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Author SHA1 Message Date
fred d18ce04959 design rev 3: GLM round-2 findings
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
shared replay mode refused (seed-only rule, contract 3 SS4.3/SS7 item 4);
concurrency loser semantics and scope-mismatch collision added to rule 5
and witness 5; query-side correlation envelope specified; no-oracle
indistinguishability probe added to witness 9; fence authorization
scope pinned; SHARED-CONTRACT SS5.3 citation fixed, fleet-side ASKS
reference removed.
2026-08-29 20:00:54 -05:00
fred 7bc69286d1 design rev 2: GLM review findings 1-8
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
Contract 5 §4 composed in full (fail-closed §4.4, CLI parity §4.5,
correlation id returned in result); idempotency re-attributed to
contract 3 §4.3 (via §7 item 4) and designed to the full fence/replay
envelope; harness error-code split fixed; full write-consumer set;
intake credential write joins the transaction; audit linkage pinned
FK-free; custody-schema cited at rev 13; witnesses 9-11 added
(correlation, CLI parity, fail-closed) plus the full §4.3 replay set.
2026-08-29 19:49:49 -05:00
fred 4753e285eb docs: agent enrollment command family v1 design (M4-4-0)
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Design note for the rank-4 enrollment command family: contract
composition (contract 5 rank-4 row + envelope, contract 3 §3.5,
custody-schema rev 4 FK binding), assignment-scope pin per D11,
measured current state, command surface with closed error enum,
additive schema delta plan (0021), and the witness list the
implementation slice must ship. Amends no contract.
2026-08-29 19:37:16 -05:00
17 changed files with 1 additions and 8080 deletions
-2
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ import { HarnessModule } from './harness/harness.module.js';
import { ReloadModule } from './reload/reload.module.js';
import { WorkspaceModule } from './workspace/workspace.module.js';
import { HierarchyModule } from './hierarchy/hierarchy.module.js';
import { EnrollmentModule } from './enrollment/enrollment.module.js';
import { QueueModule } from './queue/queue.module.js';
import { FederationModule } from './federation/federation.module.js';
import { ThrottlerGuard, ThrottlerModule } from '@nestjs/throttler';
@@ -68,7 +67,6 @@ const federationEnabled = loadConfig(resolveGatewayConfigPath()).tier === 'feder
ReloadModule,
WorkspaceModule,
HierarchyModule,
EnrollmentModule,
...(federationEnabled ? [FederationModule] : []),
],
controllers: [HealthController],
@@ -1,508 +0,0 @@
import { mkdtemp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { Test, type TestingModule } from '@nestjs/testing';
import { Logger, ValidationPipe, type ExecutionContext } from '@nestjs/common';
import { FastifyAdapter, type NestFastifyApplication } from '@nestjs/platform-fastify';
import supertest from 'supertest';
import { unseal } from '@mosaicstack/auth';
import {
agentAuditEvents,
agentIdempotencyFence,
agentOutbox,
agents,
and,
createPgliteDb,
eq,
providerCredentials,
runPgliteMigrations,
sql,
users,
type DbHandle,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { HarnessRegistry } from '../harness/harness.registry.js';
import { HARNESS_REGISTRY } from '../harness/harness.tokens.js';
import { FakeHarnessAdapter } from '../harness/testing/fake-harness.adapter.js';
import { EnrollmentController } from './enrollment.controller.js';
import {
EnrollmentRepository,
type EnrollAgentInput,
type EnrollmentResult,
type EnrolledAgentView,
} from './enrollment.repository.js';
import { EnrollmentService } from './enrollment.service.js';
/**
* Command-level witnesses for the agent enrollment family (M4-4b) — design
* docs/plans/2026-08-29-agent-enrollment-command-design.md §5 items 19 and
* 11 (item 10, CLI parity, lives in packages/mosaic). Schema-level
* constraints are witnessed in packages/db/src/agent-enrollment.witness.test.ts.
*
* The suite runs the REAL repository/service/controller graph over PGlite,
* with only AuthGuard overridden (a session store is out of scope; the
* override binds request.user exactly as the real guard does). The §6.3
* static companions — no `any`-typed boundary pass-through, a single audit
* emitter (EnrollmentRepository.appendEvent) — are code-surface properties
* reviewed on the PR, not runtime probes.
*/
describe('enrollment commands integration', (): void => {
let dataDir: string;
let handle: DbHandle;
let moduleRef: TestingModule;
let app: NestFastifyApplication;
let http: ReturnType<typeof supertest>;
let repo: EnrollmentRepository;
let previousAuthSecret: string | undefined;
const OWNER = 'enr-owner';
const ADMIN = 'enr-admin';
const STRANGER = 'enr-stranger';
const HARNESS = 'fake-harness';
/** Never-echo probe value (§5.1). Unique enough that any leak is unambiguous. */
const SECRET = `enr-secret-value-${randomUUID()}`;
/** The HTTP-leg acting user; the overridden guard binds it per request. */
let currentUserId = OWNER;
const enrollInput = (overrides: Partial<EnrollAgentInput> = {}): EnrollAgentInput => ({
actorId: OWNER,
harness: HARNESS,
name: `Agent ${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`,
persona: null,
model: 'anthropic/claude-test',
provider: `prov-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`,
credential: { mode: 'intake', type: 'api_key', value: SECRET },
idempotencyKey: randomUUID(),
...overrides,
});
function expectOk<T>(result: EnrollmentResult<T>): { ok: true; correlationId: string } & T {
if (!result.ok) throw new Error(`expected ok, got ${JSON.stringify(result)}`);
return result;
}
function expectFail<T>(
result: EnrollmentResult<T>,
error: string,
): { ok: false; error: string; message: string; correlationId: string } {
if (result.ok) throw new Error(`expected ${error}, got ok`);
expect(result.error).toBe(error);
return result;
}
const fenceForKey = (key: string) =>
handle.db
.select()
.from(agentIdempotencyFence)
.where(eq(agentIdempotencyFence.idempotencyKey, key));
const eventsForAgent = (agentId: string) =>
handle.db.select().from(agentAuditEvents).where(eq(agentAuditEvents.agentId, agentId));
const agentsNamed = (name: string) =>
handle.db.select().from(agents).where(eq(agents.name, name));
const credentialsFor = (userId: string, provider: string) =>
handle.db
.select()
.from(providerCredentials)
.where(
and(eq(providerCredentials.userId, userId), eq(providerCredentials.provider, provider)),
);
const allOutbox = () => handle.db.select().from(agentOutbox);
beforeAll(async (): Promise<void> => {
previousAuthSecret = process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] = 'enrollment-witness-sealing-key';
dataDir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'mosaic-gateway-enrollment-commands-'));
handle = createPgliteDb(dataDir);
await runPgliteMigrations(handle);
const registry = new HarnessRegistry();
registry.register(new FakeHarnessAdapter({ id: HARNESS }));
moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
controllers: [EnrollmentController],
providers: [
EnrollmentRepository,
EnrollmentService,
{ provide: DB, useValue: handle.db },
{ provide: HARNESS_REGISTRY, useValue: registry },
],
})
.overrideGuard(AuthGuard)
.useValue({
canActivate: (ctx: ExecutionContext): boolean => {
const request = ctx.switchToHttp().getRequest<{ user?: unknown }>();
request.user = { id: currentUserId };
return true;
},
})
.compile();
app = moduleRef.createNestApplication<NestFastifyApplication>(new FastifyAdapter());
// Mirror main.ts exactly — the closure witnesses depend on these options.
app.useGlobalPipes(
new ValidationPipe({ whitelist: true, forbidNonWhitelisted: true, transform: true }),
);
await app.init();
await app.getHttpAdapter().getInstance().ready();
http = supertest(app.getHttpServer());
repo = moduleRef.get(EnrollmentRepository);
await handle.db.insert(users).values([
{ id: OWNER, name: 'Owner', email: `${OWNER}@example.com` },
{ id: ADMIN, name: 'Admin', email: `${ADMIN}@example.com`, role: 'admin' },
{ id: STRANGER, name: 'Stranger', email: `${STRANGER}@example.com` },
]);
});
afterAll(async (): Promise<void> => {
await app?.close();
await handle.close();
await rm(dataDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
if (previousAuthSecret === undefined) delete process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
else process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] = previousAuthSecret;
});
// ── §5.7 wizard-facing zero-mutation (runs FIRST: no call → zero rows) ────
it('zero-mutation: with no enrollment invocation the family tables hold zero rows', async () => {
expect(await handle.db.select().from(agents)).toHaveLength(0);
expect(await handle.db.select().from(agentAuditEvents)).toHaveLength(0);
expect(await handle.db.select().from(agentOutbox)).toHaveLength(0);
expect(await handle.db.select().from(agentIdempotencyFence)).toHaveLength(0);
});
// ── §5.1 never-echo + §5.2 sealed single-copy ─────────────────────────────
it('never echoes the intake credential value: HTTP result, audit, outbox, fence, and logs are clean', async () => {
const logSink: string[] = [];
const logSpies = (['log', 'error', 'warn', 'debug', 'verbose'] as const).map((method) =>
vi.spyOn(Logger.prototype, method).mockImplementation((...args: unknown[]) => {
logSink.push(args.map(String).join(' '));
}),
);
try {
currentUserId = OWNER;
const provider = `prov-echo-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`;
const res = await http.post('/api/enrollment/agents').send({
harness: HARNESS,
name: 'Echo Probe',
persona: 'a persona',
model: 'anthropic/claude-test',
provider,
credential: { mode: 'intake', type: 'api_key', value: SECRET },
idempotencyKey: randomUUID(),
});
expect(res.status).toBe(201);
expect(res.text).not.toContain(SECRET);
const agentId = (res.body as { agent: EnrolledAgentView }).agent.id;
const events = await eventsForAgent(agentId);
expect(events).toHaveLength(1);
expect(JSON.stringify(events)).not.toContain(SECRET);
expect(JSON.stringify(await allOutbox())).not.toContain(SECRET);
const fences = await handle.db
.select()
.from(agentIdempotencyFence)
.where(eq(agentIdempotencyFence.outcomeAgentId, agentId));
expect(fences).toHaveLength(1);
expect(JSON.stringify(fences)).not.toContain(SECRET);
expect(logSink.join('\n')).not.toContain(SECRET);
// §5.2 sealed single-copy: exactly one provider_credentials row, sealed
// at rest, and it round-trips through unseal — no plaintext column.
const creds = await credentialsFor(OWNER, provider);
expect(creds).toHaveLength(1);
expect(creds[0]?.encryptedValue).not.toBe(SECRET);
expect(creds[0]?.encryptedValue).not.toContain(SECRET);
expect(unseal(creds[0]?.encryptedValue as string)).toBe(SECRET);
} finally {
logSpies.forEach((spy) => spy.mockRestore());
}
});
it('the agents table itself has no credential-bearing column (§5.2)', async () => {
const result = (await handle.db.execute(
sql`select column_name from information_schema.columns where table_name = 'agents'`,
)) as unknown as { rows?: Array<{ column_name: string }> } & Array<{ column_name: string }>;
const names = (result.rows ?? result).map((row) => row.column_name);
expect(names.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
for (const name of names) {
expect(name).not.toMatch(/credential|secret|token|api_key/i);
}
});
// ── §5.3 reference resolution ─────────────────────────────────────────────
it('refuses an unresolvable credential reference with precondition_failed and creates nothing', async () => {
const input = enrollInput({ credential: { mode: 'reference' } });
const result = await repo.enroll(input);
expectFail(result, 'precondition_failed');
expect(await agentsNamed(input.name)).toHaveLength(0);
expect(await fenceForKey(input.idempotencyKey)).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('resolves a reference credential stored earlier for (actor, provider)', async () => {
const provider = `prov-ref-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`;
const seeded = expectOk(await repo.enroll(enrollInput({ provider })));
const result = expectOk(
await repo.enroll(enrollInput({ provider, credential: { mode: 'reference' } })),
);
expect(result.agent.id).not.toBe(seeded.agent.id);
expect(await credentialsFor(OWNER, provider)).toHaveLength(1);
});
// ── §5.4 harness refusals, both codes ────────────────────────────────────
it('refuses a syntactically invalid harness as validation_failed and a registry miss as precondition_failed', async () => {
const blank = await repo.enroll(enrollInput({ harness: ' ' }));
expectFail(blank, 'validation_failed');
const miss = await repo.enroll(enrollInput({ harness: 'well-formed-but-unregistered' }));
expectFail(miss, 'precondition_failed');
currentUserId = OWNER;
const httpBlank = await http.post('/api/enrollment/agents').send({
harness: '',
name: 'H',
model: 'm',
provider: 'p',
credential: { mode: 'reference' },
idempotencyKey: randomUUID(),
});
expect(httpBlank.status).toBe(400);
});
// ── §5.5 idempotency set (contract 3 §4.3) ───────────────────────────────
it('actor-bound replay returns the recorded outcome and executes nothing new', async () => {
const input = enrollInput();
const first = expectOk(await repo.enroll(input));
const replay = expectOk(await repo.enroll({ ...input, correlationId: randomUUID() }));
expect(replay.agent.id).toBe(first.agent.id);
expect(await agentsNamed(input.name)).toHaveLength(1);
expect(await fenceForKey(input.idempotencyKey)).toHaveLength(1);
const events = await eventsForAgent(first.agent.id);
expect(events.filter((e) => e.eventType === 'agent.enrolled')).toHaveLength(1);
// A passing replay appends exactly the non-mutation access event.
const replayed = events.filter((e) => e.eventType === 'agent.enrollment.replayed');
expect(replayed).toHaveLength(1);
expect((replayed[0]?.payload as { fenceId?: string }).fenceId).toBeDefined();
});
it('payload-digest mismatch on a recorded key refuses with the single bounded conflict shape', async () => {
const input = enrollInput();
expectOk(await repo.enroll(input));
const mismatch = await repo.enroll({ ...input, name: `${input.name} CHANGED` });
const failure = expectFail(mismatch, 'conflict');
expect(failure.message).toBe('idempotency conflict');
});
it('replay-mode and scope mismatches on the recorded fence each refuse as the same constant conflict', async () => {
const modeInput = enrollInput();
expectOk(await repo.enroll(modeInput));
await handle.db
.update(agentIdempotencyFence)
.set({ replayMode: 'shared' })
.where(eq(agentIdempotencyFence.idempotencyKey, modeInput.idempotencyKey));
const modeFailure = expectFail(await repo.enroll(modeInput), 'conflict');
const scopeInput = enrollInput();
expectOk(await repo.enroll(scopeInput));
await handle.db
.update(agentIdempotencyFence)
.set({ authorizationScope: 'some-other-scope' })
.where(eq(agentIdempotencyFence.idempotencyKey, scopeInput.idempotencyKey));
const scopeFailure = expectFail(await repo.enroll(scopeInput), 'conflict');
expect(modeFailure.message).toBe(scopeFailure.message);
});
it('a different actor replaying an actor-bound key is refused conflict, learning nothing', async () => {
const input = enrollInput();
expectOk(await repo.enroll(input));
const failure = expectFail(await repo.enroll({ ...input, actorId: STRANGER }), 'conflict');
expect(failure.message).toBe('idempotency conflict');
});
it('a replay is re-authorized fresh: revoked target authority refuses instead of replaying', async () => {
const input = enrollInput();
const first = expectOk(await repo.enroll(input));
// Simulate the legacy CRUD DELETE path removing the outcome agent: the
// submitter no longer holds read authority on the referenced row.
await handle.db.delete(agents).where(eq(agents.id, first.agent.id));
expectFail(await repo.enroll(input), 'conflict');
});
it('a shared replay-mode declaration is refused validation_failed with nothing executed and no fence row', async () => {
const input = enrollInput({ replayMode: 'shared' });
expectFail(await repo.enroll(input), 'validation_failed');
expect(await agentsNamed(input.name)).toHaveLength(0);
expect(await fenceForKey(input.idempotencyKey)).toHaveLength(0);
currentUserId = OWNER;
const key = randomUUID();
const res = await http.post('/api/enrollment/agents').send({
harness: HARNESS,
name: 'Shared Probe',
model: 'm',
provider: 'p',
credential: { mode: 'reference' },
idempotencyKey: key,
replayMode: 'shared',
});
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(await fenceForKey(key)).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('two concurrent same-key submissions produce exactly one mutation, the loser resolving as a replay', async () => {
const input = enrollInput();
const [a, b] = await Promise.all([
repo.enroll(input),
repo.enroll({ ...input, correlationId: randomUUID() }),
]);
const okA = expectOk(a);
const okB = expectOk(b);
expect(okA.agent.id).toBe(okB.agent.id);
expect(await agentsNamed(input.name)).toHaveLength(1);
expect(await fenceForKey(input.idempotencyKey)).toHaveLength(1);
const events = await eventsForAgent(okA.agent.id);
expect(events.filter((e) => e.eventType === 'agent.enrolled')).toHaveLength(1);
expect(events.filter((e) => e.eventType === 'agent.enrollment.replayed')).toHaveLength(1);
});
// ── §5.6 same-tx atomicity fault injection ───────────────────────────────
it('rolls everything back on failure at each write point — no orphan credential survives', async () => {
const injectionPoints = [
'writeSealedCredential',
'insertAgentRow',
'insertFenceRow',
'appendEvent',
'insertOutboxRow',
] as const;
for (const point of injectionPoints) {
const input = enrollInput();
const spy = vi.spyOn(repo, point).mockImplementationOnce(() => {
throw new Error(`injected ${point} fault`);
});
try {
const result = await repo.enroll(input);
expectFail(result, 'internal_fault');
expect(await agentsNamed(input.name)).toHaveLength(0);
expect(await fenceForKey(input.idempotencyKey)).toHaveLength(0);
// Injection at fence/audit/outbox fires AFTER the sealed credential
// write's statement ran — the rollback must leave no orphan row.
expect(await credentialsFor(OWNER, input.provider)).toHaveLength(0);
} finally {
spy.mockRestore();
}
}
});
// ── §5.8 is_system closure ───────────────────────────────────────────────
it('rejects an is_system injection attempt at the DTO boundary', async () => {
currentUserId = OWNER;
const key = randomUUID();
const res = await http.post('/api/enrollment/agents').send({
harness: HARNESS,
name: 'System Probe',
model: 'm',
provider: 'p',
credential: { mode: 'reference' },
idempotencyKey: key,
isSystem: true,
});
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(await fenceForKey(key)).toHaveLength(0);
});
// ── §5.9 correlation + no-existence-oracle ───────────────────────────────
it('carries a submitted correlation id into the result, the audit event, and the outbox record', async () => {
const correlationId = randomUUID();
const input = enrollInput({ correlationId });
const result = expectOk(await repo.enroll(input));
expect(result.correlationId).toBe(correlationId);
const events = await eventsForAgent(result.agent.id);
expect(events).toHaveLength(1);
expect(events[0]?.correlationId).toBe(correlationId);
const outboxRows = await handle.db
.select()
.from(agentOutbox)
.where(eq(agentOutbox.eventId, events[0]?.id as string));
expect(outboxRows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(outboxRows[0]?.correlationId).toBe(correlationId);
// Refusals carry the correlation envelope too (contract 5 §4.3).
const refusal = expectFail(
await repo.enroll({ ...input, name: 'changed name', correlationId }),
'conflict',
);
expect(refusal.correlationId).toBe(correlationId);
});
it('agent.enrollment.get returns owner and admin reads with the correlation envelope, no idempotency key', async () => {
const enrolled = expectOk(await repo.enroll(enrollInput()));
const correlationId = randomUUID();
const asOwner = expectOk(await repo.getEnrollment(OWNER, enrolled.agent.id, correlationId));
expect(asOwner.correlationId).toBe(correlationId);
expect(asOwner.agent.id).toBe(enrolled.agent.id);
const asAdmin = expectOk(await repo.getEnrollment(ADMIN, enrolled.agent.id));
expect(asAdmin.correlationId).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f-]{36}$/);
currentUserId = OWNER;
const wire = randomUUID();
const res = await http.get(`/api/enrollment/agents/${enrolled.agent.id}?correlationId=${wire}`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect((res.body as { correlationId: string }).correlationId).toBe(wire);
});
it('no existence oracle: unauthorized get of a real agent and get of a missing id are indistinguishable', async () => {
const enrolled = expectOk(await repo.enroll(enrollInput()));
currentUserId = STRANGER;
const unauthorized = await http.get(`/api/enrollment/agents/${enrolled.agent.id}`);
const missing = await http.get(`/api/enrollment/agents/${randomUUID()}`);
expect(unauthorized.status).toBe(404);
expect(missing.status).toBe(404);
const strip = (body: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown> =>
Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(body).filter(([key]) => key !== 'correlationId'));
expect(strip(unauthorized.body as Record<string, unknown>)).toEqual(
strip(missing.body as Record<string, unknown>),
);
});
// ── §5.11 fail-closed ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
it('fails closed as internal_fault when the store is unreachable, with no fallback write', async () => {
const before = (await handle.db.select().from(agents)).length;
const txSpy = vi.spyOn(handle.db, 'transaction').mockImplementationOnce(() => {
throw new Error('injected store outage');
});
try {
expectFail(await repo.enroll(enrollInput()), 'internal_fault');
} finally {
txSpy.mockRestore();
}
const selectSpy = vi.spyOn(handle.db, 'select').mockImplementationOnce(() => {
throw new Error('injected store outage');
});
try {
expectFail(await repo.getEnrollment(OWNER, randomUUID()), 'internal_fault');
} finally {
selectSpy.mockRestore();
}
expect((await handle.db.select().from(agents)).length).toBe(before);
});
});
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
import {
Body,
Controller,
Get,
Param,
ParseUUIDPipe,
Post,
Query,
UseGuards,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { CurrentUser } from '../auth/current-user.decorator.js';
import { EnrollAgentDto, GetEnrollmentQueryDto } from './enrollment.dto.js';
import { EnrollmentRepository } from './enrollment.repository.js';
import { EnrollmentService } from './enrollment.service.js';
/**
* The agent enrollment command family's closed HTTP surface (design
* docs/plans/2026-08-29-agent-enrollment-command-design.md §3): one command,
* one query. Authentication failures are the guard's (401); everything else
* is the repository's closed enum mapped by EnrollmentService.
*/
@Controller('api/enrollment')
@UseGuards(AuthGuard)
export class EnrollmentController {
constructor(
private readonly repository: EnrollmentRepository,
private readonly service: EnrollmentService,
) {}
/** agent.enroll (§3.1). */
@Post('agents')
async enroll(@CurrentUser() user: { id: string }, @Body() dto: EnrollAgentDto) {
return this.service.unwrap(
await this.repository.enroll({
actorId: user.id,
harness: dto.harness,
name: dto.name,
persona: dto.persona ?? null,
model: dto.model,
provider: dto.provider,
credential: dto.credential,
idempotencyKey: dto.idempotencyKey,
correlationId: dto.correlationId,
replayMode: dto.replayMode,
}),
);
}
/** agent.enrollment.get (§3.2): owner-or-admin; unauthorized and missing fold to one not_found. */
@Get('agents/:id')
async getEnrollment(
@CurrentUser() user: { id: string },
@Param('id', ParseUUIDPipe) id: string,
@Query() query: GetEnrollmentQueryDto,
) {
return this.service.unwrap(
await this.repository.getEnrollment(user.id, id, query.correlationId),
);
}
}
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
import { Type } from 'class-transformer';
import {
IsIn,
IsOptional,
IsString,
IsUUID,
MaxLength,
MinLength,
ValidateIf,
ValidateNested,
} from 'class-validator';
/**
* Agent enrollment command DTOs (design
* docs/plans/2026-08-29-agent-enrollment-command-design.md §3.1/§3.2,
* contract 5 §4.1 typed boundary).
*
* The global ValidationPipe runs with whitelist + forbidNonWhitelisted, so
* closure is contract surface here exactly as in the hierarchy DTOs:
* - EnrollAgentDto declares NO isSystem field — `is_system` is never
* settable through this command (design §3.1 rule 4); the pipe refuses it.
* - replayMode admits ONLY 'actor-bound': `shared` is seed-only (contract 3
* §4.3), so a shared declaration is refused `validation_failed` at the
* boundary, executes nothing, and records no fence row (design §3.1).
* Every class here must be registered in PIPE_GUARDED_DTOS so the boot-time
* assertion proves the pipe sees the decorators.
*/
/**
* Credential input, discriminated on `mode` (design §3.1):
* - `{ mode: 'reference' }` — a stored credential for (actor, provider)
* must already exist; `type`/`value` must be ABSENT (the repository
* refuses a reference that smuggles a value).
* - `{ mode: 'intake', type: 'api_key', value }` — the value is sealed
* into the credential store inside the enrollment transaction and is
* never echoed anywhere (§3.1 rule 1).
*/
export class EnrollCredentialDto {
@IsIn(['reference', 'intake'])
mode!: 'reference' | 'intake';
@ValidateIf((o: EnrollCredentialDto) => o.mode === 'intake')
@IsIn(['api_key'])
type?: 'api_key';
@ValidateIf((o: EnrollCredentialDto) => o.mode === 'intake')
@IsString()
@MinLength(1)
@MaxLength(4096)
value?: string;
}
export class EnrollAgentDto {
/** Registered harness name; a well-formed name missing from the registry is `precondition_failed`. */
@IsString()
@MinLength(1)
@MaxLength(200)
harness!: string;
@IsString()
@MinLength(1)
@MaxLength(200)
name!: string;
/** Stored as the agent's system prompt; null/absent leaves it unset. */
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
@MaxLength(20000)
persona?: string | null;
/** Provider-qualified model id. */
@IsString()
@MinLength(1)
@MaxLength(200)
model!: string;
/** Names the credential's provider. */
@IsString()
@MinLength(1)
@MaxLength(200)
provider!: string;
@ValidateNested()
@Type(() => EnrollCredentialDto)
credential!: EnrollCredentialDto;
/** REQUIRED — contract 3 §4.3, ratified into contract 5 §4 via §7 item 4. */
@IsUUID()
idempotencyKey!: string;
/** Optional; generated when absent (contract 5 §4.3). */
@IsOptional()
@IsUUID()
correlationId?: string;
/** Only 'actor-bound' is admissible on this family — see module doc. */
@IsOptional()
@IsIn(['actor-bound'])
replayMode?: 'actor-bound';
}
/** Query envelope for agent.enrollment.get (design §3.2): correlation only, no idempotency key. */
export class GetEnrollmentQueryDto {
@IsOptional()
@IsUUID()
correlationId?: string;
}
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { HarnessModule } from '../harness/harness.module.js';
import { EnrollmentController } from './enrollment.controller.js';
import { EnrollmentRepository } from './enrollment.repository.js';
import { EnrollmentService } from './enrollment.service.js';
/**
* Agent enrollment command family (M4-4b; design
* docs/plans/2026-08-29-agent-enrollment-command-design.md). Imports
* HarnessModule for the live harness registry — the validation source for
* the `harness` field (a well-formed name the registry does not know is a
* precondition failure). EnrollmentRepository is the family's sole writer;
* every mutation runs fence-check → mutate → audit + outbox in one
* transaction.
*/
@Module({
imports: [HarnessModule],
controllers: [EnrollmentController],
providers: [EnrollmentRepository, EnrollmentService],
exports: [EnrollmentRepository],
})
export class EnrollmentModule {}
@@ -1,538 +0,0 @@
import { createHash, randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
import { Inject, Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import { seal } from '@mosaicstack/auth';
import {
agentAuditEvents,
agentIdempotencyFence,
agentOutbox,
agents,
and,
eq,
providerCredentials,
users,
type Db,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
import type { HarnessRegistry } from '../harness/harness.registry.js';
import { HARNESS_REGISTRY } from '../harness/harness.tokens.js';
/**
* Agent enrollment command repository (design
* docs/plans/2026-08-29-agent-enrollment-command-design.md §3; contract 5 §4
* envelope; contract 3 §4.3 idempotency fence, ratified via §7 item 4).
*
* The ONLY writer of the enrollment family's tables (`agent_audit_events`,
* `agent_outbox`, `agent_idempotency_fence`) and the only path that sets
* `agents.harness`/`agents.enrolled_at`. Every enroll runs one transaction:
* fence check → (replay | credential handling → agent insert → fence insert →
* audit event + outbox), so state, fence, event, and outbox commit or roll
* back together (§3.1 rule 6).
*
* Authorization (v1, §3.1 rule 4) is the AuthGuard-authenticated actor — no
* hierarchy grant is consulted because v1 enrollment binds no hierarchy node.
* The recorded fence authorization scope is therefore the constant
* platform-user identity domain (§3.1 rule 5).
*
* Never-echo (§3.1 rule 1): the credential value reaches exactly one sink —
* the sealed store write — and appears in no result, audit payload, outbox
* row, or log line. Log lines here carry correlation ids and error names
* only, never request fields.
*
* The single-write helper methods (writeSealedCredential, insertAgentRow,
* insertFenceRow, appendEvent, insertOutboxRow) are ordinary decomposition;
* the atomicity witnesses (§5.6) spy on them to inject faults at each write
* point without any test-only production switch.
*/
export const ENROLLMENT_OPERATION = 'agent.enroll';
/** §3.1 rule 5: v1 authorization is grant-free, so the scope is the authenticated-user identity domain. */
const AUTHORIZATION_SCOPE = 'platform-user';
/** The single bounded collision shape (§3.1 rule 5): constant, identifying no record. */
const CONFLICT_MESSAGE = 'idempotency conflict';
/** One fixed message for every not_found cause — missing and unauthorized are indistinguishable (§3.2). */
const NOT_FOUND_MESSAGE = 'agent not found';
/** Closed per-family error enum (§3.3). 401 is produced by AuthGuard; 403 folds to not_found (§3.2). */
export type EnrollmentErrorCode =
| 'validation_failed'
| 'authentication_failed'
| 'authorization_refused'
| 'not_found'
| 'conflict'
| 'precondition_failed'
| 'internal_fault';
export interface EnrollmentFailure {
readonly ok: false;
readonly error: EnrollmentErrorCode;
readonly message: string;
/** Refusals carry the correlation id too (contract 5 §4.3 end-to-end traceability). */
readonly correlationId: string;
}
export type EnrollmentResult<T> =
| ({ readonly ok: true; readonly correlationId: string } & T)
| EnrollmentFailure;
/** The persisted agent row; the table stores no credential material (§3.1 rule 1). */
export interface EnrolledAgentView {
readonly id: string;
readonly name: string;
readonly provider: string;
readonly model: string;
readonly status: string;
readonly harness: string | null;
readonly persona: string | null;
readonly ownerId: string | null;
readonly enrolledAt: string | null;
readonly createdAt: string;
}
export interface EnrollCredentialInput {
readonly mode: 'reference' | 'intake';
readonly type?: 'api_key';
readonly value?: string;
}
export interface EnrollAgentInput {
readonly actorId: string;
readonly harness: string;
readonly name: string;
readonly persona?: string | null;
readonly model: string;
readonly provider: string;
readonly credential: EnrollCredentialInput;
readonly idempotencyKey: string;
readonly correlationId?: string;
/** Defense in depth below the DTO: anything but 'actor-bound' is refused (seed-only rule). */
readonly replayMode?: string;
}
type Tx = Pick<Db, 'insert' | 'select' | 'update' | 'delete'>;
type AgentRow = typeof agents.$inferSelect;
type FenceRow = typeof agentIdempotencyFence.$inferSelect;
/** Raised inside the transaction when the fence insert lost a same-key race (§3.1 rule 5 concurrency). */
class ConcurrentEnrollmentError extends Error {
constructor() {
super('concurrent enrollment lost the fence race');
this.name = 'ConcurrentEnrollmentError';
}
}
function agentView(row: AgentRow): EnrolledAgentView {
return {
id: row.id,
name: row.name,
provider: row.provider,
model: row.model,
status: row.status,
harness: row.harness,
persona: row.systemPrompt,
ownerId: row.ownerId,
enrolledAt: row.enrolledAt?.toISOString() ?? null,
createdAt: row.createdAt.toISOString(),
};
}
/** Key-order-independent serialization (jsonb precedent in hierarchy-audit). */
function canonicalJson(value: unknown): string {
if (Array.isArray(value)) return `[${value.map(canonicalJson).join(',')}]`;
if (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') {
const record = value as Record<string, unknown>;
const body = Object.keys(record)
.sort()
.map((key) => `${JSON.stringify(key)}:${canonicalJson(record[key])}`)
.join(',');
return `{${body}}`;
}
return JSON.stringify(value);
}
interface NormalizedEnrollment {
readonly actorId: string;
readonly harness: string;
readonly name: string;
readonly persona: string | null;
readonly model: string;
readonly provider: string;
readonly credential: EnrollCredentialInput;
readonly idempotencyKey: string;
readonly correlationId: string;
readonly digest: string;
}
/**
* Canonicalized-payload digest (§3.1 rule 5). The input EXCLUDES the
* credential value by construction: it covers mode and declared type only —
* plaintext never reaches the hash.
*/
function digestOf(
input: Omit<NormalizedEnrollment, 'actorId' | 'idempotencyKey' | 'correlationId' | 'digest'>,
): string {
const canonical = canonicalJson({
harness: input.harness,
name: input.name,
persona: input.persona,
model: input.model,
provider: input.provider,
credential: { mode: input.credential.mode, type: input.credential.type ?? null },
});
return createHash('sha256').update(canonical).digest('hex');
}
@Injectable()
export class EnrollmentRepository {
private readonly logger = new Logger(EnrollmentRepository.name);
constructor(
@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db,
@Inject(HARNESS_REGISTRY) private readonly registry: HarnessRegistry,
) {}
async enroll(input: EnrollAgentInput): Promise<EnrollmentResult<{ agent: EnrolledAgentView }>> {
const correlationId = input.correlationId ?? randomUUID();
const fail = (error: EnrollmentErrorCode, message: string): EnrollmentFailure => ({
ok: false,
error,
message,
correlationId,
});
const harness = input.harness.trim();
const name = input.name.trim();
if (harness.length === 0) return fail('validation_failed', 'harness must be non-empty');
if (name.length === 0 || name.length > 200) {
return fail('validation_failed', 'name must be non-empty and at most 200 characters');
}
if (input.replayMode !== undefined && input.replayMode !== 'actor-bound') {
// Seed-only rule (contract 3 §4.3): refused with nothing executed and no fence row.
return fail('validation_failed', 'replayMode must be actor-bound');
}
if (input.credential.mode === 'reference') {
if (input.credential.type !== undefined || input.credential.value !== undefined) {
return fail('validation_failed', 'a reference credential carries no type or value');
}
} else if (
input.credential.type !== 'api_key' ||
typeof input.credential.value !== 'string' ||
input.credential.value.length === 0
) {
return fail('validation_failed', 'an intake credential requires type api_key and a value');
}
// Syntactic validity ends above; a well-formed name the live registry
// does not know is a precondition failure (§3.1 table).
if (!this.registry.has(harness)) {
return fail('precondition_failed', 'harness is not registered');
}
const normalized: NormalizedEnrollment = {
actorId: input.actorId,
harness,
name,
persona: input.persona ?? null,
model: input.model,
provider: input.provider,
credential: input.credential,
idempotencyKey: input.idempotencyKey,
correlationId,
digest: digestOf({
harness,
name,
persona: input.persona ?? null,
model: input.model,
provider: input.provider,
credential: input.credential,
}),
};
// Two attempts: a fence-race loser's transaction rolls back and the retry
// resolves through the replay path against the winner's committed row —
// or executes afresh if the winner aborted (§3.1 rule 5 concurrency). A
// unique-violation race never surfaces as an unhandled internal fault.
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 2; attempt += 1) {
try {
return await this.db.transaction(async (tx) => this.enrollTx(tx, normalized));
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof ConcurrentEnrollmentError && attempt === 0) continue;
if (error instanceof ConcurrentEnrollmentError) {
return fail('conflict', CONFLICT_MESSAGE);
}
// §4.4 fail-closed: whatever broke, the transaction rolled back and
// the refusal is the internal-fault class — no fallback write or read.
this.logger.error(
`agent.enroll failed closed (correlation=${correlationId}): ${
error instanceof Error ? error.name : 'unknown error'
}`,
);
return fail('internal_fault', 'internal fault');
}
}
return fail('internal_fault', 'internal fault');
}
private async enrollTx(
tx: Tx,
input: NormalizedEnrollment,
): Promise<EnrollmentResult<{ agent: EnrolledAgentView }>> {
const fence = await this.fenceFor(tx, input.idempotencyKey);
if (fence) return this.replay(tx, fence, input);
if (input.credential.mode === 'reference') {
// §3.1 rule 3: the reference must resolve for (actor, provider).
const existing = await tx
.select({ id: providerCredentials.id })
.from(providerCredentials)
.where(
and(
eq(providerCredentials.userId, input.actorId),
eq(providerCredentials.provider, input.provider),
),
)
.limit(1);
if (existing.length === 0) {
return {
ok: false,
error: 'precondition_failed',
message: 'credential reference does not resolve',
correlationId: input.correlationId,
};
}
} else {
// §3.1 rule 2: sealed-store write inside THIS transaction — a later
// failure rolls it back, leaving no orphan credential.
await this.writeSealedCredential(
tx,
input.actorId,
input.provider,
input.credential.value as string,
);
}
const agentRow = await this.insertAgentRow(tx, input);
const fenceRow = await this.insertFenceRow(tx, input, agentRow.id);
if (!fenceRow) {
// A same-(operation, key) winner committed first; abandon our writes.
throw new ConcurrentEnrollmentError();
}
await this.appendEvent(tx, {
eventType: 'agent.enrolled',
actorId: input.actorId,
agentId: agentRow.id,
correlationId: input.correlationId,
// §3.1 rule 6 payload: harness, provider, name, credentialMode — no credential material.
payload: {
harness: input.harness,
provider: input.provider,
name: input.name,
credentialMode: input.credential.mode,
},
});
return { ok: true, correlationId: input.correlationId, agent: agentView(agentRow) };
}
/**
* Replay path (§3.1 rule 5): a fresh submission of a recorded
* (operation, key). The actor is re-authorized exactly as a fresh
* submission (v1: authenticated actor — the guard already ran); then mode,
* scope, digest, and recorded-actor equality; then target-result read
* authority (owner or admin) on the referenced agent. ANY failure refuses
* with the single bounded conflict shape — constant, identifying no record.
* A passing replay executes nothing and appends only the non-mutation
* access event (with its outbox record — one outbox row per event).
*/
private async replay(
tx: Tx,
fence: FenceRow,
input: NormalizedEnrollment,
): Promise<EnrollmentResult<{ agent: EnrolledAgentView }>> {
const collision: EnrollmentFailure = {
ok: false,
error: 'conflict',
message: CONFLICT_MESSAGE,
correlationId: input.correlationId,
};
if (fence.replayMode !== 'actor-bound') return collision;
if (fence.authorizationScope !== AUTHORIZATION_SCOPE) return collision;
if (fence.payloadDigest !== input.digest) return collision;
if (fence.actorId !== input.actorId) return collision;
const rows = await tx.select().from(agents).where(eq(agents.id, fence.outcomeAgentId)).limit(1);
const agentRow = rows[0];
if (!agentRow) return collision;
const authorized =
agentRow.ownerId === input.actorId || (await this.isPlatformAdmin(tx, input.actorId));
if (!authorized) return collision;
await this.appendEvent(tx, {
eventType: 'agent.enrollment.replayed',
actorId: input.actorId,
agentId: agentRow.id,
correlationId: input.correlationId,
payload: { fenceId: fence.id },
});
return { ok: true, correlationId: input.correlationId, agent: agentView(agentRow) };
}
/**
* agent.enrollment.get (§3.2): owner-or-admin read. Unauthorized and
* missing fold to the same not_found wire shape (no existence oracle).
*/
async getEnrollment(
actorId: string,
agentId: string,
correlationId?: string,
): Promise<EnrollmentResult<{ agent: EnrolledAgentView }>> {
const resolvedCorrelation = correlationId ?? randomUUID();
try {
const rows = await this.db.select().from(agents).where(eq(agents.id, agentId)).limit(1);
const row = rows[0];
if (row) {
const authorized =
row.ownerId === actorId || (await this.isPlatformAdmin(this.db, actorId));
if (authorized) {
return { ok: true, correlationId: resolvedCorrelation, agent: agentView(row) };
}
}
return {
ok: false,
error: 'not_found',
message: NOT_FOUND_MESSAGE,
correlationId: resolvedCorrelation,
};
} catch (error) {
this.logger.error(
`agent.enrollment.get failed closed (correlation=${resolvedCorrelation}): ${
error instanceof Error ? error.name : 'unknown error'
}`,
);
return {
ok: false,
error: 'internal_fault',
message: 'internal fault',
correlationId: resolvedCorrelation,
};
}
}
private async fenceFor(tx: Tx, idempotencyKey: string): Promise<FenceRow | null> {
const rows = await tx
.select()
.from(agentIdempotencyFence)
.where(
and(
eq(agentIdempotencyFence.operation, ENROLLMENT_OPERATION),
eq(agentIdempotencyFence.idempotencyKey, idempotencyKey),
),
)
.limit(1);
return rows[0] ?? null;
}
private async isPlatformAdmin(tx: Tx, actorId: string): Promise<boolean> {
const rows = await tx
.select({ role: users.role })
.from(users)
.where(eq(users.id, actorId))
.limit(1);
return rows[0]?.role === 'admin';
}
/**
* Sealed intake write, mirroring ProviderCredentialsService.store semantics
* (seal-at-rest, one row per (userId, provider)) but on the enrollment
* transaction (§3.1 rule 2). The plaintext exists only in this frame.
*/
async writeSealedCredential(
tx: Tx,
userId: string,
provider: string,
value: string,
): Promise<void> {
const encryptedValue = seal(value);
await tx
.insert(providerCredentials)
.values({ userId, provider, credentialType: 'api_key', encryptedValue, metadata: null })
.onConflictDoUpdate({
target: [providerCredentials.userId, providerCredentials.provider],
set: {
credentialType: 'api_key',
encryptedValue,
metadata: null,
updatedAt: new Date(),
},
});
}
async insertAgentRow(tx: Tx, input: NormalizedEnrollment): Promise<AgentRow> {
const rows = await tx
.insert(agents)
.values({
name: input.name,
provider: input.provider,
model: input.model,
harness: input.harness,
systemPrompt: input.persona,
// §3.1 rule 4: owner is the authenticated actor; is_system stays default false.
ownerId: input.actorId,
enrolledAt: new Date(),
})
.returning();
const row = rows[0];
if (!row) throw new Error('agent insert returned no row');
return row;
}
async insertFenceRow(
tx: Tx,
input: NormalizedEnrollment,
outcomeAgentId: string,
): Promise<FenceRow | null> {
const rows = await tx
.insert(agentIdempotencyFence)
.values({
operation: ENROLLMENT_OPERATION,
idempotencyKey: input.idempotencyKey,
actorId: input.actorId,
authorizationScope: AUTHORIZATION_SCOPE,
payloadDigest: input.digest,
replayMode: 'actor-bound',
outcomeAgentId,
})
.onConflictDoNothing()
.returning();
return rows[0] ?? null;
}
/** Append one audit event and its outbox record on the caller's transaction (one outbox row per event). */
async appendEvent(
tx: Tx,
input: {
eventType: 'agent.enrolled' | 'agent.enrollment.replayed';
actorId: string;
agentId: string;
correlationId: string;
payload: Record<string, unknown>;
causationId?: string;
},
): Promise<void> {
const inserted = await tx
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values({
eventType: input.eventType,
actorId: input.actorId,
agentId: input.agentId,
correlationId: input.correlationId,
causationId: input.causationId ?? null,
payload: input.payload,
})
.returning();
const event = inserted[0];
if (!event) throw new Error('agent audit event insert returned no row');
await this.insertOutboxRow(tx, event.id, input.correlationId);
}
async insertOutboxRow(tx: Tx, eventId: string, correlationId: string): Promise<void> {
await tx.insert(agentOutbox).values({ eventId, correlationId });
}
}
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
import { HttpException, HttpStatus, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import type {
EnrollmentErrorCode,
EnrollmentFailure,
EnrollmentResult,
} from './enrollment.repository.js';
/**
* Maps enrollment result unions onto the closed HTTP status set (design
* docs/plans/2026-08-29-agent-enrollment-command-design.md §3.3, contract 5
* §4.2). Every refusal body carries the correlation id (contract 5 §4.3
* end-to-end traceability) alongside the enum code. `not_found` carries one
* fixed message for every cause — missing agent and unauthorized caller are
* indistinguishable on the wire (§3.2).
*/
const HTTP_STATUS: Record<EnrollmentErrorCode, HttpStatus> = {
validation_failed: HttpStatus.BAD_REQUEST,
authentication_failed: HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED,
authorization_refused: HttpStatus.FORBIDDEN,
not_found: HttpStatus.NOT_FOUND,
conflict: HttpStatus.CONFLICT,
precondition_failed: HttpStatus.UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
internal_fault: HttpStatus.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
};
@Injectable()
export class EnrollmentService {
unwrap<T>(result: EnrollmentResult<T>): { ok: true; correlationId: string } & T {
if (result.ok) return result;
throw this.toException(result);
}
private toException(failure: EnrollmentFailure): HttpException {
const status = HTTP_STATUS[failure.error];
return new HttpException(
{
statusCode: status,
error: failure.error,
message: failure.message,
correlationId: failure.correlationId,
},
status,
);
}
}
-30
View File
@@ -13,11 +13,6 @@ import {
TransferEstateDto,
TransferPlatformProjectDto,
} from './hierarchy/hierarchy.dto.js';
import {
EnrollAgentDto,
EnrollCredentialDto,
GetEnrollmentQueryDto,
} from './enrollment/enrollment.dto.js';
/**
* Boot-time self-check: the global ValidationPipe must be able to SEE the
@@ -110,31 +105,6 @@ export const PIPE_GUARDED_DTOS: Array<{
target: ChangeGrantDto,
properties: ['role', 'idempotencyKey'],
},
{
name: 'EnrollAgentDto',
target: EnrollAgentDto,
properties: [
'harness',
'name',
'persona',
'model',
'provider',
'credential',
'idempotencyKey',
'correlationId',
'replayMode',
],
},
{
name: 'EnrollCredentialDto',
target: EnrollCredentialDto,
properties: ['mode', 'type', 'value'],
},
{
name: 'GetEnrollmentQueryDto',
target: GetEnrollmentQueryDto,
properties: ['correlationId'],
},
];
export class PipeMetatypeCheckError extends Error {
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
CREATE TYPE "public"."agent_outbox_status" AS ENUM('pending', 'processing', 'delivered');--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE TABLE "agent_audit_events" (
"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
"seq" bigint GENERATED ALWAYS AS IDENTITY (sequence name "agent_audit_events_seq_seq" INCREMENT BY 1 MINVALUE 1 MAXVALUE 9223372036854775807 START WITH 1 CACHE 1),
"event_type" text NOT NULL,
"actor_id" text NOT NULL,
"agent_id" uuid NOT NULL,
"correlation_id" text NOT NULL,
"causation_id" uuid,
"payload" jsonb NOT NULL,
"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
CONSTRAINT "agent_audit_events_type_check" CHECK (event_type IN ('agent.enrolled', 'agent.enrollment.replayed'))
);
--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE TABLE "agent_idempotency_fence" (
"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
"operation" text NOT NULL,
"idempotency_key" text NOT NULL,
"actor_id" text NOT NULL,
"authorization_scope" text NOT NULL,
"payload_digest" text NOT NULL,
"replay_mode" text DEFAULT 'actor-bound' NOT NULL,
"outcome_agent_id" uuid NOT NULL,
"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
CONSTRAINT "agent_idempotency_fence_replay_mode_check" CHECK (replay_mode IN ('actor-bound', 'shared'))
);
--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE TABLE "agent_outbox" (
"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
"event_id" uuid NOT NULL,
"correlation_id" text NOT NULL,
"status" "agent_outbox_status" DEFAULT 'pending' NOT NULL,
"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
"updated_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
"delivered_at" timestamp with time zone
);
--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "agents" ADD COLUMN "harness" text;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "agents" ADD COLUMN "enrolled_at" timestamp with time zone;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "agent_audit_events" ADD CONSTRAINT "agent_audit_events_causation_id_agent_audit_events_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("causation_id") REFERENCES "public"."agent_audit_events"("id") ON DELETE restrict ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "agent_outbox" ADD CONSTRAINT "agent_outbox_event_id_agent_audit_events_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("event_id") REFERENCES "public"."agent_audit_events"("id") ON DELETE restrict ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "agent_audit_events_seq_idx" ON "agent_audit_events" USING btree ("seq");--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE INDEX "agent_audit_events_agent_seq_idx" ON "agent_audit_events" USING btree ("agent_id","seq");--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE INDEX "agent_audit_events_correlation_idx" ON "agent_audit_events" USING btree ("correlation_id");--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "agent_idempotency_fence_operation_key_idx" ON "agent_idempotency_fence" USING btree ("operation","idempotency_key");--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "agent_outbox_event_idx" ON "agent_outbox" USING btree ("event_id");--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE INDEX "agent_outbox_status_created_idx" ON "agent_outbox" USING btree ("status","created_at");
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-7
View File
@@ -148,13 +148,6 @@
"when": 1787963521142,
"tag": "0020_special_betty_brant",
"breakpoints": true
},
{
"idx": 21,
"version": "7",
"when": 1788053011351,
"tag": "0021_agent_enrollment",
"breakpoints": true
}
]
}
@@ -1,412 +0,0 @@
/**
* Agent enrollment schema witnesses — M4-4a, the schema-level half of the
* witness list in docs/plans/2026-08-29-agent-enrollment-command-design.md §5.
*
* Witnesses the guarantees migration 0021's tables themselves carry: the
* event-type CHECK, monotonic per-agent append order (`seq`), deletion-safe
* linkage (no foreign key from the events or fence tables into `agents` —
* rows survive a legacy CRUD DELETE of the agent), the causation self-FK,
* the outbox's FK/uniqueness/status shape, the fence's UNIQUE
* (operation, key) and replay-mode CHECK, and the nullable enrollment
* columns on `agents` (legacy rows insert without them). The command-level
* witnesses (never-echo, same-tx atomicity, replay semantics, correlation,
* CLI parity, fail-closed) belong to the M4-4b implementation slice.
*
* Two legs run the same witness body:
* - PGlite (WASM Postgres): always runs.
* - Real PostgreSQL: runs when DATABASE_URL is set — the binding witness;
* CI migrates ci-postgres before `pnpm test`.
*/
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { createDb } from './client.js';
import { createPgliteDb } from './client-pglite.js';
import { runPgliteMigrations } from './migrate.js';
import { agentAuditEvents, agentIdempotencyFence, agentOutbox, agents } from './schema.js';
type AnyDb = {
db: {
insert: (t: unknown) => { values: (v: unknown) => Promise<unknown> };
execute: (q: unknown) => Promise<{ rows?: unknown[] } | unknown[]>;
};
close: () => Promise<void>;
};
/** Match a constraint failure anywhere along drizzle's cause chain. */
async function expectViolation(p: Promise<unknown>, re: RegExp, label = ''): Promise<void> {
let err: unknown;
try {
await p;
} catch (e) {
err = e;
}
expect(err, label || 'expected the statement to be refused').toBeDefined();
const messages: string[] = [];
let cur: unknown = err;
while (cur instanceof Error) {
messages.push(cur.message);
cur = (cur as { cause?: unknown }).cause;
}
expect(messages.join(' | '), label).toMatch(re);
}
function rows(res: { rows?: unknown[] } | unknown[]): Record<string, unknown>[] {
return (Array.isArray(res) ? res : (res.rows ?? [])) as Record<string, unknown>[];
}
/** Unique per-run prefix so real-PG runs never collide and clean up safely. */
const T = `agent-e-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`;
type EventInsert = typeof agentAuditEvents.$inferInsert;
function eventRow(overrides: Partial<EventInsert> = {}): EventInsert {
return {
eventType: 'agent.enrolled',
actorId: `${T}-actor`,
agentId: randomUUID(),
correlationId: `${T}-corr-${randomUUID()}`,
payload: {
harness: 'claude-code',
provider: 'anthropic',
name: 'x',
credentialMode: 'reference',
},
...overrides,
};
}
type FenceInsert = typeof agentIdempotencyFence.$inferInsert;
function fenceRow(overrides: Partial<FenceInsert> = {}): FenceInsert {
return {
operation: 'agent.enroll',
idempotencyKey: `${T}-${randomUUID()}`,
actorId: `${T}-actor`,
authorizationScope: 'platform-user',
payloadDigest: `${T}-digest`,
outcomeAgentId: randomUUID(),
...overrides,
};
}
function witnessSuite(getHandle: () => AnyDb): void {
const db = () => getHandle().db as unknown as ReturnType<typeof createDb>['db'];
afterAll(async () => {
const d = db();
await d.execute(sql`DELETE FROM agent_outbox WHERE correlation_id LIKE ${T + '%'}`);
// Caused events first: the causation self-FK is RESTRICT.
await d.execute(
sql`DELETE FROM agent_audit_events WHERE correlation_id LIKE ${T + '%'} AND causation_id IS NOT NULL`,
);
await d.execute(sql`DELETE FROM agent_audit_events WHERE correlation_id LIKE ${T + '%'}`);
await d.execute(sql`DELETE FROM agent_idempotency_fence WHERE actor_id LIKE ${T + '%'}`);
await d.execute(sql`DELETE FROM agents WHERE name LIKE ${T + '%'}`);
});
// ── agents: nullable enrollment columns (no backfill semantics) ────────────
it('legacy agent rows insert without enrollment columns; enrolled rows carry both', async () => {
const legacyId = randomUUID();
await db()
.insert(agents)
.values({
id: legacyId,
name: `${T}-legacy`,
provider: 'anthropic',
model: 'claude-fable-5',
});
const legacy = rows(
await db().execute(sql`SELECT harness, enrolled_at FROM agents WHERE id = ${legacyId}`),
)[0]!;
expect(legacy['harness']).toBeNull();
expect(legacy['enrolled_at']).toBeNull();
const enrolledId = randomUUID();
await db()
.insert(agents)
.values({
id: enrolledId,
name: `${T}-enrolled`,
provider: 'anthropic',
model: 'claude-fable-5',
harness: 'claude-code',
enrolledAt: new Date(),
});
const enrolled = rows(
await db().execute(sql`SELECT harness, enrolled_at FROM agents WHERE id = ${enrolledId}`),
)[0]!;
expect(enrolled['harness']).toBe('claude-code');
expect(enrolled['enrolled_at']).not.toBeNull();
});
// ── agent_audit_events: CHECK, ordering, deletion-safe linkage ─────────────
it('accepts both declared event types and refuses an undeclared one', async () => {
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ eventType: 'agent.enrolled' }));
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ eventType: 'agent.enrollment.replayed' }));
await expectViolation(
db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ eventType: 'agent.deleted' })),
/type_check|violates check/i,
'undeclared event type must be refused',
);
});
it('assigns strictly increasing seq in insert order for one agent', async () => {
const agentId = randomUUID();
const c1 = `${T}-seq-1-${randomUUID()}`;
const c2 = `${T}-seq-2-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ agentId, correlationId: c1 }));
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ agentId, eventType: 'agent.enrollment.replayed', correlationId: c2 }));
const res = rows(
await db().execute(
sql`SELECT correlation_id, seq FROM agent_audit_events WHERE agent_id = ${agentId} ORDER BY seq ASC`,
),
);
expect(res.map((r) => r['correlation_id'])).toEqual([c1, c2]);
expect(Number(res[1]!['seq'])).toBeGreaterThan(Number(res[0]!['seq']));
});
it('has no foreign key into agents, and events survive agent deletion', async () => {
const fks = rows(
await db().execute(sql`
SELECT ccu.table_name AS referenced_table
FROM information_schema.table_constraints tc
JOIN information_schema.constraint_column_usage ccu
ON ccu.constraint_name = tc.constraint_name AND ccu.constraint_schema = tc.constraint_schema
WHERE tc.constraint_type = 'FOREIGN KEY' AND tc.table_name = 'agent_audit_events'
`),
);
// The causation self-FK is the ONLY foreign key on the events table.
expect([...new Set(fks.map((r) => r['referenced_table']))]).toEqual(['agent_audit_events']);
const agentId = randomUUID();
await db()
.insert(agents)
.values({ id: agentId, name: `${T}-doomed`, provider: 'anthropic', model: 'claude-fable-5' });
const corr = `${T}-survive-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ agentId, correlationId: corr }));
await db().execute(sql`DELETE FROM agents WHERE id = ${agentId}`);
const after = rows(
await db().execute(
sql`SELECT agent_id FROM agent_audit_events WHERE correlation_id = ${corr}`,
),
);
expect(after).toHaveLength(1);
expect(after[0]!['agent_id']).toBe(agentId);
});
it('enforces the causation self-FK and RESTRICTs deleting a cause', async () => {
await expectViolation(
db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ causationId: randomUUID() })),
/foreign key/i,
'causation must reference an existing event',
);
const causeCorr = `${T}-cause-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ correlationId: causeCorr }));
const cause = rows(
await db().execute(
sql`SELECT id FROM agent_audit_events WHERE correlation_id = ${causeCorr}`,
),
)[0]!;
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(
eventRow({
eventType: 'agent.enrollment.replayed',
causationId: cause['id'] as string,
}),
);
await expectViolation(
db().execute(sql`DELETE FROM agent_audit_events WHERE id = ${cause['id'] as string}`),
/foreign key/i,
'a cause with dependent events must not be deletable',
);
});
// ── agent_outbox shape ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
it('outbox rows require an existing event, one outbox row per event, closed status enum', async () => {
await expectViolation(
db()
.insert(agentOutbox)
.values({ eventId: randomUUID(), correlationId: `${T}-corr` }),
/foreign key/i,
'outbox must reference an existing event',
);
const corr = `${T}-ob-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ correlationId: corr }));
const event = rows(
await db().execute(sql`SELECT id FROM agent_audit_events WHERE correlation_id = ${corr}`),
)[0]!;
const eventId = event['id'] as string;
await db().insert(agentOutbox).values({ eventId, correlationId: corr });
await expectViolation(
db()
.insert(agentOutbox)
.values({ eventId, correlationId: `${T}-ob2` }),
/duplicate key|unique/i,
'one outbox record per event',
);
await expectViolation(
db().execute(
sql`INSERT INTO agent_outbox (event_id, correlation_id, status)
VALUES (${eventId}, ${`${T}-ob3`}, 'failed')`,
),
/invalid input value for enum|22P02/i,
'status outside pending/processing/delivered must be refused',
);
});
it('outbox FK RESTRICTs event deletion while the outbox row exists', async () => {
const corr = `${T}-obr-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentAuditEvents)
.values(eventRow({ correlationId: corr }));
const event = rows(
await db().execute(sql`SELECT id FROM agent_audit_events WHERE correlation_id = ${corr}`),
)[0]!;
await db()
.insert(agentOutbox)
.values({ eventId: event['id'] as string, correlationId: corr });
await expectViolation(
db().execute(sql`DELETE FROM agent_audit_events WHERE id = ${event['id'] as string}`),
/foreign key/i,
);
});
// ── agent_idempotency_fence: (operation, key) uniqueness, mode CHECK ───────
it('refuses a duplicate (operation, key) pair but allows the same key under another operation', async () => {
const key = `${T}-fence-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentIdempotencyFence)
.values(fenceRow({ idempotencyKey: key }));
await expectViolation(
db()
.insert(agentIdempotencyFence)
.values(fenceRow({ idempotencyKey: key })),
/duplicate key|unique/i,
'fence uniqueness is (operation, key)',
);
// Same key, different operation identifier: a distinct fence.
await db()
.insert(agentIdempotencyFence)
.values(fenceRow({ idempotencyKey: key, operation: 'agent.other' }));
});
it('defaults replay mode to actor-bound and refuses an undeclared mode', async () => {
const key = `${T}-mode-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentIdempotencyFence)
.values(fenceRow({ idempotencyKey: key }));
const row = rows(
await db().execute(
sql`SELECT replay_mode FROM agent_idempotency_fence WHERE idempotency_key = ${key}`,
),
)[0]!;
expect(row['replay_mode']).toBe('actor-bound');
await expectViolation(
db()
.insert(agentIdempotencyFence)
.values(fenceRow({ replayMode: 'unbound' as 'actor-bound' })),
/replay_mode_check|violates check/i,
'a mode outside actor-bound/shared must be refused',
);
});
it('fence has no foreign key at all, and rows survive agent deletion', async () => {
const fks = rows(
await db().execute(sql`
SELECT ccu.table_name AS referenced_table
FROM information_schema.table_constraints tc
JOIN information_schema.constraint_column_usage ccu
ON ccu.constraint_name = tc.constraint_name AND ccu.constraint_schema = tc.constraint_schema
WHERE tc.constraint_type = 'FOREIGN KEY' AND tc.table_name = 'agent_idempotency_fence'
`),
);
expect(fks).toHaveLength(0);
const agentId = randomUUID();
await db()
.insert(agents)
.values({
id: agentId,
name: `${T}-fdoomed`,
provider: 'anthropic',
model: 'claude-fable-5',
});
const key = `${T}-fsurvive-${randomUUID()}`;
await db()
.insert(agentIdempotencyFence)
.values(fenceRow({ idempotencyKey: key, outcomeAgentId: agentId }));
await db().execute(sql`DELETE FROM agents WHERE id = ${agentId}`);
const after = rows(
await db().execute(
sql`SELECT outcome_agent_id FROM agent_idempotency_fence WHERE idempotency_key = ${key}`,
),
);
expect(after).toHaveLength(1);
expect(after[0]!['outcome_agent_id']).toBe(agentId);
});
}
// ── Leg 1: PGlite (always runs — local witness signal) ───────────────────────
describe('agent enrollment schema witnesses — PGlite', () => {
let dir: string;
let handle: ReturnType<typeof createPgliteDb>;
beforeAll(async () => {
dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'agent-enroll-witness-'));
handle = createPgliteDb(dir);
await runPgliteMigrations(handle);
});
afterAll(async () => {
await handle.close();
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
witnessSuite(() => handle as unknown as AnyDb);
});
// ── Leg 2: real PostgreSQL (binding witness, ci-postgres in CI) ──────────────
const hasPostgres = Boolean(process.env['DATABASE_URL']);
describe.skipIf(!hasPostgres)('agent enrollment schema witnesses — real PostgreSQL', () => {
let handle: ReturnType<typeof createDb>;
beforeAll(() => {
handle = createDb(process.env['DATABASE_URL']!);
});
afterAll(async () => {
await handle.close();
});
witnessSuite(() => handle as unknown as AnyDb);
});
-111
View File
@@ -302,11 +302,6 @@ export const agents = pgTable(
skills: jsonb('skills').$type<string[]>(),
isSystem: boolean('is_system').notNull().default(false),
config: jsonb('config'),
// Enrollment (M4-4, docs/plans/2026-08-29-agent-enrollment-command-design.md §4).
// NULL on both marks a legacy (non-enrolled) row; no backfill — enrollment
// is a fact the rank-4 command creates, not one to invent for existing rows.
harness: text('harness'),
enrolledAt: timestamp('enrolled_at', { withTimezone: true }),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
},
@@ -1284,109 +1279,3 @@ export const hierarchyOutbox = pgTable(
index('hierarchy_outbox_status_created_idx').on(t.status, t.createdAt),
],
);
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Agent enrollment (M4-4) — rank-4 command family audit/outbox/fence stores.
// Design: docs/plans/2026-08-29-agent-enrollment-command-design.md §4.
// Pattern reuse from the hierarchy audit/outbox pair, separate store. Audit
// rows reference the agent by snapshot id, deliberately with NO FK, so audit
// history survives agent deletion through the legacy CRUD DELETE path.
// Idempotency for this family lives in agent_idempotency_fence (contract 3
// §4.3 envelope, ratified into contract 5 §4 via contract 3 §7 item 4) — the
// audit and outbox tables carry no idempotency key of their own.
export const AGENT_AUDIT_EVENT_TYPES = [
// Semantic mutation event of agent.enroll.
'agent.enrolled',
// Non-mutation access class: a passing idempotent replay appends this and
// nothing else (accessing principal, current correlation id, fence-row
// reference in the payload).
'agent.enrollment.replayed',
] as const;
export const agentAuditEvents = pgTable(
'agent_audit_events',
{
id: uuid('id').primaryKey().defaultRandom(),
// Global append order; per-agent ordering is a filter on agent_id ordered
// by seq.
seq: bigint('seq', { mode: 'number' }).notNull().generatedAlwaysAsIdentity(),
eventType: text('event_type').notNull(),
// No FK: audit events outlive every principal and every target.
actorId: text('actor_id').notNull(),
agentId: uuid('agent_id').notNull(),
correlationId: text('correlation_id').notNull(),
causationId: uuid('causation_id').references((): AnyPgColumn => agentAuditEvents.id, {
onDelete: 'restrict',
}),
// Immutable snapshot at event time; never carries credential material
// (§3.1 rule 1: actor, agent id, harness, provider, name, credentialMode).
payload: jsonb('payload').notNull(),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
},
(t) => [
uniqueIndex('agent_audit_events_seq_idx').on(t.seq),
index('agent_audit_events_agent_seq_idx').on(t.agentId, t.seq),
index('agent_audit_events_correlation_idx').on(t.correlationId),
check(
'agent_audit_events_type_check',
sql`event_type IN ('agent.enrolled', 'agent.enrollment.replayed')`,
),
],
);
export const agentOutboxStatusEnum = pgEnum('agent_outbox_status', [
'pending',
'processing',
'delivered',
]);
export const agentOutbox = pgTable(
'agent_outbox',
{
id: uuid('id').primaryKey().defaultRandom(),
// FK into the append-only events table: never dangles, RESTRICT is safe.
eventId: uuid('event_id')
.notNull()
.references(() => agentAuditEvents.id, { onDelete: 'restrict' }),
correlationId: text('correlation_id').notNull(),
status: agentOutboxStatusEnum('status').notNull().default('pending'),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
deliveredAt: timestamp('delivered_at', { withTimezone: true }),
},
(t) => [
uniqueIndex('agent_outbox_event_idx').on(t.eventId),
index('agent_outbox_status_created_idx').on(t.status, t.createdAt),
],
);
// Contract 3 §4.3 fence shape. Uniqueness is (operation, key); the recorded
// replay mode is always 'actor-bound' for this family (`shared` is seed-only
// and refused at validation — design §3.1), but the column keeps the ratified
// envelope shape and serves the mode-mismatch collision check. The payload
// digest input EXCLUDES the credential value (design §3.1 rule 5).
export const agentIdempotencyFence = pgTable(
'agent_idempotency_fence',
{
id: uuid('id').primaryKey().defaultRandom(),
operation: text('operation').notNull(),
idempotencyKey: text('idempotency_key').notNull(),
// No FK: fence rows outlive principals, mirroring the audit tables.
actorId: text('actor_id').notNull(),
authorizationScope: text('authorization_scope').notNull(),
payloadDigest: text('payload_digest').notNull(),
replayMode: text('replay_mode').notNull().default('actor-bound'),
// Committed-outcome reference (the enrolled agent's id). Snapshot value,
// no FK: the fence must keep answering replays after a legacy DELETE.
outcomeAgentId: uuid('outcome_agent_id').notNull(),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
},
(t) => [
uniqueIndex('agent_idempotency_fence_operation_key_idx').on(t.operation, t.idempotencyKey),
check(
'agent_idempotency_fence_replay_mode_check',
sql`replay_mode IN ('actor-bound', 'shared')`,
),
],
);
@@ -1,218 +0,0 @@
import { Command } from 'commander';
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { registerAgentCommand, runEnroll, runGetEnrollment } from './agent.js';
import { enrollAgent, fetchEnrollment } from '../tui/gateway-api.js';
/**
* CLI-parity witness for the agent enrollment family (design
* docs/plans/2026-08-29-agent-enrollment-command-design.md §5 item 10;
* contract 5 §4.5): `mosaic agent enroll` / `mosaic agent enrollment <id>`
* invoke the same gateway commands with the same request/result/error
* contracts the web client uses. The gateway side of the same routes is
* witnessed in apps/gateway/src/enrollment/enrollment-commands.integration.test.ts.
*/
const gateway = 'https://gateway.example.test';
const auth = { gateway, cookie: 'session=test' };
const agentBody = {
id: '3fca4f6a-1111-4222-8333-444455556666',
name: 'Nova',
provider: 'anthropic',
model: 'claude-test',
status: 'idle',
harness: 'fake-harness',
persona: null,
ownerId: 'user-1',
enrolledAt: '2026-08-29T00:00:00.000Z',
createdAt: '2026-08-29T00:00:00.000Z',
};
const okResponse = (correlationId: string) =>
new Response(JSON.stringify({ ok: true, correlationId, agent: agentBody }), {
status: 201,
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
});
afterEach(() => {
vi.unstubAllGlobals();
vi.restoreAllMocks();
process.exitCode = undefined;
});
describe('agent enrollment CLI registration', (): void => {
it('registers enroll and enrollment subcommands under `mosaic agent`', () => {
const program = new Command();
const cmd = registerAgentCommand(program);
const names = cmd.commands.map((c) => c.name());
expect(names).toContain('enroll');
expect(names).toContain('enrollment');
});
it('the enroll subcommand exposes no argv flag that carries a credential value', () => {
const program = new Command();
const cmd = registerAgentCommand(program);
const enroll = cmd.commands.find((c) => c.name() === 'enroll');
expect(enroll).toBeDefined();
const flags = (enroll as Command).options.map((o) => o.flags);
// --credential selects the MODE only; the intake value arrives via stdin.
expect(flags).toContain('--credential <mode>');
for (const flag of flags) {
expect(flag).not.toMatch(/value|key <secret>|api-key/i);
}
});
});
describe('agent.enroll CLI parity', (): void => {
it('posts the §3.1 request shape for reference mode and surfaces the typed result', async () => {
const fetchMock = vi.fn(async () => okResponse('corr-ref'));
vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock);
const log = vi.spyOn(console, 'log').mockImplementation(() => {});
await runEnroll(auth, {
gateway,
harness: 'fake-harness',
name: 'Nova',
model: 'claude-test',
provider: 'anthropic',
credential: 'reference',
idempotencyKey: '9c1a26be-0000-4000-8000-000000000001',
correlationId: 'corr-ref',
});
expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
const [url, init] = fetchMock.mock.calls[0] as unknown as [string, RequestInit];
expect(url).toBe(`${gateway}/api/enrollment/agents`);
expect(init.method).toBe('POST');
expect(JSON.parse(init.body as string)).toEqual({
harness: 'fake-harness',
name: 'Nova',
model: 'claude-test',
provider: 'anthropic',
credential: { mode: 'reference' },
idempotencyKey: '9c1a26be-0000-4000-8000-000000000001',
correlationId: 'corr-ref',
});
expect(log.mock.calls.flat().join('\n')).toContain(agentBody.id);
expect(process.exitCode).toBeUndefined();
});
it('intake mode reads the credential from the injected stdin reader, never argv', async () => {
const fetchMock = vi.fn(async () => okResponse('corr-intake'));
vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock);
vi.spyOn(console, 'log').mockImplementation(() => {});
await runEnroll(
auth,
{
gateway,
harness: 'fake-harness',
name: 'Nova',
model: 'claude-test',
provider: 'anthropic',
credential: 'intake',
idempotencyKey: '9c1a26be-0000-4000-8000-000000000002',
},
async () => 'stdin-provided-key',
);
const [, init] = fetchMock.mock.calls[0] as unknown as [string, RequestInit];
const body = JSON.parse(init.body as string) as { credential: Record<string, string> };
expect(body.credential).toEqual({
mode: 'intake',
type: 'api_key',
value: 'stdin-provided-key',
});
});
it('an empty intake credential refuses locally with no gateway call', async () => {
const fetchMock = vi.fn();
vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock);
vi.spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {});
await runEnroll(
auth,
{
gateway,
harness: 'fake-harness',
name: 'Nova',
model: 'claude-test',
provider: 'anthropic',
credential: 'intake',
},
async () => '',
);
expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(process.exitCode).toBe(1);
});
it('preserves the gateway refusal contract (closed error enum + correlation) in the CLI error', async () => {
vi.stubGlobal(
'fetch',
vi.fn(
async () =>
new Response(
JSON.stringify({
statusCode: 409,
error: 'conflict',
message: 'idempotency conflict',
correlationId: 'corr-409',
}),
{ status: 409, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } },
),
),
);
await expect(
enrollAgent(gateway, auth.cookie, {
harness: 'fake-harness',
name: 'Nova',
model: 'claude-test',
provider: 'anthropic',
credential: { mode: 'reference' },
idempotencyKey: '9c1a26be-0000-4000-8000-000000000003',
}),
).rejects.toThrow(
'Failed to enroll agent (409): {"statusCode":409,"error":"conflict",' +
'"message":"idempotency conflict","correlationId":"corr-409"}',
);
});
});
describe('agent.enrollment.get CLI parity', (): void => {
it('reads one enrollment with the correlation envelope on the query string', async () => {
const fetchMock = vi.fn(async () => okResponse('corr-get'));
vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock);
const log = vi.spyOn(console, 'log').mockImplementation(() => {});
await runGetEnrollment(auth, agentBody.id, 'corr-get');
const [url] = fetchMock.mock.calls[0] as unknown as [string];
expect(url).toBe(`${gateway}/api/enrollment/agents/${agentBody.id}?correlationId=corr-get`);
expect(log.mock.calls.flat().join('\n')).toContain('corr-get');
});
it('preserves the folded not_found contract in the CLI error', async () => {
vi.stubGlobal(
'fetch',
vi.fn(
async () =>
new Response(
JSON.stringify({
statusCode: 404,
error: 'not_found',
message: 'agent not found',
correlationId: 'corr-404',
}),
{ status: 404, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } },
),
),
);
await expect(fetchEnrollment(gateway, auth.cookie, agentBody.id)).rejects.toThrow(
'Failed to get enrollment (404): {"statusCode":404,"error":"not_found",' +
'"message":"agent not found","correlationId":"corr-404"}',
);
});
});
+1 -133
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
import type { Command } from 'commander';
import { registerFleetAgentCommands, type FleetCommandDeps } from './fleet.js';
import { withAuth } from './with-auth.js';
@@ -10,10 +9,8 @@ import {
deleteAgentConfig,
fetchProjects,
fetchProviders,
enrollAgent,
fetchEnrollment,
} from '../tui/gateway-api.js';
import type { AgentConfigInfo, EnrolledAgentInfo } from '../tui/gateway-api.js';
import type { AgentConfigInfo } from '../tui/gateway-api.js';
function formatAgent(a: AgentConfigInfo): string {
const sys = a.isSystem ? ' [system]' : '';
@@ -78,140 +75,11 @@ export function registerAgentCommand(program: Command, fleetDeps: FleetCommandDe
},
);
registerEnrollmentCommands(cmd);
registerFleetAgentCommands(cmd, fleetDeps);
return cmd;
}
// ── Agent enrollment (design docs/plans/2026-08-29-agent-enrollment-command-design.md §3;
// CLI parity bound by contract 5 §4.5) ──
export interface EnrollCommandOptions {
gateway: string;
harness: string;
name: string;
model: string;
provider: string;
persona?: string;
credential: string;
idempotencyKey?: string;
correlationId?: string;
replayMode?: string;
}
/**
* Read an intake credential value from stdin. Never accepted via argv — a
* process argument is world-readable in `ps` for the process lifetime.
*/
export async function readCredentialFromStdin(): Promise<string> {
if (process.stdin.isTTY) {
console.error('Enter API key, then press Enter and Ctrl-D:');
}
const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
for await (const chunk of process.stdin) {
chunks.push(Buffer.isBuffer(chunk) ? chunk : Buffer.from(chunk));
}
return Buffer.concat(chunks)
.toString('utf8')
.replace(/\r?\n$/, '');
}
function showEnrollment(correlationId: string, agent: EnrolledAgentInfo): void {
console.log(` ID: ${agent.id}`);
console.log(` Name: ${agent.name}`);
console.log(` Harness: ${agent.harness ?? '—'}`);
console.log(` Provider: ${agent.provider}`);
console.log(` Model: ${agent.model}`);
console.log(` Status: ${agent.status}`);
console.log(` Owner: ${agent.ownerId ?? '—'}`);
console.log(` Enrolled: ${agent.enrolledAt ?? '—'}`);
console.log(` Correlation: ${correlationId}`);
}
export async function runEnroll(
auth: { gateway: string; cookie: string },
opts: EnrollCommandOptions,
readSecret: () => Promise<string> = readCredentialFromStdin,
): Promise<void> {
if (opts.credential !== 'reference' && opts.credential !== 'intake') {
console.error(`Unknown credential mode "${opts.credential}" (use reference or intake).`);
process.exitCode = 1;
return;
}
let credential: { mode: 'reference' } | { mode: 'intake'; type: 'api_key'; value: string };
if (opts.credential === 'intake') {
const value = await readSecret();
if (!value) {
console.error('Intake credential requires a non-empty API key on stdin.');
process.exitCode = 1;
return;
}
credential = { mode: 'intake', type: 'api_key', value };
} else {
credential = { mode: 'reference' };
}
const result = await enrollAgent(auth.gateway, auth.cookie, {
harness: opts.harness,
name: opts.name,
model: opts.model,
provider: opts.provider,
...(opts.persona !== undefined ? { persona: opts.persona } : {}),
credential,
idempotencyKey: opts.idempotencyKey ?? randomUUID(),
...(opts.correlationId !== undefined ? { correlationId: opts.correlationId } : {}),
...(opts.replayMode !== undefined ? { replayMode: opts.replayMode } : {}),
});
console.log(`Agent "${result.agent.name}" enrolled.\n`);
showEnrollment(result.correlationId, result.agent);
}
export async function runGetEnrollment(
auth: { gateway: string; cookie: string },
agentId: string,
correlationId?: string,
): Promise<void> {
const result = await fetchEnrollment(auth.gateway, auth.cookie, agentId, correlationId);
showEnrollment(result.correlationId, result.agent);
}
export function registerEnrollmentCommands(cmd: Command): void {
cmd
.command('enroll')
.description('Enroll an agent through the gateway enrollment command (agent.enroll)')
.requiredOption('--harness <id>', 'Harness the agent runs on (must be registered)')
.requiredOption('--name <name>', 'Agent display name')
.requiredOption('--model <model>', 'Model identifier')
.requiredOption('--provider <provider>', 'Provider the credential belongs to')
.option('--persona <text>', 'Agent persona / system prompt')
.option(
'--credential <mode>',
'Credential mode: "reference" (already stored) or "intake" (API key read from stdin, never argv)',
'reference',
)
.option('--idempotency-key <uuid>', 'Idempotency key (generated when omitted)')
.option('--correlation-id <uuid>', 'Correlation id to carry through the audit trail')
.option('--replay-mode <mode>', 'Idempotency replay mode (actor-bound)')
.action(async (opts: Omit<EnrollCommandOptions, 'gateway'>) => {
const parent = cmd.opts<{ gateway: string }>();
const auth = await withAuth(parent.gateway);
await runEnroll(auth, { ...opts, gateway: parent.gateway });
});
cmd
.command('enrollment <agentId>')
.description('Read one enrolled agent (agent.enrollment.get; owner or admin)')
.option('--correlation-id <uuid>', 'Correlation id to carry through the read')
.action(async (agentId: string, opts: { correlationId?: string }) => {
const parent = cmd.opts<{ gateway: string }>();
const auth = await withAuth(parent.gateway);
await runGetEnrollment(auth, agentId, opts.correlationId);
});
}
async function resolveAgent(
gateway: string,
cookie: string,
@@ -173,8 +173,6 @@ describe('registerFleetCommand', () => {
expect(agent!.options.map((option) => option.long)).toContain('--list');
expect(agent!.commands.map((command) => command.name()).sort()).toEqual([
'comms-block',
'enroll',
'enrollment',
'reset',
'roster',
'send',
-68
View File
@@ -562,74 +562,6 @@ export async function fetchInteractionHealth(gatewayUrl: string): Promise<unknow
return handleResponse<unknown>(res, 'Failed to get interaction readiness');
}
// ── Agent Enrollment types (design docs/plans/2026-08-29-agent-enrollment-command-design.md §3) ──
export interface EnrolledAgentInfo {
id: string;
name: string;
provider: string;
model: string;
status: string;
harness: string | null;
persona: string | null;
ownerId: string | null;
enrolledAt: string | null;
createdAt: string;
}
export interface EnrollAgentRequest {
harness: string;
name: string;
persona?: string;
model: string;
provider: string;
credential: { mode: 'reference' } | { mode: 'intake'; type: 'api_key'; value: string };
idempotencyKey: string;
correlationId?: string;
replayMode?: string;
}
export interface EnrollmentOutcome {
ok: true;
correlationId: string;
agent: EnrolledAgentInfo;
}
// ── Agent Enrollment endpoints ──
/**
* agent.enroll. The gateway's typed refusal body (closed error enum +
* correlationId) is preserved verbatim in the thrown error, so the CLI
* surfaces the same contract the web client receives.
*/
export async function enrollAgent(
gatewayUrl: string,
sessionCookie: string,
data: EnrollAgentRequest,
): Promise<EnrollmentOutcome> {
const res = await fetch(`${gatewayUrl}/api/enrollment/agents`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: jsonHeaders(sessionCookie, gatewayUrl),
body: JSON.stringify(data),
});
return handleResponse<EnrollmentOutcome>(res, 'Failed to enroll agent');
}
/** agent.enrollment.get: owner-or-admin read of one enrolled agent. */
export async function fetchEnrollment(
gatewayUrl: string,
sessionCookie: string,
agentId: string,
correlationId?: string,
): Promise<EnrollmentOutcome> {
const params = correlationId ? `?${new URLSearchParams({ correlationId }).toString()}` : '';
const res = await fetch(
`${gatewayUrl}/api/enrollment/agents/${encodeURIComponent(agentId)}${params}`,
{ headers: headers(sessionCookie, gatewayUrl) },
);
return handleResponse<EnrollmentOutcome>(res, 'Failed to get enrollment');
}
// ── Conversation Message types ──
export interface ConversationMessage {