to exact `none`. Historical SI-001 detection remains in the gate document as evidence that rc.3 was invalid.
|
||||
- No runtime schema/migration/API/config/dependency/CI/deployment implementation is claimed. KBN-100 must still implement candidate-before-dependent-FK ordering, duplicate feasibility, empty/prod/N-1/rollback evidence, exact FK reconciliation, and separate artifact/approval foreign-workspace negatives (N100-45..50).
|
||||
- TDD remains not applicable because this continuation changes only documentation/evidence disposition and no runtime behavior.
|
||||
- Remaining orchestrator-owned sequence: worker validation/commit/push → PR open/update → Ultron review → squash merge → terminal-green post-main CI → close #753 → release KBN-100. KBN-100 is not released earlier.
|
||||
|
||||
### Final worker validation
|
||||
|
||||
- Changed-doc Prettier and link checks — PASS; issue #753 external link returned successfully.
|
||||
- Static future-test catalog check — PASS: all prefixes are individually enumerated, contiguous, and duplicate-free; N100 now spans N100-01..50.
|
||||
- rc.4 disposition assertions — PASS: gate status PASS/GO, frozen target rc.4, exact `none` unresolved section, independent APPROVE, review identities, and N100-50 are present.
|
||||
- Review identity reproduction — PASS: commit tree `7ebab8fa530a7180036928cea9527f808548aa14`, full-index SHA-256 `6b40a76265c4f3e6d1d30a7f262a2dd16e0d51997e99c146b59f527e6524cd42`, and stable patch-id `058cf98026fcd1043703c866aee047c8bb144740` match.
|
||||
- rc.4 frozen-contract static check — PASS: the candidate key is unique in the declaration and precedes both dependent FKs; frozen contract files remain byte-identical to commit `3f6a3387b419eb99453ee10dd25ba888faaab0b5`.
|
||||
- `pnpm exec tsc -p docs/native-kanban-sot/tsconfig.json --noEmit` — PASS.
|
||||
- `pnpm format:check` — PASS.
|
||||
- `pnpm lint` — PASS (23 tasks successful).
|
||||
- `pnpm typecheck` — PASS (42 tasks successful).
|
||||
- Scoped diff — PASS: only the gate document and this scratchpad are authored changes; contracts, TASKS, requirements, runtime/schema/migration/config/dependency/CI/deployment and #757-owned files are unchanged. Live `.mosaic` session state remains untouched and excluded.
|
||||
- Remaining worker steps: final formatting/scoped staging, commit `docs(#753): clear KBN-010 schema gate`, queue guard, push, and control-plane notification.
|
||||
@@ -38,19 +38,19 @@ Primary blockers:
|
||||
|
||||
### AC disposition
|
||||
|
||||
| AC | Result | Evidence |
|
||||
| --- | ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| 01 | **Fail** | No `mosaic tess`; no bidirectional same-session chat/stream E2E |
|
||||
| 02 | **Fail** | Generic CLI exists, but fleet/Matrix providers are unreachable in production |
|
||||
| 03 | Pass | Pi profile/model/reasoning/effective-policy tests passed |
|
||||
| 04 | **Fail** | No registered fleet provider or real Mos consumer |
|
||||
| 05 | Partial | Hermes normalization/fail-closed matrix passes; live capability path is limited |
|
||||
| 06 | Partial | PGlite restart/idempotency passes; no actual harness failover |
|
||||
| 07 | Partial | Focused denial/replay tests pass; full M5 abuse qualification absent |
|
||||
| 08 | Partial | Mocked shared-intersection parity passes; Matrix not operationally wired |
|
||||
| 09 | **Fail** | Baselines/CI green, but required E2E/security/rollback qualification absent |
|
||||
| 10 | **Fail** | Inventory incomplete/inconsistent; rollback not exercised |
|
||||
| 11 | Pass/ledger stale | Documentation and sitemap exist; plugin/catalog ledger remains unresolved |
|
||||
| AC | Result | Evidence |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| 01 | **Fail** | No `mosaic tess`; no bidirectional same-session chat/stream E2E |
|
||||
| 02 | **Fail** | Generic CLI exists, but fleet/Matrix providers are unreachable in production |
|
||||
| 03 | Pass | Pi profile/model/reasoning/effective-policy tests passed |
|
||||
| 04 | **Fail** | No registered fleet provider or real Mos consumer |
|
||||
| 05 | Partial | Hermes normalization/fail-closed matrix passes; live capability path is limited |
|
||||
| 06 | Partial | PGlite restart/idempotency passes; no actual harness failover |
|
||||
| 07 | Partial | Focused denial/replay tests pass; full M5 abuse qualification absent |
|
||||
| 08 | Partial | Mocked shared-intersection parity passes; Matrix not operationally wired |
|
||||
| 09 | **Fail** | Baselines/CI green, but required E2E/security/rollback qualification absent |
|
||||
| 10 | **Fail** | Inventory incomplete/inconsistent; rollback not exercised |
|
||||
| 11 | Pass/ledger stale | Documentation and sitemap exist; plugin/catalog ledger remains unresolved |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -207,14 +207,14 @@ Missing pieces:
|
||||
|
||||
# 5. Minimal follow-up issue decomposition
|
||||
|
||||
| Order | Issue | Minimum acceptance criteria |
|
||||
| ----- | ------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| 1 | **Logical identity and security fencing** | Server-derived `{tenant, logicalAgentId, connectorId, harness, leaseEpoch, scopes, expiry}`; signed/fenced execution grant; stale/forged/cross-tenant grants denied and audited; no connector credential in handoffs |
|
||||
| 2 | **Durable connector lease** | PostgreSQL-backed exclusive lease with CAS, monotonic epoch, TTL/heartbeat, explicit takeover, and gateway rejection of stale holders; connectors for Claude Code, Pi, and Codex |
|
||||
| 3 | **Canonical handoff/checkpoint** | Versioned, sealed schema containing canonical mission/task/git references, checkpoint digest, causal sequence, required capabilities, pending/ambiguous operation references, and source/destination acknowledgement; no raw secrets or mandatory harness transcript |
|
||||
| 4 | **Exactly-once connector journal** | Durable operation IDs and receipts; idempotency propagated through every adapter; Matrix transaction mapping; tmux replaced or wrapped with receiver-side durable dedupe; ambiguous effects remain held for authorized reconciliation |
|
||||
| 5 | **Cross-harness failover and rollback E2E** | Real Mos identity moves Claude Code → Pi → Codex and back; inject crashes before/after lease transfer, handoff persistence, send, and acknowledgement; stale connector fenced; no duplicate side effects; canonical state preserved; rollback evidence published |
|
||||
| 6 | **Generic gateway research ADR** | Evaluate LiteLLM subscription OAuth and Bifrost concepts without adding either to core; include terms/security review, credential lifecycle, tenant mapping, budgets, failover semantics, and adapter-only prototype |
|
||||
| Order | Issue | Minimum acceptance criteria |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| 1 | **Logical identity and security fencing** | Server-derived `{tenant, logicalAgentId, connectorId, harness, leaseEpoch, scopes, expiry}`; signed/fenced execution grant; stale/forged/cross-tenant grants denied and audited; no connector credential in handoffs |
|
||||
| 2 | **Durable connector lease** | PostgreSQL-backed exclusive lease with CAS, monotonic epoch, TTL/heartbeat, explicit takeover, and gateway rejection of stale holders; connectors for Claude Code, Pi, and Codex |
|
||||
| 3 | **Canonical handoff/checkpoint** | Versioned, sealed schema containing canonical mission/task/git references, checkpoint digest, causal sequence, required capabilities, pending/ambiguous operation references, and source/destination acknowledgement; no raw secrets or mandatory harness transcript |
|
||||
| 4 | **Exactly-once connector journal** | Durable operation IDs and receipts; idempotency propagated through every adapter; Matrix transaction mapping; tmux replaced or wrapped with receiver-side durable dedupe; ambiguous effects remain held for authorized reconciliation |
|
||||
| 5 | **Cross-harness failover and rollback E2E** | Real Mos identity moves Claude Code → Pi → Codex and back; inject crashes before/after lease transfer, handoff persistence, send, and acknowledgement; stale connector fenced; no duplicate side effects; canonical state preserved; rollback evidence published |
|
||||
| 6 | **Generic gateway research ADR** | Evaluate LiteLLM subscription OAuth and Bifrost concepts without adding either to core; include terms/security review, credential lifecycle, tenant mapping, budgets, failover semantics, and adapter-only prototype |
|
||||
|
||||
## Generic gateway placement
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user