Compare commits
1 Commits
feat/tess-
...
enhance/tm
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
c9c07cdeba |
@@ -69,9 +69,8 @@ The MVP is complete when ALL declared workstreams are complete AND every cross-c
|
||||
|
||||
| # | ID | Name | Status | Manifest | Notes |
|
||||
| --- | --- | ------------------------------------------- | ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| W1 | FED | Federation v1 | planning-complete | [docs/federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md](./federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md) | 7 milestones, ~175K tokens, issues #460–#466 filed |
|
||||
| W2 | TESS | Tess interaction agent | planning-complete | [docs/tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md](./tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md) | 5 milestones; issue #706; M1 issue #707 ready |
|
||||
| W3+ | TBD | (additional workstreams declared as scoped) | — | — | Scope creep is expected and explicitly accommodated |
|
||||
| W1 | FED | Federation v1 | planning-complete | [docs/federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md](./federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md) | 7 milestones, ~175K tokens, issues #460–#466 filed |
|
||||
| W2+ | TBD | (additional workstreams declared as scoped) | — | — | Scope creep is expected and explicitly accommodated |
|
||||
|
||||
### Likely Additional Workstreams (Not Yet Declared)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
96
docs/PRD.md
96
docs/PRD.md
@@ -79,102 +79,6 @@ Jarvis (v0.2.0) is a self-hosted AI assistant with a Python FastAPI backend and
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Tess Interaction Agent Workstream (TESS)
|
||||
|
||||
### Problem and Objective
|
||||
|
||||
Jason needs one durable, operator-facing Mosaic agent outside Hermes that is reachable through a dedicated Discord channel and CLI, can attach to and operate the Mosaic fleet and transitional Hermes agents, and preserves context across restarts and compaction. Mos remains the coding/general fleet orchestrator; Tess is the complementary human interaction, visibility, control, and migration agent.
|
||||
|
||||
The objective is to ship **Tess** (from *tessera*, a piece of a mosaic) as a Pi-native, GPT-5.6 Sol agent with high reasoning. Tess must use Mosaic-owned contracts and plugins so Hermes can be replaced incrementally rather than becoming a permanent architectural dependency.
|
||||
|
||||
### Scope
|
||||
|
||||
#### In Scope
|
||||
|
||||
1. `TESS-ARP-001`: A runtime-neutral `AgentRuntimeProvider` contract supporting `listSessions`, `streamSession`, `sendMessage`, `terminate`, `getSessionTree`, `attach`, health, capability discovery, and normalized events/errors.
|
||||
2. `TESS-PI-001`: A long-running Pi-native Tess agent profile/service pinned to GPT-5.6 Sol with high reasoning, explicit tool policy, lifecycle hooks, durable checkpoints, and restart recovery.
|
||||
3. `TESS-DSC-001`: Dedicated Discord channel binding to Tess through the Mosaic gateway, with allowlists/RBAC, thread/reply policy, streaming, attachments, approvals, and correlation IDs.
|
||||
4. `TESS-CLI-001`: `mosaic tess` CLI commands for chat, status, session listing, attach/detach, send/steer/stop, provider health, and recovery.
|
||||
5. `TESS-FLT-001`: Fleet plugin capabilities for roster/status/heartbeat inspection, message delivery, session hierarchy, safe attach, and controlled restart/recovery.
|
||||
6. `TESS-MOS-001`: Explicit Mos coordination boundary and tools: hand off orchestration requests, observe mission/task state, receive results, and never silently compete for orchestration authority.
|
||||
7. `TESS-HRM-001`: Transitional Hermes adapter for profiles/agents, sessions, streaming/messages, Kanban, skills, memory, tools, cron, and health, using capability negotiation and fail-closed unsupported operations.
|
||||
8. `TESS-MEM-001`: Unified memory/retrieval plugin with scoped search/recent/capture/stats, startup context injection, provenance, redaction, namespace isolation, and flat-file/project truth precedence.
|
||||
9. `TESS-STA-001`: Durable agent state, inbox, handoff, compaction-recovery, and resume reconstruction.
|
||||
10. `TESS-PLG-001`: Plugin/tool catalog covering runtime bootstrap, repository/PR workflow, fleet diagnostics, incident-safe read operations, Discord interaction, and extensible MCP/skill discovery.
|
||||
11. `TESS-TRN-001`: Replaceable transport providers: tmux/fleet now, Matrix/native Mosaic transport later, with no Discord/CLI business logic coupled to transport details.
|
||||
12. `TESS-SEC-001`: RBAC, per-operation authorization, explicit approval for destructive/privileged/customer-visible actions, audit events, secret/PII redaction, tenant isolation, and bounded command execution.
|
||||
13. `TESS-SEC-002`: Command execution SHALL enforce declared scope/role server-side; admin/system and destructive operations SHALL require policy-bound durable approval.
|
||||
14. `TESS-SEC-003`: Every session list/read/attach/send/terminate operation SHALL enforce server-derived owner and tenant scope; guessed or client-supplied IDs SHALL grant no authority.
|
||||
15. `TESS-SEC-004`: MCP tools SHALL derive actor/tenant from authenticated context and SHALL NOT accept caller-controlled identity fields.
|
||||
16. `TESS-SEC-005`: Discord plugin ingress SHALL authenticate service identity, enforce guild/channel/user allowlists, propagate correlation/message IDs, and reject replay.
|
||||
17. `TESS-SEC-006`: Secret/PII classification and redaction SHALL occur before persistence and before channel egress, including tool metadata and authentication flows.
|
||||
18. `TESS-SEC-007`: Approvals SHALL be one-time, expiring, actor/tenant-bound, and cryptographically bound to the exact structured action digest.
|
||||
19. `TESS-SEC-008`: Ingress, provider sends, tool side effects, and responses SHALL use durable inbox/outbox/checkpoints and idempotency records for restart-safe replay.
|
||||
20. `TESS-SEC-009`: Garbage collection and retention SHALL be session/tenant scoped unless executed as a separately authorized and audited system-wide job.
|
||||
21. `TESS-OBS-001`: Structured logs, traces, health/readiness, provider latency/errors, session lifecycle, tool audit, and actionable recovery diagnostics.
|
||||
22. `TESS-MIG-001`: Capability inventory and staged Hermes-to-Mosaic migration matrix with coexistence, cutover, rollback, and deprecation gates.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Out of Scope
|
||||
|
||||
1. Replacing Mos as coding/general fleet orchestrator.
|
||||
2. Making Hermes the Mosaic core or coupling Mosaic domain logic to Hermes schemas.
|
||||
3. Migrating every historical chat verbatim; only policy-compliant indexed summaries and user-selected sessions are migrated.
|
||||
4. Unrestricted shell execution from Discord.
|
||||
5. Full web UI parity in the first Tess operational milestone; gateway contracts must remain web-consumable.
|
||||
6. Replacing tmux before Matrix/native transport reaches operational parity.
|
||||
|
||||
### Stakeholder and User Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
- Jason must be able to converse with the same Tess session from Discord and CLI.
|
||||
- Jason must be able to see what is running, stale, blocked, or unhealthy without attaching manually to every session.
|
||||
- Jason must be able to attach to Tess and authorized fleet sessions through supported CLI controls.
|
||||
- Tess must collaborate with Mos and the fleet while preserving a single clear orchestration authority.
|
||||
- The system must migrate useful Hermes/OpenClaw capabilities intentionally, with evidence, instead of copying implementations wholesale.
|
||||
|
||||
### Non-Functional Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Security:** default-deny provider/tool capabilities, least privilege, no secrets in logs/prompts/commits, Discord user/channel authorization, and auditable approvals.
|
||||
2. **Reliability:** durable inbox/checkpoints; idempotent message handling; reconnect with bounded backoff; no message loss or duplicate execution across gateway restart.
|
||||
3. **Performance:** first acknowledgement within 2 seconds when connected; streamed agent output begins within 5 seconds excluding model/provider delay; status reads return within 2 seconds under nominal local conditions.
|
||||
4. **Observability:** every ingress message and resulting provider/tool operation carries a correlation ID across Discord, gateway, Tess, provider, and audit events.
|
||||
5. **Maintainability:** channel, runtime, transport, memory, and external-agent integrations remain adapter-based with contract tests.
|
||||
6. **Privacy:** only scoped context enters external runtimes; persisted messages/memories follow retention and redaction policy.
|
||||
7. **Portability:** Tess runs through Pi/Mosaic contracts and does not require Hermes to start or serve native Mosaic operations.
|
||||
|
||||
### Acceptance Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
1. `AC-TESS-01`: A dedicated Discord channel and `mosaic tess chat` connect to one durable Tess session and stream responses bidirectionally.
|
||||
2. `AC-TESS-02`: `mosaic tess status|sessions|tree|attach|send|stop` operate against authorized provider capabilities with stable typed outputs and actionable errors.
|
||||
3. `AC-TESS-03`: Tess runs GPT-5.6 Sol at high reasoning and its effective runtime/model/tool policy is visible through status without exposing credentials.
|
||||
4. `AC-TESS-04`: Tess can inspect and message the Mosaic fleet, hand orchestration work to Mos, and demonstrate that Tess does not independently claim Mos-owned orchestration work.
|
||||
5. `AC-TESS-05`: Hermes adapter demonstrates session listing, streaming/message delivery, hierarchy mapping, and at least one approved capability in each of Kanban, skills, memory, tools, and cron—or reports unsupported capabilities fail-closed.
|
||||
6. `AC-TESS-06`: Restart/compaction test preserves session identity, pending inbox, last durable checkpoint, and a resumable handoff without duplicate side effects.
|
||||
7. `AC-TESS-07`: Unauthorized Discord users/channels, cross-tenant access, unsafe tool calls, forged approvals, and sensitive-output cases are denied and audited.
|
||||
8. `AC-TESS-08`: tmux/fleet and Matrix/native transport implementations pass the same provider contract suite; Matrix may remain non-default until readiness gates pass.
|
||||
9. `AC-TESS-09`: Baseline quality gates, unit/integration/contract tests, Discord+CLI E2E, restart/recovery tests, independent code review, and security review are green.
|
||||
10. `AC-TESS-10`: Migration matrix documents every audited Hermes/OpenClaw capability as native, adapted, deferred, or rejected, with cutover and rollback evidence.
|
||||
11. `AC-TESS-11`: User, admin, developer, API/OpenAPI, operations/recovery, and plugin-authoring documentation is current and linked from the sitemap.
|
||||
|
||||
### Constraints, Dependencies, Risks, and Assumptions
|
||||
|
||||
- Dependency: Mosaic gateway remains the single API surface; Pi is the native runtime; Valkey/PostgreSQL provide canonical durable state where required.
|
||||
- Dependency: Discord bot credentials and dedicated channel ID are deployment secrets provisioned outside source control.
|
||||
- Risk: Tess could drift into a second orchestrator. Mitigation: explicit role policy, Mos handoff contract, authority checks, and E2E boundary tests.
|
||||
- Risk: broad Hermes compatibility can freeze legacy semantics into Mosaic. Mitigation: Mosaic-owned normalized contracts and capability negotiation.
|
||||
- Risk: Discord creates a privileged remote-control surface. Mitigation: pairing/allowlists, RBAC, approvals, rate limits, audit, and safe tool classes.
|
||||
- Risk: transcript ingestion can violate privacy or overload memory. Mitigation: scoped opt-in import, redacted summaries, provenance, retention, and deduplication.
|
||||
- Risk: current root filesystem has limited headroom. Mitigation: isolated worktrees, no duplicated dependency installation unless required, and cleanup only after active-lane verification.
|
||||
- `ASSUMPTION:` The public name is **Tess**, because the user requested a name and the tessera/Mosaic relationship is distinctive; config must permit later display-name changes without renaming APIs or storage keys.
|
||||
- `ASSUMPTION:` The dedicated Discord channel ID and final guild policy will be supplied/provisioned during deployment, so implementation uses explicit configuration and fail-fast startup validation.
|
||||
- `ASSUMPTION:` tmux/fleet is the production transport for the first operational milestone; Matrix/native transport is implemented behind the same contract and promoted only after parity/reliability verification.
|
||||
- `ASSUMPTION:` Project/task truth remains in canonical Mosaic/project stores; semantic memory systems are retrieval/mirror layers, not hidden authorities.
|
||||
|
||||
### Testing and Delivery Intent
|
||||
|
||||
Delivery uses five gated milestones: runtime contracts/security; Pi service/state; Discord/CLI; fleet/Hermes/plugin suite; migration/Matrix/recovery/qualification. Every source-code task requires tests, independent review, a PR to `main`, terminal-green CI, and issue/task closure. Production activation additionally requires a clean-host Pi launch, dedicated Discord channel smoke test, CLI attach test, restart/recovery drill, and rollback procedure.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Architecture
|
||||
|
||||
### High-Level System Diagram
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,8 +16,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
| id | status | workstream | progress | tasks file | notes |
|
||||
| --- | ----------------- | ------------------- | ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| W1 | planning-complete | Federation v1 (FED) | 0 / 7 milestones | [docs/federation/TASKS.md](./federation/TASKS.md) | M1 task breakdown populated; M2–M7 deferred to mission planning |
|
||||
| W2 | planning-complete | Tess interaction agent | 0 / 5 milestones | [docs/tess/TASKS.md](./tess/TASKS.md) | Issue #706; independent planning gate PASS; M1 issue #707 ready |
|
||||
| W1 | planning-complete | Federation v1 (FED) | 0 / 7 milestones | [docs/federation/TASKS.md](./federation/TASKS.md) | M1 task breakdown populated; M2–M7 deferred to mission planning |
|
||||
|
||||
## Cross-Cutting Tracking
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Scratchpad — Tess Interaction Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## 2026-07-12 — Mission intake
|
||||
|
||||
**Objective:** Build a Pi-native GPT-5.6 Sol high-reasoning Mosaic interaction agent, named Tess, as Jason's primary Discord/CLI access point for Mosaic fleet and transitional Hermes capabilities. Tess complements Mos and must not become a competing orchestrator.
|
||||
|
||||
**Issue:** #706
|
||||
|
||||
**Budget:** No explicit cap provided. Original working estimate was 290K implementation/review tokens. That estimate is superseded after six security prerequisite tasks were added; revised arithmetic total is pending because the calculation tool was blocked by runtime consent. Run at most two workers; prefer one implementation lane plus one independent review/discovery lane. Re-estimate after planning approval and each milestone.
|
||||
|
||||
**Evidence gathered:**
|
||||
- Mosaic already provides Pi lifecycle hooks, fleet/tmux sessions, Matrix connector/controller pieces, typed chat events, Discord/Telegram channel plugins, and command/plugin registries.
|
||||
- Current `IProviderAdapter` is an LLM model/completion abstraction, not an external agent/session provider.
|
||||
- Required new seam is `AgentRuntimeProvider`: sessions, stream, message, terminate, hierarchy, attach, health, capabilities.
|
||||
- Recurring cross-runtime needs: unified memory/retrieval, Discord routing/approvals, agent state/inbox/compaction recovery, runtime bootstrap, fleet/incident controls, and GitOps workflow.
|
||||
- Project truth must remain in canonical project/Mosaic stores; semantic memory is retrieval/mirror.
|
||||
|
||||
**Decisions:**
|
||||
1. Name: Tess (tessera). Stable machine key `tess`; display name configurable.
|
||||
2. Mos owns orchestration; Tess delegates Mos-owned work through an explicit coordination contract.
|
||||
3. Gateway owns ingress/auth/routing; Discord and CLI remain thin clients.
|
||||
4. tmux/fleet ships first behind an adapter; Matrix/native Mosaic is the forward transport.
|
||||
5. Hermes integration is transitional and capability-negotiated; unsupported operations fail closed.
|
||||
6. No unrestricted Discord shell. Privileged/destructive/customer-visible actions require authorization and approval.
|
||||
|
||||
**Plan:**
|
||||
1. Land requirements/architecture/task graph.
|
||||
2. Deliver runtime contracts and security model.
|
||||
3. Deliver durable Pi service/state.
|
||||
4. Deliver Discord and CLI.
|
||||
5. Deliver fleet/Mos/Hermes/memory/tool plugins.
|
||||
6. Deliver Matrix/native transport, migration matrix, recovery, docs, and qualification.
|
||||
|
||||
**Progress:** Issue #706 created. PRD/manifest/tasks initialized on clean branch `feat/tess-interaction-agent` from `origin/main`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Risks:** 14 GB root filesystem headroom; active fleet lanes; broad migration scope; Discord privilege boundary; possible duplicate orchestration authority.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2026-07-12 — Independent planning and threat review
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict received:** BLOCK TESS-PLAN-001. Coding remains stopped.
|
||||
|
||||
**Blocking findings:** formal threat model absent; verification matrix absent; migration inventory implied but absent; non-existent task paths; AC-TESS-03 lacked a crisp test. Security review also identified command scope bypass, cross-tenant session attachment, MCP actor impersonation, unsafe Discord service ingress, pre-persistence/egress secret leakage, non-durable replay, and globally scoped GC.
|
||||
|
||||
**Remediation applied:**
|
||||
- Added `docs/tess/ARCHITECTURE.md`.
|
||||
- Added `docs/tess/THREAT-MODEL.md` with TM-01..12.
|
||||
- Added `docs/tess/VERIFICATION-MATRIX.md` mapping AC-TESS-01..11.
|
||||
- Added `docs/tess/MIGRATION-INVENTORY.md`.
|
||||
- Added hard requirements TESS-SEC-002..009.
|
||||
- Added six prerequisite security tasks before provider/ingress implementation.
|
||||
- Corrected task paths to existing package surfaces.
|
||||
- Added explicit GPT-5.6 Sol/high/tool-policy status verification for AC-TESS-03.
|
||||
|
||||
**Re-review 1:** BLOCK only on composite `repo` values that looked like nonexistent paths. Remediated by declaring comma-separated roots and validating every root.
|
||||
|
||||
**Final focused review:** PASS. Deterministic audit validated all task repository roots with zero missing paths; no planning placeholders remained; security prerequisites still gate Tess exposure; observability traceability is explicit.
|
||||
|
||||
**Current gate:** planning PR must merge to `main` with terminal-green CI before any source-code worker starts.
|
||||
|
||||
## Ops config (Mos, 2026-07-12)
|
||||
|
||||
- **Tess dedicated Discord channel ID:** `1525947814033494126` (Jason configuring bot in Discord portal). Target for TESS-M3-001 (#709) binding. Treat as config, not a hardcoded secret. Live go-live = owner gate T1 @ M5.
|
||||
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Tess Architecture
|
||||
|
||||
## Purpose
|
||||
|
||||
Tess is the Mosaic operator interaction plane. Mos remains the coding/general fleet orchestration authority. Tess receives authorized operator intent, presents fleet/session state, delegates Mos-owned work to Mos, and exposes native Mosaic plus transitional external-agent capabilities through normalized providers.
|
||||
|
||||
## Component Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
Discord plugin ─┐
|
||||
├─ authenticated ingress envelope ─> Mosaic Gateway
|
||||
mosaic tess CLI ┘ │
|
||||
├─ policy/approval/audit
|
||||
├─ Tess durable session service (Pi GPT-5.6 Sol high)
|
||||
├─ AgentRuntimeProvider registry
|
||||
│ ├─ native Pi provider
|
||||
│ ├─ fleet/tmux provider
|
||||
│ ├─ Hermes adapter
|
||||
│ └─ Matrix/native transport provider
|
||||
├─ memory/state/inbox plugins
|
||||
└─ Mos coordination adapter ─> Mos / fleet queue
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Core Contract
|
||||
|
||||
`AgentRuntimeProvider` is separate from the existing model-completion `IProviderAdapter`. It normalizes external and native agent runtimes without leaking provider-specific schemas.
|
||||
|
||||
Required operations:
|
||||
|
||||
- `capabilities()` and `health()`
|
||||
- `listSessions(scope)`
|
||||
- `getSessionTree(scope)`
|
||||
- `streamSession(sessionRef, cursor, scope)`
|
||||
- `sendMessage(sessionRef, message, idempotencyKey, scope)`
|
||||
- `attach(sessionRef, mode, scope)` / `detach()`
|
||||
- `terminate(sessionRef, approvalRef, scope)`
|
||||
|
||||
Every call receives an immutable, server-derived actor/tenant/channel scope and correlation ID. Caller-supplied actor IDs are forbidden. Unsupported capabilities fail closed with typed errors.
|
||||
|
||||
## Authority Model
|
||||
|
||||
| Intent | Owner | Tess behavior |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| Conversation, status, retrieval, safe diagnostics | Tess | Execute within policy |
|
||||
| Code/project decomposition, worker assignment, reviews, merge orchestration | Mos | Create a correlated handoff and observe result |
|
||||
| Destructive, privileged, external/customer-visible action | Human approval + policy | Propose, wait for durable one-time approval, then execute idempotently |
|
||||
| Provider-specific unsupported action | None | Fail closed; never emulate silently |
|
||||
|
||||
## Session and State Model
|
||||
|
||||
A Tess session has stable `sessionId`, `tenantId`, `ownerId`, provider/runtime identity, ingress bindings, cursor, checkpoint, inbox/outbox, and idempotency records. Discord and CLI bind to the same authorized session. Ownership is verified server-side on every list/read/attach/send/terminate operation.
|
||||
|
||||
Valkey may hold ephemeral coordination state; PostgreSQL is canonical for durable session bindings, approvals, audit, checkpoints, inbox/outbox, and idempotency. Pi session files are replay sources, not cross-agent truth.
|
||||
|
||||
## Transport Strategy
|
||||
|
||||
- **Initial:** fleet/tmux provider, including exact target, socket, identity, heartbeat, and safe attach semantics.
|
||||
- **Forward:** Matrix/native Mosaic provider using authenticated identity, idempotent transaction IDs, replay cursors, and the same contract suite.
|
||||
- Discord/CLI never call tmux or Matrix directly.
|
||||
|
||||
## Plugin Families
|
||||
|
||||
1. Channel: Discord now; other channels later.
|
||||
2. Runtime: Pi, fleet/tmux, Hermes, Matrix/native.
|
||||
3. Operator tools: fleet health, Mos handoff, GitOps wrappers, incident-safe diagnostics.
|
||||
4. Memory/state: search/recent/capture, durable inbox, checkpoint, handoff, compaction recovery.
|
||||
5. Migration: capability inventory, adapters, cutover, rollback, telemetry.
|
||||
|
||||
## Deployment
|
||||
|
||||
Tess runs as a rostered, systemd-supervised Pi agent using GPT-5.6 Sol and high reasoning. Secrets are supplied through approved runtime secret mechanisms. Startup fails when required model, gateway identity, Discord binding, or durable-state dependencies are missing. Health reports effective model/reasoning/tool policy without credential material.
|
||||
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Tess Capability Migration Inventory
|
||||
|
||||
Status values: `native` · `adapt` · `defer` · `reject`. This is the initial inventory; M5 requires implementation and evidence fields to be completed before cutover.
|
||||
|
||||
| Capability | Current source | Target | Initial status | Cutover/rollback intent |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| Interactive agent chat/session streaming | Hermes/Pi/OpenClaw | Mosaic Tess session service | native | Dual-run per channel; revert binding to legacy gateway |
|
||||
| Discord dedicated-channel routing | Hermes/Claude/OpenClaw plugins | Mosaic Discord plugin + gateway | native | Per-channel binding switch; legacy bot disabled only after soak |
|
||||
| CLI/TUI session interaction and attach | Hermes/Pi/tmux | `mosaic tess` + AgentRuntimeProvider | native | Keep direct tmux attach as break-glass rollback |
|
||||
| Session list/tree/send/terminate | Hermes/fleet | AgentRuntimeProvider | native | Capability-negotiated adapter remains during migration |
|
||||
| Mos/fleet orchestration handoff | tmux messaging/Mosaic fleet | Mosaic coord/fleet provider | native | tmux handoff remains initial transport |
|
||||
| Kanban/projects/tasks | Hermes Kanban | Mosaic queue/coord/project providers | adapt | Read projection first; mutating cutover after parity/audit |
|
||||
| Skills catalog/load/manage | Hermes skills/Pi skills | Mosaic skill registry/provider | adapt | Import metadata/provenance; preserve source skill until validated |
|
||||
| Tools and MCP | Hermes/OpenClaw/MCP | Mosaic tool registry/MCP | adapt | Default deny; migrate allowlisted tools one capability at a time |
|
||||
| Cron/scheduled work | Hermes cron | Mosaic scheduler/queue | adapt | Shadow schedules; prevent duplicate execution; rollback owner field |
|
||||
| Memory search/recent/capture | jarvis-brain/OpenViking/OpenBrain/Hermes | Mosaic memory provider | adapt | Flat/project stores remain truth; semantic systems are mirrors |
|
||||
| User/profile preferences | Hermes memory/user profile | Mosaic user/memory domain | adapt | Provenance + explicit conflict rules; exportable rollback snapshot |
|
||||
| Agent state/inbox/handoff | OpenClaw extensions/session files | Mosaic durable state service | native | Read legacy handoff during coexistence; write Mosaic only after cutover |
|
||||
| Runtime contract/bootstrap | Mosaic framework/Hermes/OpenClaw | Mosaic compose/runtime provider | native | Legacy launchers remain until clean-host parity passes |
|
||||
| Repository/PR workflow | Mosaic wrappers/Hermes tools | Mosaic operator plugin | native | Wrapper-only; no raw-provider fallback |
|
||||
| Incident-safe diagnostics | Hermes skills/tools | Mosaic scoped operator plugin | adapt | Read-only first; privileged recovery requires approval |
|
||||
| Broad unrestricted shell from Discord | Hermes/OpenClaw configurations | None | reject | No cutover; replace with allowlisted typed operations |
|
||||
| Raw full transcript bulk migration | Hermes/Claude/OpenClaw histories | Indexed summaries/selective import | reject | Keep source archives subject to retention; no automatic copy |
|
||||
| Voice/video interaction | Hermes optional tools | Future Mosaic channel plugins | defer | Not required for Tess operational release |
|
||||
| Matrix transport | Mosaic connector | AgentRuntimeProvider Matrix implementation | native | Non-default until contract/reliability parity; tmux rollback |
|
||||
|
||||
## Cutover Gates
|
||||
|
||||
1. Capability contract and security tests pass.
|
||||
2. Data mapping/provenance and retention are documented.
|
||||
3. Shadow or dual-run shows no unauthorized access, loss, or duplicate effects.
|
||||
4. Operator runbook and rollback are exercised.
|
||||
5. Channel/provider binding changes are reversible without schema rollback.
|
||||
6. Legacy capability is disabled only after a defined soak period and evidence review.
|
||||
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Mission Manifest — Tess Interaction Agent
|
||||
|
||||
## Mission
|
||||
|
||||
- **ID:** tess-20260712
|
||||
- **Issue:** #706
|
||||
- **Branch:** `feat/tess-interaction-agent`
|
||||
- **Phase:** Execution
|
||||
- **Current Milestone:** TESS-M1 — Runtime contracts and security foundation
|
||||
- **Progress:** 0 / 5 delivery milestones complete
|
||||
- **Status:** active
|
||||
- **Owner:** Mosaic orchestrator; Mos is coordinating fleet authority
|
||||
- **Source PRD:** `docs/PRD.md` — `TESS-*` requirements
|
||||
- **Scratchpad:** `docs/scratchpads/tess-20260712.md`
|
||||
|
||||
## Mission Statement
|
||||
|
||||
Ship Tess as Jason's durable Pi-native GPT-5.6 Sol high-reasoning interaction agent for Discord and CLI, with safe visibility/control of Mosaic fleet and transitional Hermes capabilities, while Mos remains the coding/general orchestration authority.
|
||||
|
||||
## Invariants
|
||||
|
||||
1. Mosaic is the enterprise AI hub; Hermes is a reference migration adapter.
|
||||
2. Gateway is the single API surface.
|
||||
3. Mos owns coding/general fleet orchestration; Tess owns human interaction, visibility, mediation, and migration access.
|
||||
4. Runtime, transport, channel, memory, and external-agent integrations are replaceable adapters.
|
||||
5. No source task completes before merged PR, terminal-green CI, independent review, and linked task/issue closure.
|
||||
6. **The HMI agent's name/identity is configuration, never a hardcoded literal.** The agent name (display + roster key) is supplied at provisioning — user-chosen or system-generated during config — and carried as data in the roster/profile. "Tess" is only the default/example instance name and this mission's build codename; no source, schema key, service identifier, or config default may hardcode it. (M2 exit gate must prove a distinct name provisions cleanly with zero code change.)
|
||||
|
||||
## Milestones
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Issue | Name | Status | Exit gate |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| TESS-M1 | #707 | Runtime contracts and security foundation | ready | AgentRuntimeProvider, normalized events/capabilities/errors, RBAC/audit contracts and contract tests merged |
|
||||
| TESS-M2 | #708 | Durable Pi Tess service and state | not-started | GPT-5.6 Sol high service starts, resumes, checkpoints, and passes restart/compaction tests |
|
||||
| TESS-M3 | #709 | Discord and CLI interaction surfaces | not-started | One durable session works through dedicated Discord binding and `mosaic tess`, including attach and approvals |
|
||||
| TESS-M4 | #710 | Fleet, Mos, Hermes, memory, state, and tool plugins | not-started | Fleet/Mos boundary and transitional capability matrix demonstrated end-to-end |
|
||||
| TESS-M5 | #711 | Matrix/native migration, recovery, documentation, and qualification | not-started | Transport parity, migration/rollback matrix, security review, docs, greenfield and deployment validation complete |
|
||||
|
||||
## Success Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
All `AC-TESS-*` criteria in `docs/PRD.md` are mapped to reproducible evidence. The final operational test must prove Discord + CLI session continuity, fleet/Mos coordination, authorized Hermes transition capabilities, denial/audit paths, restart recovery, and rollback.
|
||||
|
||||
## Session History
|
||||
|
||||
| Session | Date | Runtime | Outcome |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| S1 | 2026-07-12 | Hermes / GPT-5.6 Sol | User commission captured; Mosaic/OpenViking/session/code archaeology completed; issue #706 created; PRD and task control plane initialized. |
|
||||
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Tasks — Tess Interaction Agent
|
||||
|
||||
> Mission: `tess-20260712` · Issue: #706 · PRD requirements: `TESS-*`
|
||||
> Orchestrator is sole writer. Workers must not modify this file.
|
||||
> `repo` contains one or more comma-separated repository-relative roots; every listed root must exist before dispatch.
|
||||
|
||||
| id | status | description | issue | agent | repo | branch | depends_on | estimate | notes |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| TESS-PLAN-001 | done | Finalize PRD, architecture, authority boundary, threat model, migration inventory, and verification matrix | #706 | sonnet | docs, packages/types, apps/gateway | feat/tess-interaction-agent | — | 22K | Independent gate PASS after two remediation rounds; completion effective when planning PR merges |
|
||||
| TESS-M1-SEC-001 | not-started | Enforce command scopes/roles and durable exact-action approval for privileged/destructive commands | #707 | codex | apps/gateway | fix/tess-command-authz | TESS-PLAN-001 | 25K | TESS-SEC-002; security TDD |
|
||||
| TESS-M1-SEC-002 | not-started | Enforce owner/tenant binding on session list/read/attach/send/terminate across REST and WS | #707 | codex | apps/gateway | fix/tess-session-ownership | TESS-PLAN-001 | 30K | TESS-SEC-003; security TDD |
|
||||
| TESS-M1-SEC-003 | not-started | Bind MCP actor/tenant to authenticated context and add per-tool scopes | #707 | codex | apps/gateway | fix/tess-mcp-identity | TESS-PLAN-001 | 22K | TESS-SEC-004; security TDD |
|
||||
| TESS-M1-SEC-004 | not-started | Add authenticated Discord service ingress, allowlists, correlation and replay protection | #707 | codex | plugins/discord, apps/gateway | fix/tess-discord-ingress | TESS-PLAN-001 | 28K | TESS-SEC-005; security TDD |
|
||||
| TESS-M1-SEC-005 | not-started | Redact/classify secret and PII before persistence/egress; harden provider login flow | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/log | fix/tess-redaction | TESS-PLAN-001 | 28K | TESS-SEC-006; seeded canary tests |
|
||||
| TESS-M1-SEC-006 | not-started | Scope session GC/retention or separate authorized global retention job | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/log | fix/tess-session-gc-scope | TESS-PLAN-001 | 18K | TESS-SEC-009; isolation TDD |
|
||||
| TESS-M1-001 | not-started | Define AgentRuntimeProvider, capabilities, session tree, normalized stream events/errors, attach semantics | #707 | codex | packages/types, packages/agent | feat/tess-runtime-contract | TESS-PLAN-001 | 25K | TESS-ARP-001, TESS-TRN-001; contract TDD |
|
||||
| TESS-M1-002 | not-started | Implement provider registry/service with immutable actor scope, approval, audit and correlation boundaries | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/agent | feat/tess-provider-registry | TESS-M1-001,TESS-M1-SEC-001,TESS-M1-SEC-002,TESS-M1-SEC-003 | 30K | TESS-SEC-001..004,007; security TDD |
|
||||
| TESS-M1-003 | not-started | Implement tmux/fleet runtime provider and safe attach/message/terminate capability policy | #707 | codex | packages/mosaic, packages/agent | feat/tess-fleet-provider | TESS-M1-002 | 30K | TESS-FLT-001; exact target/identity tests |
|
||||
| TESS-M1-OBS-001 | not-started | Implement correlation propagation, structured runtime/provider/tool audit, health/readiness and safe effective-policy status | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/agent, packages/log | feat/tess-observability | TESS-M1-002 | 24K | TESS-OBS-001; no credential material |
|
||||
| TESS-M1-V | not-started | Independent architecture/security review and complete contract/abuse-suite verification | #707 | sonnet | apps/gateway, packages/agent, packages/log, plugins/discord | review/tess-m1 | TESS-M1-SEC-001,TESS-M1-SEC-002,TESS-M1-SEC-003,TESS-M1-SEC-004,TESS-M1-SEC-005,TESS-M1-SEC-006,TESS-M1-003,TESS-M1-OBS-001 | 20K | Gate M2 |
|
||||
| TESS-M2-001 | not-started | Add Tess roster/profile/service pinned to GPT-5.6 Sol high with fail-fast config and observable effective policy | #708 | codex | packages/mosaic/framework | feat/tess-pi-service | TESS-M1-V | 22K | TESS-PI-001; explicit AC-TESS-03 test |
|
||||
| TESS-M2-002 | not-started | Implement durable session identity, inbox/outbox, approval, checkpoint, handoff, compaction and restart recovery | #708 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/agent, packages/db | feat/tess-durable-state | TESS-M2-001 | 38K | TESS-STA-001, TESS-SEC-007..008; recovery TDD |
|
||||
| TESS-M2-V | not-started | Clean-host Pi launch plus model/policy status and restart/compaction/duplicate-side-effect verification | #708 | sonnet | apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration, packages/mosaic/src | review/tess-m2 | TESS-M2-002 | 18K | Gate M3; AC-TESS-03/06 |
|
||||
| TESS-M3-001 | not-started | Bind dedicated Tess Discord channel with streaming, threads, attachments, pairing/RBAC and approvals | #709 | codex | plugins/discord, apps/gateway | feat/tess-discord | TESS-M2-V,TESS-M1-SEC-004 | 35K | TESS-DSC-001 |
|
||||
| TESS-M3-002 | not-started | Implement `mosaic tess` chat/status/sessions/tree/attach/send/stop/health/recover CLI | #709 | codex | packages/mosaic | feat/tess-cli | TESS-M2-V | 30K | TESS-CLI-001 |
|
||||
| TESS-M3-V | not-started | Discord+CLI same-session E2E, denial/approval tests, and operator-flow review | #709 | sonnet | apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration, plugins/discord, packages/mosaic/src | review/tess-m3 | TESS-M3-001,TESS-M3-002 | 20K | Gate M4 |
|
||||
| TESS-M4-001 | not-started | Implement Mos coordination handoff/observe/result contract with authority-boundary tests | #710 | codex | packages/coord, apps/gateway | feat/tess-mos-coordination | TESS-M3-V | 25K | TESS-MOS-001 |
|
||||
| TESS-M4-002 | not-started | Implement transitional Hermes runtime/capability adapter | #710 | codex | packages/agent, apps/gateway | feat/tess-hermes-adapter | TESS-M3-V | 40K | TESS-HRM-001; no legacy schema in core contracts |
|
||||
| TESS-M4-003 | not-started | Implement memory/retrieval, state/inbox, runtime bootstrap, fleet diagnostics and GitOps plugin foundations | #710 | codex | packages/memory, packages/agent, packages/mosaic | feat/tess-operator-plugins | TESS-M3-V | 40K | TESS-MEM-001, TESS-PLG-001 |
|
||||
| TESS-M4-V | not-started | Cross-provider capability, privacy, authority and failure-path qualification | #710 | sonnet | apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration, packages/agent | review/tess-m4 | TESS-M4-001,TESS-M4-002,TESS-M4-003 | 22K | Gate M5 |
|
||||
| TESS-M5-001 | not-started | Implement Matrix/native runtime provider behind common contracts and parity suite | #711 | codex | packages/mosaic, packages/agent | feat/tess-matrix-provider | TESS-M4-V | 30K | TESS-TRN-001 |
|
||||
| TESS-M5-002 | not-started | Complete migration inventory, cutover, rollback, retention and deprecation evidence | #711 | sonnet | docs/tess | feat/tess-migration-docs | TESS-M4-V | 18K | TESS-MIG-001 |
|
||||
| TESS-M5-003 | not-started | Complete OpenAPI, user/admin/developer/plugin/operations docs and checklist | #711 | codex | docs | feat/tess-docs | TESS-M5-001,TESS-M5-002 | 22K | Documentation hard gate |
|
||||
| TESS-M5-V | not-started | Full baseline, contract, integration, Discord/CLI E2E, security review, recovery drill and rollback qualification | #711 | sonnet | apps/gateway, packages/agent, plugins/discord, packages/mosaic | review/tess-final | TESS-M5-003 | 35K | Maps AC-TESS-01..11 to evidence |
|
||||
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Tess Threat Model
|
||||
|
||||
## Assets and Trust Boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
Assets: operator identity, tenant/project data, agent sessions, fleet control, approvals, credentials, memories, tool outputs, audit evidence, and provider transports.
|
||||
|
||||
Trust boundaries: Discord→plugin, CLI→gateway, plugin→gateway service identity, gateway→Pi/provider, Tess→Mos/fleet, Tess→Hermes, MCP→gateway, persistence, and tmux/Matrix transports.
|
||||
|
||||
## Threat Matrix
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Severity | Threat | Required control | Required verification |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| TM-01 | critical | Client invokes admin/system command without role | Server-side scope/role enforcement in executor; durable approval for privileged/destructive commands | Authenticated non-admin and forged-scope tests deny and audit |
|
||||
| TM-02 | critical | Cross-user/tenant list, attach, send, or terminate by guessed session ID | Owner/tenant binding on every session operation; admin override is explicit and audited | Cross-tenant matrix for REST, WS, CLI, Discord and provider methods |
|
||||
| TM-03 | high | MCP caller supplies another `userId` | Remove actor IDs from schemas; derive actor/tenant from authenticated context; per-tool scopes | Forged actor/tool calls deny; no victim data returned |
|
||||
| TM-04 | high | Discord ingress impersonates user/channel or bypasses gateway auth | Service-to-service identity, guild/channel/user allowlists, signed/correlated envelope, replay protection | Invalid service identity, unlisted IDs, replayed message IDs all deny |
|
||||
| TM-05 | high | Secrets/PII leak in chat, auth links, tool args, logs, memory, or DB | Redact before persistence/egress; DM/out-of-band auth flow; short-lived hashed token state; output classification | Seeded secret/PII canary absent from durable stores/logs/public channel |
|
||||
| TM-06 | high | Prompt/tool injection escalates from content to privileged action | Treat messages/files/tool output as untrusted data; structured proposals only; allowlisted tools; approval binds exact action digest | Injection corpus cannot invoke unapproved tools or alter authority |
|
||||
| TM-07 | high | Approval forged, replayed, or applied to modified action | One-time approval with actor, tenant, action digest, expiry, correlation and consumption record | Forged/replayed/expired/mutated approvals deny and audit |
|
||||
| TM-08 | medium | Restart causes message loss or duplicate side effects | Durable inbox/outbox/checkpoint; idempotency keys; transactional state transitions; bounded replay | Kill/restart at each state transition; exactly-once effect or safe dedupe |
|
||||
| TM-09 | medium | Session GC/retention crosses tenant/session scope | Session/user-scoped GC or separately authorized global retention job | GC one session; unrelated logs/memory remain unchanged |
|
||||
| TM-10 | high | tmux/Matrix transport target or identity spoofing | Exact target/socket binding, peer identity verification, Matrix whoami, authenticated transport metadata | Wrong socket/peer/room/identity refuses delivery/attach |
|
||||
| TM-11 | medium | Hermes adapter exposes unsupported or broader legacy powers | Capability negotiation, default deny, normalized scopes, adapter sandbox/timeouts | Unsupported and over-scoped operations fail closed |
|
||||
| TM-12 | medium | Tess competes with Mos or bypasses orchestration gates | Authority policy and correlated Mos handoff; no Tess worker-claim capability by default | Coding/decomposition intent produces handoff, not direct claim |
|
||||
|
||||
## Security Invariants
|
||||
|
||||
1. Authentication is not authorization; every command/tool/provider operation is authorized server-side.
|
||||
2. Actor, tenant, roles, and channel bindings come only from authenticated gateway context.
|
||||
3. No client-provided session ID grants ownership or attachment.
|
||||
4. No privileged action executes without a matching, unexpired, one-time approval when policy requires it.
|
||||
5. Redaction occurs before persistence and before channel egress.
|
||||
6. Every externally caused operation is replay-safe and correlated.
|
||||
7. Provider capability absence is a denial, not an invitation to shell around it.
|
||||
|
||||
## Existing Findings That Block Tess
|
||||
|
||||
- Command executor lacks server-side enforcement for declared scopes.
|
||||
- Session list/reuse/destroy surfaces are not owner-filtered consistently.
|
||||
- MCP schemas accept caller-supplied user identity.
|
||||
- Discord plugin lacks a complete authenticated service ingress and user/channel allowlists.
|
||||
- Chat/tool persistence lacks mandatory redaction.
|
||||
- Sessions/pending Discord output are in-memory and not restart-safe.
|
||||
- Session GC currently performs globally scoped promotion.
|
||||
|
||||
These are tracked as M1 security prerequisites and must pass independent security review before Tess ingress is enabled.
|
||||
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Tess Verification Matrix
|
||||
|
||||
| Acceptance criterion | Requirements | Planned evidence | Gate |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-01 | TESS-PI-001, TESS-DSC-001, TESS-CLI-001 | Discord/CLI same-session integration and streaming E2E | M3-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-02 | TESS-ARP-001, TESS-CLI-001, TESS-FLT-001 | CLI contract tests for status/sessions/tree/attach/send/stop, typed denial/error snapshots | M3-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-03 | TESS-PI-001, TESS-OBS-001 | Clean service launch; status asserts GPT-5.6 Sol, high reasoning and effective tool policy with secret canaries absent | M2-V, M3-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-04 | TESS-MOS-001, TESS-FLT-001 | Authority E2E: coding request creates Mos handoff; safe status runs in Tess; no competing worker claim | M4-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-05 | TESS-HRM-001 | Hermes capability contract suite: sessions/stream/send/tree plus Kanban/skills/memory/tools/cron supported-or-denied matrix | M4-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-06 | TESS-STA-001, TESS-SEC-008 | Kill/restart/compaction fault injection across inbox/outbox/checkpoint transitions; duplicate side-effect detector | M2-V, M5-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-07 | TESS-SEC-001..009 | Threat-model abuse suite: authz, tenant isolation, forged identity/approval, injection, redaction, transport identity, GC scope | M1-V, M3-V, M5-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-08 | TESS-TRN-001 | Common provider contract suite against tmux/fleet and Matrix/native; identity and replay tests | M5-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-09 | all | `pnpm typecheck`, lint, format, unit/integration/contract/E2E; independent code and security reviews; CI URLs | Every milestone |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-10 | TESS-MIG-001 | Completed capability inventory with native/adapted/deferred/rejected state, owner, cutover/rollback evidence | M5-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-11 | TESS-PLG-001, TESS-OBS-001 | OpenAPI and user/admin/developer/plugin/ops docs, sitemap links, documentation checklist | M5-V |
|
||||
|
||||
## Security Abuse Suite Minimum
|
||||
|
||||
- Role/scope matrix for every command and provider capability.
|
||||
- Cross-tenant and cross-user session ID matrix across REST, WS, Discord, CLI, MCP, and providers.
|
||||
- Discord service identity, guild/channel/user allowlist, replay, attachment, and mention/DM policy cases.
|
||||
- Prompt/tool injection corpus and structured-proposal enforcement.
|
||||
- Approval action-digest mutation, replay, expiry, tenant, and actor mismatch cases.
|
||||
- Secret/PII canaries through message, attachment, tool args/output, logs, memory, audit, and error paths.
|
||||
- Restart fault injection before/after enqueue, provider send, side effect, response persistence, and acknowledgement.
|
||||
- Wrong tmux socket/target and Matrix identity/room/replay cases.
|
||||
|
||||
## Evidence Rules
|
||||
|
||||
Evidence must include command/test name, terminal result, CI run URL, PR/merge reference, environment, and artifact/log location. A worker self-report is not evidence until independently verified.
|
||||
@@ -15,23 +15,13 @@
|
||||
#
|
||||
# After loading, service-specific env vars are exported.
|
||||
# Run `load_credentials --help` for details.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Resolution order (first match wins):
|
||||
# 1. $MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE (explicit override — never second-guessed)
|
||||
# 2. $HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json
|
||||
# 3. /etc/mosaic/credentials.json (host-level fallback)
|
||||
# The /etc fallback exists for HOME-redirected profile environments, where
|
||||
# $HOME points at a per-profile directory that has no credentials file.
|
||||
# Operators symlink /etc/mosaic/credentials.json to the host's canonical
|
||||
# file once, instead of exporting MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE per invocation.
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ -z "${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:-}" ]]; then
|
||||
for _cand in "$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json" "/etc/mosaic/credentials.json"; do
|
||||
for _cand in "$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json"; do
|
||||
if [[ -f "$_cand" ]]; then MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$_cand"; break; fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
: "${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:=$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json}"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
export MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE
|
||||
|
||||
_mosaic_require_jq() {
|
||||
if ! command -v jq &>/dev/null; then
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -86,16 +86,7 @@ gitea_url_matches_host() {
|
||||
|
||||
get_gitea_service_for_host() {
|
||||
local host="$1"
|
||||
local cred_file="${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:-}"
|
||||
if [[ -z "$cred_file" ]]; then
|
||||
# Same resolution chain as _lib/credentials.sh: profile HOME, then
|
||||
# host-level /etc only if it exists; neither existing keeps the
|
||||
# $HOME default (matches the lib's final := fallback).
|
||||
cred_file="$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json"
|
||||
if [[ ! -f "$cred_file" && -f /etc/mosaic/credentials.json ]]; then
|
||||
cred_file="/etc/mosaic/credentials.json"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
local cred_file="${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:-$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json}"
|
||||
|
||||
case "$host" in
|
||||
git.mosaicstack.dev)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Examples:
|
||||
$(basename "$0") -i 42 -l "in-progress" -m "0.2.0"
|
||||
$(basename "$0") -i 42 -a @me
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
exit "${1:-1}"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Parse arguments
|
||||
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
||||
shift
|
||||
;;
|
||||
-h|--help)
|
||||
usage 0
|
||||
usage
|
||||
;;
|
||||
*)
|
||||
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ Examples:
|
||||
$(basename "$0") -t "Fix login bug" -l "bug,priority-high"
|
||||
$(basename "$0") -t "Add dark mode" -b "Implement theme switching" -m "0.2.0"
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
exit "${1:-1}"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Parse arguments
|
||||
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
||||
shift 2
|
||||
;;
|
||||
-h|--help)
|
||||
usage 0
|
||||
usage
|
||||
;;
|
||||
*)
|
||||
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Examples:
|
||||
$(basename "$0") -m "0.2.0" # Issues in milestone 0.2.0
|
||||
$(basename "$0") --repo ddk/ai-bma # List issues from anywhere
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
exit "${1:-1}"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Parse arguments
|
||||
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
||||
shift 2
|
||||
;;
|
||||
-h|--help)
|
||||
usage 0
|
||||
usage
|
||||
;;
|
||||
*)
|
||||
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Examples:
|
||||
$(basename "$0") -t "0.0.1" -d "Pre-MVP Foundation Sprint"
|
||||
$(basename "$0") -t "0.1.0" -d "MVP Release" --due "2025-03-01"
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
exit "${1:-1}"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Parse arguments
|
||||
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
||||
shift
|
||||
;;
|
||||
-h|--help)
|
||||
usage 0
|
||||
usage
|
||||
;;
|
||||
*)
|
||||
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Examples:
|
||||
$(basename "$0") -i 42 -b "Implements the feature described in #42"
|
||||
$(basename "$0") -t "WIP: New feature" --draft
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
exit "${1:-1}"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Parse arguments
|
||||
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
||||
shift
|
||||
;;
|
||||
-h|--help)
|
||||
usage 0
|
||||
usage
|
||||
;;
|
||||
*)
|
||||
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Examples:
|
||||
$(basename "$0") -s merged -a username # Merged PRs by user
|
||||
$(basename "$0") --repo ddk/ai-bma # List PRs from anywhere
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
exit "${1:-1}"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Parse arguments
|
||||
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
||||
shift 2
|
||||
;;
|
||||
-h|--help)
|
||||
usage 0
|
||||
usage
|
||||
;;
|
||||
*)
|
||||
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Examples:
|
||||
$(basename "$0") -n 42 -d # Squash merge and delete branch
|
||||
$(basename "$0") -n 42 --skip-queue-guard # Skip queue guard wait
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
exit "${1:-1}"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Parse arguments
|
||||
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
||||
shift
|
||||
;;
|
||||
-h|--help)
|
||||
usage 0
|
||||
usage
|
||||
;;
|
||||
*)
|
||||
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
# Regression harness for #701: -h/--help must exit 0, bad args must still exit nonzero.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Covers the 7 wrappers whose usage() previously hard-coded `exit 1`, so every
|
||||
# --help invocation exited nonzero and logged a phantom isError across fleet lanes.
|
||||
# Asserts, per wrapper:
|
||||
# 1. `--help` exits 0 and prints usage.
|
||||
# 2. `-h` exits 0 and prints usage.
|
||||
# 3. A genuine unknown flag still exits nonzero (usage() default path untouched).
|
||||
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
|
||||
|
||||
WRAPPERS=(
|
||||
issue-assign.sh
|
||||
issue-create.sh
|
||||
issue-list.sh
|
||||
milestone-create.sh
|
||||
pr-create.sh
|
||||
pr-list.sh
|
||||
pr-merge.sh
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
fail=0
|
||||
|
||||
for wrapper in "${WRAPPERS[@]}"; do
|
||||
path="$SCRIPT_DIR/$wrapper"
|
||||
|
||||
if ! output=$(bash "$path" --help 2>&1); then
|
||||
echo "FAIL: $wrapper --help exited nonzero" >&2
|
||||
fail=1
|
||||
elif [[ "$output" != Usage:* ]]; then
|
||||
echo "FAIL: $wrapper --help did not print usage" >&2
|
||||
fail=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if ! bash "$path" -h >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
echo "FAIL: $wrapper -h exited nonzero" >&2
|
||||
fail=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if bash "$path" --this-is-not-a-real-flag >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
echo "FAIL: $wrapper accepted an unknown flag (should have exited nonzero)" >&2
|
||||
fail=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ "$fail" -eq 0 ]]; then
|
||||
echo "help-exit-code regression passed (7/7 wrappers)"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
exit "$fail"
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user