fix(framework): remediate Codex review findings in VAULT-SECRETS.md

Two should-fix findings from automated Codex review:

1. Vault KV v2 policy path — add explicit path for exact top-level
   `secret/data/k3s/<app>` entry alongside the wildcard `/*` sub-path
   rule. Without the exact path, apps reading the top-level secret get
   permission denied from Vault KV v2 even with the wildcard.

2. Go envconfig example — remove unused `os` import from config.go
   snippet (os was only referenced in a comment). Move the main() usage
   to a separate clearly-labelled main.go block to make both snippets
   copy-paste compilable.

Both fixes mirrored to duplicate path:
  guides/ <-> packages/mosaic/framework/guides/

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/PRD.md

@@ -62,9 +62,8 @@ Jarvis (v0.2.0) is a self-hosted AI assistant with a Python FastAPI backend and
 19. `@mosaicstack/prdy` — PRD wizard
 20. `@mosaicstack/quality-rails` — code quality scaffolder
 21. `@mosaicstack/cli` — unified `mosaic` CLI
-22. Mosaic framework git wrappers — provider-aware issue/PR/CI shell wrappers for GitHub and self-hosted Gitea hosts used by Mosaic/USC repositories
+22. Docker Compose deployment + bare-metal capability
-23. Docker Compose deployment + bare-metal capability
+23. Agent log service — ingest, parse, tier, summarize agent interaction logs
-24. Agent log service — ingest, parse, tier, summarize agent interaction logs
 
 ### Out of Scope (v0.1.0)
 

docs/TASKS.md

@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ These are MVP-level checks that don't belong to any single workstream. Updated b
 | MVP-T04 | not-started | Sync `.mosaic/orchestrator/mission.json` MVP slot with this manifest (milestone enumeration, etc.)       | Coord state file; consider whether to repopulate via `mosaic coord` or accept hand-edit |
 | MVP-T05 | in-progress | Kick off W1 / FED-M1 — federated tier infrastructure                                                     | Session 16 (2026-04-19): FED-M1-01 in-progress on `feat/federation-m1-tier-config`      |
 | MVP-T06 | not-started | Declare additional workstreams (web dashboard, TUI/CLI parity, remote control, etc.) as scope solidifies | Track each new workstream by adding a row to the Workstream Rollup                      |
-| MVP-T07 | in-progress | Harden Mosaic framework Gitea PR metadata and merge preflight wrappers                                   | Internal ref `t_a292e96f`; source branch `fix/gitea-pr-metadata-login-t-a292e96f`       |
 
 ## Pointer to Active Workstream
 

docs/scratchpads/t_a292e96f-gitea-pr-wrapper.md

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-# t_a292e96f — Gitea PR metadata and merge wrapper fix
-
-## Objective
-
-Fix Mosaic git wrappers so Gitea repositories on `git.uscllc.com` resolve PR metadata and merge preflight through the correct host credentials, without selecting the stale `mosaicstack` Tea login.
-
-## Acceptance criteria
-
-- `pr-metadata.sh` returns `baseRefName=main` for U-Connect PR #1905 and PR #1908.
-- `pr-metadata.sh` returns source-branch-style `headRefName`; for Gitea `refs/pull/<n>/head` responses, normalize to `head.label`.
-- `pr-merge.sh` preserves Mosaic squash-only and base-branch policy, then uses host-matched Gitea API credentials for Gitea merges instead of a hard-coded Tea login.
-- Add regression coverage/harness for Gitea metadata normalization and merge preflight.
-- Do not print, log, or commit tokens.
-
-## Plan
-
-1. Reproduce current live metadata/login context with sanitized output.
-2. Patch repo-source shell wrappers under `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/`.
-3. Add a hermetic shell regression harness with fake `git`, `curl`, and `tea`.
-4. Validate with `bash -n`, shellcheck if available, regression harness, and live sanitized U-Connect wrapper calls.
-5. Apply the same script changes to the installed Mosaic wrapper location only after source changes validate, so active U-Connect merge wrappers are unblocked while the PR is reviewed.
-6. Commit, push through queue guard, open PR, and hand off to Ultron review task `t_848435ab`; do not merge.
-
-## Progress
-
-- Live sanitized metadata check before source patch:
-  - PR #1905: `baseRefName=main`, `headRefName=edith/t_39ce717c-authentik-smoke-gate`.
-  - PR #1908: `baseRefName=main`, `headRefName=refs/pull/1908/head`; raw Gitea `head.label` is `fix/t_23fa9e1d-portal-health-backend`.
-  - `tea login list` contains only `git.mosaicstack.dev`, so the prior `--login mosaicstack` default cannot work for `git.uscllc.com`.
-
-## Verification log
-
-- `bash -n packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/detect-platform.sh packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-metadata.sh packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-merge.sh packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/tests/pr-gitea-wrapper-regression.sh` — pass.
-- `shellcheck packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/detect-platform.sh packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-metadata.sh packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-merge.sh packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/tests/pr-gitea-wrapper-regression.sh` — pass when available in the Kanban runtime.
-- `TMPDIR="$PWD/.agent-tmp" bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/tests/pr-gitea-wrapper-regression.sh` — pass; proves host-matched Gitea credential selection, metadata normalization, and merge dry-run preflight without invoking `tea`.
-- Live sanitized U-Connect metadata using the patched wrapper from `/src/uconnect`:
-  - PR #1905: `number=1905`, `baseRefName=main`, `headRefName=edith/t_39ce717c-authentik-smoke-gate`, `state=open`.
-  - PR #1908: `number=1908`, `baseRefName=main`, `headRefName=fix/t_23fa9e1d-portal-health-backend`, `state=closed`.
-- Live sanitized U-Connect merge preflight using `pr-merge.sh --skip-queue-guard --dry-run`:
-  - PR #1905: `Dry run: Gitea merge preflight OK for USC/uconnect#1905 targeting main via git.uscllc.com API`.
-  - PR #1908: `Dry run: Gitea merge preflight OK for USC/uconnect#1908 targeting main via git.uscllc.com API`.
-- Installed wrapper parity: `/home/hermes/.config/mosaic/tools/git/{detect-platform.sh,pr-metadata.sh,pr-merge.sh}` byte-match the PR source copies after validation, so active U-Connect wrapper invocations use the same fix while source PR review runs.
-
-## Risks / notes
-
-- `--dry-run` was added to `pr-merge.sh` to validate metadata/auth/preflight without merging a live PR.
-- Gitea branch deletion after merge remains a documented warning, matching prior behavior, and is not expanded in this fix.
-- Duplicate recovery PR #517 was closed after wrapper-first `pr-close.sh -n 517` failed headlessly with `/dev/tty`; PR #518 is the review target.

guides/BOOTSTRAP.md

@@ -453,6 +453,26 @@ Initialize standard labels and the first pre-MVP milestone:
 
 ---
 
+## Secrets Bootstrap (Required for Every New App)
+
+Every new application MUST complete the following secrets bootstrap before deploying to any non-local environment. This is a hard gate — deployment without completed secrets bootstrap is forbidden.
+
+### Secrets bootstrap checklist
+
+- [ ] Vault path created: `vault kv put secret/k3s/<app>/ ...` with all required secret fields
+- [ ] Required secrets listed in project README under a "Secrets architecture" section, including:
+  - Vault path(s) used
+  - All required secret keys and their purpose
+  - Whether the app uses ESO bridge (default) or Direct-Vault (opt-in, with justification)
+- [ ] `external-secret.yaml` manifest committed to repo's `deploy/` or `k8s/` directory
+- [ ] Deployment YAML references the synced k8s Secret via `secretKeyRef` (not raw env vars or `.env` files)
+- [ ] App startup has schema-based validation for all required env vars (zod / pydantic / envconfig equivalent) that exits non-zero on missing required values
+- [ ] Direct-Vault opt-in (if applicable): justification documented in README + AppRole provisioned + bootstrap credentials stored in Vault and synced via a separate `ExternalSecret`
+
+See `~/.config/mosaic/guides/VAULT-SECRETS.md` for full worked examples of the ESO bridge pattern, the Direct-Vault opt-in pattern, and the forbidden antipatterns.
+
+---
+
 ## Checklist
 
 After bootstrapping, verify:

guides/VAULT-SECRETS.md

@@ -203,3 +203,374 @@ Error: token expired
 3. **Audit logging** - All access is logged; act accordingly
 4. **No local copies** - Don't store secrets in files or env vars long-term
 5. **Rotate on compromise** - Immediately rotate any exposed secrets
+
+---
+
+## Secrets Architecture Decision Matrix
+
+Use this table to choose between the ESO bridge (default) and Direct-Vault (opt-in) patterns for every new app or integration.
+
+| Factor | ESO Bridge (default) | Direct-Vault (opt-in) |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Use-case** | All static secrets (DB creds, API keys, signing keys, OAuth secrets) | Dynamic creds with short TTLs (DB rotation, AWS STS, PKI), per-request audit trails, or lease renewal mid-pod-lifecycle |
+| **App code change** | None — reads standard env vars via `secretKeyRef` | Requires Vault client (`hvac`, `node-vault`, `vault/api`) in application code |
+| **Secret rotation** | ESO re-syncs on Vault write; pod restart or secret refresh picks up new value | App manages lease renewal or re-auth within the running process |
+| **Audit granularity** | Access logged at Vault when ESO syncs; no per-request app audit | Every app request to Vault is a separate audit log entry |
+| **Operational burden** | Low — ESO handles polling, sync, and k8s Secret lifecycle | Higher — app must handle auth, lease renewal, error paths, and token rotation |
+| **Justification required?** | No — this is the default | Yes — document in project README under "Secrets architecture" |
+| **Example use cases** | Web app DB password, OAuth client secret, JWT signing key, API token | HashiCorp DB secrets engine with 15-min TTL leases, AWS STS assume-role, Vault PKI short-lived certs |
+
+**Decision rule:** If you are unsure, use ESO. Only justify Direct-Vault when the secret cannot be safely stored in a k8s Secret (too short-lived, per-request TTL required, or mid-lifecycle renewal needed).
+
+---
+
+## ESO Bridge Pattern (Default)
+
+This is the required default for all k8s workloads. Follow this exact pattern unless a documented dynamic-secrets requirement justifies Direct-Vault.
+
+### 1. Provision Vault path
+
+```bash
+# Write the secrets for the app (run once; use IaC/Terraform for repeatable provisioning)
+vault kv put secret/k3s/<app> \
+  db_password="..." \
+  api_key="..." \
+  jwt_secret="..."
+```
+
+Use the canonical path structure: `secret/k3s/<app>` for k3s cluster workloads.
+
+### 2. ExternalSecret manifest
+
+Commit this to the repo's `deploy/` or `k8s/` directory:
+
+```yaml
+# deploy/external-secret.yaml
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1beta1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: <app>-secrets
+  namespace: <namespace>
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 1h
+  secretStoreRef:
+    name: vault-backend        # ClusterSecretStore name — verify with cluster admin
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+  target:
+    name: <app>-secrets        # k8s Secret name that will be created
+    creationPolicy: Owner
+  data:
+    - secretKey: DB_PASSWORD   # key in the k8s Secret
+      remoteRef:
+        key: secret/k3s/<app>  # Vault path
+        property: db_password  # field within the Vault secret
+    - secretKey: API_KEY
+      remoteRef:
+        key: secret/k3s/<app>
+        property: api_key
+    - secretKey: JWT_SECRET
+      remoteRef:
+        key: secret/k3s/<app>
+        property: jwt_secret
+```
+
+### 3. Deployment manifest — reference synced k8s Secret
+
+```yaml
+# deploy/deployment.yaml (env section)
+env:
+  - name: DB_PASSWORD
+    valueFrom:
+      secretKeyRef:
+        name: <app>-secrets   # matches ExternalSecret target.name
+        key: DB_PASSWORD
+  - name: API_KEY
+    valueFrom:
+      secretKeyRef:
+        name: <app>-secrets
+        key: API_KEY
+  - name: JWT_SECRET
+    valueFrom:
+      secretKeyRef:
+        name: <app>-secrets
+        key: JWT_SECRET
+  - name: PORT
+    value: "3000"              # safe-default: non-secret, no Vault needed
+```
+
+### 4. App-side schema validation — TypeScript (zod)
+
+Validate all required env vars at startup. Exit non-zero on missing values.
+
+```typescript
+// src/env.ts
+import { z } from 'zod';
+
+const envSchema = z.object({
+  DB_PASSWORD: z.string().min(1, 'DB_PASSWORD is required'),
+  API_KEY: z.string().min(1, 'API_KEY is required'),
+  JWT_SECRET: z.string().min(32, 'JWT_SECRET must be at least 32 chars'),
+  PORT: z.coerce.number().default(3000),
+  NODE_ENV: z.enum(['development', 'production', 'test']).default('production'),
+});
+
+const result = envSchema.safeParse(process.env);
+if (!result.success) {
+  console.error('Missing or invalid environment variables:');
+  console.error(result.error.flatten().fieldErrors);
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+
+export const env = result.data;
+```
+
+### 4b. App-side schema validation — Python (pydantic)
+
+```python
+# src/config.py
+from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, SettingsConfigDict
+
+class Settings(BaseSettings):
+    db_password: str
+    api_key: str
+    jwt_secret: str
+    port: int = 3000
+    node_env: str = "production"
+
+    model_config = SettingsConfigDict(env_file=None)  # no .env in prod
+
+try:
+    settings = Settings()
+except Exception as e:
+    import sys
+    print(f"Missing or invalid environment variables: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+    sys.exit(1)
+```
+
+### 4c. App-side schema validation — Go (envconfig)
+
+```go
+// config/config.go
+package config
+
+import (
+    "fmt"
+    "github.com/kelseyhightower/envconfig"
+)
+
+type Config struct {
+    DBPassword string `envconfig:"DB_PASSWORD" required:"true"`
+    APIKey     string `envconfig:"API_KEY" required:"true"`
+    JWTSecret  string `envconfig:"JWT_SECRET" required:"true"`
+    Port       int    `envconfig:"PORT" default:"3000"`
+}
+
+func Load() (*Config, error) {
+    var cfg Config
+    if err := envconfig.Process("", &cfg); err != nil {
+        return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid environment: %w", err)
+    }
+    return &cfg, nil
+}
+```
+
+In your `main.go`:
+
+```go
+cfg, err := config.Load()
+if err != nil {
+    fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
+    os.Exit(1)
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## Direct-Vault Opt-In Pattern
+
+Use this pattern ONLY when a documented dynamic-secrets requirement applies (DB rotation with short TTLs, AWS STS, PKI, per-request audit). Document the justification in the project README under "Secrets architecture" before implementing.
+
+### When it is justified
+
+- Vault DB secrets engine with lease TTLs shorter than a typical pod lifecycle (< 1 hour)
+- AWS STS assume-role tokens generated per-request
+- Vault PKI short-lived certificates (< 24 hours) that must be renewed within a running pod
+- Per-request audit trail requirement (each app call must appear separately in Vault audit log)
+
+### Provision an AppRole for the app
+
+```bash
+# Enable AppRole auth (if not already enabled)
+vault auth enable approle
+
+# Create a Vault policy for the app
+# Note: KV v2 paths require both the exact path (for the top-level secret) and the
+# wildcard (for sub-paths). Always include both to avoid permission denied errors.
+vault policy write <app>-policy - <<EOF
+path "secret/data/k3s/<app>" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+path "secret/data/k3s/<app>/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+path "database/creds/<app>-role" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+EOF
+
+# Create the AppRole
+vault write auth/approle/role/<app>-role \
+  token_policies="<app>-policy" \
+  token_ttl=1h \
+  token_max_ttl=4h \
+  secret_id_ttl=0
+
+# Retrieve role-id and secret-id
+vault read auth/approle/role/<app>-role/role-id
+vault write -f auth/approle/role/<app>-role/secret-id
+```
+
+### Bootstrap AppRole credentials via ESO (solving the chicken-and-egg problem)
+
+The AppRole `role-id` and `secret-id` are themselves secrets. Store them in Vault at a bootstrap path, then use ESO to sync them into a k8s Secret. The app reads that k8s Secret at startup to authenticate with Vault directly.
+
+```bash
+# Store the bootstrap credentials in Vault
+vault kv put secret/k3s/<app>-bootstrap \
+  role_id="<role-id>" \
+  secret_id="<secret-id>"
+```
+
+```yaml
+# deploy/external-secret-bootstrap.yaml
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1beta1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: <app>-vault-auth
+  namespace: <namespace>
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 24h
+  secretStoreRef:
+    name: vault-backend
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+  target:
+    name: <app>-vault-auth
+    creationPolicy: Owner
+  data:
+    - secretKey: VAULT_ROLE_ID
+      remoteRef:
+        key: secret/k3s/<app>-bootstrap
+        property: role_id
+    - secretKey: VAULT_SECRET_ID
+      remoteRef:
+        key: secret/k3s/<app>-bootstrap
+        property: secret_id
+```
+
+```yaml
+# deploy/deployment.yaml (env section for Direct-Vault app)
+env:
+  - name: VAULT_ADDR
+    value: "https://vault.example.com"  # safe-default: non-secret cluster address
+  - name: VAULT_ROLE_ID
+    valueFrom:
+      secretKeyRef:
+        name: <app>-vault-auth
+        key: VAULT_ROLE_ID
+  - name: VAULT_SECRET_ID
+    valueFrom:
+      secretKeyRef:
+        name: <app>-vault-auth
+        key: VAULT_SECRET_ID
+```
+
+### App-side Vault client pattern
+
+```typescript
+// src/vault-client.ts — only exists in Direct-Vault apps
+import vault from 'node-vault';
+import { z } from 'zod';
+
+const bootstrapSchema = z.object({
+  VAULT_ADDR: z.string().url(),
+  VAULT_ROLE_ID: z.string().min(1),
+  VAULT_SECRET_ID: z.string().min(1),
+});
+
+const bootstrap = bootstrapSchema.parse(process.env);
+
+const client = vault({ endpoint: bootstrap.VAULT_ADDR });
+
+export async function getVaultClient() {
+  const { auth } = await client.approleLogin({
+    role_id: bootstrap.VAULT_ROLE_ID,
+    secret_id: bootstrap.VAULT_SECRET_ID,
+  });
+  client.token = auth.client_token;
+  return client;
+}
+```
+
+Document in README under "Secrets architecture": the Vault path, why Direct-Vault is required, and the lease/renewal strategy.
+
+---
+
+## Forbidden Patterns (CI Lint Targets)
+
+The following patterns are forbidden in all Mosaic projects. CI lint SHOULD catch these automatically (implementation tracked separately). Agents MUST NOT introduce these patterns.
+
+### 1. Untagged fallback defaults for required values
+
+```yaml
+# FORBIDDEN — required secret with silent fallback
+environment:
+  - DB_PASSWORD=${DB_PASSWORD:-changeme}
+  - API_KEY=${API_KEY:-}
+
+# REQUIRED — fast-fail on missing required values
+environment:
+  - DB_PASSWORD=${DB_PASSWORD:?DB_PASSWORD is required}
+  - API_KEY=${API_KEY:?API_KEY is required}
+
+# ALLOWED — true convenience default, tagged
+environment:
+  - PORT=${PORT:-3000}  # safe-default: non-secret, app works at any port
+```
+
+This applies to: `docker-compose.yml`, k8s manifests, Helm `values.yaml`, any env file committed to git.
+
+### 2. Vault KV calls in application source code (ESO-default projects)
+
+```python
+# FORBIDDEN in ESO-default apps — direct Vault client in app source
+import hvac
+client = hvac.Client(url=os.environ['VAULT_ADDR'])
+secret = client.secrets.kv.v2.read_secret_version(path='myapp/db')
+```
+
+ESO-default apps read env vars only. Direct-Vault clients belong only in apps with a documented dynamic-secrets justification in README.
+
+### 3. Hardcoded secrets or API keys in committed files
+
+```python
+# FORBIDDEN — hardcoded credential
+DB_PASSWORD = "supersecret123"
+API_KEY = "sk-live-abc123"
+```
+
+No exceptions. CI lint must flag any string matching common secret patterns (`password`, `secret`, `api_key`, `token` assigned a literal non-env-var value).
+
+### 4. `.env` files in production deployment paths
+
+```
+# FORBIDDEN — .env file in a production deploy path
+deploy/.env
+k8s/.env
+docker/.env
+
+# ALLOWED — local dev only
+.env.example          # template only, no real values
+.env                  # local dev, must be in .gitignore
+```
+
+`.env` files are acceptable in local-dev contexts only and MUST be in `.gitignore`. They are forbidden in any path that a CI pipeline or production deployment process reads directly.

packages/mosaic/framework/defaults/STANDARDS.md

@@ -27,6 +27,16 @@ Master/slave model:
 - Do not perform destructive git/file actions without explicit instruction.
 - Browser automation (Playwright, Cypress, Puppeteer) MUST run in headless mode. Never launch a visible browser — it collides with the user's display and active session.
 
+### Secrets handling (HARD RULE)
+
+- Vault is the canonical source-of-truth for every secret in every environment. No exceptions.
+- For k8s workloads, the default read path is **External Secrets Operator → k8s Secret → env var** (`secretKeyRef`). The app reads standard env vars; no Vault client in app code.
+- Direct-Vault clients in application code are **opt-in only**, justified per-app by a documented dynamic-secrets requirement (e.g., DB rotation, AWS STS). Default to ESO. Document the justification in the project's README under "Secrets architecture".
+- `${VAR:-default}` fallback syntax in any deployment configuration (compose, k8s manifests, Helm values, env files committed to git) is **forbidden** for required values. Use `${VAR:?VAR is required}` to fast-fail. Defaults are allowed only for true conveniences (e.g. `${PORT:-3000}`) and MUST be tagged `# safe-default: <reason>` so a reviewer can confirm the intent.
+- `.env` files in production deployment paths are **forbidden**. `.env.example` and `.env` in local-dev paths are fine.
+- App startup MUST validate required secrets against a schema (zod / pydantic / equivalent) and exit non-zero on missing required values. Never run with defaulted weak fallbacks.
+- New apps: bootstrap checklist (see `~/.config/mosaic/guides/BOOTSTRAP.md`) MUST include Vault path provisioning + `ExternalSecret` manifest + README declaring the Vault path and required keys.
+
 ## Session Lifecycle Contract
 
 - Start: `scripts/agent/session-start.sh`

packages/mosaic/framework/guides/BOOTSTRAP.md

@@ -453,6 +453,26 @@ Initialize standard labels and the first pre-MVP milestone:
 
 ---
 
+## Secrets Bootstrap (Required for Every New App)
+
+Every new application MUST complete the following secrets bootstrap before deploying to any non-local environment. This is a hard gate — deployment without completed secrets bootstrap is forbidden.
+
+### Secrets bootstrap checklist
+
+- [ ] Vault path created: `vault kv put secret/k3s/<app>/ ...` with all required secret fields
+- [ ] Required secrets listed in project README under a "Secrets architecture" section, including:
+  - Vault path(s) used
+  - All required secret keys and their purpose
+  - Whether the app uses ESO bridge (default) or Direct-Vault (opt-in, with justification)
+- [ ] `external-secret.yaml` manifest committed to repo's `deploy/` or `k8s/` directory
+- [ ] Deployment YAML references the synced k8s Secret via `secretKeyRef` (not raw env vars or `.env` files)
+- [ ] App startup has schema-based validation for all required env vars (zod / pydantic / envconfig equivalent) that exits non-zero on missing required values
+- [ ] Direct-Vault opt-in (if applicable): justification documented in README + AppRole provisioned + bootstrap credentials stored in Vault and synced via a separate `ExternalSecret`
+
+See `~/.config/mosaic/guides/VAULT-SECRETS.md` for full worked examples of the ESO bridge pattern, the Direct-Vault opt-in pattern, and the forbidden antipatterns.
+
+---
+
 ## Checklist
 
 After bootstrapping, verify:

packages/mosaic/framework/guides/VAULT-SECRETS.md

@@ -203,3 +203,374 @@ Error: token expired
 3. **Audit logging** - All access is logged; act accordingly
 4. **No local copies** - Don't store secrets in files or env vars long-term
 5. **Rotate on compromise** - Immediately rotate any exposed secrets
+
+---
+
+## Secrets Architecture Decision Matrix
+
+Use this table to choose between the ESO bridge (default) and Direct-Vault (opt-in) patterns for every new app or integration.
+
+| Factor | ESO Bridge (default) | Direct-Vault (opt-in) |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **Use-case** | All static secrets (DB creds, API keys, signing keys, OAuth secrets) | Dynamic creds with short TTLs (DB rotation, AWS STS, PKI), per-request audit trails, or lease renewal mid-pod-lifecycle |
+| **App code change** | None — reads standard env vars via `secretKeyRef` | Requires Vault client (`hvac`, `node-vault`, `vault/api`) in application code |
+| **Secret rotation** | ESO re-syncs on Vault write; pod restart or secret refresh picks up new value | App manages lease renewal or re-auth within the running process |
+| **Audit granularity** | Access logged at Vault when ESO syncs; no per-request app audit | Every app request to Vault is a separate audit log entry |
+| **Operational burden** | Low — ESO handles polling, sync, and k8s Secret lifecycle | Higher — app must handle auth, lease renewal, error paths, and token rotation |
+| **Justification required?** | No — this is the default | Yes — document in project README under "Secrets architecture" |
+| **Example use cases** | Web app DB password, OAuth client secret, JWT signing key, API token | HashiCorp DB secrets engine with 15-min TTL leases, AWS STS assume-role, Vault PKI short-lived certs |
+
+**Decision rule:** If you are unsure, use ESO. Only justify Direct-Vault when the secret cannot be safely stored in a k8s Secret (too short-lived, per-request TTL required, or mid-lifecycle renewal needed).
+
+---
+
+## ESO Bridge Pattern (Default)
+
+This is the required default for all k8s workloads. Follow this exact pattern unless a documented dynamic-secrets requirement justifies Direct-Vault.
+
+### 1. Provision Vault path
+
+```bash
+# Write the secrets for the app (run once; use IaC/Terraform for repeatable provisioning)
+vault kv put secret/k3s/<app> \
+  db_password="..." \
+  api_key="..." \
+  jwt_secret="..."
+```
+
+Use the canonical path structure: `secret/k3s/<app>` for k3s cluster workloads.
+
+### 2. ExternalSecret manifest
+
+Commit this to the repo's `deploy/` or `k8s/` directory:
+
+```yaml
+# deploy/external-secret.yaml
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1beta1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: <app>-secrets
+  namespace: <namespace>
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 1h
+  secretStoreRef:
+    name: vault-backend        # ClusterSecretStore name — verify with cluster admin
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+  target:
+    name: <app>-secrets        # k8s Secret name that will be created
+    creationPolicy: Owner
+  data:
+    - secretKey: DB_PASSWORD   # key in the k8s Secret
+      remoteRef:
+        key: secret/k3s/<app>  # Vault path
+        property: db_password  # field within the Vault secret
+    - secretKey: API_KEY
+      remoteRef:
+        key: secret/k3s/<app>
+        property: api_key
+    - secretKey: JWT_SECRET
+      remoteRef:
+        key: secret/k3s/<app>
+        property: jwt_secret
+```
+
+### 3. Deployment manifest — reference synced k8s Secret
+
+```yaml
+# deploy/deployment.yaml (env section)
+env:
+  - name: DB_PASSWORD
+    valueFrom:
+      secretKeyRef:
+        name: <app>-secrets   # matches ExternalSecret target.name
+        key: DB_PASSWORD
+  - name: API_KEY
+    valueFrom:
+      secretKeyRef:
+        name: <app>-secrets
+        key: API_KEY
+  - name: JWT_SECRET
+    valueFrom:
+      secretKeyRef:
+        name: <app>-secrets
+        key: JWT_SECRET
+  - name: PORT
+    value: "3000"              # safe-default: non-secret, no Vault needed
+```
+
+### 4. App-side schema validation — TypeScript (zod)
+
+Validate all required env vars at startup. Exit non-zero on missing values.
+
+```typescript
+// src/env.ts
+import { z } from 'zod';
+
+const envSchema = z.object({
+  DB_PASSWORD: z.string().min(1, 'DB_PASSWORD is required'),
+  API_KEY: z.string().min(1, 'API_KEY is required'),
+  JWT_SECRET: z.string().min(32, 'JWT_SECRET must be at least 32 chars'),
+  PORT: z.coerce.number().default(3000),
+  NODE_ENV: z.enum(['development', 'production', 'test']).default('production'),
+});
+
+const result = envSchema.safeParse(process.env);
+if (!result.success) {
+  console.error('Missing or invalid environment variables:');
+  console.error(result.error.flatten().fieldErrors);
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+
+export const env = result.data;
+```
+
+### 4b. App-side schema validation — Python (pydantic)
+
+```python
+# src/config.py
+from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, SettingsConfigDict
+
+class Settings(BaseSettings):
+    db_password: str
+    api_key: str
+    jwt_secret: str
+    port: int = 3000
+    node_env: str = "production"
+
+    model_config = SettingsConfigDict(env_file=None)  # no .env in prod
+
+try:
+    settings = Settings()
+except Exception as e:
+    import sys
+    print(f"Missing or invalid environment variables: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+    sys.exit(1)
+```
+
+### 4c. App-side schema validation — Go (envconfig)
+
+```go
+// config/config.go
+package config
+
+import (
+    "fmt"
+    "github.com/kelseyhightower/envconfig"
+)
+
+type Config struct {
+    DBPassword string `envconfig:"DB_PASSWORD" required:"true"`
+    APIKey     string `envconfig:"API_KEY" required:"true"`
+    JWTSecret  string `envconfig:"JWT_SECRET" required:"true"`
+    Port       int    `envconfig:"PORT" default:"3000"`
+}
+
+func Load() (*Config, error) {
+    var cfg Config
+    if err := envconfig.Process("", &cfg); err != nil {
+        return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid environment: %w", err)
+    }
+    return &cfg, nil
+}
+```
+
+In your `main.go`:
+
+```go
+cfg, err := config.Load()
+if err != nil {
+    fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
+    os.Exit(1)
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## Direct-Vault Opt-In Pattern
+
+Use this pattern ONLY when a documented dynamic-secrets requirement applies (DB rotation with short TTLs, AWS STS, PKI, per-request audit). Document the justification in the project README under "Secrets architecture" before implementing.
+
+### When it is justified
+
+- Vault DB secrets engine with lease TTLs shorter than a typical pod lifecycle (< 1 hour)
+- AWS STS assume-role tokens generated per-request
+- Vault PKI short-lived certificates (< 24 hours) that must be renewed within a running pod
+- Per-request audit trail requirement (each app call must appear separately in Vault audit log)
+
+### Provision an AppRole for the app
+
+```bash
+# Enable AppRole auth (if not already enabled)
+vault auth enable approle
+
+# Create a Vault policy for the app
+# Note: KV v2 paths require both the exact path (for the top-level secret) and the
+# wildcard (for sub-paths). Always include both to avoid permission denied errors.
+vault policy write <app>-policy - <<EOF
+path "secret/data/k3s/<app>" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+path "secret/data/k3s/<app>/*" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+path "database/creds/<app>-role" {
+  capabilities = ["read"]
+}
+EOF
+
+# Create the AppRole
+vault write auth/approle/role/<app>-role \
+  token_policies="<app>-policy" \
+  token_ttl=1h \
+  token_max_ttl=4h \
+  secret_id_ttl=0
+
+# Retrieve role-id and secret-id
+vault read auth/approle/role/<app>-role/role-id
+vault write -f auth/approle/role/<app>-role/secret-id
+```
+
+### Bootstrap AppRole credentials via ESO (solving the chicken-and-egg problem)
+
+The AppRole `role-id` and `secret-id` are themselves secrets. Store them in Vault at a bootstrap path, then use ESO to sync them into a k8s Secret. The app reads that k8s Secret at startup to authenticate with Vault directly.
+
+```bash
+# Store the bootstrap credentials in Vault
+vault kv put secret/k3s/<app>-bootstrap \
+  role_id="<role-id>" \
+  secret_id="<secret-id>"
+```
+
+```yaml
+# deploy/external-secret-bootstrap.yaml
+apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1beta1
+kind: ExternalSecret
+metadata:
+  name: <app>-vault-auth
+  namespace: <namespace>
+spec:
+  refreshInterval: 24h
+  secretStoreRef:
+    name: vault-backend
+    kind: ClusterSecretStore
+  target:
+    name: <app>-vault-auth
+    creationPolicy: Owner
+  data:
+    - secretKey: VAULT_ROLE_ID
+      remoteRef:
+        key: secret/k3s/<app>-bootstrap
+        property: role_id
+    - secretKey: VAULT_SECRET_ID
+      remoteRef:
+        key: secret/k3s/<app>-bootstrap
+        property: secret_id
+```
+
+```yaml
+# deploy/deployment.yaml (env section for Direct-Vault app)
+env:
+  - name: VAULT_ADDR
+    value: "https://vault.example.com"  # safe-default: non-secret cluster address
+  - name: VAULT_ROLE_ID
+    valueFrom:
+      secretKeyRef:
+        name: <app>-vault-auth
+        key: VAULT_ROLE_ID
+  - name: VAULT_SECRET_ID
+    valueFrom:
+      secretKeyRef:
+        name: <app>-vault-auth
+        key: VAULT_SECRET_ID
+```
+
+### App-side Vault client pattern
+
+```typescript
+// src/vault-client.ts — only exists in Direct-Vault apps
+import vault from 'node-vault';
+import { z } from 'zod';
+
+const bootstrapSchema = z.object({
+  VAULT_ADDR: z.string().url(),
+  VAULT_ROLE_ID: z.string().min(1),
+  VAULT_SECRET_ID: z.string().min(1),
+});
+
+const bootstrap = bootstrapSchema.parse(process.env);
+
+const client = vault({ endpoint: bootstrap.VAULT_ADDR });
+
+export async function getVaultClient() {
+  const { auth } = await client.approleLogin({
+    role_id: bootstrap.VAULT_ROLE_ID,
+    secret_id: bootstrap.VAULT_SECRET_ID,
+  });
+  client.token = auth.client_token;
+  return client;
+}
+```
+
+Document in README under "Secrets architecture": the Vault path, why Direct-Vault is required, and the lease/renewal strategy.
+
+---
+
+## Forbidden Patterns (CI Lint Targets)
+
+The following patterns are forbidden in all Mosaic projects. CI lint SHOULD catch these automatically (implementation tracked separately). Agents MUST NOT introduce these patterns.
+
+### 1. Untagged fallback defaults for required values
+
+```yaml
+# FORBIDDEN — required secret with silent fallback
+environment:
+  - DB_PASSWORD=${DB_PASSWORD:-changeme}
+  - API_KEY=${API_KEY:-}
+
+# REQUIRED — fast-fail on missing required values
+environment:
+  - DB_PASSWORD=${DB_PASSWORD:?DB_PASSWORD is required}
+  - API_KEY=${API_KEY:?API_KEY is required}
+
+# ALLOWED — true convenience default, tagged
+environment:
+  - PORT=${PORT:-3000}  # safe-default: non-secret, app works at any port
+```
+
+This applies to: `docker-compose.yml`, k8s manifests, Helm `values.yaml`, any env file committed to git.
+
+### 2. Vault KV calls in application source code (ESO-default projects)
+
+```python
+# FORBIDDEN in ESO-default apps — direct Vault client in app source
+import hvac
+client = hvac.Client(url=os.environ['VAULT_ADDR'])
+secret = client.secrets.kv.v2.read_secret_version(path='myapp/db')
+```
+
+ESO-default apps read env vars only. Direct-Vault clients belong only in apps with a documented dynamic-secrets justification in README.
+
+### 3. Hardcoded secrets or API keys in committed files
+
+```python
+# FORBIDDEN — hardcoded credential
+DB_PASSWORD = "supersecret123"
+API_KEY = "sk-live-abc123"
+```
+
+No exceptions. CI lint must flag any string matching common secret patterns (`password`, `secret`, `api_key`, `token` assigned a literal non-env-var value).
+
+### 4. `.env` files in production deployment paths
+
+```
+# FORBIDDEN — .env file in a production deploy path
+deploy/.env
+k8s/.env
+docker/.env
+
+# ALLOWED — local dev only
+.env.example          # template only, no real values
+.env                  # local dev, must be in .gitignore
+```
+
+`.env` files are acceptable in local-dev contexts only and MUST be in `.gitignore`. They are forbidden in any path that a CI pipeline or production deployment process reads directly.

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/detect-platform.sh

@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ get_remote_host() {
 }
 
 # Resolve a Gitea API token for the given host.
-# Priority: Mosaic credential loader → host-matched GITEA_TOKEN env → ~/.git-credentials
+# Priority: Mosaic credential loader → GITEA_TOKEN env → ~/.git-credentials
 get_gitea_token() {
     local host="$1"
     local script_dir
@@ -103,28 +103,16 @@ get_gitea_token() {
     if [[ -f "$cred_loader" ]]; then
         local token
         token=$(
-            # shellcheck source=/dev/null
             source "$cred_loader"
-            # Host-specific wrapper resolution must not inherit a caller/global GITEA_TOKEN.
-            # load_credentials intentionally preserves existing env vars for interactive use,
-            # but merge/metadata wrappers need the token matching the remote host.
-            unset GITEA_TOKEN GITEA_URL
             case "$host" in
                 git.mosaicstack.dev) load_credentials gitea-mosaicstack 2>/dev/null ;;
                 git.uscllc.com)      load_credentials gitea-usc 2>/dev/null ;;
                 *)
-                    local matched=false
                     for svc in gitea-mosaicstack gitea-usc; do
-                        unset GITEA_TOKEN GITEA_URL
                         load_credentials "$svc" 2>/dev/null || continue
-                        if [[ "${GITEA_URL:-}" == "https://$host" || "${GITEA_URL:-}" == "http://$host" || "${GITEA_URL:-}" == *"//$host" ]]; then
+                        [[ "${GITEA_URL:-}" == *"$host"* ]] && break
-                            matched=true
-                            break
-                        fi
-                    done
-                    if [[ "$matched" != true ]]; then
                         unset GITEA_TOKEN GITEA_URL
-                    fi
+                    done
                     ;;
             esac
             echo "${GITEA_TOKEN:-}"
@@ -135,12 +123,10 @@ get_gitea_token() {
         fi
     fi
 
-    # 2. GITEA_TOKEN env var (only when GITEA_URL, if present, matches the remote host)
+    # 2. GITEA_TOKEN env var (may be set by caller)
     if [[ -n "${GITEA_TOKEN:-}" ]]; then
-        if [[ -z "${GITEA_URL:-}" || "${GITEA_URL:-}" == "https://$host" || "${GITEA_URL:-}" == "http://$host" || "${GITEA_URL:-}" == *"//$host" ]]; then
+        echo "$GITEA_TOKEN"
-            echo "$GITEA_TOKEN"
+        return 0
-            return 0
-        fi
     fi
 
     # 3. ~/.git-credentials file

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-merge.sh

@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 # pr-merge.sh - Merge pull requests on Gitea or GitHub
-# Usage: pr-merge.sh -n PR_NUMBER [-m squash] [-d] [--skip-queue-guard] [--dry-run]
+# Usage: pr-merge.sh -n PR_NUMBER [-m squash] [-d] [--skip-queue-guard]
 
 set -e
 
 SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-# shellcheck disable=SC1091
 source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
 
 # Default values
@@ -13,7 +12,6 @@ PR_NUMBER=""
 MERGE_METHOD="squash"
 DELETE_BRANCH=false
 SKIP_QUEUE_GUARD=false
-DRY_RUN=false
 
 usage() {
     cat <<EOF
@@ -26,7 +24,6 @@ Options:
     -m, --method METHOD     Merge method: squash only (default: squash)
     -d, --delete-branch     Delete the head branch after merge
         --skip-queue-guard  Skip CI queue guard wait before merge
-        --dry-run           Validate metadata/auth/preflight without merging
     -h, --help              Show this help message
 
 Examples:
@@ -57,10 +54,6 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             SKIP_QUEUE_GUARD=true
             shift
             ;;
-        --dry-run)
-            DRY_RUN=true
-            shift
-            ;;
         -h|--help)
             usage
             ;;
@@ -81,8 +74,7 @@ if [[ "$MERGE_METHOD" != "squash" ]]; then
     exit 1
 fi
 
-METADATA_JSON="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-metadata.sh" -n "$PR_NUMBER")"
+BASE_BRANCH="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-metadata.sh" -n "$PR_NUMBER" | python3 -c 'import json, sys; print((json.load(sys.stdin).get("baseRefName") or "").strip())')"
-BASE_BRANCH="$(printf '%s' "$METADATA_JSON" | python3 -c 'import json, sys; print((json.load(sys.stdin).get("baseRefName") or "").strip())')"
 if [[ "$BASE_BRANCH" != "main" ]]; then
     echo "Error: Mosaic policy allows merges only for PRs targeting 'main' (found '$BASE_BRANCH')." >&2
     exit 1
@@ -102,55 +94,19 @@ REPO=$(get_repo_name)
 
 case "$PLATFORM" in
     github)
-        if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]]; then
+        CMD="gh pr merge $PR_NUMBER --squash"
-            echo "Dry run: GitHub merge preflight OK for ${OWNER}/${REPO}#${PR_NUMBER} targeting ${BASE_BRANCH}"
+        [[ "$DELETE_BRANCH" == true ]] && CMD="$CMD --delete-branch"
-            exit 0
+        eval "$CMD"
-        fi
-        CMD=(gh pr merge "$PR_NUMBER" --squash)
-        [[ "$DELETE_BRANCH" == true ]] && CMD+=(--delete-branch)
-        "${CMD[@]}"
         ;;
     gitea)
-        HOST=$(get_remote_host) || {
+        CMD="tea pr merge $PR_NUMBER --style squash --repo $OWNER/$REPO --login ${GITEA_LOGIN:-mosaicstack}"
-            echo "Error: Cannot determine host from remote URL" >&2
-            exit 1
-        }
-        TOKEN=$(get_gitea_token "$HOST") || {
-            echo "Error: Could not resolve Gitea API token for ${HOST}" >&2
-            exit 1
-        }
-
-        if [[ "$DRY_RUN" == true ]]; then
-            echo "Dry run: Gitea merge preflight OK for ${OWNER}/${REPO}#${PR_NUMBER} targeting ${BASE_BRANCH} via ${HOST} API"
-            exit 0
-        fi
-
-        RESPONSE_FILE=$(mktemp)
-        trap 'rm -f "$RESPONSE_FILE"' EXIT
-        HTTP_CODE=$(curl -sS \
-            -X POST \
-            -H "Authorization: token $TOKEN" \
-            -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-            -d '{"Do":"squash"}' \
-            -o "$RESPONSE_FILE" \
-            -w '%{http_code}' \
-            "https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}/merge")
-        RESPONSE_BODY=$(cat "$RESPONSE_FILE")
-        rm -f "$RESPONSE_FILE"
-        trap - EXIT
-
-        if [[ ! "$HTTP_CODE" =~ ^2 ]]; then
-            echo "Error: Gitea PR merge failed for ${OWNER}/${REPO}#${PR_NUMBER} (HTTP ${HTTP_CODE})" >&2
-            if [[ -n "$RESPONSE_BODY" ]]; then
-                printf '%s\n' "$RESPONSE_BODY" >&2
-            fi
-            exit 1
-        fi
 
         # Delete branch after merge if requested
         if [[ "$DELETE_BRANCH" == true ]]; then
-            echo "Note: Branch deletion after merge may need to be done separately with the Gitea API" >&2
+            echo "Note: Branch deletion after merge may need to be done separately with tea" >&2
         fi
+
+        eval "$CMD"
         ;;
     *)
         echo "Error: Could not detect git platform" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-metadata.sh

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
 set -e
 
 SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-# shellcheck disable=SC1091
 source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -56,51 +55,39 @@ if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
 elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
     OWNER=$(get_repo_owner)
     REPO=$(get_repo_name)
-    HOST=$(get_remote_host) || {
+    REMOTE_URL=$(git remote get-url origin 2>/dev/null)
+
+    # Extract host from remote URL
+    if [[ "$REMOTE_URL" == https://* ]]; then
+        HOST=$(echo "$REMOTE_URL" | sed -E 's|https://([^/]+)/.*|\1|')
+    elif [[ "$REMOTE_URL" == git@* ]]; then
+        HOST=$(echo "$REMOTE_URL" | sed -E 's|git@([^:]+):.*|\1|')
+    else
         echo "Error: Cannot determine host from remote URL" >&2
         exit 1
-    }
+    fi
 
     API_URL="https://${HOST}/api/v1/repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}"
 
     GITEA_API_TOKEN=$(get_gitea_token "$HOST" || true)
 
-    RESPONSE_FILE=$(mktemp)
-    trap 'rm -f "$RESPONSE_FILE"' EXIT
     if [[ -n "$GITEA_API_TOKEN" ]]; then
-        HTTP_CODE=$(curl -sS -H "Authorization: token $GITEA_API_TOKEN" -o "$RESPONSE_FILE" -w '%{http_code}' "$API_URL")
+        RAW=$(curl -sS -H "Authorization: token $GITEA_API_TOKEN" "$API_URL")
     else
-        HTTP_CODE=$(curl -sS -o "$RESPONSE_FILE" -w '%{http_code}' "$API_URL")
+        RAW=$(curl -sS "$API_URL")
-    fi
-    RAW=$(cat "$RESPONSE_FILE")
-    rm -f "$RESPONSE_FILE"
-    trap - EXIT
-
-    if [[ ! "$HTTP_CODE" =~ ^2 ]]; then
-        echo "Error: Gitea PR metadata request failed for ${OWNER}/${REPO}#${PR_NUMBER} (HTTP ${HTTP_CODE})" >&2
-        exit 1
     fi
 
     # Normalize Gitea response to match our expected schema
     METADATA=$(echo "$RAW" | python3 -c "
 import json, sys
 data = json.load(sys.stdin)
-if 'message' in data and not data.get('number'):
-    raise SystemExit('Error: Gitea PR metadata response did not contain PR data')
-head = data.get('head') or {}
-head_ref = head.get('ref') or ''
-head_label = head.get('label') or ''
-# Gitea can report closed/merged PR heads as refs/pull/<n>/head; callers need
-# the source branch name equivalent to GitHub headRefName, so prefer label then.
-if head_ref.startswith('refs/pull/') and head_label:
-    head_ref = head_label
 normalized = {
     'number': data.get('number'),
     'title': data.get('title'),
     'body': data.get('body', ''),
     'state': data.get('state'),
     'author': data.get('user', {}).get('login', ''),
-    'headRefName': head_ref,
+    'headRefName': data.get('head', {}).get('ref', ''),
     'baseRefName': data.get('base', {}).get('ref', ''),
     'labels': [l.get('name', '') for l in data.get('labels', [])],
     'assignees': [a.get('login', '') for a in data.get('assignees', [])],

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/tests/pr-gitea-wrapper-regression.sh

@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Regression harness for Gitea PR metadata normalization and merge preflight.
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-GIT_TOOLS_DIR="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)"
-TEST_ROOT="${TEST_ROOT:-$(pwd)/.test-output/pr-gitea-wrapper-regression}"
-FAKE_BIN="$TEST_ROOT/bin"
-FAKE_REPO="$TEST_ROOT/repo"
-
-rm -rf "$TEST_ROOT"
-mkdir -p "$FAKE_BIN" "$FAKE_REPO" "$TEST_ROOT/state"
-
-cat > "$FAKE_BIN/git" <<'SH'
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-set -euo pipefail
-if [[ "$*" == "remote get-url origin" ]]; then
-  echo "https://git.uscllc.com/usc/uconnect.git"
-  exit 0
-fi
-echo "unexpected git invocation: $*" >&2
-exit 2
-SH
-chmod +x "$FAKE_BIN/git"
-
-cat > "$FAKE_BIN/curl" <<'SH'
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-set -euo pipefail
-method="GET"
-out_file=""
-write_format=""
-url=""
-while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
-  case "$1" in
-    -X)
-      method="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-    -o)
-      out_file="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-    -w)
-      write_format="$2"; shift 2 ;;
-    -H|-d)
-      shift 2 ;;
-    -s|-S|-f|-k|-sS|-fsS)
-      shift ;;
-    http*)
-      url="$1"; shift ;;
-    *)
-      shift ;;
-  esac
-done
-
-body='{}'
-code="200"
-if [[ "$method" == "GET" && "$url" == *"/api/v1/repos/usc/uconnect/pulls/1908" ]]; then
-  body='{"number":1908,"title":"Test PR","body":"","state":"open","user":{"login":"edith"},"head":{"label":"fix/t_23fa9e1d-portal-health-backend","ref":"refs/pull/1908/head","sha":"abc123"},"base":{"label":"main","ref":"main","sha":"def456"},"labels":[],"assignees":[],"created_at":"2026-05-22T00:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-05-22T00:00:00Z","html_url":"https://git.uscllc.com/usc/uconnect/pulls/1908","draft":false,"mergeable":true,"diff_url":"https://git.uscllc.com/usc/uconnect/pulls/1908.diff"}'
-elif [[ "$method" == "POST" && "$url" == *"/api/v1/repos/usc/uconnect/pulls/1908/merge" ]]; then
-  echo "$url" > "${TEST_ROOT:?}/state/merge-url"
-  body='{"merged":true}'
-else
-  code="404"
-  body='{"message":"not found"}'
-fi
-
-if [[ -n "$out_file" ]]; then
-  printf '%s' "$body" > "$out_file"
-else
-  printf '%s' "$body"
-fi
-if [[ -n "$write_format" ]]; then
-  printf '%s' "$code"
-fi
-SH
-chmod +x "$FAKE_BIN/curl"
-
-cat > "$FAKE_BIN/tea" <<'SH'
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-echo "tea must not be invoked by Gitea merge preflight" >&2
-exit 99
-SH
-chmod +x "$FAKE_BIN/tea"
-
-cat > "$TEST_ROOT/credentials.json" <<'JSON'
-{
-  "gitea": {
-    "usc": {"url": "https://git.uscllc.com", "token": "fake-token-usc"},
-    "mosaicstack": {"url": "https://git.mosaicstack.dev", "token": "fake-token-mosaic"}
-  }
-}
-JSON
-
-export PATH="$FAKE_BIN:$PATH"
-export TEST_ROOT
-export MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$TEST_ROOT/credentials.json"
-cd "$FAKE_REPO"
-
-metadata="$("$GIT_TOOLS_DIR/pr-metadata.sh" -n 1908)"
-python3 - "$metadata" <<'PY'
-import json
-import sys
-metadata = json.loads(sys.argv[1])
-assert metadata["baseRefName"] == "main", metadata
-assert metadata["headRefName"] == "fix/t_23fa9e1d-portal-health-backend", metadata
-PY
-
-merge_output="$("$GIT_TOOLS_DIR/pr-merge.sh" -n 1908 -m squash --skip-queue-guard --dry-run 2>&1)"
-if grep -q "mosaicstack\|Login name\|tea must not" <<<"$merge_output"; then
-  echo "$merge_output" >&2
-  exit 1
-fi
-if ! grep -q "Dry run: Gitea merge preflight OK" <<<"$merge_output"; then
-  echo "$merge_output" >&2
-  exit 1
-fi
-
-printf 'Gitea PR metadata and merge preflight regression passed\n'