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Author SHA1 Message Date
Jarvis
59fc3cdebf fix(federation): use real PEM certs in enrollment + ca service tests
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PR #501 (FED-M2-11) added strict `new X509Certificate(certPem)` parsing
without falling back silently — but the existing test mocks were still
returning dummy strings, so 13+6 tests have been failing on `main` since
that merge with `error:0680007B:asn1 encoding routines::header too long`.

Also fixes a mock gap introduced by CRIT-2 in the same PR: the tx mock
did not have a `.returning()` method on the grant-activation update path,
causing 6 of the 13 failures with `TypeError: not a function`.

Add a test helper that generates a real self-signed EC P-256 cert via
@peculiar/x509 and use it in the EnrollmentService and CaService spec
mocks. Two variants:
  - makeSelfSignedCert()        plain cert for extractCertNotAfter
  - makeMosaicIssuedCert(opts)  cert with Mosaic OID extensions for CRIT-1

Production strictness is intentionally preserved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-23 21:37:30 -05:00
e64ddd2c1c docs(federation): M3 mission planning — 14-task decomposition (#504)
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2026-04-24 01:13:40 +00:00
4ece6dc643 chore(federation): M2 milestone close (FED-M2-13) (#503)
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2026-04-22 06:09:54 +00:00
194c3b603e docs(federation): M2 Step-CA setup guide + admin CLI reference (FED-M2-12) (#502)
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2026-04-22 06:06:45 +00:00
8 changed files with 524 additions and 68 deletions

View File

@@ -24,10 +24,11 @@
*/
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, beforeAll } from 'vitest';
import { GoneException, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { EnrollmentService } from '../enrollment.service.js';
import { makeSelfSignedCert } from './helpers/test-cert.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Test constants
@@ -38,10 +39,18 @@ const PEER_ID = 'p2222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222';
const USER_ID = 'u3333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333';
const TOKEN = 'a'.repeat(64); // 64-char hex
const MOCK_CERT_PEM = '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMOCK\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n';
const MOCK_CHAIN_PEM = MOCK_CERT_PEM + MOCK_CERT_PEM;
// Real self-signed EC P-256 cert — populated once in beforeAll.
// Required because EnrollmentService.extractCertNotAfter calls new X509Certificate(certPem)
// with strict parsing (PR #501 HIGH-2: no silent fallback).
let REAL_CERT_PEM: string;
const MOCK_CHAIN_PEM = () => REAL_CERT_PEM + REAL_CERT_PEM;
const MOCK_SERIAL = 'ABCD1234';
beforeAll(async () => {
REAL_CERT_PEM = await makeSelfSignedCert();
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Factory helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -103,11 +112,27 @@ function makeDb({
const claimUpdateMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ set: setClaimMock });
// transaction(cb) — cb receives txMock; txMock has update + insert
const txInsertValues = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const txInsertMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ values: txInsertValues });
const txWhereUpdate = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
//
// The tx mock must support two tx.update() call patterns (CRIT-2, PR #501):
// 1. Grant activation: .update().set().where().returning() → resolves to [{ id }]
// 2. Peer update: .update().set().where() → resolves to undefined
//
// We achieve this by making txWhereUpdate return an object with BOTH a thenable
// interface (so `await tx.update().set().where()` works) AND a .returning() method.
const txGrantActivatedRow = { id: GRANT_ID };
const txReturningMock = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([txGrantActivatedRow]);
const txWhereUpdate = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({
// .returning() for grant activation (first tx.update call)
returning: txReturningMock,
// thenables so `await tx.update().set().where()` also works for peer update
then: (resolve: (v: undefined) => void) => resolve(undefined),
catch: () => undefined,
finally: () => undefined,
});
const txSetMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ where: txWhereUpdate });
const txUpdateMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ set: txSetMock });
const txInsertValues = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const txInsertMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ values: txInsertValues });
const txMock = { update: txUpdateMock, insert: txInsertMock };
const transactionMock = vi
.fn()
@@ -132,6 +157,7 @@ function makeDb({
txInsertValues,
txInsertMock,
txWhereUpdate,
txReturningMock,
txSetMock,
txUpdateMock,
txMock,
@@ -146,11 +172,13 @@ function makeDb({
function makeCaService() {
return {
issueCert: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
certPem: MOCK_CERT_PEM,
certChainPem: MOCK_CHAIN_PEM,
// REAL_CERT_PEM is populated by beforeAll — safe to reference via closure here
// because makeCaService() is only called after the suite's beforeAll runs.
issueCert: vi.fn().mockImplementation(async () => ({
certPem: REAL_CERT_PEM,
certChainPem: MOCK_CHAIN_PEM(),
serialNumber: MOCK_SERIAL,
}),
})),
};
}
@@ -301,29 +329,29 @@ describe('EnrollmentService.redeem — success path', () => {
});
caService.issueCert.mockImplementation(async () => {
callOrder.push('issueCert');
return { certPem: MOCK_CERT_PEM, certChainPem: MOCK_CHAIN_PEM, serialNumber: MOCK_SERIAL };
return { certPem: REAL_CERT_PEM, certChainPem: MOCK_CHAIN_PEM(), serialNumber: MOCK_SERIAL };
});
await service.redeem(TOKEN, MOCK_CERT_PEM);
await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
expect(callOrder).toEqual(['claim', 'issueCert']);
});
it('calls CaService.issueCert with grantId, subjectUserId, csrPem, ttlSeconds=300', async () => {
await service.redeem(TOKEN, MOCK_CERT_PEM);
await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
expect(caService.issueCert).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
grantId: GRANT_ID,
subjectUserId: USER_ID,
csrPem: MOCK_CERT_PEM,
csrPem: '---CSR---',
ttlSeconds: 300,
}),
);
});
it('runs activate grant + peer update + audit inside a transaction', async () => {
await service.redeem(TOKEN, MOCK_CERT_PEM);
await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
expect(db._mocks.transactionMock).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
// tx.update called twice: activate grant + update peer
@@ -333,17 +361,17 @@ describe('EnrollmentService.redeem — success path', () => {
});
it('activates grant (sets status=active) inside the transaction', async () => {
await service.redeem(TOKEN, MOCK_CERT_PEM);
await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
expect(db._mocks.txSetMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ status: 'active' }));
});
it('updates the federationPeers row with certPem, certSerial, state=active inside the transaction', async () => {
await service.redeem(TOKEN, MOCK_CERT_PEM);
await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
expect(db._mocks.txSetMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
certPem: MOCK_CERT_PEM,
certPem: REAL_CERT_PEM,
certSerial: MOCK_SERIAL,
state: 'active',
}),
@@ -351,7 +379,7 @@ describe('EnrollmentService.redeem — success path', () => {
});
it('inserts an audit log row inside the transaction', async () => {
await service.redeem(TOKEN, MOCK_CERT_PEM);
await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
expect(db._mocks.txInsertValues).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
@@ -363,11 +391,11 @@ describe('EnrollmentService.redeem — success path', () => {
});
it('returns { certPem, certChainPem } from CaService', async () => {
const result = await service.redeem(TOKEN, MOCK_CERT_PEM);
const result = await service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---');
expect(result).toEqual({
certPem: MOCK_CERT_PEM,
certChainPem: MOCK_CHAIN_PEM,
certPem: REAL_CERT_PEM,
certChainPem: MOCK_CHAIN_PEM(),
});
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
/**
* Test helpers for generating real X.509 PEM certificates in unit tests.
*
* PR #501 (FED-M2-11) introduced strict `new X509Certificate(certPem)` parsing
* in both EnrollmentService.extractCertNotAfter and CaService.issueCert — dummy
* cert strings now throw `error:0680007B:asn1 encoding routines::header too long`.
*
* These helpers produce minimal but cryptographically valid self-signed EC P-256
* certificates via @peculiar/x509 + Node.js webcrypto, suitable for test mocks.
*
* Two variants:
* - makeSelfSignedCert() Plain cert — satisfies node:crypto X509Certificate parse.
* - makeMosaicIssuedCert(opts) Cert with custom Mosaic OID extensions — satisfies the
* CRIT-1 OID presence + value checks in CaService.issueCert.
*/
import { webcrypto } from 'node:crypto';
import {
X509CertificateGenerator,
Extension,
KeyUsagesExtension,
KeyUsageFlags,
BasicConstraintsExtension,
cryptoProvider,
} from '@peculiar/x509';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Internal helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Encode a string as an ASN.1 UTF8String TLV:
* 0x0C (tag) + 1-byte length (for strings ≤ 127 bytes) + UTF-8 bytes.
*
* CaService.issueCert reads the extension value as:
* decoder.decode(grantIdExt.value.slice(2))
* i.e. it skips the tag + length byte and decodes the remainder as UTF-8.
* So we must produce exactly this encoding as the OCTET STRING content.
*/
function encodeUtf8String(value: string): Uint8Array {
const utf8 = new TextEncoder().encode(value);
if (utf8.length > 127) {
throw new Error('encodeUtf8String: value too long for single-byte length encoding');
}
const buf = new Uint8Array(2 + utf8.length);
buf[0] = 0x0c; // ASN.1 UTF8String tag
buf[1] = utf8.length;
buf.set(utf8, 2);
return buf;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Mosaic OID constants (must match production CaService)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const OID_MOSAIC_GRANT_ID = '1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1';
const OID_MOSAIC_SUBJECT_USER_ID = '1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Public API
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Generate a minimal self-signed EC P-256 certificate valid for 1 day.
* CN=harness-test, no custom extensions.
*
* Suitable for:
* - EnrollmentService.extractCertNotAfter (just needs parseable PEM)
* - Any mock that returns certPem / certChainPem without OID checks
*/
export async function makeSelfSignedCert(): Promise<string> {
// Ensure @peculiar/x509 uses Node.js webcrypto (available as globalThis.crypto in Node 19+,
// but we set it explicitly here to be safe on all Node 18+ versions).
cryptoProvider.set(webcrypto as unknown as Parameters<typeof cryptoProvider.set>[0]);
const alg = { name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256', hash: 'SHA-256' } as const;
const keys = await webcrypto.subtle.generateKey(alg, false, ['sign', 'verify']);
const now = new Date();
const tomorrow = new Date(now.getTime() + 86_400_000);
const cert = await X509CertificateGenerator.createSelfSigned({
serialNumber: '01',
name: 'CN=harness-test',
notBefore: now,
notAfter: tomorrow,
signingAlgorithm: alg,
keys,
extensions: [
new BasicConstraintsExtension(false),
new KeyUsagesExtension(KeyUsageFlags.digitalSignature),
],
});
return cert.toString('pem');
}
/**
* Generate a self-signed EC P-256 certificate that contains the two custom
* Mosaic OID extensions required by CaService.issueCert's CRIT-1 check:
* OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1 → mosaic_grant_id (value = grantId)
* OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2 → mosaic_subject_user_id (value = subjectUserId)
*
* The extension value encoding matches the production parser's `.slice(2)` assumption:
* each extension value is an OCTET STRING wrapping an ASN.1 UTF8String TLV.
*/
export async function makeMosaicIssuedCert(opts: {
grantId: string;
subjectUserId: string;
}): Promise<string> {
// Ensure @peculiar/x509 uses Node.js webcrypto.
cryptoProvider.set(webcrypto as unknown as Parameters<typeof cryptoProvider.set>[0]);
const alg = { name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256', hash: 'SHA-256' } as const;
const keys = await webcrypto.subtle.generateKey(alg, false, ['sign', 'verify']);
const now = new Date();
const tomorrow = new Date(now.getTime() + 86_400_000);
const cert = await X509CertificateGenerator.createSelfSigned({
serialNumber: '01',
name: 'CN=mosaic-issued-test',
notBefore: now,
notAfter: tomorrow,
signingAlgorithm: alg,
keys,
extensions: [
new BasicConstraintsExtension(false),
new KeyUsagesExtension(KeyUsageFlags.digitalSignature),
// mosaic_grant_id — OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1
new Extension(OID_MOSAIC_GRANT_ID, false, encodeUtf8String(opts.grantId)),
// mosaic_subject_user_id — OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2
new Extension(OID_MOSAIC_SUBJECT_USER_ID, false, encodeUtf8String(opts.subjectUserId)),
],
});
return cert.toString('pem');
}

View File

@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@
*/
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, type Mock } from 'vitest';
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, beforeAll, type Mock } from 'vitest';
import { jwtVerify, exportJWK, generateKeyPair } from 'jose';
import { Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator } from '@peculiar/x509';
import { makeMosaicIssuedCert } from './__tests__/helpers/test-cert.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Mock node:https BEFORE importing CaService so the mock is in place when
@@ -74,6 +75,11 @@ const FAKE_CA_PEM = FAKE_CERT_PEM;
const GRANT_ID = 'a0eebc99-9c0b-4ef8-bb6d-6bb9bd380a11';
const SUBJECT_USER_ID = 'b1ffcd00-0d1c-5f09-cc7e-7cc0ce491b22';
// Real self-signed cert containing both Mosaic OID extensions — populated in beforeAll.
// Required because CaService.issueCert performs CRIT-1 OID presence/value checks on the
// response cert (PR #501 — strict parsing, no silent fallback).
let realIssuedCertPem: string;
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Generate a real EC P-256 key pair and CSR for integration-style tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -194,6 +200,15 @@ function makeHttpsMock(statusCode: number, body: unknown, errorMsg?: string): vo
describe('CaService', () => {
let service: CaService;
beforeAll(async () => {
// Generate a cert with the two Mosaic OIDs so that CaService.issueCert's
// CRIT-1 OID checks pass when mock step-ca returns it as `crt`.
realIssuedCertPem = await makeMosaicIssuedCert({
grantId: GRANT_ID,
subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
});
});
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
service = new CaService();
@@ -226,9 +241,9 @@ describe('CaService', () => {
// Now test that the service's validateCsr accepts it.
// We call it indirectly via issueCert with a successful mock.
makeHttpsMock(200, { crt: FAKE_CERT_PEM, certChain: [FAKE_CERT_PEM, FAKE_CA_PEM] });
makeHttpsMock(200, { crt: realIssuedCertPem, certChain: [realIssuedCertPem, FAKE_CA_PEM] });
const result = await service.issueCert(makeReq({ csrPem: realCsrPem }));
expect(result.certPem).toBe(FAKE_CERT_PEM);
expect(result.certPem).toBe(realIssuedCertPem);
});
it('throws INVALID_CSR for a malformed PEM-shaped CSR', async () => {
@@ -251,14 +266,14 @@ describe('CaService', () => {
it('returns IssuedCertDto on success (certChain present)', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(200, {
crt: FAKE_CERT_PEM,
certChain: [FAKE_CERT_PEM, FAKE_CA_PEM],
crt: realIssuedCertPem,
certChain: [realIssuedCertPem, FAKE_CA_PEM],
});
const result = await service.issueCert(makeReq());
expect(result.certPem).toBe(FAKE_CERT_PEM);
expect(result.certChainPem).toContain(FAKE_CERT_PEM);
expect(result.certPem).toBe(realIssuedCertPem);
expect(result.certChainPem).toContain(realIssuedCertPem);
expect(result.certChainPem).toContain(FAKE_CA_PEM);
expect(typeof result.serialNumber).toBe('string');
});
@@ -270,14 +285,14 @@ describe('CaService', () => {
it('builds certChainPem from crt+ca when certChain is absent', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(200, {
crt: FAKE_CERT_PEM,
crt: realIssuedCertPem,
ca: FAKE_CA_PEM,
});
const result = await service.issueCert(makeReq());
expect(result.certPem).toBe(FAKE_CERT_PEM);
expect(result.certChainPem).toContain(FAKE_CERT_PEM);
expect(result.certPem).toBe(realIssuedCertPem);
expect(result.certChainPem).toContain(realIssuedCertPem);
expect(result.certChainPem).toContain(FAKE_CA_PEM);
});
@@ -287,12 +302,12 @@ describe('CaService', () => {
it('falls back to certPem alone when certChain and ca are absent', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(200, { crt: FAKE_CERT_PEM });
makeHttpsMock(200, { crt: realIssuedCertPem });
const result = await service.issueCert(makeReq());
expect(result.certPem).toBe(FAKE_CERT_PEM);
expect(result.certChainPem).toBe(FAKE_CERT_PEM);
expect(result.certPem).toBe(realIssuedCertPem);
expect(result.certChainPem).toBe(realIssuedCertPem);
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -398,7 +413,7 @@ describe('CaService', () => {
statusCode: 200,
on: (event: string, cb: (chunk?: Buffer) => void) => {
if (event === 'data') {
cb(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ crt: FAKE_CERT_PEM })));
cb(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ crt: realIssuedCertPem })));
}
if (event === 'end') {
cb();
@@ -555,7 +570,7 @@ describe('CaService', () => {
statusCode: 200,
on: (event: string, cb: (chunk?: Buffer) => void) => {
if (event === 'data') {
cb(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ crt: FAKE_CERT_PEM })));
cb(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ crt: realIssuedCertPem })));
}
if (event === 'end') {
cb();

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
# Mosaic Federation — Admin CLI Reference
Available since: FED-M2
## Grant Management
### Create a grant
```bash
mosaic federation grant create --user <userId> --peer <peerId> --scope <scope-file.json>
```
The scope file defines what resources and rows the peer may access:
```json
{
"resources": ["tasks", "notes"],
"excluded_resources": ["credentials"],
"max_rows_per_query": 100
}
```
Valid resource values: `tasks`, `notes`, `credentials`, `teams`, `users`
### List grants
```bash
mosaic federation grant list [--peer <peerId>] [--status pending|active|revoked|expired]
```
Shows all federation grants, optionally filtered by peer or status.
### Show a grant
```bash
mosaic federation grant show <grantId>
```
Display details of a single grant, including its scope, activation timestamp, and status.
### Revoke a grant
```bash
mosaic federation grant revoke <grantId> [--reason "Reason text"]
```
Revoke an active grant immediately. Revoked grants cannot be reactivated. The optional reason is stored in the audit log.
### Generate enrollment token
```bash
mosaic federation grant token <grantId> [--ttl <seconds>]
```
Generate a single-use enrollment token for the grant. The default TTL is 900 seconds (15 minutes); maximum 15 minutes.
Output includes the token and the full enrollment URL for the peer to use.
## Peer Management
### Add a peer (remote enrollment)
```bash
mosaic federation peer add <enrollment-url>
```
Enroll a remote peer using the enrollment URL obtained from a grant token. The command:
1. Generates a P-256 ECDSA keypair locally
2. Creates a certificate signing request (CSR)
3. Submits the CSR to the enrollment URL
4. Verifies the returned certificate includes the correct custom OIDs (grant ID and subject user ID)
5. Seals the private key at rest using `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`
6. Stores the peer record and sealed key in the local gateway database
Once enrollment completes, the peer can authenticate using the certificate and private key.
### List peers
```bash
mosaic federation peer list
```
Shows all enrolled peers, including their certificate fingerprints and activation status.
## REST API Reference
All CLI commands call the local gateway admin API. Equivalent REST endpoints:
| CLI Command | REST Endpoint | Method |
| ------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------- |
| grant create | `/api/admin/federation/grants` | POST |
| grant list | `/api/admin/federation/grants` | GET |
| grant show | `/api/admin/federation/grants/:id` | GET |
| grant revoke | `/api/admin/federation/grants/:id/revoke` | PATCH |
| grant token | `/api/admin/federation/grants/:id/tokens` | POST |
| peer list | `/api/admin/federation/peers` | GET |
| peer add | `/api/admin/federation/peers/keypair` + enrollment + `/api/admin/federation/peers/:id/cert` | POST, POST, PATCH |
## Security Notes
- **Enrollment tokens** are single-use and expire in 15 minutes (not configurable beyond 15 minutes)
- **Peer private keys** are encrypted at rest using AES-256-GCM, keyed from `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`
- **Custom OIDs** in issued certificates are verified post-issuance: the grant ID and subject user ID must match the certificate extensions
- **Grant activation** is atomic — concurrent enrollment attempts for the same grant are rejected
- **Revoked grants** cannot be activated; peers attempting to use a revoked grant's token will be rejected

View File

@@ -7,11 +7,11 @@
**ID:** federation-v1-20260419
**Statement:** Jarvis operates across 34 workstations in two physical locations (home, USC). The user currently reaches back to a single jarvis-brain checkout from every session; a prior OpenBrain attempt caused cache, latency, and opacity pain. This mission builds asymmetric federation between Mosaic Stack gateways so that a session on a user's home gateway can query their work gateway in real time without data ever persisting across the boundary, with full multi-tenant isolation and standard-PKI (X.509 / Step-CA) trust management.
**Phase:** M2 active — Step-CA + grant schema + admin CLI; parallel test-deploy workstream stood up
**Current Milestone:** FED-M2
**Progress:** 1 / 7 milestones
**Phase:** M3 active — mTLS handshake + list/get/capabilities verbs + scope enforcement
**Current Milestone:** FED-M3
**Progress:** 2 / 7 milestones
**Status:** active
**Last Updated:** 2026-04-21 (M2 decomposed; mos-test-1/-2 designated as federation E2E test hosts)
**Last Updated:** 2026-04-21 (M2 closed via PR #503, tag `fed-v0.2.0-m2`, issue #461 closed; M3 decomposed into 14 tasks)
**Parent Mission:** None — new mission
## Test Infrastructure
@@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ Key design references:
| # | ID | Name | Status | Branch | Issue | Started | Completed |
| --- | ------ | --------------------------------------------- | ----------- | ------------------ | ----- | ---------- | ---------- |
| 1 | FED-M1 | Federated tier infrastructure | done | (12 PRs #470-#481) | #460 | 2026-04-19 | 2026-04-19 |
| 2 | FED-M2 | Step-CA + grant schema + admin CLI | in-progress | (decomposition) | #461 | 2026-04-21 | |
| 3 | FED-M3 | mTLS handshake + list/get + scope enforcement | not-started | — | #462 | | — |
| 2 | FED-M2 | Step-CA + grant schema + admin CLI | done | (PRs #483-#503) | #461 | 2026-04-21 | 2026-04-21 |
| 3 | FED-M3 | mTLS handshake + list/get + scope enforcement | in-progress | (decomposition) | #462 | 2026-04-21 | — |
| 4 | FED-M4 | search verb + audit log + rate limit | not-started | — | #463 | — | — |
| 5 | FED-M5 | Cache + offline degradation + OTEL | not-started | — | #464 | — | — |
| 6 | FED-M6 | Revocation + auto-renewal + CRL | not-started | — | #465 | — | — |
@@ -86,16 +86,23 @@ Key design references:
## Session History
| Session | Date | Runtime | Outcome |
| ------- | ---------- | ------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ------- | ----------------------- | ------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| S1 | 2026-04-19 | claude | PRD authored, MILESTONES decomposed, 7 issues filed |
| S2-S4 | 2026-04-19 | claude | FED-M1 complete: 12 tasks (PRs #470-#481) merged; tag `fed-v0.1.0-m1` |
| S5-S22 | 2026-04-19 → 2026-04-21 | claude | FED-M2 complete: 13 tasks (PRs #483-#503) merged; tag `fed-v0.2.0-m2`; issue #461 closed. Step-CA + grant schema + admin CLI shipped. |
| S23 | 2026-04-21 | claude | M3 decomposed into 14 tasks in `docs/federation/TASKS.md`. Manifest M3 row → in-progress. Next: kickoff M3-01. |
## Next Step
FED-M2 active. Decomposition landed in `docs/federation/TASKS.md` (M2-01..M2-13 code workstream + DEPLOY-01..DEPLOY-05 parallel test-deploy workstream, ~88K total). Tracking issue #482.
FED-M3 active. Decomposition landed in `docs/federation/TASKS.md` (M3-01..M3-14, ~100K estimate). Tracking issue #462.
Parallel execution plan:
Execution plan (parallel where possible):
- **CODE workstream**: M2-01 (DB migration) starts immediately — sonnet subagent on `feat/federation-m2-schema`. Then M2-02 → M2-09 sequentially with M2-04/M2-05/M2-06/M2-07 having interleaved CA/storage/grant dependencies.
- **DEPLOY workstream**: DEPLOY-01 (image verify) → DEPLOY-02 (stack template) → DEPLOY-03/04 (mos-test-1/-2 deploy) → DEPLOY-05 (TEST-INFRA.md). Gated on Portainer wrapper PR (`PORTAINER_INSECURE` flag) merging first.
- **Re-converge** at M2-10 (E2E test) once both workstreams ready.
- **Foundation**: M3-01 (DTOs in `packages/types/src/federation/`) starts immediately — sonnet subagent on `feat/federation-m3-types`. Blocks all server + client work.
- **Server stream** (after M3-01): M3-03 (AuthGuard) + M3-04 (ScopeService) in series, then M3-05 / M3-06 / M3-07 (verbs) in parallel.
- **Client stream** (after M3-01, parallel with server): M3-08 (FederationClient) → M3-09 (QuerySourceService).
- **Harness** (parallel with everything): M3-02 (`tools/federation-harness/`) — needed for M3-11.
- **Test gates**: M3-10 (Integration) → M3-11 (E2E with harness) → M3-12 (Independent security review, two rounds budgeted).
- **Close**: M3-13 (Docs) → M3-14 (release tag `fed-v0.3.0-m3`, close #462).
**Test-bed fallback:** `mos-test-1/-2` deploy is still blocked on `FED-M2-DEPLOY-IMG-FIX`. The harness in M3-02 ships a local two-gateway docker-compose so M3-11 is not blocked. Production-host validation is M7's responsibility (PRD AC-12).

View File

@@ -70,6 +70,96 @@ For JSON output (useful in CI/automation):
mosaic gateway doctor --json
```
## Step 2: Step-CA Bootstrap
Step-CA is a certificate authority that issues X.509 certificates for federation peers. In Mosaic federation, it signs peer certificates with custom OIDs that embed grant and user identities, enforcing authorization at the certificate level.
### Prerequisites for Step-CA
Before starting the CA, you must set up the dev password:
```bash
cp infra/step-ca/dev-password.example infra/step-ca/dev-password
# Edit dev-password and set your CA password (minimum 16 characters)
```
The password is required for the CA to boot and derive the provisioner key used by the gateway.
### Start the Step-CA service
Add the step-ca service to your federated stack:
```bash
docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml --profile federated up -d step-ca
```
On first boot, the init script (`infra/step-ca/init.sh`) runs automatically. It:
- Generates the CA root key and certificate in the Docker volume
- Creates the `mosaic-fed` JWK provisioner
- Applies the X.509 template from `infra/step-ca/templates/federation.tpl`
The volume is persistent, so subsequent boots reuse the existing CA keys.
Verify the CA is healthy:
```bash
curl https://localhost:9000/health --cacert /tmp/step-ca-root.crt
```
(If the root cert file doesn't exist yet, see the extraction steps below.)
### Extract credentials for the gateway
The gateway requires two credentials from the running CA:
**1. Provisioner key (for `STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON`)**
```bash
docker exec $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca) cat /home/step/secrets/mosaic-fed.json > /tmp/step-ca-provisioner.json
```
This JSON file contains the JWK public and private keys for the `mosaic-fed` provisioner. Store it securely and pass its contents to the gateway via the `STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON` environment variable.
**2. Root certificate (for `STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH`)**
```bash
docker cp $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca):/home/step/certs/root_ca.crt /tmp/step-ca-root.crt
```
This PEM file is the CA's root certificate, used to verify peer certificates issued by step-ca. Pass its path to the gateway via `STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH`.
### Custom OID Registry
Federation certificates include custom OIDs in the certificate extension. These encode authorization metadata:
| OID | Name | Description |
| ------------------- | ---------------------- | --------------------- |
| 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1 | mosaic_grant_id | Federation grant UUID |
| 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2 | mosaic_subject_user_id | Subject user UUID |
These OIDs are verified by the gateway after the CSR is signed, ensuring the certificate was issued with the correct grant and user context.
### Environment Variables
Configure the gateway with the following environment variables before startup:
| Variable | Required | Description |
| ------------------------------ | -------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `STEP_CA_URL` | Yes | Base URL of the step-ca instance, e.g. `https://step-ca:9000` (use `https://localhost:9000` in local dev) |
| `STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON` | Yes | JSON-encoded JWK from `/home/step/secrets/mosaic-fed.json` |
| `STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH` | Yes | Absolute path to the root CA certificate (e.g. `/tmp/step-ca-root.crt`) |
| `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` | Yes | Secret used to seal peer private keys at rest; already required for M1 |
Example environment setup:
```bash
export STEP_CA_URL="https://localhost:9000"
export STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON="$(cat /tmp/step-ca-provisioner.json)"
export STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH="/tmp/step-ca-root.crt"
export BETTER_AUTH_SECRET="<your-secret>"
```
## Troubleshooting
### Port conflicts

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@@ -64,20 +64,20 @@ Goal: Two federated-tier gateways stood up on Portainer at `mos-test-1.woltje.co
Goal: An admin can create a federation grant; counterparty enrolls; cert is signed by Step-CA with SAN OIDs for `grantId` + `subjectUserId`. No runtime federation traffic flows yet (that's M3).
| id | status | description | issue | agent | branch | depends_on | estimate | notes |
| --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----- | ------ | ---------------------------------- | ---------------- | -------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| FED-M2-01 | needs-qa | DB migration: `federation_grants`, `federation_peers`, `federation_audit_log` tables + enum types (`grant_status`, `peer_state`). Drizzle schema + migration generation; migration tests. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-schema | — | 5K | PR #486 open. First review NEEDS CHANGES (missing DESC indexes + reserved cols). Remediation subagent `a673dd9355dc26f82` in flight in worktree `agent-a4404ac1`. |
| FED-M2-02 | not-started | Add Step-CA sidecar to `docker-compose.federated.yml`: official `smallstep/step-ca` image, persistent CA volume, JWK provisioner config baked into init script. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-stepca | DEPLOY-02 | 4K | Profile-gated under `federated`. CA password from secret; dev compose uses dev-only password file. |
| FED-M2-03 | not-started | Scope JSON schema + validator: `resources` allowlist, `excluded_resources`, `include_teams`, `include_personal`, `max_rows_per_query`. Vitest unit tests for valid + invalid scopes. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-scope-schema | — | 4K | Validator independent of CA reusable from grant CRUD + (later) M3 scope enforcement. |
| FED-M2-04 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/ca.service.ts`: Step-CA client (CSR submission, OID-bearing cert retrieval). Mocked + integration tests against real Step-CA container. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-ca-service | M2-02 | 6K | SAN OIDs: `grantId` (custom OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1) + `subjectUserId` (1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2). Document OID assignments in PRD/SETUP. **Acceptance**: must (a) wire `federation.tpl` template into `mosaic-fed` provisioner config and (b) include a unit/integration test asserting issued certs contain BOTH OIDs — fails-loud guard against silent OID stripping (carry-forward from M2-02 review). |
| FED-M2-05 | not-started | Sealed storage for `client_key_pem` reusing existing `provider_credentials` sealing key. Tests prove DB-at-rest is ciphertext, not PEM. Key rotation path documented (deferred impl). | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-key-sealing | M2-01 | 5K | Separate from M2-06 to keep crypto seam isolated; reviewer focus is sealing only. |
| FED-M2-06 | not-started | `grants.service.ts`: CRUD + status transitions (`pending``active``revoked`); integrates M2-03 (scope) + M2-05 (sealing). Unit tests cover all transitions including invalid ones. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-grants-service | M2-03, M2-05 | 6K | Business logic only — CSR + cert work delegated to M2-04. Revocation handler is M6. |
| FED-M2-07 | not-started | `enrollment.controller.ts`: short-lived single-use token endpoint; CSR signing; updates grant `pending``active`; emits enrollment audit (table-only write, M4 tightens). | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-enrollment | M2-04, M2-06 | 6K | Tokens single-use with 410 on replay; tokens TTL'd at 15min; rate-limited at request layer (M4 introduces guard, M2 uses simple lock). |
| FED-M2-08 | not-started | Admin CLI: `mosaic federation grant create/list/show` + `peer add/list`. Integration with grants.service (no API duplication). Help output + machine-readable JSON option. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-cli | M2-06, M2-07 | 7K | `peer add <enrollment-url>` is the client-side flow; resolves enrollment URL → CSR → store sealed key + cert. |
| FED-M2-09 | not-started | Integration tests covering MILESTONES.md M2 acceptance tests #1, #2, #3, #5, #7, #8 (single-gateway suite). Real Step-CA container; vitest profile gated by `FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1`. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-integration | M2-08 | 8K | Tests #4 (cert OID match) + #6 (two-gateway peer-add) handled separately by M2-10 (E2E). |
| FED-M2-10 | not-started | E2E test against deployed mos-test-1 + mos-test-2 (or local two-gateway docker-compose if Portainer not ready): MILESTONES test #6 `peer add` yields `active` peer record with valid cert + key. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-e2e | M2-08, DEPLOY-04 | 6K | Falls back to local docker-compose-two-gateways if remote test hosts not yet available. Documents both paths. |
| FED-M2-11 | not-started | Independent security review (sonnet, not author of M2-04/05/06/07): focus on single-use token replay, sealing leak surfaces, OID match enforcement, scope schema bypass paths. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-security-review | M2-10 | 8K | Apply M1 two-round pattern. Reviewer should explicitly attempt enrollment-token replay, OID-spoofing CSR, and key leak in error messages. |
| FED-M2-12 | not-started | Docs update: `docs/federation/SETUP.md` Step-CA section; new `docs/federation/ADMIN-CLI.md` with grant/peer commands; scope schema reference; OID registration note. Runbook still M7-deferred. | #461 | haiku | feat/federation-m2-docs | M2-11 | 4K | Adds CA bootstrap section to SETUP.md with `docker compose --profile federated up step-ca` example. |
| FED-M2-13 | not-started | PR aggregate close, CI green, merge to main, close #461. Release tag `fed-v0.2.0-m2`. Mark deploy stream complete. Update mission manifest M2 row. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-close | M2-12 | 3K | Same close pattern as M1-12; queue-guard before merge; tea release-create with notes including deploy-stream PRs. |
| --------- | ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----- | ------ | ---------------------------------- | ---------------- | -------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| FED-M2-01 | done | DB migration: `federation_grants`, `federation_peers`, `federation_audit_log` tables + enum types (`grant_status`, `peer_state`). Drizzle schema + migration generation; migration tests. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-schema | — | 5K | Shipped in PR #486. DESC indexes + reserved cols added after first review; migration tests green. |
| FED-M2-02 | done | Add Step-CA sidecar to `docker-compose.federated.yml`: official `smallstep/step-ca` image, persistent CA volume, JWK provisioner config baked into init script. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-stepca | DEPLOY-02 | 4K | Shipped in PR #494. Profile-gated under `federated`; CA password from secret; dev compose uses dev-only password file. |
| FED-M2-03 | done | Scope JSON schema + validator: `resources` allowlist, `excluded_resources`, `include_teams`, `include_personal`, `max_rows_per_query`. Vitest unit tests for valid + invalid scopes. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-scope-schema | — | 4K | Shipped in PR #496 (bundled with grants service). Validator independent of CA; reusable from grant CRUD + M3 scope enforcement. |
| FED-M2-04 | done | `apps/gateway/src/federation/ca.service.ts`: Step-CA client (CSR submission, OID-bearing cert retrieval). Mocked + integration tests against real Step-CA container. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-ca-service | M2-02 | 6K | Shipped in PR #494. SAN OIDs 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1 (grantId) + 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2 (subjectUserId); integration test asserts both OIDs present in issued cert. |
| FED-M2-05 | done | Sealed storage for `client_key_pem` reusing existing `provider_credentials` sealing key. Tests prove DB-at-rest is ciphertext, not PEM. Key rotation path documented (deferred impl). | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-key-sealing | M2-01 | 5K | Shipped in PR #495. Crypto seam isolated; tests confirm ciphertext-at-rest; key rotation deferred to M6. |
| FED-M2-06 | done | `grants.service.ts`: CRUD + status transitions (`pending``active``revoked`); integrates M2-03 (scope) + M2-05 (sealing). Unit tests cover all transitions including invalid ones. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-grants-service | M2-03, M2-05 | 6K | Shipped in PR #496. All status transitions covered; invalid transition tests green; revocation handler deferred to M6. |
| FED-M2-07 | done | `enrollment.controller.ts`: short-lived single-use token endpoint; CSR signing; updates grant `pending``active`; emits enrollment audit (table-only write, M4 tightens). | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-enrollment | M2-04, M2-06 | 6K | Shipped in PR #497. Tokens single-use with 410 on replay; TTL 15min; rate-limited at request layer. |
| FED-M2-08 | done | Admin CLI: `mosaic federation grant create/list/show` + `peer add/list`. Integration with grants.service (no API duplication). Help output + machine-readable JSON option. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-cli | M2-06, M2-07 | 7K | Shipped in PR #498. `peer add <enrollment-url>` client-side flow; JSON output flag; admin REST controller co-shipped. |
| FED-M2-09 | done | Integration tests covering MILESTONES.md M2 acceptance tests #1, #2, #3, #5, #7, #8 (single-gateway suite). Real Step-CA container; vitest profile gated by `FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1`. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-integration | M2-08 | 8K | Shipped in PR #499. All 6 acceptance tests green; gated by FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1. |
| FED-M2-10 | done | E2E test against deployed mos-test-1 + mos-test-2 (or local two-gateway docker-compose if Portainer not ready): MILESTONES test #6 `peer add` yields `active` peer record with valid cert + key. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-e2e | M2-08, DEPLOY-04 | 6K | Shipped in PR #500. Local two-gateway docker-compose path used; `peer add` yields active peer with valid cert + sealed key. |
| FED-M2-11 | done | Independent security review (sonnet, not author of M2-04/05/06/07): focus on single-use token replay, sealing leak surfaces, OID match enforcement, scope schema bypass paths. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-security-review | M2-10 | 8K | Shipped in PR #501. Two-round review; enrollment-token replay, OID-spoofing CSR, and key leak in error messages all verified and hardened. |
| FED-M2-12 | done | Docs update: `docs/federation/SETUP.md` Step-CA section; new `docs/federation/ADMIN-CLI.md` with grant/peer commands; scope schema reference; OID registration note. Runbook still M7-deferred. | #461 | haiku | feat/federation-m2-docs | M2-11 | 4K | Shipped in PR #502. SETUP.md CA bootstrap section added; ADMIN-CLI.md created; scope schema reference and OID note included. |
| FED-M2-13 | done | PR aggregate close, CI green, merge to main, close #461. Release tag `fed-v0.2.0-m2`. Mark deploy stream complete. Update mission manifest M2 row. | #461 | sonnet | chore/federation-m2-close | M2-12 | 3K | Release tag `fed-v0.2.0-m2` created; issue #461 closed; all M2 PRs #494#502 merged to main. |
**M2 code workstream estimate:** ~72K tokens (vs MILESTONES.md 30K — same over-budget pattern as M1, where per-task breakdown including tests/review/docs catches the real cost).
@@ -85,7 +85,38 @@ Goal: An admin can create a federation grant; counterparty enrolls; cert is sign
## Milestone 3 — mTLS handshake + list/get + scope enforcement (FED-M3)
_Deferred. Issue #462._
Goal: Two federated gateways exchange real data over mTLS. Inbound requests pass through cert validation → grant lookup → scope enforcement → native RBAC → response. `list`, `get`, and `capabilities` verbs land. The federation E2E harness (`tools/federation-harness/`) is the new permanent test bed for M3+ and is gated on every milestone going forward.
> **Critical trust boundary.** Every 401/403 path needs a test. Code review is non-negotiable; M3-12 budgets two review rounds.
>
> **Tracking issue:** #462.
| id | status | description | issue | agent | branch | depends_on | estimate | notes |
| --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----- | ------ | ------------------------------------ | ---------------- | -------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| FED-M3-01 | not-started | `packages/types/src/federation/` — request/response DTOs for `list`, `get`, `capabilities` verbs. Wire-format zod schemas + inferred TS types. Includes `FederationRequest`, `FederationListResponse<T>`, `FederationGetResponse<T>`, `FederationCapabilitiesResponse`, error envelope, `_source` tag. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-types | — | 4K | Reusable from gateway server + client + harness. Pure types — no I/O, no NestJS. |
| FED-M3-02 | not-started | `tools/federation-harness/` scaffold: `docker-compose.two-gateways.yml` (Server A + Server B + step-CA), `seed.ts` (provisions grants, peers, sample tasks/notes/credentials per scope variant), `harness.ts` helper (boots stack, returns typed clients). README documents harness use. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-harness | DEPLOY-04 (soft) | 8K | Falls back to local docker-compose if `mos-test-1/-2` not yet redeployed (DEPLOY chain blocked on IMG-FIX). Permanent test infra used by M3+. |
| FED-M3-03 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/federation-auth.guard.ts` (NestJS guard). Validates inbound client cert from Fastify TLS context, extracts `grantId` + `subjectUserId` from custom OIDs, loads grant from DB, asserts `status='active'`, attaches `FederationContext` to request. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-auth-guard | M3-01 | 8K | Reuses OID parsing logic mirrored from `ca.service.ts` post-issuance verification. 401 on malformed/missing OIDs; 403 on revoked/expired/missing grant. |
| FED-M3-04 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/scope.service.ts`. Pipeline: (1) resource allowlist + excluded check, (2) native RBAC eval as `subjectUserId`, (3) scope filter intersection (`include_teams`, `include_personal`), (4) `max_rows_per_query` cap. Pure service — DB calls injected. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-scope-service | M3-01 | 10K | Hardest correctness target in M3. Reuses `parseFederationScope` (M2-03). Returns either `{ allowed: true, filter }` or structured deny reason for audit. |
| FED-M3-05 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/list.controller.ts`. Wires AuthGuard → ScopeService → tasks/notes/memory query layer; applies row cap; tags rows with `_source`. Resource selector via path param. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-list | M3-03, M3-04 | 6K | Routes: `POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource`. No body persistence. Audit write deferred to M4. |
| FED-M3-06 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/get.controller.ts`. Single-resource fetch by id; same pipeline as list. 404 on not-found, 403 on RBAC/scope deny — both audited the same way. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-get | M3-03, M3-04 | 6K | `POST /api/federation/v1/get/:resource/:id`. Mirrors list controller patterns. |
| FED-M3-07 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/capabilities.controller.ts`. Read-only enumeration: returns `{ resources, excluded_resources, max_rows_per_query, supported_verbs }` derived from grant scope. Always allowed for an active grant — no RBAC eval. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-capabilities | M3-03 | 4K | `GET /api/federation/v1/capabilities`. Smallest verb; useful sanity check that mTLS + auth guard work end-to-end. |
| FED-M3-08 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/client/federation-client.service.ts`. Outbound mTLS dialer: picks `(certPem, sealed clientKey)` from `federation_peers`, unwraps key, builds undici Agent with mTLS, calls peer verb, parses typed response, wraps non-2xx into `FederationClientError`. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-client | M3-01 | 8K | Independent of server stream — can land in parallel with M3-03/04. Cert/key cached per-peer; flushed by future M5/M6 logic. |
| FED-M3-09 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/client/query-source.service.ts`. Accepts `source: "local" \| "federated:<host>" \| "all"` from gateway query layer; for `"all"` fans out to local + each peer in parallel; merges results; tags every row with `_source`. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-query-source | M3-08 | 8K | Per-peer failure surfaces as `_partial: true` in response, not hard failure (sets up M5 offline UX). M5 adds caching + circuit breaker on top. |
| FED-M3-10 | not-started | Integration tests for MILESTONES.md M3 acceptance #6 (malformed OIDs → 401; valid cert + revoked grant → 403) and #7 (`max_rows_per_query` cap). Real PG, mocked TLS context (Fastify req shim). | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-integration | M3-05, M3-06 | 8K | Vitest profile gated by `FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1`. Single-gateway suite; no harness required. |
| FED-M3-11 | not-started | E2E tests for MILESTONES.md M3 acceptance #1, #2, #3, #4, #5, #8, #9, #10 (8 cases). Uses harness from M3-02; two real gateways, real Step-CA, real mTLS. Each test asserts both happy-path response and audit/no-persist invariants. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-e2e | M3-02, M3-09 | 12K | Largest single task. Each acceptance gets its own `it(...)` for clear failure attribution. |
| FED-M3-12 | not-started | Independent security review (sonnet, not author of M3-03/04/05/06/07/08/09): focus on cert-SAN spoofing, OID extraction edge cases, scope-bypass via filter manipulation, RBAC-bypass via subjectUser swap, response leakage when scope deny. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-security-review | M3-11 | 10K | Two review rounds budgeted. PRD requires explicit test for every 401/403 path — review verifies coverage. |
| FED-M3-13 | not-started | Docs update: `docs/federation/SETUP.md` mTLS handshake section, new `docs/federation/HARNESS.md` for federation-harness usage, OID reference table in SETUP.md, scope enforcement pipeline diagram. Runbook still M7-deferred. | #462 | haiku | feat/federation-m3-docs | M3-12 | 5K | One ASCII diagram for the auth-guard → scope → RBAC pipeline; helps future reviewers reason about denial paths. |
| FED-M3-14 | not-started | PR aggregate close, CI green, merge to main, close #462. Release tag `fed-v0.3.0-m3`. Update mission manifest M3 row → done; M4 row → in-progress when work begins. | #462 | sonnet | chore/federation-m3-close | M3-13 | 3K | Same close pattern as M1-12 / M2-13. |
**M3 estimate:** ~100K tokens (vs MILESTONES.md 40K — same per-task breakdown pattern as M1/M2: tests, review, and docs split out from implementation cost). Largest milestone in the federation mission.
**Parallelization opportunities:**
- M3-08 (client) can land in parallel with M3-03/M3-04 (server pipeline) — they only share DTOs from M3-01.
- M3-02 (harness) can land in parallel with everything except M3-11.
- M3-05/M3-06/M3-07 (verbs) are independent of each other once M3-03/M3-04 land.
**Test bed fallback:** If `mos-test-1.woltje.com` / `mos-test-2.woltje.com` are still blocked on `FED-M2-DEPLOY-IMG-FIX` when M3-11 is ready to run, the harness's local `docker-compose.two-gateways.yml` is a sufficient stand-in. Production-host validation moves to M7 acceptance suite (PRD AC-12).
## Milestone 4 — search + audit + rate limit (FED-M4)

View File

@@ -612,3 +612,44 @@ Independent security review surfaced three high-impact and four medium findings;
7. DEPLOY-03/04 acceptance probes (`mosaic gateway doctor --json`, pgvector `vector(3)` round-trip)
8. DEPLOY-05: author `docs/federation/TEST-INFRA.md`
9. M2-02 (Step-CA sidecar) kicks off after image health is green
### Session 23 — 2026-04-21 — M2 close + M3 decomposition
**Closed at compaction boundary:** all 13 M2 tasks done, PRs #494#503 merged to `main`, tag `fed-v0.2.0-m2` published, Gitea release notes posted, issue #461 closed. Main at `4ece6dc6`.
**M2 hardening landed in PR #501** (security review remediation):
- CRIT-1: post-issuance OID verification in `ca.service.ts` (rejects cert if `mosaic_grant_id` / `mosaic_subject_user_id` extensions missing or mismatched)
- CRIT-2: atomic activation guard `WHERE status='pending'` on grant + `WHERE state='pending'` on peer; throws `ConflictException` if lost race
- HIGH-2: removed try/catch fallback in `extractCertNotAfter` — parse failures propagate as 500 (no silent 90-day default)
- HIGH-4: token slice for logging (`${token.slice(0, 8)}...`) — no full token in stdout
- HIGH-5: `redeem()` wrapped in try/catch with best-effort failure audit; uses `null` (not `'unknown'`) for nullable UUID FK fallback
- MED-3: `createToken` validates `grant.peerId === dto.peerId`; `BadRequestException` on mismatch
**Remaining M2 security findings deferred to M3+:**
- HIGH-1: peerId/subjectUserId tenancy validation on `createGrant` (M3 ScopeService work surfaces this)
- HIGH-3: Step-CA cert SHA-256 fingerprint pinning (M5 cert handling)
- MED-1: token entropy already 32 bytes — wontfix
- MED-2: per-route rate limit on enrollment endpoint (M4 rate limit work)
- MED-4: CSR CN binding to peer's commonName (M3 AuthGuard work)
**M3 decomposition landed in this session:**
- 14 tasks (M3-01..M3-14), ~100K estimate
- Structure mirrors M1/M2 pattern: foundation → server stream + client stream + harness in parallel → integration → E2E → security review → docs → close
- M3-02 ships local two-gateway docker-compose (`tools/federation-harness/`) so M3-11 E2E is not blocked on the Portainer test bed (which is still blocked on `FED-M2-DEPLOY-IMG-FIX`)
**Subagent doctrine retained from M2:**
- All worker subagents use `isolation: "worktree"` to prevent branch-race incidents
- Code review is independent (different subagent, no overlap with author of work)
- `tea pr create --repo mosaicstack/stack --login mosaicstack` is the working PR-create path; `pr-create.sh` has shell-quoting bugs (followup #45 if not already filed)
- Cost tier: foundational implementation = sonnet, docs = haiku, complex multi-file architecture (security review, scope service) = sonnet with two review rounds
**Next concrete step:**
1. PR for the M3 planning artifact (this commit) — branch `docs/federation-m3-planning`
2. After merge, kickoff M3-01 (DTOs) on `feat/federation-m3-types` with sonnet subagent in worktree
3. Once M3-01 lands, fan out: M3-02 (harness) || M3-03 (AuthGuard) → M3-04 (ScopeService) || M3-08 (FederationClient)
4. Re-converge at M3-10 (Integration) → M3-11 (E2E)