Compare commits
8 Commits
feat/feder
...
feat/tess-
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
b01fdf1119 | ||
|
|
fce47af3ed | ||
|
|
10f757e874 | ||
| a99aded26d | |||
| 4df38f7e81 | |||
| 4e9e053800 | |||
| 851c67c27b | |||
| 86e106fcc9 |
@@ -8,9 +8,11 @@ import { CapabilitiesController } from './server/verbs/capabilities.controller.j
|
|||||||
import { GrantsService } from './grants.service.js';
|
import { GrantsService } from './grants.service.js';
|
||||||
import { FederationClientService, QuerySourceService } from './client/index.js';
|
import { FederationClientService, QuerySourceService } from './client/index.js';
|
||||||
import { FederationAuthGuard, FederationScopeService } from './server/index.js';
|
import { FederationAuthGuard, FederationScopeService } from './server/index.js';
|
||||||
|
import { ListController } from './server/verbs/list.controller.js';
|
||||||
|
import { FederationListQueryService } from './server/verbs/list-query.service.js';
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@Module({
|
@Module({
|
||||||
controllers: [EnrollmentController, FederationController, CapabilitiesController],
|
controllers: [EnrollmentController, FederationController, CapabilitiesController, ListController],
|
||||||
providers: [
|
providers: [
|
||||||
AdminGuard,
|
AdminGuard,
|
||||||
CaService,
|
CaService,
|
||||||
@@ -20,6 +22,7 @@ import { FederationAuthGuard, FederationScopeService } from './server/index.js';
|
|||||||
QuerySourceService,
|
QuerySourceService,
|
||||||
FederationAuthGuard,
|
FederationAuthGuard,
|
||||||
FederationScopeService,
|
FederationScopeService,
|
||||||
|
FederationListQueryService,
|
||||||
],
|
],
|
||||||
exports: [
|
exports: [
|
||||||
CaService,
|
CaService,
|
||||||
@@ -29,6 +32,7 @@ import { FederationAuthGuard, FederationScopeService } from './server/index.js';
|
|||||||
QuerySourceService,
|
QuerySourceService,
|
||||||
FederationAuthGuard,
|
FederationAuthGuard,
|
||||||
FederationScopeService,
|
FederationScopeService,
|
||||||
|
FederationListQueryService,
|
||||||
],
|
],
|
||||||
})
|
})
|
||||||
export class FederationModule {}
|
export class FederationModule {}
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
|
|||||||
|
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
|
||||||
|
import {
|
||||||
|
createPgliteDb,
|
||||||
|
insights,
|
||||||
|
missionTasks,
|
||||||
|
missions,
|
||||||
|
preferences,
|
||||||
|
projects,
|
||||||
|
runPgliteMigrations,
|
||||||
|
teams,
|
||||||
|
users,
|
||||||
|
type Db,
|
||||||
|
type DbHandle,
|
||||||
|
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
|
||||||
|
import type { FederationScopeQueryFilter } from '../../scope.service.js';
|
||||||
|
import { FederationListQueryService } from '../list-query.service.js';
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const TASK_FILTER: FederationScopeQueryFilter = {
|
||||||
|
resource: 'tasks',
|
||||||
|
subjectUserId: 'user-1',
|
||||||
|
includePersonal: true,
|
||||||
|
teamIds: [],
|
||||||
|
limit: 2,
|
||||||
|
maxRowsPerQuery: 2,
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const SUBJECT_USER_ID = 'fed-m3-05-subject';
|
||||||
|
const OTHER_USER_ID = 'fed-m3-05-other';
|
||||||
|
const TEAM_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001';
|
||||||
|
const UNAUTHORIZED_TEAM_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002';
|
||||||
|
const PERSONAL_PROJECT_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000101';
|
||||||
|
const TEAM_PROJECT_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000102';
|
||||||
|
const UNAUTHORIZED_PROJECT_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000103';
|
||||||
|
const PERSONAL_MISSION_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000201';
|
||||||
|
const TEAM_MISSION_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000202';
|
||||||
|
const UNAUTHORIZED_MISSION_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000203';
|
||||||
|
const SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000301';
|
||||||
|
const OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000302';
|
||||||
|
const SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000303';
|
||||||
|
const SUBJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_NOTE_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000304';
|
||||||
|
const INSIGHT_ONE_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000401';
|
||||||
|
const INSIGHT_TWO_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000402';
|
||||||
|
const PREFERENCE_ONE_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000501';
|
||||||
|
const PREFERENCE_TWO_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000502';
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let dbHandle: DbHandle | undefined;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
function makeService() {
|
||||||
|
return new FederationListQueryService({} as Db);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
function makeDbService() {
|
||||||
|
if (!dbHandle) {
|
||||||
|
throw new Error('test DB not initialized');
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return new FederationListQueryService(dbHandle.db);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
async function seedNotesFixture() {
|
||||||
|
if (!dbHandle) {
|
||||||
|
throw new Error('test DB not initialized');
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
await dbHandle.db.insert(users).values([
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
id: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
name: 'Federation Subject',
|
||||||
|
email: `${SUBJECT_USER_ID}@example.test`,
|
||||||
|
emailVerified: false,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
id: OTHER_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
name: 'Federation Other',
|
||||||
|
email: `${OTHER_USER_ID}@example.test`,
|
||||||
|
emailVerified: false,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
]);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
await dbHandle.db.insert(teams).values([
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
id: TEAM_ID,
|
||||||
|
name: 'FED-M3-05 Team',
|
||||||
|
slug: 'fed-m3-05-team',
|
||||||
|
ownerId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
managerId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
id: UNAUTHORIZED_TEAM_ID,
|
||||||
|
name: 'FED-M3-05 Unauthorized Team',
|
||||||
|
slug: 'fed-m3-05-unauthorized-team',
|
||||||
|
ownerId: OTHER_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
managerId: OTHER_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
]);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
await dbHandle.db.insert(projects).values([
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
id: PERSONAL_PROJECT_ID,
|
||||||
|
name: 'FED-M3-05 Personal Project',
|
||||||
|
ownerId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
ownerType: 'user',
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
id: TEAM_PROJECT_ID,
|
||||||
|
name: 'FED-M3-05 Team Project',
|
||||||
|
teamId: TEAM_ID,
|
||||||
|
ownerType: 'team',
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
id: UNAUTHORIZED_PROJECT_ID,
|
||||||
|
name: 'FED-M3-05 Unauthorized Project',
|
||||||
|
teamId: UNAUTHORIZED_TEAM_ID,
|
||||||
|
ownerType: 'team',
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
]);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
await dbHandle.db.insert(missions).values([
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
id: PERSONAL_MISSION_ID,
|
||||||
|
name: 'FED-M3-05 Personal Mission',
|
||||||
|
projectId: PERSONAL_PROJECT_ID,
|
||||||
|
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
id: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
|
||||||
|
name: 'FED-M3-05 Team Mission',
|
||||||
|
projectId: TEAM_PROJECT_ID,
|
||||||
|
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
id: UNAUTHORIZED_MISSION_ID,
|
||||||
|
name: 'FED-M3-05 Unauthorized Mission',
|
||||||
|
projectId: UNAUTHORIZED_PROJECT_ID,
|
||||||
|
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
]);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
await dbHandle.db.insert(missionTasks).values([
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
id: SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
|
||||||
|
missionId: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
|
||||||
|
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
notes: 'subject note on team mission',
|
||||||
|
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T03:00:00.000Z'),
|
||||||
|
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T03:00:00.000Z'),
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
id: OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
|
||||||
|
missionId: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
|
||||||
|
userId: OTHER_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
notes: 'other user note on team mission',
|
||||||
|
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T02:00:00.000Z'),
|
||||||
|
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T02:00:00.000Z'),
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
id: SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID,
|
||||||
|
missionId: PERSONAL_MISSION_ID,
|
||||||
|
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
notes: 'subject note on personal mission',
|
||||||
|
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z'),
|
||||||
|
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z'),
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
id: SUBJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_NOTE_ID,
|
||||||
|
missionId: UNAUTHORIZED_MISSION_ID,
|
||||||
|
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
notes: 'subject note outside grant-visible missions',
|
||||||
|
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T04:00:00.000Z'),
|
||||||
|
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T04:00:00.000Z'),
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
]);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const memoryCreatedAt = new Date('2026-06-24T05:00:00.000Z');
|
||||||
|
await dbHandle.db.insert(insights).values([
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
id: INSIGHT_ONE_ID,
|
||||||
|
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
content: 'first insight',
|
||||||
|
source: 'agent',
|
||||||
|
createdAt: memoryCreatedAt,
|
||||||
|
updatedAt: memoryCreatedAt,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
id: INSIGHT_TWO_ID,
|
||||||
|
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
content: 'second insight',
|
||||||
|
source: 'agent',
|
||||||
|
createdAt: memoryCreatedAt,
|
||||||
|
updatedAt: memoryCreatedAt,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
]);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
await dbHandle.db.insert(preferences).values([
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
id: PREFERENCE_ONE_ID,
|
||||||
|
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
key: 'fed-m3-05-pref-1',
|
||||||
|
value: { enabled: true },
|
||||||
|
createdAt: memoryCreatedAt,
|
||||||
|
updatedAt: memoryCreatedAt,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
id: PREFERENCE_TWO_ID,
|
||||||
|
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
key: 'fed-m3-05-pref-2',
|
||||||
|
value: { enabled: false },
|
||||||
|
createdAt: memoryCreatedAt,
|
||||||
|
updatedAt: memoryCreatedAt,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
]);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
function stubRows(
|
||||||
|
service: FederationListQueryService,
|
||||||
|
...pages: Array<Array<Record<string, unknown>>>
|
||||||
|
) {
|
||||||
|
const mock = vi.fn();
|
||||||
|
for (const page of pages) {
|
||||||
|
mock.mockResolvedValueOnce(page);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
(
|
||||||
|
service as unknown as {
|
||||||
|
listAllRows: (
|
||||||
|
_filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
|
||||||
|
_rowLimit: number,
|
||||||
|
_cursor: unknown,
|
||||||
|
) => Promise<Array<Record<string, unknown>>>;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
).listAllRows = mock;
|
||||||
|
return mock;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
describe('FederationListQueryService', () => {
|
||||||
|
beforeAll(async () => {
|
||||||
|
dbHandle = createPgliteDb(`memory://fed-m3-05-list-${Date.now()}`);
|
||||||
|
await runPgliteMigrations(dbHandle);
|
||||||
|
await seedNotesFixture();
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
afterAll(async () => {
|
||||||
|
await dbHandle?.close();
|
||||||
|
dbHandle = undefined;
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
it('denies sensitive resources in native RBAC for M3 list reads', async () => {
|
||||||
|
const service = makeService();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
await expect(
|
||||||
|
service.evaluateReadAccess({
|
||||||
|
grantId: 'grant-1',
|
||||||
|
peerId: 'peer-1',
|
||||||
|
subjectUserId: 'user-1',
|
||||||
|
resource: 'credentials',
|
||||||
|
}),
|
||||||
|
).resolves.toMatchObject({
|
||||||
|
allowed: false,
|
||||||
|
reason: 'credentials federation list access is not implemented in M3',
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
it('allows personal memory reads without requiring team lookup', async () => {
|
||||||
|
const service = makeService();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
await expect(
|
||||||
|
service.evaluateReadAccess({
|
||||||
|
grantId: 'grant-1',
|
||||||
|
peerId: 'peer-1',
|
||||||
|
subjectUserId: 'user-1',
|
||||||
|
resource: 'memory',
|
||||||
|
}),
|
||||||
|
).resolves.toEqual({
|
||||||
|
allowed: true,
|
||||||
|
access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] },
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
it('applies the scope row cap and returns an opaque next cursor when truncated', async () => {
|
||||||
|
const service = makeService();
|
||||||
|
const listAllRows = stubRows(
|
||||||
|
service,
|
||||||
|
[
|
||||||
|
{ id: '3', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T03:00:00.000Z') },
|
||||||
|
{ id: '2', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T02:00:00.000Z') },
|
||||||
|
{ id: '1', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z') },
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
[{ id: '1', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z') }],
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const firstPage = await service.list({ filter: TASK_FILTER });
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
expect(firstPage).toEqual({
|
||||||
|
items: [
|
||||||
|
{ id: '3', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T03:00:00.000Z') },
|
||||||
|
{ id: '2', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T02:00:00.000Z') },
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
truncated: true,
|
||||||
|
nextCursor: expect.any(String),
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
expect(listAllRows).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(1, TASK_FILTER, 3, undefined);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const secondPage = await service.list({ filter: TASK_FILTER, cursor: firstPage.nextCursor });
|
||||||
|
expect(secondPage).toEqual({
|
||||||
|
items: [{ id: '1', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z') }],
|
||||||
|
truncated: false,
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
expect(listAllRows).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(
|
||||||
|
2,
|
||||||
|
TASK_FILTER,
|
||||||
|
3,
|
||||||
|
expect.objectContaining({ id: '2' }),
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
it('rejects invalid cursors instead of falling back to the first page', async () => {
|
||||||
|
const service = makeService();
|
||||||
|
stubRows(service, [{ id: '1' }]);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
await expect(service.list({ filter: TASK_FILTER, cursor: 'not-base64-json' })).rejects.toThrow(
|
||||||
|
'Invalid federation list cursor',
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
it('throws when a truncated page cannot encode a resumable cursor', async () => {
|
||||||
|
const service = makeService();
|
||||||
|
stubRows(service, [
|
||||||
|
{ id: '2', createdAt: 'not-a-date' },
|
||||||
|
{ id: '1', createdAt: 'not-a-date' },
|
||||||
|
]);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
await expect(service.list({ filter: { ...TASK_FILTER, limit: 1 } })).rejects.toThrow(
|
||||||
|
'Federation list cursor cannot be encoded',
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
it('throws on unsupported resources instead of crashing pagination', async () => {
|
||||||
|
const service = makeService();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
await expect(
|
||||||
|
service.list({
|
||||||
|
filter: {
|
||||||
|
...TASK_FILTER,
|
||||||
|
resource: 'unknown-resource' as FederationScopeQueryFilter['resource'],
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
}),
|
||||||
|
).rejects.toThrow('Unsupported federation list resource');
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
it('does not leak another user mission task notes through team-scoped note reads', async () => {
|
||||||
|
const service = makeDbService();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const result = await service.list({
|
||||||
|
filter: {
|
||||||
|
resource: 'notes',
|
||||||
|
subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
includePersonal: false,
|
||||||
|
teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
|
||||||
|
limit: 10,
|
||||||
|
maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const ids = result.items.map((item) => item['id']);
|
||||||
|
expect(ids).toEqual([SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID]);
|
||||||
|
expect(ids).not.toContain(OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID);
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
it('does not return subject personal mission task notes when includePersonal is false', async () => {
|
||||||
|
const service = makeDbService();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const result = await service.list({
|
||||||
|
filter: {
|
||||||
|
resource: 'notes',
|
||||||
|
subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
includePersonal: false,
|
||||||
|
teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
|
||||||
|
limit: 10,
|
||||||
|
maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
expect(result.items.map((item) => item['id'])).not.toContain(SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID);
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
it('does not return subject notes from missions outside the grant-visible project set', async () => {
|
||||||
|
const service = makeDbService();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const result = await service.list({
|
||||||
|
filter: {
|
||||||
|
resource: 'notes',
|
||||||
|
subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
includePersonal: true,
|
||||||
|
teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
|
||||||
|
limit: 10,
|
||||||
|
maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const ids = result.items.map((item) => item['id']);
|
||||||
|
expect(ids).toContain(SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID);
|
||||||
|
expect(ids).toContain(SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID);
|
||||||
|
expect(ids).not.toContain(SUBJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_NOTE_ID);
|
||||||
|
expect(ids).not.toContain(OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID);
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
it('paginates memory deterministically across insights and preferences', async () => {
|
||||||
|
const service = makeDbService();
|
||||||
|
const filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter = {
|
||||||
|
resource: 'memory',
|
||||||
|
subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
|
||||||
|
includePersonal: true,
|
||||||
|
teamIds: [],
|
||||||
|
limit: 2,
|
||||||
|
maxRowsPerQuery: 2,
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const firstPage = await service.list({ filter });
|
||||||
|
const secondPage = await service.list({ filter, cursor: firstPage.nextCursor });
|
||||||
|
const firstPageIds = firstPage.items.map((item) => item['id']);
|
||||||
|
const secondPageIds = secondPage.items.map((item) => item['id']);
|
||||||
|
const allIds = [...firstPageIds, ...secondPageIds];
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
expect(firstPage).toMatchObject({ truncated: true, nextCursor: expect.any(String) });
|
||||||
|
expect(firstPageIds).toEqual([INSIGHT_TWO_ID, INSIGHT_ONE_ID]);
|
||||||
|
expect(secondPageIds).toEqual([PREFERENCE_TWO_ID, PREFERENCE_ONE_ID]);
|
||||||
|
expect(new Set(allIds).size).toBe(allIds.length);
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
|
|||||||
|
import 'reflect-metadata';
|
||||||
|
import { RequestMethod } from '@nestjs/common';
|
||||||
|
import type { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
|
||||||
|
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
|
||||||
|
import { FederationAuthGuard } from '../../federation-auth.guard.js';
|
||||||
|
import type {
|
||||||
|
FederationScopeEvaluationResult,
|
||||||
|
FederationScopeQueryFilter,
|
||||||
|
} from '../../scope.service.js';
|
||||||
|
import { ListController } from '../list.controller.js';
|
||||||
|
import type { FederationListQueryResult } from '../list-query.service.js';
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const FEDERATION_CONTEXT = {
|
||||||
|
grantId: 'grant-1',
|
||||||
|
peerId: 'peer-1',
|
||||||
|
subjectUserId: 'user-1',
|
||||||
|
scope: { resources: ['tasks'], max_rows_per_query: 25 },
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const TASK_FILTER: FederationScopeQueryFilter = {
|
||||||
|
resource: 'tasks',
|
||||||
|
subjectUserId: 'user-1',
|
||||||
|
includePersonal: true,
|
||||||
|
teamIds: ['team-1'],
|
||||||
|
limit: 10,
|
||||||
|
maxRowsPerQuery: 25,
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
function makeRequest(): FastifyRequest {
|
||||||
|
return { federationContext: FEDERATION_CONTEXT } as unknown as FastifyRequest;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
function allowedScope(
|
||||||
|
filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter = TASK_FILTER,
|
||||||
|
): FederationScopeEvaluationResult {
|
||||||
|
return { allowed: true, filter };
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
function makeController(opts?: {
|
||||||
|
scopeResult?: FederationScopeEvaluationResult;
|
||||||
|
queryResult?: FederationListQueryResult;
|
||||||
|
}) {
|
||||||
|
const scope = {
|
||||||
|
evaluateAccess: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(opts?.scopeResult ?? allowedScope()),
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
const query = {
|
||||||
|
evaluateReadAccess: vi.fn(),
|
||||||
|
list: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(
|
||||||
|
opts?.queryResult ?? {
|
||||||
|
items: [
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
id: 'task-1',
|
||||||
|
title: 'Federated task',
|
||||||
|
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T00:00:00.000Z'),
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
truncated: false,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return {
|
||||||
|
controller: new ListController(scope as never, query as never),
|
||||||
|
scope,
|
||||||
|
query,
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
describe('ListController', () => {
|
||||||
|
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||||
|
vi.clearAllMocks();
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
it('declares POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource protected only by FederationAuthGuard', () => {
|
||||||
|
expect(Reflect.getMetadata('path', ListController)).toBe('api/federation/v1/list');
|
||||||
|
expect(Reflect.getMetadata('path', ListController.prototype.list)).toBe(':resource');
|
||||||
|
expect(Reflect.getMetadata('method', ListController.prototype.list)).toBe(RequestMethod.POST);
|
||||||
|
expect(Reflect.getMetadata('__guards__', ListController)).toEqual([FederationAuthGuard]);
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
it('runs AuthGuard context through ScopeService and returns local-source tagged rows', async () => {
|
||||||
|
const { controller, scope, query } = makeController();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const response = await controller.list('tasks', makeRequest(), { limit: 10 });
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
expect(scope.evaluateAccess).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
|
||||||
|
context: FEDERATION_CONTEXT,
|
||||||
|
resource: 'tasks',
|
||||||
|
requestedLimit: 10,
|
||||||
|
nativeRbac: query,
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
expect(query.list).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ filter: TASK_FILTER, cursor: undefined });
|
||||||
|
expect(response).toEqual({
|
||||||
|
items: [
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
id: 'task-1',
|
||||||
|
title: 'Federated task',
|
||||||
|
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T00:00:00.000Z'),
|
||||||
|
_source: 'local',
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
it('preserves pagination metadata when row cap truncates the query layer result', async () => {
|
||||||
|
const { controller } = makeController({
|
||||||
|
queryResult: {
|
||||||
|
items: [{ id: 'task-1' }],
|
||||||
|
nextCursor: 'cursor-2',
|
||||||
|
truncated: true,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const response = await controller.list('tasks', makeRequest(), { cursor: 'cursor-1' });
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
expect(response).toEqual({
|
||||||
|
items: [{ id: 'task-1', _source: 'local' }],
|
||||||
|
nextCursor: 'cursor-2',
|
||||||
|
_truncated: true,
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
it('returns a federation error envelope when auth guard context is missing', async () => {
|
||||||
|
const { controller, scope, query } = makeController();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
await expect(
|
||||||
|
controller.list('tasks', {} as unknown as FastifyRequest, {}),
|
||||||
|
).rejects.toMatchObject({
|
||||||
|
response: {
|
||||||
|
error: {
|
||||||
|
code: 'unauthorized',
|
||||||
|
message: 'Federation context missing',
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
status: 401,
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
expect(scope.evaluateAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||||
|
expect(query.list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
it('returns a federation error envelope when scope evaluation denies access', async () => {
|
||||||
|
const { controller, query } = makeController({
|
||||||
|
scopeResult: {
|
||||||
|
allowed: false,
|
||||||
|
deny: {
|
||||||
|
code: 'resource_excluded',
|
||||||
|
stage: 'resource_exclusion',
|
||||||
|
statusCode: 403,
|
||||||
|
message: 'Requested federation resource is explicitly excluded by grant scope',
|
||||||
|
grantId: 'grant-1',
|
||||||
|
peerId: 'peer-1',
|
||||||
|
subjectUserId: 'user-1',
|
||||||
|
resource: 'credentials',
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
await expect(controller.list('credentials', makeRequest(), {})).rejects.toMatchObject({
|
||||||
|
response: {
|
||||||
|
error: {
|
||||||
|
code: 'scope_violation',
|
||||||
|
message: 'Requested federation resource is explicitly excluded by grant scope',
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
status: 403,
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
expect(query.list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
it('rejects malformed request body fields before querying storage', async () => {
|
||||||
|
const { controller, scope, query } = makeController();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
await expect(controller.list('tasks', makeRequest(), { cursor: 123 })).rejects.toMatchObject({
|
||||||
|
response: { error: { code: 'invalid_request' } },
|
||||||
|
status: 400,
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
await expect(controller.list('tasks', makeRequest(), { limit: false })).rejects.toMatchObject({
|
||||||
|
response: { error: { code: 'invalid_request' } },
|
||||||
|
status: 400,
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
await expect(controller.list('tasks', makeRequest(), { limit: 'abc' })).rejects.toMatchObject({
|
||||||
|
response: { error: { code: 'invalid_request' } },
|
||||||
|
status: 400,
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
expect(scope.evaluateAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||||
|
expect(query.list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
408
apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/list-query.service.ts
Normal file
408
apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/list-query.service.ts
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
|
|||||||
|
/**
|
||||||
|
* Federation list query layer (FED-M3-05).
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* Read-only DB adapter used by ListController after FederationAuthGuard and
|
||||||
|
* FederationScopeService have established the subject user, allowed resource,
|
||||||
|
* native-RBAC intersection, and row cap. Audit writes are intentionally
|
||||||
|
* deferred to M4.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
|
||||||
|
import {
|
||||||
|
and,
|
||||||
|
desc,
|
||||||
|
eq,
|
||||||
|
inArray,
|
||||||
|
insights,
|
||||||
|
isNotNull,
|
||||||
|
lt,
|
||||||
|
missionTasks,
|
||||||
|
missions,
|
||||||
|
or,
|
||||||
|
preferences,
|
||||||
|
projects,
|
||||||
|
tasks,
|
||||||
|
teamMembers,
|
||||||
|
type Db,
|
||||||
|
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
|
||||||
|
import type {
|
||||||
|
FederationNativeRbacEvaluator,
|
||||||
|
FederationNativeRbacRequest,
|
||||||
|
FederationNativeRbacResult,
|
||||||
|
FederationScopeQueryFilter,
|
||||||
|
} from '../scope.service.js';
|
||||||
|
import { DB } from '../../../database/database.module.js';
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
export interface FederationListQueryRequest {
|
||||||
|
readonly filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter;
|
||||||
|
readonly cursor?: string;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
export interface FederationListQueryResult<T extends object = Record<string, unknown>> {
|
||||||
|
readonly items: T[];
|
||||||
|
readonly nextCursor?: string;
|
||||||
|
readonly truncated: boolean;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
type CursorSource = 'insights' | 'preferences';
|
||||||
|
const CURSOR_SOURCE = Symbol('federationCursorSource');
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
type RowObject = Record<string, unknown> & { readonly [CURSOR_SOURCE]?: CursorSource };
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
interface KeysetCursor {
|
||||||
|
readonly createdAt: Date;
|
||||||
|
readonly id: string;
|
||||||
|
readonly source?: CursorSource;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
function encodeCursor(row: RowObject): string {
|
||||||
|
const createdAt = row['createdAt'];
|
||||||
|
const id = row['id'];
|
||||||
|
if (!(createdAt instanceof Date) || typeof id !== 'string') {
|
||||||
|
throw new Error('Federation list cursor cannot be encoded');
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const source = row[CURSOR_SOURCE];
|
||||||
|
return Buffer.from(
|
||||||
|
JSON.stringify({ createdAt: createdAt.toISOString(), id, ...(source ? { source } : {}) }),
|
||||||
|
'utf8',
|
||||||
|
).toString('base64url');
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
function decodeCursor(cursor: string | undefined): KeysetCursor | undefined {
|
||||||
|
if (cursor === undefined) {
|
||||||
|
return undefined;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
try {
|
||||||
|
const parsed = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(cursor, 'base64url').toString('utf8')) as unknown;
|
||||||
|
if (typeof parsed !== 'object' || parsed === null) {
|
||||||
|
throw new Error('cursor must be an object');
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const { createdAt, id, source } = parsed as {
|
||||||
|
createdAt?: unknown;
|
||||||
|
id?: unknown;
|
||||||
|
source?: unknown;
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
if (typeof createdAt !== 'string' || typeof id !== 'string' || id.length === 0) {
|
||||||
|
throw new Error('cursor is missing createdAt or id');
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if (source !== undefined && source !== 'insights' && source !== 'preferences') {
|
||||||
|
throw new Error('cursor source is invalid');
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const date = new Date(createdAt);
|
||||||
|
if (Number.isNaN(date.getTime())) {
|
||||||
|
throw new Error('cursor createdAt is invalid');
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return { createdAt: date, id, ...(source ? { source } : {}) };
|
||||||
|
} catch {
|
||||||
|
throw new Error('Invalid federation list cursor');
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
function paginate<T extends RowObject>(rows: T[], limit: number): FederationListQueryResult<T> {
|
||||||
|
const page = rows.slice(0, limit);
|
||||||
|
const hasMore = rows.length > limit;
|
||||||
|
const nextCursor = hasMore ? encodeCursor(page[page.length - 1] ?? {}) : undefined;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return {
|
||||||
|
items: page,
|
||||||
|
truncated: hasMore,
|
||||||
|
...(nextCursor !== undefined ? { nextCursor } : {}),
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
function markCursorSource<T extends RowObject>(row: T, source: CursorSource): T {
|
||||||
|
Object.defineProperty(row, CURSOR_SOURCE, {
|
||||||
|
value: source,
|
||||||
|
enumerable: false,
|
||||||
|
configurable: false,
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
return row;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
function sortRows(rows: RowObject[]): RowObject[] {
|
||||||
|
return [...rows].sort((a, b) => {
|
||||||
|
const aTime = a['createdAt'] instanceof Date ? a['createdAt'].getTime() : 0;
|
||||||
|
const bTime = b['createdAt'] instanceof Date ? b['createdAt'].getTime() : 0;
|
||||||
|
if (aTime !== bTime) {
|
||||||
|
return bTime - aTime;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return String(b['id'] ?? '').localeCompare(String(a['id'] ?? ''));
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@Injectable()
|
||||||
|
export class FederationListQueryService implements FederationNativeRbacEvaluator {
|
||||||
|
constructor(@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db) {}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
async evaluateReadAccess(
|
||||||
|
request: FederationNativeRbacRequest,
|
||||||
|
): Promise<FederationNativeRbacResult> {
|
||||||
|
if (request.resource === 'credentials' || request.resource === 'api_keys') {
|
||||||
|
return {
|
||||||
|
allowed: false,
|
||||||
|
reason: `${request.resource} federation list access is not implemented in M3`,
|
||||||
|
details: { resource: request.resource },
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if (request.resource === 'memory') {
|
||||||
|
return { allowed: true, access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] } };
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const teamIds = await this.listSubjectTeamIds(request.subjectUserId);
|
||||||
|
return { allowed: true, access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds } };
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
async list<T extends RowObject = RowObject>(
|
||||||
|
request: FederationListQueryRequest,
|
||||||
|
): Promise<FederationListQueryResult<T>> {
|
||||||
|
const cursor = decodeCursor(request.cursor);
|
||||||
|
const rows = await this.listAllRows(request.filter, request.filter.limit + 1, cursor);
|
||||||
|
return paginate(rows as T[], request.filter.limit);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
private async listAllRows(
|
||||||
|
filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
|
||||||
|
rowLimit: number,
|
||||||
|
cursor: KeysetCursor | undefined,
|
||||||
|
): Promise<RowObject[]> {
|
||||||
|
switch (filter.resource) {
|
||||||
|
case 'tasks':
|
||||||
|
return this.listTasks(filter, rowLimit, cursor);
|
||||||
|
case 'notes':
|
||||||
|
return this.listNotes(filter, rowLimit, cursor);
|
||||||
|
case 'memory':
|
||||||
|
return this.listMemory(filter, rowLimit, cursor);
|
||||||
|
case 'credentials':
|
||||||
|
case 'api_keys':
|
||||||
|
return [];
|
||||||
|
default:
|
||||||
|
throw new Error(`Unsupported federation list resource: ${String(filter.resource)}`);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
private async listSubjectTeamIds(subjectUserId: string): Promise<string[]> {
|
||||||
|
const rows = await this.db
|
||||||
|
.select({ teamId: teamMembers.teamId })
|
||||||
|
.from(teamMembers)
|
||||||
|
.where(eq(teamMembers.userId, subjectUserId));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return rows.map((row) => row.teamId);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
private async listAccessibleProjectIds(filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter): Promise<string[]> {
|
||||||
|
const clauses = [];
|
||||||
|
if (filter.includePersonal) {
|
||||||
|
clauses.push(and(eq(projects.ownerType, 'user'), eq(projects.ownerId, filter.subjectUserId)));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if (filter.teamIds.length > 0) {
|
||||||
|
clauses.push(
|
||||||
|
and(eq(projects.ownerType, 'team'), inArray(projects.teamId, [...filter.teamIds])),
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if (clauses.length === 0) {
|
||||||
|
return [];
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const rows = await this.db
|
||||||
|
.select({ id: projects.id })
|
||||||
|
.from(projects)
|
||||||
|
.where(clauses.length === 1 ? clauses[0] : or(...clauses));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return rows.map((row) => row.id);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
private async listMissionIds(projectIds: readonly string[]): Promise<string[]> {
|
||||||
|
if (projectIds.length === 0) {
|
||||||
|
return [];
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const rows = await this.db
|
||||||
|
.select({ id: missions.id })
|
||||||
|
.from(missions)
|
||||||
|
.where(inArray(missions.projectId, [...projectIds]));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return rows.map((row) => row.id);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
private async listTasks(
|
||||||
|
filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
|
||||||
|
rowLimit: number,
|
||||||
|
cursor: KeysetCursor | undefined,
|
||||||
|
): Promise<RowObject[]> {
|
||||||
|
const projectIds = await this.listAccessibleProjectIds(filter);
|
||||||
|
const missionIds = await this.listMissionIds(projectIds);
|
||||||
|
const clauses = [];
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if (projectIds.length > 0) {
|
||||||
|
clauses.push(inArray(tasks.projectId, projectIds));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if (missionIds.length > 0) {
|
||||||
|
clauses.push(inArray(tasks.missionId, missionIds));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if (clauses.length === 0) {
|
||||||
|
return [];
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const scopeClause = clauses.length === 1 ? clauses[0] : or(...clauses);
|
||||||
|
const cursorClause = cursor
|
||||||
|
? or(
|
||||||
|
lt(tasks.createdAt, cursor.createdAt),
|
||||||
|
and(eq(tasks.createdAt, cursor.createdAt), lt(tasks.id, cursor.id)),
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
: undefined;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const rows = await this.db
|
||||||
|
.select({
|
||||||
|
id: tasks.id,
|
||||||
|
title: tasks.title,
|
||||||
|
description: tasks.description,
|
||||||
|
status: tasks.status,
|
||||||
|
priority: tasks.priority,
|
||||||
|
projectId: tasks.projectId,
|
||||||
|
missionId: tasks.missionId,
|
||||||
|
assignee: tasks.assignee,
|
||||||
|
tags: tasks.tags,
|
||||||
|
dueDate: tasks.dueDate,
|
||||||
|
metadata: tasks.metadata,
|
||||||
|
createdAt: tasks.createdAt,
|
||||||
|
updatedAt: tasks.updatedAt,
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
.from(tasks)
|
||||||
|
.where(and(scopeClause, cursorClause))
|
||||||
|
.orderBy(desc(tasks.createdAt), desc(tasks.id))
|
||||||
|
.limit(rowLimit);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return sortRows(rows as RowObject[]);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
private async listNotes(
|
||||||
|
filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
|
||||||
|
rowLimit: number,
|
||||||
|
cursor: KeysetCursor | undefined,
|
||||||
|
): Promise<RowObject[]> {
|
||||||
|
const projectIds = await this.listAccessibleProjectIds(filter);
|
||||||
|
const missionIds = await this.listMissionIds(projectIds);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if (missionIds.length === 0) {
|
||||||
|
return [];
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// mission_tasks rows are user-scoped even when the mission belongs to a team.
|
||||||
|
// Team visibility can narrow the mission set, but it must never widen the
|
||||||
|
// query to other users' mission task notes.
|
||||||
|
const scopeClause = and(
|
||||||
|
eq(missionTasks.userId, filter.subjectUserId),
|
||||||
|
inArray(missionTasks.missionId, missionIds),
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
const cursorClause = cursor
|
||||||
|
? or(
|
||||||
|
lt(missionTasks.createdAt, cursor.createdAt),
|
||||||
|
and(eq(missionTasks.createdAt, cursor.createdAt), lt(missionTasks.id, cursor.id)),
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
: undefined;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const rows = await this.db
|
||||||
|
.select({
|
||||||
|
id: missionTasks.id,
|
||||||
|
missionId: missionTasks.missionId,
|
||||||
|
taskId: missionTasks.taskId,
|
||||||
|
status: missionTasks.status,
|
||||||
|
content: missionTasks.notes,
|
||||||
|
createdAt: missionTasks.createdAt,
|
||||||
|
updatedAt: missionTasks.updatedAt,
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
.from(missionTasks)
|
||||||
|
.where(and(scopeClause, cursorClause, isNotNull(missionTasks.notes)))
|
||||||
|
.orderBy(desc(missionTasks.createdAt), desc(missionTasks.id))
|
||||||
|
.limit(rowLimit);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return sortRows(rows.filter((row) => row.content !== '') as RowObject[]);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
private async listMemory(
|
||||||
|
filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
|
||||||
|
rowLimit: number,
|
||||||
|
cursor: KeysetCursor | undefined,
|
||||||
|
): Promise<RowObject[]> {
|
||||||
|
if (!filter.includePersonal) {
|
||||||
|
return [];
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if (cursor && cursor.source === undefined) {
|
||||||
|
throw new Error('Invalid federation list cursor');
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const rows: RowObject[] = [];
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Memory spans two physical tables. To keep pagination deterministic and
|
||||||
|
// resumable without a SQL UNION, M3 emits a fixed block order: all insights
|
||||||
|
// first, then preferences. The opaque cursor records which table produced
|
||||||
|
// the boundary row, so the next page never re-applies one table's keyset to
|
||||||
|
// the other table (which could duplicate/skip rows at equal timestamps).
|
||||||
|
if (cursor?.source !== 'preferences') {
|
||||||
|
const insightCursorClause = cursor
|
||||||
|
? or(
|
||||||
|
lt(insights.createdAt, cursor.createdAt),
|
||||||
|
and(eq(insights.createdAt, cursor.createdAt), lt(insights.id, cursor.id)),
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
: undefined;
|
||||||
|
const insightRows = await this.db
|
||||||
|
.select({
|
||||||
|
id: insights.id,
|
||||||
|
kind: insights.source,
|
||||||
|
content: insights.content,
|
||||||
|
category: insights.category,
|
||||||
|
relevanceScore: insights.relevanceScore,
|
||||||
|
metadata: insights.metadata,
|
||||||
|
createdAt: insights.createdAt,
|
||||||
|
updatedAt: insights.updatedAt,
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
.from(insights)
|
||||||
|
.where(and(eq(insights.userId, filter.subjectUserId), insightCursorClause))
|
||||||
|
.orderBy(desc(insights.createdAt), desc(insights.id))
|
||||||
|
.limit(rowLimit);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
rows.push(...(insightRows as RowObject[]).map((row) => markCursorSource(row, 'insights')));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const remaining = rowLimit - rows.length;
|
||||||
|
if (remaining <= 0) {
|
||||||
|
return rows;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const preferenceCursorClause =
|
||||||
|
cursor?.source === 'preferences'
|
||||||
|
? or(
|
||||||
|
lt(preferences.createdAt, cursor.createdAt),
|
||||||
|
and(eq(preferences.createdAt, cursor.createdAt), lt(preferences.id, cursor.id)),
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
: undefined;
|
||||||
|
const preferenceRows = await this.db
|
||||||
|
.select({
|
||||||
|
id: preferences.id,
|
||||||
|
kind: preferences.category,
|
||||||
|
key: preferences.key,
|
||||||
|
value: preferences.value,
|
||||||
|
source: preferences.source,
|
||||||
|
mutable: preferences.mutable,
|
||||||
|
createdAt: preferences.createdAt,
|
||||||
|
updatedAt: preferences.updatedAt,
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
.from(preferences)
|
||||||
|
.where(and(eq(preferences.userId, filter.subjectUserId), preferenceCursorClause))
|
||||||
|
.orderBy(desc(preferences.createdAt), desc(preferences.id))
|
||||||
|
.limit(remaining);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
rows.push(
|
||||||
|
...(preferenceRows as RowObject[]).map((row) => markCursorSource(row, 'preferences')),
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
return rows;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
147
apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/list.controller.ts
Normal file
147
apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/list.controller.ts
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
|
|||||||
|
/**
|
||||||
|
* Federation list verb (FED-M3-05).
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* Pipeline: FederationAuthGuard attaches the active grant context, then
|
||||||
|
* FederationScopeService enforces grant scope + native RBAC intersection, then
|
||||||
|
* the read-only query layer returns capped rows tagged with `_source`. Read
|
||||||
|
* audit-log writes are deferred to M4; this controller does not persist request
|
||||||
|
* or response bodies.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import {
|
||||||
|
Body,
|
||||||
|
Controller,
|
||||||
|
HttpException,
|
||||||
|
Inject,
|
||||||
|
Param,
|
||||||
|
Post,
|
||||||
|
Req,
|
||||||
|
UseGuards,
|
||||||
|
} from '@nestjs/common';
|
||||||
|
import type { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
|
||||||
|
import {
|
||||||
|
FederationInvalidRequestError,
|
||||||
|
FederationScopeViolationError,
|
||||||
|
FederationUnauthorizedError,
|
||||||
|
SOURCE_LOCAL,
|
||||||
|
tagWithSource,
|
||||||
|
type FederationListResponse,
|
||||||
|
type SourceTag,
|
||||||
|
} from '@mosaicstack/types';
|
||||||
|
import { FederationAuthGuard } from '../federation-auth.guard.js';
|
||||||
|
import '../federation-context.js';
|
||||||
|
import { FederationScopeService } from '../scope.service.js';
|
||||||
|
import { FederationListQueryService } from './list-query.service.js';
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
interface FederationListRequestBody {
|
||||||
|
readonly limit?: unknown;
|
||||||
|
readonly cursor?: unknown;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
type FederatedRow = Record<string, unknown> & SourceTag;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
function parseLimit(body: FederationListRequestBody | undefined): number | undefined {
|
||||||
|
if (body?.limit === undefined) {
|
||||||
|
return undefined;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const parsed =
|
||||||
|
typeof body.limit === 'number'
|
||||||
|
? body.limit
|
||||||
|
: typeof body.limit === 'string' && body.limit.trim().length > 0
|
||||||
|
? Number(body.limit)
|
||||||
|
: Number.NaN;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(parsed) || parsed < 1) {
|
||||||
|
throw new HttpException(
|
||||||
|
new FederationInvalidRequestError(
|
||||||
|
'Federation list limit must be a positive integer',
|
||||||
|
).toEnvelope(),
|
||||||
|
400,
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return parsed;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
function parseCursor(body: FederationListRequestBody | undefined): string | undefined {
|
||||||
|
if (body?.cursor === undefined) {
|
||||||
|
return undefined;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if (typeof body.cursor === 'string') {
|
||||||
|
return body.cursor;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
throw new HttpException(
|
||||||
|
new FederationInvalidRequestError('Federation list cursor must be a string').toEnvelope(),
|
||||||
|
400,
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@Controller('api/federation/v1/list')
|
||||||
|
@UseGuards(FederationAuthGuard)
|
||||||
|
export class ListController {
|
||||||
|
constructor(
|
||||||
|
@Inject(FederationScopeService) private readonly scope: FederationScopeService,
|
||||||
|
@Inject(FederationListQueryService) private readonly query: FederationListQueryService,
|
||||||
|
) {}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@Post(':resource')
|
||||||
|
async list(
|
||||||
|
@Param('resource') resource: string,
|
||||||
|
@Req() request: FastifyRequest,
|
||||||
|
@Body() body?: FederationListRequestBody,
|
||||||
|
): Promise<FederationListResponse<FederatedRow>> {
|
||||||
|
if (!request.federationContext) {
|
||||||
|
throw new HttpException(
|
||||||
|
new FederationUnauthorizedError('Federation context missing').toEnvelope(),
|
||||||
|
401,
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const requestedLimit = parseLimit(body);
|
||||||
|
const cursor = parseCursor(body);
|
||||||
|
const scopeResult = await this.scope.evaluateAccess({
|
||||||
|
context: request.federationContext,
|
||||||
|
resource,
|
||||||
|
requestedLimit,
|
||||||
|
nativeRbac: this.query,
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if (!scopeResult.allowed) {
|
||||||
|
const ErrorClass =
|
||||||
|
scopeResult.deny.statusCode === 400
|
||||||
|
? FederationInvalidRequestError
|
||||||
|
: FederationScopeViolationError;
|
||||||
|
throw new HttpException(
|
||||||
|
new ErrorClass(scopeResult.deny.message, scopeResult.deny).toEnvelope(),
|
||||||
|
scopeResult.deny.statusCode,
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let result: Awaited<ReturnType<FederationListQueryService['list']>>;
|
||||||
|
try {
|
||||||
|
result = await this.query.list({ filter: scopeResult.filter, cursor });
|
||||||
|
} catch (error: unknown) {
|
||||||
|
if (error instanceof Error && error.message === 'Invalid federation list cursor') {
|
||||||
|
throw new HttpException(
|
||||||
|
new FederationInvalidRequestError('Federation list cursor is invalid').toEnvelope(),
|
||||||
|
400,
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
throw error;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const response: FederationListResponse<FederatedRow> = {
|
||||||
|
items: tagWithSource(result.items, SOURCE_LOCAL),
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
if (result.nextCursor !== undefined) {
|
||||||
|
response.nextCursor = result.nextCursor;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if (result.truncated) {
|
||||||
|
response._truncated = true;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return response;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -69,8 +69,9 @@ The MVP is complete when ALL declared workstreams are complete AND every cross-c
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
| # | ID | Name | Status | Manifest | Notes |
|
| # | ID | Name | Status | Manifest | Notes |
|
||||||
| --- | --- | ------------------------------------------- | ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- |
|
| --- | --- | ------------------------------------------- | ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||||
| W1 | FED | Federation v1 | planning-complete | [docs/federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md](./federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md) | 7 milestones, ~175K tokens, issues #460–#466 filed |
|
| W1 | FED | Federation v1 | planning-complete | [docs/federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md](./federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md) | 7 milestones, ~175K tokens, issues #460–#466 filed |
|
||||||
| W2+ | TBD | (additional workstreams declared as scoped) | — | — | Scope creep is expected and explicitly accommodated |
|
| W2 | TESS | Tess interaction agent | planning-complete | [docs/tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md](./tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md) | 5 milestones; issue #706; M1 issue #707 ready |
|
||||||
|
| W3+ | TBD | (additional workstreams declared as scoped) | — | — | Scope creep is expected and explicitly accommodated |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### Likely Additional Workstreams (Not Yet Declared)
|
### Likely Additional Workstreams (Not Yet Declared)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
96
docs/PRD.md
96
docs/PRD.md
@@ -79,6 +79,102 @@ Jarvis (v0.2.0) is a self-hosted AI assistant with a Python FastAPI backend and
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
---
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Tess Interaction Agent Workstream (TESS)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Problem and Objective
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Jason needs one durable, operator-facing Mosaic agent outside Hermes that is reachable through a dedicated Discord channel and CLI, can attach to and operate the Mosaic fleet and transitional Hermes agents, and preserves context across restarts and compaction. Mos remains the coding/general fleet orchestrator; Tess is the complementary human interaction, visibility, control, and migration agent.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The objective is to ship **Tess** (from *tessera*, a piece of a mosaic) as a Pi-native, GPT-5.6 Sol agent with high reasoning. Tess must use Mosaic-owned contracts and plugins so Hermes can be replaced incrementally rather than becoming a permanent architectural dependency.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Scope
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#### In Scope
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1. `TESS-ARP-001`: A runtime-neutral `AgentRuntimeProvider` contract supporting `listSessions`, `streamSession`, `sendMessage`, `terminate`, `getSessionTree`, `attach`, health, capability discovery, and normalized events/errors.
|
||||||
|
2. `TESS-PI-001`: A long-running Pi-native Tess agent profile/service pinned to GPT-5.6 Sol with high reasoning, explicit tool policy, lifecycle hooks, durable checkpoints, and restart recovery.
|
||||||
|
3. `TESS-DSC-001`: Dedicated Discord channel binding to Tess through the Mosaic gateway, with allowlists/RBAC, thread/reply policy, streaming, attachments, approvals, and correlation IDs.
|
||||||
|
4. `TESS-CLI-001`: `mosaic tess` CLI commands for chat, status, session listing, attach/detach, send/steer/stop, provider health, and recovery.
|
||||||
|
5. `TESS-FLT-001`: Fleet plugin capabilities for roster/status/heartbeat inspection, message delivery, session hierarchy, safe attach, and controlled restart/recovery.
|
||||||
|
6. `TESS-MOS-001`: Explicit Mos coordination boundary and tools: hand off orchestration requests, observe mission/task state, receive results, and never silently compete for orchestration authority.
|
||||||
|
7. `TESS-HRM-001`: Transitional Hermes adapter for profiles/agents, sessions, streaming/messages, Kanban, skills, memory, tools, cron, and health, using capability negotiation and fail-closed unsupported operations.
|
||||||
|
8. `TESS-MEM-001`: Unified memory/retrieval plugin with scoped search/recent/capture/stats, startup context injection, provenance, redaction, namespace isolation, and flat-file/project truth precedence.
|
||||||
|
9. `TESS-STA-001`: Durable agent state, inbox, handoff, compaction-recovery, and resume reconstruction.
|
||||||
|
10. `TESS-PLG-001`: Plugin/tool catalog covering runtime bootstrap, repository/PR workflow, fleet diagnostics, incident-safe read operations, Discord interaction, and extensible MCP/skill discovery.
|
||||||
|
11. `TESS-TRN-001`: Replaceable transport providers: tmux/fleet now, Matrix/native Mosaic transport later, with no Discord/CLI business logic coupled to transport details.
|
||||||
|
12. `TESS-SEC-001`: RBAC, per-operation authorization, explicit approval for destructive/privileged/customer-visible actions, audit events, secret/PII redaction, tenant isolation, and bounded command execution.
|
||||||
|
13. `TESS-SEC-002`: Command execution SHALL enforce declared scope/role server-side; admin/system and destructive operations SHALL require policy-bound durable approval.
|
||||||
|
14. `TESS-SEC-003`: Every session list/read/attach/send/terminate operation SHALL enforce server-derived owner and tenant scope; guessed or client-supplied IDs SHALL grant no authority.
|
||||||
|
15. `TESS-SEC-004`: MCP tools SHALL derive actor/tenant from authenticated context and SHALL NOT accept caller-controlled identity fields.
|
||||||
|
16. `TESS-SEC-005`: Discord plugin ingress SHALL authenticate service identity, enforce guild/channel/user allowlists, propagate correlation/message IDs, and reject replay.
|
||||||
|
17. `TESS-SEC-006`: Secret/PII classification and redaction SHALL occur before persistence and before channel egress, including tool metadata and authentication flows.
|
||||||
|
18. `TESS-SEC-007`: Approvals SHALL be one-time, expiring, actor/tenant-bound, and cryptographically bound to the exact structured action digest.
|
||||||
|
19. `TESS-SEC-008`: Ingress, provider sends, tool side effects, and responses SHALL use durable inbox/outbox/checkpoints and idempotency records for restart-safe replay.
|
||||||
|
20. `TESS-SEC-009`: Garbage collection and retention SHALL be session/tenant scoped unless executed as a separately authorized and audited system-wide job.
|
||||||
|
21. `TESS-OBS-001`: Structured logs, traces, health/readiness, provider latency/errors, session lifecycle, tool audit, and actionable recovery diagnostics.
|
||||||
|
22. `TESS-MIG-001`: Capability inventory and staged Hermes-to-Mosaic migration matrix with coexistence, cutover, rollback, and deprecation gates.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#### Out of Scope
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1. Replacing Mos as coding/general fleet orchestrator.
|
||||||
|
2. Making Hermes the Mosaic core or coupling Mosaic domain logic to Hermes schemas.
|
||||||
|
3. Migrating every historical chat verbatim; only policy-compliant indexed summaries and user-selected sessions are migrated.
|
||||||
|
4. Unrestricted shell execution from Discord.
|
||||||
|
5. Full web UI parity in the first Tess operational milestone; gateway contracts must remain web-consumable.
|
||||||
|
6. Replacing tmux before Matrix/native transport reaches operational parity.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Stakeholder and User Requirements
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Jason must be able to converse with the same Tess session from Discord and CLI.
|
||||||
|
- Jason must be able to see what is running, stale, blocked, or unhealthy without attaching manually to every session.
|
||||||
|
- Jason must be able to attach to Tess and authorized fleet sessions through supported CLI controls.
|
||||||
|
- Tess must collaborate with Mos and the fleet while preserving a single clear orchestration authority.
|
||||||
|
- The system must migrate useful Hermes/OpenClaw capabilities intentionally, with evidence, instead of copying implementations wholesale.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Non-Functional Requirements
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1. **Security:** default-deny provider/tool capabilities, least privilege, no secrets in logs/prompts/commits, Discord user/channel authorization, and auditable approvals.
|
||||||
|
2. **Reliability:** durable inbox/checkpoints; idempotent message handling; reconnect with bounded backoff; no message loss or duplicate execution across gateway restart.
|
||||||
|
3. **Performance:** first acknowledgement within 2 seconds when connected; streamed agent output begins within 5 seconds excluding model/provider delay; status reads return within 2 seconds under nominal local conditions.
|
||||||
|
4. **Observability:** every ingress message and resulting provider/tool operation carries a correlation ID across Discord, gateway, Tess, provider, and audit events.
|
||||||
|
5. **Maintainability:** channel, runtime, transport, memory, and external-agent integrations remain adapter-based with contract tests.
|
||||||
|
6. **Privacy:** only scoped context enters external runtimes; persisted messages/memories follow retention and redaction policy.
|
||||||
|
7. **Portability:** Tess runs through Pi/Mosaic contracts and does not require Hermes to start or serve native Mosaic operations.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Acceptance Criteria
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1. `AC-TESS-01`: A dedicated Discord channel and `mosaic tess chat` connect to one durable Tess session and stream responses bidirectionally.
|
||||||
|
2. `AC-TESS-02`: `mosaic tess status|sessions|tree|attach|send|stop` operate against authorized provider capabilities with stable typed outputs and actionable errors.
|
||||||
|
3. `AC-TESS-03`: Tess runs GPT-5.6 Sol at high reasoning and its effective runtime/model/tool policy is visible through status without exposing credentials.
|
||||||
|
4. `AC-TESS-04`: Tess can inspect and message the Mosaic fleet, hand orchestration work to Mos, and demonstrate that Tess does not independently claim Mos-owned orchestration work.
|
||||||
|
5. `AC-TESS-05`: Hermes adapter demonstrates session listing, streaming/message delivery, hierarchy mapping, and at least one approved capability in each of Kanban, skills, memory, tools, and cron—or reports unsupported capabilities fail-closed.
|
||||||
|
6. `AC-TESS-06`: Restart/compaction test preserves session identity, pending inbox, last durable checkpoint, and a resumable handoff without duplicate side effects.
|
||||||
|
7. `AC-TESS-07`: Unauthorized Discord users/channels, cross-tenant access, unsafe tool calls, forged approvals, and sensitive-output cases are denied and audited.
|
||||||
|
8. `AC-TESS-08`: tmux/fleet and Matrix/native transport implementations pass the same provider contract suite; Matrix may remain non-default until readiness gates pass.
|
||||||
|
9. `AC-TESS-09`: Baseline quality gates, unit/integration/contract tests, Discord+CLI E2E, restart/recovery tests, independent code review, and security review are green.
|
||||||
|
10. `AC-TESS-10`: Migration matrix documents every audited Hermes/OpenClaw capability as native, adapted, deferred, or rejected, with cutover and rollback evidence.
|
||||||
|
11. `AC-TESS-11`: User, admin, developer, API/OpenAPI, operations/recovery, and plugin-authoring documentation is current and linked from the sitemap.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Constraints, Dependencies, Risks, and Assumptions
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Dependency: Mosaic gateway remains the single API surface; Pi is the native runtime; Valkey/PostgreSQL provide canonical durable state where required.
|
||||||
|
- Dependency: Discord bot credentials and dedicated channel ID are deployment secrets provisioned outside source control.
|
||||||
|
- Risk: Tess could drift into a second orchestrator. Mitigation: explicit role policy, Mos handoff contract, authority checks, and E2E boundary tests.
|
||||||
|
- Risk: broad Hermes compatibility can freeze legacy semantics into Mosaic. Mitigation: Mosaic-owned normalized contracts and capability negotiation.
|
||||||
|
- Risk: Discord creates a privileged remote-control surface. Mitigation: pairing/allowlists, RBAC, approvals, rate limits, audit, and safe tool classes.
|
||||||
|
- Risk: transcript ingestion can violate privacy or overload memory. Mitigation: scoped opt-in import, redacted summaries, provenance, retention, and deduplication.
|
||||||
|
- Risk: current root filesystem has limited headroom. Mitigation: isolated worktrees, no duplicated dependency installation unless required, and cleanup only after active-lane verification.
|
||||||
|
- `ASSUMPTION:` The public name is **Tess**, because the user requested a name and the tessera/Mosaic relationship is distinctive; config must permit later display-name changes without renaming APIs or storage keys.
|
||||||
|
- `ASSUMPTION:` The dedicated Discord channel ID and final guild policy will be supplied/provisioned during deployment, so implementation uses explicit configuration and fail-fast startup validation.
|
||||||
|
- `ASSUMPTION:` tmux/fleet is the production transport for the first operational milestone; Matrix/native transport is implemented behind the same contract and promoted only after parity/reliability verification.
|
||||||
|
- `ASSUMPTION:` Project/task truth remains in canonical Mosaic/project stores; semantic memory systems are retrieval/mirror layers, not hidden authorities.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Testing and Delivery Intent
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Delivery uses five gated milestones: runtime contracts/security; Pi service/state; Discord/CLI; fleet/Hermes/plugin suite; migration/Matrix/recovery/qualification. Every source-code task requires tests, independent review, a PR to `main`, terminal-green CI, and issue/task closure. Production activation additionally requires a clean-host Pi launch, dedicated Discord channel smoke test, CLI attach test, restart/recovery drill, and rollback procedure.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Architecture
|
## Architecture
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
### High-Level System Diagram
|
### High-Level System Diagram
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
| id | status | workstream | progress | tasks file | notes |
|
| id | status | workstream | progress | tasks file | notes |
|
||||||
| --- | ----------------- | ------------------- | ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
| --- | ----------------- | ------------------- | ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||||
| W1 | planning-complete | Federation v1 (FED) | 0 / 7 milestones | [docs/federation/TASKS.md](./federation/TASKS.md) | M1 task breakdown populated; M2–M7 deferred to mission planning |
|
| W1 | planning-complete | Federation v1 (FED) | 0 / 7 milestones | [docs/federation/TASKS.md](./federation/TASKS.md) | M1 task breakdown populated; M2–M7 deferred to mission planning |
|
||||||
|
| W2 | planning-complete | Tess interaction agent | 0 / 5 milestones | [docs/tess/TASKS.md](./tess/TASKS.md) | Issue #706; independent planning gate PASS; M1 issue #707 ready |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Cross-Cutting Tracking
|
## Cross-Cutting Tracking
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
33
docs/scratchpads/561-python-is-python3.md
Normal file
33
docs/scratchpads/561-python-is-python3.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
|
|||||||
|
# Issue #561 — Bare python on agent hosts
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Objective
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Make the durable bootstrap/provisioning guidance ensure agent hosts provide a bare `python` command that resolves to Python 3.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Scope
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Add Debian/Ubuntu `python-is-python3` to agent-host prerequisites in bootstrap docs.
|
||||||
|
- Check for actual OS package provisioning scripts and update only if an existing agent-host package install path exists.
|
||||||
|
- Do not touch live host state.
|
||||||
|
- Do not update `docs/TASKS.md`; repo guidance says workers read it but never modify it.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Recon
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Issue #561 confirms repeated `python: command not found` failures from fleet agents that emit `python foo.py`.
|
||||||
|
- `guides/BOOTSTRAP.md` and `packages/mosaic/framework/guides/BOOTSTRAP.md` are the source and packaged framework copies of the bootstrap guide.
|
||||||
|
- Targeted repo sweep found no agent-host Debian package provisioning script. Existing `apt-get install` hits are CI/test helper paths or unrelated deployment docs.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Plan
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1. Add a host prerequisite section to both bootstrap guide copies.
|
||||||
|
2. Include `python-is-python3` in the Debian/Ubuntu package list with an issue comment.
|
||||||
|
3. Note the non-Debian equivalent as a `/usr/bin/python -> python3` symlink.
|
||||||
|
4. Validate markdown/diff, run shell syntax checks where applicable, run required review, commit, queue guard, and push.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Validation Log
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- `rg` recon: no existing agent-host Debian package provisioning script; only CI/test helper `apt-get install` paths and unrelated deployment docs.
|
||||||
|
- `git diff --check`: passed.
|
||||||
|
- `bash -n packages/mosaic/framework/install.sh tools/install.sh packages/mosaic/framework/tools/bootstrap/init-project.sh packages/mosaic/framework/tools/_scripts/mosaic-bootstrap-repo`: passed. No touched shell scripts.
|
||||||
|
- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-code-review.sh --uncommitted`: approved, 0 findings.
|
||||||
|
- `pnpm format:check`: initially blocked because `node_modules` was absent and `prettier` was unavailable; `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` initially hit an invalid `/root` pnpm store path. Reran install with `--store-dir /home/hermes/agent-work/.pnpm-store`, then `pnpm format:check` passed.
|
||||||
52
docs/scratchpads/FED-M3-05-list-verb.md
Normal file
52
docs/scratchpads/FED-M3-05-list-verb.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
|
|||||||
|
# FED-M3-05 — Federation List Verb Scratchpad
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Objective
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Implement `POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource`.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Scope
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Wire `FederationAuthGuard` → `FederationScopeService` → read-only list query layer.
|
||||||
|
- Apply `max_rows_per_query` row cap and return pagination metadata when truncated.
|
||||||
|
- Tag returned rows with `_source: "local"`.
|
||||||
|
- Keep audit writes deferred to M4.
|
||||||
|
- No request/response body persistence.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Base / branch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Branch: `feat/federation-m3-verb-list`
|
||||||
|
- Base: `main` after M3-04 scope service merged via PR #672 (`c739256a`).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Implementation notes
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Added `ListController` under `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/`.
|
||||||
|
- Added `FederationListQueryService` as the read-only query layer and native RBAC evaluator.
|
||||||
|
- Query resources supported in M3 list path:
|
||||||
|
- `tasks`: project/mission scoped tasks visible through personal/team project access.
|
||||||
|
- `notes`: non-empty `mission_tasks.notes` rows visible through personal/team mission access.
|
||||||
|
- `memory`: user-owned `insights` and `preferences` rows.
|
||||||
|
- `credentials` / `api_keys`: denied by native RBAC in M3 even if present in scope; sensitive-resource implementation is not part of FED-M3-05.
|
||||||
|
- Cursor pagination uses an opaque base64url keyset cursor over `(createdAt, id)`; DB reads fetch at most `limit + 1` rows per resource query.
|
||||||
|
- Reviewer isolation fix: `mission_tasks.notes` rows are always constrained by `missionTasks.userId = subjectUserId` and accessible mission IDs; team scope narrows missions but never widens to other users' mission task notes.
|
||||||
|
- Follow-up review fix: memory listing now uses deterministic table-block pagination (`insights` first, then `preferences`) with cursor source metadata, so one table's cursor is never applied to the other.
|
||||||
|
- Follow-up hardening: missing auth-guard context returns a structured federation `unauthorized` envelope; unsupported resources and non-encodable truncated cursors throw instead of silently crashing/truncating.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Tests
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test -- list.controller.spec.ts list-query.service.spec.ts` — PASS (16 tests, including PGlite regression coverage for team-scoped notes isolation, unauthorized mission notes exclusion, `includePersonal: false`, deterministic memory pagination, missing context envelope, unsupported resource, and cursor encode failure).
|
||||||
|
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway typecheck` — PASS.
|
||||||
|
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway lint` — PASS.
|
||||||
|
- `pnpm format:check` — PASS.
|
||||||
|
- `pnpm typecheck` — PASS (41/41 turbo tasks).
|
||||||
|
- `pnpm lint` — PASS (23/23 turbo tasks).
|
||||||
|
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test` — FAIL in pre-existing/live-DB integration suite: `apps/gateway/src/__tests__/cross-user-isolation.test.ts` cleanup cannot connect to local PostgreSQL on `localhost:5433`. New list tests pass; failure is outside FED-M3-05.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Review evidence
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-code-review.sh --uncommitted` — PASS after follow-up remediation; approve, no findings.
|
||||||
|
- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-security-review.sh --uncommitted` — PASS after follow-up remediation; risk level none, no findings.
|
||||||
|
- Security-review note: read-path audit logging remains intentionally deferred to M4 per orchestrator clarification and FED-M3-05 scope.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Risks / follow-up
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Read-path audit logging remains intentionally deferred to M4.
|
||||||
62
docs/scratchpads/tess-20260712.md
Normal file
62
docs/scratchpads/tess-20260712.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
|
|||||||
|
# Scratchpad — Tess Interaction Agent
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## 2026-07-12 — Mission intake
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Objective:** Build a Pi-native GPT-5.6 Sol high-reasoning Mosaic interaction agent, named Tess, as Jason's primary Discord/CLI access point for Mosaic fleet and transitional Hermes capabilities. Tess complements Mos and must not become a competing orchestrator.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Issue:** #706
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Budget:** No explicit cap provided. Original working estimate was 290K implementation/review tokens. That estimate is superseded after six security prerequisite tasks were added; revised arithmetic total is pending because the calculation tool was blocked by runtime consent. Run at most two workers; prefer one implementation lane plus one independent review/discovery lane. Re-estimate after planning approval and each milestone.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Evidence gathered:**
|
||||||
|
- Mosaic already provides Pi lifecycle hooks, fleet/tmux sessions, Matrix connector/controller pieces, typed chat events, Discord/Telegram channel plugins, and command/plugin registries.
|
||||||
|
- Current `IProviderAdapter` is an LLM model/completion abstraction, not an external agent/session provider.
|
||||||
|
- Required new seam is `AgentRuntimeProvider`: sessions, stream, message, terminate, hierarchy, attach, health, capabilities.
|
||||||
|
- Recurring cross-runtime needs: unified memory/retrieval, Discord routing/approvals, agent state/inbox/compaction recovery, runtime bootstrap, fleet/incident controls, and GitOps workflow.
|
||||||
|
- Project truth must remain in canonical project/Mosaic stores; semantic memory is retrieval/mirror.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Decisions:**
|
||||||
|
1. Name: Tess (tessera). Stable machine key `tess`; display name configurable.
|
||||||
|
2. Mos owns orchestration; Tess delegates Mos-owned work through an explicit coordination contract.
|
||||||
|
3. Gateway owns ingress/auth/routing; Discord and CLI remain thin clients.
|
||||||
|
4. tmux/fleet ships first behind an adapter; Matrix/native Mosaic is the forward transport.
|
||||||
|
5. Hermes integration is transitional and capability-negotiated; unsupported operations fail closed.
|
||||||
|
6. No unrestricted Discord shell. Privileged/destructive/customer-visible actions require authorization and approval.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Plan:**
|
||||||
|
1. Land requirements/architecture/task graph.
|
||||||
|
2. Deliver runtime contracts and security model.
|
||||||
|
3. Deliver durable Pi service/state.
|
||||||
|
4. Deliver Discord and CLI.
|
||||||
|
5. Deliver fleet/Mos/Hermes/memory/tool plugins.
|
||||||
|
6. Deliver Matrix/native transport, migration matrix, recovery, docs, and qualification.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Progress:** Issue #706 created. PRD/manifest/tasks initialized on clean branch `feat/tess-interaction-agent` from `origin/main`.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Risks:** 14 GB root filesystem headroom; active fleet lanes; broad migration scope; Discord privilege boundary; possible duplicate orchestration authority.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## 2026-07-12 — Independent planning and threat review
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Verdict received:** BLOCK TESS-PLAN-001. Coding remains stopped.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Blocking findings:** formal threat model absent; verification matrix absent; migration inventory implied but absent; non-existent task paths; AC-TESS-03 lacked a crisp test. Security review also identified command scope bypass, cross-tenant session attachment, MCP actor impersonation, unsafe Discord service ingress, pre-persistence/egress secret leakage, non-durable replay, and globally scoped GC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Remediation applied:**
|
||||||
|
- Added `docs/tess/ARCHITECTURE.md`.
|
||||||
|
- Added `docs/tess/THREAT-MODEL.md` with TM-01..12.
|
||||||
|
- Added `docs/tess/VERIFICATION-MATRIX.md` mapping AC-TESS-01..11.
|
||||||
|
- Added `docs/tess/MIGRATION-INVENTORY.md`.
|
||||||
|
- Added hard requirements TESS-SEC-002..009.
|
||||||
|
- Added six prerequisite security tasks before provider/ingress implementation.
|
||||||
|
- Corrected task paths to existing package surfaces.
|
||||||
|
- Added explicit GPT-5.6 Sol/high/tool-policy status verification for AC-TESS-03.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Re-review 1:** BLOCK only on composite `repo` values that looked like nonexistent paths. Remediated by declaring comma-separated roots and validating every root.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Final focused review:** PASS. Deterministic audit validated all task repository roots with zero missing paths; no planning placeholders remained; security prerequisites still gate Tess exposure; observability traceability is explicit.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Current gate:** planning PR must merge to `main` with terminal-green CI before any source-code worker starts.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Ops config (Mos, 2026-07-12)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Tess dedicated Discord channel ID:** `1525947814033494126` (Jason configuring bot in Discord portal). Target for TESS-M3-001 (#709) binding. Treat as config, not a hardcoded secret. Live go-live = owner gate T1 @ M5.
|
||||||
71
docs/tess/ARCHITECTURE.md
Normal file
71
docs/tess/ARCHITECTURE.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
|
|||||||
|
# Tess Architecture
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Purpose
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Tess is the Mosaic operator interaction plane. Mos remains the coding/general fleet orchestration authority. Tess receives authorized operator intent, presents fleet/session state, delegates Mos-owned work to Mos, and exposes native Mosaic plus transitional external-agent capabilities through normalized providers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Component Boundaries
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```text
|
||||||
|
Discord plugin ─┐
|
||||||
|
├─ authenticated ingress envelope ─> Mosaic Gateway
|
||||||
|
mosaic tess CLI ┘ │
|
||||||
|
├─ policy/approval/audit
|
||||||
|
├─ Tess durable session service (Pi GPT-5.6 Sol high)
|
||||||
|
├─ AgentRuntimeProvider registry
|
||||||
|
│ ├─ native Pi provider
|
||||||
|
│ ├─ fleet/tmux provider
|
||||||
|
│ ├─ Hermes adapter
|
||||||
|
│ └─ Matrix/native transport provider
|
||||||
|
├─ memory/state/inbox plugins
|
||||||
|
└─ Mos coordination adapter ─> Mos / fleet queue
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Core Contract
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
`AgentRuntimeProvider` is separate from the existing model-completion `IProviderAdapter`. It normalizes external and native agent runtimes without leaking provider-specific schemas.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Required operations:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- `capabilities()` and `health()`
|
||||||
|
- `listSessions(scope)`
|
||||||
|
- `getSessionTree(scope)`
|
||||||
|
- `streamSession(sessionRef, cursor, scope)`
|
||||||
|
- `sendMessage(sessionRef, message, idempotencyKey, scope)`
|
||||||
|
- `attach(sessionRef, mode, scope)` / `detach()`
|
||||||
|
- `terminate(sessionRef, approvalRef, scope)`
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Every call receives an immutable, server-derived actor/tenant/channel scope and correlation ID. Caller-supplied actor IDs are forbidden. Unsupported capabilities fail closed with typed errors.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Authority Model
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| Intent | Owner | Tess behavior |
|
||||||
|
| --- | --- | --- |
|
||||||
|
| Conversation, status, retrieval, safe diagnostics | Tess | Execute within policy |
|
||||||
|
| Code/project decomposition, worker assignment, reviews, merge orchestration | Mos | Create a correlated handoff and observe result |
|
||||||
|
| Destructive, privileged, external/customer-visible action | Human approval + policy | Propose, wait for durable one-time approval, then execute idempotently |
|
||||||
|
| Provider-specific unsupported action | None | Fail closed; never emulate silently |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Session and State Model
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A Tess session has stable `sessionId`, `tenantId`, `ownerId`, provider/runtime identity, ingress bindings, cursor, checkpoint, inbox/outbox, and idempotency records. Discord and CLI bind to the same authorized session. Ownership is verified server-side on every list/read/attach/send/terminate operation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Valkey may hold ephemeral coordination state; PostgreSQL is canonical for durable session bindings, approvals, audit, checkpoints, inbox/outbox, and idempotency. Pi session files are replay sources, not cross-agent truth.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Transport Strategy
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Initial:** fleet/tmux provider, including exact target, socket, identity, heartbeat, and safe attach semantics.
|
||||||
|
- **Forward:** Matrix/native Mosaic provider using authenticated identity, idempotent transaction IDs, replay cursors, and the same contract suite.
|
||||||
|
- Discord/CLI never call tmux or Matrix directly.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Plugin Families
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1. Channel: Discord now; other channels later.
|
||||||
|
2. Runtime: Pi, fleet/tmux, Hermes, Matrix/native.
|
||||||
|
3. Operator tools: fleet health, Mos handoff, GitOps wrappers, incident-safe diagnostics.
|
||||||
|
4. Memory/state: search/recent/capture, durable inbox, checkpoint, handoff, compaction recovery.
|
||||||
|
5. Migration: capability inventory, adapters, cutover, rollback, telemetry.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Deployment
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Tess runs as a rostered, systemd-supervised Pi agent using GPT-5.6 Sol and high reasoning. Secrets are supplied through approved runtime secret mechanisms. Startup fails when required model, gateway identity, Discord binding, or durable-state dependencies are missing. Health reports effective model/reasoning/tool policy without credential material.
|
||||||
34
docs/tess/MIGRATION-INVENTORY.md
Normal file
34
docs/tess/MIGRATION-INVENTORY.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
|
|||||||
|
# Tess Capability Migration Inventory
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Status values: `native` · `adapt` · `defer` · `reject`. This is the initial inventory; M5 requires implementation and evidence fields to be completed before cutover.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| Capability | Current source | Target | Initial status | Cutover/rollback intent |
|
||||||
|
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||||
|
| Interactive agent chat/session streaming | Hermes/Pi/OpenClaw | Mosaic Tess session service | native | Dual-run per channel; revert binding to legacy gateway |
|
||||||
|
| Discord dedicated-channel routing | Hermes/Claude/OpenClaw plugins | Mosaic Discord plugin + gateway | native | Per-channel binding switch; legacy bot disabled only after soak |
|
||||||
|
| CLI/TUI session interaction and attach | Hermes/Pi/tmux | `mosaic tess` + AgentRuntimeProvider | native | Keep direct tmux attach as break-glass rollback |
|
||||||
|
| Session list/tree/send/terminate | Hermes/fleet | AgentRuntimeProvider | native | Capability-negotiated adapter remains during migration |
|
||||||
|
| Mos/fleet orchestration handoff | tmux messaging/Mosaic fleet | Mosaic coord/fleet provider | native | tmux handoff remains initial transport |
|
||||||
|
| Kanban/projects/tasks | Hermes Kanban | Mosaic queue/coord/project providers | adapt | Read projection first; mutating cutover after parity/audit |
|
||||||
|
| Skills catalog/load/manage | Hermes skills/Pi skills | Mosaic skill registry/provider | adapt | Import metadata/provenance; preserve source skill until validated |
|
||||||
|
| Tools and MCP | Hermes/OpenClaw/MCP | Mosaic tool registry/MCP | adapt | Default deny; migrate allowlisted tools one capability at a time |
|
||||||
|
| Cron/scheduled work | Hermes cron | Mosaic scheduler/queue | adapt | Shadow schedules; prevent duplicate execution; rollback owner field |
|
||||||
|
| Memory search/recent/capture | jarvis-brain/OpenViking/OpenBrain/Hermes | Mosaic memory provider | adapt | Flat/project stores remain truth; semantic systems are mirrors |
|
||||||
|
| User/profile preferences | Hermes memory/user profile | Mosaic user/memory domain | adapt | Provenance + explicit conflict rules; exportable rollback snapshot |
|
||||||
|
| Agent state/inbox/handoff | OpenClaw extensions/session files | Mosaic durable state service | native | Read legacy handoff during coexistence; write Mosaic only after cutover |
|
||||||
|
| Runtime contract/bootstrap | Mosaic framework/Hermes/OpenClaw | Mosaic compose/runtime provider | native | Legacy launchers remain until clean-host parity passes |
|
||||||
|
| Repository/PR workflow | Mosaic wrappers/Hermes tools | Mosaic operator plugin | native | Wrapper-only; no raw-provider fallback |
|
||||||
|
| Incident-safe diagnostics | Hermes skills/tools | Mosaic scoped operator plugin | adapt | Read-only first; privileged recovery requires approval |
|
||||||
|
| Broad unrestricted shell from Discord | Hermes/OpenClaw configurations | None | reject | No cutover; replace with allowlisted typed operations |
|
||||||
|
| Raw full transcript bulk migration | Hermes/Claude/OpenClaw histories | Indexed summaries/selective import | reject | Keep source archives subject to retention; no automatic copy |
|
||||||
|
| Voice/video interaction | Hermes optional tools | Future Mosaic channel plugins | defer | Not required for Tess operational release |
|
||||||
|
| Matrix transport | Mosaic connector | AgentRuntimeProvider Matrix implementation | native | Non-default until contract/reliability parity; tmux rollback |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Cutover Gates
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1. Capability contract and security tests pass.
|
||||||
|
2. Data mapping/provenance and retention are documented.
|
||||||
|
3. Shadow or dual-run shows no unauthorized access, loss, or duplicate effects.
|
||||||
|
4. Operator runbook and rollback are exercised.
|
||||||
|
5. Channel/provider binding changes are reversible without schema rollback.
|
||||||
|
6. Legacy capability is disabled only after a defined soak period and evidence review.
|
||||||
47
docs/tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md
Normal file
47
docs/tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
|
|||||||
|
# Mission Manifest — Tess Interaction Agent
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Mission
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **ID:** tess-20260712
|
||||||
|
- **Issue:** #706
|
||||||
|
- **Branch:** `feat/tess-interaction-agent`
|
||||||
|
- **Phase:** Execution
|
||||||
|
- **Current Milestone:** TESS-M1 — Runtime contracts and security foundation
|
||||||
|
- **Progress:** 0 / 5 delivery milestones complete
|
||||||
|
- **Status:** active
|
||||||
|
- **Owner:** Mosaic orchestrator; Mos is coordinating fleet authority
|
||||||
|
- **Source PRD:** `docs/PRD.md` — `TESS-*` requirements
|
||||||
|
- **Scratchpad:** `docs/scratchpads/tess-20260712.md`
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Mission Statement
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Ship Tess as Jason's durable Pi-native GPT-5.6 Sol high-reasoning interaction agent for Discord and CLI, with safe visibility/control of Mosaic fleet and transitional Hermes capabilities, while Mos remains the coding/general orchestration authority.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Invariants
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1. Mosaic is the enterprise AI hub; Hermes is a reference migration adapter.
|
||||||
|
2. Gateway is the single API surface.
|
||||||
|
3. Mos owns coding/general fleet orchestration; Tess owns human interaction, visibility, mediation, and migration access.
|
||||||
|
4. Runtime, transport, channel, memory, and external-agent integrations are replaceable adapters.
|
||||||
|
5. No source task completes before merged PR, terminal-green CI, independent review, and linked task/issue closure.
|
||||||
|
6. **The HMI agent's name/identity is configuration, never a hardcoded literal.** The agent name (display + roster key) is supplied at provisioning — user-chosen or system-generated during config — and carried as data in the roster/profile. "Tess" is only the default/example instance name and this mission's build codename; no source, schema key, service identifier, or config default may hardcode it. (M2 exit gate must prove a distinct name provisions cleanly with zero code change.)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Milestones
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| ID | Issue | Name | Status | Exit gate |
|
||||||
|
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M1 | #707 | Runtime contracts and security foundation | ready | AgentRuntimeProvider, normalized events/capabilities/errors, RBAC/audit contracts and contract tests merged |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M2 | #708 | Durable Pi Tess service and state | not-started | GPT-5.6 Sol high service starts, resumes, checkpoints, and passes restart/compaction tests |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M3 | #709 | Discord and CLI interaction surfaces | not-started | One durable session works through dedicated Discord binding and `mosaic tess`, including attach and approvals |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M4 | #710 | Fleet, Mos, Hermes, memory, state, and tool plugins | not-started | Fleet/Mos boundary and transitional capability matrix demonstrated end-to-end |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M5 | #711 | Matrix/native migration, recovery, documentation, and qualification | not-started | Transport parity, migration/rollback matrix, security review, docs, greenfield and deployment validation complete |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Success Criteria
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
All `AC-TESS-*` criteria in `docs/PRD.md` are mapped to reproducible evidence. The final operational test must prove Discord + CLI session continuity, fleet/Mos coordination, authorized Hermes transition capabilities, denial/audit paths, restart recovery, and rollback.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Session History
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| Session | Date | Runtime | Outcome |
|
||||||
|
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||||
|
| S1 | 2026-07-12 | Hermes / GPT-5.6 Sol | User commission captured; Mosaic/OpenViking/session/code archaeology completed; issue #706 created; PRD and task control plane initialized. |
|
||||||
34
docs/tess/TASKS.md
Normal file
34
docs/tess/TASKS.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
|
|||||||
|
# Tasks — Tess Interaction Agent
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
> Mission: `tess-20260712` · Issue: #706 · PRD requirements: `TESS-*`
|
||||||
|
> Orchestrator is sole writer. Workers must not modify this file.
|
||||||
|
> `repo` contains one or more comma-separated repository-relative roots; every listed root must exist before dispatch.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| id | status | description | issue | agent | repo | branch | depends_on | estimate | notes |
|
||||||
|
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-PLAN-001 | done | Finalize PRD, architecture, authority boundary, threat model, migration inventory, and verification matrix | #706 | sonnet | docs, packages/types, apps/gateway | feat/tess-interaction-agent | — | 22K | Independent gate PASS after two remediation rounds; completion effective when planning PR merges |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M1-SEC-001 | not-started | Enforce command scopes/roles and durable exact-action approval for privileged/destructive commands | #707 | codex | apps/gateway | fix/tess-command-authz | TESS-PLAN-001 | 25K | TESS-SEC-002; security TDD |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M1-SEC-002 | not-started | Enforce owner/tenant binding on session list/read/attach/send/terminate across REST and WS | #707 | codex | apps/gateway | fix/tess-session-ownership | TESS-PLAN-001 | 30K | TESS-SEC-003; security TDD |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M1-SEC-003 | not-started | Bind MCP actor/tenant to authenticated context and add per-tool scopes | #707 | codex | apps/gateway | fix/tess-mcp-identity | TESS-PLAN-001 | 22K | TESS-SEC-004; security TDD |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M1-SEC-004 | not-started | Add authenticated Discord service ingress, allowlists, correlation and replay protection | #707 | codex | plugins/discord, apps/gateway | fix/tess-discord-ingress | TESS-PLAN-001 | 28K | TESS-SEC-005; security TDD |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M1-SEC-005 | not-started | Redact/classify secret and PII before persistence/egress; harden provider login flow | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/log | fix/tess-redaction | TESS-PLAN-001 | 28K | TESS-SEC-006; seeded canary tests |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M1-SEC-006 | not-started | Scope session GC/retention or separate authorized global retention job | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/log | fix/tess-session-gc-scope | TESS-PLAN-001 | 18K | TESS-SEC-009; isolation TDD |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M1-001 | not-started | Define AgentRuntimeProvider, capabilities, session tree, normalized stream events/errors, attach semantics | #707 | codex | packages/types, packages/agent | feat/tess-runtime-contract | TESS-PLAN-001 | 25K | TESS-ARP-001, TESS-TRN-001; contract TDD |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M1-002 | not-started | Implement provider registry/service with immutable actor scope, approval, audit and correlation boundaries | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/agent | feat/tess-provider-registry | TESS-M1-001,TESS-M1-SEC-001,TESS-M1-SEC-002,TESS-M1-SEC-003 | 30K | TESS-SEC-001..004,007; security TDD |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M1-003 | not-started | Implement tmux/fleet runtime provider and safe attach/message/terminate capability policy | #707 | codex | packages/mosaic, packages/agent | feat/tess-fleet-provider | TESS-M1-002 | 30K | TESS-FLT-001; exact target/identity tests |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M1-OBS-001 | not-started | Implement correlation propagation, structured runtime/provider/tool audit, health/readiness and safe effective-policy status | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/agent, packages/log | feat/tess-observability | TESS-M1-002 | 24K | TESS-OBS-001; no credential material |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M1-V | not-started | Independent architecture/security review and complete contract/abuse-suite verification | #707 | sonnet | apps/gateway, packages/agent, packages/log, plugins/discord | review/tess-m1 | TESS-M1-SEC-001,TESS-M1-SEC-002,TESS-M1-SEC-003,TESS-M1-SEC-004,TESS-M1-SEC-005,TESS-M1-SEC-006,TESS-M1-003,TESS-M1-OBS-001 | 20K | Gate M2 |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M2-001 | not-started | Add Tess roster/profile/service pinned to GPT-5.6 Sol high with fail-fast config and observable effective policy | #708 | codex | packages/mosaic/framework | feat/tess-pi-service | TESS-M1-V | 22K | TESS-PI-001; explicit AC-TESS-03 test |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M2-002 | not-started | Implement durable session identity, inbox/outbox, approval, checkpoint, handoff, compaction and restart recovery | #708 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/agent, packages/db | feat/tess-durable-state | TESS-M2-001 | 38K | TESS-STA-001, TESS-SEC-007..008; recovery TDD |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M2-V | not-started | Clean-host Pi launch plus model/policy status and restart/compaction/duplicate-side-effect verification | #708 | sonnet | apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration, packages/mosaic/src | review/tess-m2 | TESS-M2-002 | 18K | Gate M3; AC-TESS-03/06 |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M3-001 | not-started | Bind dedicated Tess Discord channel with streaming, threads, attachments, pairing/RBAC and approvals | #709 | codex | plugins/discord, apps/gateway | feat/tess-discord | TESS-M2-V,TESS-M1-SEC-004 | 35K | TESS-DSC-001 |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M3-002 | not-started | Implement `mosaic tess` chat/status/sessions/tree/attach/send/stop/health/recover CLI | #709 | codex | packages/mosaic | feat/tess-cli | TESS-M2-V | 30K | TESS-CLI-001 |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M3-V | not-started | Discord+CLI same-session E2E, denial/approval tests, and operator-flow review | #709 | sonnet | apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration, plugins/discord, packages/mosaic/src | review/tess-m3 | TESS-M3-001,TESS-M3-002 | 20K | Gate M4 |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M4-001 | not-started | Implement Mos coordination handoff/observe/result contract with authority-boundary tests | #710 | codex | packages/coord, apps/gateway | feat/tess-mos-coordination | TESS-M3-V | 25K | TESS-MOS-001 |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M4-002 | not-started | Implement transitional Hermes runtime/capability adapter | #710 | codex | packages/agent, apps/gateway | feat/tess-hermes-adapter | TESS-M3-V | 40K | TESS-HRM-001; no legacy schema in core contracts |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M4-003 | not-started | Implement memory/retrieval, state/inbox, runtime bootstrap, fleet diagnostics and GitOps plugin foundations | #710 | codex | packages/memory, packages/agent, packages/mosaic | feat/tess-operator-plugins | TESS-M3-V | 40K | TESS-MEM-001, TESS-PLG-001 |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M4-V | not-started | Cross-provider capability, privacy, authority and failure-path qualification | #710 | sonnet | apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration, packages/agent | review/tess-m4 | TESS-M4-001,TESS-M4-002,TESS-M4-003 | 22K | Gate M5 |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M5-001 | not-started | Implement Matrix/native runtime provider behind common contracts and parity suite | #711 | codex | packages/mosaic, packages/agent | feat/tess-matrix-provider | TESS-M4-V | 30K | TESS-TRN-001 |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M5-002 | not-started | Complete migration inventory, cutover, rollback, retention and deprecation evidence | #711 | sonnet | docs/tess | feat/tess-migration-docs | TESS-M4-V | 18K | TESS-MIG-001 |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M5-003 | not-started | Complete OpenAPI, user/admin/developer/plugin/operations docs and checklist | #711 | codex | docs | feat/tess-docs | TESS-M5-001,TESS-M5-002 | 22K | Documentation hard gate |
|
||||||
|
| TESS-M5-V | not-started | Full baseline, contract, integration, Discord/CLI E2E, security review, recovery drill and rollback qualification | #711 | sonnet | apps/gateway, packages/agent, plugins/discord, packages/mosaic | review/tess-final | TESS-M5-003 | 35K | Maps AC-TESS-01..11 to evidence |
|
||||||
46
docs/tess/THREAT-MODEL.md
Normal file
46
docs/tess/THREAT-MODEL.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
|
|||||||
|
# Tess Threat Model
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Assets and Trust Boundaries
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Assets: operator identity, tenant/project data, agent sessions, fleet control, approvals, credentials, memories, tool outputs, audit evidence, and provider transports.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Trust boundaries: Discord→plugin, CLI→gateway, plugin→gateway service identity, gateway→Pi/provider, Tess→Mos/fleet, Tess→Hermes, MCP→gateway, persistence, and tmux/Matrix transports.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Threat Matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| ID | Severity | Threat | Required control | Required verification |
|
||||||
|
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||||
|
| TM-01 | critical | Client invokes admin/system command without role | Server-side scope/role enforcement in executor; durable approval for privileged/destructive commands | Authenticated non-admin and forged-scope tests deny and audit |
|
||||||
|
| TM-02 | critical | Cross-user/tenant list, attach, send, or terminate by guessed session ID | Owner/tenant binding on every session operation; admin override is explicit and audited | Cross-tenant matrix for REST, WS, CLI, Discord and provider methods |
|
||||||
|
| TM-03 | high | MCP caller supplies another `userId` | Remove actor IDs from schemas; derive actor/tenant from authenticated context; per-tool scopes | Forged actor/tool calls deny; no victim data returned |
|
||||||
|
| TM-04 | high | Discord ingress impersonates user/channel or bypasses gateway auth | Service-to-service identity, guild/channel/user allowlists, signed/correlated envelope, replay protection | Invalid service identity, unlisted IDs, replayed message IDs all deny |
|
||||||
|
| TM-05 | high | Secrets/PII leak in chat, auth links, tool args, logs, memory, or DB | Redact before persistence/egress; DM/out-of-band auth flow; short-lived hashed token state; output classification | Seeded secret/PII canary absent from durable stores/logs/public channel |
|
||||||
|
| TM-06 | high | Prompt/tool injection escalates from content to privileged action | Treat messages/files/tool output as untrusted data; structured proposals only; allowlisted tools; approval binds exact action digest | Injection corpus cannot invoke unapproved tools or alter authority |
|
||||||
|
| TM-07 | high | Approval forged, replayed, or applied to modified action | One-time approval with actor, tenant, action digest, expiry, correlation and consumption record | Forged/replayed/expired/mutated approvals deny and audit |
|
||||||
|
| TM-08 | medium | Restart causes message loss or duplicate side effects | Durable inbox/outbox/checkpoint; idempotency keys; transactional state transitions; bounded replay | Kill/restart at each state transition; exactly-once effect or safe dedupe |
|
||||||
|
| TM-09 | medium | Session GC/retention crosses tenant/session scope | Session/user-scoped GC or separately authorized global retention job | GC one session; unrelated logs/memory remain unchanged |
|
||||||
|
| TM-10 | high | tmux/Matrix transport target or identity spoofing | Exact target/socket binding, peer identity verification, Matrix whoami, authenticated transport metadata | Wrong socket/peer/room/identity refuses delivery/attach |
|
||||||
|
| TM-11 | medium | Hermes adapter exposes unsupported or broader legacy powers | Capability negotiation, default deny, normalized scopes, adapter sandbox/timeouts | Unsupported and over-scoped operations fail closed |
|
||||||
|
| TM-12 | medium | Tess competes with Mos or bypasses orchestration gates | Authority policy and correlated Mos handoff; no Tess worker-claim capability by default | Coding/decomposition intent produces handoff, not direct claim |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Security Invariants
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1. Authentication is not authorization; every command/tool/provider operation is authorized server-side.
|
||||||
|
2. Actor, tenant, roles, and channel bindings come only from authenticated gateway context.
|
||||||
|
3. No client-provided session ID grants ownership or attachment.
|
||||||
|
4. No privileged action executes without a matching, unexpired, one-time approval when policy requires it.
|
||||||
|
5. Redaction occurs before persistence and before channel egress.
|
||||||
|
6. Every externally caused operation is replay-safe and correlated.
|
||||||
|
7. Provider capability absence is a denial, not an invitation to shell around it.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Existing Findings That Block Tess
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Command executor lacks server-side enforcement for declared scopes.
|
||||||
|
- Session list/reuse/destroy surfaces are not owner-filtered consistently.
|
||||||
|
- MCP schemas accept caller-supplied user identity.
|
||||||
|
- Discord plugin lacks a complete authenticated service ingress and user/channel allowlists.
|
||||||
|
- Chat/tool persistence lacks mandatory redaction.
|
||||||
|
- Sessions/pending Discord output are in-memory and not restart-safe.
|
||||||
|
- Session GC currently performs globally scoped promotion.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
These are tracked as M1 security prerequisites and must pass independent security review before Tess ingress is enabled.
|
||||||
30
docs/tess/VERIFICATION-MATRIX.md
Normal file
30
docs/tess/VERIFICATION-MATRIX.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
|||||||
|
# Tess Verification Matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| Acceptance criterion | Requirements | Planned evidence | Gate |
|
||||||
|
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||||
|
| AC-TESS-01 | TESS-PI-001, TESS-DSC-001, TESS-CLI-001 | Discord/CLI same-session integration and streaming E2E | M3-V |
|
||||||
|
| AC-TESS-02 | TESS-ARP-001, TESS-CLI-001, TESS-FLT-001 | CLI contract tests for status/sessions/tree/attach/send/stop, typed denial/error snapshots | M3-V |
|
||||||
|
| AC-TESS-03 | TESS-PI-001, TESS-OBS-001 | Clean service launch; status asserts GPT-5.6 Sol, high reasoning and effective tool policy with secret canaries absent | M2-V, M3-V |
|
||||||
|
| AC-TESS-04 | TESS-MOS-001, TESS-FLT-001 | Authority E2E: coding request creates Mos handoff; safe status runs in Tess; no competing worker claim | M4-V |
|
||||||
|
| AC-TESS-05 | TESS-HRM-001 | Hermes capability contract suite: sessions/stream/send/tree plus Kanban/skills/memory/tools/cron supported-or-denied matrix | M4-V |
|
||||||
|
| AC-TESS-06 | TESS-STA-001, TESS-SEC-008 | Kill/restart/compaction fault injection across inbox/outbox/checkpoint transitions; duplicate side-effect detector | M2-V, M5-V |
|
||||||
|
| AC-TESS-07 | TESS-SEC-001..009 | Threat-model abuse suite: authz, tenant isolation, forged identity/approval, injection, redaction, transport identity, GC scope | M1-V, M3-V, M5-V |
|
||||||
|
| AC-TESS-08 | TESS-TRN-001 | Common provider contract suite against tmux/fleet and Matrix/native; identity and replay tests | M5-V |
|
||||||
|
| AC-TESS-09 | all | `pnpm typecheck`, lint, format, unit/integration/contract/E2E; independent code and security reviews; CI URLs | Every milestone |
|
||||||
|
| AC-TESS-10 | TESS-MIG-001 | Completed capability inventory with native/adapted/deferred/rejected state, owner, cutover/rollback evidence | M5-V |
|
||||||
|
| AC-TESS-11 | TESS-PLG-001, TESS-OBS-001 | OpenAPI and user/admin/developer/plugin/ops docs, sitemap links, documentation checklist | M5-V |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Security Abuse Suite Minimum
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Role/scope matrix for every command and provider capability.
|
||||||
|
- Cross-tenant and cross-user session ID matrix across REST, WS, Discord, CLI, MCP, and providers.
|
||||||
|
- Discord service identity, guild/channel/user allowlist, replay, attachment, and mention/DM policy cases.
|
||||||
|
- Prompt/tool injection corpus and structured-proposal enforcement.
|
||||||
|
- Approval action-digest mutation, replay, expiry, tenant, and actor mismatch cases.
|
||||||
|
- Secret/PII canaries through message, attachment, tool args/output, logs, memory, audit, and error paths.
|
||||||
|
- Restart fault injection before/after enqueue, provider send, side effect, response persistence, and acknowledgement.
|
||||||
|
- Wrong tmux socket/target and Matrix identity/room/replay cases.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Evidence Rules
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Evidence must include command/test name, terminal result, CI run URL, PR/merge reference, environment, and artifact/log location. A worker self-report is not evidence until independently verified.
|
||||||
@@ -15,6 +15,22 @@ This guide covers how to bootstrap a project so AI agents (Claude, Codex, etc.)
|
|||||||
7. Branching/merging is consistent: `branch -> main` via PR with squash-only merges
|
7. Branching/merging is consistent: `branch -> main` via PR with squash-only merges
|
||||||
8. Steered-autonomy execution is enabled so agents can run end-to-end with escalation-only human intervention
|
8. Steered-autonomy execution is enabled so agents can run end-to-end with escalation-only human intervention
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Agent Host Prerequisites
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Agent hosts must provide the Python runtime shape that runtime agents and
|
||||||
|
Mosaic automation assume is present.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
For Debian/Ubuntu hosts:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```bash
|
||||||
|
sudo apt-get update
|
||||||
|
# #561: bare python invocations from agents must resolve.
|
||||||
|
sudo apt-get install -y python3 python-is-python3
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
For non-Debian hosts, install the equivalent Python 3 runtime and ensure
|
||||||
|
`/usr/bin/python` resolves to `python3` (for example, via a managed symlink).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Quick Start
|
## Quick Start
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
```bash
|
```bash
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -15,6 +15,22 @@ This guide covers how to bootstrap a project so AI agents (Claude, Codex, etc.)
|
|||||||
7. Branching/merging is consistent: `branch -> main` via PR with squash-only merges
|
7. Branching/merging is consistent: `branch -> main` via PR with squash-only merges
|
||||||
8. Steered-autonomy execution is enabled so agents can run end-to-end with escalation-only human intervention
|
8. Steered-autonomy execution is enabled so agents can run end-to-end with escalation-only human intervention
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Agent Host Prerequisites
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Agent hosts must provide the Python runtime shape that runtime agents and
|
||||||
|
Mosaic automation assume is present.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
For Debian/Ubuntu hosts:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
```bash
|
||||||
|
sudo apt-get update
|
||||||
|
# #561: bare python invocations from agents must resolve.
|
||||||
|
sudo apt-get install -y python3 python-is-python3
|
||||||
|
```
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
For non-Debian hosts, install the equivalent Python 3 runtime and ensure
|
||||||
|
`/usr/bin/python` resolves to `python3` (for example, via a managed symlink).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Quick Start
|
## Quick Start
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
```bash
|
```bash
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -15,13 +15,23 @@
|
|||||||
#
|
#
|
||||||
# After loading, service-specific env vars are exported.
|
# After loading, service-specific env vars are exported.
|
||||||
# Run `load_credentials --help` for details.
|
# Run `load_credentials --help` for details.
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# Resolution order (first match wins):
|
||||||
|
# 1. $MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE (explicit override — never second-guessed)
|
||||||
|
# 2. $HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json
|
||||||
|
# 3. /etc/mosaic/credentials.json (host-level fallback)
|
||||||
|
# The /etc fallback exists for HOME-redirected profile environments, where
|
||||||
|
# $HOME points at a per-profile directory that has no credentials file.
|
||||||
|
# Operators symlink /etc/mosaic/credentials.json to the host's canonical
|
||||||
|
# file once, instead of exporting MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE per invocation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if [[ -z "${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:-}" ]]; then
|
if [[ -z "${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:-}" ]]; then
|
||||||
for _cand in "$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json"; do
|
for _cand in "$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json" "/etc/mosaic/credentials.json"; do
|
||||||
if [[ -f "$_cand" ]]; then MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$_cand"; break; fi
|
if [[ -f "$_cand" ]]; then MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$_cand"; break; fi
|
||||||
done
|
done
|
||||||
: "${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:=$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json}"
|
: "${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:=$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json}"
|
||||||
fi
|
fi
|
||||||
|
export MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
_mosaic_require_jq() {
|
_mosaic_require_jq() {
|
||||||
if ! command -v jq &>/dev/null; then
|
if ! command -v jq &>/dev/null; then
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -86,7 +86,16 @@ gitea_url_matches_host() {
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
get_gitea_service_for_host() {
|
get_gitea_service_for_host() {
|
||||||
local host="$1"
|
local host="$1"
|
||||||
local cred_file="${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:-$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json}"
|
local cred_file="${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:-}"
|
||||||
|
if [[ -z "$cred_file" ]]; then
|
||||||
|
# Same resolution chain as _lib/credentials.sh: profile HOME, then
|
||||||
|
# host-level /etc only if it exists; neither existing keeps the
|
||||||
|
# $HOME default (matches the lib's final := fallback).
|
||||||
|
cred_file="$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json"
|
||||||
|
if [[ ! -f "$cred_file" && -f /etc/mosaic/credentials.json ]]; then
|
||||||
|
cred_file="/etc/mosaic/credentials.json"
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
case "$host" in
|
case "$host" in
|
||||||
git.mosaicstack.dev)
|
git.mosaicstack.dev)
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Examples:
|
|||||||
$(basename "$0") -i 42 -l "in-progress" -m "0.2.0"
|
$(basename "$0") -i 42 -l "in-progress" -m "0.2.0"
|
||||||
$(basename "$0") -i 42 -a @me
|
$(basename "$0") -i 42 -a @me
|
||||||
EOF
|
EOF
|
||||||
exit 1
|
exit "${1:-1}"
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Parse arguments
|
# Parse arguments
|
||||||
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
|||||||
shift
|
shift
|
||||||
;;
|
;;
|
||||||
-h|--help)
|
-h|--help)
|
||||||
usage
|
usage 0
|
||||||
;;
|
;;
|
||||||
*)
|
*)
|
||||||
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ Examples:
|
|||||||
$(basename "$0") -t "Fix login bug" -l "bug,priority-high"
|
$(basename "$0") -t "Fix login bug" -l "bug,priority-high"
|
||||||
$(basename "$0") -t "Add dark mode" -b "Implement theme switching" -m "0.2.0"
|
$(basename "$0") -t "Add dark mode" -b "Implement theme switching" -m "0.2.0"
|
||||||
EOF
|
EOF
|
||||||
exit 1
|
exit "${1:-1}"
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Parse arguments
|
# Parse arguments
|
||||||
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
|||||||
shift 2
|
shift 2
|
||||||
;;
|
;;
|
||||||
-h|--help)
|
-h|--help)
|
||||||
usage
|
usage 0
|
||||||
;;
|
;;
|
||||||
*)
|
*)
|
||||||
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Examples:
|
|||||||
$(basename "$0") -m "0.2.0" # Issues in milestone 0.2.0
|
$(basename "$0") -m "0.2.0" # Issues in milestone 0.2.0
|
||||||
$(basename "$0") --repo ddk/ai-bma # List issues from anywhere
|
$(basename "$0") --repo ddk/ai-bma # List issues from anywhere
|
||||||
EOF
|
EOF
|
||||||
exit 1
|
exit "${1:-1}"
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Parse arguments
|
# Parse arguments
|
||||||
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
|||||||
shift 2
|
shift 2
|
||||||
;;
|
;;
|
||||||
-h|--help)
|
-h|--help)
|
||||||
usage
|
usage 0
|
||||||
;;
|
;;
|
||||||
*)
|
*)
|
||||||
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Examples:
|
|||||||
$(basename "$0") -t "0.0.1" -d "Pre-MVP Foundation Sprint"
|
$(basename "$0") -t "0.0.1" -d "Pre-MVP Foundation Sprint"
|
||||||
$(basename "$0") -t "0.1.0" -d "MVP Release" --due "2025-03-01"
|
$(basename "$0") -t "0.1.0" -d "MVP Release" --due "2025-03-01"
|
||||||
EOF
|
EOF
|
||||||
exit 1
|
exit "${1:-1}"
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Parse arguments
|
# Parse arguments
|
||||||
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
|||||||
shift
|
shift
|
||||||
;;
|
;;
|
||||||
-h|--help)
|
-h|--help)
|
||||||
usage
|
usage 0
|
||||||
;;
|
;;
|
||||||
*)
|
*)
|
||||||
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Examples:
|
|||||||
$(basename "$0") -i 42 -b "Implements the feature described in #42"
|
$(basename "$0") -i 42 -b "Implements the feature described in #42"
|
||||||
$(basename "$0") -t "WIP: New feature" --draft
|
$(basename "$0") -t "WIP: New feature" --draft
|
||||||
EOF
|
EOF
|
||||||
exit 1
|
exit "${1:-1}"
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Parse arguments
|
# Parse arguments
|
||||||
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
|||||||
shift
|
shift
|
||||||
;;
|
;;
|
||||||
-h|--help)
|
-h|--help)
|
||||||
usage
|
usage 0
|
||||||
;;
|
;;
|
||||||
*)
|
*)
|
||||||
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Examples:
|
|||||||
$(basename "$0") -s merged -a username # Merged PRs by user
|
$(basename "$0") -s merged -a username # Merged PRs by user
|
||||||
$(basename "$0") --repo ddk/ai-bma # List PRs from anywhere
|
$(basename "$0") --repo ddk/ai-bma # List PRs from anywhere
|
||||||
EOF
|
EOF
|
||||||
exit 1
|
exit "${1:-1}"
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Parse arguments
|
# Parse arguments
|
||||||
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
|||||||
shift 2
|
shift 2
|
||||||
;;
|
;;
|
||||||
-h|--help)
|
-h|--help)
|
||||||
usage
|
usage 0
|
||||||
;;
|
;;
|
||||||
*)
|
*)
|
||||||
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Examples:
|
|||||||
$(basename "$0") -n 42 -d # Squash merge and delete branch
|
$(basename "$0") -n 42 -d # Squash merge and delete branch
|
||||||
$(basename "$0") -n 42 --skip-queue-guard # Skip queue guard wait
|
$(basename "$0") -n 42 --skip-queue-guard # Skip queue guard wait
|
||||||
EOF
|
EOF
|
||||||
exit 1
|
exit "${1:-1}"
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# Parse arguments
|
# Parse arguments
|
||||||
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
|||||||
shift
|
shift
|
||||||
;;
|
;;
|
||||||
-h|--help)
|
-h|--help)
|
||||||
usage
|
usage 0
|
||||||
;;
|
;;
|
||||||
*)
|
*)
|
||||||
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
||||||
|
|||||||
53
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-help-exit-code.sh
Executable file
53
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-help-exit-code.sh
Executable file
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
|
|||||||
|
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||||
|
# Regression harness for #701: -h/--help must exit 0, bad args must still exit nonzero.
|
||||||
|
#
|
||||||
|
# Covers the 7 wrappers whose usage() previously hard-coded `exit 1`, so every
|
||||||
|
# --help invocation exited nonzero and logged a phantom isError across fleet lanes.
|
||||||
|
# Asserts, per wrapper:
|
||||||
|
# 1. `--help` exits 0 and prints usage.
|
||||||
|
# 2. `-h` exits 0 and prints usage.
|
||||||
|
# 3. A genuine unknown flag still exits nonzero (usage() default path untouched).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
set -euo pipefail
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WRAPPERS=(
|
||||||
|
issue-assign.sh
|
||||||
|
issue-create.sh
|
||||||
|
issue-list.sh
|
||||||
|
milestone-create.sh
|
||||||
|
pr-create.sh
|
||||||
|
pr-list.sh
|
||||||
|
pr-merge.sh
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
fail=0
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for wrapper in "${WRAPPERS[@]}"; do
|
||||||
|
path="$SCRIPT_DIR/$wrapper"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if ! output=$(bash "$path" --help 2>&1); then
|
||||||
|
echo "FAIL: $wrapper --help exited nonzero" >&2
|
||||||
|
fail=1
|
||||||
|
elif [[ "$output" != Usage:* ]]; then
|
||||||
|
echo "FAIL: $wrapper --help did not print usage" >&2
|
||||||
|
fail=1
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if ! bash "$path" -h >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||||
|
echo "FAIL: $wrapper -h exited nonzero" >&2
|
||||||
|
fail=1
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if bash "$path" --this-is-not-a-real-flag >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||||
|
echo "FAIL: $wrapper accepted an unknown flag (should have exited nonzero)" >&2
|
||||||
|
fail=1
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
done
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if [[ "$fail" -eq 0 ]]; then
|
||||||
|
echo "help-exit-code regression passed (7/7 wrappers)"
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
exit "$fail"
|
||||||
@@ -87,6 +87,10 @@ message crosses the wire as base64 (`-b`) to avoid all shell-quoting hazards.
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
- `agent-send.sh` — inter-agent wrapper (preamble + local/remote dispatch).
|
- `agent-send.sh` — inter-agent wrapper (preamble + local/remote dispatch).
|
||||||
- `send-message.sh` — low-level reliable single-pane submitter (`-b` base64 input).
|
- `send-message.sh` — low-level reliable single-pane submitter (`-b` base64 input).
|
||||||
|
- `auto-submit-drafts.sh` — watchdog that flushes stable unsubmitted prompt
|
||||||
|
drafts on a coordinator pane (default target `mos-claude`); run it as a
|
||||||
|
long-lived process alongside the coordinator session.
|
||||||
|
- `agent-send.test.sh` — regression + grammar lock for `agent-send.sh`.
|
||||||
- `test-send-message-socket.sh` — smoke test for named-socket isolation.
|
- `test-send-message-socket.sh` — smoke test for named-socket isolation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Distribution
|
## Distribution
|
||||||
|
|||||||
80
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/auto-submit-drafts.sh
Executable file
80
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/auto-submit-drafts.sh
Executable file
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
|
|||||||
|
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||||
|
# auto-submit-drafts.sh — watchdog for Claude Code panes that receive channel
|
||||||
|
# messages but leave them as unsubmitted prompt drafts. Intended for Mos only.
|
||||||
|
set -uo pipefail
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TARGET="${1:-mos-claude}"
|
||||||
|
INTERVAL="${INTERVAL:-2}"
|
||||||
|
STABLE_SECONDS="${STABLE_SECONDS:-4}"
|
||||||
|
LOG_PREFIX="[auto-submit-drafts:$TARGET]"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
last_prompt=""
|
||||||
|
first_seen=0
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
prompt_text() {
|
||||||
|
tmux capture-pane -t "$TARGET" -p 2>/dev/null | python3 -c '
|
||||||
|
import sys, re
|
||||||
|
lines = sys.stdin.read().splitlines()
|
||||||
|
idx = None
|
||||||
|
for i in range(len(lines)-1, -1, -1):
|
||||||
|
if "❯" in lines[i]:
|
||||||
|
idx = i
|
||||||
|
break
|
||||||
|
if idx is None:
|
||||||
|
raise SystemExit
|
||||||
|
parts = []
|
||||||
|
after = lines[idx].split("❯", 1)[1]
|
||||||
|
parts.append(after)
|
||||||
|
for line in lines[idx+1:]:
|
||||||
|
# Stop at Claude Code separator/border lines.
|
||||||
|
if "─" in line or "╰" in line or "╭" in line:
|
||||||
|
break
|
||||||
|
s = line.replace("\u00a0", " ")
|
||||||
|
s = re.sub(r"[\x00-\x1f\x7f]", "", s).strip()
|
||||||
|
if s:
|
||||||
|
parts.append(s)
|
||||||
|
text = " ".join(parts).replace("\u00a0", " ")
|
||||||
|
text = re.sub(r"[\x00-\x1f\x7f]", "", text).strip()
|
||||||
|
print(text)
|
||||||
|
'
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
while true; do
|
||||||
|
if ! tmux has-session -t "$TARGET" 2>/dev/null; then
|
||||||
|
echo "$LOG_PREFIX target missing; waiting" >&2
|
||||||
|
sleep "$INTERVAL"
|
||||||
|
last_prompt=""
|
||||||
|
first_seen=0
|
||||||
|
continue
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
current="$(prompt_text || true)"
|
||||||
|
now="$(date +%s)"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if [[ -z "$current" ]]; then
|
||||||
|
last_prompt=""
|
||||||
|
first_seen=0
|
||||||
|
sleep "$INTERVAL"
|
||||||
|
continue
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if [[ "$current" != "$last_prompt" ]]; then
|
||||||
|
last_prompt="$current"
|
||||||
|
first_seen="$now"
|
||||||
|
sleep "$INTERVAL"
|
||||||
|
continue
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
age=$(( now - first_seen ))
|
||||||
|
if (( age >= STABLE_SECONDS )); then
|
||||||
|
echo "$LOG_PREFIX submitting stable draft after ${age}s: ${current:0:120}" >&2
|
||||||
|
tmux send-keys -t "$TARGET" C-j
|
||||||
|
sleep 0.8
|
||||||
|
tmux send-keys -t "$TARGET" C-m
|
||||||
|
sleep 2
|
||||||
|
last_prompt=""
|
||||||
|
first_seen=0
|
||||||
|
else
|
||||||
|
sleep "$INTERVAL"
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
done
|
||||||
@@ -77,10 +77,20 @@ snippet=$(printf '%s' "$MSG" | tr '\n' ' ' | tr -s ' ' | sed 's/[^[:print:]]//g'
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
# 1) Paste the body as a bracketed paste so multi-line content does not submit
|
# 1) Paste the body as a bracketed paste so multi-line content does not submit
|
||||||
# line-by-line. load-buffer/paste-buffer is far safer than `send-keys -l`.
|
# line-by-line. load-buffer/paste-buffer is far safer than `send-keys -l`.
|
||||||
printf '%s' "$MSG" | "${tmux_cmd[@]}" load-buffer -b __mosaic_send -
|
# Buffer name MUST be unique per invocation: concurrent senders on the shared
|
||||||
|
# tmux server race a fixed name (load overwrites load, -d deletes underneath),
|
||||||
|
# cross-delivering or dropping messages — bit the fleet on the 2026-07-09
|
||||||
|
# simultaneous restart (briefs swapped between sessions).
|
||||||
|
BUF="__mosaic_send_$$_$(date +%s%N)"
|
||||||
|
printf '%s' "$MSG" | "${tmux_cmd[@]}" load-buffer -b "$BUF" -
|
||||||
# -p = bracketed paste when the client supports it; fall back if not.
|
# -p = bracketed paste when the client supports it; fall back if not.
|
||||||
"${tmux_cmd[@]}" paste-buffer -d -p -b __mosaic_send -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" 2>/dev/null \
|
"${tmux_cmd[@]}" paste-buffer -d -p -b "$BUF" -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" 2>/dev/null \
|
||||||
|| "${tmux_cmd[@]}" paste-buffer -d -b __mosaic_send -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET"
|
|| "${tmux_cmd[@]}" paste-buffer -d -b "$BUF" -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" \
|
||||||
|
|| "${tmux_cmd[@]}" delete-buffer -b "$BUF" 2>/dev/null
|
||||||
|
# ^ -d deletes the buffer only on a SUCCESSFUL paste; if both attempts fail
|
||||||
|
# (e.g. the target vanished since the liveness check), delete explicitly —
|
||||||
|
# named buffers are exempt from tmux's buffer-limit eviction, so orphans
|
||||||
|
# would otherwise accumulate forever.
|
||||||
sleep 0.5
|
sleep 0.5
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# 2) Submit, then verify; flush with another Enter if it is still a draft.
|
# 2) Submit, then verify; flush with another Enter if it is still a draft.
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -47,4 +47,32 @@ if capture_default | grep -qF "agent socket hello"; then
|
|||||||
fail "agent-send.sh leaked named-socket message to default tmux server"
|
fail "agent-send.sh leaked named-socket message to default tmux server"
|
||||||
fi
|
fi
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# Concurrency: parallel senders on one server must not cross-deliver or drop.
|
||||||
|
# Locks the unique-per-invocation paste buffer (a fixed buffer name raced:
|
||||||
|
# load overwrote load, -d deleted underneath — messages swapped between panes).
|
||||||
|
CONC_N=5
|
||||||
|
for i in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
|
||||||
|
tmux -L "$SOCKET" new-session -d -s "conc-$i" -c "$TMPDIR" 'bash --noprofile --norc -i'
|
||||||
|
done
|
||||||
|
pids=()
|
||||||
|
for i in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
|
||||||
|
"$SEND_MESSAGE" -L "$SOCKET" -t "=conc-$i" -m "CONCPAYLOAD-${i}-END" >/dev/null &
|
||||||
|
pids+=($!)
|
||||||
|
done
|
||||||
|
for pid in "${pids[@]}"; do
|
||||||
|
wait "$pid" || fail "concurrent send-message.sh invocation exited non-zero"
|
||||||
|
done
|
||||||
|
sleep 0.2
|
||||||
|
for i in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
|
||||||
|
pane=$(tmux -L "$SOCKET" capture-pane -t "=conc-$i:0.0" -p)
|
||||||
|
printf '%s' "$pane" | grep -qF "CONCPAYLOAD-${i}-END" \
|
||||||
|
|| fail "concurrent send dropped payload for pane conc-$i"
|
||||||
|
for j in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
|
||||||
|
[ "$j" = "$i" ] && continue
|
||||||
|
if printf '%s' "$pane" | grep -qF "CONCPAYLOAD-${j}-END"; then
|
||||||
|
fail "concurrent send cross-delivered payload $j to pane conc-$i"
|
||||||
|
fi
|
||||||
|
done
|
||||||
|
done
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
echo "ok - named tmux socket send tools"
|
echo "ok - named tmux socket send tools"
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user