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Author SHA1 Message Date
code-infra-01 284b2e3c23 fix(#1332): verdict fixture 2 - herestring, not printf-pipe into grep -qF
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
pipefail-early-exit.test.mjs (static scan) flagged the fixture-2 check as a
pipe into an early-exiting consumer; the sibling at fixture 1 already uses
the herestring form. Red reproduced locally (one scan entry, exactly the
flagged line), green after matching the sibling; verdict 4/4 and glyph 6/6
re-run green.
2026-08-20 12:06:56 -05:00
code-infra-01 69efad2f9a fix(#1262): adoption follow-ups - enumeration exclusion, SEND-honoring verdict suite, retire rc=2-is-normal guide text
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
- F5 (rev-code-02 blocker): sign test-send-message-glyph-agnostic.sh into
  test-enumeration-exclusions.txt beside its tmux siblings; the CI image
  ships no tmux, so the suite stays manually run (#1017 burndown).
- Adoption finding: the verdict suite hard-coded SEND to its sibling and
  ignored the SEND env var, so a red-first run against the shipping blob
  silently measured the patched copy instead (measured: shipping run
  printed PASS=4; with SEND honored it is PASS=3 FAIL=1, fixture 2 red,
  matching the recorded review numbers). SEND is now honored with the
  sibling as default, same contract as the glyph suite.
- F6/D19: framework FLEET-COMMS.md claimed 'rc=2 is the normal result
  when the target is an idle pi seat'. Post-fix rc=0 is normal for idle
  and busy pi seats; rc=2 on a healthy seat is a real report. Never-retry
  advice kept, softened to 'may be in the pane' for the unconfirmed arm.

Live verification on sb-it-1-dt (tmux 3.7b, pi glm-5.3 low, scratch
session): idle pi - shipping rc=2 'may be UNDELIVERED' while the seat
consumed the message and answered; patched rc=0 delivered, answered.
Busy pi mid-turn - shipping rc=2 while the pane accepted both messages
as steering input ('Steering: ...', 'Alt+Up to edit all queued
messages'); patched rc=0 delivered, both consumed and acted on after the
turn. Both D11 signatures: verdict now matches reality.
2026-08-20 11:31:44 -05:00
587cb19641 fix(tmux): confirm delivery by draft transition, not by prompt glyph (#1257)
send-message.sh located the REPL input box with grep -E '❯|^>|│ >'. That set is
Claude Code's box. A pi seat renders a bare U+2500 rule with no glyph, so on every
idle pi seat the capture succeeded, the grep matched nothing, status stayed
"unconfirmed", and the tool exited 2 "may be UNDELIVERED" with the paste and the
Enter both landed. The stderr tells the operator to retry, and that retry is the
duplicate delivery reported against the same tool.

Confirmation is now runtime-agnostic: our message tail sits on the input line
(located by cursor row, no glyph) before Enter and has left it after. That
transition is positive proof of submission.

Absence still proves nothing, which is the guard the 2026-08 fix was reaching for
and got backwards. Two positive checks keep it:

  - a prompt box that IS locatable and still carries our tail => draft, exit 2.
    This covers the cursor-row blind spot: a cooked pane whose foreground process
    never reads stdin echoes the paste through the kernel line discipline and
    moves the cursor off it on Enter, which by cursor row alone is indistinguishable
    from a real submit.
  - no draft ever observed on the input line => unconfirmed, non-zero.

Tests, both red-first against the shipping blob d397907:

  test-send-message-glyph-agnostic.sh (new, 6 fixtures)  4/6 -> 6/6
  test-send-message-verdict.sh (fixture 2 reshaped, 2b added)  3/4 -> 4/4

Fixture 2 of the verdict suite asserted exit 2 for a glyphless pane that submits
and was labelled "false-positive FIXED". A pi seat is that fixture, so the suite
was locking the bug in. It is reshaped deliberately, and the guard it was credited
with moves to new fixture 2b (glyphless AND non-submitting, raw/no-echo) so the
"never infer delivered from absence" property is tested positively rather than as
a side effect.

Measured on tmux 3.7b (sb-it-1-dt), 3.5a (fomo-lin), and dragon-lin.

Co-authored-by: scooby <[email protected]>
2026-08-20 11:24:18 -05:00
Ghostgate-merge-01Ghost <>
9b6869fab7 fix(#1179): require security authority wiring (#1189)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was canceled
Co-authored-by: Ghost <>
2026-08-20 16:19:45 +00:00
23 changed files with 661 additions and 561 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
import { type Type } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Test, type TestingModule } from '@nestjs/testing';
import type { SlashCommandPayload } from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { AgentService, type AgentSession } from '../agent/agent.service.js';
import { ProviderService } from '../agent/provider.service.js';
import { AppModule } from '../app.module.js';
import { CommandAuthorizationService } from '../commands/command-authorization.service.js';
import { CommandExecutorService } from '../commands/command-executor.service.js';
import { CommandsModule } from '../commands/commands.module.js';
import { CommandRuntimeApprovalVerifier } from '../commands/runtime-approval-verifier.js';
import { PreferencesModule } from '../preferences/preferences.module.js';
import { SystemOverrideService } from '../preferences/system-override.service.js';
const fakeDb = {
$client: { exec: async (): Promise<void> => {} },
execute: async (): Promise<{ rows: unknown[] }> => ({ rows: [] }),
select: () => ({
from: () => ({
where: async (): Promise<Array<{ count: number }>> => [{ count: 1 }],
}),
}),
insert: () => ({ values: async (): Promise<void> => {} }),
};
const fakeProviderService = {
onModuleInit: async (): Promise<void> => {},
onModuleDestroy: (): void => {},
getRegistry: () => ({ getAvailable: () => [], getAll: () => [], find: () => undefined }),
getDefaultModel: () => undefined,
listAvailableModels: () => [],
listProviders: () => [],
getAdapter: () => undefined,
getProvidersHealth: () => [],
};
function compileRealAppGraph(): Promise<TestingModule> {
return Test.createTestingModule({ imports: [AppModule] })
.overrideProvider('DB_HANDLE')
.useValue({ db: fakeDb, close: async (): Promise<void> => {} })
.overrideProvider('DB')
.useValue(fakeDb)
.overrideProvider('STORAGE_ADAPTER')
.useValue({
name: 'required-security-wiring-test',
migrate: async (): Promise<void> => {},
close: async (): Promise<void> => {},
})
.overrideProvider('AUTH')
.useValue({})
.overrideProvider('BRAIN')
.useValue({ conversations: {}, agents: {} })
.overrideProvider('LOG_SERVICE')
.useValue({})
.overrideProvider('MEMORY')
.useValue({})
.overrideProvider('MEMORY_ADAPTER')
.useValue({})
.overrideProvider(ProviderService)
.useValue(fakeProviderService)
.compile();
}
function providerToken(provider: unknown): unknown {
return typeof provider === 'function' ? provider : (provider as { provide?: unknown })?.provide;
}
interface MaskingConsumer {
moduleType: Type<unknown>;
token: Type<unknown>;
useValue: object;
}
async function compileWithoutProvider(
moduleType: Type<unknown>,
missingToken: Type<unknown>,
maskingConsumer: MaskingConsumer,
): Promise<{ error: unknown; moduleRef: TestingModule | undefined }> {
const touchedModules = new Set([moduleType, maskingConsumer.moduleType]);
const originals = Array.from(touchedModules, (touchedModule: Type<unknown>) => ({
moduleType: touchedModule,
providers: (Reflect.getMetadata('providers', touchedModule) ?? []) as unknown[],
exports: (Reflect.getMetadata('exports', touchedModule) ?? []) as unknown[],
}));
for (const original of originals) {
const providers = original.providers.flatMap((provider: unknown): unknown[] => {
const token = providerToken(provider);
if (original.moduleType === moduleType && token === missingToken) return [];
if (original.moduleType === maskingConsumer.moduleType && token === maskingConsumer.token) {
return [{ provide: maskingConsumer.token, useValue: maskingConsumer.useValue }];
}
return [provider];
});
const exports = original.exports.filter(
(exported: unknown): boolean =>
original.moduleType !== moduleType || providerToken(exported) !== missingToken,
);
Reflect.defineMetadata('providers', providers, original.moduleType);
Reflect.defineMetadata('exports', exports, original.moduleType);
}
let moduleRef: TestingModule | undefined;
let error: unknown;
try {
moduleRef = await compileRealAppGraph();
} catch (caught: unknown) {
error = caught;
} finally {
for (const original of originals) {
Reflect.defineMetadata('providers', original.providers, original.moduleType);
Reflect.defineMetadata('exports', original.exports, original.moduleType);
}
}
return { error, moduleRef };
}
async function closeIfCompiled(moduleRef: TestingModule | undefined): Promise<void> {
if (moduleRef) await moduleRef.close();
}
describe('required security wiring — real AppModule startup refusal', () => {
it('FL-01 positive control: the real graph compiles when CommandAuthorizationService is bound', async () => {
const moduleRef = await compileRealAppGraph();
try {
expect(moduleRef.get(CommandAuthorizationService, { strict: false })).toBeInstanceOf(
CommandAuthorizationService,
);
} finally {
await moduleRef.close();
}
});
it('FL-01 negative control: absence read as permission is refused at module compilation', async () => {
const { error, moduleRef } = await compileWithoutProvider(
CommandsModule,
CommandAuthorizationService,
{
moduleType: CommandsModule,
token: CommandRuntimeApprovalVerifier,
useValue: {},
},
);
await closeIfCompiled(moduleRef);
expect(
error,
'absence read as permission: AppModule compilation accepted a missing CommandAuthorizationService binding',
).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
if (!(error instanceof Error)) return;
expect(error.message).toContain('CommandExecutorService');
expect(error.message).toContain('CommandAuthorizationService');
});
it('FL-11 positive control: the real graph compiles when SystemOverrideService is bound', async () => {
const moduleRef = await compileRealAppGraph();
try {
expect(moduleRef.get(SystemOverrideService, { strict: false })).toBeInstanceOf(
SystemOverrideService,
);
} finally {
await moduleRef.close();
}
});
it('FL-11 negative control: absence read as permission is refused at module compilation', async () => {
const { error, moduleRef } = await compileWithoutProvider(
PreferencesModule,
SystemOverrideService,
{
moduleType: CommandsModule,
token: CommandExecutorService,
useValue: {},
},
);
await closeIfCompiled(moduleRef);
expect(
error,
'absence read as permission: AppModule compilation accepted a missing SystemOverrideService binding',
).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
if (!(error instanceof Error)) return;
expect(error.message).toContain('AgentService');
expect(error.message).toContain('SystemOverrideService');
});
});
const actorScope = { userId: 'security-user', tenantId: 'security-tenant' };
const conversationId = 'security-conversation';
function directExecutorWithoutAuthorization(systemOverrideSet: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>) {
const registry = {
getManifest: vi.fn(() => ({
version: 1,
commands: [
{
name: 'system',
aliases: [],
description: 'Set instruction authority',
scope: 'agent' as const,
execution: 'socket' as const,
available: true,
},
],
skills: [],
})),
};
return new CommandExecutorService(
registry as never,
{ getSession: vi.fn() } as never,
{ set: systemOverrideSet, clear: vi.fn() } as never,
{ collect: vi.fn() } as never,
null,
{ agents: {} } as never,
null,
null,
{ getServerStatuses: vi.fn(() => []), getToolDefinitions: vi.fn(() => []) } as never,
undefined as never,
);
}
function directAgentWithoutSystemOverride(piPrompt: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>): {
service: AgentService;
session: AgentSession;
} {
const service = new AgentService(
{
getDefaultModel: vi.fn(() => null),
getRegistry: vi.fn(() => ({})),
findModel: vi.fn(),
listAvailableModels: vi.fn(() => []),
} as never,
{} as never,
{} as never,
{ available: false } as never,
{} as never,
{ getToolDefinitions: vi.fn(() => []) } as never,
{ loadForSession: vi.fn(async () => ({ metaTools: [], promptAdditions: [] })) } as never,
undefined as never,
null,
{ collect: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) } as never,
null,
);
const session = {
id: conversationId,
provider: 'test-provider',
modelId: 'test-model',
piSession: { prompt: piPrompt },
listeners: new Set(),
unsubscribe: vi.fn(),
createdAt: Date.now(),
promptCount: 0,
channels: new Set(),
skillPromptAdditions: [],
sandboxDir: process.cwd(),
allowedTools: null,
userId: actorScope.userId,
tenantId: actorScope.tenantId,
metrics: {
tokens: { input: 0, output: 0, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0, total: 0 },
modelSwitches: 0,
messageCount: 0,
lastActivityAt: new Date(0).toISOString(),
},
} as unknown as AgentSession;
const internals = service as unknown as { sessions: Map<string, AgentSession> };
internals.sessions.set(conversationId, session);
return { service, session };
}
describe('required security wiring — malformed direct absence has zero effects', () => {
it('FL-01 refuses command execution before any command effect when authorization is absent', async () => {
const systemOverrideSet = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const executor = directExecutorWithoutAuthorization(systemOverrideSet);
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = {
command: 'system',
args: 'authority that must not be stored',
conversationId,
};
let error: unknown;
try {
await executor.execute(payload, actorScope);
} catch (caught: unknown) {
error = caught;
}
expect
.soft(
error,
'absence read as permission: direct executor accepted missing command authorization',
)
.toBeInstanceOf(Error);
expect
.soft(
systemOverrideSet,
'absence read as permission: command effect occurred without command authorization',
)
.not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('FL-11 refuses prompt execution before any provider or session effect when system override authority is absent', async () => {
const piPrompt = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const { service, session } = directAgentWithoutSystemOverride(piPrompt);
let error: unknown;
try {
await service.prompt(conversationId, 'must not reach provider', actorScope);
} catch (caught: unknown) {
error = caught;
}
expect
.soft(
error,
'absence read as permission: direct session accepted missing system override authority',
)
.toBeInstanceOf(Error);
expect
.soft(
piPrompt,
'absence read as permission: provider prompt occurred without system override authority',
)
.not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect
.soft(
session.promptCount,
'absence read as permission: session state changed without system override authority',
)
.toBe(0);
});
});
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ function makeService(operatorMemory: unknown = null): AgentService {
{} as never, {} as never,
{ getToolDefinitions: vi.fn(() => []) } as never, { getToolDefinitions: vi.fn(() => []) } as never,
{ loadForSession: vi.fn(async () => ({ metaTools: [], promptAdditions: [] })) } as never, { loadForSession: vi.fn(async () => ({ metaTools: [], promptAdditions: [] })) } as never,
null, { get: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(null), renew: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) } as never,
null, null,
{ collect: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) } as never, { collect: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) } as never,
operatorMemory as never, operatorMemory as never,
+9 -11
View File
@@ -132,9 +132,8 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
@Inject(CoordService) private readonly coordService: CoordService, @Inject(CoordService) private readonly coordService: CoordService,
@Inject(McpClientService) private readonly mcpClientService: McpClientService, @Inject(McpClientService) private readonly mcpClientService: McpClientService,
@Inject(SkillLoaderService) private readonly skillLoaderService: SkillLoaderService, @Inject(SkillLoaderService) private readonly skillLoaderService: SkillLoaderService,
@Optional()
@Inject(SystemOverrideService) @Inject(SystemOverrideService)
private readonly systemOverride: SystemOverrideService | null, private readonly systemOverride: SystemOverrideService,
@Optional() @Optional()
@Inject(PreferencesService) @Inject(PreferencesService)
private readonly preferencesService: PreferencesService | null, private readonly preferencesService: PreferencesService | null,
@@ -709,23 +708,22 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
throw new Error(`No agent session found: ${sessionId}`); throw new Error(`No agent session found: ${sessionId}`);
} }
this.assertSessionScope(session, scope); this.assertSessionScope(session, scope);
session.promptCount += 1;
// Channel attachments are untrusted URI references. Preserve exact, // Channel attachments are untrusted URI references. Preserve exact,
// authenticated metadata for the agent without treating it as authority. // authenticated metadata for the agent without treating it as authority.
const attachmentContext = this.attachmentContext(attachments); const attachmentContext = this.attachmentContext(attachments);
// Prepend session-scoped system override if present (renew TTL on each turn) // Prepend session-scoped system override if present (renew TTL on each turn).
// Required instruction-authority wiring is consulted before session/provider effects.
let effectiveMessage = `${message}${attachmentContext}`; let effectiveMessage = `${message}${attachmentContext}`;
if (this.systemOverride) { const override = await this.systemOverride.get(sessionId, scope);
const override = await this.systemOverride.get(sessionId, scope); if (override) {
if (override) { effectiveMessage = `[System Override]\n${override}\n\n${effectiveMessage}`;
effectiveMessage = `[System Override]\n${override}\n\n${effectiveMessage}`; await this.systemOverride.renew(sessionId, scope);
await this.systemOverride.renew(sessionId, scope); this.logger.debug(`Applied system override for session ${sessionId}`);
this.logger.debug(`Applied system override for session ${sessionId}`);
}
} }
session.promptCount += 1;
try { try {
await session.piSession.prompt(effectiveMessage); await session.piSession.prompt(effectiveMessage);
} catch (err) { } catch (err) {
+5 -14
View File
@@ -451,24 +451,15 @@ describe('AppModule federation gating', (): void => {
); );
it( it(
'rejects an invalid explicit monorepo-root dotenv tier with a typed startup refusal', 'attributes an invalid monorepo-root dotenv tier to the default',
async (): Promise<void> => { async (): Promise<void> => {
const failure = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({ const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootEnvContents: 'MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER=invalid\n', rootEnvContents: 'MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER=invalid\n',
expectedProcessTier: 'invalid', expectedProcessTier: 'invalid',
}).then(
(): undefined => undefined,
(error: unknown): unknown => error,
);
expect(failure).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
expect(failure).toMatchObject({
name: 'MosaicConfigEnvironmentError',
code: 'invalid_storage_tier',
}); });
expect((failure as Error).message).toBe(
'Invalid MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER; expected "local", "standalone", or "federated".', expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
); expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'local', 'default');
}, },
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS, MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
); );
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { resolveChatRuntimeMode } from './chat-runtime.js';
interface TypedSelectionFailure {
readonly name: string;
readonly code: string;
}
describe('#1182 fail closed — a wrong answer must not be read as no answer', () => {
it('FL-07 rejects an invalid explicit CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME before embedded construction', () => {
let embeddedConstructionCount = 0;
let failure: unknown;
try {
const mode = resolveChatRuntimeMode({ CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME: 'pi-rpc-typo' });
if (mode === 'legacy') {
embeddedConstructionCount += 1;
}
} catch (error: unknown) {
failure = error;
}
expect
.soft(failure, 'invalid explicit runtime must produce a typed selection failure')
.toMatchObject({
name: 'ChatRuntimeConfigurationError',
code: 'invalid_chat_harness_runtime',
} satisfies TypedSelectionFailure);
expect(
embeddedConstructionCount,
'invalid explicit runtime must fail before the embedded runtime is constructed',
).toBe(0);
});
it.each([{}, { CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME: '' }])(
'preserves the documented transitional legacy default for true absence: %j',
(env) => {
expect(resolveChatRuntimeMode(env)).toBe('legacy');
},
);
it('anti-drift: runtime selection has no invalid-enum-to-legacy catch-all', () => {
const source = readFileSync(new URL('./chat-runtime.ts', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
expect(
source.includes("env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'] === 'pi-rpc' ? 'pi-rpc' : 'legacy'"),
'closed runtime enums must distinguish invalid explicit input from absence',
).toBe(false);
});
});
+3 -17
View File
@@ -41,28 +41,14 @@ export class ChatRuntimeUnavailableError extends Error {
} }
} }
/** Typed startup refusal for an invalid explicit chat-runtime selection. */
export class ChatRuntimeConfigurationError extends Error {
readonly code = 'invalid_chat_harness_runtime' as const;
constructor() {
super('Invalid CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME; expected "legacy" or "pi-rpc".');
this.name = 'ChatRuntimeConfigurationError';
}
}
/** /**
* Resolves the process-wide chat runtime mode from the environment. Only true * Resolves the process-wide chat runtime mode from the environment. Anything other
* absence (unset or empty) retains the documented transitional legacy default; * than the exact opt-in token `pi-rpc` keeps the legacy embedded runtime.
* any other explicit value must be a member of the closed runtime enum.
*/ */
export function resolveChatRuntimeMode( export function resolveChatRuntimeMode(
env: Record<string, string | undefined> = process.env, env: Record<string, string | undefined> = process.env,
): ChatRuntimeMode { ): ChatRuntimeMode {
const runtime = env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME']; return env['CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME'] === 'pi-rpc' ? 'pi-rpc' : 'legacy';
if (runtime === undefined || runtime === '') return 'legacy';
if (runtime === 'legacy' || runtime === 'pi-rpc') return runtime;
throw new ChatRuntimeConfigurationError();
} }
// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ const mockMcpClient = {
getToolDefinitions: vi.fn(() => []), getToolDefinitions: vi.fn(() => []),
}; };
const allowAuthorization = {
authorize: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true }),
};
function buildService( function buildService(
redis: typeof mockRedis | null = mockRedis, redis: typeof mockRedis | null = mockRedis,
mcpClient: { mcpClient: {
@@ -98,6 +102,7 @@ function buildService(
null, null,
mockChatGateway as never, mockChatGateway as never,
mcpClient as never, mcpClient as never,
allowAuthorization as never,
); );
} }
@@ -35,9 +35,8 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
@Inject(forwardRef(() => ChatGateway)) @Inject(forwardRef(() => ChatGateway))
private readonly chatGateway: ChatGateway | null, private readonly chatGateway: ChatGateway | null,
@Inject(McpClientService) private readonly mcpClient: McpClientService, @Inject(McpClientService) private readonly mcpClient: McpClientService,
@Optional()
@Inject(CommandAuthorizationService) @Inject(CommandAuthorizationService)
private readonly authorization: CommandAuthorizationService | null = null, private readonly authorization: CommandAuthorizationService,
) {} ) {}
async execute( async execute(
@@ -57,13 +56,13 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
}; };
} }
const authorization = await this.authorization?.authorize( const authorization = await this.authorization.authorize(
def, def,
payload, payload,
userId, userId,
payload.approvalId, payload.approvalId,
); );
if (authorization && !authorization.allowed) { if (!authorization.allowed) {
return { command, conversationId, success: false, message: authorization.reason }; return { command, conversationId, success: false, message: authorization.reason };
} }
@@ -171,7 +170,7 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
const def = this.registry const def = this.registry
.getManifest() .getManifest()
.commands.find((command) => command.name === payload.command); .commands.find((command) => command.name === payload.command);
if (!def || !this.authorization) return null; if (!def) return null;
return this.authorization.createApproval(def, payload, scope.userId); return this.authorization.createApproval(def, payload, scope.userId);
} }
@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ const mockMcpClient = {
reconnectServer: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined), reconnectServer: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
}; };
const allowAuthorization = {
authorize: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true }),
};
// ─── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── // ─── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
function buildRegistry(): CommandRegistryService { function buildRegistry(): CommandRegistryService {
@@ -74,6 +78,7 @@ function buildExecutor(registry: CommandRegistryService): CommandExecutorService
null, // reloadService (optional) null, // reloadService (optional)
null, // chatGateway (optional) null, // chatGateway (optional)
mockMcpClient as never, mockMcpClient as never,
allowAuthorization as never,
); );
} }
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ describe('ReloadService — /reload command sanitizes plugin errors', () => {
reloadService, reloadService,
mockChatGateway as never, mockChatGateway as never,
mockMcpClient as never, mockMcpClient as never,
{ authorize: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true }) } as never,
); );
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'reload', conversationId: 'conv-1' }; const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'reload', conversationId: 'conv-1' };
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
# #1179 — Required security DI wiring
## Objective
Eliminate the shared fail-open defect class **absence read as permission**:
- FL-01: missing `CommandAuthorizationService` must refuse Nest startup and must not permit command effects.
- FL-11: missing `SystemOverrideService` must refuse Nest startup and must not omit stored instruction authority while allowing provider/session effects.
## Tracking
- Issue: #1179, child of #1156
- Branch: `fix/1179-required-security-di`
- Base: `origin/next` at `216cd72226cd9ee17eea461cfe7cd0e010a22f02`
## Plan
1. RED: compile the real `AppModule` graph with each required provider independently removed, with a positive control for each intact binding.
2. RED: directly exercise each malformed absence path and assert zero command/provider/session effects.
3. Stop and report RED to the coordinator before production implementation.
4. After authorization, make both constructor injections required, remove absence-as-permission branches, and update explicit legitimate optional test seams.
5. Run focused Gateway tests, typecheck, lint, format, build, independent exact-head verification, and focused security review.
## Immutable path fence
Production changes are confined to:
- `apps/gateway/src/commands/command-executor.service.ts`
- `apps/gateway/src/agent/agent.service.ts`
Tests and task evidence are confined to:
- `apps/gateway/src/__tests__/required-security-wiring.test.ts`
- existing direct-constructor specs that require explicit required arguments
- `docs/scratchpads/1179-required-security-di.md`
No files in #1178, #1072, #1080, or #1054 lanes are in scope. `docs/TASKS.md` is orchestrator-owned and will not be modified.
## Budget
No explicit token ceiling was provided. Working assumption: one narrow Gateway security packet; split and stop if either arm requires unrelated module rewiring.
## Progress
- Intake read from #1179 and parent #1156.
- Base independently resolved from the issue's pre-native-stage ordering and repository `origin/next` ref; branch HEAD verified byte-for-byte against the remote ref.
- Real consumers and direct constructors inventoried.
## Tests
### RED
- `required-security-wiring.test.ts`: 4 failed, 2 passed before implementation.
- Both real-graph negative controls showed module compilation accepted the missing target binding.
- Direct FL-01 showed one unauthorized command effect; direct FL-11 showed one provider prompt and one session counter mutation.
### GREEN
- `required-security-wiring.test.ts`: 6/6 passed.
- FL-01-only production revert: exactly the two FL-01 test cases failed; all four other cases, including FL-11, passed.
- FL-11-only production revert: exactly the two FL-11 test cases failed; all four other cases, including FL-01, passed.
- Full Gateway suite: 74 files passed, 7 skipped; 831 tests passed, 17 skipped.
- Gateway typecheck: passed.
- Gateway lint: passed.
- Gateway build: passed.
- Changed-file Prettier check: passed.
### Review
- Codex code review: APPROVE, 0 findings.
- Codex focused security review: risk `none`, 0 findings.
- Independent exact-head review remains assigned to Scrappy through the coordinator.
## Risks / blockers
- `AgentModule` / `CommandsModule` / `ChatModule` contain a production cycle; the module test therefore uses the real top-level `AppModule` and replaces only storage/network leaves, preserving the target service in each arm while isolating the separate required consumer that would otherwise mask that arm's defect.
- No broad module rewrite was required.
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
# #1182 — fail closed when a wrong answer is read as no answer
## Objective
Implement FL-07 through FL-10 as one narrow fail-closed change: explicit invalid runtime/storage enum values and launcher failures must never be interpreted as absence or success.
## Tracking
- Issue: #1182 (child of #1156; W-F1 prerequisite)
- Branch: `fix/1182-fail-closed-launch`
- Verified base: `origin/next` at `216cd72226cd9ee17eea461cfe7cd0e010a22f02`
## Scope and fence
- Gateway chat runtime enum resolution and focused tests.
- Config storage-tier enum resolution and focused tests.
- Mosaic launcher spawn/provenance failure handling and focused integration/anti-drift tests.
- Narrow operator documentation in `packages/mosaic/README.md` if required by the behavior change.
- Preserve the #1109 lease broker without refactor; do not implement W-F1 composition.
- Do not touch #1178, #1179, #1072, #1080, #1054, `docs/TASKS.md`, or unrelated source/docs.
## Plan
1. RED: add one independent negative control per FL finding plus exact anti-drift checks.
2. Pause and report BASE / BRANCH / FENCE / SPLIT / RED to the coordinator.
3. After coordinator confirmation, implement each minimal fail-closed fix and verify each negative control independently.
4. Run affected package and repository test/typecheck/lint/build/format gates, focused security review, then commit/push/PR for independent exact-head verification.
## Split assessment
One PR remains reviewable: three narrowly bounded decision boundaries, no shared abstraction, no lease-broker refactor, and four independent tests naming the single defect class. Splitting would separate the same fail-closed invariant without reducing implementation coupling. If RED reveals material launcher harness expansion, split before production edits; the Gateway config half is the direct W-F1 selection prerequisite and would gate first.
## Budget
No explicit token or monetary cap supplied. Keep scope to the three production files, focused tests, this scratchpad, and one existing README.
## Progress
- Issue #1182 and parent #1156 read directly through Mosaic wrappers.
- Base derived from issue dependency plus repository topology: FL-07 exists on `origin/next` (introduced by #1172) and is absent from `origin/main`; branch reset before edits to the exact `origin/next` head above.
## Verification evidence
- RED observed independently for FL-07 through FL-10 before implementation.
- Focused GREEN: Gateway runtime 4/4, config 5/5, launcher 6/6.
- Four final per-finding production reverts discriminated: FL-07 made only FL-07 red; FL-08 made its unit and real Gateway boundary controls red after rebuilding config; FL-09 made only its abnormal-spawn controls red; FL-10 made all three provenance controls (`opencode`, `claudex`, and `yolo claudex`) red while sibling findings stayed green.
- Public config export negative control: removing only the `packages/config/src/index.ts` export caused TS2305 and `MosaicConfigEnvironmentError is not a constructor`; restoring it passed 5/5.
- Gateway full package: 74 files passed, 7 skipped; 829 tests passed, 17 skipped.
- Config full test/typecheck/lint/build: green.
- Mosaic typecheck/lint/build: green. Vitest is qualified-red only on the exact three update-notice stderr assertions tracked by #1190 — bare `--source`, bare `--decisions`, and bare `--observations`; 1528 other tests pass.
- The separate `test:framework-shell` command is red and is not attributed to #1190: `invariant_r_unittest.py` reports the host Pi runtime changed from measured 0.84.1 to 0.80.7. A clean archive of `origin/next@216cd722` reproduces the same single failure. The base test hardcodes the W-B measurement as `PI_VERSION = "0.84.1"`, then resolves `pi` via `shutil.which` and executes `--version`; on this host that is `/home/hermes/.npm-global/bin/pi`, whose global package reports 0.80.7. Issue #1191 tracks the immediate host drift and hardcoded-version design defect; #1184 tracks pinning/approving native Pi 0.84.1. No related source or test is changed here.
- Repository typecheck/lint/format/build: green.
- Codex security review: no findings. Initial code-review blocker (claudex provenance bypass) remediated with normal/yolo claudex coverage; subsequent public-export finding remediated.
## Risks / blockers
- Coordinated branch: no merge authority; coordinator routes independent exact-head verification.
- #1179 currently owns `apps/gateway/src/__tests__/required-security-wiring.test.ts`; this change does not touch it.
- #1190 independently tracks the pre-existing CLI smoke/update-notice stderr collision; no #1190 source or test is included here.
-1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ export {
DEFAULT_LOCAL_CONFIG, DEFAULT_LOCAL_CONFIG,
DEFAULT_STANDALONE_CONFIG, DEFAULT_STANDALONE_CONFIG,
DEFAULT_FEDERATED_CONFIG, DEFAULT_FEDERATED_CONFIG,
MosaicConfigEnvironmentError,
loadConfig, loadConfig,
validateConfig, validateConfig,
detectFromEnv, detectFromEnv,
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { MosaicConfigEnvironmentError as PublicMosaicConfigEnvironmentError } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import { detectFromEnv } from './mosaic-config.js';
interface TypedSelectionFailure {
readonly name: string;
readonly code: string;
}
describe('#1182 fail closed — a wrong answer must not be read as no answer', () => {
const originalEnv = process.env;
it('exports the typed storage-tier refusal from the public @mosaicstack/config entry point', () => {
expect(new PublicMosaicConfigEnvironmentError()).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
});
beforeEach(() => {
process.env = { ...originalEnv };
delete process.env['DATABASE_URL'];
delete process.env['VALKEY_URL'];
delete process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER'];
});
afterEach(() => {
process.env = originalEnv;
});
it('FL-08 rejects an invalid explicit MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER before local PGlite selection', () => {
process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER'] = 'federatd';
let pgliteSelectionCount = 0;
let failure: unknown;
try {
const config = detectFromEnv();
if (config.storage.type === 'pglite') {
pgliteSelectionCount += 1;
}
} catch (error: unknown) {
failure = error;
}
expect
.soft(failure, 'invalid explicit storage tier must produce a typed selection failure')
.toMatchObject({
name: 'MosaicConfigEnvironmentError',
code: 'invalid_storage_tier',
} satisfies TypedSelectionFailure);
expect(
pgliteSelectionCount,
'invalid explicit storage tier must fail before local PGlite is selected',
).toBe(0);
});
it.each([undefined, ''])('preserves the local default for true absence: %j', (tier) => {
if (tier === undefined) delete process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER'];
else process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER'] = tier;
const config = detectFromEnv();
expect(config.tier).toBe('local');
expect(config.storage.type).toBe('pglite');
});
it('anti-drift: storage selection validates a non-empty tier before the local default', () => {
const source = readFileSync(new URL('./mosaic-config.ts', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
expect(
/if \(tier !== undefined && tier !== ''[^]*throw new [A-Za-z]+Error/.test(source),
'closed storage enums must reject invalid explicit input before DEFAULT_LOCAL_CONFIG',
).toBe(true);
});
});
-14
View File
@@ -20,16 +20,6 @@ export interface MosaicConfig {
memory: MemoryConfigRef; memory: MemoryConfigRef;
} }
/** Typed startup refusal for an invalid explicit storage-tier selection. */
export class MosaicConfigEnvironmentError extends Error {
readonly code = 'invalid_storage_tier' as const;
constructor() {
super('Invalid MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER; expected "local", "standalone", or "federated".');
this.name = 'MosaicConfigEnvironmentError';
}
}
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ /* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* Defaults */ /* Defaults */
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ /* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
@@ -136,10 +126,6 @@ export function validateConfig(raw: unknown): MosaicConfig {
export function detectFromEnv(): MosaicConfig { export function detectFromEnv(): MosaicConfig {
const tier = process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER']; const tier = process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER'];
if (tier !== undefined && tier !== '' && !VALID_TIERS.has(tier)) {
throw new MosaicConfigEnvironmentError();
}
if (tier === 'federated') { if (tier === 'federated') {
if (process.env['DATABASE_URL']) { if (process.env['DATABASE_URL']) {
return { return {
-16
View File
@@ -26,15 +26,6 @@ Set `MOSAIC_ASSUME_YES=1` (or ensure stdin is not a TTY) to skip all interactive
| `MOSAIC_ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` | _(none)_ | No | | `MOSAIC_ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` | _(none)_ | No |
| `MOSAIC_CORS_ORIGIN` | `http://localhost:3000` | No | | `MOSAIC_CORS_ORIGIN` | `http://localhost:3000` | No |
`MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER` is a closed enum: `local`, `standalone`, or `federated`.
Unset or empty input selects the documented local default. Any other non-empty
value is a typed startup error and is rejected before a storage adapter is
selected.
The Gateway process also accepts `CHAT_HARNESS_RUNTIME=legacy|pi-rpc`. Unset or
empty input retains the transitional `legacy` default. Any other non-empty value
is a typed startup error and is rejected before either runtime is selected.
### Admin user bootstrap ### Admin user bootstrap
| Variable | Default | Required | | Variable | Default | Required |
@@ -64,13 +55,6 @@ mosaic yolo claude # …with --dangerously-skip-permissions
mosaic codex | opencode | pi mosaic codex | opencode | pi
``` ```
Every runtime launch requires its immutable `session.launch` provenance record
to be written before spawn. A provenance-write failure exits nonzero, starts no
runtime, and propagates no `MOSAIC_LAUNCH_ID`. Likewise, a spawn error, signal,
or missing numeric child status is reported with the fixed
`runtime_launch_failed` code and exits nonzero rather than being interpreted as
success.
### `mosaic claudex` (EXPERIMENTAL) ### `mosaic claudex` (EXPERIMENTAL)
Runs GPT models **inside the Claude Code harness** by pointing Claude Code at a Runs GPT models **inside the Claude Code harness** by pointing Claude Code at a
@@ -53,21 +53,23 @@ sends, it does not auto-reply.
### Exit codes ### Exit codes
| rc | Meaning | | rc | Meaning |
| --- | ---------------------------------------------- | | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 0 | delivered or queued | | 0 | delivered or queued |
| 1 | target session not found | | 1 | target session not found |
| 2 | text reached the pane but is **still a draft** | | 2 | submission unconfirmed: draft still on the input line, or no positive evidence of submission |
| 3 | usage error (bad class, missing `-s`) | | 3 | usage error (bad class, missing `-s`) |
**Never retry on rc=2.** The message is in the target pane; retrying double-sends it. Confirm **Never retry on rc=2.** The message may be in the target pane, and a retry can double-send it.
instead: Confirm instead:
```bash ```bash
tmux capture-pane -p -t <session>:0.0 | tail -20 tmux capture-pane -p -t <session>:0.0 | tail -20
``` ```
rc=2 is the normal result when the target is an idle pi seat. rc=0 is the normal result for both idle and busy pi seats (submission confirmed by draft
transition, not by prompt glyph). rc=2 on a healthy seat is exceptional — treat it as a real
report and investigate the pane.
## Durable comms ## Durable comms
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-lane-brief-pr-linkage.sh | unmeasured i
# --- tools/tmux: require a live tmux server --- # --- tools/tmux: require a live tmux server ---
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-socket.sh | requires a real tmux server on a throwaway socket; CI image ships no tmux; #1017 burndown (needs tmux in image or a signed permanent exclusion) packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-socket.sh | requires a real tmux server on a throwaway socket; CI image ships no tmux; #1017 burndown (needs tmux in image or a signed permanent exclusion)
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-verdict.sh | requires real tmux-pane fixtures on a throwaway socket; CI image ships no tmux; #1017 burndown (same condition as its sibling) packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-verdict.sh | requires real tmux-pane fixtures on a throwaway socket; CI image ships no tmux; #1017 burndown (same condition as its sibling)
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-glyph-agnostic.sh | requires real tmux-pane fixtures on a throwaway socket; CI image ships no tmux; #1017 burndown (same condition as its siblings) — signed at adoption of #1262 (rev-code-02 F5), red-first verified on sb-it-1-dt
# --- single-suite directories: unmeasured in CI --- # --- single-suite directories: unmeasured in CI ---
@@ -97,13 +97,34 @@ printf '%s' "$MSG" | "${tmux_cmd[@]}" load-buffer -b "$BUF" -
# would otherwise accumulate forever. # would otherwise accumulate forever.
sleep 0.5 sleep 0.5
# 2) Submit, then POSITIVELY confirm submission; flush with another Enter if it is # 2) Submit, then POSITIVELY confirm submission by DRAFT TRANSITION, not by prompt
# still a draft. Success requires positive evidence — the queued banner, OR the # glyph. The historical bug was treating ABSENCE of a draft as delivery; the
# REPL input box located AND clear of our message tail. The historical bug was # 2026-08 fix over-corrected to glyph inference (grep '|^>|│ >'), which locates
# treating ABSENCE of a draft as delivery: if the prompt glyph was never matched # only Claude Code's box and false-NEGATIVES every glyphless REPL (pi renders a
# (wrong pane / prompt-glyph drift), an unsubmitted message read as "delivered" # U+2500 rule, no glyph) — a delivered message reported "UNDELIVERED", driving a
# and worker->lead relays stalled silently. We now default to UNCONFIRMED and only # retry that duplicates it. Runtime-agnostic evidence: our message tail sits on
# upgrade to delivered on positive evidence; anything we cannot confirm fails loud. # the INPUT line (located by the cursor row, not a glyph) BEFORE Enter, and has
# LEFT it AFTER — that transition is positive proof of submission and needs no
# glyph. Absence alone still never means delivered: if we never saw our draft on
# the input line we stay UNCONFIRMED (wrong/dead pane), and a draft that never
# leaves the input line stays a DRAFT (exit 2), preserving both historical guards.
_cursor_line() { # echo the pane's current input (cursor) line, glyph-free
local cy line
cy=$("${tmux_cmd[@]}" display-message -p -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" -F '#{cursor_y}' 2>/dev/null) || return 1
[ -n "$cy" ] || return 1
"${tmux_cmd[@]}" capture-pane -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" -p 2>/dev/null | sed -n "$((cy + 1))p"
}
_draft_on_input() { # true iff our message tail is sitting on the input line now
[ -n "$snippet" ] || return 1
grep -qF "$snippet" <<<"$(_cursor_line)"
}
# Baseline: after the paste, our draft must be on the input line. This is positive
# proof we are on the right pane and the paste landed — the anchor the transition
# check measures against.
saw_draft=0
_draft_on_input && saw_draft=1
status="unconfirmed" status="unconfirmed"
for attempt in $(seq 1 $((RETRIES + 1))); do for attempt in $(seq 1 $((RETRIES + 1))); do
"${tmux_cmd[@]}" send-keys -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" Enter "${tmux_cmd[@]}" send-keys -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" Enter
@@ -113,20 +134,26 @@ for attempt in $(seq 1 $((RETRIES + 1))); do
if grep -qF "$QUEUED_RE" <<<"$pane"; then if grep -qF "$QUEUED_RE" <<<"$pane"; then
status="queued"; break status="queued"; break
fi fi
# Locate the REPL input box (prompt glyph). If we cannot see it, we have NO # POSITIVE draft evidence from a located prompt box, when one exists. This is the
# evidence of submission state — stay UNCONFIRMED and retry; never infer delivery. # cursor-row check's blind spot: a pane in COOKED mode (a plain shell whose
# foreground process never reads stdin) echoes our paste via the kernel line
# discipline and moves the cursor off it on Enter, which is indistinguishable from
# a real submit by cursor row alone. If a prompt box IS locatable and still carries
# our tail, that is affirmative proof the message was not consumed. Absence of a
# glyph is still never used for anything — that inference is the original E7 bug.
promptline=$(printf '%s' "$pane" | grep -E '|^>|│ >' | tail -1) promptline=$(printf '%s' "$pane" | grep -E '|^>|│ >' | tail -1)
if [ -z "$promptline" ]; then if [ -n "$promptline" ] && [ -n "$snippet" ] && grep -qF "$snippet" <<<"$promptline"; then
status="unconfirmed"; continue
fi
# Input box located AND still carrying our tail => unsubmitted draft. Flush + retry.
# (Submitted messages scroll up into history; a draft stays on the line.)
if [ -n "$snippet" ] && grep -qF "$snippet" <<<"$promptline"; then
status="draft"; continue status="draft"; continue
fi fi
# Input box located AND clear of our tail => positively submitted. This is the if [ "$saw_draft" = 1 ]; then
# only path to success besides the queued banner. if _draft_on_input; then
status="delivered"; break status="draft"; continue # still on the input line => not submitted; flush + retry
fi
status="delivered"; break # left the input line => positively submitted
fi
# No confirmed baseline yet: try to (re)acquire it; never infer delivery from absence.
if _draft_on_input; then saw_draft=1; status="draft"; continue; fi
status="unconfirmed"; continue
done done
[ "$VERBOSE" = 1 ] && { echo "--- pane tail ($TARGET) ---"; printf '%s\n' "$pane" | tail -4; echo "---"; } [ "$VERBOSE" = 1 ] && { echo "--- pane tail ($TARGET) ---"; printf '%s\n' "$pane" | tail -4; echo "---"; }
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Red-first regression test for E7 (#1017 task 2): the confirm-check must bind
# "delivered" to WHETHER THE MESSAGE WAS SUBMITTED, not to which runtime's prompt
# glyph is present. A pi seat renders a U+2500 rule input box with no /^>/│ >
# glyph; send-message.sh:118 locates the box only by glyph, so a genuinely
# delivered message on a glyphless REPL falsely reports exit 2 "may be UNDELIVERED",
# and the operator's rc=2-driven retry duplicates it.
#
# Parameterized on $SEND: RED against the shipping blob (B and D fail), GREEN
# against a candidate patch. No pi; no fake HOME; hermetic throwaway socket.
#
# Submission counting is EXACT and terminal-echo-independent: the fixture message
# is `echo <tok> >>SINK`; each real submission appends one line. wc -l SINK ==
# number of times the REPL actually executed the send. This does not depend on how
# many times the marker string is painted on screen.
set -u
SEND="${SEND:?set SEND=/path/to/send-message.sh}"
SOCKET="glyphagnostic-$$"
TMP="$(mktemp -d)"
tmux() { command tmux -L "$SOCKET" "$@"; }
cleanup() { command tmux -L "$SOCKET" kill-server 2>/dev/null; rm -rf "$TMP"; }
trap cleanup EXIT
pass=0; fail=0
ok() { printf 'ok %s\n' "$1"; pass=$((pass+1)); }
no() { printf 'FAIL %s -- %s\n' "$1" "$2"; fail=$((fail+1)); }
mk() { tmux new-session -d -s "$1" -x 120 -y 40 -c "$TMP" "PS1='$2' exec bash --noprofile --norc -i"; sleep 0.5; }
subs() { [ -f "$1" ] && wc -l <"$1" | tr -d ' ' || echo 0; } # exact submission count
echo "SEND=$SEND tmux $(command tmux -V | awk '{print $2}')"
# --- A (control): glyph box () that submits => exit 0, exactly one submission.
mk ctl ' '
SINK="$TMP/sink.ctl"
out=$("$SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -t ctl -m "echo x >>'$SINK'" 2>"$TMP/e.ctl"); rc=$?; sleep 0.4
if [ "$rc" = 0 ] && [ "$(subs "$SINK")" = 1 ]; then
ok "control: -box submits => exit 0, exactly one submission"
else no "control: -box submits => exit 0, one submission" "rc=$rc subs=$(subs "$SINK") err=[$(cat "$TMP/e.ctl")]"; fi
# --- B (THE false-rc regression): glyphless U+2500 box that SUBMITS. Message lands
# (subs==1) yet shipping reports exit 2. Must be exit 0.
mk sub $'──────── \n'
SINK="$TMP/sink.sub"
out=$("$SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -t sub -m "echo x >>'$SINK'" 2>"$TMP/e.sub"); rc=$?; sleep 0.4
if [ "$rc" = 0 ] && [ "$(subs "$SINK")" = 1 ]; then
ok "glyphless: U+2500 box that submits => exit 0 (delivered, not 'UNDELIVERED')"
else no "glyphless: U+2500 box that submits => exit 0" \
"rc=$rc subs=$(subs "$SINK")(delivered=$([ "$(subs "$SINK")" -ge 1 ] && echo yes||echo no)) err=[$(cat "$TMP/e.sub")]"; fi
# --- D (duplicate arm): operator follows the rc=2 stderr and retries once. On the
# glyphless box, shipping => two submissions (the reported duplicate). The
# property: one logical send => exactly one submission. Same fix closes it.
mk dup $'──────── \n'
SINK="$TMP/sink.dup"
tries=0
for attempt in 1 2; do
tries=$((tries+1))
out=$("$SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -t dup -m "echo x >>'$SINK'" 2>/dev/null); rc=$?
sleep 0.4
[ "$rc" = 0 ] && break # operator stops retrying only when told delivered
done
if [ "$(subs "$SINK")" = 1 ]; then
ok "duplicate: one logical send (rc-driven retry) => exactly one submission (tries=$tries)"
else no "duplicate: one logical send => exactly one submission" "submissions=$(subs "$SINK") tries=$tries"; fi
# --- E (faithful hung managed TUI, NOT a cooked shell): raw/no-echo, paints nothing.
# A cooked `sleep infinity` echoes the paste via the kernel line discipline and
# false-passes a cursor-row fix that is correct on real seats (measured). So: raw.
mk_rawstuck() { tmux new-session -d -s "$1" -x 120 -y 40 -c "$TMP" \
"bash --noprofile --norc -c 'stty -echo -icanon min 1 time 0 2>/dev/null; exec sleep infinity'"; sleep 0.5; }
mk_rawstuck estuck
SINK="$TMP/sink.estuck"
out=$("$SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -t estuck -r 1 -m "this stuck draft was never submitted" 2>/dev/null); rc=$?
sleep 0.3
if [ "$rc" != 0 ] && [ "$(subs "$SINK")" = 0 ]; then
ok "raw/no-echo stuck TUI (not submitted) => non-zero (no false delivered)"
else no "raw stuck TUI must NOT report delivered" "rc=$rc subs=$(subs "$SINK")"; fi
# --- F (busy/queued branch, your BUSY-not-runtime finding): glyphless pane rendering the
# queued banner, never consuming. QUEUED_RE :113 fires before the glyph grep => rc=0.
mk_busy() { tmux new-session -d -s "$1" -x 120 -y 40 -c "$TMP" \
"bash --noprofile --norc -c 'printf \"Press up to edit queued messages\n\"; exec sleep infinity'"; sleep 0.5; }
mk_busy ebusy
SINK="$TMP/sink.ebusy"
out=$("$SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -t ebusy -m "echo x >>'$SINK'" 2>/dev/null); rc=$?; sleep 0.3
if [ "$rc" = 0 ]; then
ok "busy/queued-banner glyphless => exit 0 (queued is delivery; runtime owns custody)"
else no "busy/queued-banner must report delivered" "rc=$rc"; fi
# --- C (historical-bug guard): unresolvable target. No pane ever carried our draft
# => must fail, never infer delivered from absence of a glyph/snippet.
if out=$("$SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -t "nonexistent-$$" -m "echo x >>'$TMP/sink.wrong'" 2>/dev/null); then
no "wrong-pane: unresolvable target must NOT report success" "expected non-zero, got 0"
else ok "wrong-pane: unresolvable target => non-zero (no false delivered)"; fi
echo "---"; echo "pass=$pass fail=$fail"
[ "$fail" = 0 ]
@@ -4,16 +4,19 @@
# #
# 1. DELIVERED — a REPL that renders a ` ` input box and submits on Enter # 1. DELIVERED — a REPL that renders a ` ` input box and submits on Enter
# (text scrolls to history, box clears) => exit 0 "✓ delivered". # (text scrolls to history, box clears) => exit 0 "✓ delivered".
# 2. UNCONFIRMED — a pane with NO locatable prompt glyph. This is the exact # 2. DELIVERED — a pane with NO prompt glyph that DOES submit => exit 0. A pi
# historical FALSE POSITIVE: pre-patch it printed "✓ delivered" # seat is this fixture (U+2500 rule, no glyph). Reshaped for
# exit 0; post-patch it MUST fail loud (exit 2, stderr # #1257; see the note at the fixture for why the old exit-2
# "could not confirm submission"). # assertion was wrong.
# 2b. UNCONFIRMED— a glyphless pane that never submits (raw/no-echo hung TUI)
# => must fail loud. This carries the historical
# false-positive guard that fixture 2 used to be credited with.
# 3. DRAFT — a ` `-prompt pane that never submits (message stays on the # 3. DRAFT — a ` `-prompt pane that never submits (message stays on the
# input line) => exit 2, stderr "unsubmitted draft". # input line) => exit 2, stderr "unsubmitted draft".
set -uo pipefail set -uo pipefail
HERE=$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd) HERE=$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)
SEND="$HERE/send-message.sh" SEND="${SEND:-$HERE/send-message.sh}"
SOCKET="verdict-test-$RANDOM-$$" SOCKET="verdict-test-$RANDOM-$$"
TMP=$(mktemp -d) TMP=$(mktemp -d)
trap 'tmux -L "$SOCKET" kill-server >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT trap 'tmux -L "$SOCKET" kill-server >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
@@ -37,19 +40,44 @@ else
no "delivered: -prompt REPL that submits => exit 0 ✓ delivered" "rc=$rc out=[$out] err=[$(cat "$TMP/e1")]" no "delivered: -prompt REPL that submits => exit 0 ✓ delivered" "rc=$rc out=[$out] err=[$(cat "$TMP/e1")]"
fi fi
# --- Fixture 2: NO prompt glyph (default bash PS1). THE regression: pre-patch this # --- Fixture 2: NO prompt glyph, and the pane DOES submit (interactive bash).
# was a silent false-positive "delivered"; post-patch it must be unconfirmed→exit 2. # RESHAPED 2026-08-16 (#1257), deliberately. This fixture previously asserted
# exit 2 here and was labelled "false-positive FIXED". That assertion was wrong,
# and locking it in is what kept E7 alive: the pane submits, so "delivered" is
# the truth, and a pi seat — whose input box is a bare U+2500 rule with no glyph
# — IS this fixture. Reporting exit 2 for it told operators a delivered message
# may be undelivered, and the retry that advice invites is the duplicate.
#
# The guard this fixture was reaching for is real and is NOT dropped: "never
# infer delivered from absence" is now enforced positively by fixture 2b below
# (glyphless AND not submitting => must fail) and by fixture 3 (locatable box
# still carrying our tail => draft). Absence alone decides nothing either way.
tmux -L "$SOCKET" new-session -d -s noglyph -c "$TMP" \ tmux -L "$SOCKET" new-session -d -s noglyph -c "$TMP" \
'PS1="sh-noglyph$ " exec bash --noprofile --norc -i' 'PS1="sh-noglyph$ " exec bash --noprofile --norc -i'
sleep 0.3 sleep 0.3
if out=$("$SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -t "=noglyph" -m "verdict fixture two must fail loud" 2>"$TMP/e2"); then out=$("$SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -t "=noglyph" -m "verdict fixture two must fail loud" 2>"$TMP/e2"); rc=$?
no "unconfirmed: glyphless pane must NOT report success" "expected exit 2, got 0 (out=[$out])" if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] && grep -qF "✓ delivered" <<<"$out"; then
ok "delivered: glyphless pane that submits => exit 0 (runtime-agnostic, E7 FIXED)"
else
no "delivered: glyphless pane that submits => exit 0" "rc=$rc out=[$out] err=[$(cat "$TMP/e2")]"
fi
# --- Fixture 2b: NO prompt glyph AND never submits — a hung managed TUI holding the
# terminal in raw/no-echo, which is what a stuck agent seat actually is (measured
# on live pi: stty -echo -icanon). Nothing is echoed, nothing is consumed, so
# there is no positive evidence of submission and the tool MUST fail loud. This
# is the historical false-positive guard, kept as a positive test.
tmux -L "$SOCKET" new-session -d -s rawstuck -c "$TMP" \
'bash --noprofile --norc -c "stty -echo -icanon min 1 time 0 2>/dev/null; exec sleep infinity"'
sleep 0.3
if out=$("$SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -t "=rawstuck" -r 1 -m "verdict fixture two-b never submitted" 2>"$TMP/e2b"); then
no "unconfirmed: glyphless hung TUI must NOT report success" "expected non-zero, got 0 (out=[$out])"
else else
rc=$? rc=$?
if [ "$rc" -eq 2 ] && grep -qF "could not confirm submission" "$TMP/e2"; then if [ "$rc" -ne 0 ] && grep -qF "could not confirm submission" "$TMP/e2b"; then
ok "unconfirmed: glyphless pane => exit 2 + 'could not confirm submission' (false-positive FIXED)" ok "unconfirmed: glyphless hung TUI (raw/no-echo) => non-zero + 'could not confirm submission'"
else else
no "unconfirmed: glyphless pane => exit 2 + stderr" "rc=$rc err=[$(cat "$TMP/e2")]" no "unconfirmed: glyphless hung TUI => non-zero + stderr" "rc=$rc err=[$(cat "$TMP/e2b")]"
fi fi
fi fi
@@ -1,193 +0,0 @@
import { spawnSync, type SpawnSyncReturns } from 'node:child_process';
import {
chmodSync,
existsSync,
mkdirSync,
mkdtempSync,
readFileSync,
rmSync,
writeFileSync,
} from 'node:fs';
import { createRequire } from 'node:module';
import { delimiter, join } from 'node:path';
import { pathToFileURL } from 'node:url';
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
const TSX_LOADER_URL = pathToFileURL(require.resolve('tsx')).href;
const COMMANDER_MODULE_URL = pathToFileURL(require.resolve('commander')).href;
const LAUNCH_MODULE_URL = pathToFileURL(join(import.meta.dirname, 'launch.ts')).href;
const DRIVER = `
const launch = await import(${JSON.stringify(LAUNCH_MODULE_URL)});
if (process.env['TEST_CLAUDEX_PROVENANCE'] === '1') {
const execute = launch.execRecordedClaudexRuntime;
if (typeof execute !== 'function') {
process.stderr.write('[missing_recorded_claudex_runtime]\\n');
process.exit(70);
}
execute([], process.env, process.env['TEST_DANGEROUS'] === '1');
} else {
const { Command } = await import(${JSON.stringify(COMMANDER_MODULE_URL)});
const program = new Command();
program.exitOverride();
launch.registerLaunchCommands(program);
await program.parseAsync(['node', 'mosaic', 'opencode']);
}
`;
interface LaunchFixture {
readonly root: string;
readonly home: string;
readonly bin: string;
readonly runtimePath: string;
}
function createFixture(): LaunchFixture {
const root = mkdtempSync('/var/tmp/mosaic-launch-fail-closed-');
const home = join(root, 'mosaic-home');
const bin = join(root, 'bin');
const runtimePath = join(bin, 'opencode');
mkdirSync(join(home, 'runtime', 'opencode'), { recursive: true });
mkdirSync(bin, { recursive: true });
writeFileSync(join(home, 'AGENTS.md'), '# test agents\n');
writeFileSync(join(home, 'SOUL.md'), '# test soul\n');
writeFileSync(join(home, 'USER.md'), '# test user\n');
writeFileSync(join(home, 'TOOLS.md'), '# test tools\n');
writeFileSync(join(home, 'runtime', 'opencode', 'RUNTIME.md'), '# test runtime\n');
return { root, home, bin, runtimePath };
}
function installRuntime(fixture: LaunchFixture, source: string): void {
writeFileSync(fixture.runtimePath, source);
chmodSync(fixture.runtimePath, 0o755);
}
function runLauncher(
fixture: LaunchFixture,
extraEnv: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = {},
): SpawnSyncReturns<string> {
const env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = {
...process.env,
...extraEnv,
MOSAIC_HOME: fixture.home,
PATH: `${fixture.bin}${delimiter}${process.env['PATH'] ?? ''}`,
};
delete env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'];
delete env['MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS'];
delete env['MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY'];
return spawnSync(
process.execPath,
['--import', TSX_LOADER_URL, '--input-type=module', '--eval', DRIVER],
{
cwd: fixture.root,
encoding: 'utf8',
env,
},
);
}
describe('#1182 fail closed — a wrong answer must not be read as no answer', () => {
let fixture: LaunchFixture;
beforeEach(() => {
fixture = createFixture();
});
afterEach(() => {
rmSync(fixture.root, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it.each([
{
condition: 'spawn error',
runtime: '#!/definitely/missing/interpreter\n',
},
{
condition: 'signal with null status',
runtime: '#!/usr/bin/env bash\nkill -TERM $$\n',
},
])('FL-09 converts $condition into a sanitized nonzero launch failure', ({ runtime }) => {
installRuntime(fixture, runtime);
const result = runLauncher(fixture);
expect.soft(result.status, 'spawn failure must never be converted into exit 0').not.toBe(0);
expect
.soft(result.stderr, 'spawn failure must report the fixed typed runtime_launch_failed code')
.toContain('[runtime_launch_failed]');
expect(
result.stderr,
'spawn diagnostics must not disclose the runtime fixture path',
).not.toContain(fixture.runtimePath);
});
it.each([
{ launcher: 'opencode', extraEnv: {} },
{
launcher: 'claudex',
extraEnv: { TEST_CLAUDEX_PROVENANCE: '1' },
},
{
launcher: 'yolo claudex',
extraEnv: { TEST_CLAUDEX_PROVENANCE: '1', TEST_DANGEROUS: '1' },
},
])(
'FL-10 refuses $launcher spawn when mandatory provenance cannot be recorded and fabricates no launch ID',
({ extraEnv }) => {
const spawnMarker = join(fixture.root, 'runtime-spawned');
const launchIdMarker = join(fixture.root, 'runtime-saw-launch-id');
installRuntime(
fixture,
`#!/usr/bin/env bash\nprintf 'spawned' > "$TEST_SPAWN_MARKER"\nif [[ -n "\${MOSAIC_LAUNCH_ID:-}" ]]; then printf '%s' "$MOSAIC_LAUNCH_ID" > "$TEST_LAUNCH_ID_MARKER"; fi\n`,
);
const ledgerPath = join(fixture.home, 'fleet', 'run', 'sessions', 'events.ndjson');
mkdirSync(ledgerPath, { recursive: true });
const result = runLauncher(fixture, {
...extraEnv,
TEST_SPAWN_MARKER: spawnMarker,
TEST_LAUNCH_ID_MARKER: launchIdMarker,
});
expect.soft(result.status, 'mandatory provenance failure must exit nonzero').not.toBe(0);
expect
.soft(existsSync(spawnMarker), 'mandatory provenance failure must prevent spawn')
.toBe(false);
expect
.soft(
existsSync(launchIdMarker),
'a failed provenance write must not fabricate or propagate a launch ID',
)
.toBe(false);
expect
.soft(
result.stderr,
'provenance refusal must report the fixed typed launch_provenance_failed code',
)
.toContain('[launch_provenance_failed]');
expect(
result.stderr,
'provenance diagnostics must not disclose filesystem details',
).not.toContain(fixture.root);
},
);
it('anti-drift: launcher contains neither null-status success nor mandatory warn-and-run', () => {
const source = readFileSync(new URL('./launch.ts', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
expect
.soft(
source.includes('result.status ?? 0'),
'spawnSync null status must never default to success',
)
.toBe(false);
expect
.soft(
source.includes('[mosaic] WARNING: launch record not written:'),
'mandatory provenance failures must never warn and continue',
)
.toBe(false);
});
});
+25 -68
View File
@@ -200,24 +200,13 @@ function redactArgv(argv: string[]): string[] {
); );
} }
interface LaunchRecordSuccess { function recordLaunch(runtime: RuntimeName, cliArgs: string[], yolo: boolean): void {
readonly ok: true;
readonly launchId: string;
}
interface LaunchRecordFailure {
readonly ok: false;
readonly code: 'launch_provenance_failed';
}
type LaunchRecordResult = LaunchRecordSuccess | LaunchRecordFailure;
function recordLaunch(runtime: RuntimeName, cliArgs: string[], yolo: boolean): LaunchRecordResult {
// Never let a stale or caller-supplied correlation id masquerade as this launch.
delete process.env['MOSAIC_LAUNCH_ID'];
try { try {
mkdirSync(LAUNCH_LEDGER_DIR, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 }); mkdirSync(LAUNCH_LEDGER_DIR, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
// Correlation id for the lease.register half. Set into process.env so it
// propagates through every `...process.env` / `...baseEnv` spread below.
const launchId = `${Date.now().toString(36)}-${randomBytes(6).toString('hex')}`; const launchId = `${Date.now().toString(36)}-${randomBytes(6).toString('hex')}`;
process.env['MOSAIC_LAUNCH_ID'] = launchId;
const record = { const record = {
seq: Date.now(), seq: Date.now(),
kind: 'session.launch', kind: 'session.launch',
@@ -244,24 +233,12 @@ function recordLaunch(runtime: RuntimeName, cliArgs: string[], yolo: boolean): L
appendFileSync(join(LAUNCH_LEDGER_DIR, 'events.ndjson'), `${JSON.stringify(record)}\n`, { appendFileSync(join(LAUNCH_LEDGER_DIR, 'events.ndjson'), `${JSON.stringify(record)}\n`, {
mode: 0o600, mode: 0o600,
}); });
return { ok: true, launchId }; } catch (err) {
} catch { // Never block a launch on bookkeeping — but never fail silently either.
return { ok: false, code: 'launch_provenance_failed' };
}
}
function requireLaunchRecord(runtime: RuntimeName, cliArgs: string[], yolo: boolean): string {
const result = recordLaunch(runtime, cliArgs, yolo);
if (!result.ok) {
console.error( console.error(
`[mosaic] ERROR [${result.code}]: mandatory launch provenance could not be recorded; runtime was not started.`, `[mosaic] WARNING: launch record not written: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
); );
process.exit(1);
} }
// Propagate correlation authority only after its immutable provenance exists.
process.env['MOSAIC_LAUNCH_ID'] = result.launchId;
return result.launchId;
} }
// ─── Pre-flight checks ────────────────────────────────────────────────────── // ─── Pre-flight checks ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -999,7 +976,7 @@ function launchRuntime(runtime: RuntimeName, args: string[], yolo: boolean): nev
cliArgs.push(...args); cliArgs.push(...args);
} }
console.log(`[mosaic] Launching ${label}${modeStr}${missionStr}...`); console.log(`[mosaic] Launching ${label}${modeStr}${missionStr}...`);
requireLaunchRecord('claude', cliArgs, yolo); recordLaunch('claude', cliArgs, yolo);
execLeaseGatedRuntime('claude', cliArgs, process.env, yolo); execLeaseGatedRuntime('claude', cliArgs, process.env, yolo);
break; break;
} }
@@ -1013,7 +990,7 @@ function launchRuntime(runtime: RuntimeName, args: string[], yolo: boolean): nev
cliArgs.push(...args); cliArgs.push(...args);
} }
console.log(`[mosaic] Launching ${label}${modeStr}${missionStr}...`); console.log(`[mosaic] Launching ${label}${modeStr}${missionStr}...`);
requireLaunchRecord('codex', cliArgs, yolo); recordLaunch('codex', cliArgs, yolo);
execRuntime('codex', cliArgs, { ...process.env, ...harnessEnv('codex') }); execRuntime('codex', cliArgs, { ...process.env, ...harnessEnv('codex') });
break; break;
} }
@@ -1022,7 +999,7 @@ function launchRuntime(runtime: RuntimeName, args: string[], yolo: boolean): nev
// opencode follows XDG, so its config resolves to $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/opencode. // opencode follows XDG, so its config resolves to $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/opencode.
ensureRuntimeConfig('opencode', join(harnessHome('opencode'), 'opencode', 'AGENTS.md')); ensureRuntimeConfig('opencode', join(harnessHome('opencode'), 'opencode', 'AGENTS.md'));
console.log(`[mosaic] Launching ${label}${modeStr}...`); console.log(`[mosaic] Launching ${label}${modeStr}...`);
requireLaunchRecord('opencode', args, yolo); recordLaunch('opencode', args, yolo);
execRuntime('opencode', args, { ...process.env, ...harnessEnv('opencode') }); execRuntime('opencode', args, { ...process.env, ...harnessEnv('opencode') });
break; break;
} }
@@ -1038,7 +1015,7 @@ function launchRuntime(runtime: RuntimeName, args: string[], yolo: boolean): nev
cliArgs.push(...args); cliArgs.push(...args);
} }
console.log(`[mosaic] Launching ${label}${modeStr}${missionStr}...`); console.log(`[mosaic] Launching ${label}${modeStr}${missionStr}...`);
requireLaunchRecord('pi', cliArgs, yolo); recordLaunch('pi', cliArgs, yolo);
execLeaseGatedRuntime('pi', cliArgs); execLeaseGatedRuntime('pi', cliArgs);
break; break;
} }
@@ -1082,31 +1059,19 @@ function execLeaseGatedRuntime(
); );
} }
type RuntimeLaunchFailureReason = 'spawn_error' | 'signal' | 'missing_status'; /** exec into the runtime, replacing the current process. */
interface RuntimeLaunchFailure {
readonly code: 'runtime_launch_failed';
readonly reason: RuntimeLaunchFailureReason;
}
function refuseRuntimeLaunch(reason: RuntimeLaunchFailureReason): never {
const failure: RuntimeLaunchFailure = { code: 'runtime_launch_failed', reason };
console.error(
`[mosaic] ERROR [${failure.code}]: runtime process did not produce a successful exit result (${failure.reason}).`,
);
process.exit(1);
}
/** Spawn the runtime and preserve only a real numeric exit status as success. */
function execRuntime(cmd: string, args: string[], env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): void { function execRuntime(cmd: string, args: string[], env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): void {
const result = spawnSync(cmd, args, { try {
stdio: 'inherit', // Use execFileSync with inherited stdio to replace the process
env, const result = spawnSync(cmd, args, {
}); stdio: 'inherit',
if (result.error !== undefined) refuseRuntimeLaunch('spawn_error'); env,
if (result.signal !== null) refuseRuntimeLaunch('signal'); });
if (result.status === null) refuseRuntimeLaunch('missing_status'); process.exit(result.status ?? 0);
process.exit(result.status); } catch (err) {
console.error(`[mosaic] Failed to launch ${cmd}:`, err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);
process.exit(1);
}
} }
/** /**
@@ -1116,15 +1081,6 @@ function execRuntime(cmd: string, args: string[], env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = proce
* orchestration to `launchClaudex` in `claudex.ts`. Kept thin so the tested * orchestration to `launchClaudex` in `claudex.ts`. Kept thin so the tested
* logic lives in the DI module, not here. * logic lives in the DI module, not here.
*/ */
export function execRecordedClaudexRuntime(
args: string[],
env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,
dangerous: boolean,
): void {
const launchId = requireLaunchRecord('claude', args, dangerous);
execLeaseGatedRuntime('claude', args, { ...env, MOSAIC_LAUNCH_ID: launchId }, dangerous);
}
function launchClaudexProduction(args: string[], yolo: boolean): void { function launchClaudexProduction(args: string[], yolo: boolean): void {
writeSessionLock('claude'); writeSessionLock('claude');
const adapter: ClaudexHarnessAdapter = { const adapter: ClaudexHarnessAdapter = {
@@ -1136,7 +1092,8 @@ function launchClaudexProduction(args: string[], yolo: boolean): void {
checkSequentialThinking('claude'); checkSequentialThinking('claude');
}, },
composePrompt: () => buildRuntimePrompt('claude'), composePrompt: () => buildRuntimePrompt('claude'),
execLeaseGated: execRecordedClaudexRuntime, execLeaseGated: (cmdArgs, env, dangerous) =>
execLeaseGatedRuntime('claude', cmdArgs, env, dangerous),
}; };
void launchClaudex(args, yolo, adapter); void launchClaudex(args, yolo, adapter);
} }