fix(#1332): verdict fixture 2 - herestring, not printf-pipe into grep -qF

pipefail-early-exit.test.mjs (static scan) flagged the fixture-2 check as a
pipe into an early-exiting consumer; the sibling at fixture 1 already uses
the herestring form. Red reproduced locally (one scan entry, exactly the
flagged line), green after matching the sibling; verdict 4/4 and glyph 6/6
re-run green.

apps/gateway/src/__tests__/required-security-wiring.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
+import { type Type } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { Test, type TestingModule } from '@nestjs/testing';
+import type { SlashCommandPayload } from '@mosaicstack/types';
+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
+import { AgentService, type AgentSession } from '../agent/agent.service.js';
+import { ProviderService } from '../agent/provider.service.js';
+import { AppModule } from '../app.module.js';
+import { CommandAuthorizationService } from '../commands/command-authorization.service.js';
+import { CommandExecutorService } from '../commands/command-executor.service.js';
+import { CommandsModule } from '../commands/commands.module.js';
+import { CommandRuntimeApprovalVerifier } from '../commands/runtime-approval-verifier.js';
+import { PreferencesModule } from '../preferences/preferences.module.js';
+import { SystemOverrideService } from '../preferences/system-override.service.js';
+
+const fakeDb = {
+  $client: { exec: async (): Promise<void> => {} },
+  execute: async (): Promise<{ rows: unknown[] }> => ({ rows: [] }),
+  select: () => ({
+    from: () => ({
+      where: async (): Promise<Array<{ count: number }>> => [{ count: 1 }],
+    }),
+  }),
+  insert: () => ({ values: async (): Promise<void> => {} }),
+};
+
+const fakeProviderService = {
+  onModuleInit: async (): Promise<void> => {},
+  onModuleDestroy: (): void => {},
+  getRegistry: () => ({ getAvailable: () => [], getAll: () => [], find: () => undefined }),
+  getDefaultModel: () => undefined,
+  listAvailableModels: () => [],
+  listProviders: () => [],
+  getAdapter: () => undefined,
+  getProvidersHealth: () => [],
+};
+
+function compileRealAppGraph(): Promise<TestingModule> {
+  return Test.createTestingModule({ imports: [AppModule] })
+    .overrideProvider('DB_HANDLE')
+    .useValue({ db: fakeDb, close: async (): Promise<void> => {} })
+    .overrideProvider('DB')
+    .useValue(fakeDb)
+    .overrideProvider('STORAGE_ADAPTER')
+    .useValue({
+      name: 'required-security-wiring-test',
+      migrate: async (): Promise<void> => {},
+      close: async (): Promise<void> => {},
+    })
+    .overrideProvider('AUTH')
+    .useValue({})
+    .overrideProvider('BRAIN')
+    .useValue({ conversations: {}, agents: {} })
+    .overrideProvider('LOG_SERVICE')
+    .useValue({})
+    .overrideProvider('MEMORY')
+    .useValue({})
+    .overrideProvider('MEMORY_ADAPTER')
+    .useValue({})
+    .overrideProvider(ProviderService)
+    .useValue(fakeProviderService)
+    .compile();
+}
+
+function providerToken(provider: unknown): unknown {
+  return typeof provider === 'function' ? provider : (provider as { provide?: unknown })?.provide;
+}
+
+interface MaskingConsumer {
+  moduleType: Type<unknown>;
+  token: Type<unknown>;
+  useValue: object;
+}
+
+async function compileWithoutProvider(
+  moduleType: Type<unknown>,
+  missingToken: Type<unknown>,
+  maskingConsumer: MaskingConsumer,
+): Promise<{ error: unknown; moduleRef: TestingModule | undefined }> {
+  const touchedModules = new Set([moduleType, maskingConsumer.moduleType]);
+  const originals = Array.from(touchedModules, (touchedModule: Type<unknown>) => ({
+    moduleType: touchedModule,
+    providers: (Reflect.getMetadata('providers', touchedModule) ?? []) as unknown[],
+    exports: (Reflect.getMetadata('exports', touchedModule) ?? []) as unknown[],
+  }));
+
+  for (const original of originals) {
+    const providers = original.providers.flatMap((provider: unknown): unknown[] => {
+      const token = providerToken(provider);
+      if (original.moduleType === moduleType && token === missingToken) return [];
+      if (original.moduleType === maskingConsumer.moduleType && token === maskingConsumer.token) {
+        return [{ provide: maskingConsumer.token, useValue: maskingConsumer.useValue }];
+      }
+      return [provider];
+    });
+    const exports = original.exports.filter(
+      (exported: unknown): boolean =>
+        original.moduleType !== moduleType || providerToken(exported) !== missingToken,
+    );
+    Reflect.defineMetadata('providers', providers, original.moduleType);
+    Reflect.defineMetadata('exports', exports, original.moduleType);
+  }
+
+  let moduleRef: TestingModule | undefined;
+  let error: unknown;
+  try {
+    moduleRef = await compileRealAppGraph();
+  } catch (caught: unknown) {
+    error = caught;
+  } finally {
+    for (const original of originals) {
+      Reflect.defineMetadata('providers', original.providers, original.moduleType);
+      Reflect.defineMetadata('exports', original.exports, original.moduleType);
+    }
+  }
+  return { error, moduleRef };
+}
+
+async function closeIfCompiled(moduleRef: TestingModule | undefined): Promise<void> {
+  if (moduleRef) await moduleRef.close();
+}
+
+describe('required security wiring — real AppModule startup refusal', () => {
+  it('FL-01 positive control: the real graph compiles when CommandAuthorizationService is bound', async () => {
+    const moduleRef = await compileRealAppGraph();
+    try {
+      expect(moduleRef.get(CommandAuthorizationService, { strict: false })).toBeInstanceOf(
+        CommandAuthorizationService,
+      );
+    } finally {
+      await moduleRef.close();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('FL-01 negative control: absence read as permission is refused at module compilation', async () => {
+    const { error, moduleRef } = await compileWithoutProvider(
+      CommandsModule,
+      CommandAuthorizationService,
+      {
+        moduleType: CommandsModule,
+        token: CommandRuntimeApprovalVerifier,
+        useValue: {},
+      },
+    );
+    await closeIfCompiled(moduleRef);
+
+    expect(
+      error,
+      'absence read as permission: AppModule compilation accepted a missing CommandAuthorizationService binding',
+    ).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
+    if (!(error instanceof Error)) return;
+    expect(error.message).toContain('CommandExecutorService');
+    expect(error.message).toContain('CommandAuthorizationService');
+  });
+
+  it('FL-11 positive control: the real graph compiles when SystemOverrideService is bound', async () => {
+    const moduleRef = await compileRealAppGraph();
+    try {
+      expect(moduleRef.get(SystemOverrideService, { strict: false })).toBeInstanceOf(
+        SystemOverrideService,
+      );
+    } finally {
+      await moduleRef.close();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('FL-11 negative control: absence read as permission is refused at module compilation', async () => {
+    const { error, moduleRef } = await compileWithoutProvider(
+      PreferencesModule,
+      SystemOverrideService,
+      {
+        moduleType: CommandsModule,
+        token: CommandExecutorService,
+        useValue: {},
+      },
+    );
+    await closeIfCompiled(moduleRef);
+
+    expect(
+      error,
+      'absence read as permission: AppModule compilation accepted a missing SystemOverrideService binding',
+    ).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
+    if (!(error instanceof Error)) return;
+    expect(error.message).toContain('AgentService');
+    expect(error.message).toContain('SystemOverrideService');
+  });
+});
+
+const actorScope = { userId: 'security-user', tenantId: 'security-tenant' };
+const conversationId = 'security-conversation';
+
+function directExecutorWithoutAuthorization(systemOverrideSet: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>) {
+  const registry = {
+    getManifest: vi.fn(() => ({
+      version: 1,
+      commands: [
+        {
+          name: 'system',
+          aliases: [],
+          description: 'Set instruction authority',
+          scope: 'agent' as const,
+          execution: 'socket' as const,
+          available: true,
+        },
+      ],
+      skills: [],
+    })),
+  };
+  return new CommandExecutorService(
+    registry as never,
+    { getSession: vi.fn() } as never,
+    { set: systemOverrideSet, clear: vi.fn() } as never,
+    { collect: vi.fn() } as never,
+    null,
+    { agents: {} } as never,
+    null,
+    null,
+    { getServerStatuses: vi.fn(() => []), getToolDefinitions: vi.fn(() => []) } as never,
+    undefined as never,
+  );
+}
+
+function directAgentWithoutSystemOverride(piPrompt: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>): {
+  service: AgentService;
+  session: AgentSession;
+} {
+  const service = new AgentService(
+    {
+      getDefaultModel: vi.fn(() => null),
+      getRegistry: vi.fn(() => ({})),
+      findModel: vi.fn(),
+      listAvailableModels: vi.fn(() => []),
+    } as never,
+    {} as never,
+    {} as never,
+    { available: false } as never,
+    {} as never,
+    { getToolDefinitions: vi.fn(() => []) } as never,
+    { loadForSession: vi.fn(async () => ({ metaTools: [], promptAdditions: [] })) } as never,
+    undefined as never,
+    null,
+    { collect: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) } as never,
+    null,
+  );
+  const session = {
+    id: conversationId,
+    provider: 'test-provider',
+    modelId: 'test-model',
+    piSession: { prompt: piPrompt },
+    listeners: new Set(),
+    unsubscribe: vi.fn(),
+    createdAt: Date.now(),
+    promptCount: 0,
+    channels: new Set(),
+    skillPromptAdditions: [],
+    sandboxDir: process.cwd(),
+    allowedTools: null,
+    userId: actorScope.userId,
+    tenantId: actorScope.tenantId,
+    metrics: {
+      tokens: { input: 0, output: 0, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0, total: 0 },
+      modelSwitches: 0,
+      messageCount: 0,
+      lastActivityAt: new Date(0).toISOString(),
+    },
+  } as unknown as AgentSession;
+  const internals = service as unknown as { sessions: Map<string, AgentSession> };
+  internals.sessions.set(conversationId, session);
+  return { service, session };
+}
+
+describe('required security wiring — malformed direct absence has zero effects', () => {
+  it('FL-01 refuses command execution before any command effect when authorization is absent', async () => {
+    const systemOverrideSet = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+    const executor = directExecutorWithoutAuthorization(systemOverrideSet);
+    const payload: SlashCommandPayload = {
+      command: 'system',
+      args: 'authority that must not be stored',
+      conversationId,
+    };
+    let error: unknown;
+
+    try {
+      await executor.execute(payload, actorScope);
+    } catch (caught: unknown) {
+      error = caught;
+    }
+
+    expect
+      .soft(
+        error,
+        'absence read as permission: direct executor accepted missing command authorization',
+      )
+      .toBeInstanceOf(Error);
+    expect
+      .soft(
+        systemOverrideSet,
+        'absence read as permission: command effect occurred without command authorization',
+      )
+      .not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('FL-11 refuses prompt execution before any provider or session effect when system override authority is absent', async () => {
+    const piPrompt = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+    const { service, session } = directAgentWithoutSystemOverride(piPrompt);
+    let error: unknown;
+
+    try {
+      await service.prompt(conversationId, 'must not reach provider', actorScope);
+    } catch (caught: unknown) {
+      error = caught;
+    }
+
+    expect
+      .soft(
+        error,
+        'absence read as permission: direct session accepted missing system override authority',
+      )
+      .toBeInstanceOf(Error);
+    expect
+      .soft(
+        piPrompt,
+        'absence read as permission: provider prompt occurred without system override authority',
+      )
+      .not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect
+      .soft(
+        session.promptCount,
+        'absence read as permission: session state changed without system override authority',
+      )
+      .toBe(0);
+  });
+});

apps/gateway/src/agent/__tests__/agent-service-ownership.test.ts

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ function makeService(operatorMemory: unknown = null): AgentService {
     {} as never,
     { getToolDefinitions: vi.fn(() => []) } as never,
     { loadForSession: vi.fn(async () => ({ metaTools: [], promptAdditions: [] })) } as never,
-    null,
+    { get: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(null), renew: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) } as never,
     null,
     { collect: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) } as never,
     operatorMemory as never,

apps/gateway/src/agent/agent.service.ts

@@ -132,9 +132,8 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
     @Inject(CoordService) private readonly coordService: CoordService,
     @Inject(McpClientService) private readonly mcpClientService: McpClientService,
     @Inject(SkillLoaderService) private readonly skillLoaderService: SkillLoaderService,
-    @Optional()
     @Inject(SystemOverrideService)
-    private readonly systemOverride: SystemOverrideService | null,
+    private readonly systemOverride: SystemOverrideService,
     @Optional()
     @Inject(PreferencesService)
     private readonly preferencesService: PreferencesService | null,
@@ -709,23 +708,22 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
       throw new Error(`No agent session found: ${sessionId}`);
     }
     this.assertSessionScope(session, scope);
-    session.promptCount += 1;
 
     // Channel attachments are untrusted URI references. Preserve exact,
     // authenticated metadata for the agent without treating it as authority.
     const attachmentContext = this.attachmentContext(attachments);
 
-    // Prepend session-scoped system override if present (renew TTL on each turn)
+    // Prepend session-scoped system override if present (renew TTL on each turn).
+    // Required instruction-authority wiring is consulted before session/provider effects.
     let effectiveMessage = `${message}${attachmentContext}`;
-    if (this.systemOverride) {
     const override = await this.systemOverride.get(sessionId, scope);
     if (override) {
       effectiveMessage = `[System Override]\n${override}\n\n${effectiveMessage}`;
       await this.systemOverride.renew(sessionId, scope);
       this.logger.debug(`Applied system override for session ${sessionId}`);
     }
-    }
 
+    session.promptCount += 1;
     try {
       await session.piSession.prompt(effectiveMessage);
     } catch (err) {

apps/gateway/src/commands/command-executor-p8012.spec.ts

@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ const mockMcpClient = {
   getToolDefinitions: vi.fn(() => []),
 };
 
+const allowAuthorization = {
+  authorize: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true }),
+};
+
 function buildService(
   redis: typeof mockRedis | null = mockRedis,
   mcpClient: {
@@ -98,6 +102,7 @@ function buildService(
     null,
     mockChatGateway as never,
     mcpClient as never,
+    allowAuthorization as never,
   );
 }
 

apps/gateway/src/commands/command-executor.service.ts

@@ -35,9 +35,8 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
     @Inject(forwardRef(() => ChatGateway))
     private readonly chatGateway: ChatGateway | null,
     @Inject(McpClientService) private readonly mcpClient: McpClientService,
-    @Optional()
     @Inject(CommandAuthorizationService)
-    private readonly authorization: CommandAuthorizationService | null = null,
+    private readonly authorization: CommandAuthorizationService,
   ) {}
 
   async execute(
@@ -57,13 +56,13 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
       };
     }
 
-    const authorization = await this.authorization?.authorize(
+    const authorization = await this.authorization.authorize(
       def,
       payload,
       userId,
       payload.approvalId,
     );
-    if (authorization && !authorization.allowed) {
+    if (!authorization.allowed) {
       return { command, conversationId, success: false, message: authorization.reason };
     }
 
@@ -171,7 +170,7 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
     const def = this.registry
       .getManifest()
       .commands.find((command) => command.name === payload.command);
-    if (!def || !this.authorization) return null;
+    if (!def) return null;
     return this.authorization.createApproval(def, payload, scope.userId);
   }
 

apps/gateway/src/commands/commands.integration.spec.ts

@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ const mockMcpClient = {
   reconnectServer: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
 };
 
+const allowAuthorization = {
+  authorize: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true }),
+};
+
 // ─── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 function buildRegistry(): CommandRegistryService {
@@ -74,6 +78,7 @@ function buildExecutor(registry: CommandRegistryService): CommandExecutorService
     null, // reloadService (optional)
     null, // chatGateway (optional)
     mockMcpClient as never,
+    allowAuthorization as never,
   );
 }
 

apps/gateway/src/reload/reload.service.spec.ts

@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ describe('ReloadService — /reload command sanitizes plugin errors', () => {
       reloadService,
       mockChatGateway as never,
       mockMcpClient as never,
+      { authorize: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true }) } as never,
     );
 
     const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'reload', conversationId: 'conv-1' };

docs/scratchpads/1179-required-security-di.md

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# #1179 — Required security DI wiring
+
+## Objective
+
+Eliminate the shared fail-open defect class **absence read as permission**:
+
+- FL-01: missing `CommandAuthorizationService` must refuse Nest startup and must not permit command effects.
+- FL-11: missing `SystemOverrideService` must refuse Nest startup and must not omit stored instruction authority while allowing provider/session effects.
+
+## Tracking
+
+- Issue: #1179, child of #1156
+- Branch: `fix/1179-required-security-di`
+- Base: `origin/next` at `216cd72226cd9ee17eea461cfe7cd0e010a22f02`
+
+## Plan
+
+1. RED: compile the real `AppModule` graph with each required provider independently removed, with a positive control for each intact binding.
+2. RED: directly exercise each malformed absence path and assert zero command/provider/session effects.
+3. Stop and report RED to the coordinator before production implementation.
+4. After authorization, make both constructor injections required, remove absence-as-permission branches, and update explicit legitimate optional test seams.
+5. Run focused Gateway tests, typecheck, lint, format, build, independent exact-head verification, and focused security review.
+
+## Immutable path fence
+
+Production changes are confined to:
+
+- `apps/gateway/src/commands/command-executor.service.ts`
+- `apps/gateway/src/agent/agent.service.ts`
+
+Tests and task evidence are confined to:
+
+- `apps/gateway/src/__tests__/required-security-wiring.test.ts`
+- existing direct-constructor specs that require explicit required arguments
+- `docs/scratchpads/1179-required-security-di.md`
+
+No files in #1178, #1072, #1080, or #1054 lanes are in scope. `docs/TASKS.md` is orchestrator-owned and will not be modified.
+
+## Budget
+
+No explicit token ceiling was provided. Working assumption: one narrow Gateway security packet; split and stop if either arm requires unrelated module rewiring.
+
+## Progress
+
+- Intake read from #1179 and parent #1156.
+- Base independently resolved from the issue's pre-native-stage ordering and repository `origin/next` ref; branch HEAD verified byte-for-byte against the remote ref.
+- Real consumers and direct constructors inventoried.
+
+## Tests
+
+### RED
+
+- `required-security-wiring.test.ts`: 4 failed, 2 passed before implementation.
+- Both real-graph negative controls showed module compilation accepted the missing target binding.
+- Direct FL-01 showed one unauthorized command effect; direct FL-11 showed one provider prompt and one session counter mutation.
+
+### GREEN
+
+- `required-security-wiring.test.ts`: 6/6 passed.
+- FL-01-only production revert: exactly the two FL-01 test cases failed; all four other cases, including FL-11, passed.
+- FL-11-only production revert: exactly the two FL-11 test cases failed; all four other cases, including FL-01, passed.
+- Full Gateway suite: 74 files passed, 7 skipped; 831 tests passed, 17 skipped.
+- Gateway typecheck: passed.
+- Gateway lint: passed.
+- Gateway build: passed.
+- Changed-file Prettier check: passed.
+
+### Review
+
+- Codex code review: APPROVE, 0 findings.
+- Codex focused security review: risk `none`, 0 findings.
+- Independent exact-head review remains assigned to Scrappy through the coordinator.
+
+## Risks / blockers
+
+- `AgentModule` / `CommandsModule` / `ChatModule` contain a production cycle; the module test therefore uses the real top-level `AppModule` and replaces only storage/network leaves, preserving the target service in each arm while isolating the separate required consumer that would otherwise mask that arm's defect.
+- No broad module rewrite was required.

packages/mosaic/framework/guides/FLEET-COMMS.md

@@ -54,20 +54,22 @@ sends, it does not auto-reply.
 ### Exit codes
 
 | rc  | Meaning                                                                                      |
-| --- | ---------------------------------------------- |
+| --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | 0   | delivered or queued                                                                          |
 | 1   | target session not found                                                                     |
-| 2   | text reached the pane but is **still a draft** |
+| 2   | submission unconfirmed: draft still on the input line, or no positive evidence of submission |
 | 3   | usage error (bad class, missing `-s`)                                                        |
 
-**Never retry on rc=2.** The message is in the target pane; retrying double-sends it. Confirm
+**Never retry on rc=2.** The message may be in the target pane, and a retry can double-send it.
-instead:
+Confirm instead:
 
 ```bash
 tmux capture-pane -p -t <session>:0.0 | tail -20
 ```
 
-rc=2 is the normal result when the target is an idle pi seat.
+rc=0 is the normal result for both idle and busy pi seats (submission confirmed by draft
+transition, not by prompt glyph). rc=2 on a healthy seat is exceptional — treat it as a real
+report and investigate the pane.
 
 ## Durable comms
 

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/test-enumeration-exclusions.txt

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-lane-brief-pr-linkage.sh | unmeasured i
 # --- tools/tmux: require a live tmux server ---
 packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-socket.sh | requires a real tmux server on a throwaway socket; CI image ships no tmux; #1017 burndown (needs tmux in image or a signed permanent exclusion)
 packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-verdict.sh | requires real tmux-pane fixtures on a throwaway socket; CI image ships no tmux; #1017 burndown (same condition as its sibling)
+packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-glyph-agnostic.sh | requires real tmux-pane fixtures on a throwaway socket; CI image ships no tmux; #1017 burndown (same condition as its siblings) — signed at adoption of #1262 (rev-code-02 F5), red-first verified on sb-it-1-dt
 
 # --- single-suite directories: unmeasured in CI ---
 

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/send-message.sh

@@ -97,13 +97,34 @@ printf '%s' "$MSG" | "${tmux_cmd[@]}" load-buffer -b "$BUF" -
 #   would otherwise accumulate forever.
 sleep 0.5
 
-# 2) Submit, then POSITIVELY confirm submission; flush with another Enter if it is
+# 2) Submit, then POSITIVELY confirm submission by DRAFT TRANSITION, not by prompt
-#    still a draft. Success requires positive evidence — the queued banner, OR the
+#    glyph. The historical bug was treating ABSENCE of a draft as delivery; the
-#    REPL input box located AND clear of our message tail. The historical bug was
+#    2026-08 fix over-corrected to glyph inference (grep '❯|^>|│ >'), which locates
-#    treating ABSENCE of a draft as delivery: if the prompt glyph was never matched
+#    only Claude Code's box and false-NEGATIVES every glyphless REPL (pi renders a
-#    (wrong pane / prompt-glyph drift), an unsubmitted message read as "delivered"
+#    U+2500 rule, no glyph) — a delivered message reported "UNDELIVERED", driving a
-#    and worker->lead relays stalled silently. We now default to UNCONFIRMED and only
+#    retry that duplicates it. Runtime-agnostic evidence: our message tail sits on
-#    upgrade to delivered on positive evidence; anything we cannot confirm fails loud.
+#    the INPUT line (located by the cursor row, not a glyph) BEFORE Enter, and has
+#    LEFT it AFTER — that transition is positive proof of submission and needs no
+#    glyph. Absence alone still never means delivered: if we never saw our draft on
+#    the input line we stay UNCONFIRMED (wrong/dead pane), and a draft that never
+#    leaves the input line stays a DRAFT (exit 2), preserving both historical guards.
+_cursor_line() { # echo the pane's current input (cursor) line, glyph-free
+  local cy line
+  cy=$("${tmux_cmd[@]}" display-message -p -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" -F '#{cursor_y}' 2>/dev/null) || return 1
+  [ -n "$cy" ] || return 1
+  "${tmux_cmd[@]}" capture-pane -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" -p 2>/dev/null | sed -n "$((cy + 1))p"
+}
+_draft_on_input() { # true iff our message tail is sitting on the input line now
+  [ -n "$snippet" ] || return 1
+  grep -qF "$snippet" <<<"$(_cursor_line)"
+}
+
+# Baseline: after the paste, our draft must be on the input line. This is positive
+# proof we are on the right pane and the paste landed — the anchor the transition
+# check measures against.
+saw_draft=0
+_draft_on_input && saw_draft=1
+
 status="unconfirmed"
 for attempt in $(seq 1 $((RETRIES + 1))); do
   "${tmux_cmd[@]}" send-keys -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" Enter
@@ -113,20 +134,26 @@ for attempt in $(seq 1 $((RETRIES + 1))); do
   if grep -qF "$QUEUED_RE" <<<"$pane"; then
     status="queued"; break
   fi
-  # Locate the REPL input box (prompt glyph). If we cannot see it, we have NO
+  # POSITIVE draft evidence from a located prompt box, when one exists. This is the
-  # evidence of submission state — stay UNCONFIRMED and retry; never infer delivery.
+  # cursor-row check's blind spot: a pane in COOKED mode (a plain shell whose
+  # foreground process never reads stdin) echoes our paste via the kernel line
+  # discipline and moves the cursor off it on Enter, which is indistinguishable from
+  # a real submit by cursor row alone. If a prompt box IS locatable and still carries
+  # our tail, that is affirmative proof the message was not consumed. Absence of a
+  # glyph is still never used for anything — that inference is the original E7 bug.
   promptline=$(printf '%s' "$pane" | grep -E '❯|^>|│ >' | tail -1)
-  if [ -z "$promptline" ]; then
+  if [ -n "$promptline" ] && [ -n "$snippet" ] && grep -qF "$snippet" <<<"$promptline"; then
-    status="unconfirmed"; continue
-  fi
-  # Input box located AND still carrying our tail => unsubmitted draft. Flush + retry.
-  # (Submitted messages scroll up into history; a draft stays on the ❯ line.)
-  if [ -n "$snippet" ] && grep -qF "$snippet" <<<"$promptline"; then
     status="draft"; continue
   fi
-  # Input box located AND clear of our tail => positively submitted. This is the
+  if [ "$saw_draft" = 1 ]; then
-  # only path to success besides the queued banner.
+    if _draft_on_input; then
-  status="delivered"; break
+      status="draft"; continue      # still on the input line => not submitted; flush + retry
+    fi
+    status="delivered"; break        # left the input line => positively submitted
+  fi
+  # No confirmed baseline yet: try to (re)acquire it; never infer delivery from absence.
+  if _draft_on_input; then saw_draft=1; status="draft"; continue; fi
+  status="unconfirmed"; continue
 done
 
 [ "$VERBOSE" = 1 ] && { echo "--- pane tail ($TARGET) ---"; printf '%s\n' "$pane" | tail -4; echo "---"; }

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-glyph-agnostic.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Red-first regression test for E7 (#1017 task 2): the confirm-check must bind
+# "delivered" to WHETHER THE MESSAGE WAS SUBMITTED, not to which runtime's prompt
+# glyph is present. A pi seat renders a U+2500 rule input box with no ❯/^>/│ >
+# glyph; send-message.sh:118 locates the box only by glyph, so a genuinely
+# delivered message on a glyphless REPL falsely reports exit 2 "may be UNDELIVERED",
+# and the operator's rc=2-driven retry duplicates it.
+#
+# Parameterized on $SEND: RED against the shipping blob (B and D fail), GREEN
+# against a candidate patch. No pi; no fake HOME; hermetic throwaway socket.
+#
+# Submission counting is EXACT and terminal-echo-independent: the fixture message
+# is `echo <tok> >>SINK`; each real submission appends one line. wc -l SINK ==
+# number of times the REPL actually executed the send. This does not depend on how
+# many times the marker string is painted on screen.
+set -u
+SEND="${SEND:?set SEND=/path/to/send-message.sh}"
+SOCKET="glyphagnostic-$$"
+TMP="$(mktemp -d)"
+tmux() { command tmux -L "$SOCKET" "$@"; }
+cleanup() { command tmux -L "$SOCKET" kill-server 2>/dev/null; rm -rf "$TMP"; }
+trap cleanup EXIT
+pass=0; fail=0
+ok() { printf 'ok   %s\n' "$1"; pass=$((pass+1)); }
+no() { printf 'FAIL %s -- %s\n' "$1" "$2"; fail=$((fail+1)); }
+
+mk() { tmux new-session -d -s "$1" -x 120 -y 40 -c "$TMP" "PS1='$2' exec bash --noprofile --norc -i"; sleep 0.5; }
+subs() { [ -f "$1" ] && wc -l <"$1" | tr -d ' ' || echo 0; }  # exact submission count
+
+echo "SEND=$SEND    tmux $(command tmux -V | awk '{print $2}')"
+
+# --- A (control): glyph box (❯) that submits => exit 0, exactly one submission.
+mk ctl '❯ '
+SINK="$TMP/sink.ctl"
+out=$("$SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -t ctl -m "echo x >>'$SINK'" 2>"$TMP/e.ctl"); rc=$?; sleep 0.4
+if [ "$rc" = 0 ] && [ "$(subs "$SINK")" = 1 ]; then
+  ok "control: ❯-box submits => exit 0, exactly one submission"
+else no "control: ❯-box submits => exit 0, one submission" "rc=$rc subs=$(subs "$SINK") err=[$(cat "$TMP/e.ctl")]"; fi
+
+# --- B (THE false-rc regression): glyphless U+2500 box that SUBMITS. Message lands
+#     (subs==1) yet shipping reports exit 2. Must be exit 0.
+mk sub $'──────── \n'
+SINK="$TMP/sink.sub"
+out=$("$SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -t sub -m "echo x >>'$SINK'" 2>"$TMP/e.sub"); rc=$?; sleep 0.4
+if [ "$rc" = 0 ] && [ "$(subs "$SINK")" = 1 ]; then
+  ok "glyphless: U+2500 box that submits => exit 0 (delivered, not 'UNDELIVERED')"
+else no "glyphless: U+2500 box that submits => exit 0" \
+        "rc=$rc subs=$(subs "$SINK")(delivered=$([ "$(subs "$SINK")" -ge 1 ] && echo yes||echo no)) err=[$(cat "$TMP/e.sub")]"; fi
+
+# --- D (duplicate arm): operator follows the rc=2 stderr and retries once. On the
+#     glyphless box, shipping => two submissions (the reported duplicate). The
+#     property: one logical send => exactly one submission. Same fix closes it.
+mk dup $'──────── \n'
+SINK="$TMP/sink.dup"
+tries=0
+for attempt in 1 2; do
+  tries=$((tries+1))
+  out=$("$SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -t dup -m "echo x >>'$SINK'" 2>/dev/null); rc=$?
+  sleep 0.4
+  [ "$rc" = 0 ] && break   # operator stops retrying only when told delivered
+done
+if [ "$(subs "$SINK")" = 1 ]; then
+  ok "duplicate: one logical send (rc-driven retry) => exactly one submission (tries=$tries)"
+else no "duplicate: one logical send => exactly one submission" "submissions=$(subs "$SINK") tries=$tries"; fi
+
+# --- E (faithful hung managed TUI, NOT a cooked shell): raw/no-echo, paints nothing.
+#     A cooked `sleep infinity` echoes the paste via the kernel line discipline and
+#     false-passes a cursor-row fix that is correct on real seats (measured). So: raw.
+mk_rawstuck() { tmux new-session -d -s "$1" -x 120 -y 40 -c "$TMP" \
+  "bash --noprofile --norc -c 'stty -echo -icanon min 1 time 0 2>/dev/null; exec sleep infinity'"; sleep 0.5; }
+mk_rawstuck estuck
+SINK="$TMP/sink.estuck"
+out=$("$SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -t estuck -r 1 -m "this stuck draft was never submitted" 2>/dev/null); rc=$?
+sleep 0.3
+if [ "$rc" != 0 ] && [ "$(subs "$SINK")" = 0 ]; then
+  ok "raw/no-echo stuck TUI (not submitted) => non-zero (no false delivered)"
+else no "raw stuck TUI must NOT report delivered" "rc=$rc subs=$(subs "$SINK")"; fi
+
+# --- F (busy/queued branch, your BUSY-not-runtime finding): glyphless pane rendering the
+#     queued banner, never consuming. QUEUED_RE :113 fires before the glyph grep => rc=0.
+mk_busy() { tmux new-session -d -s "$1" -x 120 -y 40 -c "$TMP" \
+  "bash --noprofile --norc -c 'printf \"Press up to edit queued messages\n\"; exec sleep infinity'"; sleep 0.5; }
+mk_busy ebusy
+SINK="$TMP/sink.ebusy"
+out=$("$SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -t ebusy -m "echo x >>'$SINK'" 2>/dev/null); rc=$?; sleep 0.3
+if [ "$rc" = 0 ]; then
+  ok "busy/queued-banner glyphless => exit 0 (queued is delivery; runtime owns custody)"
+else no "busy/queued-banner must report delivered" "rc=$rc"; fi
+
+# --- C (historical-bug guard): unresolvable target. No pane ever carried our draft
+#     => must fail, never infer delivered from absence of a glyph/snippet.
+if out=$("$SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -t "nonexistent-$$" -m "echo x >>'$TMP/sink.wrong'" 2>/dev/null); then
+  no "wrong-pane: unresolvable target must NOT report success" "expected non-zero, got 0"
+else ok "wrong-pane: unresolvable target => non-zero (no false delivered)"; fi
+
+echo "---"; echo "pass=$pass fail=$fail"
+[ "$fail" = 0 ]

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-verdict.sh

@@ -4,16 +4,19 @@
 #
 #   1. DELIVERED   — a REPL that renders a `❯ ` input box and submits on Enter
 #                    (text scrolls to history, box clears) => exit 0 "✓ delivered".
-#   2. UNCONFIRMED — a pane with NO locatable prompt glyph. This is the exact
+#   2. DELIVERED   — a pane with NO prompt glyph that DOES submit => exit 0. A pi
-#                    historical FALSE POSITIVE: pre-patch it printed "✓ delivered"
+#                    seat is this fixture (U+2500 rule, no glyph). Reshaped for
-#                    exit 0; post-patch it MUST fail loud (exit 2, stderr
+#                    #1257; see the note at the fixture for why the old exit-2
-#                    "could not confirm submission").
+#                    assertion was wrong.
+#   2b. UNCONFIRMED— a glyphless pane that never submits (raw/no-echo hung TUI)
+#                    => must fail loud. This carries the historical
+#                    false-positive guard that fixture 2 used to be credited with.
 #   3. DRAFT       — a `❯ `-prompt pane that never submits (message stays on the
 #                    input line) => exit 2, stderr "unsubmitted draft".
 set -uo pipefail
 
 HERE=$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)
-SEND="$HERE/send-message.sh"
+SEND="${SEND:-$HERE/send-message.sh}"
 SOCKET="verdict-test-$RANDOM-$$"
 TMP=$(mktemp -d)
 trap 'tmux -L "$SOCKET" kill-server >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
@@ -37,19 +40,44 @@ else
   no "delivered: ❯-prompt REPL that submits => exit 0 ✓ delivered" "rc=$rc out=[$out] err=[$(cat "$TMP/e1")]"
 fi
 
-# --- Fixture 2: NO prompt glyph (default bash PS1). THE regression: pre-patch this
+# --- Fixture 2: NO prompt glyph, and the pane DOES submit (interactive bash).
-#     was a silent false-positive "delivered"; post-patch it must be unconfirmed→exit 2.
+#     RESHAPED 2026-08-16 (#1257), deliberately. This fixture previously asserted
+#     exit 2 here and was labelled "false-positive FIXED". That assertion was wrong,
+#     and locking it in is what kept E7 alive: the pane submits, so "delivered" is
+#     the truth, and a pi seat — whose input box is a bare U+2500 rule with no glyph
+#     — IS this fixture. Reporting exit 2 for it told operators a delivered message
+#     may be undelivered, and the retry that advice invites is the duplicate.
+#
+#     The guard this fixture was reaching for is real and is NOT dropped: "never
+#     infer delivered from absence" is now enforced positively by fixture 2b below
+#     (glyphless AND not submitting => must fail) and by fixture 3 (locatable box
+#     still carrying our tail => draft). Absence alone decides nothing either way.
 tmux -L "$SOCKET" new-session -d -s noglyph -c "$TMP" \
   'PS1="sh-noglyph$ " exec bash --noprofile --norc -i'
 sleep 0.3
-if out=$("$SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -t "=noglyph" -m "verdict fixture two must fail loud" 2>"$TMP/e2"); then
+out=$("$SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -t "=noglyph" -m "verdict fixture two must fail loud" 2>"$TMP/e2"); rc=$?
-  no "unconfirmed: glyphless pane must NOT report success" "expected exit 2, got 0 (out=[$out])"
+if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] && grep -qF "✓ delivered" <<<"$out"; then
+  ok "delivered: glyphless pane that submits => exit 0 (runtime-agnostic, E7 FIXED)"
+else
+  no "delivered: glyphless pane that submits => exit 0" "rc=$rc out=[$out] err=[$(cat "$TMP/e2")]"
+fi
+
+# --- Fixture 2b: NO prompt glyph AND never submits — a hung managed TUI holding the
+#     terminal in raw/no-echo, which is what a stuck agent seat actually is (measured
+#     on live pi: stty -echo -icanon). Nothing is echoed, nothing is consumed, so
+#     there is no positive evidence of submission and the tool MUST fail loud. This
+#     is the historical false-positive guard, kept as a positive test.
+tmux -L "$SOCKET" new-session -d -s rawstuck -c "$TMP" \
+  'bash --noprofile --norc -c "stty -echo -icanon min 1 time 0 2>/dev/null; exec sleep infinity"'
+sleep 0.3
+if out=$("$SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -t "=rawstuck" -r 1 -m "verdict fixture two-b never submitted" 2>"$TMP/e2b"); then
+  no "unconfirmed: glyphless hung TUI must NOT report success" "expected non-zero, got 0 (out=[$out])"
 else
   rc=$?
-  if [ "$rc" -eq 2 ] && grep -qF "could not confirm submission" "$TMP/e2"; then
+  if [ "$rc" -ne 0 ] && grep -qF "could not confirm submission" "$TMP/e2b"; then
-    ok "unconfirmed: glyphless pane => exit 2 + 'could not confirm submission' (false-positive FIXED)"
+    ok "unconfirmed: glyphless hung TUI (raw/no-echo) => non-zero + 'could not confirm submission'"
   else
-    no "unconfirmed: glyphless pane => exit 2 + stderr" "rc=$rc err=[$(cat "$TMP/e2")]"
+    no "unconfirmed: glyphless hung TUI => non-zero + stderr" "rc=$rc err=[$(cat "$TMP/e2b")]"
   fi
 fi